

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
HEFT 44

ROBERT KRITZER

REBIRTH AND CAUSATION
IN THE YOGĀCĀRA ABHIDHARMA



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN
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Preface

This book is a study of Yogācāra *abhidharma* centered around a translation of the exposition of conditioned origination (*pratityasamutpāda*) in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. I attempt to identify the sources of this exposition, and I show its relationship both to Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* and to other, mostly rather early, Yogācāra texts. I also find evidence suggesting that relevant portions of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, some of which have been previously described as Sautrāntika, are in essential agreement with Yogācāra *abhidharma*.

An examination of the Sarvāstivādin literature shows that an exposition of conditioned origination similar to that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* cannot be found in any Sarvāstivādin work. However, there are many features common to the exposition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and several passages on conditioned origination in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In this study, I show how material from the *Yogācārabhūmi* has undergone further doctrinal development and refinement in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. I also suggest that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* was a source for portions of the expositions in both the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

Like large portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, although it is generally classified as a Yogācāra text, does not contain much in the way of explicitly Yogācāra terminology. The terms *ālayavijñāna* and *bija* are used sparingly in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and they do not appear in the exposition of *pratityasamutpāda*. However, I suggest that the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, or at least a theory of causation by seeds, underlies what the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says about conditioned origination in three different contexts: the arising of conditioned *dharmas* in general, the process of rebirth, and the mechanism of cognition.

When I first approached the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I attempted to use the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu in order to compare the Yogācāra *abhidharma* found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma*. After all, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* has generally been considered to be a compendium of *Vaibhāṣika abhidharma* peppered with Vasubandhu's occasional lapses from orthodoxy. However, although I was aware from the start that Vasubandhu often favors a position that he or his commentators identify as Sautrāntika, I was increasingly impressed as I compared the two texts by the similarity between Vasubandhu's "Sautrāntika" opinions and the Yogācāra position, which can generally be traced to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. This has lead me to suspect that Vasubandhu already accepted Yogācāra doctrine when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

Returning to the three contexts of conditioned origination, I have noticed, in the case of the arising of all conditioned *dharmas*, a connection between the expositions of conditioned origination in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* and expositions of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in the same texts. In all of these passages, we find similar explanations for observable aspects of the functioning of causes and results, for example: the fact that the series of causes and results is unbroken—the fact that a particular cause has only its appropriate result, etc. These explanations all appeal to a reinterpretation of the statements of conditioned origination attributed to the Buddha: "If this exists, that comes into existence"; and "Because of the origination of this, that originates." This reinterpretation, as I show, is based on a theory of causation by seeds.

The major difference between the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin categories of *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* lies in the fact that Yogācāra considers them to be merely designations, frequently of aspects of causation, and not real *dharmas*. Real *dharmas* are not required; the very nature of conditioned things, as described in the *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions, is sufficient to explain how they operate causally. As Jaini has suggested (1977: 110), Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika criticisms of the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* are similar to the Yogācāra dismissal of the category as mere designation. In this study, I show that

a number of his specific criticisms can be traced directly to the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Similarly, in the context of rebirth, I show that Vasubandhu's own opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, as well as in later texts in which he openly espouses Yogācāra, is much closer to the two-lifetimes/singlefold causation theory of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* than to the three-lifetimes/twofold theory of Sarvāstivāda. Here again a comparison of the Yogācāra *abhidharma* of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with the Sautrāntika positions of Vasubandhu supports my contention that they are actually Yogācāra positions even though Vasubandhu never identifies them as such.

Finally, in the context of cognition, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* accept the reality of *sparśa* as a separate *dharma*, as well as the existence of pleasurable feeling (*sukhavedanā*). I suggest that both of these positions are related to *ālayavijñāna*. Here the Yogācāra position agrees with Sarvāstivāda and disagrees with the non-Sarvāstivādin positions mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. It is significant that Vasubandhu rejects the dissenting position in these cases: he supports them and identifies them as Sautrāntika only when, and because, they are consonant with Yogācāra.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Conditioned origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is one of the most famous and fundamental doctrines of Buddhism. As La Vallée Poussin has pointed out in *Théorie des Douze Causes*,¹ only the teachings of the Four Noble Truths and the five *skandhas* can surpass it in importance. The underlying principle of conditioned origination is that existence in the world of *samsāra* unfolds in a series of causes and results; these results can be negated by the destruction of their causes, a process that can be accomplished only by proper insight and practice and the completion of which is equivalent to the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. The “discovery” of conditioned origination is often identified with the Buddha’s experience in meditation under the Bodhi tree. However, the various formulas with varying numbers of links in the causal chain and culminating in the well-known, twelve-membered (*dvādaśāṅga*) formula, are generally considered to be later developments.

The twelve members of the formula familiar from texts beginning with the later *Nikāyas*² are: Ignorance (*avidyā*), the Karmic Forces (*samskāra*), Consciousness (*vijñāna*), Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*), the Six Senses (*saḍāyatana*), Contact (*sparśa*), Feeling (*vedanā*), Subconscious Desire (*trṣṇā*), Appropriation (*upādāna*), Karmic Existence (*bhava*), Birth (*jāti*), and Old Age and Death (*jarāmarana*).³ Although these twelve had become standard by the time of the *abhidharma*, the exact causal relationship among the members is by no

¹1913: v. This monograph is probably the most important work on *pratītyasamutpāda* even though it was published more than eighty years ago. It should be read by anyone interested in the subject.

²The Pali Text Society’s *Pali-English Dictionary* refers to *Samyuttanikāya* II.5 ff. (Rhys Davids and Stede 1986: 394). See also Cox 1993: 126.

³Some of these translations are more or less standard, while others have been borrowed or adapted from the works of other scholars. Acknowledgements can be found in the notes to Chapter 2.

means clear, and difficulties in explaining the relationships between certain of them led to rather disparate interpretations of the formula among Buddhist philosophers. Sometimes, as we shall see, more than one explanation can be found in the works of the same school, or even in a single work. Needless to say, more striking differences can be found between expositions offered by different schools.

The best-known interpretation of conditioned origination is that of the Sarvāstivādins, particularly in the form presented by Vasubandhu in the third chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*. According to this interpretation, Ignorance and the Karmic Forces represent the past lifetime, which is the cause of Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling in the present life. The remainder of the members assigned to the present life, i.e., Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence, are the cause of Birth and Old Age and Death in the future life.

Some Yogācāra texts, on the other hand, assign the members in a very different way, over a period of two lifetimes rather than three, probably due to the fact that the Yogācāra conception of Consciousness was radically different from that of Sarvāstivāda. One can argue (as I shall below) that some of the expositions of conditioned origination in the *Yogācārabhūmi* are at least closer to the two-lifetime interpretation than to the three-lifetime interpretation. However, the earliest incontrovertible example of what is referred to by Chinese commentators and modern Japanese scholars as the two-lifetime/singlefold system, and its locus classicus, is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. In addition, the exposition of conditioned origination in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, although quite short, contains a number of other features that cannot be found in Sarvāstivādin or any other extant Hīnayāna *abhidharma* text but that do appear in other Yogācāra texts, most notably the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Furthermore, not only is it important for an understanding of Yogācāra views of causality and rebirth, but it also sheds light on the grounds for Vasubandhu's disagreement with Sarvāstivāda concerning these subjects.

The significance of the treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* was noted as early as 1947 by Gokhale, who, in

introducing the Sanskrit fragments of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, mentioned it as one of the topics in the text meriting special study (14). Rahula of course included this section in his French translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (1980: 42-44), but he neither translated nor referred to the corresponding passage of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. More recently, Matsuda has studied the interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in connection with the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* and Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (1982a). He has also published a very accurate Japanese translation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* portions of both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (1983), which is accompanied by an excellent introduction and bibliographical notes; however, he has not analyzed the contents in depth.

Here, I provide an English translation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* sections of both the text and the commentary, and I discuss some of the more important issues related to the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.⁴ In my discussion, I refer to some related texts, most notably the section on *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (198.9-232.15), which seems to have been the major source of this section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. I also compare the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with Sarvāstivādin materials, from which it often differs considerably, and with Vasubandhu's own, so-called "Sautrāntika," positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which frequently are closer to what is found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* than to Sarvāstivāda.

That the author(s) or compiler of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* knew

⁴Throughout this work, I primarily refer to, translate from, and give the text of Sanskrit editions when they are available. If, as in the case, for example, of large sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the Sanskrit is unavailable, I provide both the Tibetan and Chinese versions. In some cases, I also provide references to the Chinese or to the Tibetan and Chinese even if the Sanskrit is available. Of course, I mention any significant differences among the versions, particularly of the texts that I translate in Chapter 2, of which I am aware.

When giving Sanskrit text, I generally follow the practice of the editor of each text regarding punctuation and the breaking up of compounds.

the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* is clear: indeed, in the section immediately following ours, the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) is defined as *ālayavijñāna* together with the impressions of good (i.e., the *moksabhāgīyadharma*s).⁵ However, many discussions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, including the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, fail to mention the term *ālayavijñāna* or even to refer to the concept with a related term, although their contexts would seem to offer an opportunity to expound this crucial doctrine. On the other hand, there is nothing in the discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* that would contradict the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*. This tendency to avoid referring to *ālayavijñāna* raises questions about the nature and purpose of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as a whole, questions that perhaps cannot fully be answered without a deeper understanding of the development of Mahāyāna Yogācāra from pre-Mahāyāna sources.

Thanks to Schmithausen's monumental work, *Ālayavijñāna* (1987),

⁵ *hetupratyayaḥ katamah? ālayavijñānam kuśalavāsanā ca* (*Abhidharma-samuccaya*: 27). The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* explains that *ālayavijñāna* is the causal condition of defiled *samskāras*, while the *kuśalavāsanās* are the causal condition of pure *samskāras*, respectively (*hetupratyaya ālayavijñānam kuśalavāsanā ca sāsravānāsravānām ca samskārānām yathākramam*—35.26-36.1). This separation of *ālayavijñāna* and the *kuśalavāsanās* suggests that *ālayavijñāna* here functions as “a principle of Pollution” (Schmithausen 1987: 76 ff.). Schmithausen says this is characteristic of certain early Yogācāra texts (including portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*) but not of others (including other portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*).

The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* further explains that the *kuśalavāsanās* are the impressions of the *moksabhāgīyas* (*kuśalavāsanā moksabhāgīyānām vāsanā draṣṭavyā*—35.26-36.1). I am grateful to Professor P.S. Jaini for pointing out that it is strange that only the *moksabhāgīyas* are mentioned here, and not the *nirvedhabhbhāgīyas* as well, since the two are usually found together. For example, Schmithausen discusses a passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which it is said that *ālayavijñāna* “incorporates the Seeds of the basic wholesome dharmas (*kuśalamūla*) [indirectly] conducive to liberation (*moksabhāgīya*) and of those [directly] leading up to penetration [into Truth] (*nirvedhabhbhāgīya*)” (1987: 78). Incidentally, he mentions this passage in the context of a portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that generally takes *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of a principle of Pollution; he considers this particular passage, which clearly allows *ālayavijñāna* a more positive function, to be an interpolation. Unfortunately, I am unable to explain why the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* omits the *nirvedhabhbhāgīyas*; it does not seem to be a scribal error, since neither the Tibetan translations nor the Chinese include them.

we are now able to approach the *Yogācārabhūmi* with some hope of sorting out its various strata, some of which, as he has shown, presuppose *ālayavijñāna*, while others do not. Since the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* appear to depend on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for much of their material, it is useful to compare the pertinent sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi* with those of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. By doing so, we can understand what kind of sources the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* drew upon and to what extent it altered or developed the source material.

B. Concerning the Biography of Asaṅga

1. Reservations about the Authorship of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

It may seem strange that I have not mentioned the name Asaṅga earlier, although the fact that I refer to “the author(s) or compiler” of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* probably suggests my reasons for not having done so. Schmithausen, in a discussion of the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which he considers to be a compilation of material by various authors, raises the possibility that “at least some of the remaining works of the [so-called Maitreya Asaṅga] complex (e.g. the Hsien-yang-shēng-chiao-lun and even the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*) do not lack compilatory features either” (1987: 189). I am more willing than Schmithausen to search for Yogācāra theories underlying expositions that do not employ explicitly Yogācāra terminology. Therefore, I am able to accept the possibility that the same author can make a clearly Mahāyāna statement in one context while, in Schmithausen’s words, doing “his best to avoid specifically Mahāyāna interpretations” (1987: 193) in another. At the same time, in reading the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I am never aware of the personality of the author in the way that I am when I read, for example, Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I admit that this is merely an impression and not a basis for denying Asaṅga’s authorship, but in the present study I simply refer to “the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*” rather than to “Asaṅga.” Although I do not attempt to prove my suspicions regarding Asaṅga’s

authorship of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I believe that my comparison of the expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Savitarkādibhūmi* suggests that these two texts were not written by the same person. The relationship between these two expositions therefore casts further doubt on the traditional attribution of both the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *in toto*, and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to a single author, Asaṅga.

Although I do not refer to Asaṅga as the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, he is still generally considered such, and the traditional biographies raise some interesting issues that are worth discussing here. There are four important sources for biographical information about Asaṅga: Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu, *P'o su p'an tou fa shih chuan* 婆蘇槃豆法師傳 (T. 2049);⁶ the *Ta t'ang hsi yü chi* 大唐西域記 of Hsüan-tsang 玄奘;⁷ Bu-ston's *Chos 'byun*;⁸ and Tāranātha's *rGya gar chos 'byun*.⁹ As the accounts of Asaṅga's life have been summarized by various scholars including Lévi (1911, v. 2: 1-7), Wayman (1961: 25-41), Rahula (1966: 133-136; 1980: ix-xiii), Willis (1982: 3-12), and Griffiths (1986: 174 n. 7, 9), I do not include a summary here.

However, there are two points concerning Asaṅga's biography about which I should like to comment: the question of his Hinayāna school and the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The first point pertains not only to the understanding of the texts ascribed to Asaṅga, but also to the *corpus* of Vasubandhu, insofar as both figures are said to have converted to Mahāyāna in the middle of their careers.¹⁰ The second point is crucial in establishing the history of the development of early Yogācāra thought and is a matter of considerable controversy.

Wayman and Schmithausen disagree strongly concerning each point, and in both cases I find Schmithausen more convincing. Since

⁶ 188-191; English translation by Takakusu (1904).

⁷ T. 2087: 896b20-897a7; English translation by, among others, Beal (1983: 226-229).

⁸ *Buston chos 'byun*: 837.7 ff.; English translation by Obermiller (1986: 136-147).

⁹ English translation by Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya (1970: 154-175).

¹⁰ I comment in Chapter 5 on how the traditional biography of Vasubandhu has influenced scholarly opinion concerning his doctrinal development.

these points are pertinent to many of my observations and arguments, I must address them in detail. If I focus too much on the opinions of these two scholars, it is because they have expressed the alternative positions most clearly.

2. Asaṅga's Hinayāna School

According to Paramārtha, Asaṅga was associated with the Sarvāstivāda school before converting to Mahāyāna (T. 2049: 188c1). Hsüan-tsang, on the other hand, states that he was associated with the Mahīśāsaka school (T. 2087: 896b28). The two Tibetan sources, although including elaborate stories of the ordeals Asaṅga underwent before receiving Mahāyāna teachings from Maitreya (Obermiller 1986: 137-140; Chimpā and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 155-161), do not contain explicit accounts of his conversion and do not mention his having belonged to a Hinayāna school, let alone specify to which school he belonged. Thus, as far as the historical or pseudo-historical tradition goes, only Hsüan-tsang identifies Asaṅga's Hinayāna school as Mahīśāsaka.

In his *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, Wayman argues that Hsüan-tsang is correct. Wayman first gives several possible explanations for the difference between Hsüan-tsang's and Paramārtha's accounts: (1) Paramārtha may be referring to Asaṅga's ordination lineage, not his doctrinal beliefs; (2) Asaṅga may have been a Sarvāstivādin before becoming a Mahīśāsaka; (3) Mahīśāsaka was, in any case, a branch of Sarvāstivāda or Mūlasarvāstivāda, so Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha are both correct (1961: 25).

These explanations are not unreasonable, at least at first glance. In support of the first one is Paramārtha's wording: "He [Asaṅga] too became a priest in the Sat-ba-ta (Sarvāsti-vāda) school."¹¹ The phrase that Takakusu translates as "became a priest," *ch'u chia* 出家 (Sanskrit *pravraj-*), refers to ordination; when Paramārtha refers to doctrine, he uses the word *i* 義, as for example when he says that Vasubandhu used

¹¹Takakusu 1904: 273. The original is 亦於薩婆多部出家 (T. 2049: 188c1).

Sautrāntika doctrine to refute Sarvāstivāda.¹² However, the same argument can be applied to Hsüan-tsang's account, according to which Asaṅga was ordained into, and practiced with, the Mahīśāsaka school but after a short time came to believe in Mahāyāna.¹³ If Paramārtha, as Wayman suggests, is referring only to Asaṅga's ordination lineage and not to his doctrinal beliefs, it is equally possible that Hsüan-tsang, depending upon what he means by the word "practice,"¹⁴ is doing the same thing. In any case, even if one is willing to trust sources such as these, which are full of fantastic and hagiographical elements, Hsüan-tsang's attribution seems to me to be no more authoritative than Paramārtha's.

Wayman, however, does not rely exclusively on historical records to support his case that Asaṅga belonged to, and believed in the doctrines of, the Mahīśāsaka school. He also examines several points of doctrine that are discussed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the sole authorship of which he attributes to Asaṅga, and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, noting their similarity to doctrines attributed to the Mahīśāsakas (1961: 26-29). Wayman's arguments here have already been criticized at length and convincingly by Schmithausen (1970: 94-95, 115-119).

In a later study, "Doctrinal Affiliation of the Buddhist Master Asaṅga," which seems to have been prompted by criticisms of his conclusions in the *Analysis*, Wayman summarizes his earlier arguments and adds a number of others (1989: 210-213). Since we have no Mahīśāsaka texts aside from the Chinese translation (T. 1421, T. 1422) of the Mahīśāsaka *vinaya* (Bureau 1955: 182), Wayman necessarily relies on the traditional accounts of the doctrinal beliefs of the sects, particularly Vasumitra's, and the summary of these accounts in Bureau's *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (1955). Lamotte, in his *History of Indian Buddhism*, discusses these sources, which he frequently characterizes as "pseudo-historical," at considerable length. Although he allows that "the disputationes provide an exact idea of the

¹²立薩婆多部義隨有僻處以經部義破之 (T. 2049: 190b15-16).

¹³從彌沙塞部出家修學。頃之迴信大乘 (T. 2087: 89628-29b).

¹⁴Nakamura, referring to the *Samghabhedavastu* of the Sarvāstivādin *vinaya*, lists *brahmacaryam carati* as one of the Sanskrit equivalents of 修學 (Nakamura 1975: 624). This would suggest that the term has nothing to do with doctrine.

doctrinal orientation of the great Buddhist sects,” he concludes that “it is doubtful whether the sects themselves established the list of propositions which the disputations attribute to them and even more doubtful that they imposed adherence to them on all those who, for historical or geographical reasons, belonged to the same creed as themselves or lived in their district.” Furthermore, he points out that the most important Buddhist authors are eclectic and do not necessarily believe in all of the doctrinal positions held by the schools to which they at least nominally belong (Lamotte 1988: 521-522).

Wayman, to be sure, qualifies his argument by recognizing this fact: “It was not my theory that Asaṅga, in going along with the Mahīśāsaka, is committed to the full list of the tenets ascribed to this sect in the rather brief works devoted to the theories of the eighteen Buddhist sects, and where often the tenets are expressed with too much brevity” (1989: 213). Nevertheless, in the case of Vasumitra’s account Wayman is again perhaps too willing to take at face value sources of dubious historical accuracy, and throughout both of the works I have mentioned, he treats Asaṅga as though he were a thoroughly historical figure, the details of whose career can be accurately known from the materials available.

In “Doctrinal Affiliation,” Wayman presents two additional arguments in support of Asaṅga’s having been a Mahīśāsaka. The first concerns the Hīnayāna scriptural sources of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and, like all of Wayman’s arguments, is based on the assumption that Asaṅga is the sole author of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Wayman has identified verses from the *Samyuttanikāya*, the *Udānavarga*, and the *Suttanipāta* that are, or the Sanskrit equivalents of which are, the sources for the *Śārirārthagāthā* of the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and he concludes with the following remarks: “Asaṅga exhibits within his vast learning a control of those matters which are of vital interest to the Theravāda sect of Buddhism, especially as concerns the content of such Pāli works as the *Netti-Pakaraṇa* and the *Sutta-nipāta*. In terms of Bareau’s theory that the Mahīśāsaka were the India-based counterparts of the Theravāda, this compatibility of Asaṅga’s views with the Theravāda supports a theory that Asaṅga belonged to the Mahīśāsaka,

but does not prove it" (1989: 210).¹⁵

However, if one glances through Honjō's *A Table of Āgama-citations in the Abhidharmakośa and the Abhidharmakoś[sic]opāyikā* (1984), one can find the same set of texts cited frequently in an essentially Sarvāstivādin context. This suggests to me that "those matters which are of vital interest to the Theravāda sect" (and therefore to the Mahīśāsaka sect) were actually of as vital interest to Sarvāstivāda as to the author, or authors, of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In fact, if one does not accept Asaṅga's authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, one could conceivably adduce the same evidence as proof of the Sarvāstivādin background of its author(s). Perhaps I am not doing justice to this argument of Wayman's, but to the extent to which I understand it, it does not convince me of Asaṅga's association with the Mahīśāsaka school.

In his final argument, Wayman refers to a passage from the *Mahāśaṁnipātasūtra*, which says of certain disciples that they "will not conceive notions (*saṃjñā*) of the earth, or those of water, of fire, of wind, of space (*ākāśa*), or of consciousness (*vijñāna*). Those persons will accordingly be called Mahīśāsaka" (1989: 213). Wayman understands this to mean that "those called Mahīśāsaka, by avoiding notions of the six elements, accept *cittamātra*, also accept only the four great elements, plus *ākāśa*, to explain man basically" (1989: 214). He then compares this passage to a discussion of *cittamātra* from the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which he translates and about which he says: "The term *cittamātra* as here used implies an ideal man, that it is possible to reach, presumably by *yoga*, a state of pure consciousness (*cittamātra*) free from derived consciousness (*caitta*). As a corollary, one reaches a state of just four elements (*mahābhūta*) free

¹⁵ Bareau (1993) examines the lists of *asamksyātadharmas* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Manobhūmi*) and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* 顯揚聖教論. He adduces the similarity between these lists and that of the Mahīśāsaka school (according to Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*) as evidence in support of Wayman's opinion regarding Asaṅga's affiliation with Mahīśāsaka. I have not had a chance to explore this subject in detail. Before commenting on Bareau's article, I would have to go through the couple of dozen references to the *asamksyāt* in other portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well as Harivarman's discussion of this subject in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*.

from derived elements (*bhautika*). At that time one would be free of notions (*saṃjñā*)” (1989: 215).

Finally, Wayman comes to his conclusions concerning the name *Mahīśāsaka*:

It is because they teach the six elements as constituting man’s “earth” they have the name meaning “who teach the earth” – the earth of which one should have no notions – those six elements. And taking Asaṅga’s passage [i.e., the *Yogācārabhūmi* passage] into account, it is undeniable that his celebrated theory of *Cittamātra* is bound up with the scriptural passage about the six elements. Is this not, then, a justification for the terminology of the seventeen *bhūmis*? The word *bhūmi* means “earth” as does *mahī*. Hence, Asaṅga’s *bhūmi* system, involving in a “place” the alteration between the *citta* and the *caitta*, as between the *mahābhūta* and the *bhautika*, is not an upward progression, as the very titles of the seventeen show (Wayman 1989: 215).

I have had to quote so many sections of Wayman’s final argument because I am not confident that I understand it well enough to summarize it. However, as far as I can tell the argument is rather speculative and not likely to convince anyone who is not already strongly disposed to agree with him that Asaṅga was a *Mahīśāsaka*.

Although I do not think that Wayman has proved that Asaṅga was a *Mahīśāsaka*, I can understand his reasons for trying to establish Asaṅga’s *Hinayāna* school. As Wayman points out in his *Analysis*, the *Yogācārabhūmi* is essentially *abhidharma*, and, as such, it is based on *sūtras* that are predominantly, if not exclusively, *Hinayāna*. Considering Asaṅga to have been the author, Wayman assumes that those portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that are based on *Hinayāna sūtras* must represent the views of Asaṅga’s *Hinayāna* sect. Hence, according to Wayman, *Yogācāra abhidharma*, for that is what much of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is, consists of the addition of some *Mahāyāna* material to the *abhidharma* of a specific *Hinayāna* school, *Mahīśāsaka*; in his words, “Asaṅga did not give up his *Hinayāna* views but simply added part of the *Mahāyāna* to those” (1961: 45). In this way, Wayman explains the coexistence of

long stretches of material that seem to have no Mahāyāna content with occasional passages that can be identified as Yogācāra or Mahāyāna. In order to explain the preponderance of Hinayāna material in certain portions of the text and the concentration of the Mahāyāna material in other portions, he proposes in “Doctrinal Affiliations” a relative chronology of the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. First, Asaṅga composed the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Samāhitabhūmi* at a very early age, then the *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī*, the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, and the *Śrutamayī-*, *Cintāmayī-*, and *Bhāvanāmayībhūmis*, all before his conversion to Mahāyāna. After his conversion, he wrote the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the remainder of the *Bhūmivastu*, and the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (Wayman 1989: 203). This chronology, incidentally, is quite different from those proposed by Schmithausen¹⁶ and Aramaki¹⁷ (discussed in Chapter 5).

Presumably, Wayman would explain the contents of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which he describes as a “condensation of material from the *Yogācārabhūmi*” (1961: 33), in the same way, that is, as Mahīśāsaka doctrine with some Mahāyāna additions. However, if the intent of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is to summarize the Mahīśāsaka *abhidharma* contained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, why does it include so much Mahāyāna material? After all, as Walpola Rahula observes, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* contains nearly all the major doctrines of Mahāyāna (1980: xiv). And (I assume here for the sake of argument that Asaṅga is the sole author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*) if Asaṅga had already been converted to Mahāyāna before writing the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, why would he have repeated the Mahīśāsaka material that he had already included in those portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that he wrote before he was converted? Wayman says

¹⁶According to Schmithausen, there are three main layers: (1) parts of the *Bhūmivastu* (= *Maulībhūmi*), including the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*; (2) the remainder of the *Bhūmivastu*; (3) the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (1987: 14).

¹⁷Aramaki also distinguishes three layers, but the contents of the second two are different: (1) the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*; (2) portions of the *Samdhinirmocana* and portions of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*; (3) the remainder of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and the first nine *bhūmis* of the *Bhūmivastu* (personal communication).

that Asaṅga simply added Mahāyāna views to Hinayāna ones, but surely the conversion of a philosopher like Asaṅga would involve a more radical shift in outlook than Wayman would have us believe.

It seems far more likely to me that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is creating (or refining) a new, Mahāyāna *abhidharma*. This is not to say that it does not include a lot of material that can be found in the Hinayāna *abhidharma*, particularly that of Sarvāstivāda and perhaps, as Davidson suggests (1989: 254), its branches. However the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not, I think, committed to the doctrines of any Hinayāna school. Rather, instead of relying specifically on the *abhidharma* of, for example, the Mahīśāsakas, the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (and other Yogācāra *abhidharma* authors), like the authors of Hinayāna *abhidharma* texts, draws much of his material directly from the *sūtras* and from the earlier *abhidharma* of his own (i.e., the Yogācāra) school. In my analysis of the *pratītyasamutpāda* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I hope to illustrate its extensive reliance on, and refinement of, ideas found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Furthermore, I believe that the interpretation of *sūtra* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, even sometimes in the earliest portions, does not follow the *abhidharma* of its author's (or authors') putative Hinayāna school, but instead is based on Yogācāra ideas. The fascinating question of whether all Yogācāra is Mahāyāna is outside of the scope of this study.

3. The Authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

The other major issue raised by the biographical sources is the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Again, the traditional accounts differ. According to Paramārtha, Maitreya, at Asaṅga's request, came down from Tuṣita heaven to preach the *Shih ch'i ti ching* 十七地經 (= *Yogācārabhūmi*) at night, while during the day, Asaṅga, who was the only one who could approach Maitreya, explained Maitreya's speech to the rest of the audience (T. 2049: 188c14-20; Takakusu 1904: 274-275). According to Hsüan-tsang, on the other hand, Asaṅga ascended to Maitreya's palace at night and received from him the *Yogācārabhūmi* (瑜伽師地論), the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (大乘莊嚴經), the

Madhyāntavibhāga (中邊分別論) and other texts, which he later explained to the masses (T. 2087: 896b21-24; Beal 1983: 226).¹⁸

The Tibetan tradition is more willing to attribute the actual authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Asaṅga. Bu-ston first tells the story of Asaṅga's ascent to Tuṣita heaven, where Maitreya expounds the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and other Mahāyāna *sūtras*. In order to elucidate these scriptures, Maitreya composes the five works of Maitreya,¹⁹ which Asaṅga brings down to earth. However, Bu-ston shortly thereafter states that Asaṅga composed "his great treatise in five divisions" (in other words, the *Yogācārabhūmi*) after his return to earth (Obermiller 1986: 139-140). In Tāraṇātha's version of the same story, Asaṅga, after arriving in Tuṣita heaven, "listened to the Mahāyāna doctrine in its entirety from Ajitanātha [Maitreyanātha] and learnt the real significance of the whole collection of *sūtra*-s. Then he listened to the 'Five Works of Maitreya'" (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 159). Unlike Bu-ston, Tāraṇātha does not mention the *Yogācārabhūmi* as one of the texts preached to Asaṅga by Maitreya. However, Tāraṇātha does mention the *Yogācārabhūmi* as one of the treatises written by Asaṅga some time after his return from Tuṣita heaven (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 160).

Both Bu-ston and Tāraṇātha, in their sections on the life of Vasubandhu, relate a story according to which Vasubandhu, hearing or reading a work or some works of Asaṅga, criticized Asaṅga:

Alas, Asanga, residing in the forest,
Has practised meditation for 12 years.
Without having attained anything by his meditation,
He has founded a system, so difficult and burdensome,
That it can be carried only by an elephant!²⁰

¹⁸ Demiéville, in *La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa*, includes a long section devoted to the figure of Maitreya; in it he convincingly refutes Maitreya's historicity (1954: 376-387, especially 381 n. 4).

¹⁹ According to the Tibetan tradition, these include the *Mahāyānasūtrālāmkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the *Abhisamayālāmkāra*, the *Dharmadharmaṭāvibhāga*, and the *Uttaratantra* (Nakamura 1987: 256).

²⁰ Obermiller's translation of Bu-ston's version (1986: 143), quoted in Wayman 1961: 40. For Tāraṇātha's version, see Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 168.

Although Bu-ston does not mention the *Yogācārabhūmi* by name, referring only to “numerous treatises” (Obermiller 1986: 143), Tāranātha says specifically that Vasubandhu “read the *Five Bhūmi-s*, the work of ārya Asaṅga” (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 168). Incidentally, Wayman, perhaps relying on Tāranātha, assumes that Bu-ston’s version is, in fact, referring to the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1961: 40). Thus, Tāranātha unequivocally attributes the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Asaṅga, while Bu-ston seems to contradict himself by first saying that Maitreya expounded it to Asaṅga and then stating that Asaṅga composed it himself.

In addition to these biographical accounts, we also have traditional attributions in the canonical collections that include the *Yogācārabhūmi*. According to the *Taishō* edition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the author is Maitreya (T. 1579: 279a5; Demiéville 1978: 134), while according to the index to the Peking edition of the *Bstan 'gyur*, the author is Asaṅga.

Before I move on, I must again take issue with a statement of Wayman’s. According to him, “There is no disagreement between Chinese and Tibetan tradition as to the common provenance of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Mahāyānasamgraha*” (1961: 40). This is just not true. Neither Paramārtha nor Hsüan-tsang mentions the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* or *Mahāyānasamgraha*, so we must rely on the canonical attributions for the Chinese tradition regarding these works: both texts are attributed to Asaṅga, with no mention of Maitreya (Demiéville 1978: 136). The Tibetan tradition, which unlike the Chinese accepts Asaṅga as the author of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, agrees with the Chinese in accepting him as the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Mahāyānasamgraha*. Therefore, although, as Wayman claims, the Tibetan tradition accepts the common authorship of the three texts, the Chinese tradition certainly does not. In his later work, Wayman in fact mentions the attribution of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Maitreya in the Chinese canon, and he speculates that “Hsüan-tsang, believing that Maitreya had inspired Asaṅga, may have entered the name Maitreya in order to get a hearing for the work, to ensure its study in his country where the Buddhists mainly followed Sūtras, such [as] the Pure Land ones, the *Avataṃsaka*, the Lotus Sūtra,

and so on" (Wayman 1989: 202).

Wayman's reasoning seems to be that, since "Demiéville has sufficiently demonstrated the absurdity of regarding Maitreya as a 'historical personage,'"²¹ we can safely assume that the story of Asaṅga's having received the *Yogācārabhūmi* from Maitreya is totally fictional and that Asaṅga wrote the treatise himself. I agree with Wayman regarding the question of Maitreya, but I think that we must be more open-minded regarding the Chinese tradition that the author of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is not the same as the author of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

Modern scholars have a variety of opinions regarding the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Some, for example, Willis (1982) and Rahula (1980: xi), simply accept the traditional attribution to Asaṅga, do not acknowledge that a difference of opinion exists, and therefore make no attempt to justify their acceptance. Others recognize that there is a difference of opinion but do not seriously engage the issue. For example, Wayman states that "it is untenable to hold that certain sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi* were written by different persons" and supports this statement by saying, "My reading over the years in the *Yogācārabhūmi* has led me to conclude that it is the same person writing throughout" (1989: 201-202). At the other extreme is Nakamura, who accepts the Chinese attribution to Maitreya or Maitreyanātha and, at the end of two pages of description of the contents of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, merely mentions that "there is an opinion that, as the contents of the *Yogācārabhūmi* are substantially different to a great extent from other works ascribed to Maitreya, its author may be different from Maitreyanātha" (Nakamura 1987: 258).

Schmithausen, on the other hand, believes that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is a compilation (1987: 13) and, responding to Hakamaya, is unwilling to grant much credence to traditional attributions: "I for one prefer to confine myself to the statement that it is possible (perhaps even probable) that Asaṅga compiled [the] Y[ogācārabhūmi] or, as Hakamaya himself puts it in a later article, somehow participated in its compilation

²¹ Wayman 1961: 33, referring to Demiéville 1954.

(i.e. that ‘tradition’ may, in this case, in fact contain a kernel of historical truth in our sense). But this possibility still needs verification, and for the time being I for one cannot exclude the opposite possibility” (1987: 185). In fact, in his most recent work on the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen identifies so many passages from various portions of the text that differ so substantially from passages in other portions that, to my mind, he has effectively proved his theory that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is a heterogeneous compilation that cannot be attributed to Asaṅga.²²

The question of the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is obviously pertinent to the study of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which, to the best of my knowledge, has hitherto been universally accepted (except, perhaps, by Schmithausen) as the work of Asaṅga. That the *Yogācārabhūmi* chronologically precedes the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is also generally, but not universally, conceded; Willis (1982: 10) and Warder (1991: 441), who accept Asaṅga’s authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, both state that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is earlier without, as Schmithausen points out (1987: 262 n. 100), providing any evidence to support their positions.²³ It is indeed difficult to imagine that the same person would have first written the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, a model of brevity and organization, and afterwards produced the text to which the Tibetan tradition refers when it criticizes “Asaṅga’s system” as being “so difficult and burdensome that it can be carried only by an elephant” (Obermiller 1986: 143; see above).

Perhaps a better idea of the relationship between the two texts is suggested by Rahula in the introduction to his translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: “Ce que l’*Abhidhammapiṭaka* en pāli est pour les Theravādin, le *Jñānaprasthāna* pour les Sarvāstivāda, le

²²Schmithausen’s bibliography incidentally contains invaluable information about Japanese scholarship on the *Yogācārabhūmi*, much of which is discussed in the text of the book. He also reiterates in English some of the points made in his earlier German works, especially Schmithausen 1969 and 1969a.

²³In addition, Schmithausen adduces the fact that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, but not the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is familiar with certain doctrines found in the “Maitreya” texts as proof that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is later than the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra pour les Mādhyamika, le *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* l'est pour les Yogācārin" (Rahula 1980: xiv). Although I disagree with Rahula about the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, I think that his characterization of the text as *Yogācāra abhidharma*, which is similar to Wayman's (1961: 45; see above), is accurate. It is, moreover, significant that Rahula compares the *Yogācārabhūmi* with texts belonging to the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmapitakas* proper, rather than with the later treatises. Rahula sets aside his analogy regarding the *Yogācārabhūmi* and goes on to compare the question-and-answer format of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with that of certain Pāli *Abhidhammapitaka* texts, such as the *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Vibhaṅga*, and *Dhātukathā*. But it must be stressed that if the *Yogācārabhūmi* is compared with the *Abhidharmapitakas*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is more properly analogous to the manuals such as the *Abhidharmāmrta*, which also consists largely of questions and answers similar to those found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. In any case, the analogy should not be taken too far, since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is a much more sophisticated text than the early Sarvāstivāda manuals, let alone the works of the Pāli *abhidhamma*.

C. The Sources of the Exposition of *Pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the most readily identifiable source of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is found in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.²⁴ The last eight sections, in particular, of the exposition

²⁴This exposition consists of nine sections, of which the first, entitled *śarīra* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.17-203.5), is also found in the *Vastusamgrahānī* and is quite different in style from the last eight (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.6-232.15), which appear to be later. Schmithausen refers to the *śarīra* section as the "Pratītyasamutpāda Analysis," but he does not seem to comment on the relationship between it and the other eight sections. A verse that appears just before the *śarīra* section links it to the remainder of the exposition (see note 35).

Ui (1958: 279-295 *passim*) and Matsuda (1983) have noted some of the similarities between the expositions in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* are very *abhidharma*-like in style. Although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition is much shorter, the formats of the two are quite similar, and a number of the same topics are treated in both.²⁵ In general, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, besides being terser, is more systematic than even the latter part of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition. Not only does the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* summarize much of the contents of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition, but it shows considerable doctrinal development. This suggests advances in the *Yogācāra* philosophy that underlies the two texts.

Aside from the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, has, I believe, another rather surprising source, namely the sixth chapter (*Abhimukhibhūmi*) of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. In general, the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not refer to Mahāyāna *sūtras*, the notable exception being the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which Schmithausen suggests is in fact later than much of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, probably including the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (1987: 12). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* similarly relies on Mahāyāna *sūtra* sources only rarely, although Schmithausen has identified a passage originating in the Large *Prajñāpāramitā* (1987: 193). However, as I show in the notes to my translation, there are some striking similarities between portions of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition and the prose of the *Abhimukhibhūmi* that strongly suggest that the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* was influenced by the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.

D. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as *Yogācāra abhidharma*

In attempting to establish points of difference between the *Yogācāra* and Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma*s, I have naturally looked first at Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which, although it is well known not to be an orthodox Sarvāstivādin text, clearly analyzes the issues involved in many doctrinal controversies, and which also has the advantage of being thoroughly indexed (Hirakawa 1973-1978) and superbly translated (La Vallée Poussin 1971). Vasubandhu is famous for

²⁵See note 35.

generally upholding the Sautrāntika position when it differs from Sarvāstivāda. However, the fact that opinions that he identifies as Sautrāntika can often be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* has not been remarked upon until recently. Moreover, in at least several cases, when he does favor Sarvāstivāda over Sautrāntika (or Dārśṭāntika),²⁶ the *Yogācārabhūmi* position also is in agreement with Sarvāstivāda.

Although nothing can be said conclusively until all of the Sautrāntika positions mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* have been compared with the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, I suspect that Vasubandhu's so-called Sautrāntika opinions are, in fact, *Yogācāra abhidharma* in disguise.²⁷ If this is true, it raises questions about the meaning of the terms Sautrāntika and *Yogācāra* as well as about the definition of *Mahāyāna*. Currently, a number of Japanese scholars are studying these problems, and I refer to them throughout in my attempt to trace a number of Vasubandhu's positions to their sources in *Yogācāra abhidharma*.

²⁶Certain commentaries sometimes designate as “Sautrāntika” positions that originate with Dārśṭāntika but that are criticized by Vasubandhu. However, Vasubandhu himself does not refer to them as such. Willemen, Desein, and Cox, in discussing the terms Sautrāntika and Dārśṭāntika, observe that Sautrāntika is used as a term of approval, while Dārśṭāntika indicates disapproval (1998: 109).

²⁷Harada, who has been coming to conclusions similar to mine, distinguishes two types of theories that are identified as “Sautrāntika”: positions originating with Dārśṭāntika that are adopted by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and that can also be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*; and positions that cannot be traced to Dārśṭāntika but are adopted by Vasubandhu and can also be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1993: 107-110).

The question remains as to why Vasubandhu, if he follows the *Yogācārabhūmi*, does not mention *ālayavijñāna* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Writing about the *Vimśatikā*, Franco in a recent article suggests that those of its features that Schmithausen (1967) has identified as Sautrāntika are the result of the fact “that its opponents are the Sautrāntikas. It seems reasonable, therefore, that in trying to make his point, Vasubandhu would argue as much as possible from the Sautrāntika presuppositions and that he saw no need to drag the *ālayavijñāna* into the controversy” (1994: 369-370). I find this explanation of Vasubandhu’s method in the *Vimśatikā* provocative and useful, even though it does not directly account for what he is doing in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

**II. TRANSLATION OF THE EXPOSITION OF *PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA* IN THE *ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA* AND
*ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHĀSYA*²⁸**

A. Introductory Section

1. Questions

Abhidharmasamuccaya

- a. How [should] that which has originated conditionally [be understood]?
- b. How many [of the *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*] have originated conditionally?
- c. For what purpose is there an investigation into that which has originated conditionally? (*katham pratītyasamutpannam*, *kati pratītyasamutpannāni, kimartham pratītyasamutpannaparīksā*—25.33)

2. Answers

- a. That which has originated conditionally should be understood with reference to: [i] its characteristic (*lakṣaṇataḥ*); [ii] an analysis into the members [of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula] (*aṅgavibhāgataḥ*); [iii] the sets of members (*aṅgasamāsataḥ*); [iv] the determination of the conditional operations of the members (*aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānataḥ*); [v] the determination of the functions of the members (*aṅgakarmavyavasthānataḥ*); [vi] the grouping of members according to [three categories] of defilement (*aṅgasamklesasamgrahataḥ*); [vii] import (*arthataḥ*); [viii] profundity (*gambhīryataḥ*); [ix] varieties (*prabhedataḥ*); [x] and the progressive and regressive orders [of

²⁸Page numbers for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* refer to Gokhale's "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga," which I have used instead of Pradhan's edition because Pradhan retranslates from the Chinese and Tibetan portions that are missing from the Sanskrit, on occasion without acknowledging what he has done. The *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition can be found on pages 26 through 28 in his edition (Pradhan 1950).

defilement and purification] (*anulomapratilomataḥ*). (*lakṣaṇato* 'pi, *aṅgavibhāgato* 'pi, *aṅgasamāsato* 'pi, *aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānato* 'pi, *aṅgakarmavyavasthānato* 'pi, *aṅgasamkleśasamgrahato* 'pi, *arthato* 'pi, *gāmbhīryato* 'pi, *prabhedato* 'pi, *anuloma[pratiloma]to* 'pi *pratītyasamutpannam* *draṣṭa]vyam*—25.33-26.2)²⁹

b. All [of the *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus* originate conditionally] except for a certain portion of the element consisting of mental objects and the sphere consisting of mental objects.³⁰ (*sarvāṇi*, *dharma-dhātvāyatanaikadeśam* *sthāpayitvā* [*asamkṛtam*]³¹—26.2)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

Except for a certain portion of the element consisting of mental objects and the sphere consisting of mental objects [means] except for the portion that is characterized as unconditioned existence (*asamkṛtalakṣaṇam*). (*dharma-dhātvāyatanaikadeśam* *sthāpayitvety*

²⁹Compare this with the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, which says that the Bodhisattva should investigate *pratītyasamutpāda* in its ten aspects and in both its progressive and regressive orders (*sa evam daśākāram pratītyasamutpādaṁ pratītyavekṣate 'nulomapratilomam*), the ten aspects in terms of which he should investigate being:

- (1) *bhavāṅgānusamdhitaḥ*; (2) *ekacittasamavasaranataḥ*;
- (3) *svakarmasamṛbhedataḥ*; (4) *avinirbhāgataḥ*;
- (5) *trivartmānupravartanataḥ*; (6) *pūrvāntapratyutpannāparāntāvekṣaṇataḥ*;
- (7) *triduḥkhatā-samudayataḥ*; (8) *hetupratyayaprabhavataḥ*;
- (9) *utpādavyayavini-bandhataḥ*; (10) *bhāvaksayatāpratītyavekṣaṇataḥ* (101.17-102.3). The detailed discussion of each of these aspects that precedes this summary comprises a large portion of chapter six of the *sūtra*. For a Japanese translation, see Aramaki 1974 (Honda's English translation [1968], at least of this chapter, is not only useless but misleading).

This is one of several striking similarities in format between the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition and a large part of the prose section of the sixth chapter of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* that lead me to believe that it was a source for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

³⁰For this translation, see Rahula 1980: 42; the Chinese translation (*Abhidharma-samuccaya* [ch.]: 670c16-17) and the Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharma-samuccayabhāṣya* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* [tib.]: 23a2) and *Abhidharma-samuccayavākyā* (*Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā* [tib.]: 191b4-5) all identify this portion as *asamkṛta*; see also Matsuda 1983: 38.

³¹*asamkṛtam* is Gokhale's addition, presumably on the basis of the texts mentioned in note 30. Pradhan omits it from his retranslation.

asam̄skrtalakṣaṇam—31 n. 1)³²

Abhidharmasamuccaya

c. [There is an investigation into that which has originated conditionally] for the purpose of renouncing attachment to an *ātman* that has no cause or has inconsistent causes.³³ (*ahetuviṣamahetukātma-bhiniveśatyājanārtham*—26.2-3)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya

[There is an investigation into that which has originated conditionally] for the purpose of renouncing attachment to the *ātman* and to [the idea that] *dharma*s originate without cause or from inconsistent causes, such as Īśvara, etc.³⁴ (*ātmadharmāhetukeśvarādi-*

³²This passage, given here in Tatia's retranslation, is found only in the Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā*; see note 30. See also Matsuda 1983: 48 n. 20 for an emendation of the retranslation of *asam̄skrtasya lakṣaṇam* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 31 n. 1) to *asam̄skrtalakṣaṇam*. The Tibetan text is: *chos kyi khams dari skye mched kyi phyogs gcig ma gtogs par ūnes bya ba ni 'dus ma byas kyi mtshan ūnid do* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.]: 23a2).

³³The Tibetan translation reads somewhat differently: "...for the purpose of renouncing attachment to an *ātman* and to [the ideas that *dharma*s] originate without cause or that they originate from causes inconsistent [with their results]" (*bdag dan rgyu med pa dan / mi mthun pa'i rgyu las byuñ bar mñon par žhen pa spañ ba'i phyr ro*—*Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 76b5-6]). This interpretation would seem to be supported by the *Savitarkādibhūmi*: *hetāv ajñānañ katamat / ahetukam vā kalpayato viṣamahetum vā iśvaraprakṛtipuruṣāntarādikam vāyonīśah kalpayato yad ajñānañ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 205.3-4). See also *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*: *tatra hetusamāropah sañskārādīnām viṣamahetukalpanāt / hetvapavādo nirhetukatvakalpanāt / phalasamāropah sātmakānām sañskārādīnām avidyādipratyayapravṛttikalpanāt* (112.11-13). Matsuda likewise differentiates between attachment to a Self and the two erroneous ideas about causes (1983: 38).

³⁴This passage, retranslated by Tatia, is found only in the Tibetan translations of the commentary: *bdag dan chos rgyu med pa dan / dbañ phyug la sog pa'i rgyu las byuñ bar mñon par žen pa spañ ba'i phyr ro* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.]: 23a2-3; see also *Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā* [tib.]: 191b5-6. The mention of Īśvara as an example of an inconsistent cause probably comes from the passage in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* mentioned above [*Yogācārabhūmi*: 205.3-4]).

hetukābhiniveśatyājanārtham—31 n. 1)³⁵

B. Detailed Answers to Questions

1. Characteristic

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to its characteristic? (*katham lakṣaṇataḥ*—26.3)

[It should be understood with reference to its characteristics on the basis of the fact that: [i] [that which has originated conditionally] arises from conditions that are inactive (*nirīhapratyaya*); [ii] [that which has originated conditionally] arises from conditions that are impermanent (*anityapratyaya*); and [iii] [that which has originated conditionally] arises from conditions that are effective (*samarthapratyaya*).

³⁵In contrast to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* begins with a summarizing verse (*uddāna*) that prefaces its answer to the question, “What is conditioned origination?” in the following way:

“Structure (*śarīra*), division (*mukha*), import (*artha*), analysis (*vibhaṅga*), sequence (*krama*), irrefutability (*acodanā*),

“Traditional etymology (*nirukti*), conditioning (*pratyayatva*), a detailed exposition of the conditions (*pratyayatvaprabhedataḥ*),*

“Summary of scriptural expositions (*sūtrāntasamgraha*), and, last of all, variety (*vicitra*) (will be discussed)” (*śārīramukham arthaś ca vibhaṅgakramam acodanā / niruktiḥ pratyayatvam ca pratyayatvaprabhedataḥ / sūtrāntasamgrahaś ceti vicitraḥ paścimo bhavet—Yogācārabhūmi: 198.14-16).*

*This ablative is reflected in neither the Chinese nor the Tibetan, so I ignore it.

Of these topics, *mukha* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.6-11) corresponds to *prabheda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and *vibhaṅga* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.1-212.4) to *vibhāga*. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* section on *artha* contains most of the components of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* section of the same name (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.12-20), along with several new additions; see note 123.

In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* with respect to the conditional operations of the members (*aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānataḥ*) deals with the same subject as the section in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* on conditioning (*pratyayatva*) (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 215.1-15). Finally, the contents of the sections in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on the sets of the members (*aṅgasamāsataḥ*) and on the progressive and regressive orders (of defilement and purification—*anulomapratilomataḥ*) are similar to the contents of the section in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* on structure (*śarīra*) (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.17-203.5).

(*nirī[ha]pratyayotpattitām upādāya, anityapratyayotpattitām upādāya, samarthapratyayotpattitām upādāya*—26.3-4)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya 40A

This is what the Lord has taught to be the characteristic of conditioned origination: “Since this exists, that exists”; “Due to the arising of this, that arises”; and (*bhagavatoktam yat pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇam—asmin satīdam bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate / tad uta*—31 n. 1)³⁶ “Conditioned by Ignorance, the Karmic Forces³⁷ [exist], etc.” (*avidyāpratyayāḥ samskārā ity evam ādi*—31.1)

With respect to this:

i. [The Lord said,] “Since this exists, that exists,” on the basis of the fact that [that which has originated conditionally] arises from conditions that are inactive. The meaning is as follows: merely due to the fact that the condition exists, the result arises. And it is not the case that there is any action on the part of the condition [aimed at] the origination of the result. (*tatra [i] asmin satīdam bhavati nirīhapratyayotpattitām upādāya / sati kevalam pratyaye phalam bhavati, na tu phalotpādanam prati pratyayasya kācid ihetu arthaḥ*—31.1-3)

ii. [The Lord said,] “Due to the arising of this, that arises,” on the basis of the fact that [that which has originated conditionally] arises from conditions that are impermanent because it cannot be established that any result originates from a cause that has the nature of non-arising. ([ii] *asyotpādād idam utpadyate anityapratyayotpattitām upādāya, na hy anutpādināḥ kāraṇāt*³⁸ *kimcid utpadyamānam kāryam siddham iti kṛtvā*—31.3-5)

iii. [The Lord said,] “Conditioned by Ignorance, the Karmic Forces [exist], etc.,” on the basis of the fact that [that which has originated conditionally] arises from conditions that are effective. Even though

³⁶This portion has been retranslated by Tatia from the Tibetan: *bcom ldan 'das kyis rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid gañ gsuñs pa ni 'di yod pas / 'di 'byuñ / 'di skyes pa'i phyir 'di skye ba ste / 'di ltar ... (Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya [tib.]: 23a3; see also Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā [tib.]: 191b6-7; and T. 1606: 711b10-11).*

³⁷*samskārāḥ*; for this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 653.

³⁸Corrected from Tatia's *anutpādikāraṇāt* (Sakuma 1996: 13).

[conditions] are inactive and impermanent, it does not follow that every result originates [indiscriminately] from any condition. Rather, [a result originates] only from a [specifically] effective condition, as the Karmic Forces [originate] from Ignorance [and so on,] up to Old Age and Death, [which originate] from Birth. ([iii] *avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādi samartha pratyayotpattiām upādāya / nirīhakatvānityatve 'pi sati na yataḥ kutaścit pratyayāt sarvam eva phalam utpadyate; kiṃ tarhi samarthaḥ / tadyathā 'vidyātāḥ saṃskārā yāvaj jātito jarāmarañam iti*—31.5-8)

2. Analysis into Members of the *Pratītyasamutpāda* Formula

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to an analysis into the members [of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]?

[It should be understood as consisting of] twelve members. The twelve-membered (*dvādaśāṅga*) [formula of] conditioned origination [consists of]: Ignorance (*avidyā*), the Karmic Forces (*saṃskāra*), Consciousness (*vijñāna*), Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*),³⁹ the Six Senses (*saḍāyatana*),⁴⁰ Contact (*sparśa*), Feeling (*vedanā*), Subconscious Desire (*trṣṇā*),⁴¹ Appropriation (*upādāna*), Karmic Existence (*bhava*), Birth [into a given species of living beings] (*jāti*), and Old Age and Death (*jarāmarañā*). (*katham aṅgavibhāgataḥ / dvādaśāṅgāni, dvādaśāṅgah pratītyasamutpādah—avidyā, samskārāḥ, vijñānam, nāmarūpam, saḍāyatanaṁ, sparśah, vedanā, trṣṇā, upādānam, bhavah, jātih, jarāmarañā ca*—26.4-6).⁴²

³⁹For this translation, see Aramaki 1988. I am here simplifying his “individual-intersubjective existence.”

⁴⁰For this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 652.

⁴¹For this translation, see Aramaki 1988.

⁴²The section on *aṅgavibhāga* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* appears to be nothing more than a list of the members of the formula. In contrast, the corresponding portion in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* on *vibhāga* (according to the *uddāna* [*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.4] and the last sentence of the section [*Yogācārabhūmi*: 212.14]) or *vibhāga* (according to the first sentence of the section [*Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.2]) contains long

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāya 40B

(No comment on this section)

3. Sets of Members

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to the sets of members?⁴³

[It should be understood as consisting of] the projecting [set of] members (*ākṣepakāṅga*), the projected [set of] members (*ākṣiptāṅga*), the actualizing [set of] members (*abhinirvartakāṅga*), and the actualized [set of] members (*abhinirvṛttaṅga*). (*katham aṅgasamāsato 'pi / ākṣepakāṅgam, ākṣiptāṅgam, abhinirvartakāṅgam, abhinirvṛttaṅgañ ca*—26.6-7)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāya 40C

If we then group [into sets] the twelve members beginning with Ignorance that we have already distinguished, we have four [sets of] members, namely the projecting [set] of members, etc. In the exposition of the originating [aspect of conditioned origination], only the following need be expounded. All [of conditioned origination] should be understood as being explained by the four [sets of] members: that which projects and that which is projected at the time of cause, and that which actualizes and that which is actualized at the time of result. (*yāny avidyādīni dvādaśāṅgāni vibhaktāni tāny eva punah samasya catvāry aṅgāni bhavanty ākṣepāṅgādīni / etāvac ca pravṛttinirdeśe nirdeśtavyam yad uta hetukāle yenaṅkṣipyate yac cākṣipyate phalakāle*

and detailed explanations of each member. For example, the *Savitarkādibhūmi* devotes two and a half pages of Sanskrit text to definitions and discussions of many different kinds of ignorance (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.6-206.2).

⁴³The Sanskrit text reads *katham aṅgasamāsato 'pi*, but the *api*, which is found in neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese, seems to have slipped in from Section One, where each of the ten ways of understanding *pratītyasamutpāda* is followed by *api*. Therefore, I ignore it in my translation.

yenābhinirvartyate yac cābhinirvartyate⁴⁴ tad etat sarvam ehir aṅgair nirdiṣṭam veditavyam—31.9-12)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the projecting [set] of members? [It consists of] Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness.

What is the projected [set] of members? [It consists of] Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling.

What is the actualizing [set] of members? [It consists of] Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence.

What is the actualized [set] of members? [It consists of] Birth and Old Age and Death. (*ākṣepakāṅgam katamat / avidyā, saṃskārāḥ, vijñānañ ca / āksiptāṅgam katamat / nāmarūpam, saḍāyatanañ, sparśaḥ, vedanā ca / abhinirvartakāṅgam katamat / trṣṇā, upādānam, bhavaś ca / abhinirvṛttyaṅgam katamat / jātiḥ jarāmaranañ ca—26.7-9*)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya

Among these [four sets], [i] “The projecting [set of] members consists of Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness” means that consciousness is impregnated by actions preceded by ignorance of the [Noble] Truths [in such a way] that future rebirth may be actualized. (*tatra [i] ākṣepakāṅgam avidyā saṃskārā vijñānam ca, anāgatajanmābhinirvṛttaye satyeṣv ajñānapūrvakena karmanā cittavāsanārthena—(31.12-14)*

[ii] The projected [set of] members consists of Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling since, due to that impregnation of consciousness, the seeds [of Individual Existence, etc.,] develop so as to actualize Individual Existence, etc., in the future life in due order of dependence, the later [members being dependent on the] preceding [ones]. ([ii] *āksiptāṅgam nāmarūpam saḍāyatanañ sparśo vedanā ca, tayā cittavāsanayā nāmarūpādīnām āyatyañ pūrvottarasam-niśrayakramenābhinirvṛttaye⁴⁵ bijapuṣṭitah—(31.14-16)*

⁴⁴Corrected from *cābhinirvartyate*.

⁴⁵Corrected from *°nirvṛttaye* (Sakuma 1996: 13).

[iii] The actualizing [set of] members consists of Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence since, under the sway of undestroyed Subconscious Desire⁴⁶ with respect to *kāmadhātu*, etc., due to wishing and craving (*chandarāga*), which is preceded by pleasure in the varieties of good and bad deeds with respect to *kāmadhātu*, etc., [insofar as] consciousness is under the sway of clinging,⁴⁷ there is, at the stage of death, the realization of the impressions of either kind of actions [i.e., good or bad] conforming to wishing and craving [that leads] to the yielding of results. ([iii] *abhinirvartakāngam* *trsñā upādānam* *bhavaś ca* *aprahīṇakāmāditrṣñādivaśena*⁴⁸ *kāmādiśu* *sucaritaduścaritaprakārābhira* *tipūrvakēna*⁴⁹ *chandarāgena* *sopādāne* *vijñāne* *sati* *maranāvasthāyām* *phaladānam* *prati* *chandarāgānurūpānyatarakarmavāsanābhīmukhībhāvāt*⁵⁰—31.16-19)

[iv] The actualized [set of] members consists of Birth and Old Age and Death since, when there is realization of the impressions of some⁵¹ actions in the way [mentioned above], Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*), etc., arises accordingly, as it has been projected, in a group of beings (*nikāyasabhāga*) that is distinguished [according to] the various destinies (*gati*), classes of beings (*yoni*), etc. ([iv]⁵² *abhinirvṛtyāngam* *jātijarāmarañam*⁵³ *ca*, *tena* *prakāreṇa* *karmāntaravāsanābhīmukhye* *saty* *antarasmin* *gatiyonyādibhedabhinne* *nikāyasabhāge* *yathāksipte* *nāmarūpādyabhinirvṛtteh*⁵⁴—31. 19-21)

⁴⁶The Sanskrit text reads *trsñādivasena*, but the Chinese and Tibetan translations omit the *ādi*, as does Matsuda (1983: 39).

⁴⁷*sopādāne* *vijñāne* *sati*. For this translation of *sopādāna*, see Schmithausen 1987: 69 ff.

⁴⁸Corrected from ^o*vasena* (Sakuma 1996: 13).

⁴⁹Corrected from ^o*prakārārati*^o (Sakuma 1996: 13).

⁵⁰Corrected from ^o*rāgānurūpyāntara*^o (Sakuma 1996: 13).

⁵¹Matsuda comments on the difficulty in understanding the word *antara* here. He proposes a solution that I do not completely understand, but if I am correct about his general meaning, this karma, which causes rebirth into a specific *gati*, etc., is different (*antara*) from karma that causes rebirth in general (1983: 49 n. 27).

⁵²Gokhale has omitted the number here, but I include it for the sake of consistency.

⁵³Corrected from ^o*jarāmanam* (Sakuma 1996: 13).

⁵⁴Corrected from ^o*rūpādinirvṛtteh* (Sakuma 1996: 13).

Mention of Birth and Old Age and Death [is made] for the sake of [causing] aversion by referring to the three characteristics of conditioned things (*samskratalakṣaṇa*). (*jātijarāmaranavacanam samskratalakṣaṇatrayādhikārenodvejanārtham*—31.21-32.1)

Old Age and Death are put [together] to form one member because death is possible even without old age. It is not similarly the case that, among the class of beings born from the womb, the Six Senses can exist without [the member that precedes them, namely] Individual Existence, and so on [for the other members]. Thus, it is to be understood that these [members] comprise separate members. (*jarāmaranasyaikāṅgakaranaṁ vināpi jarāṁ maranasambhavāt / na tv evam jarāyujāyām yonau vinā nāmariūpādibhiḥ ṣadāyatanaṁ sambhava ity eṣām prthagāṅgīkaraṇam veditavyam*—32.1-3)

4. Determination of the Conditional Operations of the Members

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to the determination of the conditional operations of the members [of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]?

The determination of the conditional operations of the members is to be understood in terms of impressioning (*vāsana*), continuing force (*āvedha*), [being the object of] attention (*manasikāra*), and concomitance (*sahabhāva*). And that [determination in terms of these four is to be applied] according to the circumstances [in the case of each of the links of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]. (*katham aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānataḥ / vāsanato 'pi, āvedhato 'pi, manasikārato 'pi, sahabhāvato 'py aṅgānām pratyayatvavyavasthānam veditavyam / tac ca yathāyogam*—26.9-11).

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya 40D

The determination of the conditional operations of the members concerns the four conditions (*pratyaya*). (*aṅgapratyaya[yatvavya]-vasthānam caturah pratyayān adhikṛtya*—32.4)

In this case:

[i] First of all, Ignorance, [when] it has previously come into existence, is the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of the Karmic Forces in terms of impressioning because karma that has been produced [in] a series⁵⁵ perfumed by it [i.e., Ignorance] is capable of activating rebirth.⁵⁶ (*tatra [i] tāvad avidyā samskārañām purvotpannā⁵⁷ vāsanato hetupratyayāḥ, tatparibhāvitasaṁtānotpannāñām karmañām punarbhavābhissamskaraṇasāmarthyāt*—32.4-6)

[ii] [Ignorance], when it is operative at that time [i.e., in the present], is the immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of continuing force because the stream of Karmic Forces continues to evolve in accordance with its specific propelling power.⁵⁸ ([ii] *tatkālasamudācāriṇī⁵⁹ āvedhataḥ samanantara-*

⁵⁵*saṁtāna*. I.e., the series that constitutes the individual personality. See Schmithausen 1987: 67.

⁵⁶The Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* disagree with each other and with the Sanskrit text in this section, and the Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* disagrees with all the other versions. Like Matsuda (1983: 40), I follow the Sanskrit text since the Tibetan versions seem corrupt (e.g., they both give *rgyu* for *saṁtāna*, instead of *rgyun*), and Hsüan-tsang's translation is a bit free.

⁵⁷The Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* (23b7) and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (193a1-2) both read *de la ma rig pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi rkyen te / sna logs su byuṇ ba'i bag chags*, etc. This would suggest *purvotpannavāsanato*, a correction indeed made by Sakuma (14). The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [ch.] seems in any case closer to the Tibetan than to our Sanskrit: 且如無明行。前生習氣故 (T. 1606: 711c13). However, as I stated in note 56, I follow the Sanskrit, which seems to make more sense given the context.

⁵⁸Matsuda (1983: 40) follows the Tibetan translations in reading the Sanskrit *tadāksepakaviśeṣena* (note that Matsuda does not correct *aksepaka*° to *aksepa*°) as *tadā + āksepakaviśeṣena* (*de'i tshe 'phen pa'i bye brag*—*Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* [tib.]: 24a1; *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 193a3), but the temporal reference does not seem to me to make sense here; I follow Hsüan-tsang's Chinese, where 彼 (*tad* = *tasya*) refers back to Ignorance, which Hsüan-tsang seems to have supplied in order to clarify the passage (當於爾時現行無明能引發故。為等無間緣。由彼引發差別諸行流轉相續生故—T. 1606: 711c14-16).

⁵⁹In his edition, Tatia breaks the sentence after *tatkālasamudācāriṇī*; however, this seems to be a mistake. Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* clearly and, I believe, correctly construes it with what follows (T. 1606: 711c14-15).

pratyayah, tadāksepaviśesena⁶⁰ samskārasroto 'nupravṛtteḥ⁶¹—32.4-6)

[iii] [Ignorance] is the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of [its being the object of] attention because, in the state of benightedness, it [*avidyā*] becomes the object of incorrect attention as being “the Supreme” (*agratā*), etc. ([iii] *manaskārata* *ālambanapratyayah, mūḍhāvasthāyā agratādibhir ayoniśomanaskārālambanībhāvāt*—32.8-9)⁶²

[iv] [Ignorance] is the influencing condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of concomitance because, due to its influence, the volition associated with it fabricates a false object. ([iv] *sahabhbhāvato* 'dhipatipratyayah, *tadādhipatyena tatsamprayuktāyāś cetanāyā viparītālambanābhisaṃskāraṇāt*—32.9-10)

5. Determination of the Functions of the Members

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to the determination of the function of the members [of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula]? (*katham aṅgakarmavyavasthānataḥ—26.11-12*)

a. Ignorance (*avidyā*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Ignorance? It deludes beings concerning existence, and it is the condition of the Karmic Forces. (*avidyā kīmkarmikā / bhave ca sattvān sammohayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati samskāraṇām*—26.11-12)

⁶⁰I have corrected from °ākṣepaka° here. Sakuma (1996) is silent.

⁶¹Corrected from *samskārasrotānupravṛtteḥ* on the advice of Schmithausen. Sakuma (1996) is silent.

⁶²Although I think that, in each of these four explanations, the causal relationship between *avidyā* and the *samskāras* is implied, I cannot understand in what sense *avidyā* is here considered to be the *ālambanapratyaya* of the *samskāras*.

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya 40E

Ignorance deludes beings concerning existence because, due to its concealing, there is a lack of real knowledge regarding the past, future, and middle [i.e., present] existences,⁶³ wherefore one has doubts, [such as] “Did I exist in the past, or did I not exist?” and so on.⁶⁴

And it is the condition of the Karmic Forces because, due to it, there is an accumulation of karma that is conducive to rebirth. ([i] avidyā bhāve sattvān sammohayati, tadāvṛteḥ pūrvāntāparāntamadhyāntānām yathābhūtāparijñānāt / yata evaṃ vicikitsati—kim nū aham abhūvam ati[te] 'dhvany āhosvin nābhūvam ity evam ādi / pratyayaś ca bhavati samṣkārāṇām, tadvaśena punarbhavikakarmopacayāt—32.11-12)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES⁶⁵

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.1-206.9)

[The exposition of Ignorance in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* section on *vibhāga* consists of definitions of various types of Ignorance; the types mentioned largely correspond with those found in the above-mentioned *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* in the *Samyuktāgama*. As I mentioned above, the explanation in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* of the first function of Ignorance appears to be a summary of the definitions of the first three types in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. Regarding the definitions of

⁶³This is included in the definition of Ignorance found in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* of the *Samyuktāgama* [T. 99 (sūtra 298): 85a16-17], to which I refer throughout this section, as well as in the *Yüan ch'i ching* 緣起經 translated by Hsüan-tsang [T. 124: 547b22-24]; see also Matsuda 1982a: 43; de Jong 1979: 246; *Arthaviniścayasūtra*: 5.15-6.17.

⁶⁴“ity evam ādi here refers, I think, to the other types of Ignorance mentioned in the *sūtra* and defined in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (see *Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.1-206.5; *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 9b2-3; *Arthaviniścayasūtramibandhana*: 103.1-111.4).

⁶⁵After my translation of the discussions of the functions of each member, I provide a translation, together with the Sanskrit text, or a summary (in square brackets) of the corresponding section on *vibhāga* (or *vibhāga*) from the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. This is preceded by a summary of the passage from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* on which the *vibhāga* section is based.

In addition, I have translated a corresponding portion of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. (This is my own translation; see also Honda 1968: 189-190.)

internal ignorance (*adhyātmam ajñānam*) and external ignorance (*bahirdhājñānam*), Schmithausen remarks that in this passage from the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, *avidyā* is closely associated with *satkāyadr̄ṣṭi/ātmadr̄ṣṭi*, while a distinction is usually made between them in Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin texts (1987: 518 n. 1421).]

Daśabhūmikasūtra (98.14-99.2)

Here, Ignorance has two functions (*dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā*).⁶⁶ It deludes beings regarding objects (*ālambanataḥ*), and it provides the cause (*hetu*) for the generation of the Karmic Forces. (*tatrāvidyā dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati / ālambanataḥ sattvān sammohayati / hetum ca dadāti samskārābhinirvrttaye*)

b. Karmic Forces (*samskāra*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of the Karmic Forces? They distinguish beings according to the destinies (*gatisu*), and they are the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness.⁶⁷ (*samskārāḥ kiṃkarmakāḥ / gatisu ca sattvān vibhajanti, pratyayāś ca bhavanti vijñānavāsanāyāḥ*—26.12-13)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

The Karmic Forces distinguish beings according to the destinies because, due to karma, there is a diversity of different destinies to which beings go.

And they are the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness because [they] nourish the seeds in order that Individual Existence⁶⁸ may arise in the future. (*samskārā gatisu sattvān*⁶⁹)

⁶⁶For translation, see Aramaki 1974: 177.

⁶⁷*vijñānavāsanāyāḥ*. For this translation, see Matsuda 1983: 41. According to the Chinese translation, the Karmic Forces are the condition of Consciousness due to impressions (二與識作緣。由熏習故—T. 1605: 671a3-4).

⁶⁸In the Tibetan and Chinese versions, the word “etc.” follows “Individual Existence” (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* [tib.]: 24a5; *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* [tib.]: 193b2; T. 1606: 711c119).

⁶⁹Tatia omits the *virāma* at the end of *sattvān*.

vibhajanti, karmavaśena sattvānām gatyantaragamanavaiciryāt / pratyayāś ca bhāvanti vijñānasya vāsanāyāḥ, āyat�ā nāmarūpābhī-nirvṛttaye bijapoṣaṇāt—32.14-17)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (Yogācārabhūmi: 206.10-13)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādaśūtra* mentions three types of *samskāras*: physical, vocal, and mental. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines them as meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable (*āniñjya*) karma and states in which realm each type of karma can be performed.]

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.2-3)

The Karmic Forces also have two functions. They manifest the generation of karmic results (*vipāka*) in the future, and they provide the cause for the generation of Consciousness. (*samskārā api dvividhakārya-pratyupasthānā bhavamti / anāgatavipākābhinirvṛttam cādarśayati / hetum ca dadāti vijñānābhinirvṛttaye*)⁷⁰

c. Consciousness (*vijñāna*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Consciousness? It supports the bond of action of beings, and it is the condition of Individual Existence. (*vijñānam kiñkarmakam / sattvānām karmabandhañ ca dhārayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya—26.13-14)*

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

Consciousness supports the bond of action of beings because it arises⁷¹ simultaneously with the impressions deposited by the Karmic Forces.

⁷⁰In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu in commenting on the *Pratītyasamutpādaśūtra* includes the same information as the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. In addition, he states the reasons for which one performs the various actions; for example, one performs non-meritorious action in order to obtain an agreeable sensation in this life in *kāmadhātu* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 139.25-140.2; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 84).

⁷¹The Chinese translation adds “and is destroyed” (與行所引習氣俱生滅故—T. 1606: 712a3).

And it is the condition of Individual Existence because Individual Existence attains growth due to the entrance of Consciousness into the mother's womb. (*vijñānam sattvānām*⁷² *karmabandham dhārayati, saṃskārāhitavāsanāsaḥpatteḥ / pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya, mātuh kuksau vijñānāvakraṇtyā nāmarūpavivṛddhigamanāt*—32.17-19)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 206.14-18)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* defines Consciousness as the six *vijñānakāyas* and names each of them. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* gives a detailed definition of the first of the six, eye-consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), according to its own theory of seeds:]⁷³

What is eye-consciousness? It is, in the future, the consciousness [resulting] from the discernment (*prativijñapti*) of *rūpa*, which is based on the organ of sight, that has the form of a seed permeated by meritorious, demeritorious, or immovable [*karma*] and [the consciousness] that has the form of the result produced by that seed. (*cakṣurvijñānam katamat / āyat�ām cakṣurindriyāśrayāyā rūpa-prativijñapter yat punyāpuṇyāneñjyaparibhāvitabījabhūtam vijñānam yac ca tadbījasamudbhavam phalabhūtam*—*Yogācārabhūmi*: 206.14-15)⁷⁴

[The *Savitarkādibhūmi* goes on to say that the other five types of consciousness should be similarly understood and lists which types of consciousness are found in which realms.]

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.3-4)

Consciousness also has two functions. It brings about conception into (the next) existence, and it provides the cause for the generation of

⁷²Matsuda emends the Sanskrit text, which omits *sattvānām*, on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese (see *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* [tib.]: 24a5; *Abhidharma-samuccayavākhyā* [tib.]: 193b3; T. 1606: 712a1).

⁷³This definition is characterized by Schmithausen as “somewhat archaic” (1987: 178).

⁷⁴Underlined portions represent Schmithausen’s corrections on the basis of the manuscript (1987: 472 n. 1154). See also note 224.

Individual Existence. (*vijñānam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānam bhavati / bhavapratisamdhim ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti nāmarūpābhī-nirvṛttaye*)⁷⁵

d. Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Individual Existence? It makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,⁷⁶ and it is the condition of the Six Senses. (*nāmarūpam kiñkarmakam / ātmabhāvam ca sattvān grāhayati, pratyayaś ca saḍāyatanaśya*—26.14)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya

Individual Existence makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence because, due to its arising, beings are distributed⁷⁷ among the various births (*nikāyasabhāga*).

The fact that Individual Existence, etc., is the condition of the Six Senses, etc., is to be seen as being due to the arising of the later members in dependence on the earlier members.⁷⁸ (*nāmarūpam ātmabhāvam sattvān grāhayati tannirvṛtīyā sattvānām nikāyasabhāgāntarabhajanāt / nāmarūpādīnām saḍāyatānādipratyayabhbāvah pūrvāṅgasam-niśrayenottarāṅganirvṛttito draṣṭavyah*—32.19-21)

⁷⁵For Vasubandhu's comments on *vijñāna* in the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, see Chapter 5.

⁷⁶For this translation of *ātmabhāva*, see Schmithausen 1987: 24.

⁷⁷Matsuda (1983: 49 n. 31) points out that the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.] and *Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā* [tib.] both give *brten pa* for *bhajana*.

⁷⁸According to the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* 成唯識論, the members from Consciousness through Feeling, in other words the members belonging to the projected set (in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, of course, this consists of the members from Individual Existence through Feeling since these texts include Consciousness in the projecting set), are really simultaneous since, in the form of seeds, they are created by karma all at once. However, they are often spoken of as occurring in order, because when they yield results, they appear at different times (T. 1585: 43c11-12; *Shindōjōyuishikiron* 新導成唯識論: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 489). Therefore, the relationship of dependency among these members is different from that among the other members. It is to this fact, I think, that the *Bhbāṣya* is referring in this comment.

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 207.1-9)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādāsūtra* defines Individual Existence as consisting of the four immaterial *skandhas* (= *nāma*) as well as *rūpaskandha*, which consists of the four *mahābhūtas* and the matter derived from them (*upādāyarūpa*). The *Savitarkādibhūmi* explains each of the immaterial *skandhas* and the two types of matter and states in which realms they can be found. At the end of the section, it gives a definition according to its seed theory:]

And all this [Individual Existence] is twofold: having the form of the seed [of Individual Existence] contained in the seed of Consciousness, and having the form of the result [i.e., Individual Existence as an actualized entity] produced by that [seed]. (*sarvam tad api dvividham / vijñānabijaparigrītabijabhūtam ca tadabhinirvarttītaphalabhūtam*⁷⁹ *ca*—*Yogācārabhūmi*: 207.9)⁸⁰

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.4-6)

Individual Existence also has two functions. It forms the mutual support,⁸¹ and it provides the cause for the generation of the Six Senses. (*nāmarūpam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānam bhavati / anyonyo-pastambhanam ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti sadāyatana-bhīnirvṛttaye*)

e. Six Senses (*sadāyatana*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of the Six Senses? They cause beings to grasp

⁷⁹I am emending Bhattacharya's *tadanirvarttītaphalabhūtam*, which is an obvious error.

⁸⁰See Schmithausen 1987: 278 n. 147b; 472 n. 1155 for his understanding of the first aspect of Individual Existence: "the Seed of *n.* possessed by, or contained in, *v.*" Elsewhere, however, he indicates that the seed of the future *nāmarūpa* is contained in the seed of the future *vijñāna* (1987: 178).

⁸¹With Consciousness (see La Vallée Poussin 1913: 12-18).

the completion of the basis of personal existence, and they are the condition of Contact. (*śadāyatanaṁ kiṁkarmakam / ātmabhāvapari-pūriñ ca sattvān grāhayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati sparśasya*—26.15-16)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

The Six Senses cause beings to grasp the completion of the basis of personal existence because, when [the Six Senses] arise, the remaining organs are no [longer] lacking.⁸² (*śadāyatanaṁ ātmabhāvapari-pūriṁ ca sattvān grāhayati, tannivṛttāv*⁸³ *indriyāntarāvaikalyāt*—32.21-33.1)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

***Savitarkādibhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 207.10-15)**

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* simply lists the six *āyatanas*. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines *cakṣurāyatana* in detail, saying that it is the subtle matter (*rūpaprasāda*) by which visual consciousness is supported and by which material objects are seen in the three times and that the other *āyatanas* are to be understood similarly. Following this, a definition is given according to seed theory:]

And all this [the Six Senses] is twofold: having the form of the seed [of the Six Senses] contained in the seed of Individual Existence and having the form of the result [i.e., the Six Senses as actualized entities] produced by that [seed]. (*tad api dvividham nāmarūpabijaparigrhītabijabhūtam*⁸⁴ *tadabhinirvartitaphalabhbūtam ca*—*Yogācārabhūmi*: 13-15)

⁸²Following Matsuda (1983: 49 n. 32), who notes that the sentence *pratyayaś ca bhavati sparśasya* was added to the Sanskrit manuscript and is found in none of the other versions of the text, I omit it here, as well as the sentence *pratyayaś ca bhavati vedanāyāḥ* in the comment on Contact. The last portion of the comment on Individual Existence as a condition of the Six Senses applies to the discussions of the Six Senses and Contact as well.

⁸³Corrected from *tannivṛttāv* (Sakuma 1996: 14).

⁸⁴Corrected from Bhattacharya's *nāmarūpaparigrhīta-bijabhūtam* following Schmithausen 1987: 472 n. 1156.

[The *Savitarkādibhūmi* then mentions how many *āyatanas* can be found in each of the three realms.]

***Daśabhbūmikasūtra* (99.6-7)**

The Six Senses also have two functions. They manifest the separateness of their objects, and they provide the cause for the generation of Contact. (*sadāyatanaṁ pi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānam bhavati / svaviśayavibhaktitāñ cādarśayati / hetum ca dadāti sparśābhinirvṛttaye*)

f. Contact (*sparśa*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Contact? It turns beings toward the experience of the sense objects, and it is the condition of Feeling. (*sparśaḥ kimkarmakah / viśayopabhoge ca sattvān pravartayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati vedanāyāḥ*—26.16)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāsyā

Contact turns beings toward the experience of the sense objects because, due to it, there is experience of the three types of sense objects, pleasurable ones, etc. (*sparśo viśayopabhoge sattvān pravartayati, tanmukhena sukhavedanīyādītrividhaviśayopabhogāt*—33.2-3)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

***Savitarkādibhūmi* (Yogācārabhūmi: 207)**

[The *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra* defines Contact as the six kinds of *sparśakāyas*.⁸⁵ The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines *cakṣuḥsamsparśa* as the

⁸⁵觸身: I can find this compound only in the *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhbāsyā*, where it is said to be equivalent to *sparśana*. Nothing corresponding to 身 is found in the Sanskrit text (Hirakawa 1973-1978: 311), but in the version of the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra* found in the Sanskrit text of the *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, *sparśa* is defined as *satparśakāyāḥ* (*Arthaviniścayasūtra*: 10.1-4). Therefore, I feel confident in my retranslation. Curiously, however, both Chinese versions of *Arthaviniścayasūtra* have only 觸 (T. 762: 651b1-2; T. 763: 654c12-14).

grasping of the object as agreeable (or disagreeable or neutral) that is occasioned by the coming together of the three (object, sense organ, and consciousness). The *Savitarkādibhūmi* continues, saying that the other *samsparśas* should be similarly understood. Again, it defines the member, Contact, in this case according to seed theory:]

They [the six types of Contact] again are twofold: having the form of the seed [of Contact] contained in the seed of the Six Senses, and having the form of the result [i.e., Contact as an actualized entity] produced by that [seed]. (*te punar dvividhāḥ / ṣadāyatana bijapari-grhitabijabhūtāś ca tadabhinirvarttaphalabhūtāś—Yogacārabhūmi*: 207.17-18)

[The *Savitarkādibhūmi* then states how many types of Contact can be found in each of the three realms.]

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.7-8)

Contact also has two functions. It is contact with objects, and it provides the cause for the generation of Feeling. (*sparśo 'pi dvividhā-kāryapratyupasthāno bhavati / ālambanasparśāś ca bhavati / ⁸⁶ hetum ca dadāti vedanābhinirvṛttaye*)

g. Feeling (*vedanā*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Feeling? It turns beings toward the

Bhattacharya remarks that the Sanskrit text of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is corrupt here, and he claims that the Tibetan text is illegible. However, the Peking version is quite legible, and I have summarized from it (*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 121b3-4); Schmithausen's emendation from the manuscript essentially agrees with the Tibetan (1987: 380 n. 613).

⁸⁶However, La Vallée Poussin and Rahder both read *ālambanasparśanām ca karoti*: “It brings about contact with objects” (La Vallée Poussin 1913: 118; Rahder 1926: 50), and the Tibetan agrees: *dmigs pa la reg par yañ byed do* (*Daśabhūmikasūtra* [tib.]: 103b8). I cannot tell which version the Chinese translation supports (能觸所緣—T. 286: 515a10; T. 278: 558c12; T. 1522: 169b8-9; T. 279: 194a27; T. 287: 553a25. I cannot make sense of Dharmarakṣa’s early translation, T. 285).

experience of⁸⁷ existence,⁸⁸ and it is the condition of Subconscious Desire. (*vedanā kiṃkarmikā / janmopabhoge ca sattvān pravartayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati trṣṇāyāḥ*—26.17)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

Feeling turns beings toward the experience of existence because, on the basis of it, there is the experience of the desirable, etc., results of action.

And it is the condition of Subconscious Desire because, through a craving for connection, etc., with it [i.e., Feeling], there is the arising of Subconscious Desire. (*vedanā janmopabhoge ca sattvān pravartayati, tadadhiṣṭhāneneṣṭādikarmavipākopabhogāt / pratyayaś ca bhavati trṣṇāyāḥ, tatsamprayogādyabhilāṣamukhena trṣṇotpatteḥ*—33.4-5)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 208.1-7)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* defines Feeling as the three types of Feeling: pleasurable, painful, and neither pleasurable nor painful. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* in turn defines each of these three types and states in which realms they can be found. Again, it gives a definition according to seed theory:]

These Feelings also are twofold: having the form of the seed [of Feeling] contained in the seed of Contact, and having the form of the result [i.e., Feeling as an actualized entity] produced by that [seed]. (*tā api vedanā dvividhāḥ sparśabijaparigrhītabijabhbūtāḥ tadabhinnirvartitaphalabhbūtāś ca*—*Yogācārabhūmi*: 208.6-7)

⁸⁷Matsuda supplies 次の in parentheses: “(the next) existence” (1983: 41) here and in the case of *trṣṇā*, immediately below.

⁸⁸The Peking edition of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.] interprets *janmo pabhoga* as a *dvandva*: “existence and experience” (*skye ba dan loṅs spyod*—*Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 77a8). However, the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.] (24b2) and *Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā* [tib.] (194a1) both take it as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*: *skye ba 'i loṅs spyod*.

Daśabhbūmikasūtra (99.8-10)

Feeling also has two functions. It brings about the experience of that which is agreeable, disagreeable, and neither [agreeable nor disagreeable], and it provides the cause for the generation of Subconscious Desire. (*vedanāpi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati / iṣṭāniṣṭobhayaviparītayuktānubhavanam ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti trṣṇābhinirvṛttaye*)

h. Subconscious Desire (*trṣṇā*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Subconscious Desire? It draws beings to existence, and it is the condition of Appropriation. (*trṣṇā kiṃkarmikā / janmani ca sattvān ākarsayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati upādānasya—26.17-18*)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

Subconscious Desire draws beings to existence because, due to its power, there is no interruption in the stream of future existences (*janmāntarasrotaḥ*).

And it is the condition of Appropriation because, through a desire for savor, wishes and greed (*chandarāga*) with respect to *kāma*[*dhātu*], etc., arise. (*trṣṇā janmani sattvān ākarsati, tadvaśena janmāntarasroto 'nupacchedād / pratyayaś ca bhavaty upādānasya, āsvādaprārthanā-mukhena kāmādiṣu chandarāgapravṛtteḥ—33.6-7*)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 208.8-13)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* defines Subconscious Desire as Subconscious Desire in each of the three realms. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines Subconscious Desire in each realm as a defiled desire (*kliṣṭā prārthanā*) with respect to the conditioning factors (*samskāra*)⁸⁹ of that realm. This desire is dependent upon the actions (*samskāra*) performed

⁸⁹Here, I think, in the sense of experiences.

in that realm, and it produces misery (*duḥkha*) in that realm.]

***Daśabhbūmikasūtra* (99.10-11)**

Subconscious Desire also has two functions. It brings about desire for desirable things, and it provides the cause for the generation of Appropriation. (*trṣṇāpi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati / samraṇjanīyavastusamṛāgam ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti upādā-nābhinirvṛttaye*)

i. Appropriation (*upādāna*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Appropriation? It makes the consciousness of beings [become] endowed with grasping⁹⁰ so that [they] seize a new birth, and it is the condition of Karmic Existence. (*upādānam kimkarmakam / punarbhavādānārtham*⁹¹ *sopādānam ca sattvānām vijñānam karoti, pratayāś ca bhavati bhavasya*—26.18-19)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya

Appropriation makes the consciousness of beings [become] endowed with grasping so that [they] seize a new birth because the impressions of actions determine the conception [of beings]⁹² in [a form of] rebirth specified as [a particular] destiny, such as hell, etc.⁹³

⁹⁰*sopādāna*. I have translated *upādāna* here in this way to distinguish it from *upādānāṅga*.

⁹¹I have followed Pradhan and corrected Gokhale's *punarbhavādānāc ca* to *punarbhavādānārtham* (see Pradhan 1950: 27 n. 4).

⁹²Found in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.] and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.] but not in the Sanskrit or in the Chinese translation of the *Vyākhyā*.

⁹³This passage is difficult, and neither the Tibetan (*sems can dmyal ba la sog pa'i 'gro ba bye brag can du yan srid pa'i ŋin mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ba'i las kyi bag cags nes par byed pa'i phyir ro—Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.]: 24b4; *sems can dmyal ba la sog pa'i 'gro ba bye brag can du yan srid pa ŋin mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ba'i las kyi bag cags nes par byin pa'i phyir ro—Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 194a5) nor the Chinese (為那落迦趣等差別後有相續不斷。令業習氣得決定故—T. 1606: 712a22-23) translation seems to correspond exactly to the Sanskrit.

And it is the condition of Karmic Existence because, due to its power, the impressions of the Karmic Forces obtain activity. (upādānam punarbhavādānāya sopādānam ca sattvānām vijñānam karoti, narakādigativiśiṣṭapunarbhavapratisamdhaye karmavāsanāniyamāt / pratyayaś ca bhavati bhavasya, tadvaśena samskāravāsanāyā⁹⁴ vṛtti-lābhāt—33.8-10)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 208.14-18)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* lists four types of Appropriation. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines them and specifies in which realms each type can produce suffering (*duḥkham abhinirvartayati*).]

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.16-17)

Appropriation also has two functions. It brings about the bond with defilement, and it provides the cause for the generation of Karmic Existence. (upādānam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānam karoti / saṃkleśabandhanam ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti bhavābhinirvṛttaye)

j. Karmic Existence (*Bhava*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Karmic Existence? It inclines beings toward rebirth, and it is the condition of Birth. (*bhavaḥ kimkarmakah / punarbhavē ca sattvān abhimukhīkaroti, pratyayaś ca bhavati jātēh—26.19-20*)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya

Karmic Existence inclines beings toward rebirth because it conveys them immediately to a new destiny.

And it is the condition of Birth because the next life (*nikāyasabhāgāntara*) arises due to it. (*bhavaḥ punarbhavē sattvān*

⁹⁴Corrected from *°vāsanayor* (Sakuma 1996: 14).

abhimukhīkaroti, anantaragatyantarāvāhanāt pratyayaś ca bhavati jāteḥ, tato nikāyasabhāgāntaranirvṛt̄teḥ—33.10-12)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (Yogācārabhūmi: 208.19-209.5)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādāsūtra* lists three types of Karmic Existence, namely existence in the *kāma*, *rūpa*, and *ārūpya* realms. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines *kāmabhava* as consisting of: (1) *pūrvakālabhava*, (2) *karmabhava*, (3) *maranabhava*, (4) *antarābhava*, (5) *upapattibhava*,⁹⁵ (6) *nārakabhava*, (7) *tiryagbhava*, (8) *pretabhava*, (9) *devabhava*, and (10) *manusyabhava* and adds that it is generated by the possession of actions and defilements produced in the past.⁹⁶ The *Savitarkādibhūmi* then defines *rūpabhava* and *ārūpyabhava*. Finally, it explains the apparent contradiction between this list of ten *bhavas* and the usual list of seven *bhavas* by saying that, in the list of seven, one (presumably *karmabhava*) is *ākṣepaka*, one (presumably *antarābhava*) is concerned with the attainment of existence (*bhavasamprāpaka*), and five are concerned with the experience of the results (of past karma, i.e., *naraka*, *tiryāñc*, *preta*, *deva*, and *manusya*].⁹⁷

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.12-14)

Karmic Existence also has two functions. It establishes the destiny

⁹⁵Bhattacharya gives *upādhibhava*, but the Tibetan *skye ba'i srid pa* (*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 122b2) and the Chinese 生有 (T. 1579: 323b26) suggest that this is an error, on either his part or that of his manuscript.

⁹⁶*pūrvakṛtasamksārakleśaparigrahaprabhāvita* (Yogācārabhūmi: 208.21; *śnon byas pa'i 'du byed dañ / ḥnon moñ pa yoñ su zin ciñ bskyed pa yin no* (*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 122b3). Hsüan-tsang translates *prabhāvita* as 熏發, suggesting that impregnation has a role in the generation of *bhava* (T. 1579: 323b28).

⁹⁷See, for example, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 114.19-22; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 13.

What we have here seems to be a merging of two lists, the list of seven and a list of four, consisting of *antarābhava*, *upapattibhava*, *pūrvakālabhava*, and *maranabhava*. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 124.19-24; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 45; also, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 25.20-22, where these four types of *bhavas* are said to be equivalent to the last four in a list of twenty-four produced (*utpanna*) things.

of another [i.e., the next] life, and it provides the cause for the generation of Birth. (*bhāvo 'pi dvividhakāryapratyupasthāno bhavati / anyabhavagatipratyupasthānam ca karoti / hetum ca daññati jātyabhinirvṛttaye*)

1. Birth (*jāti*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Birth? It produces beings in the proper order: Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling; and it is the condition of Old Age and Death. (*jātiḥ kiñkarmikā / nāma-rūpaśadāyatanasparśavedanānupūrvyā ca sattvān abhinirvartayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati jarāmaranasya*—26.20-21)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya

Birth produces beings in the proper order: Individual Existence, etc., because it conveys them through the various states, one after another.

And it is the condition of Old Age and Death because, when there is birth, there is the possibility of change-of-state (*anyathātva*) and of the destruction of the continuity of the person [who has been born]. (*jātir nāmarūpādyānupūrvyā sattvān abhinirvartayati, uttarottarā-vasthāntarāvāhanāt, pratyayaś ca bhavati jarāmaranasya, jātau satyām tatprabandhasyānyathātvavinaśasambhavāt*—33.12-14)

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 209.6-19)⁹⁸

[The *Pratītyasamutpādāsūtra* defines *jāti* in terms of ten aspects or stages.⁹⁹ The *Savitarkādibhūmi* explains these aspects or stages as follows: (1) *jāti* is the first moment of actualization¹⁰⁰ in the case of

⁹⁸A similar explanation of *jāti* is found in the *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Paryāyasamgrahaṇī*: 48a7-48b3; T. 1579: 769a12-18).

⁹⁹The various versions of the *sūtra* differ considerably here. In this case, the *Savitarkādibhūmi* follows most closely the order and terminology of the *Yüan ch'i ching* 縁起經 translated by Hsüan-tsang (T. 124: 547c24-26).

¹⁰⁰*Abhinirvṛtti*. In his translation of the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, Hsüan-tsang takes this in the sense of conception and translates it as 託生時 (T. 1579: 323c5-6).

beings born from a womb or from an egg; (2) *samjāti* is the completion of the basis of personal existence in this;¹⁰¹ (3) *avakrānti*¹⁰² is the coming forth from this;¹⁰³ (4) *abhinihṛti*¹⁰⁴ is the growth of that which has come forth; (5) *prādurbhāva* is the instantaneous arising of beings born from moisture and apparitional beings; (6) *skandhapratilābha* is the arising of the five *upādānakandhas* in these types of beings and states;¹⁰⁵ (7) *dhātupratilambha* is the fact that those *skandhas* are influenced by the causal condition;¹⁰⁶ (8) *āyatana pratilambha* is the fact that those *skandhas* are

¹⁰¹The antecedent of “this” is not clear. It seems to refer to the inside of the womb or egg (*de ḥid kyi nañ du*—*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 122b7) before the emergence of the being (*samjātiḥ katamā / yā tatraiva ātmabhāvaparipūrīranihṛtasya*—the Sanskrit text, as Bhattacharya remarks, is strange here; in order to understand the general idea, I follow the Chinese although I am still not completely confident of the meaning: 等生云何。謂即於彼身分圓滿。仍未出時 [T. 1579: 323c6-7]). The *Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana* comments on another version of the *sūtra*, which contains another stage, not included in our version, namely, *upapatti*. According to the *Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana*, *samjāti* is the completion of *nāmarūpa*, while *upapatti* is the obtaining of the remainder of the body on the part of the completed *nāmarūpa* (*sampūrṇanāmarūpasya viśiṣṭakāyavasthā-prāptir upapattiḥ*—*Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana*: 148.2). Thus, *samjāti* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is equivalent to *samjāti* and *upapatti*, taken together, in the *Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana* (148.3).

¹⁰²Bhattacharya gives *bhavakrānti*, which, again, is clearly an error; the *Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana* (148.3) gives *avakrānti*.

¹⁰³Again, the antecedent is unclear; *avakrānti* usually refers to the descent into the womb, i.e., conception (see Monier-Williams 1970: 97), but here, it clearly refers to a later stage in the process of birth.

¹⁰⁴*abhinirvṛtti* according to the *Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana* (148.4).

¹⁰⁵*skandhapratilābhah katamah / ya asv eva yoniṣ avasthāsu ca pañcānām upādānakandhānam* [saṃbhavaḥ] (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 209.10-11). *Pratilābhah* should probably be emended to *pratilambhah*, which is found in the next two items. The Chinese uses the same word for all three (得), as does the Tibetan ('thob/thob).

The term is again defined in the *Paryāyasamgrahāñi*: *skandhapratilambha* is the state consisting of *nāmarūpa* (*phuṇ po rñed pa ni miñ dan gzugs kyi gnas skabs so*—*Paryāyasamgrahāñi* [tib.]: 48b1; 又蘊得者。謂名色位—T. 1579: 769a14-15).

According to the *Arthaviniścayasyaśūtranibandhana*, the term *skandha* here means “mass” (*rāśi*; both the editor and Honjō [1989: 85] refer to *Abhidharmakośa* I 20ab). Therefore, this is taught to refute the notion of a single, unified self (*rāśyartho hi skandhārtha iti skandhagrahanam ekātmakalpanāvudāsārtham*—149.4-5).

¹⁰⁶*dhātupratilambhah katamah / yā teṣām eva skandhānām hetupratyayaparigr̥hītataḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 209.12-13); 'khamṣ thob pa gañ že na / phuṇ po de dag ḥid rgyu'i rkyen gyis yoñs su zin pa gañ yin pa'o (*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 123a1-2); 界得云何。謂

influenced by the other conditions;¹⁰⁷ (9) *skandhābhinirvrtti* refers to the

即彼諸蘊因緣所攝性 (T. 1579: 323c9-10). In this definition and the following one, the translation of *parigr̄hitatā* is difficult (for extensive remarks on the use of *parigr̄hīta* in Yogācāra texts, see Schmithausen 1987: 277 n. 147). Before attempting to explain this definition, I shall provide some other interpretations of the term *dhātupratilambha*:

According to the *Paryāyasamgrahañī*, *dhātupratilambha* is the obtainment of the seeds of those (*skandhas*) in this [*nāmarūpa*] state (*khams rñed pa ñid du de'i sa bon rñed pa'o*—*Paryāyasamgrahañī* [tib.]: 48b1; 界得。即是於此位中彼種子得—T. 1579: 769a15).

According to the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*, the term *dhātu* here refers to that which is empty in that it is nothing more than *dharmas*. Therefore, this is taught to refute the notion that the body is the self (*dharmañātram tuccham dhātūr iti nirvacanāt dhātugrahanām dehyātmakalpanāvyudāsārtham*—149.5-6).

The *Yü ch'ie lun chi* 瑜伽論記 explains *dhātupratilambha* together with *skandhapratilambha*, in terms of seeds: “The obtainment of the *skandhas* is the arising of the actuality of the *skandhas*. The obtainment of the *dhātus* is the nature of the seeds of the *skandhas* to act as the causal condition of the *skandhas*. The obtainment of the *skandhas* is the ripening of that which is currently existing. The obtainment of the *dhātus* is the ripening of seeds. The obtainment of the *āyatanas* is the ripening of the other three conditions through both that which is currently existing and seeds: 蘊得謂蘊體起。界得謂蘊種子蘊因緣性。蘊得現行成熟。界得種子成熟。處得通現種。餘三緣成熟 (T. 1828: 368c16-19). But I suspect that this explanation reads too much later Yogācāra philosophy into the text.

The above three interpretations of the term *dhātupratilambha* all differ, and what the *Savitarkādibhūmi* says is not very clear, but perhaps the meaning is something like this: after the initial arising of the *skandhas*, those *skandhas* reproduce themselves from one moment to the next by acting as the *hetupratyaya* for their next moment of existence (in this case, *hetupratyaya*, *bīja*, and *dhātu* are essentially synonymous; for this meaning of *dhātu*, see Yamabe 1997a, 1997b).

¹⁰⁷āyatanañpratilambhaḥ .katamah / yā teśām eva skandhānām tadanya-
pratyayaparigr̄hitatā (Yogācārabhūmi: 209.13-134); skye mched 'thob pa gañ ze na / phuñ
po de dag ñid de las gžan pa'i rkyen gyis yoñs su zin pa gañ yin pa'o (Savitarkādibhūmi
[tib.]: 123a2); 處得云何。謂即彼諸蘊餘緣所攝性 (T. 1579: 323c10-11).

According to the *Paryāyasamgrahañī*, *āyatanañpratilambha* is the completion of the six *āyatanas*, the *nāmarūpa* having grown up (skye mched rñed pa ni miñ dan
gzugs 'phel bas skye mched drug yoñs su rdzogs pa'o—*Paryāyasamgrahañī* [tib.]: 48b1-2; 言處得者。名色增長六處圓滿—T. 1579: 769a15-16).

According to the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*, the sense-organs are the “locations” (*āyatanas*) of the apprehension of the objects of perception. Therefore, this is taught to refute the notion that the perceiver of objects is the self (*cakṣurādīni viśayopalabdhher āyatānī. nopalabdhātra kaścid astīti āyatanañgrahañam trītyakalpanāvyudāsārtham*—149.6-7).

The connection between the *āyatanas* and the remaining three conditions referred to in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* eludes me.

growth of the *skandhas*, which is due to the daily¹⁰⁸ taking of nourishment; (10) *jīvitendriyaprādurbhāva* is the continued existence of the *skandhas* according to the amount of life remaining.

Finally, the *Savitarkādibhūmi* states that the condensed meaning (*saṃśārtha*) of Birth encompasses: the intrinsic state of birth (*jāteḥ svabhāva*); the place in which one is born; the entity that is born;¹⁰⁹ the causes and conditions of which Birth consists; and the nourishment and co-arising factors by means of which Birth is preserved.]¹¹⁰

***Daśabhūmikasūtra* (99.14-15)**

Birth also has two functions. It brings about the emergence of the *skandhas*, and it provides the cause for the generation of Old Age. (*jātir api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati / skandhonmajjanam ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti jarābhinirvṛttaye*)

m. Old Age and Death (*jarāmarāṇa*)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

What is the function of Old Age and Death? They repeatedly yoke beings to decline due to age and to the termination of life-span (*jīvitaparināma*). (*jarāmarāṇam kiṃkarmakam / punah punar vayaḥparināmena jīvitaparināmena ca sattvān yojayati*—26.21-22)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya

Old Age and Death repeatedly yoke beings to decline due to age and to the termination of life-span through yoking them to the destruction of youth and life. (*jarāmarāṇam punah punar vayaḥparināmena jīvitaparināmena ca sattvān yojayati, yaivānāyusor vināśena yojanāt*—33.14-16)

¹⁰⁸Bhattacharya reads *pratidina* with *jīvitendriyaprādurbhāva*, which follows, and notes that the Tibetan text omits it. In fact, both the Tibetan (*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 123a3) and the Chinese translations (T. 1579: 323c11-12) include it in their definitions of *skandhābhinirvṛtti*.

¹⁰⁹This is missing from Bhattacharya's Sanskrit text, but it is found in both the Tibetan (*gaṇ skye ba dai*—*Savitarkādibhūmi* [tib.]: 123a4) and the Chinese (若所生—T. 1579: 323c14).

¹¹⁰*yena copastambhenāhṛtena sahajena ca dhṛiyata ity* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 209.18).

CORRESPONDING PASSAGES

Savitarkādibhūmi (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 210.1-212.5)¹¹¹

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* first deals with Old Age and lists a number of the afflictions that accompany it.¹¹² The *Savitarkādibhūmi* defines individually seventeen of them (there are a number of discrepancies among the Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan versions) and then, as in the case of *jāti*, gives a summary:]

What is the condensed meaning of Old Age? The condensed meaning of Old Age is to be understood (as) the end of life, (which is equivalent to) going beyond the (normally allotted) states of life (*daśātivṛttir*) (and which consists of): the degeneration (*pariṇāma*; literally, transformation) of the body (*āśraya*); the degeneration of the hair (*keśa*);¹¹³ the degeneration of growth (*puṣṭi*); the degeneration of beauty and strength (*tejobala*); the degeneration of health (*ārogya*); the degeneration of color (*varṇa*); the degeneration of movement (*īryāpatha*); the degeneration of the immaterial faculties (*arūpīndriya*); the degeneration of the material faculties (*rūpīndriya*). (*jarāyāḥ punah samāsārthaḥ katamah / āśrayavipariṇāmāḥ keśavipariṇāmāḥ puṣṭivipariṇāmas tejobalavipariṇāma ārogyavipariṇāmo varṇavipariṇāma īryāpathavipariṇāmo 'rūpīndriyavipariṇāmo rūpīndriyavipariṇāmo daśātivṛttir āyuḥsamkṣepasamāsārtho*¹¹⁴ *draṣṭavyah—Yogācārabhūmi*: 211.3-7)

[The *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* finally states that all beings, from whatever class of being, must experience Death, which is defined by a number of nearly synonymous terms. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* gives detailed

¹¹¹ A similar explanation of *jarā* is found in the *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī* (*Paryāyasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 48b3-48b7; T. 1579: 769a18-b1).

¹¹² Again, the version translated by Hsüan-tsang seems closer to the version commented on in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*.

¹¹³ As Bhattacharya notes, this is missing in the Tibetan.

¹¹⁴ This probably should be corrected to something like *āyuḥsamkṣepa ity ayam samāsārtho*.

explanations of each of these terms and again provides a summary:]¹¹⁵.

What again is the condensed meaning of Death? The condensed meaning of Death (encompasses): that which is death; the entity that dies; the manner of death; and the time subsequent to this (i.e., after death) of the one who has died.

(*māraṇasya punah samāsārthaḥ katamah / yā ca cyutih / yasya dharmasya cyutih / yathā ca cyutih cyutasya ca tadūrdhvam yah kālah / ity ayam samāsārthaḥ*—*Yogācārabhūmi*: 212.1-3)

Daśabhūmikasūtra (99.16-18)

Old Age also has two functions. It brings about the degeneration of the faculties, and it provides the cause for the generation of the meeting with Death. Death also has two functions. It destroys the conditioned factors, and it brings about the non-interruption of ignorance. (*jarāpi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati / indriyaparināmam ca karoti / hetum ca dadāti maraṇasamavadhānābhinirvṛttaye / maraṇam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānam bhavati / saṃskāravidhvamsanam ca karoti / aparijñānopacchedam ca karoti*)

6. The Inclusion of the Members of the Formula in the Categories of Defilement

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to the inclusion of the members in [the three categories of] defilement? Ignorance, Subconscious Desire, and Appropriation are included in [the category of] defilement consisting of *kleśa* (*kleśasamkleśa*). The Karmic Forces, Consciousness, and Karmic Existence are included in [the category of] defilement consisting of action (*las kyi kun nas ñon moñs pa = karmasamkleśa*). The remaining [members] are included in [the category of] defilement consisting of

¹¹⁵A similar explanation of *maraṇa* is found in the *Paryāyasamgrahañī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Paryāyasamgrahañī* [tib.]: 48b7-49a2; T. 1579: 769b2-8).

birth (*tshe'i kun nas ñon moñs pa = janmasamkleśa*). (*katham aṅgasamkleśasamgrahataḥ / yā cā 'vidyā, yā ca trṣṇā, yac copādānam ity ayam [kleśa]saṃkleśasamgrahah [ye ca saṃskārā yac ca vijñānam yac ca bhava ity ayam karmasamkleśasamgrahah / śeṣāni janmasamkleśasamgrahah*—26.22-23)¹¹⁶

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya 40F

The inclusion of Consciousness [in the category of] defilement

¹¹⁶There is some problem with the Sanskrit text here. According to Gokhale's edition, the entire section on *aṅgasamkleśasamgraha* reads as follows: *katham aṅgasamkleśasamgrahataḥ / yā cā 'vidyā yā ca trṣṇā yac copādānam ity ayam saṃkleśasamgrahah*. Gokhale gives no indication that his manuscript differs from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.], *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [ch.], *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* [tib.], or *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [ch.]. Pradhan, who also fails to acknowledge that his edition differs from the above-mentioned Chinese and Tibetan translations, as well as from Gokhale's edition, gives the following: *katham aṅgasamkleśasamgrahah / yā cāvidyā yā ca trṣṇā yac copādānam ity ayam saṃkleśasamgrahah / ye ca saṃskārā yac ca vijñānam yac ca bhava ity ayam karmasamkleśasamgrahah / śeṣāni janmasamkleśasamgrahah* (Pradhan 1950: 27.14-16). Pradhan's text essentially agrees with the Chinese and Tibetan translations, with one major exception: instead of *saṃkleśasamgrahah*, the Chinese and the Tibetan suggest *kleśasamkleśasamgrahah* (*ñon moñs pa'i kun nas ñon moñs pa*: 煩惱雜染).

Since I do not have access to the photographs of the manuscript, I cannot determine whether Gokhale's version or Pradhan's version or neither accurately reflects the manuscript reading. It is possible that Gokhale simply dropped the portion from *ye ca saṃskārā* to the end, or perhaps Pradhan translated this portion from the Tibetan and neglected to tell us so. Rahula evidently translates directly from Pradhan's text and gives no evidence of having consulted either the Tibetan and Chinese translations or Gokhale's edition: "L'ignorance, la soif, la saisie: tel est le group de l'impureté [simple] (*saṃkleśasamgraha*). Les formations..." (Rahula 1980: 43). Matsuda, on the other hand, in his Japanese translation, follows the Tibetan and Chinese versions without commenting on Gokhale or Pradhan's readings or Rahula's translation (1983: 42).

Since the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula have elsewhere been analyzed according to three types of *saṃkleśa*, beginning with *kleśasamkleśa* (e.g., *Madhyāntavibhāga*: 32.6 ff. [Yamaguchi 1934: 40.15 ff.]; *Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 13.23-32; implied in *Abhidharmakośa* III 26 [*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 134.24-25]), I accept and translate from Pradhan's text, with the emendation of *kleśasamkleśasamgrahah* for *saṃkleśasamgrahah*.

consisting of action is due to the fact that the member Consciousness is defined¹¹⁷ as the impressions of the Karmic Forces (*samskāravāsanā-prabhāvitavād*).¹¹⁸ (*vijñānasya karma[sām]kleśasamgrahaṇam samskāravāsanāprabhāvitavād vijñānāṅgasya*—33.17-18)

7. Import

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to its import? [The import of] conditioned origination [comprises the following]: (1) the import of the absence of a creator (*niḥkartrkārtha*); (2) the import of the presence of causes (*sahetukārtha*); (3) the import of the absence of beings (*niḥsattvārtha*); (4) the import of dependence (*paratantrārtha*); (5) the import of inactivity (*nirihakārtha*); (6) the import of impermanence (*anityārtha*); (7) the import of momentariness (*kṣanikārtha*); (8) the import of the uninterrupted series of cause and result (*hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*); (9) the import of corresponding cause and result (*anurūpahetuphalārtha*); (10) the import of varied cause and result (*vicitrahetuphalārtha*);¹¹⁹ and (11) the import of determined cause and

¹¹⁷I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for bringing to my attention a long discussion of the meaning of the ending *prabhāvita* in Schmithausen 1969: 109-111.

¹¹⁸The point of this comment is to explain why the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes *vijñāna* in *karmasamkleśasamgraha* rather than in *janmasamkleśasamgraha*, which is where it is included in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (33.2; Yamaguchi 1934: 41.14-16). The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* here refers to the explanation of the first function of Consciousness in the *āṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (see above). For a discussion of this point, see Funahashi 1991: 22-25.

¹¹⁹Gokhale instead supplies *nānāhetuphalārtha* in square brackets, indicating that the word is missing in the manuscript and that he is translating it from the Tibetan or Chinese. Pradhan gives *vicitrahetuphalārtha* without any comment (Pradhan 1950: 27.19). Could he read something in the manuscript that was indecipherable by Gokhale, or is he supplying it from the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*? Again, without photographs of the manuscript, I cannot explain this. In my translation, I follow Pradhan on the basis of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* version.

result (*pratiniyatāhetuphalārtha*).¹²⁰ (*katham arthataḥ / niḥkartrkārthah pratītyasamutpādārthah, sahetukārthah, niḥsattvārthah, paratantrārthah nirīhakārthah, anityārthah, kṣaṇikārthah, hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārthah, anurūpahetuphalārthah, [nānāhetuphalārthah,] pratiniyatāhetuphalārthaś ca pratītyasamutpādah*—26.23-25)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya 40G

[The import of conditioned origination comprises]: (1) the import of the absence of a creator because of the absence of any creator, such as Īśvara; (2) the import of the presence of causes because Ignorance, etc.,

¹²⁰Matsuda (1983: 49 n. 34) notes that this list of eleven imports of *pratītyasamutpāda* is identical to that of the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* (分別緣義初勝法門經—T. 717; 緣生初勝分法本經—T. 716). In fact, there are some differences, mostly in translations of terms, between the two versions of the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* as well as between both versions of the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; below are the three lists for comparison:

Abhidharmasamuccaya (Identical to *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*): (1) 無作者義; (2) 有因義; (3) 離有情義; (4) 依他起義; (5) 無作用義; (6) 無常義; (7) 有剎那義; (8) 因果相續不斷義; (9) 因果相似攝受義; (10) 因果差別義; (11) 因果決定義.

緣生初勝分法本經—T. 716: 834b4-10 (translated by Dharmagupta): (1) 無作者義; (2) 共因者義; (3) 無衆生義; (4) 他生義; (5) 不動義; (6) 無常義; (7) 念念空義; (8) 因果相續不斷義; (9) 種種因果義; (10) 相似因果義; (11) 決定因果義.

分別緣起初勝法門經—T. 717: 841b18-27 (translated by Hsüan-tsang): (1) 無作者義; (2) 有因生義; (3) 離有情義; (4) 依他起義; (5) 無動作義; (6) 性無常義; (7) 剎那滅義; (8) 因果相續無間絕義; (9) 種種因果品類別義; (10) 因果更互相符順義; (11) 因果決定無雜亂義.

Notice also that numbers 9 and 10 are reversed in the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* list.

In the same note, Matsuda refers to a list of eight imports of *pratītyasamutpāda* found in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. I list them here for convenience of comparison, but I discuss them in Chapter Six (underlined items correspond to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*): (1) *niḥsattvārtha*; (2) *anityārtha*; (3) *itvarapratyupasthāpanārtha*; (4) *paratantrārtha*; (5) *nirīhārtha*; (6) *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*; (7) *anurūpahetuphalapratavartanārtha*; (8) *karmasvabhāvārtha* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.13-18). Thus, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* contains *niḥkartrka-*, *sahetuka-*, *kṣaṇika-*, *vicitrahetuphalā-*, and *pratiniyatāhetuphalārtha*, which are not in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* list. On the other hand, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* lacks *itvarapratyupasthāpanārtha* and *karmasvabhāvārtha*, which are included in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*.

are causes [of that which has originated conditionally]; (3) the import of the absence of beings because of the non-existence of a self per se (*svayamanātmatvāt*); (4) the import of dependence because of the dependence [of everything conditionally produced] on conditions (*pratyayādhinatvāt*); (5) the import of inactivity because the conditions lack exertion (*pratyayānām nirvyāpāratvāt*); (6) the import of impermanence because of the fact that nothing is eternal (*āśāsvatatvāt*); (7) the import of momentariness because of the non-abiding [of that which is conditionally produced] after the time of arising; (8) the import of the uninterrupted series of cause and result because the moment of result arises at the same time that the moment of cause perishes (*kāraṇakṣaṇanirodhasamakālam kāryakṣaṇotpādāt*); [Abhidharma-samuccayabhaṣya p. 34] (9) the import of corresponding cause and result¹²¹ because it is not the case that every [result] arises from every [cause] indiscriminately (*sarvataḥ sarvasyāsaṁbhavāt*); (10) the import of varied cause and result because of the arising of single and manifold results from manifold and single causes (*anekaikajatiyāt kāraṇād ekānekajatiyākāryotpattēh*);¹²² (11) the import of determined cause and result because there is no coming to fruition of things heterogeneous to

¹²¹The Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* reads *anurūpa-hetuphalaparigrahārtha*, which corresponds to the 因果相似攝受義 of the Chinese translations of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*. However, the Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*, and *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā* all agree on *anurūpahetuphalārtha*.

¹²²I do not understand what this means, and Matsuda does not make it any clearer. In the section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on the *cittaviprayuktasāmskāras*, *pratiniyama* is explained as being a designation for the varied nature of cause and effect (*hetuphalānānātvam*—Pradhan 1950: 11.17-18). But the *Bhaṣya*'s explanation of *hetuphalānānātvam*, that it refers to the way that desirable effects proceed from good actions, etc. (*iṣṭasya phalasya sucaritam aniṣṭasya duścaritam ity evam ādi / phalānām prthak prthag anyonyahetukatvam*—*Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*: 10.16-17), does not seem to pertain to the question of “single and manifold” causes and effects here.

the stream.¹²³ (niskartrkārtha īśvarādikartrrahitavāt/ sahetukārtho 'vidyādihetukatvāt / nihsattvārthah svayam anātmavāt/ paratantrārthah pratyayādhinātvāt/ nirīhakārthah pratyāyānām nirvyāpāratvāt/ anityārtho 'śāśvatatvāt / kṣanikārtha utpattikālāt pareñānavasthānāt/ hetuphalaprabandhānu pacchedārthah kāraṇa kaṣaṇa nirodhasamakālām kārya kaṣaṇa notpādāt/ anurūpahetuphalaparigrahārthah sarvataḥ sarvasyāsaṁbhavāt/ vicitrahetuphalārtho 'nekaikajātiyāt kāraṇād ekānekajātiyakāryoyatpatteḥ/ pratiniyatahetuphalārthah samtānāntarā- phalanāt—33.19-34.3)¹²⁴

8. Profundity

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to its profundity? Its profundity is to be understood in terms of (a) the profundity of cause (*hetugāmbhīrya*); (b) the profundity of characteristics (*lakṣaṇagāmbhīrya*); (c) the profundity of arising (*utpattigāmbhīrya*); (d) the profundity of continued existence (*sthiti**gāmbhīrya*); (e) the profundity of progression (*vr̥ttagāmbhīrya*).¹²⁵

¹²³ There seems to be a correspondence between *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* and one of the six modes of *bija* mentioned in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (see Chapter 6, section A). According to the *Mahāyānasamgrahabhbhāṣya*, “Ils [bijas] sont les auteurs d'un fruit propre: un germe donné produit seulement le fruit qui lui est propre. Ainsi, la connaissance-réceptacle produit seulement la connaissance-réceptacle, et le blé produit seulement le fruit du blé” (Lamotte 1973: 40-41). Although our text does not mention *ālayavijñāna* or *bija*, it describes the same causal principle, namely that the result is essentially homogenous with the cause.

¹²⁴ Some of these *arthas* call to mind the definitions of certain of the *cittaviprayuktasamkāras* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Pradhan 1950: 11.16-24; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya*: 9.7-11.8): specifically, *hetuphalaprabandhānu* *pacchedārtha* seems to correspond to *pravṛtti*; *vicitrahetuphalārtha* and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* seem related to *pratiniyama*; *anurūpahetuphalārtha* corresponds to *yoga*; and *kṣanikārtha* perhaps is related to *java*. I examine the relationship between the group of *cittaviprayuktasamkāras* pertaining to cause and effect and *pratityasamutpāda* in Chapter Six.

¹²⁵ The Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* gives *pravṛtti* instead of *vr̥tti*, but there is no difference between the Chinese texts of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavākyā*, which both give 轉, or among the

(*katham gāmbhīryataḥ / hetugāmbhīryato 'pi, lakṣaṇagāmbhīryato 'pi, utpattigāmbhīryato 'pi, sthitigāmbhīryato 'pi, vṛttigāmbhīryato 'pi gāmbhīryam draṣṭavyam*—26.25-27)¹²⁶

***Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* 40H (1)**

Moreover, the fivefold profundity of conditioned origination is to be understood by means of these imports [of the absence of a creator, etc.].¹²⁷

(a) Profundity of cause [is to be understood] by means of two imports [i.e., *nihkartṛkārtha* and *sahetukārtha*] because [these imports (?) are] an antidote to theories of inconsistent causation¹²⁸ and theories of no causation (*viśamahetvahetuvāda*).

(b) Profundity of characteristics [is to be understood] by means of one import [i.e., *nīhsattvārtha*] because of the fact that there is no self.

(c) Profundity of arising [is to be understood] by means of two imports [i.e., *paratantrārtha* and *nirīhakārtha*] because of the fact that, even though results arise due to conditions, they are not [really] manufactured by them.

(d) Profundity of continued existence [is to be understood] by means

Tibetan texts of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, and *Abhidharmasamuccayavākhyā*, which all give 'byūñ bas'.

Although I hesitate to correct the Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* here, I translate *vṛtti* as though it were equivalent to *pravṛtti*. In any case, the two words share much of the same meaning.

¹²⁶The *sūtrāntasaṅgraha* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition also analyzes “profound” *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms of *anitya*, *duḥkha*, *śūnya*, and *nairātmya* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 228.8-229.3). This rather long discussion, with reference to *bija*, is interesting and merits further study.

¹²⁷This is supplied from the *Abhidharmasamuccayavākhyā* (*Abhidharmasamuccayavākhyā* [tib.]: 78b4; T. 1606: 712b21-22), the text of which is somewhat different from that of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*. For convenience, I reproduce the corresponding portions of the Tibetan texts of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavākhyā*:

(*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.]) *yan don 'di dag gis rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byūñ ba rnam pa lñas zab par rig pa bya ste/*

(*Abhidharmasamuccayavākhyā* [tib.]) *yan byed pa po med pa la sog s pa'i don 'di dag gis rkyen so so las kun tu skye ba rnam pa lñas rtogs dka' bar rig pa bya ste/*

¹²⁸That is to say, in which the cause is inconsistent with the result (see also section A2c).

of two imports [i.e., *anityārtha* and *kṣanikārtha*] because of the [illusory] appearance of duration on the part of things that are not [really] constant (*avyavasthitānām sthityābhāsanād*).

(e) Profundity of progression [is to be understood] by means of four of the imports [i.e., *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*, *anurūpahetuphalārtha*, *vicitrahetuphalārtha*, and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*] because of the difficulty of understanding the progression of cause and result. (*punar ebhir evārthaiḥ pratītyasamutpādasya pañcavidhāṇ gāmbhīryam veditavyam / hetugāmbhīryam viśamahetvāhetuvādapratiṣṭhāna dvābhyaṁ arthābhyaṁ / laksanagāmbhīryam nirātmakatayaikārthena/ utpatti gāmbhīryam pratyayebhyāḥ phalotpattāḥ apy atatkrtataya dvābhyaṁ arthābhyaṁ / sthitigāmbhīryam avyavasthitānām sthityābhāsanād dvābhyaṁ arthābhyaṁ / pravṛttigāmbhīryam hetuphalapratītidurvijñānatvā¹²⁹ caturbhīr arthaḥ iti—34.4-9)*

Abhidharmasamuccaya

Furthermore, conditioned origination is momentary, yet continued existence (*sthiti*) is experienced.

Conditioned origination has inactive (*nirīhaka*) conditions, yet it is experienced as having potent (*samartha*) conditions.

Conditioned origination is devoid of beings, yet it is experienced from the point of view of beings (*sattvataś copalabhyate*).

Conditioned origination has no creator, yet the non-perishing of actions and results is experienced. (*api khalu kṣaṇikāḥ pratītyasamutpādāḥ, sthitiś copalabhyate / nirīhaka pratyayaḥ pratītyasamutpādāḥ, samartha pratyayaś copalabhyate / niḥsattvāḥ pratītyasamutpādāḥ, sattvataś copalabhyate / niṣkṛtāḥ pratītyasamutpādāḥ, karmaphalāvipraṇāśāś copalabhyate—26.27-29*)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya 40H (2)

Even without an agent (*kartṛ*), there exist action (*karma*), the performance (*kriyā*) [of action], and the experience of the result of that

¹²⁹Corrected from *pravattidurvijñāna* (Sakuma 1996: 14).

[action] (*tatphalopabhoga*); this is how the non-perishing of actions and results is to be understood here. (*antareṇa eva kartāraṁ karma kriyā cāsti tatphalopabhogaś cety ayam atra karmaphalāvipraṇāśo veditavyah*—34.10-11)

Abhidharmasamuccaya

[That which has originated conditionally]¹³⁰ is produced (i) not by itself, (ii) not by another, (iii) not by the two [i.e., by itself and by another], (iv) not by its own action, not by the action of another, and not without cause. For this reason, too, [conditioned origination] is profound.¹³¹ (*na svato na parato na dvābhyaṁ na svayamkā[rapara]kārāhetusamutpannah / ato 'pi gambhīrah*—26.29-30)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya 40H (3)

(i) A *dharma* is made not by itself because that by which it might be made [namely, itself], not yet having been produced, does not exist. (ii) [A *dharma*] is made not by another because the conditions [due to which it arises] are not an agent. (iii) [A *dharma*] is made not by both¹³² because [it is not made]¹³³ by those two causes [that have already been shown in (i) and (ii) to be impossible]. (iv) [A *dharma*] is produced not by its own action, not by the action of another, and not without cause¹³⁴ because

¹³⁰The Chinese supplies 諸緣起法 (T. 1605: 671a28-29).

¹³¹The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, in its discussion of *pratītyasamutpādakaūśalya*, similarly relates four profundities to this *catuskoti*: 由善了知四種甚深緣起故。謂不從自生。不從他生。非自他生。非無因生 (T. 1602: 546b19-21).

¹³²*nobhaya* in contrast with *na dvābhyaṁ* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

¹³³The Tibetan versions supply this: *rgyu de gñis kyis ma byas pa'i phyir ro—Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.]: 25a7; *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 195b3.

¹³⁴Tatia's Sanskrit text reads *nāśb[sic]ayamkārāpa[ra]kārāhetusamutpannah*, which is supported by the Chinese translations of both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (非不自作他作因生—T. 1605: 671b19-c1; T. 1606: 712c3). Sakuma corrects this to *nāsvayam-*, which he says is reflected in the manuscript (1996: 14). However, as Tatia points out, the Tibetan texts of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 78a3-4), *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* [tib.]: 25a7-b1), and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (*Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 195b2) all agree in supporting Gokhale's reading of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* manuscript (*na svayamkā[rapara]kārāhetusamutpannah*). I follow Matsuda (1983: 44; 50 n. 37) in

conditions¹³⁵ have the ability to produce results.¹³⁶ (na svayamkrto dharmo 'nutpannasyābhāvād yenāsau kriyate/ na parakṛtaḥ pratyayānām akartrikatvāt / nobhayakṛta etenaiva kāraṇadvayena / na svayamkārāpa[ra]kārahetusamutpannah hetupratyayānām phalotpattau sāmarthyāt—34.12-15)

[There is] another way [of explaining this]: (i) [A *dharma*] is not made by itself because of its dependence on conditions. (ii) [A *dharma*] is not made by another because, even when the conditions [for its arising] are present, there is no arising of that which lacks a seed. (iii) [A *dharma*] is not made by both [itself and another] because both of them are inactive (*tadubhayor nirīhakatvāt*).¹³⁷ (iv) [A *dharma*] is not produced without cause because seeds and conditions have real efficacy. (*aparah paryāyah / na svayamkṛtaḥ pratyayāpekṣaṇāt / na parakṛtaḥ satsv api pratyayēṣu nirbījasyānupādāt / nobhayakṛtas tadubhayor nirīhakatvāt / nāhetusamutpanno bijapratyayānām śaktisadbhā[vā]d iti*—34.15-18)

Indeed it is also [said]:

Because it has its own seed, [a *dharma*] is not [produced] by another;
Because of its dependence on those [conditions],¹³⁸ [it is] not [produced] by itself.

Because of the powerlessness to act [on the part of itself and another, it is] not [produced] by the two.

And because of the efficacy of those [seeds and conditions], [it is] not [produced] without cause.¹³⁹

correcting the text in accordance with the Sanskrit reading from the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. Incidentally, Pradhan's reading (*na svayamkārāpa[ra]kārahetusamutpannah*) does not completely agree with Gokhale's (Pradhan 1950: 27.24).

¹³⁵ Although Tatia's Sanskrit text reads *hetupratyayānām*, the *Abhidharma-samuccayabhaṣya* [tib.], *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā* [tib.], and *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā* [ch.] all suggest simply *pratyayānām*.

¹³⁶ Matsuda notes that the *Abhidharma-samuccayabhaṣya* [tib.], *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā* [tib.], and *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā* [ch.] give *pratyayānām* instead of the *hetupratyayānām* of Tatia's text (1983: 50 n. 38). Again, I follow Matsuda in my translation.

¹³⁷ See the *Abhidharma-samuccayabhaṣya* explanation of *nirīhakārtha* above.

¹³⁸ The Chinese translation of the *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā* supplies the antecedent of the *tad* of the Sanskrit text (*tadapekṣaṇāt*): 待衆緣—T. 1606: 712c11.

¹³⁹ Neither Matsuda nor the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translators seem to have been able

Conditioned origination would be profound [even] if it were [only] a repudiation of the two points (*dvividhakoṭi*): “not by itself”; “not by another.” It is still more [profound] in that four points are repudiated. Therefore, it must be understood that [conditioned origination] is the ultimate in profundity. (*bhavati hy api—svabijatvān na parataḥ na svayam tadapekṣaṇāt / niśceṣṭatvān na ca dvābhyaṁ tac chakter nāpy ahetutāḥ // iti / na svayam na parato dvividhakoṭipratikṣepe 'pi gambhīraḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ syāt prāg eva yatra catasro 'pi koṭayāḥ pratikṣipyante, tasmād etasya paramagāmbhīryam veditavyam*—34.18-22)

9. Varieties¹⁴⁰

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to its varieties? Its varieties are to be understood in terms of: (i) the variety of the arising of consciousness (*vijñānotpattiprabheda*);

to locate the source of this verse. However, the same verse appears in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*:

又緣起法當知有四種道理。何等為四。頌曰 自種故非他／持緣故非自／／無作故非共／／用故非無因／／ 論曰。由四道理入無常性。謂諸行法不從他生。自種起故。亦非自生。持外緣故。亦非俱生。俱無作故。亦非無因。彼二於生有功用故 (T. 1602: 551a3-9).

It does not seem to be quoted here; rather, it is incorporated as a verse of the text (this is supported by the fact that it appears in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* *sung*, a text comprised of only the verses from the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* [T. 1603: 585c20-21]). Thus, it is at least possible that the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* is the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*'s source.

¹⁴⁰ As I mentioned above (see note 35), the *prabheda* portion corresponds to the *mukha* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, which states that *pratītyasamutpāda* proceeds by means of eight “doors” (*mukha*): (1) *adhyātmam vijñānotpattimukha*; (2) *bahirdhā sasyaniṣpattimukha*; (3) *sattvaloka-cyutiyutpattimukha*; (4) *bhājanalokasaṃvartavartamukha*; (5) *āhāropastambhamukha*; (6) *istāniṣṭakarmatadanurūpaphalopabhogamukha*; (7) *prabhāvamukha*; (8) *vyavadānamukha* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.6-11). Matsuda (1983: 50 n. 39) has noted this correspondence, as well as the slight differences between the two texts, and he has identified another corresponding passage from the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* (T. 717: 841a3-25; T. 716: 833c21-834a13).

(ii) the variety of birth and death (*cyutupapattiprabheda*);¹⁴¹ (iii) the variety of the arising of the external crop (*bāhyaśasyotpattiprabheda*);¹⁴² (iv) the variety of dissolution and development (*samvartavivartaprabheda*); (v) the variety of the support [of beings] by means of nourishment (*āhāropastambhaprabheda*); (vi) the variety of the distinction between desirable and undesirable destinies (*iṣṭāniṣṭagativibhāgaprabheda*);¹⁴³ (vii) the variety of purity (*viśuddhiprabheda*); and (viii) the variety of powers (*prabhāvaprabheda*). (*katham prabhedataḥ / vijñānotpattiprabhedataḥ, cyutupapattiprabhedataḥ, bāhyaśasyotpattiprabhedataḥ, samvartavivartaprabhedataḥ, āhāropastambhaprabhedataḥ, iṣṭāniṣṭagativibhāgaprabhedataḥ, viśuddhiprabhedataḥ, prabhāvaprabhedataś ca prabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ*—26.30-32)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya 40I

[Its varieties are to be understood: (i) in terms of the variety of the arising of consciousness [because] it is said [in the *sūtra*] that visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) arises depending on the eye and on matter (*rūpa*), and so on in this manner; (ii) in terms of the variety of birth and death [because] with reference to the world of beings it is said [in the *sūtra*] that the Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition, and so on in this manner; (iii) in terms of the variety of the arising of the external crop [because] the sprout (*aṅkura*) depends on the seed (*bīja*), and the stem (*kānda*) depends on the sprout. Similarly, stalks (*nāda*), leaves (*patra*), blossoms (*puṣpa*), and fruit (*phala*) are to be [understood as being] connected [in such a relationship of successive dependency]; (iv) in terms of the variety of dissolution and development because the “great earth” (*mahāprthivi*), etc., arises due to the predominance of

¹⁴¹The Chinese here supplies the word 內—“internal”: 内死生差別 (T. 1605: 671b2).

¹⁴²The Chinese here adds 等, “etc.”: 外穀等差別 (T. 1605: 671b3).

¹⁴³Matsuda (1983: 50 n. 40) has identified a parallel to this in the *Mahāyāna-samgraha*, which mentions two types of *pratīyasamutpāda*, *svabhāvibhāgīn* and *iṣṭāniṣṭavibhāgīn* (*Mahāyāna-samgraha* [tib.]: 10.29-11.10; Lamotte 1973: 36-37).

common karma on the part of all beings (*sarvasattvasādhāraṇā-karmādhipatya*); (v) in terms of the variety of the support [of beings] by means of nourishment because beings abide in the three realms due to the four types of nourishment;¹⁴⁴ (vi) the variety of the distinction between desirable and undesirable destinies because [beings] go to good or bad destinies depending on [their] good and bad conduct; (vii) in terms of the variety of purity [because] it is said that [the process of obtaining enlightenment] begins with the arising of the (*dharmas*) leading to penetration into truth (*nirvedhabhāgīya*)¹⁴⁵ depending on the (*dharmas*) leading to liberation (*moksabhāgīya*) [and proceeds] in due order through the path of insight (*darśanamārga*) and the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) up to the obtainment of arhatship,¹⁴⁶ or, [to give another example, it] begins with the arising of correct understanding (*samyagdrṣṭi*) depending on the speech of another¹⁴⁷ and on correct attention (*yoniśo manaskāra*), which is internal, [and thus eventually leads to] the destruction of all outflows (*sarvāsravavakṣaya*); (viii) in terms of the variety of powers [because] it is said that the distinguished qualities (*vaiśeṣika guna*), such as superknowledge (*abhijñā*), etc., are dependent on [spiritual] realization (*adhigama*). By means of these varieties, the conditioned origination of the conditioning factors (*samskāra*) is to be investigated in detail. (*vijñānotpatti-prabhedataś cakṣuh pratitya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam ity*

¹⁴⁴For four kinds of *āhāra* (*kavadīkāra*, *sparśa*, *manahsāmcetanā*, and *vijñāna*) see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 152.7 ff.

¹⁴⁵For this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 78.

¹⁴⁶In the sixth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*, one can find the order of spiritual attainment compared to the development of a plant: "In one life, one might produce the roots of good that lead to liberation. In the second [life, one might produce the *dharmas*] that lead to penetration. In the third [life, one might produce] the Path. [This is] like the order of the planting of the seed, the growth of the plant, and the arising of the fruit" (*ekasmin janmani moksabhāgīyam kuśalamūlam utpādayet / dvitīye nirvedhabhāgīyāni / trītye āryamārgam / bījaviropanasasyābhivṛddhaphalottattikramavat—Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 349.8-9; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 178).

¹⁴⁷The Chinese translation adds that this is external (外) in contrast to the internal correct contemplation that follows (T. 1606: 712c27).

evam ādi / cyutyutpattiprabhedatah¹⁴⁸ sattvalokam adhikṛtya,
 avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādi / bāhyasasyotpattiprabhedatah¹⁴⁹
 bijām pratītyāṅkuraḥ, aṅkurām pratītya kāṇḍaḥ / tathā nādapatra-
 puṣpaphalāni¹⁵⁰ yojyāni / saṃvartavivartaprabhedatah sarvasattva-
 sādhāraṇakarmādhipatyam pratītya mahāprthivyādīnām utpādāt/
 āhāropastambhaprabhedataś catura āharān pratītya traidhātuke
 sattvānām avasthānāt / istiṇistagativibhāgaprabhedatah sucaritaduścarite
 pratītya sugatidurgatigamanāt / viśuddhiprabhedata mokṣabhbhāgīyāni
 pratītya nirvedhabhbhāgīyotpattito yāvad darśanabhbhāvanāmārgānu-
 pūrvyārhattvaprapātitah, parato vā ghoṣam pratītyādhyātmaṁ ca yoniśo
 manaskāram samyagdrṣṭis tato yāvat sarvāsravakṣaya iti/
prabhāvaprabhedata 'dhigamam pratītyābhijñādayo vaiśeṣikā guṇā iti /
 ebhīḥ prabhedair vistareṇa saṃskārāṇām pratītyasamutpādo
 'nusartavayah—35.1-13)

10. Progressive and Regressive Order

Abhidharmasamuccaya

How [should that which has originated conditionally be understood] with reference to the progressive and regressive order [of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]? The exposition of the progressive and regressive order of conditioned origination is to be understood with reference to both the (i) progressive and (ii) regressive order of defilement and (iii) the progressive and (iv) regressive order of purification. (*katham anulomapratilomataḥ / saṃklesānuloma-
 pratilomato 'pi vyavadānānulomapratilomato 'pi pratītyasamut-
 pādasyānulomapratilomanirdeśo*¹⁵¹ draṣṭavyaḥ—26.32-34)

Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya 40J

With reference to the (i) progressive and (ii) regressive order of defilement: (i) the exposition of the progressive order [of conditioned origination, namely,] “the Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their

¹⁴⁸Corrected from *vyutpatti*^o (Sakuma 1996: 14).

¹⁴⁹Corrected from *bāhyavasya* (Sakuma 1996: 14).

¹⁵⁰Corrected from *nā 'patra*^o (Sakuma 1996: 14).

¹⁵¹Here I follow Pradhan (1950: 28.4). Gokhale gives *°asyā 'nuloma*^o.

condition,” etc., [is to be understood as] concerning the regular order of origination-and-continuance¹⁵² (*pravṛtyānupūrvī*); (ii) the exposition of the regressive order [of conditioned origination] is to be understood as concerning the establishment of the [Four Noble] Truths, [namely:] “Old Age and Death exist; there is an origin of Old Age and Death; the cessation of Old Age and Death is [possible]; there is a Path leading to the cessation of Old Age and Death.” ([sam]klesānulomapratilomata¹⁵³
iti pravṛtyānupūrvīm adhikṛtya, avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādy anulomanirdeśah / jarāmaranām jarāmara[na]samudayo [jarāmaranānirodho] jarāmaranānirodhagāminī pratipad iti satyavyavasthānam adhikṛtya pratilomanirdeśo veditavyah—35.14-17)

With reference to the (iii) progressive and (iv) regressive order of purification¹⁵⁴: (iii) thus for instance, [the statement,] “the cessation of the Karmic Forces is the result of the cessation of Ignorance, etc.,” is the exposition of the progressive order of purification; (iv) [and the question,] “Due to the non-existence of what will Old Age and Death not exist [and] due to the cessation of what [will] the cessation of Old Age and Death [result]?” is the exposition¹⁵⁵ of the regressive order [of purification]. ([vyavadānānulomapratilomata iti] *tadyathā 'vidyā-nirodhāt saṃskāranirodhā ity evam ādi vyavadānānulomanirdeśah / kasmin na sati na jarāmaranām bhavati kasya nirodhāj jarāmaranānirodha iti pratilomanirdeśah*—35.18-20)

¹⁵²This is Schmithausen's translation of *pravṛtti* (1987: 173).

¹⁵³I am emending from ^o*pratiloma* on the basis of the text of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*.

¹⁵⁴This is missing from both the Sanskrit manuscript and the Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and *Abhidharma-samuccaya* *abhāṣya* and *Abhidharma-samuccaya* *avyākhyā*. Tatia supplies *vyavadānānulomapratilomata iti* from the Chinese (清淨順逆者—T. 1606: 713a6).

¹⁵⁵As Tatia notes, the Tibetan and Chinese versions have *pratilomanirdeśah* instead of the *pratilomanirdeśataḥ* of the Sanskrit manuscript. Following Matsuda (1983: 50 n. 41), I emend *pratilomanirdeśataḥ* to *pratilomanirdeśah*.

III. THE TWO-LIFETIMES/SINGLEFOLD THEORY OF CAUSATION

A. Two Lifetimes or Three?

In order to understand the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula more than superficially, it is necessary, as Takasaki has pointed out (1987: 151), to investigate the relationships among the various members, as well as the meanings of the individual members. The section on *āngasamāsa* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is just such an investigation, and its fourfold division of the members is one of the most striking features of its discussion of conditioned origination. In this section, the principle of conditioned origination is applied to the cycle of rebirth, and the twelve members are divided into four groups according to their roles in the rebirth process. Since this division is only one of a number of such divisions proposed by Buddhist thinkers, we must compare it with other interpretations, especially those of the Sarvāstivāda, whose *abhidharma* the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* often seems to supersede.

One division particularly helpful for an understanding of the relationship among the members can be found, among other places, in the *Vibhāṣā* and in Vasubandhu's exposition of Sarvāstivādin doctrine in the *Abhidharmakośa*. In this grouping, members of the formula are not explicitly assigned positions in the cycle; rather they are grouped according to their essential nature. As we shall see, this is a preliminary step toward establishing their positions. According to this division, there are three groups: (1) Ignorance, Subconscious Desire, and Appropriation are of the nature of defilement (*kleśa*); (2) the Karmic Forces and Karmic Existence are of the nature of karma; (3) Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, Feeling, Birth, and Old Age and Death are of the nature of substance (*vastu*)¹⁵⁶ or result

¹⁵⁶Vasubandhu explains this as being due to the fact that they are the support of *kleśa* and *karma* (*kleśakarmāśrayatvāt*—*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 134.12).

(*phala*).¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the first two groups are, in essence, cause. However, *kleśa* cannot produce result immediately; the mediation of karma is necessary.¹⁵⁸ Thus, karma, which in Sarvāstivāda, but not in

¹⁵⁷ *Abhidharmakośa* III 26; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 134.3-15; see also La Vallée Poussin 1913: 34-36.

In a note to his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, La Vallée Poussin states, “Dans toutes les autres sources, le troisième *vartman* est seulement défini comme rétribution (*vipāka*) [ou fruit, *phala*]” (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 68 n. 2). Unfortunately, he does not specify what all these other sources are. As far as I have discovered, the earlier *abhidharma* texts do not, in fact, define the third *vartman* as *vipāka* or *phala*. The *Vibhāṣā* simply states that the three divisions are *kleśa*, *karma*, and *vastu* (三分者。謂煩惱業事—T. 1545: 122b12), and it mentions the opinion of another teacher that the members can be gathered into three groups: *kleśa*, *karma*, and *duḥkha* (又十二支。攝為三聚。謂煩惱業苦—T. 1545: 122b15-16). The *Abhidharmāmrta* calls the third division *duḥkha* (T. 1553: 970c27; Sastri 1953: 70.5; Van den Broeck 1977: 131). The Chinese translation of Dharmārī’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya* uses the character 體, which is probably a translation of *vastu* (T. 1550: 826c26; Willemen 1975: 129), while 事, the more common translation of *vastu*, is found in both Upaśānta’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1551: 860c1) and the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1552: 935b18). None of these texts mentions *vipāka* or *phala*.

On the other hand, the *Visuddhimagga*, as La Vallée Poussin mentions in the same note, also contains three divisions, the third of which is called *vipākavatṭa*; what he does not mention, however, is that *jāti* and *jarāmarāṇa* are not included (*saṅkhārabhavā kammavatṭam*, *avijjā-taṇhupādānāni kilesavatṭam*, *viññāna-nāmarūpa-saṭṭayatana-phassa-vedanā vipākavatṭan ti*—498.7-9) because they comprise *viññāna*, etc. (*Āyatim phalapañcakan ti viññānādīni pañca. Tāni jātigahañena vuttāni. Jarāmarāṇam pana tesam yeva jarāmarāṇam*—498.1-2).

None of the commentators whom I have been able to consult (Yaśomitra, Saṃghabhadra, P’u-kuang 普光, and Fa-pao 法寶) remarks upon Vasubandhu’s application of the term *phala* to the members included in *vastu*. Of course, in the three-lifetimes/ twofold causation system of Sarvāstivāda, discussed below, it makes sense to call these members “result,” since *viññāna*, etc., are the result of past *avidyā* and *saṃskāra*, while *jāti* and *jarāmarāṇa* are the result of present *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava*. Conversely, in the two-lifetimes/singlefold system, it does not make sense to call *viññāna* (*nāmarūpa* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*), etc., “result,” since they are seeds; only when they are actualized as *jāti* and *jarāmarāṇa* can they be called *phala* (see section C2 of this chapter).

Usually, when Vasubandhu changes or adds to what is said in the *Vibhāṣā* and *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, there is some significance, but in this case I cannot figure out what it is.

¹⁵⁸ *kleśat karma / upādānat bhavo 'vidyāyāś ca saṃskārāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 134.26-135.1; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 68).

other schools, has a physical as well as a mental component,¹⁵⁹ enables the purely mental state of defilement to have a tangible consequence, namely rebirth, which consists of both mental and physical factors. The last group is result, which in turn comprises two subsets of consecutive members, one consisting of Consciousness through Feeling, the other of Birth and Old Age and Death. These two subsets correspond to the projected and actualized sets of members in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, with the exception of Consciousness, the causal aspect of which the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* emphasizes by including it in the projecting set. This placement of Consciousness is in contrast to not only Sarvāstivāda, which considers *vijñāna* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula to be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and thus purely fruitional, but also the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which includes *vijñāna* in the group of projected members on the grounds that it refers to the seeds projected from the previous life that are the cause of *ālayavijñāna*.¹⁶⁰

Next we come to divisions of members according to their position in the rebirth cycle. Concerning the number of lifetimes needed to complete one cycle of causation, beginning with Ignorance and ending with Old Age and Death, there are two major schools of thought. The first, presented by Vasubandhu as the orthodox Sarvāstivādin position and indeed found in the *Vibhāṣā*¹⁶¹ and in the *Abhidharmārta*,¹⁶² requires three lifetimes and two rounds of causation.¹⁶³ This system can

¹⁵⁹ See, for example, the definition of *kāyavijñapti* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: *cittavaśena kāyasya tathā tathā samsthānam kāyavijñaptih* (192.24; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 4). *Avijñaptirūpa*, too, although not exactly material, is nevertheless *rūpa*, and, as P.S. Jaini has pointed out in a personal communication, *karma* inheres in it (see also Hirakawa 1990: 189-193; Wood 1979).


¹⁶⁰ 二所引支。謂本識內親生當來異熟果攝識等五種。是前二支所引發故。此中識種謂本識因 (T. 1585: 43c2-4; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 482; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 354-355).

¹⁶¹ T. 1545: 117a26-29.

¹⁶² *A p'i t'an k'an lu wei lun* 阿毘曇甘露味論—T. 1553: 970c28-29; Sastri 1953: 70.6-7; Van den Broeck 1977: 132-133.

¹⁶³ *san shih liang ch'ung* 三世兩重, as opposed to *liang shih i ch'ung* 兩世一重. These expressions are commonly used by Japanese Buddhist scholars and seem to have their origin in the commentarial tradition on the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*; see *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 358-359.

be represented by the following chart:



In this arrangement, the past life is the cause of the resultant aspect of the present life, while the causal aspect of the present life produces the future life, which consists of Birth and Old Age and Death.¹⁶⁴

This system, which is probably the most widely known division of the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula,¹⁶⁵ has a certain appeal. First of all, by mentioning three lifetimes, it answers the commonsensical questions of how we arrived in this lifetime in the first place, and what will become of us in the next life. Furthermore, it suits

¹⁶⁴ *Abhidharmakośa* III 20; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 131.3-11.

¹⁶⁵ It can be seen for example in the Pāli tradition in the *Visuddhimagga*: *Atītā-paccuppannānāgatā c'assa tayo kālā. Tesu pāliyam sarūpato āgatavasena, avijjā sankhārā cā ti dve aṅgāni atītakālāni; viññānādīni bhavāvasānāni attha paccuppannakālāni; jāti c'eva jarāmarāṇañ ca dve anāgatakālāni ti veditabbāni* (*Visuddhimagga*: 496.8-11). See also *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*: *avijjā sankhārā atīto addhā, jātijarāmarāṇam anāgato addhā, majjhe atīta paccupanne addhā ti tayo addhā* (*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*: 142.3-5).

one of the major contentions of the Sarvāstivāda school, that the past and the future really exist, that is to say, that past and future *dharmas* exist. Finally it is simple, at least superficially, since it does not disturb the order of the members; thus, it lends itself to pictorial representation in the outer ring of the wheel of life (*bhavacakra*, Tibetan *srid pa'i 'khor lo*) familiar to us from Tibetan painting.¹⁶⁶

The second way of distributing the members into lifetimes requires only two lifetimes and one round of causation.¹⁶⁷ According to this system, or at least to the version presented in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, the causal members, which constitute the projecting set of members (Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness) and the actualizing set (Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence), belong to one life. The resultant members, which constitute the projected set (Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling) and the actualized set (Birth and Old Age and Death), belong to the next life. Thus, all the causal members are assigned to the earlier lifetime, and all the resultant members to the later. This system is generally recognized as being associated with the Yogācāra school although Matsuda, following Yamaguchi's conclusions regarding the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, seems to feel that it is more properly classified as Hinayāna and hence connected to the Sautrāntika school (1982a: 48). Although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* never says so explicitly, its scheme can equally well explain birth from the past life into the present and from the present life into the future.¹⁶⁸

If I understand Matsuda correctly, he believes that the treatment in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is the earliest example of the “two-lifetimes/singlefold” theory of causation (1982a: 48). However, this very terse arrangement of the members of the formula, which cannot be understood without reference to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, does

¹⁶⁶For a list of the constituents of each of the four rings, see the large Tibetan-Chinese dictionary (*Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*: 2976-2977).

¹⁶⁷*liang shih i ch'ung* 兩世一重.

¹⁶⁸For a sixth-century Chinese discussion of this question in particular and a summary of various divisions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula over numbers of lifetimes, see the *Ta ch'eng i cheng* 大乘義章 of Ch'ing-ying Hui-yüan 淨影慧遠 (T. 1851: 549a6-550a29).

not give the appearance of being a newly worked-out scheme. In searching for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*'s sources, I have found that its system has certain features in common with the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* regarding the lifetimes to which particular members are assigned. Moreover, it closely matches what is said, although in a non-schematic way, in the section on *pratītyasamutpādaśarīra* in the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* found in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.¹⁶⁹ In order to trace the development of the two-lifetimes/singlefold causation theory, I shall provide translations of the relevant portions of the two texts mentioned above and try to show how they lead to the system in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which I think is the most fully developed version.

B. From the Sixth Stage of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*

1. Concerning the Text

The textual history of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is very complex. In the case of the brief portion of the sixth stage dealing with the lifetimes with which the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula are associated, the discrepancies among the Chinese and Tibetan translations and the extant Sanskrit version are strikingly numerous. Among these variants one can distinguish two basic textual traditions, the difference between which, I believe, reflects developments in *Yogācāra* thought. Although my conclusions, based on such a small excerpt from the text, are highly speculative, I think that the earlier of the two traditions may have been a source for the ideas found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, while the later tradition seems to have been influenced by the fully developed two-lifetimes/singlefold causation theory.¹⁷⁰

I have consulted ten different versions of the text of the

¹⁶⁹The contents of this section are also found in the *Vastusamgrahāṇī*. See below for details.

¹⁷⁰A very abbreviated summary of the following argument can be found in Kritzer 1992.

Daśabhbūmikasūtra: (1) Dharmarakṣa's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra*, c. 297;¹⁷¹ (2) Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra*, c. 409;¹⁷² (3) Buddhabhadra's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* as a part of the *Avatāmsakasūtra*, c. 418-420;¹⁷³ (4) the root text of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* as given in Bodhiruci's Chinese translation of a commentary on the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* ascribed to Vasubandhu, c. 508-511;¹⁷⁴ (5) the text of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* as quoted within the comment of text four; (6) Śikṣānanda's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* as a part of the *Avatāmsakasūtra*, c. 695-697;¹⁷⁵ (7) Śīladharma's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra*, c. 753-790;¹⁷⁶ (8) the Tibetan translation by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi, Ye śes sde, et al., ninth century;¹⁷⁷ (9) the text of the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* as found in the Tibetan translation of the commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu, ninth century;¹⁷⁸ (10) the Sanskrit text based on Nepalese manuscripts, date unknown, but probably some time after the end of the ninth century.¹⁷⁹

In the case of this small portion of the *sūtra*, texts one through four essentially agree (although text one is so short that it is impossible to be certain), and I refer to them as the first version. Texts six through ten likewise essentially agree, and I call them the second version. Text five,

¹⁷¹ *Chien pei i ch'ieh chih te ching* 漸備一切智德經 (T. 285).

¹⁷² *Shih chu ching* 十住經 (T. 286).

¹⁷³ *Ta fang kuang fo hua yen ching* 大方廣仏華嚴經 (T. 278).

¹⁷⁴ *Shih ti ching lun* 十地經論 (T. 1522). The Sanskrit title, as restored from the Chinese is *Daśabhbūmikasūtraśāstra*; restored from the Tibetan, it is *Daśabhbūmivyākhyāna* (Demiéville 1978: 129). This commentary is not among the texts that Schmithausen refers to as “works of Vasubandhu the Kośakāra,” although he does not comment explicitly on its authorship since it is not discussed in his work (1987: 262 n. 101). I have not read enough of the text to form an opinion one way or the other, but out of a general sense of caution regarding the authorship of works ascribed to both Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, I refrain from calling it “Vasubandhu’s commentary.”

¹⁷⁵ *Ta fang kuang fo hua yen ching* 大方廣仏華嚴經 (T. 279).

¹⁷⁶ *Shih ti ching* 十地經 (T. 287).

¹⁷⁷ Peking *Bka' 'gyur* 761 (*Phal-chen I yi*).

¹⁷⁸ Peking *Bstan 'gyur* 5494 (*Mdo 'grel* XXXV nī).

¹⁷⁹ *Daśabhbūmikasūtra*: 101. For dates, see Itō 1988: 37-60.

the text of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* as quoted in the Chinese translation of the comment, contains elements of both versions. Below, I provide translations of each version.

2. Translations from the *Daśabhūmika*¹⁸⁰

a. The First Version

“The Karmic Forces, which are conditioned by Ignorance”; are the things of the past life. “Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling” are the things of the present life. “Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, Karmic Existence, Birth, and Old Age and Death” are the things of the future life. Thus, there is the occurrence of three lifetimes.¹⁸¹

b. The Second Version

“The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition”; this is [the relationship of] dependence in the past life. “[From] Consciousness through Feeling”; this is [the relationship of] dependence in the present life. “[From] Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence”; this is [the relationship of] dependence in the future life. From here onwards [i.e., Birth and Old Age and Death] is the continuation of this¹⁸² [relationship of dependence].¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰These are my own translations. The *Daśabhūmikasūtra* has been translated in its entirety by a number of scholars: Tatsuyama 1938 (the passage under discussion is found on p. 124); Honda 1968: 191; Aramaki 1980: 182; and Cleary 1993: 748.

¹⁸¹From Kumārajīva’s translation: 無明因緣諸行者。即是過去世事。識名色六入觸受。是現在事。愛取有生老死。是未來世事。於是有三世出 (T. 286: 515a29-b2). Buddhahbadra’s translation is almost identical: 又無明及行是過去事。識名色六入觸受是現在事。愛取有老死是未來事。於是有三世轉 (T. 278: 559a12-14). The earliest translation, Dharmarakṣa’s, appears to be drastically abridged: 以無明矣。為去來今。見縛布 (T. 285: 476c3-4).

¹⁸²I am taking the antecedent of *asyāḥ* to be *apekṣā*; however, the Chinese translations specify the continuation of the *santāna*. Rahder’s *asya* could conceivably have *santānasya* as its antecedent.

¹⁸³From Kondō’s Sanskrit text: *avidyāpratyayāḥ samṣkārā iti / esā pūrvam̄tikī apekṣā / vijñānam yāvad vedanety esā pratyutpannā apekṣā / trsnā yāvad bhava ity esā aparāntikī apekṣā / ata ūrdhvam asyāḥ* (according to Rahder’s edition, *asya*—Rahder 1926: 51.4) *pravṛttir iti* (*Daśabhūmikasūtra*: 101.6-8). Śiladharma’s translation:

3. Comparison of the Two Versions

If we compare these two versions, we can see two significant differences. The first version explicitly includes Birth and Old Age and Death in the group of members pertaining to the future life, while the second version omits them or separates them in some way from this group. Furthermore, the final sentence of the first version seems to state straightforwardly that the twelve members are to be assigned to three lifetimes, while the last sentence of the second version implies that Birth and Old Age and Death do not belong to the same lifetime as Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence.

If we next compare the first version to the Sarvāstivādin three-lifetimes/twofold causation system, we can see that the distribution of members in the present and future lives is quite different. According to Sarvāstivāda, the members from Consciousness through Feeling

無明緣行是前世觀待。識乃至受是現在觀待。愛乃至有是後世觀待。由是於後相續流轉 (T. 287: 553c8-10). Śiksānanda's translation: 無明緣行者。是觀過去。識乃至受。是觀現在。愛乃至有。是觀未來。於是以後。展轉相續 (T. 279: 194b14-16). Śiladharma and Śiksānanda agree, while the Tibetan translation adds *jāti* to the future life: *de ltar ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnamśes bya ba 'di ni sñon gyi mtha' la bltas pa'o / rnam par śes pa dañ miñ dañ zgugs dañ drug gi skye mched dañ reg pa dañ / tshor ba 'di dag ni da ltar byuñ ba la bltas pa'o / sred* [corrected from *srid* on the basis of the Derge (Niñ ma edition, v. 13, text 44, p. 308, leaf 1227)] *pa dañ ñe bar len pa dañ srid pa dañ / skye ba žes bya ba 'di ni phyi ma'i mtha la bltas pa ste / de phan chad du 'an de dag rgyun tu* [sic] *'byuñ ño* (Avatamsakasūtra [tib.]: li 105a5-7).

This portion of the text is quoted in the Śiksāsamuccaya: *api tu khalu punar yad ucyate 'vidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā iti eṣā pūrvāntikyapeksā / vijñānam yāvad vedaneti / eṣā pratyupannāpeksā / trṣṇā yāvad bhava iti eṣā 'parāntikyapeksā 'ta ūrdhvam asya pravṛttir iti* (Śiksāsamuccaya: 227-228; Bendall and Rouse 1971: 215). Notice that this version reads *asya* instead of *asyāḥ*.

I am grateful to Matsuda Kazunobu for informing me of two old Nepalese manuscripts of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, belonging to the Cecil Bendall Manuscript Collection in the National Archives in Kathmandu, and for transcribing the relevant portions. These manuscripts are not reflected in the Kondō or Rahder editions. Bendall uses one of them in his edition of the Śiksāsamuccaya, and he claims that it dates from the sixth century, which seems exceedingly early (Śiksāsamuccaya: 291). This manuscript unfortunately lacks much of our passage, and it is impossible to even know whether it corresponds with the first or the second version. The reading from the other manuscript is substantially identical to Kondō's. See Matsuda 1991 for more information on the Bendall collection.

comprise the fruitional aspect of the present life, while Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence, which also belong to the present life, are causal with respect to the future life. In the first version of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, however, those members that Sarvāstivāda considers the cause of the future life are themselves included in the future life. At first glance, this seems strange, since as a rule in both Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra discussions of *pratītyasamutpāda*, causal members and resultant members are associated with different lifetimes.

However, as Itō has observed, the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* contains a mixture of *abhidharma*-like precision and undifferentiated, undeveloped formulations (1988: 718). In the discussion of lifetimes, the grouping of the causes of the future life together with the future life itself suggests that our passage is an example of non-*abhidharma*-like imprecision. Thus, when the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* relates the members to the various lifetimes, we need not assume as rigid an association as is found, for example, in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Nor, in fact, must we understand past, present, and future to be absolute concepts. As we shall see below, the commentary on this passage shows the relative nature of the three times.

In terms of the development of the two-lifetimes/singlefold causation system, in the first version of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the members from Ignorance through Feeling are grouped in the same way as in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* arrangement (with the exception of Consciousness), while the members from Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence no longer share the present life with the members from Consciousness through Feeling. Thus, if we look only at the past and present lives, we can see a fully completed round of causation: Ignorance and the Karmic Forces in the past are the cause of the present life, which consists of Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling. Here there are no remaining members that require fruition in a third lifetime, as do Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in the Sarvāstivāda system. If we use the terminology of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to describe the arrangement in the first version of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the projecting and projected groups of members are in place, again except for

Consciousness, which here belongs to the present life and must be considered part of the projected group (for more discussion of the ambiguous position of Consciousness, see below). The actualizing and actualized members, on the other hand, are both mentioned with reference to the future life. No other texts that I have consulted, whether Sarvāstivādin or Yogācāra, include these members in the same life, nor does the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* discuss its own arrangement, and I do not see how the location of Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in the future can be justified.

4. Concerning the Commentary on the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*

It is difficult to establish which version of the root text the author of the commentary actually used and what exactly he said about it, because there is considerable discrepancy between the Chinese and Tibetan translations of this text, of which no Sanskrit manuscript is extant. Itō remarks that the Tibetan translation is more easily understood than the Chinese (1988: 99), and this observation is certainly valid regarding the passage under discussion. The two versions differ most markedly concerning the root text as presented in the beginning of the section, that is, before the comment begins, and as quoted in the comment. The versions of the comment itself, on the other hand, have only one meaningful difference; this is found in the discussion of the present life. I am unable to establish which of the two translations is more faithful to the original, so I refer to the Tibetan since it makes more sense. However, I provide translations of both versions.

5. Translations from the Commentary

a. From the Tibetan Translation¹⁸⁴

i. Root text

Furthermore, what is [indicated by the phrase,] “The Karmic Forces

¹⁸⁴ Portions that differ significantly from the Chinese translation are in small capital letters.

are conditioned by Ignorance," is the [relationship of] dependence in the past life. The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "From Consciousness [through] Feeling," is the [relationship of] dependence in the present. The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "**FROM SUBCONSCIOUS DESIRE [THROUGH] KARMIC EXISTENCE**," is the [relationship of] dependence in the future. **BEYOND THAT, THOSE CONTINUE.**¹⁸⁵

ii. Commentary

In this case, what is [indicated by the phrase,] “The Karmic Forces are conditioned by Ignorance,” is the [relationship of] dependence in the past life because that which was done in the past is for the sake of this life.¹⁸⁶ The present existence is the previous lifetime of [i.e., with respect to] the future life. The meaning of [this relationship of] dependence is to be understood in the sense of cause.

The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "From Consciousness [through] Feeling," is the [relationship of] dependence in the present BECAUSE, BEING THE RESULT OF WHATEVER ACTION [WAS PERFORMED] IN THE PAST LIFE FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, THESE [MEMBERS], CONSCIOUSNESS, [ETC.], SINCE THEY HAVE COMPLETED BEING PRODUCED AS RESULT IN THIS [LIFE], LACK THE ABILITY TO PRODUCE RESULT IN THE FUTURE LIFETIME.

The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "From Subconscious Desire [through] Karmic Existence," is the [relationship of] dependence in the future because [these members] immediately necessitate the production of a new existence.

“BEYOND THAT, THOSE CONTINUE” because a new existence is

¹⁸⁵ *yan ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnames žes bya ba gañ yin pa de ni sñon gyi mitha' pa'i bltos pa'o / rnam par žes pa nas tshor ba žes bya ba'i bar de ni da ltar byuñ ba'i bltos pa'o / sred pa nas srid pa žes bya ba'i bar de ni phyi ma'i mitha' pa'i bltos pa ste / de yan chad du yan de dag rab tu 'byuñ no* (*Daśabhūmivyākhyāna* [tib.]: nñ 256a3-5).

¹⁸⁶The phrase, *tshe 'di'i phyir*, is difficult to translate; the meaning seems to be that what was done in the past is the cause of the present life.

actualized from¹⁸⁷ [this kind of relationship of] dependence.¹⁸⁸

b. From the *Shih ti ching lun* 十地經論¹⁸⁹

i. Root text

“The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition”: this [is said] considering¹⁹⁰ the affairs of the past life. “Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling”: this [is said] considering the affairs of the present life. **SUBCONSCIOUS DESIRE, APPROPRIATION, KARMIC EXISTENCE, BIRTH, AND OLD AGE AND DEATH**”: this [is said] considering the affairs of the future life. **ACCORDING TO THIS [WAY OF] CONSIDERING [THE AFFAIRS OF THE VARIOUS LIVES], THERE IS THE CONTINUATION OF THREE LIFETIMES.**¹⁹¹

ii. Commentary

“The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition”: this is considering the affairs of the past life. Because birth in the present is produced by [that] past, the result in the present is the future [life with

¹⁸⁷The Tibetan *las* here might mean that rebirth somehow is caused by this [inaccurate] way of considering the three times, or it might have the sense of “according to.”

¹⁸⁸*de la ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnam [sic] ūes bya ba de ni sñon gyi mtha' pa'i bltos pa žes bya ba ni tshe'i 'di'i phyir sñar byas pa'i phyir ro / da ltar byuñ ba ni ma 'oñs pa'i sñon gyi mtha'o / bltos pa'i don rgyu'i don du rig par bya'o rnam par ūes pa nas tshor ba ūes bya ba'i bar de ni da ltar byuñ ba'i bltos pa'o žes bya ba ni don gan la tshe rabs sna ma'i las gan yin pa de'i 'bras bu rnam par žes pa de dag 'dir 'bras bur bskyed zin pas phyi ma la 'bras bu bskyed pa'i mthu med pa'i phyir ro / sred pa nas srid pa ūes bya ba'i bar de ni phyi ma'i mtha' pa'i bltos pa ste / žes bya ba ni yañ srid pa mñon par 'grub par gcig tu nes par byed pa'i phyir ro / de phan chad du yañ de dag rab tu 'byuñ no žes bya ba ni bltos pa las yañ srid pa mñon par 'grub pa'i phyir ro* (*Daśabhūmivyākhyāna* [tib.]: ni 256a 5-256b1).

¹⁸⁹Portions that differ significantly from the Tibetan translation are in small capital letters.

¹⁹⁰Bodhiruci, like Śikṣānanda, renders *apekṣā* in the verbal sense of “to see.” This is undoubtedly due to the meaning of the Sanskrit root, *īkṣ* (see Nakamura 1975: 197).

¹⁹¹經曰。無明緣行者。是見過去世事。識名色六入觸受是見現在世事。愛取有生老死。是見未來世事。於是見有三世轉 (T. 1522: 170a13-15).

respect to the past life]. This [way of] considering the past is in the sense of [taking the previous life to be] the cause [of the following life].

Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling: this is considering the affairs of the present life. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE PAST LIFE, THESE ACTIONS CAN OBTAIN RETRIBUTION IN THE [FORM OF] CONSCIOUSNESS, ETC., IN THE PRESENT LIFE. FURTHERMORE, THEY CAN OBTAIN RETRIBUTION IN THE FUTURE.

Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence: this is considering the affairs of the future, because it is established that there will be another rebirth.

ACCORDING TO THIS [WAY OF] CONSIDERING [THE AFFAIRS OF THE VARIOUS LIVES], THERE IS THE CONTINUATION OF THREE LIFETIMES because, there being again a rebirth in a later life, there is continuation.¹⁹²

6. Analysis of the Comment¹⁹³

The comments on the past lifetime are particularly interesting in that they point out the relative nature of the three times. According to this interpretation, the past life in the context of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula is the time of cause. Thus, if we take any three successive lifetimes, Lifetime One is the past life with respect to, and hence the cause of, Lifetime Two. Lifetime Two is the past life with respect to, and hence the cause of, Lifetime Three. The logical conclusion, and the point that I think the commentator is making, is that it would be better to talk of the antecedent lifetime and the ensuing lifetime, in this way reducing the three lifetimes to two. Incidentally, according to the

¹⁹²論曰。無明緣行即是見過去世事者。現在生是過去作故。現在果即是當來す即是見過去世因義。識乃至受是見現在世事者。過去世生隨所有業彼業得現在識等果報。復能得未來果報。愛取有是見未來世事者。復有生一往定故。於是見有三世轉者。復有後生轉故 (T. 1522: 170a17-23).

¹⁹³As I mentioned above, I rely on the Tibetan translation in my discussion of the comment.

Shindōjōyuishikiron, two of the commentaries on the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* seem to make the same point.¹⁹⁴

In his discussion of the members that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* assigns to the future life, the commentator in fact does not mention past, present, or future by name; he simply refers to a subsequent existence. He states that Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence cause the production of a new existence, and he implies (or at least I infer) that this new existence is equivalent to the members, Birth and Old Age and Death. In this case, the comment only makes sense in the context of the second version of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* passage (the version quoted within the comment), in which the last two members are not grouped with the previous three; if all five members from Subconscious Desire through Old Age and Death belonged to the same lifetime (as they do in the Chinese, but not in the Tibetan, translation of the root text), the causal relationship that the commentator attributes to them would be impossible.

Thus, the second version of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* passage, especially as interpreted in the commentary, is yet another step closer to the fully developed Yogācāra two-lifetimes/singlefold causation theory. The members that comprise the actualizing and actualized groups are now assigned to different lifetimes and so can assume a relationship of cause and result. Moreover, the real status of the future lifetime has been somewhat undermined. It is true that, at this point, the lifetimes to which the actualizing and actualized groups of members belong is not yet clear. However, the second version, far more than the first, can support an interpretation consistent with the two-lifetimes theory. This fact suggests to me that the text was altered for doctrinal reasons either shortly before the commentary was written or under its influence.

¹⁹⁴“The past [consists of] the ten causal members; the present [consists of] the two resultant [members]. Furthermore, the present [consists of] the ten causal [members]; the future [consists of] the two resultant [members].” (過去十因.現在二果.又現在十因.未來二果也—*Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 359)

C. From the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

1. General Remarks Concerning the *Śarīra* Section

When we look at the section on the structure (*śarīra*) of conditioned origination in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Maulibhūmi*,¹⁹⁵ we find that the members of the formula are arranged in similar, although not precisely the same, groups as in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and we also have an explanation of the logic underlying this grouping. Matsuda disagrees with Ui, whom he quotes as saying that the *śarīra* section contains neither a three-lifetimes/twofold causation theory nor a two-lifetimes/singlefold theory. Referring to another, more or less parallel passage in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Matsuda maintains that the passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi* do, in fact, express a two-lifetimes/singlefold causation theory, while at the same time he points out that the *śarīra* section is quite difficult to understand (1983: 30-32). Although the ideas found there are somewhat disorganized, I shall attempt to show their relationship to the more systematized presentation in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵The *śarīra* portion only of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.17-203.5; *Maulibhūmi* [tib.]: zi 115a3-118b3; T. 1579: 321a17-322a18) is parallel to the first portion of the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* (*Vastusamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 'i 285a3-287b6; T. 1579: 827c3-828c12).

¹⁹⁶Similar ideas can be found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in a discussion of ten types of causes (*hetu*), among which *ākṣepahetu* is defined as follows: *avidyādīnāṁ dharmānāṁ dṛṣṭa eva dharme yāni bijāni jātasya bhūtasyeha / tāny anyajānmikasya jātijarāmaranāṣyākṣepahetuḥ* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 100.13-15; T. 1579: 501c17-19); the entire discussion of the ten types of causes, which includes an extensive explanation of *bija* causality in botanical terms, as well as a definition of *abhinirvṛttihetu* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 99.9-100.10; T. 1579: 501b18-c11), deserves further study. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* also contains a discussion of ten types of causes in which *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* are defined (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 106ff; T. 1579: 301b9 ff.). In Chapter Four, I shall return to *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the ten-*hetus* system.

Unlike the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Yogācārabhūmi* refers to three lifetimes in its discussion: “What is the structure (*śarīra*, of *pratītyasamutpāda*)? Briefly, it is the definition of conditioned origination in its three phases: [1] how one is born in the present life from the past life; [2] how one is born in the future life from the present life; and [3] how one, having been born in the present life, exists and departs to purification.”¹⁹⁷ However, although three lifetimes are mentioned, the twelve members seem to complete a cycle of cause and result in only two lifetimes, as I show in my translation of the discussion of the second phase.¹⁹⁸

2. Translation of Phase Two: Present Life to Future Life¹⁹⁹

How do the conditioning factors (*samskāra*) evolve through conditioned origination from the present life to the future life? And how do they cease evolving, and [how] are they purified by cessation?²⁰⁰

The person who has been reborn in the present life according to [the process described in Phase One] experiences two types of results of previous actions: the internal result-by-way-of-maturation (*vipākaphala*), and the subordinate result (*adhipatiphala*), which consists of feeling arising from [contact with] objects. He is deluded concerning both types of results, having heard bad teachings or due to past habits. He who is deluded concerning the internal result-by-way-of-

¹⁹⁷ *śarīram katamat / samāsatas tribhir ākāraiḥ pratītyasamutpādasya vyavasthānam bhavati / yathā pūrvāntān madhyānte sambhavati / yathā ca madhyāntād aparānte sambhavati / yathā ca ca madhyānte sambhūto vartate vyavadānāya ca paraiti* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.17-19).

¹⁹⁸ For what is essentially a very brief summary of the *śarīra* portion, see Schmithausen 1987: 178, where he characterizes it as containing “a somewhat archaic doctrine of Seeds.”

¹⁹⁹ *Yogācārabhūmi*: 200.6-201.13. I am grateful for the help of Aramaki Noritoshi and Yamabe Nobuyoshi in reading this passage. I am, of course, solely responsible for any errors.

²⁰⁰ *katham madhyāntād aparānte samskārāñām pratītyasamutpādasambhavo bhavati katham cāsambhavaḥ / asambhavāc ca vyavadānam* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 200.6-7).

maturation does not understand in accordance with the truth that the production of future rebirth is suffering. And due to his ignorance with respect to his former and subsequent lives, he performs and accumulates *karma* as before. When he performs new actions, his consciousness comes under the sway of those acts in the present life.²⁰¹

Thus, conditioned by Ignorance, the Karmic Forces arise, and conditioned by the Karmic Forces, Consciousness [arises]. And the same Consciousness in the present life becomes the cause [of consciousness in the process of actualization] because it embraces [the seed of] consciousness in the process of actualization as its result in the future. And, with reference to Consciousness in its entirety, [Consciousness] is defined as the six consciousnesses. And that Consciousness is endowed with the seed of Individual Existence pertaining to rebirth in the future. Furthermore; this seed of Individual Existence is endowed with the seed of the Six Senses pertaining to rebirth in the future. And this seed of the Six Senses is endowed with the seed of Contact pertaining to rebirth in the future. And this seed of Contact is endowed with the seed of Feeling pertaining to rebirth in the future. And this [process of causality] is to be known as the projecting cause in the present life of rebirth [into the future life], by which is projected the entire personal existence from Consciousness through Feeling.²⁰²

²⁰¹ *sa tathā madhyānte sambhūtaḥ pudgalo dvividham pūrvakarmaphalam pratyānubhavati / ādhyātmikam ca vīpākaphalam viṣayānirjātam* (Emended from *viṣama-* on the basis of the Tibetan *yul las* [Maulībhūmi [tib.]: 286a3]) *ca veditam adhipatiphalam/ so 'saddharmaśravaṇam vāgamyā pūrvābhyaśām vā dvividhe 'pi phale sammūḍho bhavati / so 'dhyātmam vīpākaphale sammūḍhaḥ punarbhāvā-bhinirvṛttim duḥkhato yathābhūtam na jānāti / sa pūrvāntikīm cāparāntikīm cāvidyām adhipatim kṛtvā pūrvavat sāṃskārān karoty upacinoti / tasya tadvijñānam abhinavam karma kurvatas tatkarmopagam bhavati drṣṭe eva dharme (Yogācārabhūmi: 200.7-14).*

²⁰² *evam avidyāpratyayāḥ [sāṃskārā (supplied from the Maulībhūmi [tib.]: dzi 116b8)] utpadyante sāṃskārapratyayam ca vijñānam / tac ca vijñānam drṣṭe dharme hetubhūtam āyatām abhinirvṛttivijñānaphalaparigrahāt / sarvam ca vijñānam* [The Chinese and Tibetan translations of the version in the *Vastusamgrahāṇī*, however, indicate *samṭāna* (personal continuity) instead of *vijñāna* (T. 1579: 828a17; *Vastusamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: 'i 286a7). It is not clear to me whether this difference is

That person having [so far] projected a new existence by means of the first delusion, concerning the [internal] result-by-way-of-maturation, [then] by means of the second delusion, concerning the [subordinate] result arising from [contact with] objects, produces Subconscious Desire for feelings arising from [sense-]objects.²⁰³

Due to [this] Subconscious Desire, he starts either searching for objects of desire or searching for existence. Accordingly, he appropriates sense-objects, or he appropriates [wrong] views, observances and vows, and a belief in the self. And when he has performed [either] Appropriation, the projecting cause [produced by the] previous [round of causation and consisting of Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and the causal Consciousness, endowed with the seeds of Consciousness in the process of actualization, the seeds of Individual Existence, etc.], endowed with and conjoined with Subconscious Desire and Appropriation, is called “Karmic Existence.”²⁰⁴

When [Karmic Existence], which is identified with the cause that actualizes rebirth, perishes in the immediately following moment, the

significant.] *adhikṛtya sadvijñānakāyā ity ucyante / tac ca vijñānam āyat�ām paunarbhavikanāmarūpabijopagatam /* tad api nāmarūpabijam āyatipaunarbhavika-sadāyatana bijopagatam / tac ca sadāyatana bijam āyatipaunarbhavikasparśa-bijopagatam / tac ca sparśabijam āyatipaunarbhavikaveditabijopagatam / ayam tāvat punarbhavasya madhyānte ākṣepako hetur veditavyo yena vijñānādayo [corrected from vijñānādayo] veditaparyavasānah kṛtsna evātmabhāva ākṣipto bhavati* (Yogācārabhūmi: 200.14-21).

*Schmithausen has corrected this to *āyati-paunarbhavika-nāmarūpa-bijopagatam* on the basis of the manuscript (1987: 342 n. 441). About this sentence he says, “already in some parts of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* mind is unequivocally taught to contain the Seeds not only of corporeal matter but, occasionally, even of internal and external matter” (1987: 62).

²⁰³*sa pūrvakena vi pākaphalasammohenaiva punarbhavam ākṣipyā dvitīyena viṣayanirjātaphalasammohena viṣayavedanālambanām trṣṇām utpādayati* (Yogācārabhūmi: 201.1-2).

²⁰⁴*yathā trṣṇayā kāmaparyeṣanām vāpadyamāno bhavaparyeṣanām vā kāmopādānam vopādadāti dṛṣṭiśilavratātmayād- should be inserted here on the basis of both the Tibetan (*Maulībhūmi* [tib.]: dзи 117a6) and the Chinese (T. 1579: 321c10) translations] *opādānām vā / upātte copādāne trṣṇopādānasahitasaṅgataḥ pūrvaka ākṣepako hetur bhava ity ucyate* (Yogācārabhūmi: 201.3-5).*

Thus, *bhava* consists of the *ākṣepakhetu*, together with *trṣṇā* and *upādāna*.

appearance of the conditioning factors, starting with Consciousness and continuing through Feeling, occurs, either gradually or all at once, due to the projecting cause thus projected [by the causation from the previous life].²⁰⁵

Thus, in the present life, Subconscious Desire arises conditioned by Feeling resulting from contact with Ignorance. Appropriation arises conditioned by Subconscious Desire. Karmic Existence arises conditioned by Appropriation. Birth [in the future] arises conditioned by Karmic Existence. Conditioned by Birth, the various kinds of suffering, such as Old Age, disease, and Death, etc., are experienced directly in some realms of birth, while in other [realms] they must be understood as being inherent in the form of [their] seeds.²⁰⁶

Thus, there will arise in the future life conditioning factors, depending [both] on Karmic Forces conditioned by Ignorance and on Subconscious Desire conditioned by Feeling in the present life.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetusamgrhītasya ca bhavasyānantaram kālam krtavato yathākṣiptenākṣepahetunā vijñānādīnām samskārānām veditaparyantānām pradurbhāvo bhavaty anukramaśo vā sakrd vā* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 201.5-8).

It is important to note that *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* is not a *dvandva* compound referring to two types of causes, *upapattihetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (see the Tibetan [*skyé ba mnon par 'grub pa'i rgyur*—*Maulibhūmi* [tib.]: *dzi 117a7*] and Chinese [即是後有生因—T. 1579: 321c11] translations). Elsewhere, in a section of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* that I consider later than the *śārīra* portion, *upapatti* and *abhinirvṛtti* are contrasted, and Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa* distinguishes between *upapattihetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (see Chapter 4, section 7d for my discussion of *trṣṇā*, which Vasubandhu identifies with *abhinirvṛttihetu*, in the section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on *āngakarmavayasthāna*). Here *upapatti* seems to refer to rebirth in general, not to birth in a specific *dhātu*, *gati*, or *yoni*.

²⁰⁶ *evam dṛṣṭe dharme avidyāsaṃsparśajā vedita pratyayā trṣṇā / trṣṇāpratyayam upādānaṃ / upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ / bhavapratyayā jātiḥ / jātipratyayāś ca jarāvyādhimaraṇādayo duhkhaiśeṣāḥ saṃmukhībhavanti / kvacid upapattyāyatane kvacid bījānuṣaṅgato veditavyāḥ* [emended from *veditavyāḥ*] (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 201.8-11).

²⁰⁷ *evam madhyānte avidyāpratyayān saṃskārān vedanāpratyayām ca trṣṇām pratītyāparānte saṃskārānām samudayo bhavati* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 201.11-13).

3. Analysis of Phase Two of the *Śarīra* Portion

Before comparing the above discussion with the scheme in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, let me summarize the treatment in the *śarīra* portion. I shall also refer to the section on *pratyaya* that is found a few pages later in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Although this section, like the remainder of the exposition, seems later and more systematized, it can help us make sense of some of the obscurities of the earlier portion.

In the passage that I have translated, the *Yogācārabhūmi* identifies two types of causes, the projecting cause (*āksepakahetu*) and the cause that actualizes rebirth (*upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu*). The projecting cause consists of Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness in the present life, together with the seeds of Consciousness (in the form of the six *vijñānakāyas*), Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling in the future. The cause that actualizes rebirth consists of Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in the present life. The above passage does not designate the result of these causes, but the later section on *pratyaya* does: “How many members are included in the projecting cause? [The members] from Ignorance through Feeling. How many members are included in the cause that actualizes rebirth? [The members] from Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence. How many members are included in the result of both the projecting cause and the cause that actualizes rebirth? In the present and the future, [the members] from Consciousness through Feeling and the states of Birth and Old Age and Death.”²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ *katy aṅgāny āksepahetusamgrhītāni / avidyām upādāya yāvad vedanā / katy aṅgāny abhinirvṛttihetusamgrhītāni / tṛṣṇām upādāya yāvad bhavaḥ / katy aṅgāny āksepābhinirvṛttihetvoh phalasamgrhītāni / drṣṭe ca dharme samparāye ca vijñānādīni vedanāvāsānāni jātijarāmarañāvasthānāni* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 215.12-15). However, this portion of the text presents problems. I have corrected Bhattacharya’s *jātijarāmarañāvāsāni*, which is clearly a mistake; both the Tibetan and the Chinese translations indicate some form of *avasthā* or *avasthānam*: *tshe 'di nas tshe phyi ma'i rnam par s̄es pa nas tshor ba la thug pa rnam dañ/skye ba dañ/rga s̄i'i gnas skabs rnam so* (*Maulībhūmi* [tib.]: dzi 126b1-2); 答於現法後法中。識

At this point, a diagram of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* system may be useful:

Projecting Cause

Ignorance

Karmic Forces

Consciousness

(a. Causal Consciousness)


(b. Seeds of Consciousness in the process of actualization)

Individual Existence

the Six Senses

Contact

Feeling



Result of the Projecting Cause and
of the Cause that Actualizes Rebirth

Consciousness

Individual Existence

the Six Senses

Contact

Feeling

Birth

Old Age and Death



Cause that Actualizes Rebirth

Subconscious Desire

Appropriation

Karmic Existence

This diagram conflates the *śarīra* and the *pratyaya* portions of the exposition. It seems to me that the *śarīra* discussion implies what the *pratyaya* portions explicitly states to be the result of the two causes. The repetition of Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling is explained by the fact that these members have the form of seeds in the projecting cause, while they are actualized entities when they are the results of the two causes. Consciousness, on the other hand, appears three times: as the causal consciousness, as the seeds of the six consciousnesses in the projecting cause, and as the new actualized

等乃至受。於生老死位。所攝諸支 (T. 1579: 324c24-26). In my translation, I follow the Tibetan in adding the word "and."

consciousness when it is the result of the two causes.

In this way, the discussion of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* represents a theory of causation based on seeds. In brief, the causal consciousness in this lifetime contains the seeds of rebirth in the next lifetime. The cause that actualizes rebirth, namely Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in this lifetime, makes the seeds of rebirth yield results, thereby producing rebirth in the future.²⁰⁹

Readers who are familiar with the fully developed, two-layered structure of consciousness found in “classical” Yogācāra texts such as the *Trimśikābhāṣya* may find the descriptions of consciousness in this exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* a bit strange. Most strikingly, there is no discussion of how this consciousness operates in cognition. Nor is there any mention of its object or of a continuous stream of an underlying consciousness generally accompanied by one of the regular sense-consciousnesses. To some extent, this passage is similar to other expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda*, in which the mechanism of cognition is far less important than the implications of cognition in perpetuating the cycle of *kleśa*, *karma*, and *vastu* (or *duḥkha*). Not even in a text like the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, in which the doctrine of *vijñaptimātra* is fully developed and cognition is explained in detail, can we find a mention of the cognitive function of *vijñāna* in statements about *vijñānāṅga*.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that consciousness in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* *śarīra* portion, although clearly different from consciousness in, for example, Sarvāstivādin interpretations of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, is not called *ālayavijñāna* nor is it described in a way that clearly suggests that it is *ālayavijñāna*. Schmithausen points out the resemblance between the consciousness


²⁰⁹ Another grouping of the *āṅgas* can be found in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*: 復次緣起次第略有四種。一牽引次第。二生起次第。三受用境界次第。四受用苦次第。無明緣行行緣識。是牽引次第。識緣名色名色緣六處。是生起次第。六種緣觸觸緣受。是生起已受用境界次第。受緣愛愛緣取緣有有緣生生緣老死。是受苦次第 (T. 1579: 638a4-9).

I have not been able to find any other mention of this grouping, and I shall not try to reconstruct the Sanskrit names of the four groups. This passage is worthy of further study.

described in this passage and *sarvabijakam vijñānam*, but in his opinion, even *sarvabijakam vijñānam*, in early strata of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, did not presuppose *ālayavijñāna*: “it will, originally, have been nothing but the series of (ordinary) *vijñānas* (including dim moments, as in the embryonic state) in so far as this series was regarded to contain Seeds, or, more precisely, to take in and pass on (karmic Impressions turning into the) Seeds (of future existence and its arrangement)” (1987:179). Therefore, when we read in the *Yogācārabhūmi* about consciousness in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, we should not expect to find an exposition of *ālayavijñāna*. Even if Schmithausen is mistaken and the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* had already been worked out by the time of the composition of our passage, the context does not demand that *vijñānāṅga* be explicitly identified with *ālayavijñāna*.²¹⁰

D. The Two-lifetimes/Singlefold Causation System in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*

A theory similar to, but not identical with, that found in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is represented in a more schematized form in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Again, a diagram might be useful:



²¹⁰On the other hand, it is well known that the *Mahāyānasamgraha* argues that *karmasamklesha* would be impossible if *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* were not defined as *ālayavijñāna* (*Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 15.14-16; Lamotte 1973: 53). However, this argument is made specifically to prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna*, not to explain *pratītyasamutpāda*.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not use the term *bija* at all in its explanation of *āngasamāsa*. However, it is clear from the discussion of the projected set in the *Bhāṣya* that the terms Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling here designate seeds rather than actualized *dharma*s. Furthermore, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* points out that the term Consciousness here refers to the causal aspect of *vijñāna*, i.e., the *karmabijas*,²¹¹ while the seeds of the *vipākavijñāna* (i.e., the *vijñānabijas*,

²¹¹I have not, in fact, discovered any occurrences of this term in Sanskrit texts. However, the Chinese 業種子 or 業種, which should be equivalent to *karmabija*, is quite common, especially in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. Mochizuki defines the term as the seeds of the result of *karma* (業果の種子), as opposed to the seeds of speech (*vyavahārabija*). *Karmabija* is a synonym of *karmavāsanā* (業習氣). It describes the ability of the seeds of good or bad mental *karma* created by *manovijñāna* to help the other weak, inferior, morally neutral seeds (他の贏劣無記の種子) produce existence. Other synonyms include 異熟習氣 (*vipakavāsanā*), 有支習氣 (*bhavāṅgavāsanā*), 有分熏種子, and 有受盡相種子 (Mochizuki 1974: 1054).

The term 業種子 appears in the Chinese translation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*; however, the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions include neither *karmabija* nor *karmavāsanā* nor any of the other synonyms. Instead, Hsüan-tsang seems to be adding his own phrase, “moistens the *karmabijas*,” to explain the action of *trṣṇā* and *upādāna* in actualizing rebirth. Compare: *yadbalena yatsāṃmukhyena tatkarmavipākadānasāmartham* (following Shukla's suggestion, I emend from [°]*vipākadānādāna*^o) *bhavaty ayam abhinirvṛttihetuh* (*Śrāvakabhūmi*: 385.4-5); *de'i stobs dan / de'i mthu las de'i rnam par smin pa skyed par nus pa'an yin pa ste / de ni mnon par 'grub pa'i rgyu yin no* (*Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: wi 169b 8-170al); 由此勢力由此功能潤業種子。令其能與諸異熟果。如是一切名生起因 (T. 1579: 454b28-cl; the underlined portion does not correspond to Sanskrit or Tibetan).

業種子 also appears in Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Nyāyānusāra* (T. 1562: 411a28 ff.; Cox 1995: 343). Cox, who also cites the occurrence in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, notes that the term is very uncommon in *abhidharma* texts (1995: 373 n. 142).

According to the *Trimśikābhāṣya*, *karmavāsanā* refers to the power, deposited in the *ālayavijñāna* by mental *karma*, to actualize a future existence (*punyāpūṇyā-neñjyacetanā karma / tena karmanā yad anāgatātmabhāvābhinirvrttaye* (emended from *ānagatātmā*^o) *ālayavijñāne sāmarthyam āhitam / sā karmavāsanā*—*Trimśikābhāṣya*: 36.23-24).

In the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā*, *karmavāsanā* is defined in terms of *bija*: *karmavāsanāyā iti / kā punar iyam karmavāsanā nāma? anāgatasya janmano bijam hetubhāvah* (*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā*: 29.12-13; Yamaguchi 1934: 36.18-20).

Schmithausen suggests that “in the early Yogācāra sources a clear-cut distinction

see *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 355) are included in Individual Existence (T. 1585: 43c8-9). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* refines the *Yogācārabhūmi* system by further analyzing the projecting cause into sets of projecting and projected members, thereby assigning the seeds of Individual Existence, etc., to the next lifetime, where they are a potentiality waiting to be actualized.

Thus, the treatment of *āngasamāsa* is typical of the method in much of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Without even mentioning *bīja*, let alone *ālayavijñāna*, it systematizes ideas found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and perhaps in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* in order to formulate an *abhidharma* that is consistent with *bīja* and *ālayavijñāna* theory. In this case, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is so effective that its exposition is incorporated, with only slight changes, into the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, a text that of course explicitly propounds the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*.

between the different categories of *vāsanās* or *bījas* is often missing or at least not easily recognizable" (1987: 343 n. 448) and that the seeds of future *ātmabhāvas* can "hardly be dissociated from the Impressions of *karman*" (1987: 428 n. 831).

Therefore, what the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* here refers to by the term 業種 and what La Vallée Poussin retranslates as *karmabīja*, probably has the meaning of *karmavāsanā*.

IV. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

A. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the functions of some of the individual members of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula as described in the fifth section (*aṅgakarmavyavasthāna*) of our exposition. My approach in each case is somewhat different, and the discussions vary in length as I examine a number of doctrinal issues raised by the very terse explanations. In order to clarify these issues, I have had to look at a rather large number of other sources.

While the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya-abhāṣya* are the only extant works that both are openly attributed to Yogācāra and include the word *abhidharma* in their titles, the contents of large portions of other Yogācāra texts, most notably the *Yogācārabhūmi*, can certainly be characterized as *abhidharma*. Furthermore, in my opinion Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on at least some occasions adopts a position in agreement with the *Yogācārabhūmi* rather than with orthodox Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma*. Other texts attributed to Vasubandhu, such as the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* and the *Pañcaskandhaka*, more obviously not written from a Sarvāstivādin viewpoint, are clearly relevant to the study of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. In addition, in order to understand the divergence between Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda, it is often necessary to trace the development of a concept within the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* literature and sometimes even further back, to the *Āgamas*.

Therefore, in this chapter I frequently refer to a large body of *śāstras*, including works associated with both Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda. More surprisingly, a passage from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is directly relevant here, as can be seen from my translation in Chapter Two. In general, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, like the *Yogācārabhūmi*, neither quotes from nor refers to *Mahāyāna sūtras*, but the format of our fifth section is strikingly similar to that of the *Daśabhūmikasūtrapassage*.

B. Concerning the Two Parallel Passages

According to the section in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on the establishment of the functions of the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula (*aṅgakarmavyavasthāna*), each member, with the exception of *jarāmarāṇa*, has two functions, the second of which is to act as the condition of the following member. Matsuda (1983: 49 n. 28) mentions that this section corresponds to the *vibhaṅga* section of the discussion in *Savitarkādibhūmi*, which he identifies as a commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhāganirdeśasūtra* found in the *Samyuktāgama*.²¹² In my discussion, I examine both the section on *vibhaṅga* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and another possible source for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the section from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* that I have included in the notes to my translation. Another relevant text is Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, which quotes the entire text of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* treatment of *avidyāṅga* and often corresponds to the discussions of *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (1983: 47 n. 11, 49 n. 28). Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to read the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, except very partially. For this reason, I only occasionally refer to this very important text, which, although it is later than the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, may help us understand the philosophical underpinnings of the *abhidharma* system of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

Before I discuss a number of the individual members in detail, I shall make a few very general comments on what I consider to be the relationship between the discussions in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and those in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. The *Savitarkādibhūmi* *vibhaṅga* section

²¹²T. 99 (no. 298): 85a-b. The discussion in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* in some cases seems to match more closely the version of the *sūtra* as translated by Hsüan-tsang (T. 124: 547b-548a) than the version in the *Samyuktāgama*, to which Matsuda mentions it corresponds (1982a: 43). However, I cannot here address the question of the exact source of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* discussion.

is, to a large extent, a rather straightforward commentary on the *Pratyasamutpādādivibhāganirdeśasūtra*, and its discussions of the first two (Ignorance and the Karmic Forces) and the last five members (Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, Karmic Existence, Birth, and Old Age and Death) of the formula seem unremarkable from a doctrinal point of view. However, as Schmithausen has noted,²¹³ the discussion of the members from Consciousness through Feeling presents a theory of causation by seeds; to my mind, this indicates that it is a Yogācāra interpretation, albeit an early or “primitive” one.

The discussion in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, on the other hand, does not contain any terms such as *bīja* that are specifically associated with Yogācāra doctrine. The form of the discussion, however, is nearly identical to that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Each member is first defined in terms of its own activity and then in terms of its function as the condition of the following member. Outside of these two texts, I have not seen a discussion similar in form, with the possible exception of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* discussion of Consciousness through Feeling, in which each member seems to be at once itself and the seed of itself produced by the preceding member. I believe that it is possible that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* adopted the form of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* discussion in order to emphasize that not only the function of each member, but also the precise relationship between one member and another, is important for an understanding of conditioned origination. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* only mentions and does not explain the second function of each member, with the crucial exception of the Karmic Forces, which it specifies as being the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness.²¹⁴ The comments of the *Bhāṣya*, however, clarify the nature of each relationship.

In this chapter, I shall discuss Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, Individual Existence, Feeling, the Six Senses, Contact, and Subconscious Desire. The functions of *vijñāna* will be the subject of the next chapter.

²¹³(1987: 78). See Chapter 2, section B5c.

²¹⁴See Chapter 2, section B5b.

C. Discussion of Individual Members

1. Ignorance

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the first function of Ignorance is to delude beings concerning existence. This seems to be a fairly straightforward summary of the definition found in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, which consists of a long list of different types of Ignorance regarding various aspects of existence. The *Abhidharma-samuccayabhaṣya* certainly understands it this way; it supplies from the *vibhaṅga* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* the examples of Ignorance regarding past, future, and present lives in order to show that delusion regarding existence consists of the various types of Ignorance mentioned in the *sūtra* and that each of these types should be understood according to the explanations in *Savitarkādibhūmi*.

A related explanation of the nature of Ignorance can be found in the *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*, in a passage in which Vasubandhu gives his own, as opposed to the orthodox *Vaibhāṣika*, explanation of *pratītyasamutpāda*: “an ignorant person, not understanding that what originates conditionally is merely the conditioning factors...”²¹⁵ Yaśomitra explains that “merely the conditioning factors” refers to the non-existence of a self.²¹⁶ Here, Vasubandhu seems to have chosen for the purpose of summarizing Ignorance another of the types of Ignorance mentioned by the *sūtra*, *adhyātmam ajñānam*, which is explained as follows by the *Savitarkādibhūmi*: “What is internal ignorance? It is the ignorance of one who improperly considers his conditioning factors to be a self.”²¹⁷ This discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*²¹⁸ generally follows the

²¹⁵ *bālo hi pratītyasamutpannam saṃskāramātram idam ity aprajānan* (*Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*: 139.25-26; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 84).

²¹⁶ *mātragrahaṇam ātmapratiṣedhārtham* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 299.8-9).

²¹⁷ *adhyātmam ajñānam katamat / prat�ātmikān saṃskārān ayoniṣa ātmato* [corrected by Schmithausen (1987: 518 n. 1421) from *ātmanā* on the basis of the manuscript] *manasikurvato yad ajñānam* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.10-11).

²¹⁸ *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*: 139.24-140.25; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 83-88.

Pratīyasamutpādasūtra. I mention it further below, especially with reference to Consciousness.

In comparison, the definition in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, that Ignorance deludes beings regarding objects (99.1), is considerably broader if we understand *ālambana* to refer to all the objects of experience.²¹⁹ Furthermore, the association of *avidyā* with *ātmadrṣṭi* noticed by Schmithausen in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* passage,²²⁰ and implicitly present in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Abhidharma-samuccayabhāṣya*, and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is not found here.

2. Karmic Forces

Kajiyama Yuichi has pointed out that *samskāra* can have two meanings, karma and *vāsanā*.²²¹ In other words, it can be used in the sense of either of the meanings attributed to karma by Takasaki in his discussion of Yogācāra doctrine: “a residual force (*vāsanā*, 習氣) insofar as it remains after having perished, and a formative force (*samskāra*, 行) insofar as it gives rise to the following mode of activity” (1987: 204). Consequently, according to Kajiyama, the *vijñāna* that is dependent on the *samskāras* also can be understood in two different senses, the rebirth consciousness (*pratisamdhivijñāna*) and the six ordinary forms of consciousness (*śadvijñānakāya*), respectively. Of the texts under discussion, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* unambiguously sticks to the first pair of meanings (i.e., karma/*pratisamdhivijñāna*, and its definitions of both the Karmic Forces and Consciousness are in keeping with the definitions found in the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation of the formula, in which each member represents a different state of the five

²¹⁹ See *Abhidharmakośa* II 62c: *ālambanam sarvadharmaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*: 100.3).

²²⁰ 1987: 518 n. 1421. See Chapter 2, section B5a.

²²¹ These two meanings occur in *abhidharma* (Kajiyama, personal communication), but the Taishō index suggests that the term *vāsanā* does not appear in *abhidharma* texts earlier than the *Abhidharmakośa*, except for the *Vibhāṣā*. Further study is necessary to establish at exactly what point *vāsanā*, like *bīja*, takes on the technical meaning that becomes so important in Yogācāra texts.

skandhas.²²² The *Daśabhūmikasūtra* discussion of the function of the Karmic Forces does not suggest an awareness of any of the issues associated with *ālayavijñāna* or seed theory.

Coming to the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, we find that in the *śarīra* exposition, the focal point of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula with regard to seed theory is Consciousness. It is the role of Consciousness that departs radically from pre-*Yogācāra* interpretations. In contrast, although the Karmic Forces put Consciousness “under their sway” (*karmopagam*), which implies that they “impress” Consciousness or leave seeds in it (Schmithausen 1987: 178), the passage never explicitly mentions *bīja* or *vāsanā* in connection with *saṃskārāṅga*. Similarly, in the *vibhaṅga* section, there is nothing about the Karmic Forces that goes beyond the spirit of what was said in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*. The *vibhaṅga* section defines the Karmic Forces simply as karma, with no mention of *vāsanā*,²²³ while it accepts the *sūtra* definition of *vijñāna* as the six *vijñānakāyas*.²²⁴ Thus, if we are to take the *Savitarkādibhūmi vibhaṅga* definitions at face value, karma from the earlier lifetime causes the six types of consciousness in the later life. This relationship, however, is problematic in a technical context, in which, as Kajiyama and Takasaki suggest, karma should be the cause of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, not of the *vijñānakāyas*.

However, when we look at the *vibhaṅga* description of *cakṣurvi-jñāna*, it is clear that the *saṃskāra* that conditions *vijñāna* is not, in fact,

²²²See Chapter 5.

²²³*kāyasamśkārāḥ katame / kāyakarma kāmāvacaram rūpāvacaram punyāpunyasyaṃkhyātām adha ūrdhvam punar āniñjyasyaṃkhyātām / vāksaṃskārāḥ katame / vākkarma / śesam pūrvavad draṣṭavyam / manahsamaṃskārāḥ katame / manaskarma / tat kāmadhātāu punyāpunyam nāneñjyam dvayor uparimayor dhātvor āneñjyam eva ca* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 206.10-13).

²²⁴*cakṣur vijñānam katamat / āyat�ām cakṣurindriyāśrayāyā rūpaprativijñāpter yat punyāpunyāneñjyaparibhāvitabījabhūtām vijñānam yac ca tadbījasamudbhavam phalabhūtām / yathā cakṣurvijñānam evaṇi śrotraghṛāṇajihvākāyamanovijñānāni draṣṭavyāni / āśrayaviṣayakṛtaś caīṣa prativijñaptiviśeṣo draṣṭavyaḥ / tat punah kāmāvacaram ṣadvidham rūpāvacaram caturvidham ārūpyāvacaram ekavidham eva* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 206.14-18). Underlined portions represent Schmithausen’s corrections from the manuscript (1987: 472 n. 1154). See also note 74.

simply Takasaki's "formative force." Schmithausen refers to both the *śarīra* and the *vibhaṅga* sections²²⁵ in explaining the relationship between *samskāra* and *vijñāna* that is implied by the *vibhaṅga* definition of *cakṣurvijñāna*: "If I see it correctly, the *Pratītya Analysis* contains a somewhat archaic doctrine of Seeds (*bija*) according to which *vijñāna*—still understood as the [mental series constituted by successive moments of one or the other of] the six ordinary kinds of *vijñāna*—"approaches" or "follows" (—*upaga*—) karman, i.e. comes under its sway by being somehow "impressed" by it so that it becomes the cause or Seed of the (*vipāka*-)*vijñāna* which is the initial factor of a new existence" (1987: 178). Schmithausen's explanation is perhaps as difficult to understand as the passages themselves, but it emphasizes that, even though the *Savitarkādibhūmi* still interprets *vijñāna* as the six *vijñānas*, it has broadened their definition to include both actualized Consciousness and seeds. If Schmithausen is correct, and the *vipākavijñāna* at this stage is still somehow identical to the six ordinary *vijñānas*, then *samskāra* must at the same time "form" the *pratisamdhivijñāna* and be the "residual force" from which future *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., arises.

Furthermore, in the *śarīra* section of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*²²⁶ it is clear that the way in which the Karmic Forces condition Consciousness by bringing it "under its sway" is not the same way in which the karma of the past life, according to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* as well as to *Sarvāstivāda*, conditions Consciousness by producing *pratisamdhivijñāna* in the present life. Thus, both the *śarīra* and the *vibhaṅga* sections at least implicitly suggest the impressioning or seed-planting function of the Karmic Forces.

The explanation of the first function of *samskāra* in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* consists of a very terse statement about how the Karmic Forces work in determining rebirth, that is to say about their formative

²²⁵Unlike me, Schmithausen does not seem to consider the *śarīra* portion to be earlier than the remainder of the *Savitarkādibhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition.

²²⁶See Chapter 3, section C2.

function. This is essentially the same as the first function in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. However, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines their second function as acting as the conditions of the *vāsanās* contained in Consciousness. This is dramatically different from the definition in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, as well as from the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* definition of *saṃskāra*. Furthermore, it goes beyond what is found in either of the sections of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* that I have discussed. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, as we have seen above, includes Consciousness among the projecting members and thereby assigns it to the earlier of two lifetimes. Moreover, as we have also seen, Consciousness as understood in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* has been identified with the *karmabijas* by the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*.²²⁷ The present definition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of the second function of the Karmic Forces, together with that of the first function of Consciousness, which follows, is probably the basis for this identification.

In the section on the sets of members (*āṅgasamāsa*), the causal role of Consciousness is emphasized, a fact that suggests to me that the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* presupposes a more fully developed concept of *ālayavijñāna* than that which underlies the *Savitarkādibhūmi* discussion. As I have mentioned, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in general avoids terminology usually associated with Yogācāra, such as *vāsanā* and *bija*. However, in order to justify an interpretation of *vijñāna* that stresses its causal aspect, the text is here forced to be more explicit than usual. By introducing the term *vāsanā* into its definition of *saṃskārāṅga*, it rationalizes the inclusion of *vijñānāṅga* in the group of projecting members. If the Karmic Forces were stated here to be the condition of Consciousness, instead of the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness, then they would represent the “formative force” of karma, and the Consciousness resulting from them would have to be reassigned to the group of projected members. The ability to project belongs, properly speaking, to

²²⁷See Chapter 3, section D.

karma,²²⁸ and only if Consciousness is identified with karma can it belong to the projecting group of members. Thus, for the sake of maintaining consistency between its interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the particular theory of *ālayavijñāna* and *bījas* to which it subscribes, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* must emphasize the “residual force” of karma. To do so, it must depart at an earlier point than the *Savitarkādibhūmi* from giving a simple, non-innovative interpretation of the formula, namely at *samskāra* rather than *vijñāna*.

The treatment in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, although terse, is more sophisticated than that in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* or the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra*, and it systematically incorporates both backward-looking and forward-looking definitions in the section on the function of the members (*āngakarmavyavasthāna*). Thus, the first function of the Karmic Forces is the performance, under the influence of Ignorance, of the karma that, according to its moral nature, produces rebirth in one of the various destinies; this is *avidyāpratyayaṁ samskāram*. The second function is the depositing of the impressions that comprise the following member, *vijñāna*; this is the *samskāra* in *samskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam*. The crucial difference between the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra* is that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states explicitly that the nature of the causal relationship between the Karmic Forces and Consciousness is one of impressioning or impregnation. In the *Daśabhbūmikasūtra*, on the other hand, the Karmic Forces “provide the cause of the generation of Consciousness,” the first function of which is to “bring about conception into the next existence” (99.3-4).²²⁹

Schmithausen has shown that the Yogācāras use *ālayavijñāna* to solve the problem of dependence of Consciousness on the Karmic Forces (1987: 6). Referring to a number of texts, including the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, *Trimśikābhāṣya*, *Pañca-*

²²⁸See, for example, a portion of Vasubandhu’s discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, to which I refer again later: *tasyāvidyāpratyayāḥ samskārāḥ karmākṣepavaśāc ca vijñānasamṛtatis tāṁ tāṁ gatīm gacchati* (*Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 140.1-2).

²²⁹See Chapter 2, section B5d.

skandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya, *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*, and *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, he says, “the *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the prior existence which receives the Impression of karman and - by continuously propagating itself along with this Impression - becomes, in its turn, the cause of a new existence (beginning with *nāmarūpa*). This exegetical issue thus involves the systematical issue of (ālaya)vijñāna as the recipient and support of karmic Impressions (*vāsanā*)” (1987: 253-254 n. 51). The description of the second function of the Karmic Forces in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, together with the location of *vijñāna* in the projecting group of members, suggests that the exposition of *pratīyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which is probably earlier than the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and almost certainly older than the other texts mentioned by Schmithausen, already presupposes a *vijñāna* that can, in Schmithausen's terminology, receive and support karmic impressions. In other words, it presupposes *ālayavijñāna*:

3. Individual Existence

The definition of *nāmarūpa* in the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*, which is quoted in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*,²³⁰ is a very basic one, and it can be found as well in early Vaibhāṣika texts such as the *Abhidharmāmrta*.²³¹ However, even this very simple definition immediately suggests some rather complex problems. If, in the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, *nāmarūpa* is dependent on *vijñāna* and at the same time consists, partly of *vijñānaskandha*, then the question arises as to how *vijñāna* can be included in two *āngas*. Schmithausen shows how the Vaibhāṣikas get around this problem in two different contexts. In their interpretation of the formula in terms of a single moment (*kṣaṇikapratīyasamutpāda*), they alter the definition of *nāmarūpa* so as to exclude *vijñānaskandha*.²³² In their *āvasthika* interpretation, on

²³⁰ See Chapter 2, section B5d.

²³¹ 痛想行識陰是謂名。四大及造色是謂色。二事俱說名色 (T. 1553: 971a21-23; Sastri 1953: 71.17-18; Van den Broeck 1977:135).

²³² Individual Existence consists of the four *skandhas* that appear together with *vijñāna* (*vijñānasahabhuvaś catvāraḥ skandhā nāmarūpam*—*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:

the other hand, both *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* consist of all five *skandhas* at different moments (Schmithausen 1987: 464). According to the discussion of *āvasthikapratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośa*, *nāmarūpa* refers to the *skandhas* from the moment of conception (*pratisamṛti*) to the moment immediately preceding the development of the Six Senses,²³³ that is to say, to a stage of the embryo.²³⁴

Another issue involving *nāmarūpāṅga* arises from the statement found in several *sūtras* that *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, like two bunches of reeds, are mutually dependent; Schmithausen identifies the *Nādakalāpikāsūtra* of the *Samyuktāgama*²³⁵ as being the primary source of the discussion of this issue in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (1987: 170, 460 n. 1076). Schmithausen discusses the interpretation of this simile in great detail, mainly to refute Kajiyama's thesis that "the

133.4; referred to in Schmithausen 1987: 173, 464 ns. 1110, 1114). Paramārtha's translation agrees with the Sanskrit: 與識俱起四陰名色 (T. 1559: 205c8).

However, as La Vallée Poussin points out (1971, v. 2: 65 n. 2), Hsüan-tsang alters this in his translation to three *skandhas* (識俱三蘊總稱名色—T. 1558: 48c12). For a complete discussion of this issue, see Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 169-170, ns. 1, 7.

²³³ *saṃdhicitāt pareṇa yāvat ṣaḍāyatanaṃ notpadyate sā 'vasthā nāmarūpam tāvat ṣaḍāyatanaṃ ity ucyate* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 132.3-4).

²³⁴ Moreover, in the portion of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in which, as I show in my chapter on *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*, he expounds his own, provisional opinion, Vasubandhu contradicts the definition according to *kṣaṇikapratītyasamutpāda*: *vijñānapūrvakam punas tasyām tasyām gatau nāmarūpam jāyate pañcaskandhakam kṛtsnajanmānugatam / vibhaṅge mahānidānaparyāye caivam nirdeśat* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.5-6; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85). As the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* states, the definition to which Vasubandhu here refers is the *sūtra* definition according to which *nāma* consists of four *skandhas* (*vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna*) and *rūpa* of one (*rūpaskandha*): *vibhamga evam nirdeśād iti*. *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtre nāmarūpavibhamga evam nirdeśāt. nāma katamat. catvāro 'rupiṇāḥ skandhā iti. rūpam katamat. yatkīncid rūpam iti vistareṇa. yāvad yac cedam rūpam yac ca nāma. tad-ubhayam nāma-rūpam ity ucyata iti* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 299.32-300.1). In this particular case, Vasubandhu's definition coincides with that of the *āvasthika* interpretation since both agree that *nāmarūpāṅga* consists of five *skandhas*. Again, Vasubandhu follows the same *sūtra* upon which the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is a commentary.

²³⁵ T. 99 (no. 288): 81b.

exegesis of the relation between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* played an important if not the decisive role in the formation of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*" (1987: 171). Although he concludes that "a connection of *ālayavijñāna* with the context of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is not found before *Mahāyānasamgraha*" (1987: 171), Schmithausen refers to a number of other texts in which mutual dependence is mentioned, among them both *Vaibhāṣika* (e.g., the *Vibhāṣā* and *Nyāyānusāra*) and *Yogācāra* works (e.g., the *Yogācārabhūmi*). In fact, we have seen that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* defines the first function of *nāmarūpa* as forming the "mutual support" (99.5); as I indicate in my translation, this must refer to its relationship of mutual dependence with *vijñāna*.

The challenge of solving the problems raised by either the "doubling" of *vijñāna* (its inclusion in two *aṅgas*) or the mutual of dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* would seem to provide a *Yogācāra* author with the opportunity to "prove" the existence of *ālayavijñāna*; in fact, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* does precisely this.²³⁶ The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, is not concerned with proving the existence of *ālayavijñāna*, so it does not address these questions. Nevertheless, the understanding of *nāmarūpa* revealed by the definition of its functions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* presupposes, I believe, an identification of *saṃskārapratyaya* *vijñānam* with *ālayavijñāna*.

To understand what the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* means when it says that "Individual Existence makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,"²³⁷ it may be helpful to look at a portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which a similar notion is expressed in greater detail, as well as at the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, in which the position of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is explained and criticized.

The first phase of the *śarīra* section of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* concerns rebirth from the past life

²³⁶ *rnam par šes pa dan / miñ dan gzugs mduñ khyim ltar gcig la gcig brten pa'i tshul gyis 'jug pa gañ yin pa de yañ / rnam par smin pa'i rnam par šes pa med na mi run no*—*Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 16.18-21; Lamotte 1973: 58-59).

²³⁷ *ātmabhāvam ca sattvān grāhayati* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.14).

into the present and describes what happens in the first moments of the new life: “After he [namely, a person who, in the past, performed acts conditioned by Ignorance] has passed away from the previous life, he produces in the proper order a basis of personal existence (*ātmabhāva*), that is to say, the conception consciousness in the mother’s womb, the resultant consciousness (*pratisaṁdhiphalavijñāna*), which is conditioned by the causal consciousness (*hetuvijñānapratyaya*), namely [we are to understand ‘in the proper order’ as meaning] through the successive stages of the Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*) in the form of the embryo, such as the fetus, etc., up until Old Age.”²³⁸ Schmithausen cites this passage as a case in which *pratisaṁdhivijñāna* precedes *nāmarūpa* by one moment, and he contrasts it with the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* section on *āṅgasamāsa*, according to which, he implies, *pratisaṁdhivijñāna* is simultaneous with *nāmarūpa* (1987: 175, 467 n. 1129). However, I am not sure that this passage must be read as unambiguously separating *pratisaṁdhivijñāna* from *nāmarūpa*; the extremely confused syntax of the passage makes it difficult to determine the exact temporal relationship between the *pratisaṁdhiphalavijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*.

In any case, what concerns me here is the use of the term “basis of personal existence” (*ātmabhāva*) in a context similar to that in which the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* uses it. Throughout his book on *ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen discusses this term and identifies four aspects of *ātmabhāva*, that “are not mutually exclusive but may be variously stressed or ignored according to the context.” Among these four he identifies a “qualitative aspect,” in which *ātmabhāva* is similar to *nikāyasabhāga*, and a “concrete aspect,” referring to “the constituents on which a certain personal existence is based, or which forms its

²³⁸ *sa kālam kṛtvā pūrvāntād vartamāne 'dhvany ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayat anupūrveṇa mātūḥ kukṣau hetuvijñāna[pratyayaṁ]—Schmithausen's emendation from the manuscript (1987: 468 n. 1130)] pratisandhiphalavijñānam yāvad eva kalalatvādibhir avasthāviśeṣair uttarottarais tasya garbhagatasya nāmarūpasya yāvaj jīrṇatvāya (Yogācārabhūmi: 199.3-5). Schmithausen translates this passage (1987: 467-468 n. 1130) and calls it difficult; my translation differs somewhat from his.*

nucleus resulting from karmic Maturation, especially the *vipākajam śad-āyatanaṁ*" (1987: 558-559 n. 1477).

In both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Savitarkādibhūmi* passages under discussion here, the concrete aspect of *ātmabhāva* seems prominent. The beginning of the *ātmabhāva* in the new life, which consists of either the *pratisamdhivijñāna* together with *nāmarūpa* at the same moment, or the *pratisamdhivijñāna* immediately followed by the *nāmarūpa*, is the karmic result of the causal consciousness from the preceding life.²³⁹ The fact that these are the only two passages that I have come across in which the term *ātmabhāva* is used in the context of *nāmarūpa* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula further suggests that the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is a major source of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.²⁴⁰

Another peculiarity of the terminology, or rather phrasing, of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* here is the use of the verb, *grāhayati*, which, like almost all of the verbs in the section on the function of the members, is causative. Unlike in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, where the functions attributed to the *āṅgas* from Individual Existence through Feeling are rather passive and are, for the most part, related to the process of cognition, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* they are decidedly active and are related to the process of rebirth. This can be explained, I believe, by the fact that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, when it refers to the

²³⁹The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, on the other hand, stresses the qualitative aspect by relating the arising of *nāmarūpa* to the distribution of beings among the *nikāyasabhāgas*.

²⁴⁰In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the term *ātmabhāvaphala* appears as the result due to an ignorance of which the causal chain leading to the projection of a new existence begins (*Śrāvakabhūmi*: 384.8; Wayman 1961: 114; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 169b3; T. 1579: 454b16. In his translation of the immediately following passage [*tatrākṣepakō hetur dvividhe phale saṁmoha{h}* saṁmoha-pūrvakāś ca punyāpuṇyāniṣyāḥ saṁskārāḥ*, etc.], Wayman reads *dvividhe phale* as a locative absolute ["while there is the fruit of two kinds"], but I think that it should be construed with *saṁmoha*). This passage appears to be a less complete (or perhaps less systematic) version of the description of *ākṣepakahetu* found in the expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* and *Savitarkādibhūmi*.

*Addition suggested by Schmithausen 1987: 519 n. 1421 fn. 4.

āngas from Individual Existence through Feeling, is actually referring to their seeds. The *Ch'eng wei shih lun* suggests that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, as well as the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and the *Pratīyasamutpāda-sūtra*, refers to the members from Consciousness to Feeling as actual entities rather than as *bijas* because it designates these *āngas* from the point of view of the time of their actualization, when they appear in the order of the formula, rather than from the point of view of their causal state, when they are still simultaneous.²⁴¹ This explanation is convincing since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* here is, in fact, explaining the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula per se, in the order in which it is traditionally presented, rather than in the rearranged order found in the section on the sets of members.

More specifically, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* states that, in the section on the sets of members in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *nāmarūpa* includes the *bijas* of *vipākavijñāna*.²⁴² If, keeping this assertion in mind, we examine the statement that *nāmarūpāṅga* “makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,” we can see that actualized *nāmarūpa* would have no power to cause a being to do anything; it is, essentially, the being itself. However, if *nāmarūpāṅga* consists of the seeds of the first moment or moments of the karmically produced next life, then one can understand how it has the potential to make beings commence a new existence. In the immediately following discussions of the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* similarly uses verbs indicating capabilities that can only be explained if these *āngas* represent seeds rather than actualized entities.

The notion that a member of the formula can be a seed seems to

²⁴¹T. 1585: 42c13-14; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483. Actually, the text specifies the five members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā*, but this is probably because, as the *Shindōjōyuishikiron* points out, it is referring not only to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* but also to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and the *Pratīyasamutpāda-sūtra*, in which *vijñāna* does not receive the same treatment as in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, where it is grouped among the projecting members. See also my translation of the section on the Determination of the Functions of the Members (Chapter 2, section B5).

²⁴²異熟識種名色攝 (T. 1585: 42c8-9).

originate in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.²⁴³ It is further elaborated, I believe, in the passage from the *śarīra* section of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* that describes the transition from the present life to the future life (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 200.5-201.13).²⁴⁴ (As I have indicated, the entire *śarīra* section may have originated in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*.) The section entitled *vibhaṅga* (*vibhāga*) of the same exposition (summarized in my translation of the section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on the functions of the members) appears to have applied some concepts from the *śarīra* section to the individual members of the formula (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.1-212.4).

However, the seed theory implicit in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition is, as I have mentioned in Chapter Three, somewhat different from the theory (or theories) found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. According to the explanation of *nāmarūpa* in the section on *vibhaṅga* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, the term refers to a seed that is contained in the seed of consciousness (presumably, the consciousness that has been projected by karma from the previous life), as well as to *nāmarūpa* in the form of the actualized result of that seed. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* system, on the other hand, *nāmarūpa* is not contained in the seed of consciousness; rather, it is the seed of the resultant consciousness itself. Nor does it refer to the actualized *nāmarūpa*, which is only to be found in *jātyaṅga*. Similarly, in the discussions of the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* seems to have refined the *Savitarkādibhūmi* theory so that seeds and actualized *dharmas* no longer are included in the same member. This interpretation of the formula is possible only when the member Consciousness, which in the *śarīra*

²⁴³tatrākṣepako hetur dvividhe phale saṃmoha[ḥ]* saṃmoha-pūrvakāś ca punyāpunyāniñjyāḥ saṃskārāḥ saṃskāraparigrhītam ca / punarbhavavijñānāṅkura-prādurbhāvāya tadbiṇam vijñānaparigrhītam paunarbhavika-nāmarūpa-bījam saḍāyatana-bījam sparśa-vedanābījam iti / sa evam āyat�ām jāti-samjñakānām vijñāna-nāmarūpa-saḍāyatana-sparśa-vedanānām utpattaye / ānupūrvyā pūrvam eva bijaparigrahaḥ / ayam ākṣepa[kā]-hetuḥ (Wayman 1961: 114; *Śrāvakabhūmi*: 384.11-18; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 169b4-7; T. 1579: 454b20-26).

*Addition suggested by Schmithausen 1987: 519 n. 1421 fn. 4.

²⁴⁴Translated in Chapter 3, section C2.

section has the dual nature of being both the causal consciousness in the past life and the resultant conception consciousness in the present life, is taken unequivocally to refer to the *karmabījas* or *karmavāsanās* in the past life.

4. The Six Senses

Unlike the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* emphasize the role in the rebirth process of the Six Senses, which, as we have seen above, Schmithausen describes as the result of karmic maturation. In this respect, at least, their definition is quite close to the *āvasthika* definition in the *Abhidharmakośa*, as explained in the *Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya* and *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. According to the *āvasthika* interpretation of the formula, Individual Existence refers to a stage of the embryo in which only two of the organs, namely *manas* and *kāya*, are present,²⁴⁵ while the Six Senses refer to the stage at which the other four organs have developed.²⁴⁶ This explains the comment of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* that the remaining organs are no longer lacking. As for Vasubandhu, in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, in which he gives his own opinion, he essentially agrees with the *āvasthika* definitions of both *nāmarūpa* and the *saḍāyatana*s.²⁴⁷

According to the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *saḍāyatana*s refer to the actual completion of the embryonic new existence. However, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* they are seeds, which, when they yield results, will result in the completion of the *ātmabhāva*. Like the actualized

²⁴⁵At the end of the explanation of *nāmarūpa* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (see note 232), Vasubandhu adds *prāk caturāyatanoṭpādādīni vaktavye saḍāyatana-*ava-*canām tadā tadvyavasthāpanāt* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 132.4-5). Yaśomitra explains: *tadā tad-*vyavasthāpanād* iti. cakṣur-ādy-āyatanoṭpatti-kāle kāya-*ma-*ṇāyatana-yor vyavasthāpanād* ity arthāt (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 285.3-4; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 63 n. 2).

²⁴⁶*utpanne saḍāyatane sāvasthā tāvat saḍāyatanaṁ ity ucyate* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 132.7).

²⁴⁷Here Vasubandhu simply quotes again from the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*: *tathā nāmarūpa paripākāt krameṇa saḍāyatanaṁ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.6-7).

nāmarūpa, the actualized *sadāyatanas* are included in *jātyaṅga*.

5. Contact

a. The *Abhidharma* Controversy about *Sparśa*

In this section, before discussing how *sparśa* functions as a member of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula according to the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, I examine the *abhidharma* debate concerning the reality of *sparśa*, as well as the *Yogācāra* position on this issue.

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the definition of *sparśa* is presented as a subject of controversy. According to *Sarvāstivāda*, *sparśa* is a real *dharma*, defined as that which is produced by the coming together of three *dharmas*.²⁴⁸ The opponents, on the other hand, say that it is not a *dharma* in itself, but simply the coming together of the three. Jaini, in the introduction to his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (1959b: 59), identifies the *sūtra* source of the “*Sautrāntika*”²⁴⁹ position as being similar to a passage from the *Madhupindikasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*,²⁵⁰ and he says that the *Vaibhāṣika* position is based on the *Ṣaṭsaṭkasūtra*.²⁵¹ Furthermore, in the *Samyuktāgama*, one can find two *sūtras* that seem to support the two different positions.²⁵²

²⁴⁸ However, it is not clear that all *Sarvāstivādin* texts agree with this definition. The *Prakaranapāda* (阿毘達磨品類足論), for example, defines *sparśa* simply as having the nature of the coming together of the three (觸云何。謂三和合性—T. 1542: 693a13-14).

²⁴⁹ Jaini uses this term, but the text itself does not identify the opponents. Since this position is attributed to the *Dārṣṭāntika* in the *Vibhāṣā*, and since Vasubandhu does not accept it, I shall refer to it as a *Dārṣṭāntika* position.

²⁵⁰ Jaini refers to a passage quoted in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: ata indriya-viṣaya-vijñāna-trayam sparśa-bhūtam* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 304.33-34). Honjō identifies another passage quoted in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as *Samyuktāgama* 214: *iti ya eṣām trayānām dharmānām samgatiḥ samnipātah samavāyāḥ sa sparśah* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 143.7-8; Honjō 1984: 41; see also La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97 n. 1).

²⁵¹ La Vallée Poussin identifies this *sūtra* as being parallel to the *Chachakkasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* iii. 180 and *Dīghanikāya* iii. 243 [La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97 n. 3]). Honjō also refers to *Samyuktāgama* 304 (1984: 41).

²⁵² *Samyuktāgama* 306: “The conditions *caksus* and *rūpa* produce *cakṣurvijñāna*; the coming together of the three is *sparśa*” (眼色緣生眼識三事和合觸—T. 99: 87c26-27);

Jaini implies that the view of *sparśa* as a separate *dharma* prevails in the *abhidharma* (1959b: 59). While this is largely true, it is, perhaps, an oversimplification of what appears in the various strata of the immense *abhidharma* literature. One might expect to find the simpler definition, that *sparśa* is the coming together of the three, in the earlier *abhidharma* texts. However, it is interesting that in the earliest²⁵³ *Abhidharmapiṭaka* texts that I have consulted, the *Dharmaskandha*²⁵⁴ and the *Saṅgītiparyāya*,²⁵⁵ the references that I have found suggest that *sparśa* is, indeed, a *dharma* distinct from the coming together of the three. Both texts state that *sparśa* results from the coming together of the sense organ, the object, and the corresponding consciousness.

Among texts of the middle period, the *Dhātukāya* holds to the same position,²⁵⁶ as does the *Vijñānakāyaśāstra* in a general denial of the reality of the *pudgala*.²⁵⁷ However, immediately afterwards, in another passage, which concerns *pratītyasamutpāda*, the *Vijñānakāyaśāstra* states that the coming together of the six *āyatana*s is *sparśa*.²⁵⁸ This passage, I believe, is the *sāṃbandhika* interpretation described in the *Vibhāṣā*,²⁵⁹ which is related to the *kṣaṇika* interpretation²⁶⁰ presented in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, according to which *sparśa* is the activity of the organs on their objects.²⁶¹ In

Samyuktāgama 68: “*Cakṣurvijñāna* arises in dependence on *cakṣur* and *rūpa*. The coming together of the three produces *sparśa*” (緣眼及色眼識生。三事和合生觸—T. 99: 18a13-14). The *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation of the *Vibhāṣā*, which mentions these two *sūtras* in a note, seems to understand them as identical in meaning (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 14: 285 n. 5), but there is clearly a difference in the relationship between the coming together of the three and *sparśa* in the two passages.

²⁵³ For the relative chronology of *abhidharma* texts, see Mizuno 1961: 69-75.

²⁵⁴ 云何六處緣觸。謂眼及色為緣生眼識。三和合故生觸, etc. (T. 1537: 509b26-27).

²⁵⁵ 云何眼觸身。答眼及諸色為緣生眼識。三和合故觸, etc. (T. 1536: 429a21-23).

²⁵⁶ 眼觸云何。謂眼及色為緣生於眼識。三和合故觸, etc. (T. 1540: 615c10-11).

²⁵⁷ T. 1539: 545b-547a passim.

²⁵⁸ 六處和合即是其觸 (T. 1539: 547a5-6).

²⁵⁹ T. 1545: 118c17-25; *sparśa* is defined in columns 20-21. See Chapter 5, section B2.

²⁶⁰ La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65-66.

²⁶¹ *sadāyatanaśabhinipātah sparśaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 133.5). *Abhinipātah* is glossed as *pravṛttiḥ* by Yaśomitra (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 286.9; see also La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65 n. 4). I follow Yaśomitra in my translation.

this context, at least, the definition of *sparśa* is closer to that of the Dārśāntikas.

Among the later texts, the *Prakaraṇapāda* also contains two different definitions of *sparśa*. In a long discussion of *cakṣuhsparśa* as one of the six *sparśas*, *sparśa* is defined as resulting from the coming together of the organ, etc.²⁶² However, in a discussion of the five categories of *rūpa*, *citta*, *caitta*, *cittaviprayukta*, and *asamskṛta*, *sparśa*, although included in *caitta*, is simply defined as having the nature of being the coming together of the three.²⁶³ Similarly, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, which Mizuno describes as containing material belonging to all three periods (1961: 71-72), contains both definitions. In a long discussion of many types of *sparśa*, *sparśa* is said to be produced by the coming together of the organ, etc.,²⁶⁴ while in a reference to the Buddha's words in a discussion of *dhyāna*²⁶⁵ and in an explanation of the six *sparśas* in an exposition of *caittadharmas*,²⁶⁶ the coming-together-of-the-three definition appears.

This inconsistency in the definition of *sparśa* in the *Abhidharmaśāstra* suggests to me that the Sarvāstivādins generally defined *sparśa* as a separate *dharma* in their earliest texts, and that the definition did not become a matter of controversy until a later period. In the *Vibhāṣā*,²⁶⁷ however, the Dārśāntikas are credited with the view that the *sūtra*²⁶⁸ definition of *sparśa* as the coming together of the three rules out the possibility that it is a separate and real *dharma*. The *Vibhāṣā* disagrees, pointing out two undesirable consequences that would obtain if *sparśa* were not real: (1) the *aṅga*, *sparśapratyayā vedanā*, in the

²⁶²眼觸云何。謂眼及色為緣生眼識。三和合故觸 (T. 1542: 701a5-6).

²⁶³觸云何。謂三和合性 (T. 1542: 693a13-14).

²⁶⁴復次綠色生眼識三法和合生觸。是名眼觸 (T. 1548: 697b9-10).

²⁶⁵如佛說。云何觸。緣眼緣色生眼識。三法和合觸 (T. 1548: 622c29-623a1).

²⁶⁶復次眼觸緣眼緣色生眼識。三法和合觸。是名眼觸, etc. (T. 1548: 672b11-12).

²⁶⁷T. 1545: 760a28-b3. This passage, as the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation states (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 14: 283-284 n. 2), occurs at the beginning of a passage commenting on an enumeration of sixteen types of *sparśa* in the *Jñānaprasthāna* (T. 1544: 996b9-25).

²⁶⁸The *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* identifies *Samyuktāgama* 306 (see note 251) as one version of this *sūtra* (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 14: 285 n. 5).

pratītyasamutpāda formula would have to be replaced by *śadāyatana-pratyayā vedanā*, with the result that the formula would have only eleven members, not the twelve mentioned in the *sūtra*; (2) the list of *dharmas* present in every moment of consciousness (*cittamahābhūmika*) would consist of only nine, not ten.²⁶⁹ The *Vibhāṣā* then goes on to interpret the *sūtra* quoted by the Dārśṭāntikas as meaning that the coming together of the three is actually the cause of the arising of *sparśa* and states that it is not the case that something unreal can “arise.” Furthermore, if *sparśa* did not arise, there would be no condition that would give rise to *vedanā*.²⁷⁰ Thus it seems that in the period between the composition of the *Abhidharmapitaka* texts and that of the *Vibhāṣā*, the definition of *sparśa* became a topic of scholastic contention.

The controversy is quite elaborately laid out in the *Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya*. Vasubandhu’s clearest and most detailed description of the Sarvāstivādin definition is found in his exposition of the *caitasika dharmas* in Chapter II: “*Sparśa* is the contact that is produced by the coming together of a sense-organ, an object, and consciousness.”²⁷¹ Yaśomitra reiterates the distinction between the “contact” and the “coming together”: “that [entity] by means of which a sense-organ, an object and consciousness touch one another, as it were, is *sparśa*.”²⁷² Vasubandhu does not discuss the Dārśṭāntika position here, however, so we must return to his exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*. There, in a comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 30b,²⁷³ Vasubandhu presents the controversy in the form of an argument between the (Dārśṭāntika)

²⁶⁹便違經說。如契經說。觸為緣受。若無觸者但應說六處緣受。惑說無緣不應言觸緣受。又若觸體非實有者。應說緣起唯十一支。契經不應說有十二。又若觸體非實有者。但應說有九大地法。然說有十故觸實有 (T. 1545: 760b3-8).

²⁷⁰問若觸實有云何會釋彼所引經。答彼經意說三法和合為緣生觸非於無體得有生義。此若不生云何緣受 (T. 1545: 760b9-11; *Kokuyaku Issaikyō Bidon-bu* 14: 284).

²⁷¹*Sparśa indriyavīśayavijñānasannipātajā sprṣṭih* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 54.21-22; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 154).

²⁷²*yad-yogād indriya-visaya-vijñānāny anyonyam sprśantīva sa sparśah* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 127.26-27; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 154).

²⁷³The verse reads: *sparśāḥ ṣaṭ saṃnipātajāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 142.23-143.1; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 95-98).

opponents²⁷⁴ and the Sarvāstivādins. Below, I shall attempt to summarize this argument, which, of course, is quite closely related to the one found in the *Vibhāṣā*.

The Dārśāntikas begin by quoting a *sūtra* that states that *sparśa* is simply the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness.²⁷⁵ The Sarvāstivādins counter with the *Ṣaṭṣaṭkasūtra*,²⁷⁶ which enumerates six external and internal āyatanas, *vijñānas*, *sparśas*, *vedanās*, and *trṣṇās*;²⁷⁷ they say that the *sūtra* would not mention *sparśa* in this context if it were not a separate *dharma* because that would result in an undesirable repetition.²⁷⁸ In other words, if *sparśa* were merely the coming together of the three, the *sūtra* would not mention it since it has already mentioned the object (the external āyatana), the organ (the internal āyatana), and consciousness.

The Dārśāntikas, however, object to this reasoning, saying that the *sūtra* in fact does mention things that are already included in other categories; for example, *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* belong to one of the six so-called external āyatanas, namely, *dharma-yatana*.²⁷⁹ The Sarvāstivādins respond by pointing out the difference between the “repetition” of *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* and the mention of *sparśa* in this context. According to them, many *dharmas* belong to *dharma-yatana*; hence, it is reasonable

²⁷⁴The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* of Harivarman (identified in Katō 1980 as a fellow student, along with Śrīlāta, of Kumāralāta) not surprisingly takes the same position as Vasubandhu’s opponent: 識在緣中是名為觸。以三事和合名觸。是非觸相。所以者何。根不到緣。是故根緣不應和合以三事能取緣故名為和合 (T. 1646: 286c13-15; *Kokuyaku Issaikyō Ronjū-bu* 3: 210).

²⁷⁵*Samyuktāgama* 214; for text, see note 249.

²⁷⁶*Samyuktāgama* 304; see note 250.

²⁷⁷ṣaṭṣaṭko dharmaparyāyah katamah / ṣaḍ ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni / ṣaṭ bāhyāny āyatanāni / ṣaṭ vijñānakāyāh / ṣaṭ sparśakāyāh / ṣaṭ vedanākāyāh / ṣaṭ trṣṇākāyā iti (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 143.9-11; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97).

²⁷⁸ananyatve hi satīndriyārtha-vijñānesuktesu sparśa-kāya-vacanam punar uktam syāt. tataś ca ṣaṭ-ṣaṭkatvam hīyate. (*Abhidharmakośavākyā*: 304.14-156; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97).

²⁷⁹na vai prtha (corrected from *i*)gnirdeśāt prthagbhāvo bhavati / mā bhūd dharmāyatanād vedanātrṣṇayoh prthagbhāva iti (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 143.13-14), which Yaśomitra explains as follows: *yadi prtha-nirdeśāt prthag-bhāvo bhavet. vedanā-trṣṇe api dharmāyatanāt prtha nirdiṣṭe. tayor api yedanā-trṣṇayor*

to mention the *vedanākāyas* and the *trṣṇākāyas* separately. If *sparśa*, however, is, as the Dārśāntikas maintain, merely the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness, it would be unreasonable to mention it separately from these three since there can be no question as to which three entities are coming together.²⁸⁰

The Sarvāstivādins continue, saying that since consciousness is always caused by an organ and an object, the Dārśāntikas cannot claim that the *sūtra* mentions organs and objects without reference to consciousness. Therefore, organ, object, and consciousness clearly go together, and *sparśa* need only be mentioned if it is indeed a real and separate *dharma*.²⁸¹ The Dārśāntika²⁸² response to this is that it is not the case that, whenever any *caksus* and *rūpa* are present, they always cause visual consciousness; nor is it the case that all visual consciousness is the result of the presence of every *caksus* and *rūpa*.²⁸³ Therefore the term

*dharma*yatanāt prthag-bhāvah syāt. na ca tayoḥ prthag-bhāva iṣyate. *dharma*yatanāntarbhāvāt. naisa dosa iti vistarah. (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 304.16-19; Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 9; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97).

²⁸⁰ *naisa dosas* tadvyatirkasyāpi *dharma*yatanasya *bhāvāt* / na caivam sparśa-bhūtāt *trayād anyat* *trayam asti* *yasya* śeṣasyātra *grahaṇam* syāt (Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya: 143). naisa dosa iti yathoktas tad-vyatirkasyāpi *vedanā-trṣṇā-vyatirkasyāpi* *dharma*yatanasya saṃjñādi-svabhāvasya bhāvād astītvāt. na caivam iti vistarah. na caivam *bhavatas* *trayānām* *saṃnipātāt* *sparśa* ity evam *bruvāṇasya* *sparśa-bhūtād* *indriyārtha-vijñāna*-trayād anyad *asparśa-bhūtām* trayam *indriyārtha-vijñāna*-trayam *asti*. *yasya* śeṣasyātra *sūtre* *grahanam* syāt. (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 304.19-24; Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 9).

²⁸¹ *yady api* *hindriyārthau* syātām *avijñānakau* na tu punar vijñānam *anindriyārthakam* / *tasmāt triṣu nirdiṣṭeṣu* *punah sparśasya* *grahaṇam* *anarthakam* *prāpnoti* (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 143.16-17). yady apindriyārthau syātām avijñānakau. tat-sabhaṅgāv ity arthah. na tu punar vijñānam anindriyārthakam. *avaśyam* hi vijñānam *sendriyārthakam* bhavati. tac ca vijñānam apadiṣṭam atra *śad vijñāna*-*kāyā* iti. tasmāt triṣu nirdiṣṭeṣu *indriyārtha-vijñāne* *śad-vijñāna*-*kāyāvacanena* *punah sparśa-grahaṇam* *anarthakam* *prāpnoti*. *śat-sparśa-kāyā* iti. atāḥ *saṃnipātād anyāḥ* *sparśa* iti *siddhaṇ*. (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 305.1-6; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97-98).

²⁸² The *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* identifies this as the opinion of Śrīlāta (305.7; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 98). For a discussion of the identity of Śrīlāta, see Katō 1980.

²⁸³ *na khalu sarve cakṣurūpe sarvasya cakṣurvijñānasya* *kāraṇam* *nāpi sarvam cakṣurvijñānam* *sarvayoś cakṣurūpayaḥ* *kāryam* (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 143.18-19);

cakṣuhsparśa must be used to refer to the occasions when the three do enter into a relationship of cause and result.²⁸⁴

Finally, Vasubandhu explains how the Sarvāstivādins maintain their opinion when confronted with the *sūtra* passage mentioned above: “*sparśa* is the meeting of, the contact among, the coming together of these three.”²⁸⁵ The Sarvāstivādins either read the *sūtra* differently: “*sparśa* is that which is produced from the meeting of, the contact among, the coming together of these three *dharmas*.”²⁸⁶ Or they say that the *sūtra* figuratively identifies the result, *sparśa*, with the cause, *samgati*.²⁸⁷ As we have seen, it is in fact possible to find *sūtra* passages

for a remark on the translation of the repeated use of *sarva*, see Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 261 n. 1). Except for identifying this as Śrīlābha’s (sic) opinion, La Vallée Poussin does not provide any information from the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. Instead, he refers to Chapter Four of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in which are mentioned two types of *rūpa* (*samādhivīṣaya* and *avijñapti*) that are not visible (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 18). His implication seems to be that these are examples of *rūpa* that cannot result in *cakṣurvijñāna*. Yaśomitra, however, explains Śrīlāṭa’s opinion differently. According to him (if I understand this rather difficult passage correctly), only previously produced *cakṣus* and *rūpa* can be the cause of a *cakṣurvijñāna*, not *cakṣus* and *rūpa* produced at the same time as the *vijñāna*. Similarly, only the *vijñāna* that is produced afterwards, and not every *cakṣurvijñāna*, can be the result of the previous *cakṣus* and *rūpa*, and not of *cakṣus* and *rūpa* produced at the same time (*na khaly iti vistarah. pūrvotpanne cakṣu-rūpe kāraṇām. na tu vijñāna-sahotpanne. nāpi sarva-cakṣur-vijñānam iti. paścād utpannam pūrvayos cakṣu-rūpayoh. na sahotpannayoh—Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 305.7-9). Śrīlāṭa’s point seems to be that causes and effects cannot be simultaneous, a non-Sarvāstivādin position (for discussions of this issue, in the context of *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Katō 1989: 317-326; in the context of the relationship between *sparśa* and *vedanā*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 145.3 ff.; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 101; in the context of perception, see La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 282).

²⁸⁴ato yeṣāṁ kāryakāraṇabhāvas te sparśabhāve vyavasthāpitā ity eke (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 143.19-20).

²⁸⁵iti ya eṣāṁ trayāṇāṁ samgatiḥ samnipātah samavāyah sa sparśah (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 143.7-8).

²⁸⁶ya eṣāṁ dharmāṇāṁ samgateḥ samnipātāt samavāyād utpannah sa sparśah (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 305.13-14; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 98 n. 2).

²⁸⁷kāraṇe va kāryopacārō 'yam iti bruvanti (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 143.22-23), which is explained by Yaśomitra: samgatau samnipātē samavāye kāraṇe kāryopacārah sparśa iti (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 305.14-15).

that support either interpretation so the first explanation, at least, is quite convincing. Vasubandhu then cuts off this argument, allowing the Sarvāstivādins to have the last word, and in this case I believe that he agrees with them, not with the Dārśāntikas.

b. Vasubandhu's Position

In order to ascertain Vasubandhu's personal opinion, we must return to the context of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula as a whole. In the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, there are three general interpretations of the formula. The first, an explanation of each member as a state (*avasthā*) of the five *skandhas*, is accepted by the Vaibhāśikas. The second, *kṣaṇīka*, interpretation is an explanation of each member as it occurs in a single moment; Vasubandhu gives the example of the moment at which a murder is committed.²⁸⁸ This interpretation is not, as far as I know, associated with a particular school. Finally, there is a passage in the comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, in which Vasubandhu presents his own understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In this passage, Vasubandhu often criticizes Sarvāstivādin positions, seemingly from a Sautrāntika point of view,²⁸⁹ but in the case of *sparśa*, he seems to accept the Sarvāstivādin position. Before discussing this passage in detail, I shall examine the *āvasthika* definition in order to see whether it is consistent with the Sarvāstivādin definition of *sparśa* as a *mahābhūmikadharma* described above.

According to the *āvasthika* interpretation as presented by Vasubandhu, the term *saḍāyatana* refers to the five *skandhas* from the time that all six sense organs are present until the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness.²⁹⁰ That is to say, it refers to the last stage of the embryo, immediately before birth. The term *sparśa* refers to the *skandhas* from the moment of the coming together of the three until the ability to distinguish the causes of pleasurable, unpleasurable, and

²⁸⁸ See the previous section and Chapter 5, section 5Bh.

²⁸⁹ Again, see Chapter 5.

²⁹⁰ *utpanne saḍāyatane sāvasthā tāvat saḍāyatanaṁ ity ucyate yāvad indriyaviśaya-viññānatrikasaṁnipātaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 132.7-8).

neutral feelings has developed.²⁹¹ Yaśomitra points out that *sparśa* is established at the state of birth, because only then is the coming together of consciousness, the completed sense organs, and their objects possible.²⁹² He also suggests a possible upper age limit for this stage, giving the example of a child who touches a fire because he does not know that it will cause him pain.²⁹³ Thus, the stage seems to coincide with very early childhood.

Certainly, the term *sparśa* seems to be used almost synonymously with *trikasaṅgama*, another synonym for *trikasamnipāta*, in the verse here.²⁹⁴ Nevertheless, I think that I can distinguish a difference between the significance of the two terms in the *āvasthika* interpretation. Vasubandhu uses the terms *trikasaṅgama* and *trikasamnipāta* in the verse and the commentary respectively to refer to the first moment of the stage, the moment of birth. However, to refer to the entire stage, he uses the term *sparśa*, again in both the verse and the commentary.²⁹⁵

I believe that the key to understanding this passage lies in the fact that certain members of the formula, including *sparśa*, have a strongly cognitional role, even in the “embryological” *āvasthika* system.²⁹⁶ If from birth to about age three, an infant or child can experience the

²⁹¹ *trayāñām samnipātāt sparśo bhavati. sa yāvad vedanātrayakāraṇa paricchedena samartha bhavati sā 'vasthā sparśa ity ucyate* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 132.10-11; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 64).

²⁹² *sparśo jātāvasthāyām vyavasthāpyate. paripūrṇa-śadāyatana-samnipāta-sadbhāvāt.* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 285.9-10).

²⁹³ *tathā hi bālako 'gnim api sprśed duḥkhasyaitat kāraṇam ity aparicchindan* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 285.13-14).

²⁹⁴ “[*Nāmarūpa* is the state of the *skandhas*] before the production of the six āyatanas; those [namely, the six āyatanas are the state of the *skandhas*] before the coming together of the three; *sparśa* [is the state of the *skandhas*] before the ability to know the cause of pleasure, pain, etc.” (*prāk śadāyatana* *notpādāt tat pūrvam trikasamgamāt / sparśah prāk sukhaduhkhādikāraṇajñānaśaktitah*—*Abhidharmakośa* III 22; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 132.2 ff.; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 63-64).

²⁹⁵ It is true that Yaśomitra glosses *sparśa* as *śad-indriya-viśaya-vijñāna-samnipātāḥ*, but this is in the context of explaining why the stage called *sparśa* begins at the moment of birth (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 285.9).

²⁹⁶ For a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* that touches on this issue, see Takasaki 1987: 149-162 (for *sparśa* in particular, 152-156).

outside world, albeit without understanding how it functions causally, it is, as Yaśomitra states, because the elements necessary for cognition become present at the time of birth. Therefore, the potential for cognition that occurs at the moment of birth, *trikasamnipāta*, is the cause, in some sense, of *sparśa*. In this way, I believe, the Sarvāstivādins' embryological explanation of *sparśa* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula can be reconciled with their insistence in other contexts that *sparśa* is a *dharma* that exists independently from organ, object, and consciousness, but that is caused by the coming together of the three.

Coming to Vasubandhu's own exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* commentary on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, we are immediately confronted with a textual problem. According to Pradhan's Sanskrit text,²⁹⁷ *sparśa* is the coming together of the three.²⁹⁸ If we accept his reading, it would appear that Vasubandhu here, as is frequently the case, favors a Dārśāntika/Sautrāntika opinion. However, the Chinese and Tibetan translations all differ from Pradhan's text, and they all suggest an original Sanskrit *trayāñām saṃnipātajah* ("produced by the coming together of the three")²⁹⁹ or *trayāñām saṃnipātāt* ("as a result of the coming together of the three").³⁰⁰ These versions suggest that Vasubandhu here accepts the Sarvāstivādin position. Unfortunately, Yaśomitra and Sthiramati neither comment on nor even quote the definition of *sparśa* in Vasubandhu's exposition³⁰¹ so we are unable to know what version of the

²⁹⁷ *trayāñām saṃnipātah sparśah sukhādivedanīyah* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.7-8). Pradhan's reading here has been confirmed by inspection of a photocopy of the manuscript.

²⁹⁸ Mejor's translation reflects the Sanskrit text: "there is a meeting of the three [viz. visual consciousness, sense of vision, object of vision, etc.], [and this is called] 'contact', [which may be felt as pleasant etc.]" (1991: 96).

²⁹⁹ Paramārtha's Chinese translation: 次於塵起亂心時。由識生故。從三和合生觸。謂於樂受等勝 (T. 1559: 208a23-24).

³⁰⁰ Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation: 次與境合便有識生。三和故有順樂等觸 (T. 1558: 51b3-4. Tibetan: *gsum 'dus pa las bde ba la sogs pa myon bar 'gyur ba'i reg pa'o* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* [tib.]: 151b8). Naturally, both La Vallée Poussin in his French translation (1971, v. 2: 85) and Yamaguchi and Funahashi in their Japanese (1955: 231) reflect these versions since the Sanskrit text was published after their translations.

³⁰¹ See Mejor 1991: 98-110 for the Tibetan text of Sthiramati's gloss on Vasubandhu's exposition.

text was available to them. P'u-kuang, who quotes Hsüan-tsang's translation, does not seem to be considering the distinction between the two definitions of *sparśa*, and we learn nothing more from his comment. Finally, it seems quite plausible that Pradhan's manuscript simply dropped one letter, turning *saṃnipātajah* into *saṃnipātah*.

On the basis then of the available sources, I believe that Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* accepts the Sarvāstivādin, rather than the Dārśāntika, definition of *sparśa*. My conclusion is supported by the fact that Vasubandhu elsewhere either implicitly or explicitly grants *sparśa* the status of an independent *dharma*. In the *Pañcaskandhaka*,³⁰² he defines *sparśa* simply as one of the universally present (*sarvatraga*) *dharmas*, without referring to any difference of opinion, while in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, in his exposition of *sadāyatana**pratyayah* *sparśah*, he quotes the *sūtra* on which the Dārśāntika position is based and proceeds to refute this position at considerable length, using some of the same arguments that he attributes to Sarvāstivāda in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.³⁰³

³⁰² *reg pa gañ že na / gsum 'dus nas yoñs su gcod pa'o* (*Pañcaskandhaka* [tib.]: 14a2). This clearly indicates that *sparśa* and *trikasañnipāta* are not identical, unlike the Chinese translation, which is not so clear: 云何為觸。謂三和合分別為性 (T. 1612: 848c12-13). However, the Chinese translation of Sthiramati's commentary, *Pañcaskandhaprakaranavaibhāṣya*, explains the above Chinese text as follows: 三和。謂眼色識。如是等。此諸和合心心法生故名為觸。與受所依為業 (T. 1613: 851c9-10). Therefore, I think that the Chinese version can be understood in essentially the same way as the Tibetan, which I translate as follows: "What is contact? It is the distinct apprehension (for this translation of what was probably *pariccheda* in the original Sanskrit, see Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613) [that occurs] after the three come together" (see Anacker [1984: 67] for a slightly different English translation and Dantinne [1980: 9] for a French translation).

³⁰³ *de dag ni rgyu la 'bras bu gdags pa yin te / dper na 'phags pa rnams ni mthoñ ba bde žes bya ba dañ / tshañs spyod dri ma bud med yin žes bya ba lta bu'o / jig rten na yañ me ni bde ba'o / me ni sdug bsñal ba'o žes bya ba lta bu'o / rgyu la 'bras bu de ltar gdags kyi gsum 'dus pa ñid reg pa ma yin no žes bya ba 'di ji ltar yid ches par bya / jig rten na phrad pa la reg go žes brjod do že na / 'di ni re žig skye mched drug gi rkyen gyis reg pa žes 'byuñ ba'i mdo sde dañ 'gal ba yin te / skye mched drug ni gsum gyi nañ du 'dus pa'i phyir dañ / sems las 'byuñ ba'i reg pa yañ ma yin par thal bar*

c. *Sparśa* in Yogācāra Texts

If, in fact, Vasubandhu accepts the Sarvāstivādin definition of *sparśa* as a separate *dharma*, it is not surprising. As I shall argue in more detail later in this chapter and in following ones, Vasubandhu, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, when discussing a controversial point, tends to side with whichever position is more consonant with Yogācāra doctrine. In this case, it is Sarvāstivāda that is closer to Yogācāra. The Dārśāntika denial of the reality of *sparśa* is incompatible with its status, according to Yogācāra texts such as the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, as one of the five *caitasika dharmas* always associated with *ālayavijñāna* and thus separate and real entities.³⁰⁴

However, the definitions of *sparśa* in earlier portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* differ from those in later ones, and it is necessary to examine the various definitions in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in order to determine at what point Yogācāra starts to identify *sparśa* explicitly as something other than the mere coming together of organ, object, and consciousness. As far as I can tell, those portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* identified by Schmithausen as the oldest, i.e., the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and *Vastusamgrahanī*, do not define *sparśa* in terms that indicate a concern with the question of its reality.³⁰⁵

In the *Manobhūmi*, on the other hand, most of the evidence suggests

'gyur la / gsum 'dus pa ni sems las byuñ ba'i chos reg pa yañ ma yin no / reg pa ni
btags pa yin te ris 'dra ba bžin no že na yañ de ltar na mi ldan pa yin par 'gyur la de
lta bu ni sde pa gañ gi grub pa'i mtha' yañ ma yin no / btsun pa gos dam rab dañ mdo
sde 'di ñid las gsuñs pa miñ gañ že na / tshor ba dañ 'du śes dañ / sems pa dañ / reg
pa dañ / yid la byed pa'o žes bya ba dañ / sde tshan drug pa drug las kyañ sde tshan
drug rnams ni rigs tha dad pa las rnam par bžag gi / gsum 'dus pa ñid reg pa ma yin
no (Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā [tib.]: 35b8-36a6).

³⁰⁴T. 1585: 11b16-c16, especially 11c4: 然觸自性是實非假; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 143-146. Elsewhere in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *sparśa* is defined as one of the *caitasika dharmas* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 15.18-16.1); I shall discuss the particulars of the definition later.

³⁰⁵There is a reference to 三和合觸 in the *Vastusamgrahanī* (T. 1579: 800c26), but there is no discussion of the term. Furthermore, the context neither indicates an awareness of the issue nor implies a position.

that *sparśa* is an independent *dharma*. It is true that we can find *sparśa* defined as *trikasamnipāta*, and this could suggest that *sparśa* is nothing more than the coming together of the three. However, immediately before this definition, *sparśa*, which is said to be that by which the pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral character of an object is ascertained,³⁰⁶ is mentioned as one of the *sarvabhūmika caittadharmas*. Both its function and its inclusion among the *sarvabhūmikas* imply that it is real. After this passage, in which the functions of the *sarvabhūmikas* are described in order to prove that they are indeed present at each moment of consciousness, each *dharma* is defined by a single noun, nominal compound, or very brief nominal phrase.³⁰⁷ In this context, we find the definition: “What is *sparśa*? The coming together of the three.” Thus, the term is probably used here, not to indicate the author’s rejection of *sparśa* as a real entity, but simply for convenience since, as we have seen, the term *trikasamnipāta* is found in the *sūtras* and can thus be understood as a kind of shorthand definition.³⁰⁸ In the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, too, *sparśa* is included among the *dharmas* always associated with *vijñāna*, which in this case is specified as *ālayavijñāna*.³⁰⁹ From these passages, we can infer that *sparśa* is considered real and separate, but, unlike in the Sarvāstivādin discussions, it is never explicitly stated to be the result of the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness.

In the *pratyayaprabheda* section of the analysis of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, however, the question is raised as to how,

³⁰⁶tatraiva śubhāśubhobhayaviparītalakṣaṇam yat [tat] sparśena pratipadyate (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 59.17-18; see Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613).

³⁰⁷manaskāraḥ katamāḥ / cetāśā abhogāḥ / sparśaḥ katamāḥ / trikasannipātah / vedanā katamā / anubhavanā / saṃjñā katamā / sañjānanā / cetanā katamā / cittābhisaṃskāraḥ (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 60.1-3).

³⁰⁸This passage is referred to in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, which reproduces its enumeration of *sarvabhūmikas* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 273b7-8; T. 1579: 684a8-9).

³⁰⁹de la mtshuṇs par ldan pas 'jug pa rnām par bzag pa gaṇ žé na / 'di la kun gži rnām par žes pa tshuṇs par ldan pa na sems dan mtshuṇs par ldan pa kun tu 'gro ba lna bo yid la byed pa dan / reg pa dan / tshor ba dan / 'du šes dan / sems pa rnām dan mtshuṇs par ldan no (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 5a5-6); 云何建立相應轉相。謂阿賴耶識。與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意觸受想思 (T. 1579: 580a29-b1).

if *sparśa* is defined as being the result of the coming together of the three, it can be called *saḍāyatana-pratyaya* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula. The answer is an attempt to reconcile the theory of cognition with the terminology of the formula: when a sense organ is present, the other two (namely, object and consciousness) must also be present, but, because of the predominance of the six sense organs and the fact that the other two are here included in the term *saḍāyatana*, only the six sense organs are mentioned.³¹⁰ Thus, this passage, which occurs in a part of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that I consider to be highly systematized, implies a definition of *sparśa* identical to the one accepted by the Sarvāstivādins: *sparśa* is conditioned by, and hence is not identical to, the simultaneous presence of organ, object, and consciousness, all three of which are here designated as *saḍāyatana*. In the *vibhaṅga* section of the same *pratītyasamutpāda* analysis, moreover, we can find an explicit statement that *sparśa* is produced by the coming together of the three.³¹¹

Except for the mention of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* passage, the definitions of *sparśa* in the earliest Yogācāra materials are essentially similar to the Sarvāstivādin definitions. The *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, on the other hand, perhaps elaborating on the passage from the *Manobhūmi* in which *sparśa* is said to ascertain the pleasant, etc., character of an object (see above), redefines *sparśa* in a way that seems to influence later texts, such as the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*, and *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. According to the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, *sparśa* is *trikasannipāta*³¹² *indriyavikāraparicchedah*. This

³¹⁰yadā trikasamavāyapratyayah sparśah kena kāranena saḍāyatana-pratyaya evoktaḥ / sati saḍāyatane tadanyadvayāvaikalyāt saḍāyatana-pradhānam [emended from saḍāyatana-pradhānam pradhānam] iti kṛtvā dvayasamgrahāc ca saḍāyatana-sya (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 217.10-12).

³¹¹cakṣuḥsamsparśah katamah / trikasamavāyajā visayam śubhādyarthataḥ udgrahaṇātā (Schmithausen's correction of Bhattacharya's edition [207.16] on the basis of the manuscript—Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613). I have summarized the passage in which this definition occurs and provided the complete text in the notes to my translation (Chapter 2, section B5f).

³¹²Pradhan gives *trikasannipāta* (Pradhan 1950: 6.3). The Tibetan reads *gsum 'dus nas* (*Abhidharma-samuccaya* [tib.]: 55b6), which would suggest a Sanskrit ablative: *trikasannipātād*.

is difficult to translate. There is not much difference in meaning between “when there is coming together of the three” and “after (or due to) the coming together of the three,” so whether one follows the Sanskrit or the Tibetan, it is clear that *sparśa* and *trikasannipāta* are not equivalent here. However, the compound *indriyavikāraparicchedah* is more problematic. Rahula thinks that he is following La Vallée Poussin in translating *vikāraparicchedah* as “analogue à la transformation” and quotes him as saying, “Cette signification de *pariccheda* n'est pas connue de nos lexiques.”³¹³ But Rahula must not have noticed that La Vallée Poussin is referring to a specific and idiosyncratic explanation of *pariccheda* (*fen pieh* 分別) in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*³¹⁴ and its further explanation in the commentary of K'uei-chi 窺基.³¹⁵ There is no reason to assume that this definition applies to the term as used in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. In fact, La Vallée Poussin remarks in that Sthiramati,³¹⁶ who follows the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, gives an explanation in the *Trimśikābhāṣya* different from that of the *Ch'eng wei*

³¹³ Rahula 1980: 7; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 143-144.

³¹⁴ 觸似彼起故名分別 (T. 1585: 11b23). 彼 here refers to *vikāra*.

³¹⁵ 故名分別 分別之用是觸功能。分別領似異名。如子似父名分別父 (*Shindōjō-yuishikiron*: 97; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 144-145 n. c.).

³¹⁶ The reference here is to the *Trimśikābhāṣya*. The entire passage is as follows:

tatra sparśas trikasamnipātē indriyavikāraparicchedah vedanā-saṃniśraya-karmakah / indriyavīṣayavijñānāni triṇy eva trikām tasya kāryakāraṇabhävena samavasthānam trikasamnipātāḥ / tasmin sati tatsamakālam evendriyasya sukhaduhkhādivedanānukūlo yo vikāras tena sadṛśo viṣayasya sukhādivedanīyākāra-paricchedo yah sa sparśah / indriyam punar yena viśeṣena sukhaduhkhādihetutvam pratipadyate sa tasya vikāraḥ / sparśah punar indriyavikāra-sādrśyānendriyam sprśatindriyena va sprśyata iti sparśa ucyate / ata eva viṣayavikāraparicchedātmako 'pindriyavikārapariccheda ukta (*Trimśikābhāṣya*: 20.2-10). Stcherbatsky interprets this last sentence as meaning that *sparśa* “represents rather a modification, or effect, on the object than on the sense-organ” (Stcherbatsky 1978: 042), while Lévi's translation also suggests that its being a modification of the object is primary: “Ainsi donc, quoi qu'il consiste essentiellement dans une modification définie de l'objet, il est aussi une modification définie de l'organe” (Lévi 1932: 74).

The *Madhyāntavibhāgabhäṣya* and *Tīkā* give yet another, similar definition: *triparicchedāj jagat kliṣyata iti sambadhyate / trayāñām hindri[ya]viṣaya-vijñānasannipātē indriyasya sukhādivedanotpattyānukūlo yas triprakāro vikāras taṭparicchedah sparśah / ata evāyam indriyavikārasādrśyam sprśati tadākāratayeti sparśa ucyate / atha vā ṣadāyatanapratyayaḥ sparśa indriyasya sukhādi-*

shih lun: “Le Sparśa est le discernement (*pariccheda*) de la modification (*vikāra*) de l’organe, modification produite quand a lieu le concours de la triade” (1928-1929: 144 n. b). Schmithausen’s summary of the definition according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharma-samuccayabhbāṣya*, therefore, is correct: “*sparśa* is the distinct apprehension of such modifications of the sense-organs as are suitable to the arising of pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feelings (*vedanā*).”³¹⁷ On the basis of all of the above, I translate the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* definition as follows: “The three [object, organ, and consciousness] having come together, *sparśa* is the distinct apprehension of the modification of the organ.” Two other texts define *sparśa* in terms of *pariccheda*: the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*³¹⁸ and the *Pañcaskandhaka*.³¹⁹ Their nearly identical definitions, however, do not specify what is apprehended.

It is clear that the definitions containing the term *pariccheda*, of which the earliest I can find is that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, are different from the Dārśāntika definition, on the one hand, and the Sarvāstivādin and various *Yogācārabhūmi* definitions on the other. I suspect that the reason for this new definition is related to a development in the concept of *indriya* that Schmithausen investigates in his attempt to establish the beginnings of the theory of *ālayavijñāna*. According to Schmithausen, “ālayavijñāna was, originally, nothing but a hypostasis of the Seeds of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties” (1987: 63). Eventually, “after this ‘principle of hypostasis’ and the connection of *ālayavijñāna* with the specific theory of Seeds from which it started had fallen into oblivion,” *ālayavijñāna* came to include the

vedanānukūlam *trividham* *vikāram* *prasūte* (*Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*: 30.28-31.1; Nagao 1964: 21.15-16; Yamaguchi 1934: 38.17-22 [there are some differences, both in retranslations from Sanskrit and in readings of the manuscript, between Pandeya’s and Yamaguchi’s versions]; for translation, see Stcherbatsky 1978: 64).

³¹⁷ Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613. The text of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* reads as follows: *vijñānotpattāv indriyasya sukhādivedanotpattyanukūlo yo vikāras tadākārah sparśo veditavyah* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 5.3-4).

³¹⁸ 觸者。謂三事和合分別爲體 (T. 1602: 481a21).

³¹⁹ *reg pa gaṇ ze na / gsum 'dus nas yoṅs su gcod pa'o* (*Pañcaskandhaka* [tib.]: 14a2); 云何為觸。謂三和合分別為性 (T. 1612: 848c12). See note 301.

seeds of the sense-faculties and other matter, as well. Schmithausen traces the original formulation of this new concept of *ālaya* to what he calls the *Nirṛti Portion* of the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*.³²⁰ He sees a further development along these lines in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* definitions of *cakṣur-*, *rūpa-*, and *cakṣurvijñānadhātu*.

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *cakṣurdhātu* consists of the eye by which visible matter is perceived, the *ālayavijñāna* comprising the accumulated seed of *cakṣus* that will develop in a future existence, and the resultant *ālayavijñāna* (“from which the present *cakṣus*, etc., have arisen” [Schmithausen 1987: 64]).³²¹ *Rūpadhātu* consists of whatever visible matter is perceived by the eye, as well as the power of *cakṣurdhātu* over that visible matter;³²² Schmithausen understands this to mean that the sense-objects “arise under the influence of the sense-faculties, which would, in view of the fact that the sense-faculties, in their turn, originate from *ālayavijñāna*, amount to an indirect origination of the sense-objects, too, from *ālayavijñāna*” (1987: 64).

³²⁰ He also provides a tentative retranslation into Sanskrit of the pertinent passage (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 8a5 ff.; T. 1579: 581a26-29): (*tathā hi*) 1. *tat sattvaloka-nirṛtti-mūlam / sādhiṣṭhānendriya-pravṛttivijñāna-janakatvāt* / 2. *bhājanaloka-nirṛtti-mūlam ca / bhājanaloka-janakatvāt* (Schmithausen 1987: 342 n. 444).

³²¹ *cakṣurdhātuh kimlakṣaṇah / yena cakṣusā rūpāṇi drṣṭavān paśyati yac ca tasya bijam upacita[m vai pākyam cā]layavijñānam tac cakṣuh* (retranslation into Sanskrit in Pradhan 1950: 3.2-3; portion in brackets represents Schmithausen's emendation on the basis of the Tibetan and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*—1987: 343 n. 445; see also *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 52b2-3; Rahula 1971: 3, where it is translated on the basis of Pradhan's uncorrected text). Schmithausen's addition to the retranslation is based on the *Bhāṣya*: *yena cakṣusā rūpāṇi drṣṭavān* *ity atītavijñānopabhogadharakatvena dhātutvam darśayati / paśyatīti vartamānavijñānopabhogadharakatvena / yac ca tasya cakṣuso bijam upacitam ālayavijñānam* *yata āyatām cakṣur nirvartiyate, vaipākyam ca yato nirvṛttam, tad api dvividham bijam cakṣurdhātūr* *ity ucyate, cakṣuso hetutvāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 2.20-24; Schmithausen 1987: 343 ns. 446, 447).

³²² *rūpadhātuh kimlakṣaṇah / rūpam yac cakṣusā drṣṭam drṣyate ca yac ca tatra cakṣurdhātūr ādhipatyam tad rūpadhātulakṣaṇam* (retranslation into Sanskrit in Pradhan 1950: 3.5-6; confirmed by *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 52b4-5). As Schmithausen points out, the *Bhāṣya* reads *rūpe* instead of *tatra*: *yac cakṣurdhātōh rūpe ādhipatyam* *iti rūpīndriyādhipatyena bāhyaviṣayanirvartanāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 2.24-25; Schmithausen 1987: 343 n. 449).

Finally, *cakṣurvijñānadhātu* consists of the recognition of visible matter, having the eye as its basis and visible matter as its object, as well as the *ālayavijñāna* comprising the accumulated seed of *cakṣurvijñāna* and the resultant *ālayavijñāna*,³²³ “from which *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., have arisen or are going to arise in the present existence” (1987: 343 n. 447).

As they have thus become identified with *ālayavijñāna*, the *indriyas* are the karmically produced receptors of experience in the present life. That is to say, the way in which the present life is experienced is conditioned by karma from the past life. Moreover, experience in the present lifetime creates an impression that will condition the way in which the future life will be experienced. In this way, one can say that there is “a change in the *indriya*” at the moment of cognition; what changes must be the accumulated seed of future consciousness. *Sparśa* is the registering of the nature of this change.

The definitions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and other, later Yogācāra texts are difficult to understand. Although I have indicated my reasons for thinking that they presuppose a theory of *ālayavijñāna*, some uncertainty remains. I have been assuming that the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* definition is a refinement of ideas originating in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but the possibility remains that the author (or authors or compiler) of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* took this definition from the *abhidharma* of his (or their) putative Hīnayāna school.³²⁴ If this is, in fact, the case, there may be another explanation of the meaning of *indriyavikārapariccheda*. Nevertheless, we can say, at least, that Yogācāra, like Sarvāstivāda, consistently grants *sparśa* the status of a separate *dharma*, present at every moment of consciousness.

³²³ *cakṣurvijñānadhātuh kiṃlakṣaṇaḥ / cakṣurāśrayā rūpālambanā rūpaprati-vijñaptih yac ca tasya bijam upacitam vi pākālayavijñānam tac cakṣurvijñāna-dhātulakṣaṇam* (retranslation into Sanskrit in Pradhan 1950: 3.7-9). However, both the Tibetan (*gzugs su snañ ba'i rnam par rig pa*—*Abhidharma-samuccaya* [tib.]: 52b7; *gzugs kyis so sor snañ ba'i rnam par śes pa*—*Abhidharma-samuccaya* *avyākhyā* [tib.]: 148a3) and the Chinese (似色了別—T. 1605: 663b15-16; T. 1606: 695c28) say that the recognition has the appearance of visible matter. Pradhan should have added something like *ābhāsa* between *rūpa* and *prativijñaptih*. Schmithausen has not corrected this passage.

³²⁴ I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for pointing out this possibility.

Furthermore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, whether or not it borrowed the definition from a no longer extant Hinayāna *abhidharma*, is the earliest known text to explain *sparśa* as *indriyavikārapariccheda*.

d. The Function of *Sparśa* According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

Returning now to the function of Contact in the *pratītyasamutpāda* process, we can see that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* again, as in the case of the last two members (*nāmarūpa* and *saḍāyatana*), stresses the active nature of its role in rebirth. That this is related to its role in the process of cognition emerges clearly from the remainder of La Vallée Poussin's translation of Sthiramati's explanation of *sparśa*: "Le concours, c'est quand l'organe et l'objet produisent le *Vijñāna*. A ce moment a lieu une modification de l'organe qui est favorable à une sensation agréable, désagréable, neutre. [L'organe est affecté d'une certaine manière lorsque, avec l'objet, il produit le *Vijñāna*]. En conformité avec cette modification, pareil à cette modification, a lieu le discernment de la qualité qu'a l'objet de pouvoir être senti d'une manière agréable, etc" (1928-1929: 144 n. b). Thus, *sparśa* is the moment at which one becomes engaged with what one perceives and, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Trīṃśikābhāṣya*, this engagement causes one to change internally.

At this moment, which, according to the *āvasthika* system, coincides with emergence from the womb in the present life,³²⁵ the chain of events begins that will result in the creation of new karma and the next rebirth. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* implies that Contact, like the rest of the projected members, refers to the seed of itself produced by the karma of the previous lifetime. Actualized *sparśa*, on the other hand, is included in the member, Old Age and Death. Again, the causative verb form, *pravartayati*, can only apply to a seed, the potential of which can impel a being to do something. If the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* had intended for *sparśāṅga* to refer to an actualized *dharma*, it would have defined it as the movement of, rather than that which turns, beings toward the experience of the sense objects.

³²⁵ *sparśo jātāvasthāyām vyavasthāpyate* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 285.9).

e. Conclusion

Thus, although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines *sparśa* differently than does Sarvāstivāda, it does not question its status, and what it says about *sparśa* is congruent with the Sarvāstivādin arguments for its reality as a *dharma*. We have seen that one of these arguments is that, if *sparśa* were not a real and separate entity, the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula would not include it as a member. In the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, this is all the more true in that *sparśāṅga* must consist of *bīja*. Therefore, if *sparśa* were nothing but the coming together of the three, the member designated as Contact would have to consist of the seeds of an *indriya*, a *viśaya*, and a *vijñāna*, and this would not make sense. The fact that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes *sparśa* in its definition of *samskāraskandha* recalls the Sarvāstivādin argument that *sparśa* would not be included among the *cittamahābhūmikas* if it were not real. Finally, it is clear from the definition of *sparśa* as *indriyavikārapariccheda* that *sparśa* is considered to be subsequent to, and quite different from, mere *saññipāta*.³²⁶

In many controversies, Vasubandhu opposes Sarvāstivāda and aligns himself with what he identifies as the Sautrāntika position, which is usually identical with those of the Dārśāntika, Harivarman, and Śrīlāta. In these cases, the *Yogācārabhūmi* frequently contains a similar position, which in turn is often followed by subsequent Yogācāra texts.³²⁷ In the case of *sparśa*, however, Vasubandhu disagrees with the Dārśāntika position, and it is not coincidental that the Yogācāra position is closer to the Sarvāstivādin stance that he takes than to

³²⁶ Another argument against *sparśa*'s being identical to *trikasāññipāta* can be inferred from the statement in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* that *sparśāṅga* is exclusively non-material: 六唯非色。謂無明識觸受愛取餘通二種 (T. 1585: 44b12; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 359; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 491). If *sparśa* were the coming together of object, organ, and consciousness, rather than the result thereof, it is clear that it would often consist in part of *rūpa*.

³²⁷ Some of the most striking examples can be found in the discussions of *cittaprayuktasamskāras*. See Chapter 6.

Dārśāntika. We have seen three definitions of *sparśa*: (1) According to Dārśāntika, *sparśa* is the coming together of object, organ, and consciousness; (2) according to Sarvāstivāda, *sparśa* is produced from the coming together of the three; (3) according to the Yogācāra definition found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *sparśa* is the distinct apprehension of the modification of the organ that occurs when the object, organ, and consciousness have come together. The Dārśāntika definition cannot be reconciled with that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. The Sarvāstivādin definition, on the other hand, is in no way contradicted by the Yogācāra definition; from the Yogācāra point of view what the Sarvāstivādins say can be seen as simply incomplete.

6. Feeling

a. *Vedanā* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

In the sixth (*mārga*) chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu, in the context of a discussion of the threefold nature of *duḥkha* (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*, *samskāraduḥkhatā*, and *parināmaduḥkhatā*), details a controversy regarding *vedanā*: “according to some [teachers], there is no pleasurable feeling; all [feeling] is painful.”³²⁸ Concerning the identity of these teachers, La Vallée Poussin refers to the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, which, according to him, identifies them as Śrīlābha,³²⁹ etc., to the “éditeur Japonais,” who says they are the Sautrāntikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., and to Saṃghabhadra, who associates this position with the Sthavira³³⁰ (1971, v. 4: 129 n. 1). More recently, Katō has discussed their identity and has concluded that Saṃghabhadra’s reference is to Śrīlāta, otherwise known as the Sthavira, the Sautrāntika follower of Kumāralāta.³³¹

³²⁸ *nāsty eva sukhā vedanety ekīyā duḥkhaiva tu sarvā* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 330.10-11; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 129).

³²⁹ However, according to Wogihara’s edition of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Śrīlāta is the preferable reading (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 518.21).

³³⁰ 上坐於此亦作是 (*Nyāyānusāra*, T. 1562: 663b7).

³³¹ Katō 1980; see also Katō 1989: 183-197 for a detailed discussion of the denial of *sukhavedanā*.

Vasubandhu, after presenting their arguments, which appeal to scripture and reason (*sūtrād yuktitaś ca*), concludes that the *ābhidharmika* position is correct: *sukhavedanā* really exists.³³² He then embarks on a point-by-point refutation of the opponent's position.³³³ In the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*, Vasubandhu devotes a large part of his discussion of *vedanāvibhaṅga* to a similar debate³³⁴ and states that he has proven, both by scripture and by reason, that *sparsa-pratyayā vedanā* consists of three types of *vedanā* (including *sukha*).³³⁵

La Vallée Poussin was perhaps the first to point out (1971, v. 1: xlv) that an argument similar to Vasubandhu's can be found in an *abhidharma* text earlier than the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Dharmatrāta's *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*.³³⁶ Katō, who concludes that this Dharmatrāta is later than Śrīlāta and is probably the author of the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, discusses in some detail the passage identified by La Vallée Poussin. According to Katō, Dharmatrāta borrows considerably from Śrīlāta in presenting the argument on the basis of *sūtra* against the reality of *sukhavedanā*, while he rejects this argument in the same way as Vasubandhu, by combining the three types of *duḥkhatā* (*duḥkha-*, *parināma-*, and *samskāraduḥkhatā*) with the three *vedanās* (1989: 191).³³⁷ Harivarman, on the other hand, takes the opposite position in the

³³² *asti evety ābhidhārmikāḥ / esa eva ca nyāyah* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 330.22; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 130).

³³³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 330.11-333.2; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 130-136.

³³⁴ The *vedanāvibhaṅga* begins at folio 38a8 and continues to folio 41b2. The discussion of the existence of three types of *vedanā* occupies folios 38b5-41a4. Tucci's fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript includes a portion corresponding to folios 40b1-41b2 (Tucci 1930: 615-616). Honjō (1989: 173) has identified a passage corresponding to folio 38b5-7 in the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* (127.5-128.2; Honjō 1989: 74-75).

³³⁵ *ity āgama 'pi yuktito 'pi siddhāḥ tisro vedanāḥ / sparsa-pratyayā vedanā iti* (Tucci 1930: 615.21-616.1). *luṇ daṇ rigs pas kyaṇ grub pa yin te / reg pa'i rkyaṇ gyiṣ tshor ba ni gsum mo žes 'byuṇ ḥo* (*Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 41a3-4).

³³⁶ La Vallée Poussin seems to have made a slip in referring to it as the *Pañcavastuka* when it is, in fact, Dharmatrāta's commentary, the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*, but he gives the correct Taishō reference: T. 1555: 994c6-995b28.

³³⁷ The *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* is mentioned by Samghabhadra in the *Abhidharma-piṭaka-prakaraṇaśāsanāśāstra* as presenting a correct interpretation, and one that

section on *samskāraduḥkhatā* in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, and after discussing both sides of the controversy declares that all *vedanā* is *duḥkha* (T. 1646: 281c17-282c22). Katō points out the similarity between Harivarman's argument and that of Śrīlāta as recorded by Samghabhadra and speculates that Harivarman, like Śrīlāta, was a student of Kumāralāta (1989: 191-192).³³⁸

Vasubandhu again takes up the subject of *vedanā* several times, in the specific context of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In the *āvasthika* exposition, he defines *vedanā* as the state in which one becomes able to recognize the causes of the three kinds of feelings (pleasurable, painful, or neutral).³³⁹ In his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28a-b, where he expresses his own opinion, which follows the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, Vasubandhu simply refers to the fact that *vedanā* consists of three kinds.³⁴⁰

Finally, in verse III 32, he divides *vedanā* into six and then eighteen types. The discussion of this verse in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* relates a disagreement between the Vaibhāṣikas and an opponent regarding the temporal relationship between *sparśa* and *vedanā*.³⁴¹ According to the Vaibhāṣikas, *vedanā* is simultaneous with *sparśa*, and the two are described as reciprocal causes (*sahabhūhetu*). The opponent, who is not named here by either the *Bhāṣya* or the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, but

agrees with the *Nyāyānusāra*, of two types of *vedanā*: *chih ch'ü shou* 執取受 and *tzu hsing shou* 自性受 (T. 1563: 783a26-b4; see also T. 1562: 338c26). Perhaps there is some connection between these two types and *tzu hsiang* 自相 and *kung hsiang* 共相, or *tzu hsing* 自性 and *cheng chien* 正見, in the *Yogācārabhūmi* passages mentioned later in this chapter (section 6b).

³³⁸Schmithausen refers to this opinion of Śrīlāta and Harivarman and sees a relation between their radical emphasis on *duḥkha* and their negative concept of *nirvāṇa* (Schmithausen 1977: 922-923).

³³⁹*sa yāvad vedanātrayakāraṇaparicchedena samartho bhāvati sā 'vasthā sparśa ity ucyate / paricchedasāmarthye sati vitti prāk maithunāt* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 132.10-12 [underlined portion is the first *pāda* of *Abhidharmakośa* III 23]; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 64).

³⁴⁰*tatas trividhā vedanā* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.8; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85).

³⁴¹*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 144.23-146.25; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 101-107.

who is identified by La Vallée Poussin as the Sautrāntika,³⁴² denies the possibility of reciprocal causation. Vasubandhu seems to favor the Vaibhāṣika position here, and after restating it and alluding to Chapter Two, in which the Vaibhāṣikas have already established *sahabhūhetu*,³⁴³ he terminates the argument.³⁴⁴

Next, Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of “others” (*apare*), identified by Yaśomitra as Śrīlāta,³⁴⁵ according to whom *vedanā* must occur after *sparśa*. This theory postulates three moments: (1) the moment in which the organ and the object come into proximity; (2) the moment in which *vijñāna* is produced, which, for Śrīlāta, is equivalent to and simultaneous with *sparśa*; (3) the moment in which *vedanā* is produced as a result of *sparśa*.³⁴⁶ The Vaibhāṣika shows that this theory results in an illogical explanation of cognition³⁴⁷ and that it contradicts the principle of universally occurring (*mahābhūmika*) *dharmas*, according to which *vijñāna* is always accompanied by *sparśa* and *vedanā*, as well as by eight other *dharmas*.

³⁴² It appears as though La Vallée Poussin is following Saeki (1978, v. 2: 432 ff.) in attributing this position to the Sautrāntika. But since Vasubandhu does not agree with the position, I hesitate to call it Sautrāntika. Since I have not found any attribution of the position to Dārśāntika, I shall simply refer to “the opponent.”

³⁴³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 84.20-85.7; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 253-255.

³⁴⁴ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 145.19; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 101-102.

³⁴⁵ *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 307.17; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 102.

³⁴⁶ *indriyārthau hi pūrvānto vijñānam / so 'sau trayānām samnipātah sparśah sparśapratyayāt paścad vedanā trītyakṣana* iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 145.20-21; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* [tib.]: 156a8; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 103). vedanā trītye ksane iti. *indriyārtha-kṣaṇaḥ prathamah vijñānotpatti-kṣaṇo dvitīyo vedanotpatti-kṣanas trītya* iti. (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 307.18-20).

*As Pradhan notes, the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* gives *trītye kṣane*; however, the Tibetan *reg pa'i rkyen gyis skad cig ma gsum pa tshor ba 'byuñ no žes zer ro* supports the nominative of Pradhan's Sanskrit text.

³⁴⁷ The argument in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is rather complicated and compressed (the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* devotes more than a page to explaining fewer than ten lines from the *Bhāṣya*), and I will not attempt to present it in full. The heart, I think, of the Vaibhāṣika argument is that Śrīlāta's position undermines the logically necessary association between the consciousness of an object and the mental factors that accompany consciousness of that particular object (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 145.21-146.2; *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 307.17-308.19; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 103).

The opponent replies to this argument by attacking the *Vaibhāṣika* category of *mahābhūmikas*. First of all, he says that he does not recognize as authority the *abhidharma*, in which the category is found. Next, he proposes a different interpretation of the term *mahābhūmika*. There are three groups of three *bhūmis*, in which the term *bhūmi* refers to respectively: planes of existence or meditational states (*savitarkā savicārā*, *avitarkā savicārā*, and *avitarkā avicārā bhūmis*); groups of *dharmas* classified according to their moral status (*kuśalā*, *akuśalā*, and *avyākṛtā bhūmis*); and groups of *dharmas* classified according to the type of person with which they are associated (*śaikṣī*, *aśaikṣī*, and *naivaśaikṣī* [*nāśaikṣī*] *bhūmis*). If a *dharma*, for example, *vedanā*, is found in all nine of these *bhūmis*, it is called *mahābhūmika*; it does not have to be present in every moment of consciousness.³⁴⁸

According to Yaśomitra,³⁴⁹ the correct understanding of when *vedanā* occurs can be found by consulting the *Pañcaskandhaka*,³⁵⁰ according to which two groups of *dharmas* are distinguished. *Chanda*, *adhimokṣa*, *smṛti*, *saṃādhi*, and *prajñā* are of limited occurrence (*pratiniyatavisaya*). For example, *chanda* is defined as desire for an agreeable object, and, as Yaśomitra points out, if the object is disagreeable, there will be no desire.³⁵¹ In contrast, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *sparśa*, *manaskāra*, and *cetanā* are specifically said to be universal; therefore, Yaśomitra implies, they must be simultaneously present in every moment of consciousness.³⁵²

³⁴⁸The text here is not completely clear about whose opinion this is. According to the Sanskrit, this passage belongs at the end of what “others say” (*Abhidharma-kośabhasya*: 146.11). According to the Tibetan, the sentence *de dag ni ci rigs par rnams grāns kyis yin gyi / thams cad cig car ni ma yin no* is introduced by *gžan dag na re* and concluded by *ües zer ro*, thus separating it from the preceding non-*Vaibhāṣika* definition of *mahābhūmika* (*Abhidharma-kośabhasya* [tib.]: 157a1). For a discussion of the problems in identifying who is saying what in the entire section on *vedanā*, see Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 310-313.

³⁴⁹*Abhidharmaśavyākhyā*: 309.7-13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 105 n. 1.

³⁵⁰*Pañcaskandhaka* [tib.]: 14a1-7; Dantinne 1980: 9-10.

³⁵¹*tad-yathā chandah katamah. abhipreta-vastuny abhilāṣah. anabhiprete nāsti chanda ity abhiprayaḥ* (*Abhidharmaśavyākhyā*: 309.8-9).

³⁵²These five *sarvatragacaitasikas* are commonly found in *Yogācāra* texts (see

Yaśomitra evidently refers to the *Pañcaskandhaka* here to illustrate that the opinion stated in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* coincides with what he considers to be Vasubandhu's own opinion. In this case, Vasubandhu agrees with the Vaibhāṣikas regarding the meaning of *mahābhūmika* and the simultaneity of *sparśa* and *vedanā* and disagrees with the opponent, even though he only accepts half of the Vaibhāṣikas' list of *mahābhūmikas* as being truly universal. Elsewhere, Yaśomitra refers to the *Pañcaskandhaka* to show the contrast between a position mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Vasubandhu's own. For example, when Vasubandhu comments on *Abhidharmakośa* II 24, which gives the Vaibhāṣika list of *mahābhūmikas*, he uses the word *kila* to indicate that he himself does not believe that they are all present at every moment, and Yaśomitra mentions the definitions of *chanda* and *adhimokṣa* in the *Pañcaskandhaka* to illustrate that Vasubandhu really believes that they are *pratiniyata*.³⁵³

The argument continues in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* with another exchange regarding the opponent's assertion that *vedanā* follows *sparśa*.³⁵⁴ This exchange ends with the Vaibhāṣikas having the last word and declaring, "Therefore, whenever there is *vijñāna*, there must be *sparśa*, and *vedanā* must be produced together with *sparśa*."³⁵⁵ Vasubandhu in the *Bhāṣya* thus rejects the various positions of the opponent

below). Certain Tibetan *siddhānta* texts, such as the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, also mention a Sautrāntika teacher who, contrary to the standard Sautrāntika position that, among the *caitaskas*, only *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* are real, accepts these five, which are identified as *saṃvratrāga*. The identity of this teacher is unclear. Although his name is given as Buddhadeva in certain texts, the opinion attributed to him contradicts that of a famous Buddhadeva who, in the *Vibhāṣā*, is said to believe that the *caitaskas* are not independent *dharma*s (Mimaki 1979: 198; 1980: 151, 166-169 ns. 15-17).

³⁵³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 55.19; *Abhidharmakośavākyā*: 127.20-23; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 153-156.

³⁵⁴ Actually, there is a very problematic sentence concerning *akuśalamahābhūmika dharma*s between the end of the opponent's explanation of *mahābhūmika* and the beginning of this Vaibhāṣika rejoinder. According to Yamaguchi, this sentence is perhaps related to the discussion of the *manopavīcāras* that follows *Abhidharmakośa* III 32c-d (Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 311-312 n. 5).

³⁵⁵ *tasmād avaśyam saṃvratra vijñāne sparśah sparśasahajā ca vedanaiṣṭavyā* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 146.23-24; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 105-107).

regarding *vedanā* in favor of that of the Vaibhāśikas, which, as Yaśomitra points out, coincides in this case with what Vasubandhu says in the *Pañcaskandhaka*.

b. *Vedanā* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

As Harada has recently pointed out, the Dārśāntika doctrines that Vasubandhu attacks in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* are frequently irreconcilable with what is found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and the question of whether *sukhavedanā* really exists is a case in point. Referring to Katō 1989, Harada states that, although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not mention the controversy per se, it reconciles the theory of the threefold nature of *duḥkha* with the three types of *vedanā* in a way similar to Vasubandhu's comment in the *Bhāṣya* on *Abhidharmakośa* VI 3 (1993: 109-110).³⁵⁶ Harada refers to three passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi*: (1) the passage from *Savitarkādibhūmi* that I summarized in my translation of the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section of *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, in which the three types of *vedanā* are defined but in which there is no mention of *duḥkhatā*;³⁵⁷ (2) a passage from the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, in which the three *duḥkhatās* and the three *vedanās* are related;³⁵⁸ (3) a passage from

³⁵⁶ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 328.25- 333.2; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 124-139.

³⁵⁷ *sukhā vedanā katamā / yat sukhasthāniyam indriyavisayam pratītyotpadyate sātam vedayitam vedanāgatam / duḥkha vedanā katamā / yad duḥkhasthāniyam [dvayam] pratītyotpadyate 'sātam vedayitam / aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā katamā / yad aduḥkhāsukhasthāniyam dvayam pratītyotpadyate naiva sātam nāsātam vedayitam vedanāgatam / tisrah kām{āv—my emendation}acaryāḥ / dve rūpāvacarye tṛtyād yāvad dhyānāt / aduḥkhāsukhā caturthād dhyānād ūrdhvam yāvān naivasamjñānā-samjñāyatanāt tā api vedanā dvividhāḥ sparśabijaparigrītabijabhūtās tadabhinirvaritaphalabhūtāś ca (Yogācārabhūmi: 208.1-7; T. 1579: 323a27-b6).*

³⁵⁸ *de la rañ gi mtshan ŋid ni bde ba dañ / sdug bsñal ba dañ / sdug bsñal yañ ma yin bde ba yañ ma yin pa'i tshor ba'o / de la tshor ba'i phuñ po 'i spyi'i mtshan ŋid ni bde ba 'i tshor ba ni 'gyur ba'i sdug bsñal ŋid kyis sdug bsñal ba dañ / sdug bsñal kyi tshor ba ni sdug bsñal kyi sdug bsñal ŋid kyis sdug bsñal ba dañ / sdug bsñal yañ ma yin bde ba yañ ma yin pa'i tshor ba ni 'du byed kyi sdug bsñal ŋid kyis sdug bsñal ba'i dañ du mazad nas / gañ ci tshor [ba] yañ run ste / de 'dir sdug bsñal ba'o ūes bya'o (Viniścayasamgrahaṇī [tib.]: 42a2-5); 相者。謂自相及共相。自相有三。樂受苦受不苦*

the *Paryāyasamgrahani*, which is similar to the *Viniścayasamgrahani* passage but more detailed.³⁵⁹ Harada, who is here concerned with Vasubandhu's interest in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, does not discuss the relative chronology of the portions of the text from which these passages are drawn. In fact, he does not even identify the portions by name.³⁶⁰

However, it may be useful to attempt to trace the discussions of *vedanā* in the various layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in order to see at what point the two groups of three [i.e., three types of *vedanā* and three types of *duḥkhatā*] first became juxtaposed.

The *Śrāvakabhūmi*, generally considered the oldest portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, contains definitions of *vedanāskandha*, *vedanā*, and *sukhavedanā*, but in none of these is there a reference to the three types of *duḥkhatā*.³⁶¹ Nor does its detailed treatment of the three

不樂受。樂受壞苦故苦。苦受苦苦故苦。不苦不樂受。行苦故苦。由此因緣諸所有受皆說名苦。是名受共相 (T. 1579: 594a18-22).

³⁵⁹ ji ltar na gaṇ ci tshor yaṇ ruṇ de ni 'dir sdug bsñal ba'o ūes bya ūe na / bde ba'i tshor ba ni 'gyur ba'i sdug bsñal ūid kyis sdug bsñal lo / sdug bsñal ni sdug bsñal gyi sdug bsñal ūid kyis skye ba daṇ gnas pas sdug bsñal lo / bde ba yaṇ ma yin sdug bsñal ba yaṇ ma yin pa ni mi rtog pa daṇ 'gog pa'i chos can pas sdug bsñal lo / de la bde ba ni mi rtog pa'i phyir yoṇs su 'gyur ro / sdug bsñal ni mi rtog pa'i phyir skye'o / rgyun du 'byuṇ ba'i phyir gnas so / sdug bsñal yaṇ ma yin bde ba yaṇ ma yin pa yaṇ 'gags pa ni mi rtog pa / skyes pa ni 'gag pa'i chos can te / de 'gags kyan de gñis daṇ ma bral ba ni de gñis daṇ rjes su 'bral ba yin pas de'i phyir de yaṇ sdug bsñal yin no, etc. (*Paryāyasamgrahani* [tib.]: 36b4 ff.); 云何諸所有受皆說為苦。謂諸樂受變壞故苦。一切苦受生住故苦。非苦樂受。體是無常滅壞法故。說之為苦。此中樂受由無常故必有變壞。一切苦受由無常故。生住相續皆起於苦。非苦樂受已滅壞者由無常故。說之為苦。已生起者滅壞法故。亦說為苦。此滅壞法彼二所隨逐故與二相應。故亦名為苦, etc. (T. 1579: 764a15 ff.).

³⁶⁰ Paramārtha's partial translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, entitled *Chüeh ting tsang lun* 決定藏論, contains a similar passage: 何者自相苦樂不苦不樂。樂受者生樂住樂壞苦愛著因緣。苦者生苦住苦壞樂離愛因緣。不苦不樂者行苦故苦解脫愛緣。此一切若皆悉是苦名受共相 (T. 1584: 1029c28-1030a3).

³⁶¹ tatra vedanāskandhah katamah [] sukhavedanīyam vā sparśam pratītya, duḥkhave danīyam vā, aduḥkhāsukhāvedanīyam vā [] ṣad vedanākāyāh / cakṣuḥsaṁsparśajā vedanā[/ śro]traghāṇajihvākāyamanahsam sparśajā vedanā (Śrāvakabhūmi: 239.4-240.3; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 111a7-8; T. 1579: 433c7-12).

tatra vedanā katamā [] tadyathā sukhā, duḥkhā, aduḥkhāsukhā ca vedanā / tatra sukhāpi kāyikī / duḥkhāpy aduḥkhāsukhāpi [] yathā kāyikī / evam caitasikī / sukhāpi

*duhkhatās*³⁶² deal with the question of the existence of *sukhavedanā*.

The earliest passage that I could find that resembles the two mentioned by Harada is in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*. This passage contains a verse that enumerates nine and seven aspects of *vedanā* respectively, together with a long commentary.³⁶³ Mukai has shown that, with the exception of the first and the last, each aspect corresponds to a *sūtra* in the *Samyuktāgama* on the subject of *vedanā*.³⁶⁴ Several of these aspects are of interest to us. The first of these aspects, self-nature (*tzu hsing* 自性), is explained as being simply the three kinds of *vedanās*.³⁶⁵ The explanation of the third aspect, correct view (*cheng chien* 正見), corresponds to *Samyuktāgama sūtra* no. 467. According to this *sūtra*: when one considers *sukhavedanā*, one should think of *duhkha*; when

sāmisā, duhkhp y aduhkhāsukhāpi / evam nirāmisāpi, evam gardhāśritā (corrected by Shukla from *gardha*[vā]śrite[stā]), *naiṣkramyāśritā vedanā, sukhāpi duhkhp y aduhkhāsukhāpi / saiṣā ekavimśatividhā vedanā bhavati / navavidhā vā* (Śrāvakabhūmi: 293.18-294.6; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 133a3-6; T. 1579: 440b8-13).

tatra sukhavedanā yat sukhavedanīyam sparśam pratītyotpadyāte [/] sātam, veditam, vedanāgatam / sā punar yā pañcavijñānasamprayuktā / sā kāyikī / yā manovijñānasamprayuktā sā caitasikī / yathā sukhavedanīyam evam duhkha-vedanīyam aduhkhāsukhavedanīyam sparśam pratītyotpadyate asātam, naivasātam nāsātam veditam [vigatarāgām (not in Chinese, added to ms.)] vedanāgatam idam ucyate duhkha aduhkhāsukhā vedanā / sā punar yā pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā / sā kāyikī / yā manovijñānasamprayuktā / sā caitasikī / yā nirvāṇānukūlā[sā]-nairvvedhikī / atyantaniṣṭhatāyai atyantavimalatāyai / atyantabrahma-caryaparyavasānāyai[ya?] / samavarttate / sā nirāmisā // yā punardhātupatitā, bhavapatitā sā sāmisā[/] yā puna (nā) rūpārūpya pratisamyuktā [Chinese reads 若色無色界繫], vairāgyānukūlā vā, sā naiṣkramyāśritā / yā punah kāyapratismayuktā, nā ca vairāgyānukūlā, sā gardhāśritā (Śrāvakabhūmi: 295.8-296.12; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 133b6-134a6; T. 1579: 440b23-c5). I have included Shukla's various suggestions and additions here as they appear in her text.

³⁶² Śrāvakabhūmi: 254.11-257.17; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 115b4-117a5; T. 1579: 435a1-b12).

³⁶³ *Vastusamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 'i 340a4-347a5; T. 1579: 850c14-853b23; see Mukai 1985: 37.

³⁶⁴ Mukai has found no corresponding *sūtras* for the first aspect, *tzu hsing* 自性, while he has found two corresponding *sūtras* in the *Madhyamāgama* for the last, *wen chi* 間記 (Mukai 1985: 37).

³⁶⁵ *de la mdor bsdu na tshor ba gsum ni tshor ba rnams kyi rañ būñ no* (*Vastusamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 'i 340a8); 略說三受。是受自性 (T. 1579: 850c23-24).

one considers *duḥkhavedanā*, one should think of the piercing of a knife; and when one considers *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*, one should think of impermanence.³⁶⁶

The *Vastusamgrahanī* explains at some length statements corresponding to those from the *Samyuktāgama*. *Sukhavedanā* should be viewed as *duḥkha* because it is always subject to change and because it is based on desire, which is the cause of all future *duḥkha*. *Duḥkhavedanā* should be viewed as an arrow because its nature is to cause pain in the present; it is like a poisoned arrow that has not yet been pulled out. *Aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* should be viewed as impermanent in nature and as subject to destruction because, when it is already destroyed, it is [manifestly] impermanent, while when it is present, it is subject to being destroyed. Therefore, if one correctly views *vedanā* in this way, one can properly understand the statement, "Everything experienced is *duḥkha*."³⁶⁷ The juxtaposition of self-nature and correct view in this passage resembles that of *tzu hsiang* 自相 (= *svalakṣaṇa*?) and *kung hsiang* 共相 (= *sāmanyalakṣaṇa*?) in the *Viniścayasamgrahanī* passage mentioned above. Furthermore, the explanations of why each type of *vedanā* is *duḥkha* are almost identical to those in the *Paryāyasamgrahanī* passage. Therefore, in as early a

³⁶⁶ 觀於樂受而作苦想。觀於苦受。作劍刺想。觀不苦不樂受。作無常想 (T. 99: 119a27-29).

³⁶⁷ *bde ba'i tshor ba rnam par 'gyur ba'i chos can yin pa dañ / 'dod chags kyi gnas yin pa dañ / 'dod chags ni phyi ma'i sdug bsñal gyi rgyu yin pa'i phyir bde ba'i tshor ba ni sdug bsñal ba yin par blta bar bya'o / sdug bsñal ba mñon sum du gyur pa ni zug rñu ma phyin pa dañ 'dra bar gnod pa'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir sdug bsñal ba ni zug rñu yin par blta bar bya'o / sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin bde ba yañ ma yin pa'i tshor ba med par 'gyur ba gañ yin pa ni de mi rtag pa yin pa dañ / mñon sum du gyur pa yañ 'gag pa'i chos ñid yin pa'i phyir gñis ga 'an ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba dañ mthun pas na sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin bde ba yañ ma yin pa ni mi rtag pa dañ / 'gag pa'i chos ñid du blta bar bya ste / 'di ni tshor ba rnams la yañ dag par lta ba yin te / tshor ba gañ ci yañ ruñ ba 'di ni 'dir sdug bsñal ba'o ñes bya ba la 'jug pa'i phyir ro* (*Vastusamgrahanī* [tib.]: 'i 340b1-5); 又諸樂受變壞法故。貪依處故。貪是當來衆苦因故。由此應觀樂受為苦。若諸苦現在前時。惱害性故。如中毒箭而未得拔。由此應觀苦受如箭。非苦樂受已滅壞者。是無常故。正現前者。是滅法故。於二更續能隨順故。由此應觀非苦樂受性是無常性是滅法。如是於受所生正見。能隨悟入諸有所受皆悉是苦 (T. 1579: 850c24-851a3).

portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi* as the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, the existence of three types of *vedanā* was in some way contrasted with the universality of *duḥkha*, which is one of the basic principles of Buddhism.

In summary, of the passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi* discussed above, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Savitarkādibhūmi* define the three types of *vedanā* without reference to *duḥkhatā*, while the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī*, and *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* all relate the three *vedanās* to the three *duḥkhatās*. The question then presents itself as to why certain texts connect the two doctrines in this way, while others do not.

Of course, the point of the teaching of three *duḥkhatās* is to show that what at first seems pleasant or neutral is ultimately to be experienced as suffering, and it is natural to state, as does the *Samyuktāgama* passage mentioned above, that one should regard even pleasant experience as *duḥkha*. However, the passage implies, and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* makes explicit by use of the term, “correct view,” that the statement, “Everything experienced is *duḥkha*,” is an epistemological one. The fact that the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* defines the “self-nature” of *vedanā* as *sukha-*, *duḥkha-*, and *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* indicates that it accepts the ontological reality of all three *vedanās*. At the same time, it suggests to me that, by the time of the composition of the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, the ontological status of *sukhavedanā* was already being questioned. Therefore, although the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as Harada says, does not record a controversy, the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, followed by the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī*, may in fact be reacting to early proponents of the view, later accepted by Śrīlāṭa and Harivarman, that *sukhavedanā* does not really exist.

Following Harada, I have argued that the texts that explain the meaning of the statement “everything experienced is *duḥkha*” do so in order to show that *sukhavedanā* exists even though it must be recognized as unsatisfactory. As for the other two texts, we can speculate that the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, probably the oldest of all the material under discussion, was written before the reality of *sukhavedanā* was questioned. On the other hand, the *Savitarkādibhūmi*

is, by both Schmithausen's and Aramaki's reckoning,³⁶⁸ later than the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, so we must search for a separate reason for the omission of such a discussion from the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. If we accept Schmithausen's assertion that the *Savitarkādibhūmi* belongs to the middle layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* to the latest, it is difficult to explain why a text from the latest layer (the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*), along with a text from the earliest layer (the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*), should contain such a discussion, while a text belonging to the middle layer does not. On the other hand, if we follow Aramaki, who believes that the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* belongs to the middle layer and the *Savitarkādibhūmi* to the latest, we can speculate that, for the author(s) of the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, the issue is already settled, with *sukhavedanā* so thoroughly integrated into the *Yogācāra abhidharma* system that there is no longer any need to justify its existence.

As far as I can tell, there is no later *Yogācāra* discussion of this issue. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which gives a rather long definition of *vedanā*, does not refer to *duḥkhatā* in this context, nor does the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* mention it in commenting on the definition.³⁶⁹ Likewise, Vasubandhu ignores the question in the

³⁶⁸ See Chapter 1, section B2.

³⁶⁹ *vedanāśkandhavyavasthānam* *katamat* / *śadvedanākāyāḥ* / *cakṣuḥsamsparśajā* *vedanā* *śrotraghānajihvākāyamanaḥ* *samsparśajā* *vedanā* / *evam* *śadvedanā* *kāyāḥ* *sukhā* *vā* *duḥkhaḥ* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *vā* / *punah* *sukhā* *kāyikī* *vedanā* *duḥkhaḥ* *kāyikī* *vedanā* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *kāyikī* *vedanā* *sukhā* *caitasikī* *vedanā* *duḥkhaḥ* *caitasikī* *vedanā* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *caitasikī* *vedanā* *sukhā* *sāmiśavedanā* *duḥkhaḥ* *sāmiśavedanā* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *sāmiśavedanā* *sukhā* *nirāmiśavedanā* *duḥkhaḥ* *nirāmiśavedanā* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *nirāmiśavedanā* *punah* *sukhā* *gredhāśritavedanā* *duḥkhaḥ* *gredhāśritavedanā* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *gredhāśritavedanā* *sukhā* *naiśkramyāśritavedanā* *duḥkhaḥ* *naiśkramyāśritavedanā* *aduḥkhāsukhā* *naiśkramyāśritavedanā* [corrected from *naiśkramyānnitavedanā*] *ca* / *kāyikī* *vedanā* *katamā* / *pamcavijñānasamprayuktā* *vedanā* / *caitasikī* *vedanā* *katamā* / *manovijñānasamprayuktā* *vedanā* / *sāmiśavedanā* *katamā* / *ātmabhāvatṛṣṇāsamprayuktā* *vedanā* / *nirāmiśavedanā* *katamā* / *tattrṣṇāviprayuktā* *vedanā* / *gredhāśritavedanā* *katamā* / *pamcakāmagunatrṣṇāsamprayuktā* *vedanā* / *naiśkramyāśritavedanā* *katamā* / *tattrṣṇāviprayuktā* *vedanā* (Pradhan: 4.15-5.3; *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 54a5-54b6; T. 1605: 663c18-664a2; Rahula: 5-6).

Pañcaskandhaka, contenting himself with a simple explanation of the three types of *vedanā*.³⁷⁰ Finally, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which contains a long section on *vedanā* that includes differing opinions on a variety of issues, does not mention the question of the reality of *sukhavedanā*.³⁷¹ Therefore, it seems that the status of *sukhavedanā* was an issue in Yogācāra only for a limited period starting after the composition of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and ending before the composition of the *Savitarkādibhūmi*.

Let us now return to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. If, as I suspect, Vasubandhu's purpose in writing the *Bhāṣya* was to produce retroactively an *abhidharma* that would support Yogācāra doctrine, it is understandable that he would defend the ontological reality of *sukhavedanā*. The occurrence of pleasant physical sensations in certain trance states is attested in texts such as the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (which is quoted in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*) and the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. These pleasant experiences are based on *ālayavijñāna* after *āśrayaparāvṛtti* has taken place (Schmithausen 1987: 5-6, 44, 315 n. 297, 316 n. 300). Nevertheless, according to Schmithausen, “due to the negative development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*..., this idea does not appear to have struck roots” (1987: 88). However the question of *sukha* in the context of meditational states, which is the subject of a detailed discussion in the eighth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is rather complicated, and I am not prepared to go into it here.

vedanāskandhavyavasthānam āśrayataḥ svabhāvata āśrayasamkalanataḥ / saṃkleśavyavadānataś ca / tatra rūpāśrayasamkalanataḥ kāyikīvedanāvyavasthānam / arūpāśrayasamkalanataś caitasikīvedanāvyavasthānam / saṃkleśataḥ sāṃśādinām, vyavadānato nirāmīśādinām vyavasthānam veditavyam / tattrsnāvīyukteḥ visamyuktā visamyogyanukūlā ca veditavyā (Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya: 4.6-10; T. 1606: 696c14-18).

³⁷⁰ *tshor ba gañ ūe na / myoñ ba rñam gsum pa ste / bde ba dañ / sdug bsñal ba dañ / sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin / bde ba yañ ma yin pa de / bde ba ni gañ 'gags na / phrad par 'dod pa'o / sdug bsñal ni gañ byuñ na / bral bar 'dod pa'o / bde ba yañ ma yin / sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin ba ni gañ byuñ na / gñis kar 'dod par mi gyur ba'o / (Pañcaskandhaka [tib.]: 13a8-13b2; T. 1612: 848b26-28; Dantinne 1980: 6).*

³⁷¹ T. 1585: 27a8-c25; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 217-222; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 299-306.

Of greater systematic importance in Yogācāra doctrine is the association of *ālayavijñāna* with *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*. *Ālayavijñāna*, as we have seen in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, is always associated with *vedanā*, and since *ālayavijñāna* and its associates are *vipāka*, this *vedanā* must always be *aduḥkhāsukhā*.³⁷² Since the argument by which *sukhavedanā* is denied can also be applied to *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*, it is clear that the Yogācāra system cannot accept the claim that only *duḥkhavedanā* really exists.

c. *Vedanā* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

i. The Existence of *Sukhavedanā*

Although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not refer to the controversy over the reality of *sukhavedanā*, it mentions *sukhavedanā* or *sukha* on several occasions. Sometimes the terms occur in the enumeration of categories from *āgama*. For example, in its definition of *vedanāskandha*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* mentions the traditional six types of *vedanā* according to the sense organs from which they arise; each of these six types is subdivided into *sukha-*, *duḥkha-*, and *aduḥkhā-sukhavedanā*.³⁷³ *Sukha* also appears in discussions of the *dhyānas*. In the section on *samudayasatya*, *sukha* is said to be one of the sensations accompanying *rāga* in *kāmadhātu* and the first three *dhyānas* (Pradhan 1950: 51.7-9). Furthermore, in the section on *mārgasatya*, *sukha* is listed as one of the *āngas* of each of the first three *dhyānas* of *laukikamārga*, while *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* is an *āṅga* of the fourth *dhyāna* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 32.21-24).

In our section on *pratītyasamutpāda*, too, the real existence of *sukhavedanā* is implied, although not explicitly stated. Since karma is of three types, good, bad, and neutral, it follows that when the seed of *vedanā* is actualized the resulting feelings will be of three types, *sukhā*,

³⁷²This sentence undoubtedly grossly oversimplifies a very complicated issue in the Yogācāra system. For details, see Schmithausen 1987: 61, 68, 87-88, 337 n. 422, 352 n. 490, 458 n. 1064.

³⁷³Pradhan: 4.15-5.3; *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 54a5-54b6; T. 1605: 663c18-664a2; Rahula: 5-6. For the text, see note 368.

duḥkhā, and *asukhāduḥkhā*. This is what the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-abhāṣya* suggests when it states that “on the basis of it [i.e., *vedanā*], there is the experience of the desirable, etc., results of action.”³⁷⁴ In the seed interpretation of the *pratīyasāmutpāda* formula, the projected members are the means by which the moral values of actions of the past life are preserved to receive retribution in the present life. Therefore, this is another context in which, for the Yogācāras, the real existence of *sukhavedanā* is necessary, in this case to ensure the consistency of action and result.

ii. The Temporal Relationship Between *Vedanā* and *Sparśa*

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not explicitly state a position regarding the question of the temporal relationship between *vedanā* and *sparsā*. In its enumeration of *samskāras*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not specify subgroups such as *mahābhūmika* or *pratiniyata*, but its definitions of individual *samskāras* are generally similar to those found in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, in which six categories of *caitasikas* are specified.³⁷⁵ The commentary (*Pañcaskandhaprakaranavaibhāṣya*) indicates the *dharmas* that belong to each category.³⁷⁶ The *Pañcaskandhaka* defines *samskāraskandha* as the *caitasika dharmas*, except for *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* (which comprise their own *skandhas*), as well as the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, and it then enumerates the *caitasikas*, including *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*. However, in the definitions of *caitasikas*, which follow the list and the specification of categories, *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* are omitted, since they were defined earlier as *skandhas*. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, defines *saṃskāraskandha* as the six *cetanākāyas*, together with the remaining *caitasika dharmas*, except for *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*, as well as the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, and then enumerates and defines the

³⁷⁴ *tadadhiṣṭhānenesṭādikarmavipākopabhogāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 33.4-5; see Chapter 2, section B5g).

³⁷⁵ *Pañcaskandhaka* [tib.]: 14a1-2; T. 1612: 848c5-9; Dantinne 1980: 9.

³⁷⁶ T. 1613: 851b29-c6; see Dantinne 1980: 65-67, ns. 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93.

samskāras.³⁷⁷ By juxtaposing the lists, we can impose the subdivisions from the *Pañcaskandhaka* on to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list³⁷⁸ with

³⁷⁷There is a problem with the text here. After stating that *samskāraskandha* consists of *cetanā*, the other *caitasika dharmas*, with the exception of *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*, and the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*, the Sanskrit text asks the question, “And what are they?” The answer is a list of the *caitasikas*, except for the three mentioned above (*itiyām cetanā'vedanām saṃjñām ca sthāpayitvā tadanye caitasikā dharmāś cittaviprayuktāś ca samskārāḥ samskāraskandha ity ucyate / te punah katame / manaskārāḥ sparśāḥ chando ...vicāraś ca*—*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 15.9-16): in other words, all the *samskāras* except for *cetanā*. After the list, all the *cittasam-prayuktasam-skāras*, including *cetanā*, are defined. Then the question is asked, “What are the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*?” The answer again consists of a list, which is followed by definitions.

Both the Tibetan and Chinese translators seem to have noticed a problem regarding the antecedent of the pronoun *te*, and the differences in their readings probably represent attempts to solve it. In the Tibetan text, the question is the same as in the Sanskrit, while *cetanā* appears at the beginning of the list (*de dag kyañ gañ ūe na / sems pa dañ / yid la byed pa dañ*, etc.—*Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.], 55a7). This suggests that the Tibetan translators understood *te* as indicating all the *cittasam-prayuktasam-skāras*. The Chinese text, on the other hand, asks a different question: “What are the other *caitasika dharmas*?” (何等名為餘心所法—T. 1605: 664a12). It, like the Sanskrit, omits *cetanā* from the list, and it seems to understand “other *caitasika dharmas*” as meaning other than *cetanā*, *vedanā*, and *saṃjñā*.

Although both the Tibetan and the Chinese make better sense than the Sanskrit, I believe that Pradhan, who notes the variants (Pradhan 1950: 5 ns. 8,9), is correct in letting the Sanskrit text stand. In the case of the Chinese translation, the specification of *te* as *tadanye caitasikā dharmāḥ* seems to be an example of Hsüan-tsang’s tendency to explain, rather than simply reproduce, the text that he is translating. And the fact that *cetanā* is missing from the Chinese translation, as well as from the Sanskrit manuscript, makes it likely that it was added by the Tibetan translators, not without a purpose, as Pradhan suggests, but rather to correct what seemed like a mistake in the Sanskrit text.

Rahula’s “Et que sont-elles [ces formations]?” is not satisfactory since “ces formations” should include *cetanā* (Rahula 1980: 6).

³⁷⁸Hsüan-tsang has, in fact, done just this in his translation of the *Abhidharma-samuccayavyākhyā*. After the enumeration of the constituents of *samskāraskandha*, and before their definitions, the following passage is found in the Chinese text: 如是思等五十五法。若遍行若別境若善若煩惱若隨煩惱若不定。如其次第五五十一十二十四應知 (T. 1606: 697a20-23). This seems to be Hsüan-tsang’s interpolation since it is found in neither the Sanskrit *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* nor in the Tibetan *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*.

the result that *vedanā* and *sparśa* fall into the *sarvatraga* group. On the basis of this, they must, as in the Sarvāstivādin system, be simultaneous. My argument that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* implicitly considers *vedanā* a *sarvatraga caitasika* is strengthened by the fact that several passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi* classify it thus and were probably known to the authors/compilers of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.³⁷⁹

iii. *Vedanā* in the *Pratītyasamutpāda* Formula

The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, which, after *nāmarūpa*, suspends comment on the second function of the members belonging to the projected group, resumes here with *vedanā*. Since *vedanāṅga* belongs to the second life, it is not immediately clear how it can be understood to function as the condition of *trṣṇā*, a member of the actualizing group, which belongs to the first life. The *Bhbāṣya*'s explanation of this function, that *trṣṇā* arises due to a craving for *vedanā*, recalls the account in the *Yogācārabhūmi* *śarīra* exposition that I translated in Chapter 3 but will now summarize briefly. After having

³⁷⁹ From the *Manobhūmi*: *tasmād ete manaskārādayaś cetanāparyavasānāś caitasāḥ sarvatra sarvabhūmike sarvadā sarve copadyante* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 59.21-22). From the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*: (1) *de la mtshuṇs par ldn pas 'jug pa rnam par bzag pa gaṇ ze na / 'di la kun gži rnam par žes pa tshuṇs par ldn pa na sems daṇ mtshuṇs par ldn pa kun tu 'gro ba lṇa bo yid la byed pa daṇ / reg pa daṇ / tshor ba daṇ / 'du śes daṇ / sems pa rnames daṇ mtshuṇs par ldn no* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 5a5-6); 云何建立相應轉相。謂阿賴耶識。與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意觸受想思 (T. 1579: 580a29-b1); (2) *rnam par śes pa 'byuṇ ba na sems las 'byuṇ ba'i chos kun tu 'gro ba du 'byuṇ ze na / smras pa lṇa ste / yid la byed pa daṇ / reg pa daṇ / tshor ba daṇ / 'du śes daṇ / sems pa'o / kun tu 'gro ba ma yin pa du 'byuṇ ze na / smras pa / kun tu 'gro ba ma yin pa ni maṇ mod kyi gtso bo ni [lṇa ste /]'di lta ste / 'dun pa daṇ / mos pa daṇ / dran pa daṇ / tiṇ ne 'dzin daṇ / śes rab pa'o (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 61b7-8; the bracketed portion is illegible in the Peking edition and has been supplied from *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib. derge]: zi 116.6); 問諸識生時。與幾遍行心法俱起。答五。一作意。二觸。三受。四想。五思。問復與幾不遍行心法俱起。答不遍行法乃多種。勝者唯五。一欲。二勝解。三念。四三摩地。五慧 (T. 1579: 601c10-13); (3) *de la sems thams cad daṇ / 'byuṇ ba ni lṇa ste / yid la byed pa daṇ / reg pa daṇ / tshor ba daṇ / 'du śes daṇ / sems pa'o / de dag gi mtshan ŋid ni yid kyi sar bstan zin to* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 273b7-8); 遍諸心起復有五種。謂作意觸受想思。如前意地已說其相 (T. 1579: 684a8-9).*

been reborn in the present life, a being receives two types of retribution for past karma: *vipākaphala*, which is, in effect, his existence itself, and *adhipatiphala*, which is the content of his experience and which consists of feelings produced by contact with objects. His delusion concerning the nature of existence, namely his failure to understand that rebirth is suffering, leads him to perform new actions, which will project another rebirth. His delusion concerning the content of existence, that is to say, his failure to understand that the world he experiences is unsatisfactory, arouses in him subconscious desire (*trṣṇā*) for feelings arising from sense-objects.³⁸⁰ This suggests that *vedanā* conditions *trṣṇā* by being its object³⁸¹ and is consistent with the comment in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* on the second function of *vedanā*: “due to a craving for connection, etc., with it [i.e., Feeling], there is the arising of Subconscious Desire.”³⁸²

Still, in our passage from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the second function of *vedanā* is inconsistent with its being a seed rather than an actualized *dharma*. One’s misunderstanding of the nature of experience should lead one to desire actual feelings, not the potential for feelings, with which *vedanāṅga* (= *vedanābija*) is identified. This, in fact, seems to be the way that Sthiramati understands the relationship between *vedanā* and *trṣṇā*: in the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, he says that *trṣṇā* depends on *vedanā* that has arisen at this time from that which was previously projected.³⁸³ Therefore, it seems that *sparśapratyayā vedanā* is a seed belonging to the future lifetime, projected from the present, while the *vedanā* on which *trṣṇā* depends is a *dharma* that was projected into the present lifetime from a still earlier lifetime and that has already been actualized.

³⁸⁰ *Yogācārabhūmi*: 200.6-201.13. See Chapter 3, section C2 for the text and a complete translation.

³⁸¹ *ālambana*. See my translation of the *aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthāna* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*.

³⁸² *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*: 33.5; see Chapter 2, section B5g.

³⁸³ *tad evam āksiptam kenābhīnirvartyate / yathoktakramena pūrvāksiptād ihotpannām vedanām pratiṭyā yā trṣṇotpannā tatpratyayenopādānena* (*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*: 34.16-18; Yamaguchi 1934: 43.23-25).

7. Subconscious Desire

a. An Early Passage Concerning *Trṣṇā*

In a paper exploring the early development of the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Aramaki (1986) identifies two prose *sūtras* from which he thinks the twelve-membered formula originated. He discusses one of these, a *sūtra* on the relationship between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, but he reserves the other, the subject of which is *trṣṇā*, for a later paper, which has not yet appeared. This second *sūtra*³⁸⁴ clearly shows the importance of *trṣṇā* in the process of *samsāra*, and a portion of it reads as follows:

In the past, any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who viewed that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as permanent, who viewed [it] as unchangeable, as secure, as health, as self, as belonging to self, increased *trṣṇā*. Those who increased *trṣṇā* increased attachment to existence (*upadhi*). Those who increased attachment to existence increased *duḥkha*. Those who increased *duḥkha* were not released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They were not released from *duḥkha*, I say.

But any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who viewed that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as disease, who viewed [it] as a boil, as a thorn, as misfortune,³⁸⁵ as impermanent, as misery, as empty, as lacking a self, destroyed *trṣṇā*. Those who destroyed *trṣṇā* destroyed attachment to existence. Those who destroyed attachment to existence destroyed *duḥkha*. Those who destroyed *duḥkha* were released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They were released from *duḥkha*, I say.

In the future, too, any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who view that

³⁸⁴ *Nidānasamyukta* 9 [Tripāṭhī 1962: 121-126]; *Samyuktāgama* 12, *sūtra* 291 (T. 99: 82); *Samyuttanikāya* 12. 66.

³⁸⁵ For translation of *agato*, see Tripāṭhī 1962: 125, ns. 3, 10.

which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as permanent, who view [it] as unchangeable, as secure, as health, as self, as belonging to self, will increase *trṣṇā*. Those who increase *trṣṇā* will increase attachment to existence (*upadhi*). Those who increase attachment to existence will increase *duḥkha*. Those who increase *duḥkha* will not be released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They will not be released from *duḥkha*, I say.

But any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who view that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as disease, who view [it] as a boil, as a thorn, as misfortune, as impermanent, as misery, as empty, as lacking a self, will destroy *trṣṇā*. Those who destroy *trṣṇā* will destroy attachment to existence. Those who destroy attachment to existence will destroy *duḥkha*. Those who destroy *duḥkha* will be released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They will be released from *duḥkha*, I say.³⁸⁶

³⁸⁶(atīte 'py adhvani ye kecic chramaṇā vā) brāhmaṇā vā yal loke priyarūpaṁ sātarūpa(m) ta(n) nityataḥ (sa)manvadrākṣuḥ /) (dhruvataḥ kṣemata ārog�ata ātmata ātmīyataḥ samanvadrākṣus te trṣṇām prāvardhayiṣuḥ / ye trṣṇām prāvardhayi)ṣus te (upadhiṁ prāvardhayiṣuḥ / ye upadhiṁ prāvardhayiṣus te duḥkha(m p)rāvardhayi)ṣu(h / ye duḥkham prāvardhayiṣus te) na (pari)mucya(n te sma) jātā(i)t(ijarāv)yādhi(m) na (śokaparidevaduḥkha)kha(daurma)nasyopāyā(sebhyah / na parimucyante) sma duḥkhaḍ iti vadāmi /

ye (tu) kecic chra(maṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā ya)l loke pri(yar)ū(pam) sā(ta)rū(pam) ta(d rogataḥ samanvad)rākṣuḥ / gaṇḍa(taḥ) śalyato ('gato 'ni(tyato duḥkhataḥ śūnyato) 'nātmataḥ sam(anvadrā)kṣus te trṣṇām prajahuḥ / ye trṣṇām praja)hus te u(padhi)ṁ prajahuḥ / ye upadhiṁ prajahu(s te) duḥkham prajahu(s t)e parimu(cyan)te (sma) jātā(i)jarāvyaḍhi(maraṇaśoka)pari(d)evaduḥkha(daurmanasyo)pāyā(sebhyah / parimucyante sma duḥkhaḍ i)ti (va)dāmi /

anāgatē 'py adhvani ye k(e)cic chramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā yal loke (pr)iyarūpa(m) sātarūpa(m) tan nityataḥ sa(manudrakṣyanti /) dhruvataḥ (kṣemata ārog�ata ātmata) ātmīyataḥ samanudrak(s)yanti te trṣṇām pravardhayiṣyanti / ye trṣṇā(m) pravardhayiṣyanti te upadhiṁ pravardhayiṣyan(ti) / y(e) upadhiṁ pravardhayiṣyant(i) te duḥkha(m) pravardhav(sic)yi(syanti / ye duḥkham pravardhayi)ṣya(n)ti te na parimokṣyante jātījarā(vyāḍhi)maraṇaśokaparideva-duḥkhadaurma(s)y(o)pāyā(s)ebhyah / (na parimok)ṣya(nt)e duḥkhaḍ iti vadāmi /

ye tu keci(c chra)maṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā yal loke priya)rūpam sātarūpam tad

b. *Trṣṇā* in *Abhidharma* Texts—The Context of *Samudayasatya*

As Takasaki, who probably has in mind texts such as the *sūtra* translated above, says, “The positing of craving [*trṣṇā*] as the cause of suffering is the oldest formula of dependent co-arising, and even in later Buddhism desire is ever looked upon as the root of all evil” (1987: 156). However, the topic of *trṣṇā* is not completely free from controversy, notably in the context of the Noble Truth of the origin of suffering (*samudayasatya*). Vasubandhu, in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* VI 2, defines *duḥkhasatya* as the *upādānaskandhas* when they are result; *samudayasatya*, he says, consists of the *upādānaskandhas* when they are cause.³⁸⁷ In a note, La Vallée Poussin points out that not all *abhidharma* sources agree with this view, and he translates a passage from the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 397a28-b13) in which the following opinions are attributed to various sources: According to the *ābhidharmikas*, *duḥkhasatya* consists of the *upādānaskandhas*, while *sāmudayasatya* is the cause of *sāsraवadharmas*; according to the *Dārṣṭāntikas*, *duḥkhasatya* is *nāmarūpa*, while *sāmudayasatya* is karma and *kleśa*; and according to the *Vibhajyavādins*, *duḥkhasatya* consists of only those *sāsraवadharmas* that have the eight characteristics of *duḥkha*, while *sāmudayasatya* consists of only that *trṣṇā* that produces rebirth.³⁸⁸

rogataḥ sama(nudra)kṣyanti / gaṇ(da)ta(h) śalya(to) 'gato 'n(i)tyato du(hkhataḥ) śūnyato 'nā(tma)taḥ samanu(d)rakṣyanti te t(r)ṣṇā(m) prahāsyanti / ye (trṣṇā)m prahāsyanti te upadhi(m) prahāsyanti / ye upadhi(m) prahās(ya)n(ti te) duḥkham prahā(sya)n(ti) / ye duḥkham prahās(ya)nti te (parimokṣyante) jāti(ja(rā)-vyādhimaraṇaśoka(pari)deva(duḥ)kha(daurmanasyopāyāsebhyaḥ / parimokṣyante) duḥkhād iti vadāmi (Tripāṭhi 1962: 124-126).

³⁸⁷tatra phalabhūtā upādānaskandhā duḥkhasatyam / hetubhūtāḥ samudayasatyam / samudety asmād iti kṛtvā / ata eva tayoḥ phalahetubhāvān nāmato bhedo na dravyataḥ (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 328.14-16; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 122-123; Yaśomitra does not comment on these definitions). This echoes the definition of the *upādānaskandhas* in *Abhidharmakośa* I 8: ye sāsraवā upādānaskandhās te saraṇā api / duḥkham samudayo loko dṛṣṭisthānam bhavaś ca te (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 5.9 ff.; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 13-14).

³⁸⁸A fourth opinion, attributed to Ghoṣaka (尊者妙音), is also discussed, at greater length than the other three, in this passage (T. 1545: 397b13-c8; *Kokuyaku Issaikyō*,

La Vallée Poussin also refers to a definition from the *Śaṅgitiparyāya*,³⁸⁹ according to which *samudayasatya* is the cause of the *sāśravadvadharma*s (1971, v. 4: 122-123 n. 3); this is identical to the *ābhidharmika* definition mentioned by the *Vibhāṣā*.

Elsewhere, the *Vibhāṣā* establishes what becomes accepted as the *Vaiśbhāṣika* definition. It indicates that *samudayasatya* consists of all the

Bidon-bu 10: 320-321), but La Vallée Poussin does not summarize it. I shall provide extracts from this passage, which seems specifically to contradict the *Vibhajyavādin* opinion: 若墮自相續五蘊。若墮他相續五蘊。若有情數及無情數諸蘊。如是一切皆是苦是苦諦。修觀行者起現觀時。唯觀墮自相續五蘊為苦。不觀墮他相續五蘊。及無情數諸蘊為苦。所以者何。逼切行相是苦 (punctuation emended according to the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation) 現觀墮他相續及無情數蘊於自相續非逼切故。彼生智論作如是說。自相續蘊極自逼切。非他相續及無情數蘊。非離自身他及非情能相逼切。無自身者他及非情何所逼切。故現觀時唯觀墮自相續五蘊為苦非餘。

若墮自相續五蘊因。若墮他相續五蘊因。若有情數及無情數諸蘊因。如是一切皆是集是集諦。修觀行者起現觀時。唯觀墮自相續五蘊因為集不觀墮他相續五蘊因。及無情數諸蘊因為集 (T. 1545: 397b13-28).

This may be summarized as follows: everything that is *duḥkha*, including the *pañcaskandhas* of one's own and of others' *samtatis*, as well as all animate and inanimate *skandhas*, is *duḥkhasatya*. But when meditators produce insight, they should only consider their own *pañcaskandhas* as *duḥkha*, not those of others or all the inanimate *skandhas*, because *duḥkha* is something that is to be destroyed, and having insight into the *skandhas* of others does not destroy that which is in one's own *samtati*. Similarly, everything that is *samudaya* is *samudayasatya*, but in meditation one should consider only the cause of one's own *pañcaskandhas*.

After presenting *Ghoṣaka*'s opinion, the *Vibhāṣā* gives its own opinion: 若墮自相續五蘊。若墮他相續五蘊。若有情數及無情數諸蘊。如是一切皆是苦是苦諦。修觀行者起現觀時。皆觀為苦。問逼切行相是苦 (punctuation emended according to the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation) 現觀墮他相續及無情數蘊於自相續既非逼切。修觀行者起現觀時何故亦觀為苦。答設彼於自不能逼切亦為苦。所以者何。無始時來於一切苦皆起無智。為對治彼皆應起智。無始時來於一切苦皆起猶豫。為對治彼皆應起決定。無始時來一切起皆起誹謗。為對治彼皆應起信。故應遍觀一切為苦。況彼於自亦能逼切。所以者何。若有為他所打觸者。亦生大苦。豈非逼切。若有空中木石瓦等墮自身上。亦生大苦。豈非逼切。既有逼切自相續義。故現觀時亦觀為苦。若墮自相續五蘊因。若墮他相續五蘊因。若有情數及無情數諸蘊因。如是一切皆是集是集諦。修觀行者起現觀時皆觀為集 (T. 1545: 397c8-26).

Thus, the *Vibhāṣā* agrees with *Ghoṣaka* regarding the constituents of *duḥkha*- and *samudayasatya*. However, it states that, at the time of producing insight, meditators should, in fact, consider the *pañcaskandhas* of others and all animate and inanimate *skandhas* as *duḥkha*.

³⁸⁹ 云何苦集聖諦。答諸有漏因。是名苦集聖諦 (T. 1536: 392a19-20).

*sāsraवadharma*s, and it justifies the apparent discrepancy between its definition and the *sūtra* definition, according to which *samudayasatya* is only said to consist of *trṣṇā*.³⁹⁰ The *Abhidharmaḥṛdaya* of Dharmāśrī, the *Abhidharmaḥṛdaya* of Upaśānta, and the *Samyuktābhidharmaḥṛdaya* of Dharmatrāta all maintain a similar position,³⁹¹ as does Ghoṣaka in the *Abhidharmaṁṛta*.³⁹² Vasubandhu, as we have seen above, accepts a version of the Vaibhāṣika definition that is closest to Ghoṣaka's in the *Abhidharmaṁṛta*.

Near the end of his comment on verse three, after discussing the existence of *sukhavedanā*, Vasubandhu, like the *Vibhāṣā*, reconciles his definition of *samudayasatya* with that of the *sūtra*, explaining that the *sūtra*

³⁹⁰ 問苦集聖諦云何。答如契經說。諸所有愛及後有愛。臺俱行愛彼彼喜愛。是名苦集聖諦。問諸有漏法能為因義皆是集諦。何故世尊但說集諦是愛非餘。答愛於施設集聖諦中。勢用增強非餘漏。故偏說愛是集非餘。然有漏法皆是集諦。如施設行蘊中思最勝故說思非餘。而實相應不相應行皆是行蘊。是故偏說愛為集諦。復次愛是三世衆苦因本。道路由緒能作生緣。集起勝故偏說集諦。復次愛能數數招集苦果勝故偏說, etc. (T. 1545: 403a2-4) La Vallée Poussin refers to this passage: "Tous les dharmas impurs (*sāsra*) sont cause et par conséquent vérité de l'origine. Pourquoi Bhagavat dit-il que la soif est la vérité de l'origine? Il y a trente explications..." (v. 4, 136 n. 2).

³⁹¹ *Abhidharmaḥṛdaya* of Dharmāśrī:

諸行若有果有漏是說苦者。一切有漏行從(corrected from 從行 following Willemen 1975: 269 n. 82) 因中生。亦作一切苦患。是故一切行說苦諦。若有因是習者。一切有漏行他因。是以一切行說習諦。如一女亦說母亦說女前後故。如是有漏行亦說苦諦亦說習諦。已生當生故 (T. 1550: 827a24-29; Willemen 1975: 131-132).

Abhidharmaḥṛdaya of Upaśānta :

果相似諸行有漏是說苦者。一切有漏行從因生。逼惱相是故說苦。因相似是集者。一切有漏行他因相似。是故彼說苦集。如一稻種子前後相望故。亦說果亦說因。如是有漏行觀已生當生故。亦說苦說集 (T. 1551: 861a8-12).

Samyuktābhidharmaḥṛdaya of Dharmatrāta:

謂性果諸行有漏是說苦者。一切有漏行有因及縛性故說苦。因性則為集者。此有漏行是因性者說集諦。是故苦集是一物。因果故立二諦 (T. 1552: 936b26-29).

³⁹² 五受陰報果時是謂苦諦。五受陰因緣時是謂習諦。亦謂苦諦。譬如人亦名子亦名父 (T. 1553: 978a12-14; Sastri 1953: 119.8-10; Van den Broeck 1977: 213). A little earlier in his discussion of the four *satyas*, Ghoṣaka defines *duḥkha*- and *samudayasatya* in a way that resembles what was attributed to him by the *Vibhāṣā*: 一切種種苦是謂苦諦。云何習諦。是種種苦因五受陰是謂習諦 (T. 1553: 978a3-5; Sastri 1953: 118.8-10; Van den Broeck 1977: 212). In his retranslation into Sanskrit, Sastri explains that the manifold *duḥkha*, like its cause, consists of the five *upādānakandhas*.

mentions only *trṣṇā* because of its prominence.³⁹³ But he insists that the other *sāsravadvadharma*s are also included in *samudayasatya*, and he quotes from two *sūtras* from *Samyuktāgama* to support his position. According to the *Mānuṣyakasūtra*, not only *trṣṇā*, but karma and *avidyā* as well, are stated to be the cause of the *samskāras* in the future.³⁹⁴ According to another *sūtra*, the five types of seeds, which grow into plants, are analogous to *sopādānavijñāna*, while the soil in which they grow is analogous to the four *vijñānasthitis*.³⁹⁵ In this case, the seeds are *hetu* and therefore *samudaya*, as are the *vijñānasthitis*,³⁹⁶ which function as cause by way of being support (*pratiṣṭhāhetu*).³⁹⁷ On the basis of these other *sūtras*, Vasubandhu then states that the *sūtra* definition of *samudayasatya* is *ābhiprāyika*, while that found in the *abhidharma* is *lākṣaṇika*.³⁹⁸

³⁹³ *pradhānyād asau sūtra uktā* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.3; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 136). Vasubandhu's reasoning here follows that of the *Vibhāṣā*, which compares the designation of *samudayasatya* by *trṣṇā* with that of *samskāraskandha* by *cetanā* (see note 389).

³⁹⁴ *karma ca trṣṇā ca atho avidyā samskārāṇām hetur abhisamparāya iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.5; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 136). Honjō (1984: 86-87) has identified the source as the *Mānuṣyakasūtra* of the *Samyuktāgama* (*sūtras* 306-307; T. 99: 87c-88b, especially 88b9: 諸業愛無明／因積他世陰). Mukai (1985: 34) has identified the same *sūtra* as the subject of comment by the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* (*Vastusamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 278a8-279a3; T. 1579: 824c2-27), but the discussion does not include this three-fold cause of the future *skandhas* or *samskāras*.

³⁹⁵ *pañcabijajātānītī sopādānasya vijñānasyaitad adhivacanam / prthivīdhātūr iti catasr̄ṇām vijñānasthitīnām etad adhivacanam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.6-7; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 136-137). Identified by Honjō (1984: 86-87) as *sūtra* no. 39 of the *Samyuktāgama* (T. 99: 8c-9b). Again, as Mukai points out (1985: 30), this *sūtra* is commented on in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* (*Vastusamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 201a2-201b2; T. 1579: 794b6-24).

³⁹⁶ *bījaṇi punar hetuḥ yaś ca hetuḥ sa samudayaḥ vijñāna-sthitayo 'pi pratiṣṭhāhetuḥ.* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 522.26-27). These four *vijñānasthitis* are undoubtedly the ones enumerated in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*'s comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 7b, namely *rūpopagā-*, *vedanopagā-*, *samjñopagā-*, and *samskāropagāvijñānasthiti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 117.21-22; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 23-24).

³⁹⁷ For *pratiṣṭhāhetu*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 102.28; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 314. For *pratiṣṭhāphala*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 97.11-12; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 297.

³⁹⁸ *tasmād ābhiprāyikāḥ sutreṣu nirdeśo lākṣaṇikas tv abhidharme* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.7-8).

Finally, Vasubandhu suggests another reason for the identification of *samudayasatya* with *trṣṇā*, namely that what is being explained in the *sūtra* is, specifically, the cause of rebirth (*abhinirvṛttihetu*). In support of this interpretation, he refers back to the *Mānuṣyakasūtra*, from which, alluding to yet another *sūtra*,³⁹⁹ he infers that *trṣṇā* is the cause of rebirth in general (*abhinirvṛttihetu*),⁴⁰⁰ karma is the cause of rebirth into specific circumstances (*upapattihetu*),⁴⁰¹ and *avidyā* is the cause of both *trṣṇā* and karma.⁴⁰² Vasubandhu then compares *upapatti-* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* to a seed, which produces sprouts of a specific type of grain, and water, which causes the germination of any type of sprout.⁴⁰³ Next, he provides us with a logical proof that *trṣṇā* must be *abhinirvṛttihetu*: Although all people must die, only those who possess *trṣṇā* are reborn; therefore, there is no rebirth without *trṣṇā*, and we can know that *trṣṇā* is the cause of the production of existence.⁴⁰⁴

I have been unable to trace the term *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the *abhidharma* literature that precedes Vasubandhu. However, along with *āksepahetu*, *abhinirvṛttihetu* appears in Yogācāra texts in two contexts,

³⁹⁹ *karma hetur upapattaye trṣṇā hetur abhinirvṛttaya iti sūtre vacanāt* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.10-11; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 137). Honjō was unable to identify this *sūtra* (Honjō 1984: 86-87). Pāśādika (1986: 104) identifies the *Ādīviśeśavibhāgasūtra* (T. 716: 834a14-15) as the source, but this is unlikely, given the probable late date of this *sūtra* (not to mention its possible authorship by Vasubandhu himself) and considering the fact that the passage is also cited in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, a citation that Pāśādika does not mention.

⁴⁰⁰ *abhedena punarbhavapratisamdhānam abhinirvṛttih* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

⁴⁰¹ *dhātugatiyonādiprakārabhedenātmabhāvayopapadanam upapattiḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.12-13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

⁴⁰² *upapatti-hetuḥ karma. abhinirvṛtti-hetus trṣṇā bhaveṣu. tayoḥ punas tad-dhetvoh karma-trṣṇayor avidyā hetur ity āha* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 523.3-4).

⁴⁰³ *tadyathā bijam̄ śālivādijāti prakārabhedenāñkuro papadanasya hetuḥ / āpah punar abhedena sarvāñkuraprarohamātrasyety eva dṛṣṭāntaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.14-15; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

⁴⁰⁴ *trṣṇā 'bhinirvṛttihetur iti kā 'tra yuktih / vītatrṣṇasya janmābhāvāt / ubhaye 'pi mriyante / satrṣṇā vītarṣṇāś ca / satrṣṇā eva jātā drṣyante na vītarṣṇā iti / vinā trṣṇayā janmābhāvāt / bhavasyābhinirvṛttitau trṣṇāhetum pratīmaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 333.16-18; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

in a list of ten *hetus* and in discussions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula. Therefore, it seems likely to me that, in his reasons for insisting that *trṣṇā* is not equivalent to *samudayasatya*, but only to *abhinirvṛttihetu*, Vasubandhu is actually relying on Yogācāra sources. Before going further into the relation between Vasubandhu's argument here and a specific passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi*, I shall explain the background of *abhinirvṛttihetu* and *ākṣepahetu*.

c. *Abhinirvṛttihetu* and *Ākṣepahetu*⁴⁰⁵

The best known, and probably the earliest, occurrence of a list of ten *hetus* is found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. This list is followed by definitions of the individual causes, which are then assigned to two groups, *janakahetu* and *upāyahetu*, after which they are related to the four *pratyayas*. Finally, three processes are described in terms of the ten causes: a) the coming into existence of everyday things (*laukika bhāva*), with particular reference to grain (*sasya*); b) the process of defilement (*samklesa*), which is equated with *pratītyasamutpāda* and analyzed with reference to the members of the formula; and c) the process of purification (*vyavadāna*), which is equivalent to *pratītyasamutpāda* in its reverse (*pratiloma*) order.⁴⁰⁶ This passage has been translated into French by Bendall and La Vallée Poussin (1911: 176-182) and is summarized by La Vallée Poussin in a section of his pioneering work, *Théorie des Douze Causes*, entitled "La causalité dans le système des Vijñānavādins" (1913: 64-67). La Vallée Poussin treats this subject again in his translation of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which relates the ten *hetus* to fifteen *adhisthānas*, as well as to the five results.⁴⁰⁷ In his notes, he provides extensive references to other occurrences of ten *hetus*, and he remarks that the order in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* differs from that of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (1928-1929: 456).

More recently, Funahashi has examined the relationship between the

⁴⁰⁵ Some of the material in this section has appeared in a very abbreviated form in Kritzer 1994a.

⁴⁰⁶ *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 97.6-102.1; T. 1579: 501a8 ff.

⁴⁰⁷ T. 1585: 41b13-42c17; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 453-459.

ten *hetus* and the twenty *kāraṇas*, and he, too, notes the difference in order between the lists of *hetus* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* on the one hand, and in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, as well as in the list of twenty *kāraṇas* (the last ten of which correspond to the ten *hetus*) of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other (1979; see also Funahashi 1991). In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *parigrahahetu* separates the third *hetu*, *ākṣepahetu*, from the fifth, *abhinirvṛttihetu*. In the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, *abhinirvṛttihetu* immediately follows *ākṣepahetu*, while *parigrahahetu* follows *abhinirvṛttihetu*. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *parigrahakāraṇa*, the fifteenth *kāraṇa*, similarly follows number thirteen, *ākṣepakāraṇa*, and number fourteen, *abhinirvṛttikāraṇa*. Funahashi suggests that the difference is due to the fact that the *Savitarkādibhūmi* considers the *hetus* in relation to the scheme of fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas*, according to which *sābhiniṣyandabija*,⁴⁰⁸ with which *abhinirvṛttihetu* is associated, precedes the group of six *adhiṣṭhānas* (*śliṣṭanirodha*, *viṣaya*, *indriya*, *kriyā*, *puruṣakāra*, and *tattvadarśana*)⁴⁰⁹ with which *parigrahahetu* is associated (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 108.5-13). The *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, on the other hand, mentions *parigrahahetu* in the middle because it consists of the auxiliary causes that help the seeds that comprise *ākṣepahetu* to become the immediate cause of rebirth, *abhinirvṛttihetu*.⁴¹⁰ Funahashi does not pursue the issue further.

At this point I would like to make two comments with regard to Funahashi's article. First, the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* refers to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* list and reproduces it in the same order;⁴¹¹ as far as I can tell, Funahashi does not notice this. Although the chronological relationship between the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, two of the oldest sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is still unclear, this reference in

⁴⁰⁸ According to La Vallée Poussin's translation of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, *sasnehabijādhiṣṭhāna*.

⁴⁰⁹ According to La Vallée Poussin, *anantarāniruddha-*, *viṣaya-*, *indriya-*, *kāraṇa-*, *puruṣakāra-*, and *tattvadarśanādhiṣṭhāna* (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 456-457).

⁴¹⁰ Funahashi 1979: 329-330; La Vallée Poussin 1913: 66-67; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 456-457.

⁴¹¹ T. 1579: 881b13. Not found in the Tibetan; see note 411.

the *Vastusaṅgrahaṇī* would suggest that at least this portion of it⁴¹² is newer than portions of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Second, Funahashi, as I mentioned above, thinks that the order of the *hetus* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is related to the order of the *adhiṣṭhānas*, and this certainly seems to be true. However, I have been unable to find any mention of fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas* earlier than this same discussion of *hetu*, *pratyaya*, *phala*, and *adhiṣṭhāna* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. Therefore, it seems probable to me that the association of the fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas* with the ten *hetus* did not prompt the rearranging of the list. Instead, I think, the influence of early Yogācāra interpretations of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula led to both these features of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* passage.

In the introduction to his translation of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and its *Bhāṣya*, Matsuda discusses the development of the Yogācāra “two-lifetimes/singlefold causation” theory. Although the section on *āṅgasamāsa* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is the *locus classicus* of this theory, Matsuda suggests that the *Yogācārabhūmi* may contain its forerunners. There are several expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and Matsuda deals with two in particular. Regarding the *śarīra* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.17-203.5), which is also included in the *Vastusaṅgrahaṇī* (*Vastusaṅgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 'i 285a3-287b6; T. 1579: 827c3-828c12), Matsuda disagrees with Ui Hakuju, who does not see it as similar to the two-lifetimes/singlefold causation theory. However, citing the difficulties in understanding this passage, Matsuda does not analyze it in depth. Instead he turns to an exposition in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (*Śrāvakabhūmi*: 384.6-385.5; Wayman 1961: 114; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 169b2-170a1; T. 1579: 454b15-c1) that he says corresponds to it, in which two types of causes (*āksepakahetu* and *abhinirvartakahetu*, or *abhinirvṛttihetu*) and two types of results (*ātmabhāvaphala* and *viṣayopabhogaphala*) are

⁴¹²This last portion of the *Vastusaṅgrahaṇī*, unlike the majority of the text, is not a commentary on the *Samyuktāgama*; rather it consists of a *mātrikā* of *abhidharma*, and Mukai notes that it does not exist in Tibetan translation (1985: 6). This, and the fact that the portion refers to the *Maulībhūmi*, suggests that it is a later addition to the *Vastusaṅgrahaṇī*.

mentioned. According to this passage, the members from Consciousness through Feeling are the seeds in the present life of Birth in the future life (Matsuda 1983: 30-32). The *śarīra* section from the *Savitarkādibhūmi* in fact seems to present a very similar system, with certain slight differences in terminology (*vipākaphala* for *ātmabhāvaphala*; *viṣayanirjāta[phala]* for *viṣayopabhogaphala*; *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* for *abhinirvṛttihetu*) and perhaps a somewhat different mechanism of seed-causation.

Establishing the chronological sequence of these expositions is difficult. As I have mentioned above, Schmithausen thinks that the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* belong to the earliest layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1987: 14). Since the *śarīra* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition appears (without the heading *śarīra*) in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, the most natural assumption might be that it was borrowed by the *Savitarkādibhūmi* to serve as the first of its nine sections. If this is the case, then the *śarīra* section, unlike the remainder of the exposition, is very early. However, Mukai has shown that, while much of the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* is in effect a commentary on the *Samyuktāgama*, the part corresponding to the *Savitarkādibhūmi* *śarīra* section is not (1985: 34). On the other hand, it does not seem likely to me that this section originated as late as the composition of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and was interpolated from the *Savitarkādibhūmi* into the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*. On the contrary, its rather disorganized contents suggest to me an early date of composition; in fact, its greater length and lack of clarity make it seem older than the *Śrāvakabhūmi* exposition, even though the *Śrāvakabhūmi* is generally considered to be earlier than the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, let alone the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. Although Schmithausen refers to this passage and mentions the fact that it appears in both the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* and *Savitarkādibhūmi*, he does not speculate on where it was first incorporated (1987: 38, 48, 170). Therefore, the origin of this passage remains unclear, as does its chronological relation to the *Śrāvakabhūmi* exposition, at least to my mind. In any case, the *Savitarkādibhūmi* *śarīra* section and its *Vastusamgrahaṇī* parallel are probably considerably older than the remainder of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition, while the *Śrāvakabhūmi*

passage is undoubtedly so.

Thus, we can find the terms *ākṣepa* (*ākṣepaka*) and *abhinirvṛtti* (*abhinirvartaka*) occurring with essentially similar meanings in the several systematic expositions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula contained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. As we shall see, they also are found in the fully developed two-lifetimes/singlefold causation system of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. However, there seems to be some development over the course of time. In certain passages (the expositions in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Vastusamgrahanī*, as well as the *śarīra* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi*), the terms are mentioned as part of an explanation of the process of conditioned origination, while in others (the *pratyayatva* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and the *aṅgasamāsa* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*), they appear as the headings of groups under which the members of the formula are enumerated. On the basis of this, I think that the *Yogācāra* explanation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in terms of a theory of seed causation is in the process of being worked out in the earlier passages, while the later passages simply describe the implications of a theory that has already been more or less systematized.

How then are the *ākṣepakahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (or *abhinirvartakahetu*) of the *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions related to *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the list of the ten *hetus*? I shall attempt to show a sequence of ideas and texts, but given our lack of certainty regarding the chronology of the *Yogācārabhūmi* texts, my conclusions must be largely speculative.

The earliest interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula containing the idea that actions performed under the influence of Ignorance condition rebirth, not by directly causing Consciousness to arise in the next life, as in the Sarvāstivādin three-lifetimes/twofold causation system, but by “planting” a seed that can become actualized in the form of the next life, is perhaps found in a passage from Chapter Six of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.⁴¹³ Although this passage does not contain the

⁴¹³ *teṣāṁ taiḥ saṃskāraih paribhāvitam* [omitted by Rahder (1926: 48) and La Vallée Poussin (1913: 116), but supported by *Daśabhūmikasūtra* [tib.]: li 102b2]

terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu*, its approach is more similar to that of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *śarīra* expositions than to that of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, and the botanical metaphor that is elaborated on in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* discussion of the ten *hetus* seems to originate here. Both the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *śarīra* expositions seem to be attempts to explain more systematically the process described in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and both expositions take the term *bīja* in a more technical sense. Although we do not know which is earlier, the *śarīra* exposition as found in the *Vastusaṅgrahaṇī*, or the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, I believe that, in the course of determining exactly how the members of the formula function in causing rebirth, one of these two texts introduced the terms *ākṣepahetu*⁴¹⁴ and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (or *abhinirvartakahetu*).

If I am correct then, the ten-*hetus* passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in which the description of how the *hetus* function in a botanical context clearly recalls the language of the *Daśabhūmika-*

avaropitāṇi cittabījāṇi sāsravāṇi sopādānam āyatāṇi jātijarāmaranāṇapunarbhavā-
*bhini[r]*vṛttisamābhavopagataṇi bhavati / karmakṣetrālayam avidyāmdhakārā-*
trṣṇāsneham asmimāṇapariṣyandināṇi drṣṭikṛtajālapravṛddhyā nāmarūpāṇkuraḥ
prādurbhavati (Daśabhūmikasūtra: 97.3-6).

*Rahder and La Vallée Poussin clearly provide a better reading here.

With regard to the question of when explanations of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula in terms of seeds first appeared, Aramaki cites a *sutta* from the *Samyuttanikāya*, according to which the body's development, depending on causes, is similar to a plant's development from a seed that has received "earthly nutrients" (Aramaki's translation) and water (*nayidam attakataṇi bimbaṇi nayidam parakataṇi aghaṇi / hetum paṭicca sambhūtaṇi hetubhaṇgā nirujjhati // yathā aññatarāṇi bijam khette vuttā virūhati / pathavīrasam cāgamaṇi sinehaṇi ca tād ubhayām*—as given in Aramaki 1986: 118). This, of course, is an earlier example of a botanical simile in a discussion of causation, and the basic metaphor may have originated in this or some even older text. However, this *sutta*, if I understand Aramaki correctly, precedes the emergence of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula as we know it. The very detailed application of the metaphor to the formula in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* strikingly resembles that of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. Although the two texts may have a common source, it seems likely to me that the author of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* was familiar with the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* passage.

⁴¹⁴I do not think that there is any substantial difference in meaning between *ākṣepa* and *ākṣepaka* in these compounds.

sūtra,⁴¹⁵ borrows the terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* from one of the early *pratīyasamutpāda* expositions found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Although its definitions of these two causes as being, respectively, the seeds of Ignorance, etc., in the present life, which produce Birth and Old Age and Death in the next life,⁴¹⁶ and the seeds of Ignorance, etc., which produce themselves,⁴¹⁷ are not exactly the same as those of *ākṣepakahetu* and the *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* in the *śarīra* exposition, they are similar in their broad outlines. The main differences between the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* definitions and those of the *śarīra* exposition involve the mention of the seeds of Ignorance in the former. Both the *śarīra*⁴¹⁸ and the *Śrāvakabhūmi*⁴¹⁹ passages include seeds in *ākṣepakahetu*, but only the seeds of the members from Consciousness through Feeling; Ignorance and the Karmic Forces are not described as seeds. Similarly, in the *śarīra* exposition, *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* is identified with Karmic Existence, which consists of the seeds from *ākṣepakahetu*, endowed with Subconscious Desire and Appropriation (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 201.4-8).⁴²⁰ In other words, it consists of the seeds of Consciousness through Feeling after they have been rendered viable by Subconscious Desire and Appropriation. Again, the seeds of Ignorance are not mentioned; however, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, like the *śarīra* exposition, defines *abhinirvṛttihetu* as the seeds of the constituents of the next life in a state of readiness to yield results.

These differences in definitions can be explained by the fact that the

⁴¹⁵ An example of the botanical imagery in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is the following: *yato yataḥ svabijād yasya yasya sasyasya prādurbhāvo bhavati. tad bījam tasyā-*kṣepahetuḥ. prthivīvr̥styādikāḥ pratyayo 'nkurapradurbhāvāya parigrahahetuḥ. tad bījam tasyāñkurasayābhiniṇvṛttihetuḥ.**

⁴¹⁶ *avidyādīnāṁ dharmānāṁ drṣṭa eva dharma yāni bījāni jātasya bhūtasyeha. tāny anyajānmi kasya jātijarāmarāṇasyākṣepahetuḥ* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 100.18-20).

⁴¹⁷ *svakasvakanī bijam avidyādīnāṁ nirvṛttihetuḥ* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 100.23-24).

⁴¹⁸ *Yogācārabhūmi*: 200.16-20.

⁴¹⁹ *Śrāvakabhūmi*: 384.11-18; Wayman 1961: 114; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 169b4-7; T. 1579: 454b20-26.

⁴²⁰ The *Śrāvakabhūmi* simply says that *abhinirvṛttihetu* is the potential of karma, which Matsuda notes is here equivalent to Karmic Existence (1983: 31), to produce *vipāka* (*Śrāvakabhūmi*: 385.4-5; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 169b8-170a1; T. 1579: 454b29).

Bodhisattvabhūmi passage, unlike the other two, is not an analysis of *pratīyasamutpāda* per se and so does not precisely identify where each member of the formula functions in the process of causation. Furthermore, the fact that another *hetu*, *parigrahahetu*, comes between *ākṣepa-* and *abhinirvṛttihetus* suggests that at the time of the composition of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* list the expositions of *pratīyasamutpāda* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* were not yet established as the standard Yogācāra explanations of the formula, and thus *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* were not yet an inseparable pair. The botanical origin of the seed metaphor, which lingers in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* description of external causality, perhaps still overrides the more abstract theory of causality found in the expositions of *pratīyasamutpāda*. After all, in the physical process whereby a seed gains the potential to yield fruit, auxiliary causes such as water clearly work their results after the planting of the seed in its “unmoistened” state and before its fructification, and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* devotes considerable space to describing this process. In contrast, the ten-*hetus* passage in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* does not refer to botanical development at all; in fact, it scarcely mentions the external world.⁴²¹

As seed theory was refined, the original metaphor may have lost its force, and even in texts as early as the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the term *bija* seems somewhat divorced from the botanical setting. By the time of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (here I exclude the *śarīra* section on the grounds that it was probably borrowed wholesale from an earlier source), there has been even further movement away from the original meaning, and the remainder of the extensive treatment of *pratīyasamutpāda* found at the end of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* represents a later stage in the systematization of *bija* theory. Unlike the exposition of *śarīra*, which is convoluted and repetitive, the rest of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* analysis is written in a straightforward *abhidharma* style, full of definitions and

⁴²¹For example, in its explanation of *ākṣepahetu*, the *Savitarkādibhūmi* simply states: *bāhyānām ca bhāvānām tenaivādhipatyena sampannavipannatā* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 108.2-3). In its explanation of *abhinirvṛttihetu*, on the other hand, it does not specifically mention external things at all.

lists introduced by the questions, “What?” “How many?” and “Why?” Much of this section appears to consist of reinterpretations of earlier material in terms of *bija* (for example, the entire *vibhaṅga* or *vibhāga* section is a commentary on the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*).⁴²² Elsewhere there are attempts to coordinate already established categories with the *bija* system. The *pratyaya* section, for example, in explaining the types of causal relations the various members of the formula can enter into with one another, states that one member cannot be the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of another because the causal condition of something is always the seed of that same thing.⁴²³ The terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* come up in further discussion of this point.

Here the two, as they occur in the list of ten causes,⁴²⁴ are related specifically to the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula: *ākṣepahetu* consists of the members from Ignorance through Feeling, while *abhinirvṛttihetu* consists of the members from Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence.⁴²⁵ In the course of showing the connection between the four *pratyayas* and the twelve members of the formula, this brief passage in effect summarizes the lengthy descriptions of *ākṣepakahetu* and *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* from the *śārīra* exposition and equates the two with the *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* of the ten-*hetus* system. By this point, the *bija* interpretation of the formula is so well established that here, unlike in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *śārīra* expositions, the fact that the members from Individual Existence through Feeling are in the form of seeds rather than actualized *dharma*s is not even mentioned, a feature this passage shares with the *aṅgasamāsa* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. For the author of this text, the projection and actualization of seeds are the essence of conditioned origination, and

⁴²²See *Samyuktāgama*, *sūtra* 298 (T. 99: 85a); see also, T. 124: 547b.

⁴²³*kena kāraṇena hetupratyayena na pratyayāny etāny aṅgāni / svabhāva-bijapratyayaprabhāvitavād hetupratyayasya* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 215.8-9).

⁴²⁴We know that the reference is to the ten-*hetus* list because another member of the list, *āvāhakahetu*, is mentioned here as well.

⁴²⁵*katy aṅgāny ākṣepahetusamgrhītāni / avidyām upādāya yāvad vedanā / katy aṅgāny abhinirvṛttihetusāṅgrhītāni / tṛṣṇām upādāya yāvad bhavaḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 215.12-13).

thus the terms *ākṣepa* and *abhinirvṛtti* are inevitably found together.

Hence, it is not surprising that, earlier in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, in the discussion of the ten *hetus*, the order of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* list has been changed to bring *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* together. Furthermore, the definition of the causes in terms of the *adhiṣṭhānas*, upon which Funahashi remarks, places more emphasis than the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* on the relationship between the two types of causes in the rebirth process: *Ākṣepahetu* is to be understood in terms of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of perfuming (*vāsanā*) because the Karmic Forces, perfumed by good or bad karma, project new lives in desirable or undesirable existences,⁴²⁶ while *abhinirvṛttihetu* is to be understood in terms of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the moist seed (*sābhīṣyandabīja*) because the seed, moistened by Subconscious Desire, results in the actualization of the projected new lives.⁴²⁷

With the exceptions of the *Vinścayasamgrahaṇī* and the *Chüeh ting tsang lun*, both of which refer the reader to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* exposition without enumerating the causes themselves, all discussions of the ten *hetus* that I have found in texts later than the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* follow the order of the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. Furthermore, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, although it contains two different explanations of a discrepancy between the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Savitarkādibhūmi* regarding *jana-kahetu* and *upāyahetu* in which *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* figure prominently,⁴²⁸ does not mention the difference between these two texts regarding the order of the *hetus*. Thus, the change in order of the *hetus*

⁴²⁶tatra vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoh / tathā hi / śubhāsubhakarma paribhāvitāḥ samskārāś traidhātukeṣṭāniṣtagatīṣṭāniṣṭātmabhāvān ākṣipanti. (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 107.20-108.2). It seems somewhat strange to say that the *samskāras* are “perfumed” (*paribhāvita*) by karma since they themselves are equivalent to karma.

⁴²⁷tatra sābhīṣyandam bijam hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoh / tathā hi / kāmapratisamyuktānām dharmāṇām rūpārūpyapratisamyuktānām svakasvakād bijāt prādurbhāvo bhavati / tṛṣṇā punar bijābhīṣyanda ity ucye / tatas tayābhīṣyanditām bijam ākṣiptānām ātmabhāvānām abhinirvṛttayā bhāvati (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 108.5-9).

⁴²⁸T. 1585: 41c17-42a14; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 343-344; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 459-462.

seems to have occurred after the *bija* interpretation of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula was systematized to the point at which each member, except for the purely resultant Birth and Old Age and Death, is assigned explicitly to one of the two causes. After this point, while there was no further evolution in the exposition of ten *hetus*, the Yogācāra interpretation of *pratīyasamutpāda* was brought to yet a higher level of systematization in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. As we have seen, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* explains the formula in terms of four sets of members: that which projects (*ākṣepakāṅga*: Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness) and that which is projected (*ākṣiptāṅga*: Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling) at the time of cause, and that which actualizes (*abhinirvartakāṅga*: Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence) and that which is actualized (*abhinirvṛtyāṅga*: Birth and Old Age and Death) at the time of result.⁴²⁹

d. The *Yogācāra* Source of Vasubandhu's *Upapattihetu* and *Abhinirvṛtihetu*

As we saw earlier, Vasubandhu referred to an as yet unidentified *sūtra* to show that *trṣṇā* is the cause of rebirth in general (*abhinirvṛtihetu*), while karma is the cause of the specific rebirth (*upapattihetu*). The same *sūtra* passage (*karma hetur upapattaye / trṣṇā hetur abhinirvṛttaye*) is quoted at the end of the explanation of *abhinirvṛtihetu* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition of the ten *hetus* summarized in the preceding section (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 108.10). Although the *Savitarkādibhūmi* does not explicitly identify *upapattihetu* with *ākṣepahetu*, *ākṣepahetu*, like *upapattihetu*, is essentially karma, albeit in the form of *bija* or *vāsanā*. Furthermore, the quotation appears to be used in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* passage to justify not only the category of *abhinirvṛtihetu*, but of *ākṣepahetu* as well.⁴³⁰ The *Savitarkādibhūmi*,

⁴²⁹ *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.6-9; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 31.9-32.3. see Chapter Two, section B3.

⁴³⁰ This passage recognizes a distinction between *upapatti* and *abhinirvṛtti* that is not made in the *śarīra* portion of the exposition of *pratīyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. See note 205.

like Vasubandhu, cites the *sūtra* to show the special role of *trṣṇā* in the rebirth process: *trṣṇā* moistens the seed, and the moistened seed results in the actualization of the projected *ātmabhāva*.

I have suggested in the previous section that the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition of the ten *hetus*, like the majority of its *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition (excluding the *śarīra* section), reflects a highly systematized doctrine of seed causation. We have seen that the less systematized *śarīra* section uses the word *upapatti* in the compound *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* simply as a synonym of *punarbhava*, with no special reference to seeds. The ten *hetus* exposition, on the other hand, by quoting from a *sūtra* that contrasts *upapatti* with *abhinirvṛtti*, emphasizes the twofold process that constitutes seed causation.

Our discussion of *trṣṇā* began with the controversy about whether *trṣṇā* alone comprises *samudayasatya*. On the basis of the *Yogācārabhūmi* analyses of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the ten *hetus*, we must conclude that in the *Yogācāra* system *trṣṇā* cannot be solely responsible for *duḥkha* because *abhinirvṛttihetu* is not the only causal process involved; *ākṣepahetu*, which is equivalent to karma, is also necessary. This is what Vasubandhu suggests in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, although, in the context of *samudayasatya*, he avoids using the term *bīja* in a technical sense and does not mention *ākṣepa*. Again, I believe that Vasubandhu adopts a position, this time the *Vaiśiṣṭika* insistence that all *sāsraṇadharmas* comprise *samudayasatya*, because it can be more easily reconciled with *Yogācāra* doctrine than its alternative.

Elsewhere, in his discussion of *āhāra*, Vasubandhu uses the terms *ākṣepa* and *abhinirvṛtti* in the same sentence to analyze the process of rebirth: “Projection of a new existence is due to mental volition; actualization of that which is projected, moreover, [arises] from the seed of consciousness, which is impregnated by karma. The foremost [role] in producing the existence of a being who is not born belongs to these two.”⁴³¹

⁴³¹ *manahsamcetanayā punarbhavasyākṣepah ākṣiptasya punah karmaparibhāvitād vijñānabijād abhinirvṛttir ity anayor anutpannasya bhavasyākarane prādhānyam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 154.14-16; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 126; also quoted and translated in Waldron 1994: 211).

In this statement, Vasubandhu clearly proposes a model of rebirth similar to those of the expositions of *pratityasamutpāda* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Mental volition, identified by Yaśomitra as karma, corresponds to *saṃskāra* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* passages and to *vijñāna* (understood as *karmabīja*) in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. The seed of consciousness corresponds to the seeds of *vijñāna* through *vedanā* (or, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *nāmarūpa* through *vedanā*). Actualization corresponds to *jāti*. Only the cause of actualization is not mentioned here.

However, Samghabhadra in his comment clarifies Vasubandhu's understanding of the relationship between *trṣṇā* and the future life: “*Cetanā* is projecting karma. *Vijñāna* is *bīja*. [They] bring about the future life. This means that, due to karma, one can project the existence of the two, *nāma* and *rūpa*, of the future. After karma has projected [*nāmarūpa*], *trṣṇā*, [by] moistening the seed of *vijñāna*, is able to generate the *ātmabhāva*, which consists of the *nāmarūpa* of the future existence. Thus it is said in the *sūtra*, ‘*karmā* is the cause of *upapatti*; *trṣṇā* is the cause of *abhinirvṛtti*.’”⁴³² This, of course, is the same *sūtra* that is quoted by Vasubandhu and in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, and Samghabhadra equates *ākṣepahetu* with *upapattihetu*, as I have done above.

Vasubandhu is being more blatantly unorthodox than usual in this passage. He even inserts what I consider to be telltale Yogācāra terms, *ākṣepa* and *[abhi]nirvṛtti*, into the verse.⁴³³ Therefore, it is the more surprising that Samghabhadra does not attack Vasubandhu for the reference to *bīja* in this passage of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. On the other hand, P'u-kuang, as La Vallée Poussin notes, characterizes the passage as a Sautrāntika explanation.⁴³⁴ But if he is correct, we

⁴³²思為引業。識為種子。引起當有。謂由業故。能引當來。名色二有。業既引已。愛潤識種。能令當有名色身起。故契經說。業為生因。愛為起因 (T. 1562: 511b17-20; Kokuyaku Issaikyō Bidon-bu 28: 268).

⁴³³*dvayam anyabhavākṣepanirvṛtyartham yathākramam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 154.12; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 125-126).

⁴³⁴T. 1821: 182b2-3. La Vallée Poussin does not give the reference (1971, v. 2: 126 n. 3).

can also describe the relevant passages in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *Savitarkādibhūmi*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, etc., as Sautrāntika. Again, I think that Vasubandhu is advocating a Yogācāra position here, and it is not recognized as such because of the tradition that Vasubandhu was a Sautrāntika and not a Yogācāra when he wrote the *Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya*.

We must still ask how aware the authors of early Yogācāra texts were of the contradiction between the *sūtra* statement that *trṣṇā* is *samudayasatya* and the logical demands of their own system of causation. As far as I can tell, the earliest strata of the *Yogācārabhūmi* do not reveal such an awareness. In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *samudayasatya* is simply and explicitly defined, as it is in the *sūtras*, as comprising the various types of *trṣṇā*.⁴³⁵ In the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, although *samudayasatya* is mentioned in a number of contexts, there seems to be nothing to suggest that its scope must be larger than *trṣṇā*. Finally, I have found no detailed discussion of *samudayasatya* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.⁴³⁶

However, when one turns to later portions, particularly the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and *Savitarkādibhūmi*, one can see clearly that the *sūtra* definition has been reconsidered. In the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on *Śrūtāyībhūmi*, *samudayasatya* is said to consist of *kleśasamkleśa* and *karmasamkleśa*, in contrast to *duḥkhasatya*, which consists of *janmasamkleśa*. Furthermore, the text explains that the Buddha mentioned only *trṣṇā* in the *sūtra* because of its predominance.⁴³⁷ Similarly, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on *Cintāyībhūmi* states that *samudayasatya*

⁴³⁵tatra samudaya āryasatyam trṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinandinī (Śrāvakabhūmi: 252.1-2; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 115a1-2; T. 1579: 434c13-14).

⁴³⁶As far as I can tell, it is mentioned only once, in a simple enumeration of the four truths (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 38.9-10; T. 1579: 486c9-10).

⁴³⁷sdug bsñal gyi bden pa gañ žé na / smras pa / skye ba'i sdug bsñal žes bya ba la sogz pa rgyas par sña ma bžin te / mdor sdu-na skye ba'i kun nas ñon moñz pa ji skad bstan pa ni sdug bsñal gyi bden pa žes bya'o / kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa gañ žé na / smras pa / ñon moñz pa'i kun nas ñon moñz [pa] dañ las kyi kun nas ñon moñz pa ji skad bstan pa thams cad ni kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa yin no / bcom ldan 'das kyi gtso bor ni sred pa yin pa bstan to / gtso bo'i rgyu rnams ni [sña ma b]žin du rig par bya'o

really consists of *kleśa* and karma that can produce rebirth, but that the Buddha, speaking generally (i.e., not technically) in the *sūtras*, mentioned only *trṣṇā*.⁴³⁸ These passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi* seem to be the basis for the standard *Yogācāra abhidharma* definitions of *samudayasatya* as found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*⁴³⁹ and *Hsien yang*

(*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 197a1-3. Bracketed portions are difficult to read in the Peking edition but have been confirmed in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib. derge]: zi 382.6-383.1); 云何苦諦。謂生苦等。廣說如前。若略說者。如說一切生雜染事。皆名苦諦。云何集諦。謂說一切煩惱雜染及業雜染。皆名集諦。世尊就勝唯顯貪愛。其勝因緣如前應知(T. 1579: 655c2-5).

A related passage is found in the *Cintāmāyībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*: *sdug bsñal gyi bden pa gañ yin pa de kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa yañ yin nam / kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa gañ yin pa de yañ sdug bsñal gyi bden pa yin nam že na / re žig kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa gañ yin pa de ni sdug bsñal gyi bden pa yañ yin mod kyi sdug bsñal gyi bden pa yin la kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa ma yin pa yañ yod do / dgra bcom pa'i rgyud rnam par dag pa las byuñ ba 'jig rten pa'i chos dge ba dañ / luñ du ma bstan pa thams cad dañ / so so'i skye bo rnams kyi luñ du ma bstan pa'i chos 'bras bur gyur pa rnam par smin par bsdus pa thams cad dañ / da ltar byuñ ba skyes bu'i byed pa las skyes pa bde ba dañ / sdug bsñal ba dañ / sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin bde ba yañ ma yin pa dañ ldan pa'i 'du byed luñ du ma bstan pa thams cad de / de ltar 'du byed de dag thams cad ni sdug bsñal gyi bden pa kho nas bsdus pa yin par blta bar bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 246b4-8); 問若是苦諦亦集諦耶。設是集諦亦苦諦耶。答諸是集諦者皆是苦諦。或是苦諦而非集諦。謂一切阿羅漢清淨相續中所有若善若無記。一切世間法一切異生身中所有果異熟攝無記諸法。一切現在土用所生若苦若樂。若不苦不樂俱行無記諸行。當知唯是苦諦所攝 (T. 1579: 672c16-22).

⁴³⁸yañ 'byuñ ba pa'i las dañ ñon moñ pas 'du byed de skyed par byed pa gañ dag yin pa de dag ni mtshan ñid kyis tshul gyis kun tu 'byuñ ba'i bden pa yin mod kyi / bcom ldan 'das kyis mdo sde'i tshul gyis gtsor ni sred pa ñid yin par bstan to (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 222a3-4); 復次即此能生後有諸行業及煩惱。由相道理是集聖諦。世尊經中據勝道理唯顯示愛 (T. 1579: 663c24-26).

⁴³⁹ *samudayasatya* *katamat / kleśah kleśādhipateyañ ca karma // prādhānyanirdeśas tu bhagavatā trṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatratastrābhinandinī samudayasatyanirdeśena nirdiṣṭā* (the Chinese takes this to indicate four types of *trṣṇā*: 若愛若後有愛。若喜貪俱行愛。若彼彼喜樂愛) // *prādhānyārthaḥ katamah yah sarvatragārthaḥ / sarvatragārthaḥ katamah tathāpi trṣṇā vastusarvatragā avasthāsarvatragā adhvasarvatragā dhātusarvatragā eṣaṇāsarvatragā prakārasarvatragā* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 32.1-4; T. 1605: 676a19-25). See also *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* on the above passage: *kleśāh kleśādhipateyam ca karma iti sāsravam ity arthaḥ / yady evam kim arthaṁ bhagavatā trṣṇaiva samudayanirdeśe nirdiṣṭā / sarvatragatvena prādhānyāt / (i) trṣṇā vastusarvatragā*

*sheng chiao lun.*⁴⁴⁰ Elsewhere, in connection with the division of the members of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula into three categories of defilement, we see that *duḥkhasatya* corresponds to defilement consisting of birth (*janmasaṃkleśa*), while *samudayasatya* corresponds to defilement consisting of *kleśa* (*kleśasaṃkleśa*) together with defilement consisting of action (*karmasaṃkleśa*). This relationship is only suggested implicitly in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.⁴⁴¹ However, it is stated explicitly in the *pratyayaprabheda* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi pratīyasamutpāda* exposition, according to which: *duḥkhasatya* in the present life consists of *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa*; *duḥkhasatya* in the future life consists of the members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā* in the form of seeds; and *samudayasatya* consists of the remaining members, namely *avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava*.⁴⁴²

prāptāprāptasarvātmabhbhāvavastuvyāpanāt / prāpte ātmabhāve trṣṇā aprāpte paunarbhavikī / prāptesu viṣayesu [nandīrāgasaṃhagatā / aprāptesu viṣayesu] tatrataṃtrābhīnandīnī veditavyā / (ii) avasthāsarvatraṅgā duḥkhaduḥkhatādityavasthesu saṃskāreṣy anuga[tā]tvāt / tatra duḥkhaduḥkhatāvasthesu prāptesu viyogatṛṣṇā aprāptesv asaṃyogatṛṣṇā / viparīṇāmaduḥkhatāvasthesu aviyogatṛṣṇā saṃyogatṛṣṇā ca prāptāprāptabhedāt / saṃskāraduḥkhatāvasthesu saṃmohatṛṣṇā kleśadauṣthulyaprabhbhāvitavād aduḥkhaśukhavedanāprabhāvitavāc ca / ālayavijñānam viṣeṣena saṃskāraduḥkhatāvastham tatra cātma-saṃmohamukhena trṣṇā pravṛttā veditavyā, etc. (Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya: 55.15-15; T. 1606: 722b12-c4).

⁴⁴⁰如是已說雜染諦今當說頌曰 諸諦有六種 論曰諦有六種。一世俗諦。二勝義諦。三苦諦。四集諦。五滅諦。六道諦。

世俗諦者。謂名句文身。及依彼義一切言說。及依言說所解了義。又會得世間心及心法。及彼所行境義

勝義諦者。謂聖智及彼所行境義。及彼相應心心法等

苦諦者。此有二種。一世俗諦所攝。二勝義諦所攝。世俗諦所攝者。如經中說。生苦老苦病苦死苦怨憎會苦愛別離苦求不得苦。勝義諦所攝者。如經中說。略攝一切五取蘊苦

集諦者。此有四種。一全攝。二勝攝。三世俗諦攝。四勝義諦攝。全攝者。謂一切三界煩惱及業。皆名集諦。勝攝者。謂緣已得未得自體及境所起愛後有愛喜俱行愛處喜愛。皆名集諦。世俗諦集者。若因能感世俗諦所攝苦諦。勝義諦攝者。若因能感勝義諦所攝苦諦 (T. 1602: 485c10-27).

⁴⁴¹See Chapter 2, section B6.

⁴⁴²*katy angāni duḥkhasatya* (emended from *pratyaya* on the basis of Tibetan *sdug bṣhal gyi bden pas bsdus* and Chinese 苦諦攝) *grhītāni drṣṭadhārmaduḥkhyā ca / dve jātijarāmaraṇām ca / kati duḥkhasatya saṃgrhītāny evāyat�ām eva ca duḥkhyā / vijñānādīni vedanāvastānāni bijahūtāni / kati samudayasatya saṃgrhītāni / avaśiṣṭāni.* (*Yogācārabhbūmi*: 219.11-14; T. 1579: 325c12-15; *Maulībhūmi* [tib.]: 218b8-219a2).

Although none of the passages referred to above mentions *ālayavijñāna*, the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāya* comments that *ālayavijñāna* is a state of *samskāraduḥkhatā* and that, due to ego-delusion with respect to it, *trṣṇā* is produced. In addition a passage in the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* relates *duḥkha-* and *samudayasatya* to the question of why *ālayavijñāna* is the source of all defilements:⁴⁴³ “Ālayavijñāna, because it can hold the seeds of all *dharmas*, is the essential nature of *duḥkhasatya* in the present, and it is also the cause that produces *duḥkhasatya* in the future. Furthermore, it is the cause that produces *samudayasatya* in the present. Because it can produce the world of beings (*sattvaloka*), because it can produce the inanimate world (*bhājanaloka*), because it is the essential nature of *duḥkhasatya*, because it can produce *duḥkhasatya* in the future, [and] because it can produce *samudayasatya* in the present, we must know that *ālayavijñāna* is the basis of all impurity.”⁴⁴⁴

These are the only explanations of *samudayasatya* in terms of *ālayavijñāna* that I have found in the early Yogācāra literature.⁴⁴⁵ A discussion of the four *satyas* in the context of the *trisvabhāva* theory can be found in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, but there is no mention of the *ālayavijñāna*.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴³This is from what Schmithausen refers to as the *Nivṛtti* portion.

⁴⁴⁴de ltar kun gži rnam par šes pa de ŋid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir da ltar gyi dus na sdug bsñal gyi bden pa'i rañ bžin dañ / ma 'oñs pa'i dus su sdug bsñal gyi bden pa skyed par byed pa dañ / da ltar gyi dus ŋid na kun 'byuñ ba'i bden pa skyed par byed pa yan yin no (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 8b1-2); 又即此阿賴耶識。能持一切法種子故。於現在世是苦諦體。亦是未來苦諦生因。又是現在集諦生因。如是能生有情世間故。能生器世間故。是苦諦體故。能生未來苦諦故。能生現在集諦故。當知阿賴耶識是一切雜染根本 (T. 1579: 581b4-9). For an explanation of this passage, as well as a retranslation into Sanskrit, see Schmithausen 1987: 75, 363 n. 548.

⁴⁴⁵But see Schmithausen 1987: 160 ff. regarding the possibility of a similar interpretation in the *Paramārthagāthās* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

⁴⁴⁶*Madhyāntavibhāga*: 91.4-93.23; Nagao 1964: 40.4-41.5; Yamaguchi 1934: 119.23-123.7; see also *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585: 47b4-23; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 542-545).

e. The Function of *Trṣṇā* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

Returning to the exposition of *pratīyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, we can, if we compare the functions of *samskārāṅga* and *trṣṇāṅga*, identify a distinction similar to that between *upapattihetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu*. As we have seen, the *samskāras*, which are identified with karma, determine the specific destiny into which beings are born, as well as being the cause of the seeds of future existence.⁴⁴⁷ Thus, they correspond closely to Vasubandhu's *upapattihetu*, which causes rebirth in specific circumstances (see section d above).

Trṣṇā, on the other hand, draws beings to existence in general; the term *existence* (*janman*) here seems synonymous with *abhinirvṛtti*. *Trṣṇā* is thus the first step of the three-step process (designated as *abhinirvartakāṅga* in the *āṅgasamāsa* section) that leads to the actual production of the new life. It ensures that beings will not be released from *samsāra* in this life and must, therefore, be born again. *Upādāna*, which Takasaki sees as corresponding to karma in the context of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula,⁴⁴⁸ affects their consciousness, so that the impressions of past karma contained therein will result in the appropriate rebirth. When these impressions are activated, all the karma that leads to rebirth, added up, as it were, at the last moment, is called *bhava*.⁴⁴⁹ *Bhava*, as the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* says, conveys beings immediately to the next existence.⁴⁵⁰

The main function of *trṣṇā* in this section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* *pratīyasamutpāda* exposition is to act as *abhinirvṛttihetu*, or as the most important constituent of *abhinirvṛttihetu*, which is

⁴⁴⁷ See Chapter 2, section B5b.

⁴⁴⁸ This is in spite of the fact, which he recognizes, that *upādāna* is formally *kleśa* rather than karma (Takasaki 1987: 156-158). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes *upādāna* in the category of *kleśasamkleśa* (see Chapter 2, section B6).

⁴⁴⁹ Or so Vasubandhu explains *bhava* in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, where he presents his own understanding of *pratīyasamutpāda*: *upādānapratyayaḥ punah paunarbhāvikan karmopacīyate / tad bhavaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.15; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 86).

⁴⁵⁰ See Chapter 2, section B5j.

completed by *upādāna* and *bhava*. This becomes clear by comparison when one looks at the explanation of the functions of these three members in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. Chapter Six of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, I believe, foreshadows various features of Yogācāra expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* but without formulating a consistent system. Although elsewhere in the chapter, as we have seen, one can find an explanation of *pratītyasamutpāda* involving seeds, the system of two types of cause, one that produces seeds and another that actualizes them, is not yet apparent. Nor does anything in the explanation of the functions in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* suggest that *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* belong to different lifetimes,⁴⁵¹ or that *vedanā* is a seed, while *trṣṇā* is an actualized *dharma*.⁴⁵² Neither *trṣṇā* nor *upādāna* is related to rebirth at all; only *bhava* is said to establish the destiny of the new birth,⁴⁵³ a function assigned by the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to *samskāra*.

The *āngakarmavyavasthāna* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* thus seems to be a rewriting of the corresponding passage from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* in the light of the fully developed two-lifetimes/singlefold causation system. In the case of *trṣṇā*, the function described in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, namely to bring about desire for desirable

⁴⁵¹ However, in the portion of Chapter Six of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* in which the members are assigned to the past, present or future, *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* are assigned to different lifetimes (see Chapter 3, section B).

⁴⁵² The *Ch'eng wei shih lun* says that the members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā*, although they are seeds and simultaneous, are always mentioned in the traditional sequence, either due to the relative importance of each member, or because when they are actualized, they appear in this order (識等五種由業熏發雖實同時。而依主伴總別勝劣因果相異故諸聖教假說前後。或依當來現起分位有次第故說有前後。由斯識等亦說現行因時定無現行義故—T. 1585: 43c11-14; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483). According to the annotation of the *Shindōjōyuishikiron*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* all follow the logic of the second reason mentioned above in representing the members as actualized *dharmas* and not *bijas* (*Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483). While this seems to be accurate with respect to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I think that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, in fact, represents them as actualized *dharmas* because it has not yet taken the step of considering them to be *bijas*. It seems to me to be on the verge of doing so.

⁴⁵³ See Chapter 2, section B5j.

things,⁴⁵⁴ is similar to the definition in the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation, according to which *trṣṇā* is said to be the desire for pleasure, particularly sexual pleasure.⁴⁵⁵ In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, its function is more grandiose although (or because) it is related specifically to rebirth, in which it acts as the principle cause of the actualization of the *bījas* that, when actualized, will constitute the next life. This, I believe, is the significance of the statement that *trṣṇā* “draws beings to existence.”⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁴See Chapter 2, section B5h.

⁴⁵⁵*trṣṇā bhogamaithunarāgiṇāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośa* III 23b; *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*: 132.14; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 64).

⁴⁵⁶See Chapter 2, section B5h.

V. THE ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA AND VASUBANDHU ON SAMSKĀRAPRATYAYAM VIJÑĀNAM

A. Introduction

The definition of Consciousness as a member of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is, of *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*, is crucially important to all interpretations of the principle of conditioned origination, and in any technical discussion of the formula, the treatment of *vijñāna* sheds light on the fundamental doctrinal stance of the author. In this chapter, I show how early Yogācāra authors reject the traditional Sarvāstivādin definition in favor of a *sūtra* definition that they can reinterpret according to their characteristic doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*.

Three possible definitions of Consciousness as a member of the formula concern us here. Does *vijñānāṅga* consist of the six *vijñānakāyas*, i.e., visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), and the other five? Is it *pratisamdhivijñāna*, the exclusively mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) at the moment of conception? Or is it *ālayavijñāna*?

Of these three, the six-*vijñānakāya* definition appears in the two versions of the *Pratītyasamutpādāsūtra* mentioned above (T. 99: 85a26-28; T. 124: 547c6-8), as well as in the Tibetan translation of the *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhāganirdeśa* (de Jong 1979: 147). Furthermore, an explanation, with reference to the process of cognition, of how the six *vijñānas* are conditioned by *samskāra* is also given as one of a number of interpretations of *samskārapratyayam vijñānam* in the *Dharmaskandha*, an early Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* text.⁴⁵⁷ In a later

⁴⁵⁷api khalu cakṣuh pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam (/) tatra cakṣuh samskṛtam rūpāṇi ca bāhyam pratyayam cakṣurvijñānasya tad ucyate samskār[a](pratyayam vijñānam /) śrottraghṛāṇajihvākāyamanah pratītya dharmmāś cotpadyate manovijñānam (/) tatra manah samskṛtam dharmmāś ca bāhyam pratyayam manovijñānasya tad ucyate samskārapratyayam vijñānam (Dietz 1984: 31.5-12). 復次眼及色為緣生眼識。此中眼是內有為行。色為外緣生眼識。是名行緣識。乃至意及法為緣生意識。此中意是內有為行。法為外緣生意識。是名行緣識 (T. 1537: 507a4-9). See Cox 1993: 127-132 for a discussion of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Dharmaskandha*.

period, Vasubandhu proposes one variation on this interpretation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and another somewhat different interpretation in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*.

Vasubandhu, without personally subscribing to it, presents the best known version of the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* interpretation in the verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*. This, as I shall show, is the orthodox interpretation of the Sarvāstivādin school from the period of the *Vibhāṣā*. In reaction to this interpretation, Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* insists that *vijñānāṅga* consists of the six *vijñānakāyas* in the intermediate existence. His reason for rejecting the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* definition is, I believe, that it cannot be rationalized in terms of Yogācāra doctrine while the six-*vijñāna* definition can.

Finally, the explicitly Yogācāra interpretation of *saṃskārapratyayam vijñānam* is that it must be *ālayavijñāna*. This is Vasubandhu's ultimate position in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, and it underlies, I believe, his discussion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, although it is by no means explicitly stated there. In the beginning of this chapter I examine Vasubandhu's various interpretations, an understanding of which may help clarify the explanation of the two functions of *vijñānāṅga* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

B. Vasubandhu on *Saṃskārapratyayam Vijñānam*

1. What was Vasubandhu's Own Opinion?

In Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośa*, Vasubandhu devotes nineteen verses (v. 20-38) to a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In the course of this discussion, we can find two conflicting definitions of consciousness as a member (*aṅga*) of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is to say, of consciousness conditioned by the karmic forces (*saṃskārapratyayam vijñānam*). In verse 21c, consciousness is defined as the *skandhas* at the moment of conception.⁴⁵⁸ In his comment in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on verse 28ab, however, Vasubandhu states that

⁴⁵⁸ *saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 131.26).

samskārapratyayam vijñānam actually refers to the continuity of consciousness that goes to the various destinies by way of the *antarābhava*, which serves as a connection, and he cites a *sūtra* definition for support.⁴⁵⁹ Although Vasubandhu does not explicitly mention *pratisamdhivijñāna*, his commentators, as we shall see, infer the inclusion of this moment of consciousness in his definition.

In his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, La Vallée Poussin does not mention which school accepts the second definition. In his translation of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, on the other hand, La Vallée Poussin attributes it to Sarvāstivāda (1928-1929: 200). Jaini makes the same attribution in the introduction to his edition of the *Abhidharma-dīpa*: “The other [i.e., not *pratisamdhivijñāna*] meaning, viz., the six *vijñānas*, although occurring in the Vibhaṅga-sutta of the *Samyutta-nikāya*, is most probably a later addition introduced by the Ābhidharmikas. This becomes evident from the attempt of the Vaibhāśikas to apply this term not only to the moment of rebirth consciousness, but also to a long preceding period called *antarā-bhava*, where alone the six *vijñānas* could be understood to function” (1977: 58-59). More recently, Mejor has introduced a translation of the comment in the *Abhidharma-kōśabhaṣya* on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, together with the text and translation of the corresponding portion of Sthiramati's commentary, *Tattvārtha*, as “Vaibhāśikas on the *pratītyasamutpāda*” (1991: 96), thus indicating that he, too, considers the six-*vijñānakāya* definition to represent the Sarvāstivādin position.

Samtani has pointed out that the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* identifies another interpretation of the six-*vijñānakāya* definition, in which the six *vijñānas* are described as *samskāraparibhāvitāḥ*, as a

⁴⁵⁹ *karmāksepavaśāc ca vijñānasamtatis tām tām gatim gacchatī / jvālāgamana-yogenāntarābhavasambandhāt / tad asya* samskārapratyayam vijñānam / evam ca krtvā tad upapannam bhavati vijñānāṅganirdeśe “vijñānam katamat / śadvijñānakāyā” iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*: 140.2-4; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 84-85).

Following the suggestion of Muroji Gijin (personal communication), I have emended *tad anya* to *tad asya* on the basis of the Tibetan translation *de ni 'di'i 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par śes pa yin no* (*Abhidharmakośabhaṣya* [tib.]: gu 151b6). This emendation is also made by Kōda (1997: 43 n. 26).

Sautrāntika view,⁴⁶⁰ and he recognizes that this contradicts Jaini's opinion, (*Arthaviniścayasūtra*, introduction: 143-144). However, Samtani does not go into the matter any further. Among Japanese scholars, Yamaguchi and Funahashi describe the section of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in which this definition is found as "Vasubandhu's Twelve-membered Conditioned Origination" (1955: 230), thus indicating that it does not represent Sarvāstivāda doctrine. Furthermore, Katō shows that Vasubandhu, in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, is actually attacking the Sarvāstivādin āvasthika interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*. According to Katō, Vasubandhu makes this attack in the name of the Sautrāntika (1989: 315-317). However, Katō too does not explore Vasubandhu's interpretation of *vijñāna* in detail.

In this section, I hope to show that the first of these two definitions (*saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam*) represents the orthodox Sarvāstivādin position, while the second (*vijñānam katamat/ saṃvijñānakāyāḥ*) is Vasubandhu's own opinion. I shall also try to explain the implications of Vasubandhu's position.

2. The Sarvāstivādin Definition: *Pratisaṃdhivijñāna*

Since the exposition of conditioned origination in the *Abhidharmakośa* is rather involved, I shall first explain the context in which each definition occurs. In the beginning of Chapter Three, the Exposition of the Universe (*Lokanirdesa*), Vasubandhu enumerates the various realms, destinies, etc., into which beings are reborn, and he explains *antarābhava*, the intermediate existence between death and rebirth. He then denies that there is any soul (*ātman*) that is reborn; rather, "the *skandhas* alone, conditioned by defilement and action, enter the womb by way of the series (that is given the name) of the intermediate existence, like a lamp."⁴⁶¹ To explain this conditioning

⁴⁶⁰This is Vasubandhu's position in another text, the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*; see below, section B4.

⁴⁶¹*nātmāsti skandhamātrām tu kleśakarmābhisaṃskṛtam / antarābhavasamṛtatyāku*ṣīm eti *pradīpavat* (*Abhidharmakośa* III 18; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 129.7 ff.; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 57).

process, whereby defilement and action result in rebirth, and birth in turn results in defilement and action, Vasubandhu introduces the topic of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The first definition of *vijñāna* can be found at the beginning of this discussion.

In *Abhidharmakośa* III 20, Vasubandhu states that the twelve members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula can be divided among three lifetimes, and, in *Abhidharmakośa* III 21-24, he defines each member as being a “state” (*daśā* or *avasthā*) of the five *skandhas*. However, in verse 25, using the word *kila* (“as is said”), he indicates that he personally disagrees with this interpretation, which he attributes to the Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika school.⁴⁶² It is among the verses that present the *āvasthika* interpretation that our first definition of *vijñāna* is found.

Thus, Vasubandhu himself has identified the first definition as being that of Sarvāstivāda. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, near the beginning of his comment on verse 28ab, he attacks the entire *āvasthika* interpretation, to which, he says, the Sautrāntikas object, and he questions whether it accurately reflects the meaning of *sūtra*.⁴⁶³ Moreover, at the end of the same section, he again explicitly identifies everything contained in the *āvasthika* interpretation as Vaibhāṣika doctrine.⁴⁶⁴

Similar *āvasthika* interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda*, including definitions of *vijñānāṅga* resembling the one found in *Abhidharmakośa* III 21c, can be traced to earlier Sarvāstivādin texts, although not to the earliest group. I have not found such interpretations in the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharma* *pitaka*, either in early texts, such as the *Dharmaskandha* (*A p'i ta mo fa yün tsu lun* 阿毘達磨法蘊足論), which contains extensive discussions of both *samskārapratyaya* *vijñānam* and *nāmarūpa*-

⁴⁶² *āvasthikah kileṣṭo 'yam* (*Abhidharmakośa* III 25a; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 133.11; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 66 n. 5).

⁴⁶³ *atra tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kim khalv etā iṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭir āhosvit sūtrārthaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 136.16-17; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 75).

⁴⁶⁴ *sa eva tu vaibhāṣikanyāyo yah pūrvam uktah* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.25; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 88). This point is noted by La Vallée Poussin in his translation.

pratyayam vijñānam,⁴⁶⁵ or in later texts, such as the *Jñānaprasthāna* (*A p'i ta mo fa chih lun* 阿毘達磨發智論), which is cited by La Vallée Poussin as the source of the division of members into three lifetimes.⁴⁶⁶ Nor does the *Abhidharmāmrta* (*A p'i tan kan lu wei lun* 阿毘曇甘露味論), one of the earliest Sarvāstivādin manuals, contain an *āvasthika* interpretation, although it does divide the members among the three lifetimes and classify each member as *kleśa*, *karma*, or *duḥkha*.⁴⁶⁷ However, at least three *abhidharma* texts prior to the *Abhidharmakośa* claim that the *āvasthika* interpretation represents the correct understanding of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* formula.

The earliest source that I have found is the *Vibhāṣā*.⁴⁶⁸ The *Vibhāṣā* first distinguishes its own, *āvasthika*, interpretation from the *kṣanika* interpretation of Śarmadatta (She ma ta to 設摩達多)⁴⁶⁹ and the *sāṃbandhika* interpretation of the *Vijñānakāyaśāstra* (*A p'i ta mo shih shen tsu lun* 阿毘達磨識身足論).⁴⁷⁰ In the *kṣanika* interpretation, all twelve members are present in a single moment, as in the case of someone who, due to passion, harms a sentient being: his mental confusion is *avidyā*; his volition is *samskāra*; his consciousness (i.e., his awareness of the object of his crime) is *vijñāna*, etc.⁴⁷¹ According to the *sāṃbandhika* interpretation, a number of members, but not all of them, can be present in a single moment: for example, when someone conceives of passion for an object, his ignorance (about the true nature

⁴⁶⁵ Dietz 1984: 30-36; T. 1537: 506c29-508b10; see also Schmithausen 1987: 464-465 ns. 1114, 1119.

⁴⁶⁶ T. 1544: 921b16-19; La Vallée Poussin 1971 v. 2: 60 n. 1. See also the earlier translation, *A p'i t'an pa chien tulun* 阿毘曇八健度論 (T. 1543: 775c13-15).

⁴⁶⁷ T. 1553: 970c25-971b21; *Abhidharmāmrta* [tib.]: 70-73; Van den Broeck 1977: 130-133.

⁴⁶⁸ T. 1545 (*A p'i ta mo ta p'i p'o sha lun* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論); T. 1546 (*A p'i t'an p'i p'o sha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論). See La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 62 n. 1.

⁴⁶⁹ La Vallée Poussin tentatively suggests Śamadatta (1971, v. 6: 135), while Nishi gives Kṣemadatta (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 26.1: 47 n. 40). I follow Akanuma's rendering (1979: 602).

⁴⁷⁰ T. 1545: 118c6-119a1; T. 1546: 93c27-94a11.

⁴⁷¹ T. 1545: 118c7-15; identical to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 133.1-8; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65-66.

of the object) is *avidyā*; his desire is *samskāra*; his discrimination of the object is *vijñāna*, etc. But these members do not consist of all five *skandhas*. Some members, on the other hand, do consist of all five *skandhas*: for example, the arising of all the *skandhas* in the new lifetime is *jāti*, and their deterioration is *jarāmarāṇa*. These members, however, do not occupy a single moment (T. 1545: 118c17-23). This interpretation seems to fall somewhere between the *kṣaṇika* and the *āvasthika* interpretations.

According to the *Vibhāṣā*'s own interpretation, each member refers to the five *skandhas* at a different moment; this is clearly the same *āvasthika* system described in *Abhidharmakośa* III 21-24. The definition of *vijñāna* in the *Vibhāṣā*, however, appears somewhat different at first glance. According to Hsüan-tsang's translation, *vijñāna* is the *pratisamdhicitta* (*hsü hsin* 繢心), together with its accompaniment (*chu pan* 助伴), which the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* explains as the remaining four *skandhas* (T. 1545: 119a5; *Kokuyaku Issaikyō*, Bidon-bu, v. 8: 9 n. 19). The earlier translation (attributed to Kātyāyanīputra) has *hsiang hsü hsin* 相續心 instead of *hsü hsin* 繢心, but this is not significantly different (T. 1546: 94a15). Nor, I think, is there any difference in meaning between this *pratisamdhicitta* and the *samdhiskandhas* of *Abhidharmakośa* III 21; according to the *āvasthika* system, the five *skandhas* at this point in the development of the new life can be called *vijñāna* (or *citta*, since the terms are synonymous here)⁴⁷² because *vijñāna* is the predominant element.⁴⁷³ Vasubandhu perhaps condenses the term *pratisamdhī metri causa*, and Yaśomitra, judging from his comment on Vasubandhu's second definition,⁴⁷⁴ considers that *samdhiskandhas* refers to *pratisamdhicitta*.

Similar to the definition of the *Vibhāṣā* are those of Upaśānta's

⁴⁷² *cittam mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham* (*Abhidharmakośa* II 34ab; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 61.22; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 176).

⁴⁷³ *prādhānyāt tv āngakīrtanam* (*Abhidharmakośa* III 25b; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 133.13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 66).

⁴⁷⁴ *samskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam pratisamdhicittam evābhipretam syāt* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 299.25-26).

Abhidharmahrdaya (*A p'i t'an hsin lun ching* 阿毘曇心論經) and the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*, or *Ksudrakābhidharmahrdaya* (*Tsa a p'i t'an hsin lun* 雜阿毘曇心論). Upaśānta's *Abhidharmahrdaya* defines *vijñāna* as the *pratisamdhicitta* (*hsiang hsü hsin* 相續心) together with its associates (T. 1551: 860c9). The *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* defines it as the present *samtati* (*hsien tsai hsiang hsü* 現在相續), which here seems to be equivalent to the five *skandhas* at the first moment of the present life, since the next member, *nāmarūpa*, is defined in the following way: "that *samtati*, (after) it already (exists), and while the six *āyatanas* are not completely differentiated, is called *nāmarūpa*."⁴⁷⁵

Dharmaśī's *Abhidharmahrdaya* (or *Abhidharmasāra*—*A p'i t'an hsin lun* 阿毘曇心論) also agrees with the *Vibhāṣā* in maintaining that the twelve members of the *pratityasamutpāda* formula refer to twelve sets, or states, of the *skandhas* and that the formula should not be understood in terms of a single moment. Its definition of *vijñāna*, on the other hand, is rather surprising; it states that *vijñāna* is the *chung hsin* 種心 (= *bijacitta*) produced by the previous member, *samskāra*.⁴⁷⁶ This would seem to support Mizuno Kōgen's statement that Dharmaśī's *Abhidharmahrdaya* sometimes contains doctrines that diverge from orthodox Sarvāstivāda (1961: 73). Although Willemen does not comment on it in his translation, this definition deserves further exploration, especially since the term *chung hsin*, or *chung shih* 種識, is a synonym for *ālayavijñāna* in some *vijñaptimātratā* texts (Nakamura 1975: 650).

All of the *abhidharma* texts mentioned above define *vijñānāṅga* as the initial moment of the present lifetime and as the karmic link between the past life and the present. In the *Vibhāṣā*, Upaśānta's *Abhidharmahrdaya*, and the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*, moreover, this *vijñāna* cannot possibly be the six *vijñānakāyas* because, as we discover from the definitions of the following *āngas*, the six sense organs are not yet present at the moment referred to as *vijñāna*. Furthermore, although the *Dharmaskandha*, which is much earlier than the *Vibhāṣā*, defines

⁴⁷⁵ 彼相續已六入分未滿說名色 (T. 1552: 935b25-26).

⁴⁷⁶ 彼生種心是識 (T. 1550: 827a4-5).

samskārapratyayam vijñānam as the six *vijñānas*,⁴⁷⁷ in none of these post-*Vibhāṣā* texts, to the best of my knowledge, is *vijñānāṅga* ever defined as the six *vijñānakāyas*, nor is the definition from the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*, quoted by Vasubandhu in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, ever discussed. Thus, I have found no evidence that the Sarvāstivādins, from the period of the *Vibhāṣā*, interpreted *vijñānāṅga* as the six *vijñānakāyas* in the intermediate existence,⁴⁷⁸ whereas there are a number of Vaibhāṣika texts that present the *āvasthika* interpretation as orthodox. Moreover, we should not forget that Vasubandhu himself identifies it as a Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

Further confirmation can be found in Samghabhadra's two texts, the *Nyāyānusāra* (*A p'i ta mo shun cheng li lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論) and the *Abhidharmapiṭakaprakaraṇaśāsanāśāstra* or *Samayapradīpika* (*A p'i ta mo tsang hsien tsung lun* 阿毘達磨藏顯宗論). In both texts, Samghabhadra quotes Vasubandhu's gloss on verse 21c and continues with a further explanation: “In the mother's womb, at the time of conception, the five skandhas in a momentary state are called Consciousness because, at this moment, consciousness is the most prominent (of the *skandhas*. This consciousness) is only *manovijñāna* because, in this state, the causes of the production of the (other) five *vijñānas* (i.e., the sense organs) are not yet possessed.”⁴⁷⁹ Again, in neither of these texts could I find the six-*vijñānakāyas* definition.

3. Vasubandhu's Definition in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: The Six *Vijñānas*

In order to show that the six-*vijñānakāyas* definition in fact

⁴⁷⁷ T. 1537: 507a4-8. But this passage does not mention *antarābhava*.

⁴⁷⁸ However, the following opinion is attributed to Parśva: “The consciousness of the intermediate existence is *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*. The consciousness at the moment of conception is *nāmarūpapratyayam vijñānam*. The consciousness of the current existence is consciousness that arises due to both conditions” (脇尊者言。行緣識說中有識。名色緣識說生有識。二緣生識說本有識—T. 1545: 120a6-8; *Kokuyaku Issaikyō Bidon-bu* 8: 13).

⁴⁷⁹ 於母胎等。正結生時。一剎那位五蘊名識。此剎那中。識最勝故。此唯意識。於此位中。五識生緣。猶未具故 (T. 1562: 484b14-17; also, T. 1563: 841a6-8).

represents Vasubandhu's own opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, I must begin by summarizing his rather long and complicated comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab: "The origination is the cause; that which originates is the result."⁴⁸⁰ Vasubandhu explains the verse, saying that all the members are both *pratīyasamutpāda* and *pratīyasamutpanna*. He then mentions the differing opinion of a Sthavira Pūrṇāśa, who adduces four reasons to prove that whatever is *pratīyasamutpāda* cannot be *pratīyasamutpanna* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 136.10-16; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 74).

It is at this point that Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the criticism of the āvasthika interpretation, mentioned above. According to the Sautrāntikas, nothing like it can be found in the *sūtras*. There follows an argument between the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins concerning the authority and completeness of the *sūtra* definitions of the members of the formula. In the course of this argument, the Sarvāstivādins maintain that these definitions are not complete and that their meanings are not clear.⁴⁸¹ The Sautrāntikas, who have the last word in this dispute, state that the *sūtra* is actually complete,⁴⁸² and they proceed to point out the logical flaws in the āvasthika interpretation: "Why do you introduce something of a different kind [other than *avidyā*; i.e., the five *skandhas*] into [your definition of] *avidyā*? Although the five *skandhas* are found in these 'states,' only that [entity] whose existence or non-existence determines the existence or non-existence of some [other entity, i.e., the following member] can be established as a member. Although the *arhat* possesses the five *skandhas*, he does not have any *samskāras* [which, according to your interpretation, would have to be] caused by the five *skandhas*. Why [not]? Because [the *samskāras* that constitute *samskārāṅga*] are only caused by *avidyā* [which the *arhat* does not

⁴⁸⁰ *hetur atra samutpādah samutpannam phalam matam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 136.9; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 74).

⁴⁸¹ *na vai sarvam nirdeśato nītārtham bhavati* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 136.21; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 75).

⁴⁸² *evam ihaipy avidyādīnām paripūrṇa eva nirdeśo na sāvaśeṣaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 136.26-137.1; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 75).

have]. Likewise, [the *arhat* does not have] any *vijñāna* that goes to good, bad or immovable destinies, or any *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*, etc. [Therefore,] the meaning of the *sūtra* is just as is stated [in the *sūtra*].”⁴⁸³ Yaśomitra explains that the *vijñāna* referred to here is *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 293.11-12).

The point of this argument seems to be that, if the members of the formula are defined as states of the *skandhas*, the *arhat* would still be ensnared in *samsāra*, simply because he still possesses the *skandhas*. However, we know that the *arhat* is able to reverse the process of *samsāra* precisely because he destroys the first member, *avidyā*. Thus, although he possesses the *skandhas* until his death, he does not produce the conditions for rebirth and the continuation of *samsāra*.

Vasubandhu next returns to the four points of Pūrṇāśa, refuting the first of them, and then discusses the question of whether *pratītyasamutpāda* is *asamkrta*. This in turn leads into an etymological discussion of the term *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is followed by various opinions regarding the question of why the Buddha expressed the principle of conditioned origination in two ways: “since this exists, that exists,” and “due to the arising of this, that arises.”⁴⁸⁴

Finally, Vasubandhu offers his own interpretation of the formula. Katō has remarked that, although Vasubandhu rejects *āvasthikapratītyasamutpāda* in principle and treats the formula for the most part in terms of a theory of cognition (*ninshikiron* 認識論), his definitions of *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, and the *saṃdāyatana*s are not inconsistent with an embryo-

⁴⁸³ *jātyantarasya tv avidyāyām kiṃkṛtaḥ prakṣepah / yady api ca tāsv avasthāsu pañcaskandhā vidyante yasya tu bhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvaniyamāḥ tad evāṅgam vyavasthāpayitum / saty api ca pañcaskandhake 'rhatāḥ saṃskārā na bhavanti pañcaskandhahetukāḥ / kiṃ tarhi / avidyāhetukā eva / tathā puṇyāpuṇyāneñjyopagam ca vijñānam [na bhavati]* trṣṇādayaś ceti / yathānirdeśa** eva sūtrārthāḥ (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 137.4-8; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 76).*

*This is missing in Pradhan’s edition, but Shastri includes this (*Abhidharmakośa* & *Bhaṣya*: 452.7), and I follow him on the basis of the Tibetan (*Abhidharmakośabhaṣya* [tib.]: gu 149b2).

**Pradhan gives *yathānirdeśam*, which is ungrammatical. I follow Shastri here (*Abhidharmakośa* & *Bhaṣya*: 452.8).

⁴⁸⁴ *asmin satīdam bhavati* and *asyotpādād idam utpadyate*.

logical (*taiseigakuteki* 胎生学的) interpretation, which is how Katō characterizes *āvasthikapratītyasamutpāda* (1989: 315). While Vasubandhu does not define these members as states of the *skandhas*, he does trace the early development of the new being from its beginning as consciousness, karmically projected by the past life, through the appearance of the other three mental *skandhas*, together with *rūpaskandha* (i.e., *nāmarūpa*), to the development of the six sense organs (*sadāyatana*). However, as I have shown at the beginning of this section, Vasubandhu does not think that *vijñāna* refers only to the moment of *pratisaṃdhi* consciousness; rather, it encompasses the series of *vijñānas* that continues through the intermediate existence and begins the next life.⁴⁸⁵ This interpretation of the definition from the *Pratītyasamutpādaśūtra*, which Vasubandhu quotes here,⁴⁸⁶ can be justified because, according to *abhidharma*, the sense organs are all present in the intermediate existence,⁴⁸⁷ and thus consciousness can include all six *vijñānakāyas*. (It is to this rule of *abhidharma* that Jaini alludes in the passage quoted in section B1 above.) If, on the other hand, explains Yaśomitra, the *sūtra* had intended for *vijñānāṅga* to refer exclusively to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, it would have said, “What is *vijñāna*? *Manovijñāna*,” because, at the moment of conception, only *manovijñāna* is present, not the other five *vijñānas*.⁴⁸⁸ Yaśomitra then quotes from *Abhidharmakośa* III 42ac to support his claim that *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* can only be *manovijñāna*, a point on which Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivāda agree (see Saṃghabhadra’s comment, quoted above at the end of section B2).

Curiously, Saṃghabhadra does not, as far as I can tell, comment on

⁴⁸⁵ Some of his commentators think that he also includes in his definition the moment of rebirth into the next life (see note 427 below).

⁴⁸⁶ *vijñānam* *katamat* / *saḍvijñānakāyā* *iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 140.4; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85).

⁴⁸⁷ *sakalākṣaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośa* III 14c; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 125.7; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 46).

⁴⁸⁸ *evam* *tu vaktavyam* *syāt* / *vijñānam* *katamat* / *manovijñānam* *iti* / *na hi prati-*
saṃdhikṣane pañcavijñānakāyasambhavo 'sti / *manovijñānenāiva pratisaṃdhibandhāt*
(*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 299.27-29).

this portion of the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*. The Chinese commentator, P'u-kuang, on the other hand, does. In his *Chü she lun chi* 俱舍論記, P'u-kuang first explains that Vasubandhu's intention is to include (1) the stream of *vijñānas* in the intermediate existence and (2) the *upapattibhava*, which is equivalent to *pratisamdhivijñāna*, in his definition of *vijñānāṅga*: "This *vijñāna* passes through both the intermediate existence and the moment of conception. Although the moment of conception is only *manovijñāna*, in the state of the intermediate existence, [the stream of the *vijñānas*?] produces all six *vijñānas*."⁴⁸⁹ Then, after quoting Vasubandhu's approval of the definition of *vijñāna* in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* as the six *vijñānakāyas*, P'u-kuang states, "If one relies on the Sarvāstivādins, *vijñānāṅga* is only the single moment of *upapattibhava* and does not pass through the intermediate existence; therefore, (for them) it is only *manovijñāna*."⁴⁹⁰ Clearly, P'u-kuang believes that Vasubandhu disagrees with orthodox Sarvāstivādin doctrine.

With the exception of the mention of Parśva in the *Vibhāṣā*, no interpretation of *vijñānāṅga* as including the consciousness of the intermediate existence can be found in the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma*. Since Vasubandhu says very little by way of justifying his definition, we must look elsewhere for explanations. Perhaps Sthiramati's comment on Vasubandhu's exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhbāṣya* can clarify Vasubandhu's reasoning in the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*. In his explanation of *samskārāṅga* in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhbāṣya*, Vasubandhu says that the *samskāras* "plant" or establish the *karmavāsanās* in the *vijñāna*,⁴⁹¹ and Sthiramati

⁴⁸⁹ 此識通於中。生二有。生有雖唯意識於中有位通起六識 (T. 1821: 172b5-6). P'u-kuang is not alone among Vasubandhu's commentators in including *upapattibhava* or *pratisamdhivijñāna* in *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*; see also the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (*antarābhavapratisandhicittam upādāya yāvad upapattikṣanah*—*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 299.21-22) and Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha* (*srid pa bar mar nīn mtshams sbyor ba'i skad cig ma nas gzuṇ ste / skye ba'i skad cig gi bar du*—quoted in Mejor 1991: 101-102).

⁴⁹⁰ 若依說一切有部。識支唯生有一剎那不通中有。故唯意識 (T. 1821: 172b7-9).

⁴⁹¹ *ropanāt samskārair vijñāne karmavāsanāyāḥ pratiṣṭhāpanāt* (*Madhyāntavibhāga*: 28.11-12; Nagao 1964: 21.12-13).

insists that this *vijñāna* can only be *ālayavijñāna*, and not the *pravrtti-vijñānas*.⁴⁹² This is consistent with Sthiramati's explicitly Yogācāra position, while it apparently contradicts what Vasubandhu says in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

On the other hand, in his comment on Vasubandhu's explanation of *vijñāna* in the *Trīṃśikābhāṣya*, Sthiramati, although he does not use the term *antarābhava*, agrees with Vasubandhu's statement in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* that *samskārapratyaya* *vijñānam* is located at least partially in the interval between death and rebirth. When Vasubandhu says that *vijñāna* "leads" beings to, or causes them to obtain, rebirth,⁴⁹³ Sthiramati explains that the *vāsanās*, in the form of the seeds of rebirth, are led from death in the present life to rebirth in the next by means of the continuance of the stream of *vijñānas* that is impregnated by karma.⁴⁹⁴ Sthiramati then seems to say that this is proof that the *vijñāna* of the previous life, and not the *pratisandhivijñāna*, is *samskārapratyaya*.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹² *vijñāna iti atrālayavijñānam abhipretam na tu pravrttivijñānam* (*Madhyāntavibhāgatīkā*: 29; Yamaguchi 1934: 36.15-16).

⁴⁹³ *nayanād vijñānenopapattisthānasamprāpanāt* (*Madhyāntavibhāga*: 28.12; Nagao 1964: 21.13-14).

⁴⁹⁴ *karmaparibhāvitena vijñānenā santānavṛtyā cyuttisthānād upapapattisthāne punarbhavabijahūtāyā vāsanāyāḥ prāpanām nayanam* (*Madhyāntavibhāgatīkā*: 29.21-22; Yamaguchi 1934: 7-9).

⁴⁹⁵ *tathā ca sati na pratisandhivijñānam samskārapratyayam pūrvakālabhava-vijñānam eva samskārapratyayam iti pradarśitam bhavati* (*Madhyāntavibhāgatīkā*: 29.23-30.1). This portion is Pandeya's retranslation. Yamaguchi's is different: *tathā ca sati na pratisandhivijñāna pratyayaḥ samskāraḥ pūrvakālabhavavijñānam eva samskārapratyayam iti pradarśitam bhavati* (1934: 37.9-11). Stcherbatsky's retranslation is also different from Pandeya's: *evaṃ kṛtvā pratisandhivijñānam pratyayo, na samskāraḥ, pūrvakālinabhadavavijñānam eva samskārapratyayam iti pradarśitam bhavati* (1978: 041). The Tibetan text as quoted by Stcherbatsky (1978: 041) is as follows: *de ltar byas na ŋin mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa rkyen ni 'du byed ma yin gyi s̄non gyi dus kyi srid pa'i rnam par śes pa ŋid kyi rkyen 'du byed par rab tu bstan pa yin te*. However, the Derge edition reads (differences underlined): *de ltar byas na ŋin mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa'i rkyen ni 'du byed ma yin gyi / s̄non gyi dus kyi srid pa'i rnam par śes pa ŋid kyi rkyen 'du byed yin par rab tu bstan pa yin te* (*Madhyāntavibhāgatīkā* [tib.]: 207a7-208b1).

Of these versions, the Derge Tibetan and Pandeya's reconstruction are the most satisfactory. The three translations (Yamaguchi 1966: 58; Friedman 1937: 48; and

Thus, as I understand him, the balance of the karmic account from one life is carried over to the next by means of a stream of *vijñānas* that are karmically equivalent to the final *vijñāna* of the previous life.

In our passage from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu does not use the term *karmaparibhāvita*, let alone *ālayavijñāna*. But by including the consciousness of the intermediate existence in *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*, he contradicts the unequivocal identification of *vijñāna* with the present life that is prominent in the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation. And by doing so, he suggests that the nature of *vijñāna* in the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula is causal rather than resultant, as it would have to be if it were simply *pratisamdhivijñāna*.

4. Vasubandhu's Definition in the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*: *Saṃskāraparibhāvitam Vijñānam*

Like P'u-kuang, Viryaśrīdatta, in a passage in the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtranibandhana*, also draws attention to the difference between two definitions of *vijñānāṅga*.⁴⁹⁶ The *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* itself contains the text of the *Pratīyasamutpādāsūtra* and hence the six-*vijñānakāya*

Stcherbatsky 1978: 62) all disagree. Friedman probably comes closest to an accurate and intelligible translation, but he understands *pūrvakālabhava* in a technical sense that is not, I think, justified here. Referring to the *Abhidharmakośa*, which defines *pūrvakālabhava* as the *skandhas* between the moments of *pratisamṛti* and death, he explains the significance of our passage as follows: "The *samskāras* condition not only the first moment of the new existence, i.e. the moment of reincarnation, but the whole existence, starting from the moment of conception up to death" (1937: 127 ns. 62, 63). If Friedman is correct, *samskārapratyayam vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the present lifetime, from the moment of birth up until the moment of death. Friedman does not cite any other texts that define *vijñānāṅga* in this way, nor do I know of any. Therefore, I think we should read *śñon gyi dus kyi srid pa'i rnam par śes pa* literally as "the *vijñāna* of the previous existence." In fact, the following sentence suggests that Sthiramati is arguing that the *samskāras* from the previous life, which no longer exists, cannot directly condition the *vijñāna* of the present life (*na hi vinaśṭāt* [following Yamaguchi, instead of *vinaśṭātvāt*] *kāraṇāt kāryotpattir yujyate*—*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā*: 30.1; Yamaguchi 1934: 37.12).

⁴⁹⁶This passage corresponds to a portion of the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*, in which Vasubandhu quotes the view of an opponent whom he will soon refute (Honjō 1989: 173); Viryaśrīdatta, on the other hand, seems to approve of this view.

definition, but Vīryaśrīdatta, who, according to Mejor, follows the Kashmirian Vaibhāśikas (1991: 18), points out that elsewhere *samskāra-pratyayam vijñānam* is identified with *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, and he quotes *Abhidharmakośa* III 21c (*saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam*). He also refers to the well-known *sūtra* statement according to which *nāmarūpa* could not solidify into a fetus if *vijñāna* did not descend into the mother's womb (*Dīghanikāya* II 63; quoted in La Vallée Poussin 1913: 12) and understands it to imply that *vijñāna* in the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula refers to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and hence can only be *manovijñāna* (*Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*: 118.2-6).

Vīryaśrīdatta then points out the discrepancy between this interpretation and the definition in the *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, but he argues that there is no contradiction (*virodha*). According to him, the definition in the *Arthaviniścayasūtra* (i.e., that of the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*) is overly broad and not specific to the context of rebirth. Therefore, he says, it is not *lākṣaṇika*. To support this assertion, he compares the *sūtra* definitions of *vijñāna* and the *rūpa* portion of *nāmarūpa* and shows that, in the case of *rūpa*, too, the *sūtra* likewise gives an all-inclusive definition that does not pertain to the specific context of *vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam*. Furthermore, he states that the *lākṣaṇika* definition is to be found elsewhere, i.e., in the verse of the *Abhidharmakośa* that contains the *āvasthika* definition (*Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*: 118.6-119.2).

However, Vīryaśrīdatta is also able to rationalize the *sūtra* definition; that is to say, he is able to understand it in the context of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula. He mentions by name the Sautrāntikas, who, he says, believe that the *vijñāna* conditioned by the *samskāras* is not *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* but rather the six *vijñānas*, which are permeated by the *samskāras*.⁴⁹⁷ This passage is significant because it is one of only two explicit attributions of a six-*vijñānakāya* definition to the Sautrāntikas

⁴⁹⁷ *sautrāntikamatena tv ayirodha eva / yasmāt tasya samskāraparibhāvitāḥ
sadvijñānakāyāḥ samskārapratyayam vijñānam iṣṭam na pratisaṃdhivijñānam eveti*
(*Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*: 119.2-4; Honjō 1989: 67-69).

that I have found.⁴⁹⁸ However, the interpretation of the six *vijñānakāyas* here as *sam-skāraparibhāvita* is not identical to Vasubandhu's interpretation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in which the term *sam-skāraparibhāvita* is not mentioned, whereas *antarābhava* is. Moreover, there are many passages in the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* that correspond to Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, including the first part of this one (Honjō 1989: 173), and it is perhaps to this text, and not to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, that Viryaśrīdatta is referring when he mentions the opinion of the Sautrāntikas in the above passage.

In the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*,⁴⁹⁹ Vasubandhu includes a long discussion of *vijñānaṅga*,⁵⁰⁰ in which he mentions the view of certain "others" (*gṛan dag*) who maintain that *sam-skārapratyayaṁ vijñānam* is the *pratisamdhivijñāna* in the mother's womb (20b4-5; see above concerning the correspondence between this passage and the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*). Schmithausen has identified a passage⁵⁰¹ in which Vasubandhu refutes this view as being inconsistent with both *sūtra*⁵⁰² and reason (1987: 467 n. 1128).⁵⁰³ Among the several opinions that Vasubandhu attacks is the one quoted with approval in the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*, namely that the *pratisamdhivijñāna* definition is *lākṣaṇika* and the six-*vijñānakāya* definition is *ābhīprāyika*, and that the *śāstra* definition, therefore, does not contradict the *sūtra*

⁴⁹⁸The other occurs in the *Trīṁśikāṭikā* (quoted in Muroji 1993: 181 n. 297).

⁴⁹⁹This text has been studied by Matsuda (1982a; 1982b), Muroji (1985), and Schmithausen (1987). Muroji has published an edition and study of the *sam-skāra-* and *vijñānavibhāgas* of the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (1993). On the basis of Muroji's work, as well as a personal communication, for which I am grateful, I have made a number of changes to the following section; however, he may still disagree with my understanding of Vasubandhu's position.

⁵⁰⁰*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 17a5 - 26b5; Muroji 1993: 144-201.

⁵⁰¹*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 20b4 - 22b4; Muroji 1993: 163-175.

⁵⁰²*mdo sde dañ 'gal* (*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 20b6-21b8; Muroji 1993: 164-170).

⁵⁰³*rigs pa dañ 'gal* (*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 21b8- 22b4; Muroji 1993: 171-175).

definition (*Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: f. 20b7-21a2).

Vasubandhu ridicules this position, saying that the two definitions are indeed irreconcilable. He shows that, in the case of the *rūpa* portion of *nāmarūpa*, the *sūtra* definition, namely that *rūpa* consists of the four *mahābhūtas* and the four *upādāyarūpas*, and the *śāstra* definition, presumably that *rūpa* is the material portion of the embryo, are compatible since the embryonic *rūpa* does, in fact, consist of the *mahābhūtas* and the *upādāyarūpas*. In the case of *vijñāna*, however, the six *vijñānakāyas* are not present at the moment of conception, so *śāstra* contradicts *sūtra*.⁵⁰⁴

Instead, Vasubandhu here defines *samskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam* as *vijñāna* permeated by the *samskāras*.⁵⁰⁵ Schmithausen describes this *vijñāna* as follows: “The *samskāra-pratyayaṁ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the prior existence which receives the Impressions of karma and – by continuously propagating itself along with this impression – becomes, in its turn, the cause of a new existence (beginning with *nāmarūpa*)” (1987: 253 n. 51).

Vasubandhu rejects the Vaibhāṣika assertion that the *pratisamdhivijñāna* definition is *lakṣaṇika*. However, he too, as Matsuda points out (1982b: 63-64), considers the six-*vijñānakāya* definition in the *sūtra* to be intentional: according to Vasubandhu, *samskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam* is ultimately the stream of *ālayavijñāna* permeated by the *samskāras*, due to the evolution of which rebirth can occur. When the *sūtra* mentions the six *vijñānakāyas*, it is really indicating the cause (*ālayavijñāna*) by means of the result (the six *vijñānas*), the basis by

⁵⁰⁴ *ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba na rnam par śes pa gañ yin pa de rnam par śes pa'i tshogs drug ma yin pas / 'dir chos 'dra ba ci yod / 'dir ni 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par śes pa bstan pa brtsams pa yin pas zla la ci'i phyir bya* (*Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 21a3-4; Muroji 1993: 165; see also Wayman and Wayman 1974: 55 n. 58, where this passage is referred to; however, I am not sure whether the Wayman's understand it in the same way that I do).

⁵⁰⁵ *de ltar na 'du byed kyi yon's su bsgos pa rnam par śes pa de ñid 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis yin gyi ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa ni ma yin no* (*Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 23a1-2; Muroji 1993: 176).

means of that which is based on it.⁵⁰⁶ Nevertheless, there is a difference in Vasubandhu's treatment of the two definitions. According to him, the first definition is simply wrong: as has been shown by scripture and by reason, *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* cannot be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*. The second definition, on the other hand, can be justified by the exegetical maneuver of claiming that when the *sūtra* says “the six *vijñānas*,” it really means “*ālayavijñāna*.” The remainder of Vasubandhu's section on *vijñānāṅga* concerns *ālayavijñāna*, a discussion that is similar to that found in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, yet another text by Vasubandhu (Matsuda 1982a: 44).

C. Vasubandhu's Positions—Sautrāntika or Yogācāra?

In all interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the context of rebirth, *vijñāna* is the most important member since it is exactly at *vijñāna* that the karmic legacy of one life passes on to the next. However, as we have seen, different interpretations disagree regarding two interrelated issues: the stage in the rebirth process to which *vijñānāṅga* corresponds; and its causal nature. To the question of whether *vijñāna* is cause, result, or both cause and result, all possible answers have been proposed in one text or another during the history of the exegesis of the formula.⁵⁰⁷

As I have shown above, *vijñāna* in the Sarvāstivādin system refers

⁵⁰⁶ 'dir don ñid gañ že na / 'du byed kyis yoñs su bsgos pa'i kun gži rnam par šes pa'i rgyun yoñs su gyur pas yañ srid 'byuñ bar nus pa ni 'dir 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par šes pa yin par dgoñs pa yin no / gañ yañ 'di skad du rnam par šes pa drug go žes gsuñs pa ni gnas pa gnas bstan pa dañ 'bras bus rgyu ste de dañ ldn pa'i rnam par šes pa'i rgyun 'bab pa bstan pa'i phyr ro (*Pratītyasamutpādayākhyā* [tib.]: 24a1-3; Muroji 1993: 182-183; Matsuda 1982b: 64).

See also a later portion of the text that mentions the *sūtra* by name: ñe bar len pa'i phuñ po gañ gi nañ du 'dus že na / rnam par šes pa ñe bar len pa'i phuñ por ro / 'o na 'di ni rnam par byed pa'i mdo las rnam par šes pa ñe bar len pa'i phuñ po gañ že na / rnam par šes pa'i tshogs drug go žes 'byuñ ba mi 'thad par 'gyur ro že na / yoñs su ma rdzogs par bstan pa yin te (*Pratītyasamutpādayākhyā* [tib.]: 24b6-8; Muroji 1993: 188).

⁵⁰⁷ For an example of a text that takes *vijñānāṅga* to be both cause and result, see Wayman's description of Tsöñ kha pa's interpretation (1984: 181-185).

to the first moment of the present lifetime, and it is result (*phala*) since it is based on *kleśa* and karma (*Abhidharmakośa* III 26ab; *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 134.10-11). There is some disagreement as to whether or not *vijñāna* is *vipāka*. According to the Sarvāstivādins, it is not *vipāka* because for them, *pratisaṃdhi* is always defiled,⁵⁰⁸ while *vipāka* must be morally neutral.⁵⁰⁹ However, as Schmithausen has shown, *pratisaṃdhibhbāṣya* is, in fact, considered to be *vipāka* in Theravādin *abhidharma*, in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, and in parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1987: 38; 307 ns. 256-257). On the other hand, certain Yogācāra texts, for example, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585: 19a8; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 217) and the *Mahāyānasamgrahabhbāṣya* (Lamotte 1973: 53-54), have adduced the defiled nature of *pratisaṃdhibhbāṣya* as proof that it could not be *samskārapratyaya* *vijñānam*, which, according to them, must be *vipāka* and hence neutral. Regardless of the moral nature of *pratisaṃdhibhbāṣya*, there is certainly nothing about it that suggests the strongly causal and projecting qualities of the six *vijñānakāyas*, permeated by the *samskāras*, as described by Vasubandhu in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*.

In the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, Vasubandhu locates *vijñāna* in the prior lifetime. Furthermore, by calling it *samskāraparibhbāvita*, he shows that, rather than being a resultant entity, projected by karma into the next life, it is a causal entity, the ability of which to project the next life is conditioned by karma. As for *pratisaṃdhibhbāṣya*, it is the first moment of *nāmarūpa* in the present life.⁵¹⁰

The general similarities between the explanations of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* have been noted by Matsuda (1982a: 47-48), and the

⁵⁰⁸ *upapattibhavaḥ kliṣṭah* (*Abhidharmakośa* III 38a; *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 151.19; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 117-118).

⁵⁰⁹ *vipāko 'vyākṛto dharmah* (*Abhidharmakośa* II 57a; *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 95.10; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 289).

⁵¹⁰ *mdo sde 'di las rnam par śes pa'i rkyen gyis phuṇ po lna pa'i miṇ dan gzugs bstan pas ūiṇ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa de ji ltar de dan lhan cig byuṇ ba'i miṇ dan gzugs kyi rkyen du ruṇ* (*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [tib.]: 21b3-4; Muroji 1993: 168; Schmithausen 1987: 467 n. 1128).

interpretations of *vijñāna*, in particular, coincide in substance. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *vijñāna*, which is considered a projecting (ākṣepaka) member of the formula and hence belongs to the prior life, “supports the bond of beings’ actions”;⁵¹¹ the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* explains that this is “because it arises simultaneously with the impressions produced by the Karmic Forces.”⁵¹² This seems to be the same function that is implicit in Vasubandhu’s *vijñāna* permeated by the *samskāras*. Furthermore, “it is the condition of Individual Existence,”⁵¹³ because “Individual Existence attains growth due to the entrance of consciousness into the mother’s womb.”⁵¹⁴ The consciousness mentioned here by the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* must be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and, being associated with the later lifetime, cannot be the same as the *vijñāna* that arises simultaneously with the karmic impressions. In the immediately following description of the function of *nāmarūpa*, which “makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,”⁵¹⁵ it becomes clear that, as in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is identified with the initial moment of *nāmarūpa*.

Thus, both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Vasubandhu in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* recognize two types of consciousness, a causal one, which is associated with the impressions of karma and which the *sūtra* identifies provisionally with the six *vijñānakāyas*, and a frictional one, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, which is not considered *samskārapratyaya* and which is associated with *nāmarūpa*. The idea that the six *vijñānas* can be permeated by the *samskāras*, which has been attributed to the Sautrāntikas,⁵¹⁶ is criticized in certain Yogācāra texts

⁵¹¹ *sattvānām karmabandhañ ca dhārayati* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.13).

⁵¹² *samskārahitavāsanāsaḥotpatteḥ* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 32.17-18).

⁵¹³ *pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.13-14).

⁵¹⁴ *mātuh kuksau vijñānāvakrāntyā nāmarūpavivṛddhigamanāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 32.18-19).

⁵¹⁵ *ātmabhāvam ca sattvān grāhayati* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.14).

⁵¹⁶ See *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*: 119.2-4, quoted above; also, La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 217; *Shindōjōyūishikiron*: 155).

A related idea appears in the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, namely that the *cittasaṃptati*, permeated by karma, is capable of producing results in the future (‘*o na ni gal te las nus*

that explicitly teach *ālayavijñāna*, for example, the *Trimśikābhāṣya*⁵¹⁷

kyañ des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu 'byuñ na—Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa: 193.1-2. Muroji [1985: 23] allows the *nub* of the Derge edition, upon which he bases his version, to stand in place of *nus*, which is attested in the Peking and Narthang editions).

All of the editors and translators seem to rely on the commentary (*Karmasiddhiprakaranaṭikā*) of Sumatiśila, whom Anacker (1984: 85) dates to the late eighth century, in order to identify the proponents of the various arguments presented in the text. Even so, there remains considerable confusion regarding who is saying what and in answer to whom. In the case of the above passage, everybody agrees that it is either a Sautrāntika statement (Lamotte 1936: 233; Muroji 1985: 23; Anacker 1984: 106) or Vasubandhu's comment on a Sautrāntika position (Yamaguchi 1975: 162). However, their analyses of the surrounding text vary considerably (in the following, I refer to Lamotte's division of the text, which differs from Yamaguchi's and Muroji's).

According to Lamotte, section 20 is a statement of the Sautrāntika theory of *saṃtānapariṇāma*. Section 21, in which the passage occurs, is a Sautrāntika answer to a Vaibhāṣika objection. Section 22 consists of a Vaibhāṣika statement that also mentions *paribhāvitavijñāna* (*kha cig na re tshe 'di nīd la des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud mtshams 'byor pa las so že na—Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*: 193.6-7) and that is questioned by someone, presumably Vasubandhu.

According to Yamaguchi, section 20 and the first half of section 21 comprise the Sautrāntika statement of *saṃtānapariṇāma*, while the second half of section 21, beginning with the phrase '*o na ni gal te las nus kyañ des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu 'byuñ na*', quoted above, as well as section 22, are Vasubandhu's comment on the Sautrāntika position, with which he disagrees. Yamaguchi identifies the *kha cig* in the statement *kha cig na re tshe 'di nīd la des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud mtshams 'byor pa las so že na* as "some among the Sautrāntikas"; although he does not so indicate, he relies here on the *Karmasiddhiprakaranaṭikā* for this identification (see Muroji 1985: 23 note a).

According to Anacker, section 20 is Vasubandhu's opinion. Section 21 consists of the Vaibhāṣika objection and a Sautrāntika response. Section 22 consists of an interchange between Vasubandhu and certain Sautrāntikas.

Finally, Muroji agrees with Yamaguchi that section 20 and the first half of section 21 are the Sautrāntika statement, but he also identifies the second half of 22 as the Sautrāntika *pūrvapakṣa*, in which the view of another group of Sautrāntikas is mentioned.

Clearly the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is a difficult text to make sense of, and it is probably not advisable to accept unquestioningly Sumatiśila's identifications. Regardless of to whom the two references to *paribhāvitavijñāna* are attributed, I have been unable to find any references to *karmaparibhāvita-* or *samśkāra-paribhāvitavijñāna* among the texts (e.g., the *Vibhāṣā*, *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, and *Nyāyānusāra*) that are our sources for pre-Vasubandhu Sautrāntika. Therefore, I think it likely that this notion originates from Vasubandhu himself.

⁵¹⁷The *Trimśikābhāṣya* argues that *saṃskārapratyayam* *vijñānam* must be *ālayavijñāna* since it can be neither *pratisamdhivijñāna* nor the six *vijñānas*, and it

and the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*,⁵¹⁸ in order to prove that *samskārapratyayam vijñānam* must be *ālayavijñāna*. However, a similar notion appears in the *śarīra* section of the *pratīyasamutpāda* exposition of the *Savitarkādibhūmi*: “For example, a person in the past has performed and accumulated acts, whether meritorious, unmeritorious, or immovable (*āniñjya*), whether physical, verbal, or mental, which are conditioned by ignorance. His consciousness, accompanied by those acts, continues to exist up to the moment of death and becomes the cause of the consciousness at the moment of conception.”⁵¹⁹ As for *pratisamdhivijñāna*, it is explicitly called *vipākavijñāna*, and it is said to be

gives its reasons in detail:

tatrālayavijñānād anyat samskārapratyayam vijñānam na yujyate / samskārapratyayavijñānābhāve pravṛtter apy abhāvah / samsārasya ālayavijñānānabhāvhyupagame pratisamdhivijñānam vā samskārapratyayam parikalpyeta samskārabhāvitā vā ṣadvijñānakāyāḥ /

tatra ye samskārah prātisamdhikavijñānapratyayatvenesyante / teśām ciraniruddhatvāt / niruddhasya cāsatvāt asataś ca pratyayatvābhāvāt / na samskārapratyayam pratisamdhivijñānam yujyate / pratisamdhau ca nāmarūpam apy asti na kevalam vijñānam tatra vijñānam eva samskārapratyayam na nāmarūpam iti / kā tatra yuktih / tasmāt samskārapratyayam nāmarūpam iti vaktavyam / na tu vijñānam iti / katamad anyavijñānapratyayam nāmarūpam / yad uttarakālam iti cet tasya pratisamdhikanāmarūpāt ka ātmatiṣayah yatas tad eva vijñānapratyayam na pūrvam / pūrvam ca samskārapratyayam nottaram iti / ataś ca samskārapratyayam nāmarūpam evāstu kiṁ pratisamdhivijñānenāngāntareṇa parikalpitena / tasmān na pratisamdhivijñāna samskārapratyayam yujyate /

samskāraparibhāvitā vā ṣadvijñānakāyā api na samskārapratyayam vijñānam yujyate / kiṁ kāraṇam / na hi vijñānam vīpākavāsanām niṣyandavāsanām vā svātmany ādhattum samarthaṁ svātmani kāritavirodhāt nāpy anāgate tasya tadānupannatvāt / anupannasya cāsatvāt / nāpy utpannapūrvasya tadā niruddhatvāt / acittikāsu ca nirodhasamāpattyādyavasthāsu punah samskāraparibhāvitacittopattyasambhavāt (*Trimsikābhāṣya* 37.16-38.9; see La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 217 for a summary of the argument against *pratisamdhivijñāna*'s being *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*).

⁵¹⁸ 又行緣識應不得成。轉識受熏前已遮故。結生染識非行惑故 (T. 1585: 19a7-8; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 216-217).

⁵¹⁹ yathāpihaikatyena pūrvam aviduṣāvidyāgatenāvidyāpratyayam punyāpunyā-niñjyam kāyavāñmanahkarma kṛtam bhavaty upacitam / tatkarmopagam (Schmithausen's correction from the manuscript of Bhattacharya's *tatkarmopabhogam* [1987: 472 n. 1153]) cāsyā vijñānam āmaranasamayād anuvṛttam bhavati pratisandhivijñānahetubhūtam (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 198.20-199.1; also, Schmithausen 1987: 178).

conditioned by the causal consciousness. The relationship between this *vipākavijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is explained in terms of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 199.7-14).

Schmithausen, who considers this passage to predate a systematized notion of *ālayavijñāna*, emphasizes that both the causal and the *vipāka* consciousnesses here are the series “consisting of one or the other of the ordinary six kinds of *vijñāna*” (1987: 178). However, he does not suggest that it therefore represents a non-Yogācāra (for example, a Sautrāntika) doctrine. According to him, the earliest Yogācāra thought, which he says is found in portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, does not encompass a fully developed theory of *ālayavijñāna*, explicitly identified as such. This raises the question of the development of Yogācāra doctrine and its relationship to the Sautrāntika school, a question that is very pertinent to the study of texts such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. Vasubandhu, whose name is associated with both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools, of course figures critically in any discussion of the relationship between them.

There are many different opinions regarding Vasubandhu, especially concerning his dates and to how many people his name refers. Hirakawa summarizes the most commonly held views regarding Vasubandhu's philosophical beliefs: “It is generally accepted among scholars that the author of the *Kośa* was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda School, but his thoughts were closer to those of the Sautrāntika School. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika School is based on ‘the *prajñapti*,’ which includes the teaching of *bīja*; therefore, the developed form of this doctrine can be related to the doctrine of *Vijñānavāda*. It does not necessarily mean that the Sautrāntika School itself developed into the *Vijñānavāda*, but it can be easily assumed that the author of the *Kośa* belonged to the Sautrāntika School [and] later changed to the *Vijñānavāda*, for there is a certain common ground between the doctrines” (1973-1978, v. 1: xi-xii). According to this way of thinking, Vasubandhu wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* when he was a Sautrāntika, the *Trīṁśikā* when he was a Yogācāra, and texts like the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* at some time in between, while he was presumably in the process of conversion from Sautrāntika to Yogācāra. Muroji, for example, suggests just such a development (1985: [2]), while

Matsuda implies something similar when he states that the *ālayavijñāna* that is expounded in the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* and the *Karmasiddhiprakarana* is different from that of the Yogācāra school since it is “tinged with a Sautrāntika hue” (1982a: 44).

This model of Vasubandhu’s literary and philosophical development is largely based on two types of evidence: traditional accounts of his life and the contents of his writings. According to Mejor, the reliable information in the Chinese and Tibetan biographies and historical sources “may be summarized in two points: (1) Vasubandhu’s composition of the *Abhidharmakośa-karikā* and *bhāṣya* and a subsequent controversy with a Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika master, Saṅghabhadra, (2) Vasubandhu’s conversion to Mahayana under the influence of his elder brother Asaṅga” (1991: 7). As for the content of his works, it is well known that in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Vasubandhu frequently criticizes Vaibhāṣika positions while supporting positions that he identifies as, or we know from other sources to be, Sautrāntika. To summarize what Lamotte says about the *Karmasiddhiprakarana* (and this applies to works such as the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* as well), Vasubandhu, although he mentions *ālayavijñāna*, does not propose a doctrine of consciousness-only; furthermore, he quotes almost exclusively from non-Mahāyāna *sūtras*, mentions the opinions mostly of non-Mahāyāna schools and teachers, and takes recognizably Sautrāntika positions on a number of important issues (Lamotte 1935-36: 176-179). Finally, in the *Trīṃśikā*, his exposition is clearly and classically Yogācāra.

There may, however, be another way to explain why Vasubandhu asserts a “Sautrāntika” position, at least in our case of *sam-skāra-pratyaya-vijñānam*. Before I come to this, it is necessary to discuss briefly two differing opinions regarding the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a text that precedes Vasubandhu and with which he was presumably acquainted.⁵²⁰

⁵²⁰Concerning the question of the relationship between the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Yamabe (1990) raises the possibility that Vasubandhu’s *bija* theory can be traced back to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See also Hakamaya 1986.

Schmithausen, in the course of trying to explain the context in which the Yogācāra concept of *ālayavijñāna* first arose, concludes that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is probably “a compilation consisting of several (or at least two) heterogeneous (or at any rate chronologically distinct) layers” (1987: 13), rather than the work of a single author. He goes on to identify three layers of the text: an oldest layer, in which there is no reference to *ālayavijñāna*; a middle layer, in which there are occasional references to *ālayavijñāna*, but no reference to the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*; and the newest layer, in which *ālayavijñāna* is discussed in detail and the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is fully utilized (1987: 14). The assumption that underlies Schmithausen’s view of the stratification of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is that, roughly speaking, the less mention of *ālayavijñāna* and the fewer references to Mahāyāna *sūtra* there are, the older the layer. Aramaki Noritoshi, on the other hand, takes a different approach in determining the strata of the text.⁵²¹ Aramaki agrees with Schmithausen regarding the portions comprising the oldest layer, but he takes issue with Schmithausen’s identification of the other two layers. Aramaki locates some portions containing material from the *Samdhinirmocana* and detailed treatments of *ālayavijñāna* in the middle layer and some portions containing scant mention of *ālayavijñāna* in the newest layer. According to Aramaki’s theory, the middle layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi* contains the Yogācāra exposition of ultimate truth (*paramārthavyavasthāna*), namely the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, while the newest layer contains an exposition of provisional truth (*saṃvṛti-vyavasthāna*), which presupposes *ālayavijñāna* theory.⁵²² In this layer, Aramaki sees the origin of the Yogācāra *abhidharma*.

In the case of Vasubandhu’s texts, as well as the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*, we are dealing with a different situation. All of these texts were written after even the newest layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and there is a greater possibility of there having

⁵²¹Personal communication.

⁵²²This is not to say that *ālayavijñāna* itself has ultimate reality (*parinippanna-svabhāva*). In fact, according to the *trisvabhāva* system, only consciousness after *āśrayaparāvṛtti* has been achieved can be so designated. But we are not concerned here with this system.

been composed by a single, identifiable author. Furthermore, by the time these works were written, the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* had been considerably systematized. Nonetheless, Aramaki's distinction between *paramārthavyavasthāna* and *saṃvṛtvavyavasthāna* can perhaps help us understand the intention of these texts.

First, let us consider the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*. The purpose of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* is specifically to expound the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, or, to use Aramaki's terminology, the Yogācāra *paramārthavyavasthāna*, and it contains systematic proofs and elaborations. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, while it occasionally mentions the term, does not expound *ālayavijñāna* in detail. Rather, a philosophical system based on *ālayavijñāna* having already been worked out, the author/compiler(s) of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* have attempted to produce an *abhidharma*, a *saṃvṛtvavyavasthāna*, consonant with, and supportive of, this *paramārthavyavasthāna*. In the case of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* interpretation of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, the two-lifetime system, in which the causal *vijñāna* of the past life projects the seeds of the present life, only makes sense if *vijñānāṅga* is really *ālayavijñāna*. However, since the purpose is to explain the twelve-membered formula and not to prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention it by name. This is in contrast to *Mahāyānasamgraha* I. 33, where, as one of a number of proofs of *ālayavijñāna*, it is stated that *saṃskārapratyayam vijñānam* can only be *ālayavijñāna* (*Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 15.15-16; Lamotte 1973: 53).

Similarly, although he eloquently expounds *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñāptimatrā* in the *Trīśikā*, Vasubandhu is writing for different purposes in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*. The *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* is a commentary on a *sūtra*,⁵²³ the subject of which, as its name suggests, is *pratīyasamutpāda*, and Vasubandhu, in commenting on it, does not have to refer to *vijñāptimātra* theory, even though he uses the term *ālayavijñāna*. The fact that he does not mention

⁵²³The *Fen pieh yüan ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching* 分別緣起初勝法門經 (T. 717; the Sanskrit title is given by Matsuda as *Adiviśeśavibhāgasūtra* [1982a: 42]).

the system of eight *vijñānas* need not mean that he does not believe in it, contrary to what Matsuda states (1982a: 44). Nor does his accepting on the level of “intentional meaning” the identification of *vijñānāṅga* with the six *vijñānas*, a position associated by some (see above) with the Sautrāntika school, while rejecting the Sarvāstivādin identification of it with *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, prove that he is himself a Sautrāntika, at least in the sense of accepting the doctrines of other teachers, such as Śrīlāta, who are designated as Sautrāntikas.

In an article that explores a number of points raised by Katō (1989) about Sautrāntika, Honjō suggests the possibility that Vasubandhu was the proponent of a Mahāyāna Sautrāntika doctrine, distinguishable from the “orthodox,” Hīnayāna Sautrāntika of Śrīlāta (1990). My own theory is that Vasubandhu espouses Sautrāntika or Sautrāntika-like ideas for the purpose of constructing Yogācāra *abhidharma*; this is, perhaps, not so different from Honjō’s proposal. Whether Vasubandhu is writing as a Mahāyāna Sautrāntika or a covert Yogācāra, by contrasting the *abhiprāya* of the *samskāraparibhāvitavijñānas* with *ālayavijñāna*, he implies that, for him, the term *ālayavijñāna* applies to a higher realm of truth than the six *vijñānas*.

To return to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, there is some question in my mind whether Vasubandhu’s definition of *samskārapratyaya* *vijñānam* in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab is substantially the same as his definition in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. At first glance, they appear different. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu does not use the expression *samskāraparibhāvita* to describe *vijñāna*, and this expression, with its connotations of *bija*-theory, is one of the most striking features of his discussion in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. Although Sthiramati, in his subcommentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, calls the stream of *vijñānas* in the intermediate existence *karmaparibhāvita* (Mejor 1991: 101-102), he may be, perhaps under the influence of what Vasubandhu says in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, reading too much into the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.⁵²⁴ More important is the fact that, in the

⁵²⁴In the *Madhyāntavibhāgatikā*, Sthiramati likewise interprets *vijñāna* as the stream of *vijñānas*, impregnated by karma, in the *antarābhava* (*karmaparibhāvita*

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu, as I mentioned above, has been understood by his commentators to include *pratisamdhivijñāna*, along with the stream of the six *vijñānas* in *antarābhava*, in his definition of *samskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam*. This would seem to be inconsistent with the causal nature ascribed to *vijñāna* in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* as well as with the statement that *pratisamdhivijñāna* is the first moment of *nāmarūpa* in the later lifetime.

However, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is again quite a different type of text from either the *Trīṁśikā* or the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. Although in *Abhidharmakośa* VIII 40ab Vasubandhu claims to have presented an *abhidharma* system largely in agreement with the *Vaibhāṣika* school,⁵²⁵ it is well known that he rejects the *Sarvāstivādin* position on many crucial points. Nevertheless, even if the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* is correct in assuming, as Jaini puts it, that “the *Kośa* is not an authentic *Vaibhāṣika* treatise but only a mouth-piece of the *Mahāyānist* Vasubandhu disguised as a *Vaibhāṣika* āchārya” (1977: 129), Vasubandhu’s intention in writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is not explicitly to expound *Mahāyāna*, specifically *Yogācāra*, doctrine, even less so than it is in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* or the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*. In the case of his discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Vasubandhu seems mostly concerned with undermining the *Sarvāstivādin* *āvasthika* interpretation and with promoting the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* as scriptural authority. Having established in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, without using any suspiciously *Yogācāra* terminology such as *paribhāvita*, that the *sūtra* definition of *samskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam* as consisting of the six *vijñānakāyas* is preferable to the *Sarvāstivādin* definition, he is free to interpret this six-*vijñānakāya* definition in a more overtly *Yogācāra* fashion in the

vijñānenā santānavṛttiyā cyutisthānād upapattisthane punarbhavabijahūtāyā vāsanāyāḥ prāpaṇam nayanam (*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā*: 29; Yamaguchi 1934: 37.7-9).

⁵²⁵ *kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddhah prāyo mayā 'yam kathito 'bhidharmah* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 459.16-17; quoted by Mejor, who seems to take this verse to mean that Vasubandhu’s own doctrinal standpoint agrees with that of the *Vaibhāṣikas* [1991: 19]).

Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā. It thus seems possible that Vasubandhu, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is adjusting the *abhidharma* system so painstakingly worked out by the Vaibhāṣikas in order to make it consonant with his Yogācāra beliefs.

In his introduction to the *Abhidharmadīpa*, Jaini identifies sixteen points on which the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* attacks Vasubandhu for departing from orthodox Vaibhāṣika doctrine. In a significant number of these cases, the “Sautrāntika” position taken by Vasubandhu is either virtually identical to that of the Yogācāra school (for example, regarding the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*) or, in Jaini’s words, “foreshadows the theory of *ālaya-vijñāna*” (1977: 110), for example, regarding the *anuśayas*. Jaini draws attention to the fact that the Dīpakāra accuses Vasubandhu of being a *vaitulika*, i.e., accepting Mahāyāna, (see above; also 1977: 128), and, in a discussion of the controversy about *sarvāstivāda*, states: “Although the main attack on the Sarvāstivāda comes from the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, the Dīpakāra’s reference to the *ālaya-vijñāna* and to the *abhūta-parikalpita* unmistakably shows that his real opponents were Yogāchāra-Vijñānavādins...” (1977: 121). However, Jaini takes the Dīpakāra’s accusations as confirmation of the traditional, and still commonly accepted, assertion that Vasubandhu was a Sautrāntika when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and later converted to Mahāyāna and Yogācāra.

I, on the other hand, would like to suggest that the Dīpakāra may have been right, that Vasubandhu, when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, may already have been a Yogācāra, and that the “Sautrāntika” views that he espoused provided a better abhidharmic infrastructure for the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* than did the Sarvāstivādin positions that he attacked. I believe that what Vasubandhu says about *samskārapratyayam vijñānam* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā* supports my speculation.

D. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on *Samskārapratyayam vijñānam*

In the preceding section, I have mentioned, in the context of Vasubandhu’s various positions, several features of the interpretation of

samskārapratyayam vijñānam in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Here, I shall examine the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition, particularly as found in the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section, as *Yogācāra abhidharma* in its own right.

Vasubandhu, in both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* is working under certain restraints. In the case of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, he is commenting on his own, fairly faithful summary of Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* contained in his *kārikās*. Although he does not hesitate to criticize Sarvāstivādin positions, he is not willing to state explicitly the *Yogācāra* beliefs that, if my speculations in the last section are correct, he held even at the time of writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. And, as I have mentioned, in the case of the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, he is commenting on a *sūtra*, not writing an independent exposition, even though his commentary is lengthy and far-reaching.

The author or compiler of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, is free of these limitations. He is free to include uncamouflaged *Yogācāra* concepts and terms, even if sparingly. Furthermore, since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not a commentary on some other text, it can and must stand as an independent work. Therefore, unlike the *śarīra* section of the *Savitarkādibhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, which seems to belong to an earlier stage of *Yogācāra* thought, in which a preliminary theory of *ālayavijñāna* is being worked out, and unlike Vasubandhu when he comments on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention the six *vijñānakāyas* at all in connection with *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*. Nor does it mention the view that *pratisandhivijñāna* is *samskārapratyayam vijñānam*, since the purpose of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not to criticize Sarvāstivādin doctrine, as Vasubandhu does in both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, but to expound *Yogācāra abhidharma*.⁵²⁶

The nature of Consciousness in the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*

⁵²⁶It is interesting to note that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, when discussing the functions of Consciousness, seems to be unaware of any but the Sarvāstivādin definition of *vijñānāṅga* (see Chapter 2, section B5c).

in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not stated explicitly. However, the comments in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* on the functions of *vijñāna* in the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section can help us understand the definition of *vijñāna* that is implicit throughout the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, most strikingly in the section on *aṅgasamāsa*, where Consciousness is assigned to the projecting set of members.⁵²⁷ According to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*, Consciousness “supports the bonds of action of beings” because its arising coincides with the *vāsanās* deposited by the Karmic Forces (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*: 32.17-18). This is tantamount to associating *samskārapratyayam vijñānam* with the *bijas* produced by karma. Thus, the first function of Consciousness, that of supporting karmic continuity, is accomplished by the projection of the seeds of the new rebirth. This function of Consciousness is the one that Sthiramati in his *Trimśikābhāṣya* argues cannot be performed by the six *vijñānakāyas* since a *pravṛttivijñāna* is unable to contain any sort of *vāsanā*.⁵²⁸

The second function of Consciousness, i.e., to serve as the condition of Individual Existence, is accomplished when Consciousness enters the womb and initiates the Individual Existence of the next lifetime; this moment is *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*.⁵²⁹ The two functions of Consciousness thus straddle the border between two lifetimes as well as manifesting two aspects of *ālayavijñāna* mentioned in the famous verse of the *Trimśikā*: “Among these [three transformations of consciousness,] the consciousness called *ālaya* is *vipāka* and contains all seeds.”⁵³⁰ The first function is possible because Consciousness is *sarvabijaka*, the second because it is *vipāka*. However, as I have pointed out earlier, the

⁵²⁷ See *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*: 31.12-14 and *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585: 43c8). See also my Chapter Three.

⁵²⁸ *na hi vijñānam vipākavāsanām nisyandavāsanām vā svātmany ādhattum samar�ham svātmani kāritavirodhāt*—*Trimśikābhāṣya*: 38.5-6.

⁵²⁹ *pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya, mātuh kuksau vijñānāvakraṇtyā nāmarūpaviruddhigamanāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*: 32.18-19; see Chapter 2, section B5c).

⁵³⁰ *tatrālayākhyam vijñānam vipākah sarvabijakam* (*Trimśikā* IIcd; *Trimśikābhāṣya*: 18.21).

members from *nāmarūpa* through *vedanā* are implicitly seeds, rather than actualized *dharma*s; and, according to the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* intends for the seeds of the *vipākavijñāna* to be included in *nāmarūpāṅga*.⁵³¹ Therefore, *pratisaṃdhi* actually takes place in *jātyaṅga*, which “produces beings in the proper order,” beginning with *nāmarūpa*.⁵³²

Thus, without using the terms *ālayavijñāna*, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, or *sadvijñānāḥ*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* describes a Consciousness capable of fulfilling the functions explicitly attributed to *ālayavijñāna* by the *Trīṇśikābhāṣya*. To my mind, the reason that the term *ālayavijñāna* is not mentioned here is not that this section of the *Abhidharma*-*saṃuccaya* was written before *ālayavijñāna* was “discovered,” as may have been true in the case of the *śarīra* portion of the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition. Nor is the concept disguised, as it is by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharma*-*saṃuccaya* and, to some extent, in the *Pratītya-saṃutpādavyākhyā*. On the contrary, the concept has been discovered and accepted, and it lies unconcealed behind the description of a *vijñāna* that contains the impressions of which *saṃskāra* is the condition and that “supports the bond of action of beings.” *Ālayavijñāna* is not mentioned simply because there is no need to use the term in an exegesis of the *pratītya-saṃutpāda* formula, the purpose of which is to eliminate “attachment to an *ātman* that has no cause or has inconsistent causes.”⁵³³

⁵³¹ 異熟識種名色攝故 (T. 1585: 43c8-9; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483).

⁵³² *jātiḥ kimkarmikā / nāmarūpaśaḍāyatanaśparśavedanānupūrvyā ca sattvān abhinirvartayati, pratayaś ca bhavati jarāmarañasya* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.20-21).

⁵³³ *ahetuviśamaheṭukātmābhiniśatyājanārtham* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.2-3; see Chapter 2, section A2c).

VI. PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA AND THE CITTAVIPRAYUKTASAMSKĀRAS

A. Introduction

Certain of the imports (*artha*) of conditioned origination appear to be connected with the group of nine or ten *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* that are associated specifically with the Yogācāra school.⁵³⁴ In this chapter, I examine the Yogācāra treatment of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, particularly as it relates the *dharmas* in this category to aspects of causality. In doing so, I refer frequently to Vasubandhu, whose opinions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* appear to have been influenced not only by the tradition that can be traced back to the Dārśāntika of the *Vibhāṣā*, but also by the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Under the category of *artha*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* enumerates eleven features of the relationship between cause and result, and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* reiterates the importance of these features in the immediately following section, where it relates them to the fivefold profundity (*gāmbhīrya*) of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Ui and Suguro have examined the section on *artha* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which appears to be the basis of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* treatment, and neither of them has found any specifically Yogācāra features in its description of causality. Ui thinks that the whole *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* is essentially similar to, and based on, the Vaibhāṣika three-lifetimes/twofold causation system (1958: 283, 286). Suguro, too, although he points out the relationship between *paratantrārtha* and the *trisvabhāva* theory, stresses that he can find no signs of either a Mādhyamika theory of causality or one based on *ālayavijñāna* in the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (1982: 210-212).

However, these lists of *pratītyasamutpādārtha*s do not resemble anything found in the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* texts and commentaries.

⁵³⁴See Chapter 2, section B7.

Instead, like a number of other lists pertaining to causality (for example, those of the ten *hetus* and the four *yuktis*), they appear to be unique to the *abhidharma* of the Yogācāra, and they first appear in one portion or another of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The *pratītyasamutpādārthas* do not on the surface presuppose ālayavijñāna or even a system of seed causation, although later texts sometimes interpret them in such terms. For example, the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya*, in its comment on the *gāmbhīrya* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, after explaining the five profundities in terms of the eleven *arthas*, explicitly connects the profundity of conditioned origination to causation by seeds.⁵³⁵

Even more strikingly, the *Mahāyānasamgraha*⁵³⁶ refers to a number of the aspects of causality described as *pratītyasamutpādārthas* in its definition of the six modes of *bijas*. *Bijas* are: (1) momentary (*kṣaṇika*); (2) simultaneous (*sahabhūka*); (3) continuous (*saṃtānānuvṛt*); (4) determined (*nīyata*); (5) dependent on conditions (*pratyayāpekṣa*); (6) realized only in their own result (*svaphalasyaiva sādhana*).⁵³⁷ Of these, the first corresponds to *kṣaṇikārtha*, the third to *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*, the fourth⁵³⁸ to *anurūpa-hetuphalārtha*, and the sixth to *pratiniyatāhetuphalārtha*. Thus, the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, unlike the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, understands these facets of conditioned origination explicitly in terms of the operation of *bijas*.

Furthermore, if Nishi is correct in his assertion that the source of most

⁵³⁵ *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya*: 34.12-22; see Chapter 2, section B8.

⁵³⁶ *Mahāyānasamgraha* I: 22 (*Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 12.5-11; Lamotte 1973: 40-41; Nagao 1982, v. 1: 156-161). For the Sanskrit equivalents, I have followed Aramaki's retranslation in Nagao 1982, v. 1.

⁵³⁷ A similar exposition is found in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585: 9b7-c1; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 116-118; *Shindōjōyūshikiron*: 73-74).

⁵³⁸ The *Mahāyānasamgrahabhbhāṣya* explains this in almost the same way that the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* explains *anurūpa-hetuphalārtha*: “Ils sont déterminés: ils sont individuellement déterminés (*pratiniyata*). Tout ne naît pas de tout, mais telle substance naît de tel germe qui lui est propre” (Lamotte 1973: 40). The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya*, however, does not mention *bija* (see Chapter 2, section B7).

of the ideas about *bijas* in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* passage can be traced to the *Vibhāṣā* (1975: 483-495), then these ideas predate the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well as the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Given the facts that the *pratītyasamutpādārthas* do not appear in any Sarvāstivādin text, that they are explicitly related to *bija* theory by later Yogācāra texts, and that many of the aspects of causality that they explain also appear elsewhere exclusively in Yogācāra texts, it seems fair to say that a *bija* interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* underlies the *pratītyasamutpādārthas*, even though the term *bija* does not appear in their exposition.

In the Yogācāra reinterpretation of the Sarvāstivādin category of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*, some of the same features of causality that are described in the Yogācāra expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the ten *hetus* appear again in the definitions of various *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*, especially those belonging to the group of nine or ten that are Yogācāra additions to the Sarvāstivādin list and that, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, are designations of states of cause and result.⁵³⁹ However, before turning to the Yogācāra lists and discussions of the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* and their relation to *pratītyasamutpāda*, I must first attempt to establish at what stage of development the Sarvāstivādin list was adopted by Yogācāra. I shall also investigate *saṃghabhedā* and *sāmagrī*, two items not found on the orthodox Sarvāstivādin list but sometimes considered by Sarvāstivādins to be *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*. There is a possible relation between them and the Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*, *sāmagrī* and *asāmagrī*, which I examine in the second half of this chapter.

B. *Cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* in Sarvāstivāda

1. *Cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* in the Sarvāstivāda Literature

The best-known discussion of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* in a Western language is Jaini's "Origin and Development of the Theory of *viprayukta-sam-skāras*" (1959b). Jaini shows that the term is found in

⁵³⁹ *hetuphalāvasthāyām* *śesā* *iti* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 11.6-7). See section C2.

Theravāda literature as well as in Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, and he suggests a strong Vaiśeṣika influence on what he calls the “*dravya-vāda* of the Vaibhāṣika” (1959b: 537) as well as in the case of the last nine *cittaviprayuktasam̄skāras* of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list. Although Jaini’s account of the controversy in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* concerning the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasam̄skāras* is excellent, his treatment of the development of the lists in early Sarvāstivādin texts, being limited to Sanskrit sources, is necessarily incomplete. For references to earlier *abhidharma* texts extant only in Chinese, the Japanese secondary literature is invaluable. Mizuno’s long article entitled “*Shinfusōhō ni tsuite*” (1956, perhaps the most exhaustive treatment of the subject), the article on *cittaviprayuktasam̄skāras* in *Mochizuki Bukkyō Dai Jiten* (Mochizuki 1974: 2089), and the chapter on *abhidharma* in Yamada’s *Daijō Bukkyō Seiritsuron Josetsu* (1959: 61-136) are particularly useful. Cox also summarizes the earlier Sarvāstivādin lists in her translation and study of the *cittaviprayuktasam̄skāra* section of the *Nyāyānusāra* (1995: 70-73), and Van den Broeck discusses them in some detail in the introduction to his translation of the *Abhidharmāmṛta* (1977: 56-62).

Since the publication of Jaini’s paper, a Sanskrit fragment of the *Pañcavastuka*, probably the earliest source for the five categories (*pañcavastu*),⁵⁴⁰ as well as for a list of *cittaviprayuktasam̄skāras*, has become available (Imanishi: 1969). On the basis of the partial manuscript and the Chinese translations, Imanishi has arrived at a text with a list of fifteen items: (1) *prāpti*; (2) *asamjñasamāpatti*; (3) *nirodhasamāpatti*; (4) *āsamjñika*; 5) *jīvitendriya*; (6) *nikāyasabhāga*; (7) *āśrayapratilābha*; (8) *vastupratilābha*; (9) *āyatana-pratilābha*; (10) *jāti*; (11) *jarā*; (12) *sthitī*; (13) *anityatā*; (14) *nāmakāya*; (15) *padakāya* (1969: 8).⁵⁴¹ Although Imanishi’s text does not indicate it, both Chinese translations, as well as the text of the *Prakaraṇapāda*, which is probably

⁵⁴⁰The five categories are: *citta*, *caitta*, *rūpa*, *cittaviprayukta*, and *asam̄skṛta* (see Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: xii-xxiv).

⁵⁴¹The later Chinese translation includes *vyāñjanakāya* as well, and even the very early translation of An Shih-kao 安世高 probably indicates three *kāyas* rather than two. At the end of An Shih-kao’s list of *cittaviprayuktasam̄skāras* we find the characters 名,

based on the *Pañcavastuka*,⁵⁴² include references to other similar *dharmas* that are *cittaviprayukta*.⁵⁴³ Thus, we can add the sentence *ye 'py evamjātiyakā* (or *evambhāgīyā*)⁵⁴⁴ to the Sanskrit on the basis of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, which quotes from a *sāstra* identified by Wogihara as the *Prakaraṇapāda*.⁵⁴⁵

This is not merely a pedantic correction of Imanishi's text. The addition is significant because it proves that, at this period of *abhidharma* literature, the list of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* was still open.⁵⁴⁶ Other texts that include similar phrases are the *Dharmaskandha*,

字, and 絶 (T. 1557: 998c25). 名 is the standard translation for *nāma*, and 字 is one of the translations for *vyañjana*. Although I could not find 絶 as a translation for *pada*, one of its meanings, probably as an abbreviation for the compound 絶句, is “a stanza of four lines” (Matthews 1975: 240). Although the Sanskrit *pada* in this context probably means “a sentence (*pāda*) or a line of a *gāthā*” (Jaini 1959c: 99), it seems likely that An Shih-kao is in fact translating it by 絶, which at least preserves the notion of an utterance longer than a word or syllable that expresses a complete meaning. Incidentally, the character 句 by itself is, in fact, used to translate *pada*.

⁵⁴² See Yamada 1959: 93.

⁵⁴³ 亦餘如是法分別意行。是名分別意行 (T. 1557 [An Shih-kao]: 998c25-26); 復有餘法與心不相應。如是等類。名為心不相應行法 (T. 1556 [Fa-ch'eng 法成]: 995c23-24); 復有所餘如是類法。與心不相應。總名心不相應行 (T. 1542 [Prakaranapāda]: 692c8-9).

⁵⁴⁴ Mizuno has pointed out that, in the *Mahāvyutpatti* (p. 152, item number 1999), *evambhāgīyāḥ* is added, along with *bheda*, *prabandha*, *prabandhoparama*, *vyañjana*, *aksara*, and *varṇa*, to the twenty-four *Yogācāra cittaviprayuktasamskāras* to form a list of thirty-one (1956: 32). He does not mention that it occurs after *padakāya* and before *pravṛtti*. It seems likely to me that it does not indicate a separate *dharma* in the *Mahāvyutpatti* list but rather refers to the unnamed additional *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* mentioned by the pre-*Abhidharmaśāstra* texts and by the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośa*.

⁵⁴⁵ *nāma-kāyādayaś ceti. ca-śabda evamjātiyakānukta-viprayukta-pradarśanārthah. samgha-bheda-prabhrtyo hi dravyataś citta-viprayuktā iṣyante iti ye 'py evamjātiyakā iti sāstre 'py uktatvāt* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 142.28-31).

⁵⁴⁶ In fact, the list of *caitasikas* in the *Pañcavastuka* is similarly followed by the phrase *ye vā punar anye 'py evambhāgīyā dharmāś cittena samprayuktā ucyante caitasikā dharmāḥ*. But notice that An Shih-kao's translation of the phrase indicating the remaining *caitasikas* (亦所有。如是法意共俱。是名為意所念法—T. 1557: 918c21-22) is different from his translation of the phrase that indicates the remaining *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* (see note 542). In Fa-ch'eng's translation, the phrases are identical (復有餘法與心不相應。如是等類。名為心不相應行—T. 1556: 995c23-24; 復有餘法。與心相應如是等類。名為心所有法—T. 1556: 995c18-19).

which includes an abbreviated list of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*,⁵⁴⁷ and the *Abhidharmāmrta*.⁵⁴⁸ Actually, the *Abhidharmāmrta* includes two lists, only the second of which Jaini, referring to Sastri's often inaccurate Sanskrit retranslation, mentions in his article.⁵⁴⁹ This second list contains seventeen *dharmas*, each preceded by a number, and does not refer to the existence of any *dharmas* not on the list.⁵⁵⁰ However, the first list, which contains only sixteen items, is followed by a reference to "various similar

⁵⁴⁷“What is *cittaviprayuktasam-skāraskandha*? *Prāpti*, *asamjñikasamāpatti*, and so forth up to *vyañjanakāya*, as well as other similar *dharmas*, which are not associated with *citta*, are called *cittaviprayuktasam-skāraskandha*” (云何心不相應行蘊。謂得無想定。廣說乃至文身。復有所餘如是類法。不與心相應。是名心不相應行蘊—T. 1537: 501b20-22; not in Sanskrit fragment).

⁵⁴⁸The *Vibhāṣā* lacks a comprehensive discussion of the category of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāra*, probably because it does not employ the *pañcavastu* category. Instead it has a unique system of *shih men* 十門 (see T. 1545: 466b1 ff.; Yamada 1959: 108-109).

However, in a discussion of 退 (*hāni*, *parihāṇa*), the *Vibhāṣā* refers to the “remaining *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*”:評曰。退自性者是不成就無覆無記。即是非得心不相應行蘊所攝。即在復有所餘如是類法心不相應中攝 (T. 1545: 313a25-27). See also T. 1546: 236a11-13, where the term *aprāpti* (非得) does not appear. It would be interesting to see to what extent references to *aprāpti* are Hsüan-tsang's interpolations. I refer again to this passage below.

⁵⁴⁹Jaini is not the only one to have overlooked the first list in the *Abhidharmāmrta*. Both Mochizuki (1974: 2089) and Fukuda (1990) refer only to the second. Van den Broeck, on the other hand, notices both lists and the inconsistency between them, and he discusses possible reasons for the difference (1977: 56-57).

⁵⁵⁰云何不相應法。得等十七法。十七法者。一成就。二無想定。三滅盡定。四無想處。五命根。六種類。七處得。八物得。九入得。十生。十一老。十二住。十三無常。十四名衆。十五字衆。十六味衆。十七凡夫性 (T. 1553: 979b28-c3). According to Sastri's retranslation: *katame viprayuktā dharmāḥ / prāptyādayaḥ saptadaśa dharmāḥ / prāpti* [1], *āsamjñikasamāpattiḥ* [2], *nirodhasamāpattiḥ* [3], *asamjñī āyatanaṁ* [4], *jīvitendriyam* [5], *nikāyasabhaṅgatā* [6], *sthānaprāptiḥ* [7], *vastuprāptiḥ* [8], *āyatanaprāptiḥ* [9], *jātiḥ* [10], *jarā* [11], *sthitiḥ* [12], *anityatā* [13], *nāmakāyaḥ* [14], *padakāyaḥ* [15], *vyāñjanakāyaḥ* [16], *prthagjanatvam* [17] (Sastri 1953: 130).

Van den Broeck retranslates the names of the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* as follows: *prāpti*, *asamjñisamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, *asamjñikāyatana*, *jīvitendriya*, *nikāyasabhaṅgatā*, *āśrayapratilābha*, *vastupratilābha* (or *viśayapratilābha*), *āyatanapratilābha*, *jāti*, *jarā*, *sthiti*, *anityatā*, *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, *vyāñjanakāya*, and *prthagjanatva* (1977: 231). This list is followed by definitions of each item; these definitions are more elaborate than those of the *Prakaraṇapāda*.

dharma.”⁵⁵¹ The second list, in which the order and terminology are slightly different, occurs in the final section of the text.⁵⁵² Although none of the available secondary sources⁵⁵³ mentions the possibility, I would guess it is a later addition. This would explain why *jīvitendriya* has been added and why the reference to “other similar *dharma*s” has been

⁵⁵¹ 云何心不相應行。得生住老無常無想定滅盡定無想處。種種〔類〕方得物得入得名衆句衆味衆凡夫性。如是種種法。是謂心不相應行 (T. 1553: 970a13-16; Van den Broeck 1997: 123). Sastrī retranslates this as follows: *katame cittaviprayuktāḥ samskārāḥ / prāptih jātiḥ sthitih jarā anityatā asamjñisamāpattiḥ nirodhasamāpattiḥ āsamjñikāyatanaṁ vividhā deśaprāptih vastuprāptih āyatanaaprāptih nāmakāyah padakāyah vyañjanakāyah prthagjanatavam ity evam vividhā dharmāś cittaviprayuktāḥ samskārāḥ* (Sastrī 1953: 61). Mochizuki, following the alternate reading in the Taishō note, reads 種類 for the first 種種, but, like La Vallée Poussin, he reads it with 方得, which La Vallée Poussin retranslates as *nānādeśaprāpti* (1971, v. 1: xlvi). Mochizuki notes that, unlike the *Prakarana-pāda*, the *Abhidharmāmrta* has dropped *jīvitendriya* and added *prthagjanatva*, but he does not explain what has happened to *nikāyasabhāgatā*. In fact, we should follow Mochizuki in accepting the reading 種類, which is sometimes used instead of 衆同分 to translate *nikāyasabhāgatā*, e.g., in the earlier translation of the *Prakarana-pāda* (T. 1541: 627a20; 628c19-20), as well as in the second passage from the *Abhidharmāmrta* (see note 549). Thus, by replacing *vividhā* with *nikāyasabhāgatā*, we arrive at a list of sixteen *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*.

Van den Broeck retranslates the names of the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* as follows: *prāpti, jāti, sthiti, jarā, anityatā, asamjñisamāpatti, nirodhasamāpatti, asamjñikāyatana, nikāyasabhāgatā, āśrayapratilābha, vastupratilābha, āyatanapratilābha, nāmakāya, padakāya, vyañjanakāya, and prthagjanatva* (1977: 123). In addition, he adds *jīvitendriya* on the basis of the fact that it appears in Chapter 16. In his general remarks on the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* (1977: 56-62), he indicates that Ghoṣaka simply forgot to include *jīvitendriya* in Chapter 6.

⁵⁵² *tsa p'in ti shih liu* 雜品第十六。

⁵⁵³ I.e., Mochizuki (1974: 2089), Sastrī (1953: 1-25), La Vallée Poussin (1971 v. 1: xlvi-xlvii), or *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten* (v. 1: 36).

Van den Broeck states: “Les chapitres 15 et 16 sont un supplément, un recueil de notes consacrées à des sujets que l'auteur avait passés sous silence dans le texte. Il est manifeste que l'*Abhidharma-sāra* a continué à servir de modèle. Le chapitre 16 continent d'ailleurs des inconsistances car l'auteur traite à nouveau la question des quatre ‘existences’ (*bhava*) dont il avait déjà parlé au chapitre 3” (1977: 23), and he suggests that the repeated mention of the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* is another example (1977: 56).

Van den Broeck does not suggest that these supplementary chapters are later additions to the text.

dropped; the list has been modified to better match the standardized lists of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* accepted by the later Vaibhāśikas.

In both texts with the reconstructed title *Abhidharmahṛdaya*,⁵⁵⁴ as well as in the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, the number of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* has been reduced to fourteen,⁵⁵⁵ the number well known to us from the *Abhidharmakośa*.⁵⁵⁶ In none of these texts does a phrase indicating the existence of other *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* occur. The *Abhidharmāvatāra*, the only other extant source that predates the *Abhidharmakośa*, is found in Tibetan, Eastern Tocharian, and Chinese translations. Hsüan-tsang, the Chinese translator, adds the word “et cetera” (*teng* 等) to the list of fourteen *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*,⁵⁵⁷ but the Tibetan translation does not.⁵⁵⁸ Van Velthem has remarked on the fact that Hsüan-tsang’s translation on occasion contains more than the corresponding Tibetan (1977: xix-xx). Perhaps in this case Hsüan-tsang, when he translated the *Abhidharmāvatāra* in 658, had in mind the *Abhidharmakośa*, which he is said to have translated between 651 and 654 and which contains the word *ādayah*. Alternatively, he may have

⁵⁵⁴ Hereafter, I refer to the *A p'i t'an hsin lun* 阿毘曇心論 (T. 1550) as Dharmāśri’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya* and to the *A p'i t'an hsin lun ching* 阿毘曇心論經 (T. 1551) as Upaśānta’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya*.

⁵⁵⁵ The lists, although identical in content, vary slightly in the terms used for translation and in order: 無思想, 無想定, 滅盡定, 衆生種類, 句身, 味身, 名身, 命根, 法得, 凡夫性, 生, 老, 住, 無常 (*Abhidharmahṛdaya* [阿毘曇心論]—T. 1550: 830c21-831a6); 無想, 無想定, 滅盡定, 衆生種類, 句身, 味身, 名身, 命根, 法得, 凡夫性, 生, 老, 住, 無常 (*Abhidharmahṛdaya* [阿毘曇心論經]—T. 1551: 866a3-20); 無想, 無想正受, 滅盡正受, 衆生種類, 句身, 味身, 名身, 命根, 法得, 凡夫性, 生, 住, 老, 無常 (*Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*—T. 1552: 942c24-943b9). Mochizuki remarks that the *Pañcaskandhaka* is identical.

⁵⁵⁶ Although from this point on, the number of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* is generally given as fourteen, only thirteen are included in the *Abhidharmadīpa* (verse 128; *Abhidharmadīpa*: 85.16-17); the exclusion of *asamjñisamāpatti* seems to be explained in verse 135 and its commentary (*Abhidharmadīpa*: 92.2-6). However, this passage is difficult to understand, and Jaini does not comment on this difference between the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmadīpa*.

⁵⁵⁷ 與此相違名不相應。謂得非得無想定滅定無想事命根衆同分生住老無常名身句身文身等 (T. 1554: 982a3-6; Van Velthem 1977: 14).

⁵⁵⁸ Van Velthem 1977: 86. Whether the fragmentary Eastern Tocharian translation includes this portion is not indicated.

been thinking of a text like the *Prakaraṇapāda*, which, although he is said to have translated it in 660, he probably had already studied before translating the *Abhidharmāvatāra*. The *Abhidharmāvatāra* is noteworthy for substituting *aprāpti* for *prthagjanatva*, which is simply a special case of *aprāpti*. According to Mochizuki, the identical list of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* in the *Abhidharmakośa* must have been based on the *Abhidharmāvatāra* (1974: 2089). The list in the *Abhidharmakośa* is generally considered to represent the orthodox Sarvāstivādin list.

Before coming back to later Sarvāstivādin opinions about the constituents of the list, I shall compare the Yogācāra list with the Sarvāstivādin lists mentioned above.

2. The Relationship between the Sarvāstivādin and the Yogācāra Lists

There are two passages about the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* in the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. Of these, the first (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 21b1-29b1; T. 1579: 585c9-588c9) appears to be the oldest Yogācāra exposition, and it is to this passage that I devote the most attention in my later discussion. However, since it does not contain a complete list, I refer to the second passage, which includes the twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* most frequently associated with Yogācāra, for the purpose of enumerating the Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*.⁵⁵⁹

One should notice first of all that the first fourteen *dharmas* in this list correspond most closely to the list of the *Abhidharmahrdaya*; notably, both texts include *prthagjanatva* rather than *aprāpti*. The first passage, although it omits *asamjñisamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, and *āsamjñika*, likewise contains *prthagjanatva*. In fact, all other Yogācāra enumerations of the first fourteen *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* contain the

⁵⁵⁹ 1. 得 (*prāpti*) 2. 無想定 (*asamjñisamāpatti*) 3. 滅盡定 (*nirodhasamāpatti*) 4. 無想天 (*āsamjñika*) 5. 命根 (*jīvitendriya*) 6. 衆同分 (*nikāyasabhāgatā*) 7. 生 (*jāti*) 8. 老 (*jarā*) 9. 住 (*sthiti*) 10. 無常 (*anityatā*) 11. 名身 (*nāmakāya*) 12. 句身 (*padakāya*) 13. 文身 (*vyañjanakāya*) 14. 異生性 (*prthagjanarva*) 15. 流轉 (*pravṛtti*) 16. 定異 (*pratiniyama*) 17. 相應 (*yoga*) 18. 勢速 (*java*) 19. 次第 (*anukrama*) 20. 時 (*kāla*) 21. 方 (*deśa*) 22. 數 (*saṃkhyā*) 23. 和合 (*sāmagrī*) 24. 不和合 (*asamagrī*) (T. 1579: 607a28-608a6).

same *dharma*s as the *Abhidharmahrdaya*.

Another feature of all the lists found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as well as that of the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun*, is that they do not contain any reference to “other” *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. In the case of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the Chinese translation includes the word “et cetera” (等) at the end of its list.⁵⁶⁰ However, neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation does, thus suggesting that this word is another of Hsüan-tsang’s additions. The appearance of a reference to other *dharma*s in the Chinese translation (also by Hsüan-tsang) of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T. 1602: 484a27-28), the Sanskrit and Tibetan of which are no longer extant, is therefore suspect as well. The *Pañcaskandhaka*, on the other hand, which includes only the first fourteen *dharma*s, undeniably contains a reference to similar *dharma*s.⁵⁶¹ P’u-kuang, in his commentary on the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* 大乘百法明門論, explains that the reference to other *dharma*s in the *Pañcaskandhaka* is to the last ten *dharma*s of the *Yogācāra* list, beginning with *pravṛtti*.⁵⁶²

On the basis of the above, I think that the *Yogācārabhūmi* tradition regarding the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* must have diverged from the Sarvāstivādin tradition between the time of the *Abhidharmahrdaya* and that of the *Abhidharmāvatāra*. Of course, the *Abhidharmahrdaya* is considerably earlier than the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*. However, it is possible that, at the time of the composition of the *Abhidharmahrdaya*, the forerunners of the *Yogācāras* were already reconsidering the constituents, as well as the ontological status, of the category of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. If, in fact, additions to the Sarvāstivādin list were suggested at this early date, phrases such as *ye 'py evamjātiyakā*

⁵⁶⁰謂得無想定滅盡定無想異熟命根衆同分生老住無常名身句身文身異生性流轉定異相應勢速次第時方數和合等 (T. 1605: 665b28-c2).

⁵⁶¹云何心不相應行。謂依色心心法分位。但假建立不可施設。決定異性及不異性。彼復云何。謂得無想等至滅盡等至無想所有。命根衆同分。生老住無常。名身句身文身異生性如是等類 (T. 1612: 849b29-c5). The Tibetan translation also includes such a phrase: *de lta bu'i cha dan mthun pa dag go* (Dantinne 1980: 141).

⁵⁶²何故五蘊論中唯有十四。無流転等十。解云。所以五蘊論不說流転等十也。彼論云。如是等類者則解彼論云。當知如是等類之言亦等流転等十也。此中唯略故不別列名也 (T. 1837 [Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun shu]: 60a22-25).

(“and those of this sort”) may have been used as justification. Perhaps it was in reaction to this that the *Abhidharmahrdaya* and its successors omitted such phrases and limited the category to fourteen *dharmas*.

3. *Samghabhedā*, *Sāmagrī*, and the Reopening of the Sarvāstivādin List

If, as I propose, the Sarvāstivādin school from about the time of the *Abhidharmahrdaya* closed the list of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras* at fourteen, the question arises as to whether, as a number of commentators suggest, Vasubandhu re-opens the list with the phrase *ādayaś ceti* in the verse of the *Abhidharmakośa*, and if so, why. In verse thirty-five and the first *pāda* of verse thirty-six of Chapter II, Vasubandhu says “the *viprayuktasam-skāras* are *prāpti*, *aprāpti*, *sabhāgatā*, *āsamjñika*, the (two) *saṃpatti*, *jīvita*, the *lakṣaṇas*, *nāmakāya*, et cetera.”⁵⁶³ It is clear that, due to the exigencies of versification, Vasubandhu like earlier authors has abbreviated the names of some of these *dharmas*: *sabhāgatā* for *nikāyasabhāgatā*,⁵⁶⁴ the (two) *saṃpatti* for *asamjñisamāpatti*⁵⁶⁵ and *nirodhasamāpatti*,⁵⁶⁶ *jīvita* for *jīvitendriya*,⁵⁶⁷ and the *lakṣaṇas* for *jāti*, *jarā*, *sthitī*, and *anityatā*.⁵⁶⁸ Therefore, it seems likely that “et cetera” here simply refers to *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya*.

Furthermore, the structure of the presentation in the verses does not suggest the existence of any other *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*. As we have seen, verses 35 and 36a consist of a list of the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*, while verses 36b through 47 contain definitions or

⁵⁶³ *Abhidharmakośa* II 35-36a: *viprayuktās tu saṃskārāḥ prāptya prāpti sabhāgatā / āsamjñikam samāpatti jīvitam lakṣaṇāni ca // nāmakāyādāyaś ceti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 62.11-13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 178);

心不相應行／得非得同分／／無想二定命／相名身等類／／(T. 1558: 22a6-7);

不相應諸行。至非至同分。無想處二定。壽命及諸相。名聚等 (T. 1559: 180c15-16);

mi ldan pa'i 'du byed rnams / thob dañ ma thob skal mñām dañ / 'du 'ses med sñoms 'jug pa dañ / srog dañ mtshan ñid rnams dañ ni / miñ gi tshogs la sogs pa yan (Fukuhara 1973: 240-242).

⁵⁶⁴ See *Abhidharmakośa* II 41a; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 67.15.

⁵⁶⁵ See *Abhidharmakośa* II 42a; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 69.1-3.

⁵⁶⁶ See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 71.18.

⁵⁶⁷ See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 73.16.

⁵⁶⁸ See *Abhidharmakośa* II 45cd; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 75.19.

explanations of each *dharma*.⁵⁶⁹ Verse 47 quotes the phrase *nāmakāyādayaḥ* from verse 36b and explains that *nāmakāya*, et cetera, are equivalent to “the congregation of name (samjñā), clause (vākyā) and syllable (akṣara).”⁵⁷⁰ Vasubandhu, before criticizing the Vaibhāṣika position, explains in the *Bhāṣya* that the word *ādi* refers to *pada-* and *vyañjanakāya*.⁵⁷¹ He further clarifies the verse by stating that *nāma* corresponds to *saṃjñā*, *pada* to *vākyā*, and *vyañjana* to *akṣara* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 80.14-17). Thus, in his exposition of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, Vasubandhu himself accounts for the word *ādi* without allowing for the possibility of more than fourteen *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. This is consistent with his general tendency to present in the verses a Sarvāstivādin position similar to that found in the *Abhidharmaḥṛdaya* or *Samyuktābhidharmaḥṛdaya*. As for the words *ca* and *iti*, they seem to have no special meaning other than to fill out the verse and indicate the end of the list.⁵⁷²

In the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, however, Yaśomitra interprets the phrase *nāmakāyādayaś ceti* in verse 36a differently. According to Yaśomitra, Vasubandhu intends to include other similar *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, for example, *saṃghabheda*, that have not been mentioned but that are really *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. Yaśomitra justifies this by referring to the phrase in *śāstra*, *ye 'py evamjātiyakā*, which I have already traced back to the *Pañcavastuka*.⁵⁷³ In fact, in Chapter Four (*Karmanirdeśa*) Vasubandhu defines *saṃghabheda* as a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* having the nature of *asāmagrī*, which La Vallée Poussin

⁵⁶⁹The fourth *pāda* of verse 47 and verse 48 contain a summary of the resultant nature (*nisyanda*, *vipāka*, or both) of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 82.3-18).

⁵⁷⁰*nāmakāyādayaḥ samjñāvākyākṣarasamuktayaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośa* II 47ab; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 80.13; translation from Fukuhara 1973: 264).

⁵⁷¹*ādigrahaṇena padavyañjanakāyagrahaṇanam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 80.14).

⁵⁷²For this meaning of *iti*, see Macdonell 1929: 45.

⁵⁷³*nāma-kāyādayaś ceti. ca-śabda evamjātiyakānukta-viprayukta-pradarśa-nārthah. saṃgha-bheda-prabhṛtayo hi dravyataś citta-viprayuktā iṣyante iti ye 'py evamjātiyakā iti śāstre 'py ukratvāt.* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 142.28-31; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 178 n. 2). According to Wogihara, the manuscripts read *iti-śabda*, but he has corrected the Sanskrit on the basis of the Tibetan *yan*.

translates as “non-concorde.”⁵⁷⁴ La Vallée Poussin refers to the passage in the *Vibhāṣā* according to which *saṃghabhedā*, unlike *saṃghabhedāvadya* (namely, lying [*mṛṣāvāda*]), is a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*.⁵⁷⁵ The identification of *saṃghabhedā* with *asāmagrī*, a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, can also be found in the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*⁵⁷⁶ but not in the corresponding portion of Upaśānta’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1551: 843c9-18).

It is, therefore, true that *saṃghabhedā* has been identified by Vasubandhu, as well as by his Vaibhāṣika sources, as a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* and that the *Vibhāṣā* has even associated *saṃghabhedā* with the phrase “remaining *dharmas* of the same type.”⁵⁷⁷ In translating the *Abhidharmakośa*, Hsüan-tsang seems to have such a phrase in mind when he renders *ādayaś ceti* as *teng lei* 等類; *lei* appears to be an abbreviation of *so yü ju shih lei fa* 所餘如是類法. Paramārtha, on the other hand, being more faithful to the original text and less interpretive, does not supply *lei*.⁵⁷⁸

The *Nyāyānusāra* also understands *ādayaś ceti* to include more than simply *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya*. As Cox points out, the *dharmas* that Samghabhadra refers to by the term *ca* (*lei* 類) are different from those for which he uses the term *ādi* (*teng* 等).⁵⁷⁹ *Ādi* includes *padakāya*

⁵⁷⁴ *saṃghabhedas tv asāmagrīsvabhāvo viprayuktah / akliṣṭāvyākṛto dharmah* (*Abhidharmakośa* IV 98a-c; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 260.17-18).

⁵⁷⁵ See note 548. 如僧破與破僧罪異。僧破以不和合為自性。無覆無記心不相行蘊所攝。破僧罪以虛詭語為自性。僧成就破破僧人成就罪 (T. 1545: 313b1-4).

⁵⁷⁶ 謂不和合性／當知是僧壞／不隱沒無記／是不相應行／ 僧壞者。是不和合性。不隱沒無記不相應行陰攝 (T. 1552: 898c20-23).

⁵⁷⁷ I am assuming that the *Vibhāṣā*’s comparison of *saṃghabhedā* with *hāni* extends to the phrase 復有所餘如是類法心不相應 (評曰。退自性者是不成就無覆無記。即是非得心不相應行蘊所攝。即在復有所餘如是類法心不相應中攝。應知退與順退法異。退以不成就非得為自性。無覆無記心不相行蘊所攝。順退法以一切不善有覆無記為其自性。如僧破與破僧罪異。僧破以不和合為自性。無覆無記心不相行蘊所攝。破僧罪以虛詭語為自性。僧成就破破僧人成就罪—T. 1545: 313a25-b4; see notes 547 and 574).

⁵⁷⁸ See note 562.

⁵⁷⁹ *Nyāyānusāra*: 頌曰 心不相應行／得非得同分／／無想二定命／相名身等類／／論曰。等者等取句身文身及和合性。類者顯餘所計度法。即前種類。謂有計度離得等有蘊得等性。如是諸法。不與心相應故。說名為此不相應行 (T. 1562: 396c8-14; Cox 1995: 181). Although Cox says that she indicates in brackets all of Hsüan-tsang’s

and *vyañjanakāya*, as well as *sāmagrī*, while *ca* “represents factors that, in Saṅghabhadra’s opinion, do not exist separately as factors dissociated from thought: that is, factors that are merely varieties of the dissociated factors listed in this verse” (Cox 1995: 182 n. 2).

The inclusion of *sāmagrī* is interesting for a number of reasons. Cox notes that Saṅghabhadra does not discuss the meaning of this term as a *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāra*. However, she refers to the *Vibhāṣā*, where it is said that *sāmagrī*, and not the object itself, is the cause of the awareness of a composite object.⁵⁸⁰ The objection is then raised: “if the individual (conditions of awareness taken) separately are not called the cause, then the totality (*sāmagrī*) of many factors must not be the cause.” To this, the answer is given: “The individual (conditions of awareness taken) separately are not called the totality; the assembled group of many factors is called the totality. Therefore, the individual (conditions of awareness taken) separately are not called the cause; the totality (consisting of) many factors can be called the cause.”⁵⁸¹ Cox also mentions a passage from the *Nyāyānusāra*, according to which *sāmagrī* is the “cause of the cognition of composites” (Cox 1995: 77 n. 26; T. 1562: 350c29-351a). As we shall see, the *Vibhāṣā* description of *sāmagrī* in this context is quite similar to the Yogācāra definition of *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāra*, and it is not surprising that Cox looks to these other passages for some clue as to what Saṅghabhadra meant by saying that *sāmagrī* is a *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāra*.

additions to the Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmakośa*, she does not bracket the word “type” in her translation of *Abhidharmakośa* II 36a: “name set (*nāmakāya*) and so on, and [other dharmas of that] type.” While she is correct that Hsüan-tsang uses 類 to render *ca*, the entire phrase, “other dharmas of that type,” is really Hsüan-tsang’s interpretation, not what Vasubandhu wrote. On the basis of the *Abhidharmakośavākyā* (see note 573), we can probably say that what Hsüan-tsang translates as 類 in Saṅghabhadra’s comment was also simply *ca* in the original Sanskrit.

⁵⁸⁰Cox 1995: 77 n. 26. This is the passage that she refers to: 問由有瓶故得有瓶覺豈此瓶覺唯瓶為因。答非但有瓶則有瓶覺以無瓶時亦有瓶覺。雖有瓶時無瓶覺故然有和合故得有瓶覺。是故和合是瓶覺因緣。有作是說。和合是因此和合因說名為緣 (T. 1545: 109b25-c1).

⁵⁸¹問若一一別不名為因。衆事和合亦應非因。答如一一別不名和合。衆事聚集即名和合。故一一別不名為因衆事和合得名為因 (T. 1545: 109c1-4).

However, we have a secondhand account of Samghabhadra's opinion according to which the meaning of *sāmagrī* is much more limited. In the *Chü she lun chi*, P'u-kuang relates an argument between Vasubandhu and Samghabhadra regarding *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*. When Vasubandhu challenges Samghabhadra about the nature of *sāmagrī*, Samghabhadra says that it is what one abandons at the time of *saṃghabheda*. Vasubandhu denies that this is a separate *dharma* and maintains that *sāmagrī* should be included in *sabhāgatā*.⁵⁸² After presenting a rather long debate, P'u-kuang states that, because there are different expositions of *sāmagrī*, the matter needs further investigation.⁵⁸³ However, he is certain that *sāmagrī* does not consist of *prāpti*, and he uses the same argument as in his discussion of *saṃghabheda* (see the next paragraph). I have not been able to find any trace of this debate in either the *Abhidharmakośa* or the *Nyāyanusāra*; nevertheless it calls into question whether the broader meanings that Cox suggests for *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* (1995: 77 n. 26) are, in fact, intended by Samghabhadra.

P'u-kuang, in his discussion of *Abhidharmakośa* IV 98, also has something to say about *saṃghabheda* and *asāmagrī*. After mentioning the opinions of two other teachers,⁵⁸⁴ he gives his own definition of *asāmagrī*: it is *aprāpti* with respect to *sāmagrī* (which, in this case, clearly refers to monastic concord). Prior to *saṃghabheda*, there is *sāmagrī*, and all members of the monastic community, sharing this *sāmagrī*, can obtain the *āryamārga*. In other words, because the *saṃgha* has *sāmagrī*, it is possible for the monks to enter the Path. If, however, the *saṃgha* is broken, *sāmagrī* is relinquished, and *asāmagrī* arises: because the *sāmagrī* has been broken, it is impossible to enter the Path. This is the reason that *saṃghabheda* is a deadly sin (*anantaryakarma*). Since the *saṃgha* does not achieve that *sāmagrī*, *asāmagrī* consists of

⁵⁸²俱舍師問云。此和合性如何證知。正理師解云。如破僧時捨和合性。明知別有。正理師問云。如我所立別有體性。汝不立者何法中收。俱舍師解云。此和合性衆同分攝 (T. 1821: 84b11-15).

⁵⁸³其和合性異說不同。故須研究 (T. 1821: 84c14).

⁵⁸⁴The two teachers are named as 古德空法師 and 空法師. I have been unable to identify these teachers.

aprāpti with respect to *sāmagrī*. However, *sāmagrī* does not consist of *prāpti*, because not every *dharma* has an opposite. For example, although the state of being an ordinary person is equivalent to *aprāpti* of the state of being an *ārya*, the state of being an *ārya* does not only consist of *prāpti*.⁵⁸⁵

P'u-kuang thus seems to understand *sāmagrī* as the opposite of *saṃghabhedā* and not as a general causal principle, and he denies the separate reality of both of them as real *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* not included in Vasubandhu's list of fourteen. Furthermore, he interprets the *lei* as indicating subclasses of the fourteen, and maintains that Vasubandhu did not intend to include any other *dharmas*.⁵⁸⁶ Fa-pao, on the other hand, disagrees with P'u-kuang; he says that Saṃghabhadra's inclusion of *sāmagrī* is justified since Vasubandhu, following texts such as the *Dharmaskandha* and *Prakaraṇapāda*, intended to leave the list open.⁵⁸⁷

Thus, there is some basis in the *Vibhāṣā* for Yaśomitra's assertion that *saṃghabhedā* should be included on the list, and it is not too far-fetched for Saṃghabhadra to substitute *sāmagrī*, in the sense of the opposite of *saṃghabhedā*. However, there is no evidence that in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* or the *Nyāyānusāra* either of these terms appears in the context of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* with a meaning extending beyond monastic discord or concord.

In the end, we cannot say anything conclusive about *saṃghabhedā* and *sāmagrī* as *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in these *abhidharma* texts. We do not know whether Vasubandhu actually intended to allow for the possibility of more than fourteen *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*, although I suspect that he did not. In any case, it is not clear whether there is any

⁵⁸⁵不和合性以和合上非得為體。謂僧未破有和合性。同共和合許有聖道。僧由有此和合性故容得入聖。若僧被破。捨和合性。有不和合性起。由彼破此和合性故不得入聖。故成無間。既不成就彼和合性。即以和合體上非得為不和合性。問破僧不和合非得以為體。亦可僧和合以彼得為體。解云諸法未必皆相翻立。如異生性以非得為體。聖性非唯以得為體 (T. 1821: 276c24-277a3).

⁵⁸⁶若作俱舍師說。類言即顯此十四種同流類。故非顯餘計 (T. 1821: 85a9-11).

⁵⁸⁷此論不說更無。正理不彈俱舍。六足言有所餘。正理說有和合。餘文皆通兩解。正理更無異端。教既分明。理須依釋。故知十四之外更有不相應行 (T. 1822: 135c15-18; see Fukuhara 1973: 241).

connection between Yaśomitra and Samghabhadra's inclusion of those particular *dharmas* and the fact that they have counterparts in the Yogācāra lists. As far as I know, none of the commentators on the *Abhidharmakośa* refers to any of the other *dharmas* included among the nine or ten extra Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*. Furthermore, although the commentators on the *Abhidharmakośa*, both Indian and Chinese, are clearly sensitive to the phrase *ye 'py evamjātiyakā*, none of them even draws attention to the possible relation between it and the fact that *Yogācāra* texts include twenty-three or twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*. Thus, *saṃghabhedā* and *sāmagrī* remain possible, but elusive, points of connection between the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra lists.

C. *Cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in Yogācāra

1. *Cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in Yogācāra Texts

Although it is well known that lists of *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* appear in the Yogācāra literature and that the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* are considered merely provisional designations (*prajñapti*), there has been, as far as I know, no detailed study of the relationship between the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin lists.⁵⁸⁸ This may be due to the fact that the literature of neither school contains an explicit discussion of the other school's list. In this section I examine the Yogācāra reinterpretation of several of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* that are common to both lists in order to establish why Yogācāra, if it considers the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* to be merely *prajñapti*, preserves the category. I also discuss the group of *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* that are specifically associated with Yogācāra in the hope of explaining why they were added.

In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* generally appear in two contexts, as members of the category of *prajñaptidharmas*

⁵⁸⁸Jaini has found similarities between the last nine *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list and certain Vaiśeṣika categories, but he does not speculate about why these *dharmas* were introduced into the Yogācāra lists (Jaini 1959b: 537-538).

and as constituents of *dharmadhātu*. I have located six places in the *Yogācārabhūmi* where *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* are discussed.⁵⁸⁹ Of these, a passage in the *Manobhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 68.12-69.7; *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: dzi 40b2-5; T. 1579: 293c7-11) states that *dharmadhātu* consists of eighty-seven *dharmas*, including those that are *prajñapti*: the fifty-three *caitasiskas* from *manaskāra* through *vitarka* and *vicāra*; the two types of *rūpa* included in *dharmadhātu* (*saṃvara-saṃvarasamgrhita* and *saṃādhigocara*); twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*; and eight *asamskṛtas*. These *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* include the same fourteen that are found in the *Abhidharmahrdaya* and *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*,⁵⁹⁰ although in a different order, together with the ten causal *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* peculiar to *Yogācāra*.⁵⁹¹

Most of the remaining passages concern the provisional nature of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. In the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, a large number, but not the entire list, are examined in great detail (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 21b1-29b1; T. 1579: 585c9-588c9).⁵⁹² This section, which begins with a discussion of why the four

⁵⁸⁹Fukuhara refers to *chüan* 40 of Hsüan-tsang's translation, which is included in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Fukuhara 1973: 241). However, I have been unable to locate the term *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* either in this *chüan* or in the Sanskrit text, and I have found no other secondary sources that refer to a discussion of this subject in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

⁵⁹⁰See note 554.

⁵⁹¹*prāpti* (*thob pa* 得), *asamjñāsamāpatti* ('du s̄es med pa'i s̄nom̄s par 'jug pa 無想定), *nirodhasamāpatti* ('gog pa'i s̄nom̄s par 'jug pa 滅盡定), *āsamjñika* ('du s̄es med pa 無想異熟) *jīvitendriya* (*srog gi dbai po* 命根), *nikāyasabhāgatā* (*ris mthun pa* 衆同分), *prthagjanatva* (*so so i skye bo nīd* 異生性), *jāti* (*skye ba* 生), *jarā* (*rga ba* 老), *sthiti* (*gnas pa* 住), *anityatā* (*mi rtag pa* 無常), *nāmakāya* (*miñ gi tshogs rnams* 名身), *padakāya* (*tshig gi tshogs rnams* 句身), *vyañjanakāya* (*vi ge'i tshogs rnams* 文身), as well as *pravrtti* ('jug pa 流轉), *pratiniyama* (*so sor nes pa* 定異), *yoga* ('byor 'grel 相應), *java* (*mgyogs pa* 勢速), *anukrama* (*go rim* 次第), *kāla* (*dus* 時), *deśa* (*yul* 方), *samkhyā* (*grains* 數), *sāmagrī* (*tshogs pa* 和合), and *asāmagrī* (*tsogs pa med yin pa* 不和合). Neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation includes either the number or the term *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*, but Hsüan-tsang inserts the sentence 不相應行有二十四種 before the sublist (T. 1579: 293c7-11). No definitions are given.

⁵⁹²A parallel passage can be found in the *Chüeh ting tsang lun* (T. 1584: 1023a23-1025b26).

samskratalakṣaṇas are *prajñapti* and not *dravya*, contains the most complete and interesting definitions of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras* found in the Yogācāra literature, often with reference to *bijas*. Later in the same chapter, each of the twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*, which are said to be states of the *skandhas*,⁵⁹³ is defined simply and further divided into three types (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 76a5-78a3; T. 1579: 607a23-608a6). In the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī*, the twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*, as well as *vijñapti*, *avijñapti*, and *bīja*, are said to comprise a particular type of *prajñapti*.⁵⁹⁴ Finally, the *Abhidharmamātrikā* section of the *Vastusaṃgrahāṇī* mentions the category of *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra* (T. 1579: 878c8-9), and, referring to the *Manobhūmi*, describes the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras* as having one of the six types of provisional existence, i.e., provisional existence by way of being a state (*fen wei chia yu* 分位假有 = *avasthāprajñapti*).⁵⁹⁵

In addition, there is another passage in the *Pañcavijñānakāyamano-bhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 38b4-39b1; T. 1579: 592c13-593a14) that defines *asamjñisamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti*, although not in the context of *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*. Here both of the *saṃpattis* are said to have only provisional existence. Schmithausen says about the definition of *nirodhasamāpatti*

⁵⁹³ *phuṇ po rnams kyi gnas skabs du yod ce na / smras pa / maṇ ste sems daṇ ldan pa yin pa 'di lta ste / 'thob pa daṇ / 'du śes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa la sogs pa rgyas par sñar bstan pa bžin du rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi* [tib.]: zi 76a5-6). 問諸蘊分位有幾種。答有多種。謂得無想定等心不相應行 (T. 1579: 607a23-24).*

⁵⁹⁴ *dus byas kyi miṇ can gyi dṇos po la skye ba daṇ / rga ba daṇ / gnas pa daṇ / mi rtag pa daṇ / sa bon daṇ rnām par rig byed daṇ / rnām par rig byed ma yin pa daṇ / 'thob pa daṇ / 'thob pa ma yin pa daṇ / srog gi dbaṇ po daṇ / ris mthun pa daṇ / miṇ gi tshogs daṇ / tshig gi tshogs daṇ / yi ge'i tshogs rnāms daṇ so so'i skye bo nīd daṇ / tshogs pa daṇ ma tshogs pa daṇ / 'jug pa so sor nes pa daṇ / sbyor ba daṇ / mgyogs pa daṇ / go rims daṇ / dus daṇ yul daṇ graṇs nē bar 'dogs pa daṇ (*Yogācārabhūmi* [tib.]: zi 208a4-6). 又於有諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身文身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16, perhaps commenting on the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Maulibhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi* [tib.]: dzi 232a ff.; T. 1579: 362a1 ff., where *brda'i mtshan nīd* (假相有法) is discussed]).*

⁵⁹⁵ 分位假有者。謂生等諸心不相應行。如前意地已標辯釋。即於諸行由依前後有及非有。同類異類相續分位假立生等。非此生等離諸行外有真實體而別可得 (T. 1579: 879a15-19).

here that “the (traditional) definition of *nirodhasamāpatti* as cessation of mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) [in general, i.e. of all of them] is followed by the remark (once again by the compiler?) that what ceases is only the *pravṛttivijñānas* but not *ālayavijñāna*” (1987: 271-272 n. 131).

There are several other Yogācāra texts that generally follow the *Yogācārabhūmi* treatment of *cittaviprayuktasamāskāras*. The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T. 1602: 484a21-b27)⁵⁹⁶ and the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* (T. 1614: 855c10-16) contain the same lists of twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasamāskāras* as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, while the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* enumerates twenty-three, omitting *asāmagrī* (*Abhidharma-samuccaya*: 18.20-22).⁵⁹⁷ The *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* does not define the individual *dharmas*, but the definitions found in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* are often almost identical, especially those of the *cittaviprayuktasamāskāras* from *pravṛtti* to *sāmagrī*.⁵⁹⁸ The definitions in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, although only the

⁵⁹⁶In Hsüan-tsang's translation, the list of *cittaviprayuktasamāskāras* that precedes their definitions is ended by the phrase 復有諸餘如是種類差別 (T. 1602: 484a27-28). However, we must be skeptical about whether this isn't Hsüan-tsang's own contribution (see above, section A2, as well as note 596).

⁵⁹⁷In his commentary on the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun*, P'u-kuang offers two explanations for the absence of *asāmagrī* in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. According to the first explanation, the word “et cetera” (等), which follows *sāmagrī* in Hsüan-tsang's translation (but is found in neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation), should be understood to include *asāmagrī*. According to the second, *asāmagrī* is omitted in the interest of brevity because it really is included in *prthagjanatva*, which is equivalent to *aprāpti* of the *āryamārga* (何故對法論有二十三無不和合。此有何意。一解云。對法論云和合等者。論既言和合等。當知則等取不和合。又一解云。略故不說。問曰。等略何故不略餘數但略不和合耶。解云。已說在所說中。所以但偏略不和合性也。言說在所說中者。謂異生性是見道煩惱。假建立。望聖道有不得義故。即是不和合義。不和合中略舉一隅。餘不和合類亦可知。所以偏略不和合性—T. 1837: 60a11-18. See my discussion of *asāmagrī* below, section C4b).

⁵⁹⁸There are some differences between the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* and *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. In the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, *prthagjanatva* occurs after *nikāyasabhāgata* and before the *sāṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, while in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* it occurs after *vyañjanakāya* and before *pravṛtti*. The definition of *prāpti* in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* contains a reference to *bījas*, while that in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* does not. And the definitions of *prthagjanatva* are different: the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* describes two types, the ignorant nature of beings, which has no beginning, and the nature of all false paths, i.e., those other than the

first fourteen *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* are included, generally agree with those of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*. Regarding these three texts, we can say that the definitions of the first fourteen *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* generally give the impression of having been most directly taken from the definitions in the second *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* passage mentioned above (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 76a5-78a3; T. 1579: 607a23-608a6), which themselves seem to be based on the much longer definitions in the first passage (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 76a5-78a3; T. 1579: 585c9-588c9). This is most strikingly true in the case of *prāpti*.⁵⁹⁹ The definitions of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* from *pravṛtti* to *anukrama* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, and the second passage from the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* are almost identical, while those of the remaining *dharmas* differ somewhat from text to text.

2. The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* on the *Cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*

The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, after commenting on many of the definitions of individual *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in the *Abhidharma-*

Buddha's (異生性者。此有二種。一愚夫異生性。二無聞異生性。愚夫異生性者。謂無始世來有情身中愚夫之性。無聞異生性者。謂如來法外諸邪道性—T. 1602: 484b12-15; see section 3c below); the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* simply defines it as non-obtainment of the *āryadharma* (*prthagjanatvām kātamā / āryadharmaṇām apratilambhe prthagjanatvam iti prajñaptih*—*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.5).

⁵⁹⁹Compare: (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*) *prāptih kātamā / kuśalākuśalānām* (Tibetan and Chinese both add *avyākṛtānām*) *dharmaṇām sācayāpacaye prāptih pratilambhah samanvāgama iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 18.22-23);

(*Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*) 得者。此復三種。一諸行種子所攝相續差別性。二自在生起相續差別性。三自相生起相續差別性 (T. 1602: 484a28-b1);

(*Yogācārabhūmi*) 'thob pa de yan m dor bsdu na rnam pa gsum du rig par bya'o / sa bon dañ ldan pa dañ / dbañ dañ ldan pa dañ / kun tu 'byuñ bar ldan pa pa'o (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 25a5). 當知此得略有三種。一種子成就。二自在成就。三現行成就 (T. 1579: 587a10-11). This last is later defined as follows: *da ltar gyi chos rnam s m nōn sum gyi dños bos rai gi mtshan n̄id kyis 'grub pa ni kun tu 'byuñ ba dañ ldan pa žes bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 25b1-2). 若現在諸法自相現前轉。名現行成就 (T. 1579: 587a19-20);

(*Pañcaskandhaka*) 云何為得。謂若獲若成就。復此三種。謂若種子若自在若現前。如其所應 (T. 1612: 849c6-7).

samuccaya, provides its own explanation of the category as a whole and its provisional nature. This serves as a summary of the contents of the passages that are discussed below, so I translate it in full:

These *cittaviprayuktas*, because they are designations of states of conditioned *dharmas*,⁶⁰⁰ are all to be understood as being [only] provisionally real. Among them, one [*prāpti*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of the increase or decrease of good, bad, etc. Three [*asamjñisamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, and *āsamjñika*] are [designations] for the state consisting of the non-arising of *citta* and the *caitasikas*. One [*jīvitendriya*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of continued existence. One [*nikāyasabhāga*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of similarity. Four [*jāti*, *jarā*, *sthiti*, and *anityatā*] are [designations] for the state consisting of the characteristics [of conditioned existence]. Three [*nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya*] are [designations] for the state consisting of discourse. One [*prthagjanatva*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of the non-obtaining [of the *āryadharma*s]. The remainder [from *pravṛtti* through *sāmagrī*] are [designations] for the state consisting of cause and result. Moreover, cause and result is to be understood as all of conditioned existence: when something else arises due to a certain thing, [that thing] is a cause; when a certain thing arises due to something else, [that thing] is a result.⁶⁰¹

As we can see from this passage, there is really no clear-cut distinction between the last nine *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, which are specified as

⁶⁰⁰ *Avasthāprajñapti* is mentioned in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* as the fifth of six types of provisional existence (又此假有略有六種。一衆集假有。二因假有。三果假有。四所行假有。五分位假有。六觀持假有—T. 1579: 878c27-29) and is defined as consisting of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* (see note 594). This portion of the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* is late.

⁶⁰¹ *ity evam ete cittaviprayuktāḥ samskārāṇāṁ dharmāṇāṁ avasthāsu prajñapanāt sarve prajñaptisanto veditavyāḥ / tatra kuśalākuśalādyā[sic]cayāpacayāvasthāyāṁ ekaḥ / cittacaitasikāpravrtyavasthāyāṁ trayah / sthityavasthāyāṁ ekaḥ / sādrśyāvasthāyāṁ ekaḥ / laksānāvasthāyāṁ catvāraḥ / vyavahārāvasthāyāṁ trayah / alābhāvasthāyāṁ ekaḥ / hetuphalāvasthāyāṁ śesā iti / hetuphalam punar atra sarvam samskrtaṁ veditavyam / tato 'nyasyotpādād hetuḥ / anyatas tadotpādāt phalam iti (Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya: 11.3-8).*

designations for the state of cause and result, and many of the other *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*, most obviously *prāpti*, the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, and *prthagjanatva*. All of them are descriptions of certain aspects of the causal process, and, as the *Bhāṣya* suggests, the causal process and conditioned existence are identical. The Sautrāntika/Yogācāra⁶⁰² criticism of many of the Sarvāstivādin *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* is based on a refutation of the overly mechanistic Sarvāstivādin explanation of these aspects. By “mechanistic,” I mean that Sarvāstivāda finds it necessary to posit entities or forces to explain causal phenomena. The Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, on the other hand, believe that these phenomena come about due to the very nature of conditioned existence. *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* such as *prāpti* are maintained as descriptions of phenomena but are no longer considered their causes, while *pravṛtti*, etc., are added to turn the Yogācāra interpretation of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* into an extensive discussion of causality.

As a result, it is not surprising that we should find material from other Yogācāra explanations of causality, for example, from expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda*, *bīja* theory, and the ten-*hetu* system, in the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāra* sections of texts such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*. In the following sections, I focus on the relationship between the definitions of the individual *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* and these other expositions of causality.

3. Yogācāra interpretations of Sarvāstivādin *Cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*

As I said above, it seems that the first passage from the *Viniścayayasamgrahānī*, although not a complete enumeration, is the

⁶⁰²In an early but very important article on the Dārṣṭāntika and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, Mizuno was the first to establish the affinity among the criticisms of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* by the Dārṣṭāntika, Harivarman, and Vasubandhu. Furthermore, he stated that the Yogācāra school relied on the Dārṣṭāntika’s opinion that the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* are merely *prajñapti* (1930: 145). However, he did not discuss the explanations of some *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* in terms of *bīja*, which are found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and which are the subject of much of the following.

earliest⁶⁰³ Yogācāra exposition of the *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*.⁶⁰⁴ Moreover, it is certainly the most explicit source of information about the *dharmas* peculiar to Yogācāra as well as about the specifically Yogācāra interpretation of *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* that belong equally to the Sarvāstivādin list. Before I examine the group of the last ten *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*, I discuss some of these reinterpretations in which the term *bija* appears. These definitions are of particular interest to me because they contain many of the arguments adduced by Vasubandhu in his so-called “Sautrāntika” criticism of the Sarvāstivādin *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*. Significantly, although some of these arguments can also be traced to the Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika tradition, a number of them seem to have originated in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

a. *Jāti*⁶⁰⁵

The first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage begins by denying the real existence of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and granting them only provisional status. The text makes a number of arguments against the ultimate existence of *jāti*, several of which I mention briefly. The first of these is based on a denial of the real existence of the three times that

⁶⁰³This is in accord with Mizuno’s opinion that the *Yogācārabhūmi* originally did not posit a definite number of *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras*; the example he gives is our first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, which omits *asamjñikasamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, and *āsamjñika*, as well as *deśa* and *asāmagrī* (he mistakenly says that it also omits *sāmagrī*). Later, he says, the number was fixed, and he gives the *Manobhūmi* and second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passages as examples (1956: 58).

⁶⁰⁴However, the separate existence of the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is denied as early as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which maintains that they are nothing other than the *saṃskṛtadharma*s themselves (*tatra bodhisattvah saṃskāra-mātram sthāpayitvā na tasya jātim na sthitim na jarām nānityatām sarva-kālam dravya-svabhāva-pariniṣpattitāḥ paśyati. tat kasya hetoh. saṃskāra-mātram utpadyamānam upalabhatē nāsyānyām jātim na sthitim na jarām nānityatām*—*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 279.6-11; T. 1579: 544b17-20).

⁶⁰⁵A study on momentariness in Buddhism contains a chapter on the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in which are cited many of the passages discussed below (Rosspatt 1995: 40-66).

immediately precedes the discussion of the *lakṣanas*.⁶⁰⁶ Once the separate existence of the future *saṃskāras* themselves has been rejected, the real existence of *jāti*, which pertains to the future, must also be rejected.⁶⁰⁷ This argument foreshadows one of Vasubandhu's criticisms of the Sarvāstivādin position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*,⁶⁰⁸ and a similar objection is also raised in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*.⁶⁰⁹ Another argument is that all *dharma*s are caused by their own *bījas*; hence there is no need for an entity called *jāti* to produce them.⁶¹⁰ Finally, the text asks whether *jāti* is the actualization of the *saṃskṛtadharma*s or the cause of their actualization. If it is their actualization, then *jāti* actualizes the *saṃskṛtas*. However, it does not make sense to say that *samskṛtas* are

⁶⁰⁶ According to this passage, the past is a designation of the stream of *bījas* that have already produced results. The future refers to the stream of future *bījas* that have not yet produced results, while the present refers to the stream of present *bījas* that have not yet produced results (*bcom ldn 'das kyis khams 'das pa yañ yod de / khams ma 'oñs pa yañ yod do žes gañ gsüns pa 'de la gdoñs pa gañ yin že na / sa bon gyi rgyun 'bras bu bskyed zin pa ni khams 'das pa žes bya'o / sa bon gyi rgyun 'byuñ ba 'bras bu ma bskyed pa nñid ni khams ma 'oñs pa žes bya'o / da ltar sa bon gyi rgyun 'bras bu ma skyed pa ni khams da ltar byuñ ba žes bya'o—*Viniścayasamgrahāñ* [tib.]: zi 21a7-8; 問如世尊言。有過去界有未來界有現在界。此何密意。答若已與果種子相續。名過去界。若未與果當來種子相續。名未來界。若未與果現在種子相續。名現在界—T. 1579: 585c1-5).*

⁶⁰⁷ 'di ltar ma 'oñs pa'i skye ba ni med pa yin pas ji ltar gžan skyed par 'gyur la / da ltar gyi skye bas ni da ltar gyi 'du byed skyed pa mi nus pa'i phyir ro (*Viniścayasamgrahāñ* [tib.]: zi 21b2-3). 未来世生自無所有。云何能生所餘諸行。亦非現在能生能現在諸行 (T. 1579: 585c11-13).

⁶⁰⁸ *eko dharmah ekasmīnna eva kālē jātāḥ sthito jīrṇo naṣṭāḥ syād eṣām sahabhūtvāt / kārītrakālābhedāt / anāgatā hi jātīḥ kārītrām hi karoti / yasmān na jātam janyate janite tu dharme vartamānāḥ kṣityādayāḥ kārītrām kurvantītī na yadā jāyate tada tīṣṭhati jīryati vinaśyati vā / idam tāvad iha sampradhāryam bhavet / kim anāgatām dravyato 'sti nāstīti paścāj janayati vā na vetti sidhyet / saty api tu tasmin jātīḥ kārītrām kurvatītī katham anāgatā sidhyatītī anāgatalakṣanām vaktavyam / uparatakārītrā cotpannā katham vartamānā sidhyatītī vartamānalakṣanām vaktavyam (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 78.13-20; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 231-232).*

⁶⁰⁹ 生名為有。寧在未來 (T. 1585: 6a5-6; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 66; *Shindōjōyūshikiron*: 52).

⁶¹⁰ gžan yañ ran gi sa bon gyi rgyu so sor nes pa dañ ldn pa'i chos thams cad la skye par byed pa'i skye ba gžan brtags pas ci žig bya (*Viniścayasamgrahāñ* [tib.]: zi 21b6-7). 又一切法各各別有自種子因。何須計有異生能生 (T. 1579: 585c18-19).

actualized due simply to the presence of *jāti*.⁶¹¹ If on the other hand *jāti* is the cause of actualization, then for each *samskr̄tadharma* there must be two *jātis*, one that actualizes and one that is actualized, and this also is illogical.⁶¹² The reasoning here seems to resemble the argument of infinite regress raised by Vasubandhu against the *anulakṣaṇas*, *jātijāti*, etc.⁶¹³

After stating that the other *lakṣaṇas* can be similarly criticized, the text concludes that they are, therefore, all designations for the *samskr̄tadharma*s themselves.⁶¹⁴ When, due to causes, formerly non-existent *samskr̄tadharma*s arise, this is called *jāti*. When the *samskr̄tadharma*s that arise later are different from the earlier ones, this is called *jarā*. When these *samskr̄tadharma*s, having been produced, persist for a limited time, this is called *sthiti*. And when, after the

⁶¹¹ *gžan yañ skye ba 'du byed rnams kyi mñon par 'grub pa tsam žig gam / 'on te mñon par 'grub pa'i rgyur 'gyur ba žig yin / re žig gal te mñon par 'grub pa tsam žig yin na ni / skye ba 'du byed rnams mñon par 'grub par byed pa yin te / skye ba yod na mñon par 'grub par 'gyur ro žes bya ba mi ruñ no* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāñ* [tib.]: zi 21b7-8). 又此生相為即諸行生耶。為是諸行生因耶。若即諸行生者。計此生相能生諸行由有生故諸行得生。不應道理 (T. 1579: 585c19-21). This argument seems to be reflected in Vasubandhu's objection in the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya* to the effect that, if future *jāti* produces the future *dharma* that it is supposed to produce, all future *dharmas* will be produced simultaneously. The Sarvāstivādin answer to this is that all the causes and conditions of production must also come together for a *dharma* to be produced (*api ca yady anāgatā jātir janyasya janikā kim arthaṃ sarvam anāgatam yugapan notpadyate / yasmāt janyasya janikā jātir na hetupratyayair vinā na hi vinā hetupratyayasāmagryā jātir janikā bhavati*—*Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 79.17-19; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 234). See the discussion of *sāmagrī* below.

⁶¹² *gal te skye ba 'du byed rnams kyi mñon par 'grub pa'i rgyu yin na ni / des na 'du byed gcig la mñon par 'grub par byed pa dai / mñon par 'grub pa'i skye ba gñis 'byuñ bar 'gyur te mi ruñ no* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāñ* [tib.]: zi 21b8-22a1). 若是諸行生因者。諸行生時於一一行便有二生。謂生能生。不應道理 (T. 1579: 585c21-23). See La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 224-225; Jaini 1959b: 543.

⁶¹³ *tesām api nāma jātyādīnām samskr̄tavād anyair jātyādibhir bhavitavyam / bhavanty eva / jātijātyādayas tesām tesām api catvāry anulakṣaṇāni bhavanti / jātijātih sthitisthitiḥ jarājarā anityatā 'nityatā iti / nanu caikasyaikasya caturlakṣaṇ[āñ]*ī prāpnoti aparyavasānadośaś ca / tesām punar anyajātyādiprasaṅgāt* (*Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*: 76.9-14; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 224).

*Pradhan omits the bracketed letters.

⁶¹⁴ This conclusion is the same as that of the *Bodhisattvabhbūmi*: see note 604.

moment of production, the characteristics of these *samskrtradharmas* are destroyed, this is called *nirodha* or *anityatā*.⁶¹⁵

The arguments in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* against the real existence of the *samskratalakṣaṇas* seem somewhat truncated and are difficult to follow. Nevertheless, in them one can recognize a number of general ideas that are expressed much more fully and systematically by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Furthermore, its explanation that they are designations for the *samskrtradharmas* is perfectly clear and is obviously reflected in Vasubandhu's statement of his own position, particularly in the second of three verses that he composes to support his argument: "Jāti is existence that has not existed before; sthiti is the series; destruction (=anityatā) is the cutting off [of the series]; the change in state of sthiti (=jarā) is intended to be the difference between the earlier and later [moments of] the series."⁶¹⁶

Katō suggests that Harivarman, the "Sthavira" of the *Nyāyānusāra*, and Vasubandhu all rely on the Dārśṭāntika of the *Vibhāśā* in their criticisms of the *samskratalakṣaṇas* (1989: 308). It is certainly true that the arguments of all four are similar. According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, it is the Sthavira's opinion that Vasubandhu quotes in the first of the three verses in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* mentioned in the preceding paragraph: The stream of *samskrtradharmas* is called *jāti* when it arises,

⁶¹⁵ *de lta bas na skye ba la sog pa yan 'du byed rnam la [bta]gs pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o / de la rgyu yod na ran gi mtshan ñid sñon ma byuñ ba 'grub pa ni 'du byed rnam kyi skye ba žes bya'o / sna ma las phyi ma gžan ñid du gžan du 'gyur ba ñid ni 'du byed rnam kyi rga ba žes bya'o / skye ba'i dus tsam la gnas pa ni 'du byed rnam kyi gnas pa žes bya ste / de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnam kyi 'jig pa žes bya'o (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 22a-2-4). 故知生等於諸行中假施設。有由有因故諸行非本自相始起說名為生。後起諸行與前差別說名為老。即彼諸行生位暫停說名為住。生剎那後諸行相盡說名為滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c24-28). Compare with the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*: 然有為法因緣力故。本無今有。暫有還無。表異無為假立四相。本無今有有位名生。生位暫停即說為住。住別前後復立異名。暫有還無無時名滅 (T. 1585: 6a8-12; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 52; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 66-67).*

⁶¹⁶ *jātir apūrvo bhāvah sthithi prabandho vyayas taduccheda / sthityanyathātvam iṣṭam prabandha pūrvāparaviśesa iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 77.13-14; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 228, where the reconstruction of the Sanskrit is slightly inaccurate).

vyaya when it is destroyed, and *sthiti* while it proceeds; the difference between earlier and later moments is called *sthityanyathātva*.⁶¹⁷

Harivarman says that *jāti* is equivalent to the *skandhas* in the present world, *vyaya*⁶¹⁸ (=anityatā) to their abandoning of the present world, *sthiti* to the fact that they continue, and *sthityanyathātva* to the fact that their continuance changes.⁶¹⁹ They are not separate *dharmas*. Furthermore, *jāti* cannot be a *dharma*: according to the principle that all *dharmas* arise due to the conjunction of a number of conditions, no one *dharma* (*jāti*) can produce another *dharma* (any of the *samskratadharmas* in this case).⁶²⁰

Finally, the Dārśāntika is represented by the *Vibhāṣā* as denying the reality of the *samskratalakṣaṇas*.⁶²¹ He is also said to reject the simultaneous presence of the three⁶²² *lakṣaṇas*, saying that the arising of all *dharmas* is called *jāti*, their subsequent destruction is called *vyaya*, and their maturing is called *jarā*.⁶²³

⁶¹⁷ 諸行相續。初起名生。終盡位中。說名為滅。中間相續隨轉名住。此前後別。名為住異 (T. 1562: 407c10-12; Katō 1989: 306; Cox 1995: 320). The Sanskrit as found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is as follows: *jātir ādiḥ pravāhasya vyayaś chedah sthitis tu sah / sthityanyathātvam tasyaiva pūrvāparaviśiṣṭatā* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 77.11-12; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 228, where the reconstruction of the Sanskrit is again slightly inaccurate).

⁶¹⁸ This is the Sanskrit equivalent of 滅 according to Katsura (1974: 86).

⁶¹⁹ 生者。五陰在現在世名生。捨現在世名滅。相續故住。是住變故名為住異 (T. 1646: 289b18-20; Katō 1989: 304-305; Rospatt 1995: 60 n. 129). Katō points out the similarity between this position and one attributed in the *Vibhāṣā* to the 經部師, whom he identifies (Katō 1989: 119) as being earlier than the Sautrāntikas generally familiar to us: 或復有執。色等五蘊。出胎時名生。相續時名住。衰變時名異。命終時名滅。如經部師 (T. 1545: 198b1-3; Cox 1995: 362 n. 64). But he suggests the possibility that Hsüan-tsang altered the original of the *Vibhāṣā*, perhaps on the basis of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (Katō 1989: 304-305).

⁶²⁰ 非別有法名生住滅。又佛法深義。謂衆緣和合有諸法生。是故無法能生異法 (T. 1646: 289b20-22; Katō 1989: 304; Rospatt 1995: 61 n. 130).

⁶²¹ 譬喻者說生等諸相體非實有 (T. 1545: 198c22; Katō 1989: 303). Rospatt points out that this passage is not found in T. 1546 (1995: 63 n. 137).

⁶²² In some texts, only three *lakṣaṇas* are mentioned; see Rospatt 1995: 40-44.

⁶²³ 謂或有執三有為相非一剎那。如譬喻者彼作是說。若一剎那有三相者。則應一法一時亦生亦老亦滅。然無此理互相違故。應說諸法初起名生。後盡名滅。中熟名老 (T. 1545: 200a3-5; Katō 1989: 303). Rospatt cites this passage and says that it suggests

The four texts examined by Katō share the same conclusion as the *Yogācārabhumi*, namely that the *samṣkṛtalakṣaṇas* are designations for the *saṃskṛtadharma*s at different points in the course of their existence. They all suggest that the principle of conditioned origination is sufficient to explain the progression of the *samskritas* from their initial production to their final destruction without the agency of other *dharmas*.⁶²⁴ Furthermore, both the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*⁶²⁵ and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*,⁶²⁶ while omitting their reasons for denying the reality of the *lakṣaṇas*, come to the same conclusions, as does the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which includes its reasons in full.⁶²⁷ However, unlike these three

that “unlike the Sautrāntikas, at least some sections among the Dārśāntikas took the canonical position that origination, change and destruction alone are *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as their starting point” (1995: 63 n. 136).

⁶²⁴Vasubandhu makes this criticism explicitly in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* II 46c-d. The objection is anticipated that future *jāti* would produce all future *dharmas* at the same time (*api ca yady anāgatā jātir janyasya janikā kim arthaḥ sarvam anāgatam yugapan notpadyate*—*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 79.17). Cox points out that, according to P'u-kuang (T. 1821: 107a28 ff.), this is not Vasubandhu's objection (1983: 313 n. 126; in 1995: 372 n. 132, she cites P'u-kuang but does not mention what he says). The verse gives the Sarvāstivādin response, namely that production does not occur without causes and conditions, that is to say, according to the *Bhāṣya*, without the totality of causes and conditions (*janyasya janikā jātir na hetupratyaya* vinā *na hi vinā hetupratyaya* sāmagryā *jātir janikā bhavati*—*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 79.18-19). Vasubandhu then attacks, saying that only causes and conditions have the power to produce; *jāti* is unnecessary (*hetupratyaya* nām *eva tarhi sāmarthyam paśyāmaḥ / sati sāmagrye bhāvād asati cābhāvān na jāter iti hetupratyaya* eva janakāḥ santāḥ—*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 79.19-21; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 234-235; see also the extensive discussion of this issue in the *Nyāyānusāra* [T. 1562: 411a-2b13; Cox 1995: 341-344]). I discuss below the possible relation between Vasubandhu's *sāmagrī* / *sāmagryam* and the *Yogācāra* *cittavipravṛayuktasamṣkāra*, *sāmagrī*.

⁶²⁵生者。謂諸行自相發起性。老者。謂諸行前後變異性。住者。謂諸行生時相續不斷性。無常者。謂諸行自相生後滅壞性 (T. 1602: 484b15-18).

⁶²⁶*jāti katamā / nikāyasabhāge saṃskārānām abhūtvā bhāvē jātir iti prajñaptih // jarā katamā / nikāyasabhāge saṃskārānām prabandhānyathātve jareti prajñaptih // sthitih katamā / nikāyasabhāge saṃskārānām prabandhāvipraṇāśe sthitir iti prajñaptih // anityatā katamā / nikāyasabhāge saṃskārānām prabandhavināśe 'nityateti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharma-samuccaya*: 18.31-19.1).

⁶²⁷T. 1585: 5c21-6a24; *Shindōjōyūshikiron*: 51-53; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 64-68.

openly Yogācāra texts, not to mention Katō’s four sources, only the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* refers to *bīja* in its criticism of the Sarvāstivādin *dharma, jāti*.

It is difficult to trace the relationships among the various texts in this case. I have argued that in several places Vasubandhu rejects the Dārśtāntika-Harivarman-Śrīlāta position in favor of that of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but here the Dārśtāntika and Yogācāra texts are essentially in agreement. Jaini has identified Vasubandhu’s three main arguments against the real existence of the *lakṣaṇas*: “(1) they cannot simultaneously work upon a momentary (*kṣanika*) dharma; (2) the theory of *upalakṣaṇa*⁶²⁸ results in the fallacy of regress; (3) the term *samskrta* in the sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāśikas does not refer to a momentary dharma but to a series of them (*pravāha*)” (Jaini 1959b: 543). Of these, the first is most obviously similar to the Dārśtāntika argument mentioned in the *Vibhāṣā*. The second, although it originated early,⁶²⁹ is not attributed by the *Vibhāṣā* to the Dārśtāntika or by the *Nyāyānusāra* to Śrīlāta. On the other hand, it seems at least related to the last argument in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. As for the third, Vasubandhu’s argument is closest to the Sthavira’s as represented in the *Nyāyānusāra*. However, all of these texts, at least implicitly, take the *lakṣaṇas* to operate in the stream or the personality, rather than on an individual *dharma*.

Clearly, Vasubandhu essentially agrees with the Dārśtāntika position. However, his arguments cannot be traced solely to the Dārśtāntika tradition, and it is possible that he was influenced by the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well.⁶³⁰ In any case, the Dārśtāntika and the

⁶²⁸ Jaini is clearly thinking of the *anulakṣaṇas* here.

⁶²⁹ See, for example, the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 200c13ff.; cited in Cox 1995: 357 n. 17) and the *Madhyamakaśāstra* (Chapter Seven, verses 1 ff.; cited in La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 224 n. 3).

⁶³⁰ With regard to the relationship between the *Yogācārabhūmi* and Harivarman, a comparison of their respective lists of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* shows that, while the *Yogācārabhūmi* includes *prthagjanatva* instead of *aprāpti* (see note 590), the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* includes both *prthagjanatva* and *aprāpti* (T. 1646: 289a21-22; Katsura 1974: 86). If the *Yogācārabhūmi* actually relies on the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* for

Yogacārabhūmi are equally opposed to Sarvāstivāda here and for largely similar reasons.

b. *Prāpti*

As it does in the case of the *samskrtalakṣaṇas*, the *Viniścaya-*
saṃgrahaṇī explains in detail the reasons for denying the real existence
of *prāpti*. If *prāpti* is real, it must be the cause of the arising of all
samskṛtadharmas as well as the cause of the non-loss of all *dharmas*.⁶³¹
The text first denies that *prāpti* can be the cause of the arising of the
samskṛtadharmas. The point of this argument seems to be that *prāpti*
itself, being a *samskṛtadharma*, would have to be the cause of its own
arising, which is impossible since it must have been nonexistent prior to
its arising.⁶³² It cannot be the cause of the non-loss of all *dharmas*
because if it were, the *prāptis* of all good, bad, and neutral *dharmas*
would be present simultaneously, and morally contradictory *dharmas*
would arise simultaneously. Therefore, the two functions of *prāpti* are
both illogical.⁶³³ The first of these arguments presages the second of
Vasubandhu's three criticisms of *prāpti* as the cause of production of

its criticism of the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, it is hard to explain why it
seems to follow the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* in including only *prthagjanatva*; furthermore,
it also omits *anyathātva* (異).

⁶³¹gal te 'thob pa rdzas su yod par gyur na / de 'du byed rnams kyi 'byuñ ba'i rgyu
'am / yañ na chos dañ mi 'bral bar 'gyur ba'i rgyur 'gyur grañ na (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*
[tib.]: zi 24b8-25a1). 为是諸行生因。為是諸法不離散因 (T. 1579: 586c27-28).

⁶³²gal te 'du byed rnams 'byuñ ba'i rgyu gyur na ni / des na ji srid du chos de
thob par ma gyur pa'i sna rol na de'i 'byuñ ba'i rgyu thob pa med pas nam yañ 'byuñ
bar mi 'gyur te / de lta na de gtan mi 'thob [corrected from 'thab on the basis of
Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 43, line 5] pa ñid du
'gyur ro (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 25a1-2). 若是諸行生因者。若從先來未得此法。
此既無有生因之得。應常不生。由此亦應畢竟不得 (T. 1579: 586c27-587a1).

⁶³³gal te chos dañ mi 'bral ba'i rgyu gyur na ni des na dge ba dañ mi dge ba dañ
luñ du ma bstan pa'i chos de dag thams cad kyi 'thob pa mgo mñam du yod pas / mi
mthun pa de dag kyan mgo mñam du kun 'byuñ bar 'gyur te / de lta bas na gñi ga yañ
mi run no (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 25a2-3). 若是諸法不離散因者。一切善不善無
記法得既俱有。彼雖相違應頓現行。是故二種俱不應理 (T. 1579: 587a1-3).

*dharma*s.⁶³⁴ The second anticipates Saṅghabhadra's rejoinder to Vasubandhu that *prāpti* is not the cause of production but is rather the cause of *dharma*s' not being lost.⁶³⁵

The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* then gives its own explanation of the reality behind the notion of *prāpti*, presumably in accordance with the system of seed causality expounded earlier in the text:⁶³⁶ it states that the cause of the production of any *dharma* is that *dharma*'s own *bija*, which is comprised of the individual conditions.⁶³⁷ Furthermore, the cause of non-loss is really simply the fact that the reason that some conditions are lost is that other conditions become present.⁶³⁸ In other words, if I understand correctly, non-loss refers to the replacement of past *dharma*s by present *dharma*s of the same sort. This replacement, moreover, is in accord with the principle of conditioned origination and does not require a separate *dharma* to effect it.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁴ *utpattihetur dharmāñāṇaṁ prāptiḥ iti cet / (1) asaṁskṛtasya na syāt / (2) ye ca dharmā aprāptā (3) ye ca tyaktā bhūmisamcāravairāgyatas teṣāṁ katham utpattiḥ syāt* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 63.11-13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 182-183; Cox 1995: 102 n. 24, 213 n. 22. Numbers are mine). Yaśomitra explains that the unobtained *dharma*s mentioned in 2) consist of spiritual attainments such as *dharmajñānakṣāṇī* with respect to the first Noble Truth, etc. (*ye ca dharmā aprāptā duḥkhe dharmajñāna-kṣāṇty-ādayaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 145.33-146.1; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 182 n. 2), but Cox gives the example of "insentient objects" (1983: 115 n. 24; however, she omits this example in 1995: 213 n. 22).

⁶³⁵ 執有別物。是為非理。此定不然。非非理故。由所計得是已得法不失因故 (T. 1582: 397b4-5; Cox 1995: 188-189). Yaśomitra criticizes Saṅghabhadra's position, saying that, if *prāpti* were the cause of the non-loss of *dharma*s, it would be impossible to get rid of any *dharma* that one has acquired (*yadi ca pratilabdha-dharmāvipraṇāśa-kāraṇam prāptiḥ iṣyate. prāpti-parityāgo naiva syāt. bhavati ca. tasmād akāraṇam etat*—*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 148.24-25).

⁶³⁶ Beginning from *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 15b5 (T. 1579: 583b18); see Schmithausen 1987: 21, 64, 271 n. 131, 286 n. 172.

⁶³⁷ *chos rnams kyi 'byuñ ba'i rgyu ni so sor nes pa'i rkyen gyis rañ gi sa bon yoñs su zin pa'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 25a3). 又生因者。所謂各別緣所攝受諸法自種 (T. 1579: 587a3-4). My translation is tentative.

⁶³⁸ *bral ba'i rgyu ni rkyen gžan mñon du gyur pas rkyen gžan dan 'bral ba'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 25a3-4). 不離散因者。謂由餘緣現在前故餘緣離散 (T. 1579: 587a4-5).

⁶³⁹ I think that similar reasoning is behind the denial in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* of *prāpti* as the cause of non-loss: 若得於法是不失因。有情由此成就彼故。諸可成法不離

Having explained that *prāpti* is not a separate entity but simply a term that describes certain operations of causes and conditions, the text defines three types, namely *bijasamanvāgama*, *vaśitvasamanvāgama*, and *samudācārasamanvāgama*.⁶⁴⁰ *Bijasamanvāgama* consists of the *bijas* of *klistadharmas* that have not been destroyed by *śamatha*, of *avyākṛtadharmas*⁶⁴¹ that have not been permanently annihilated by the *āryamārga*, and of those *kuśaladharmas* that are inborn and not obtained by effort, as long as they have not been destroyed by false views, as in the case of a person whose *kuśalamūlas* are destroyed.⁶⁴²

有情。若離有情實不可得。故得於方俱為無用。得實無故 (T. 1585: 5a28-b2; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 37). La Vallée Poussin, relying heavily on K'uei-chi's commentary, translates as follows: "Il réplique: La Prāpti est la cause qui fait qu'on ne perd pas les Dharmas, car c'est par la vertu de la Prāpti qu'un Pudgala rest 'muni' des Dharmas une fois possédés [même quand ces Dharmas ne sont pas présents et jusqu'au moment où la Prāpti est rompue.]

"Observons qu'on n'est jamais sans les Dharmas dont il est possible d'être 'muni', c'est-à-dire sans les Dharmas actuellement présents et sans la Bhūtatathatā. Les Dharmas sans lesquels on peut être ne sont pas réellement susceptibles d'être possédés (*prāpti*): il s'agit des Dharmas passés et futurs, qui n'existent pas. Par conséquent, que l'on considère les Dharmas qui 'quittent' ou ceux qui ne 'quittent' pas, la Prāpti est sans utilité" (1928-1929: 56-57).

⁶⁴⁰sa bon dañ ldn pa, dbañ dañ ldn pa, and kun tu 'byuñ bar ldn pa (種子成就, 自在成就, and 現在成就). The Sanskrit equivalents are suggested by La Vallée Poussin (1928-1929: 57). In this case, *prāpti* and *samanvāgama* seem to be interchangeable (see note 598, which contains the *Pañcaskandhaka* definition of *prāpti*, according to which *samanvāgama* and *prāpti* are synonymous). Mizuno mentions this definition as an example of the way in which the Yogācāra school adds its own theories of *bīja* or *ālayavijñāna* to material that it has "inherited" from Sarvāstivāda or the Sautrāntikas (1956: 57-58). However, I think that Mizuno does not do justice to the Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* exposition when he represents it as simple accretion. Rather, it appears to me to be a radical and systematic reinterpretation of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*.

⁶⁴¹According to La Vallée Poussin, these are *upapattilābhika* (1928-1929: 57 n. 2).

⁶⁴²thob pa de yañ mdor bsdu na rnam pa gsum du rig par bya'o / sa bon dañ ldn pa dañ / dbañ dañ ldn pa dañ / kun tu 'byuñ bar ldn pa'o / de la re žig ſñon moññ pa can dañ luñ du ma bstan pa dañ / skyes nas thob pa'i chos ma btsal bar kun tu 'byuñ ba gañ yin pa de dag ni sa bon re žig gi gnas kyi ſñams pas kyañ ſñams par ma byas la / 'phags pa'i lam gyis kyañ yañ-dag par ma bcom pa dañ / dge ba rnams kyi yañ 'di lta ste / dper na dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu bcad pa rnams kyi ltar log par lta bas ſñams par ma byas pa gañ yin pa de ni sa bon dañ ldn pa žes bya ste (*Viniścayasamgrahañ* [tib.]: zi

Vasítvasamanvāgama consists of the *bijas* of *kuśaladharmas* obtained by effort and of some⁶⁴³ *avyākṛtadharma*s.⁶⁴⁴ Finally, *samudācārasamanvāgama* consists of the activity of actualized, present *dharmas*.⁶⁴⁵ La Vallée Poussin points out that the three types of *samanvāgama* mentioned in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* are drawn from our *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passage. He also says that, although the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not mention three types, its general explanation of *prāpti* is similar to that of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. However, he does not speculate on the relationship between the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

To me, a close comparison of the passage summarized above with the corresponding section of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*⁶⁴⁶ strongly suggests that Vasubandhu follows the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, at least in

25a5-7). 當知此得略有三種。一種子成就。二自在成就。三現行成就。若所有染污法諸無記法生得善法不由功用而現行者。彼諸種子若未為奢摩他之所損伏。若未為聖道之所永害。若不為邪見損伏諸善如斷善根者。如是名為種子成就 (T. 1579: 587a10-15).

⁶⁴³ According to La Vallée Poussin, these are the *avyākṛtas* that are not *upapattīlābhika* (1928-1929: 57 n. 2).

⁶⁴⁴ *age ba'i chos mnon par 'du bya bas bskyed pa rnams dañ lun du ma bstan pa de dag kha cig gi 'byuñ ba'i rkyen gyis rgyu sa bon yoñs su rtas pa yoñs su zin pa ni dbañ dañ ldn pa žes bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 25a8-25b1). 若加行所生善法。及一分無記法生緣所攝受增盛因種子。名自在成就 (T. 1579: 587a17-19).

⁶⁴⁵ *da ltar gyi chos rnams mnon sum gyi dños pos rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis 'grub pa ni kun tu 'byuñ ba dañ ldn pa žes bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 25b1-2). 若現

在諸法自相現前轉。名現行成就 (T. 1579: 587a19-20).

⁶⁴⁶ *āśrayaviśeṣād etat sidhyati / āśrayo hi sa āryāñām darśanabhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyāñām kleśānām prarohasamartho bhavati / ato 'gnidagdhavṛhīvad abījibhūte āśraye kleśānām prahīnakleśa ity ucyate / upahatabijabhāve vā laukikena mārgena / viparyayād aprahīnakleśah / yaś cāprahīnas tena samanvāgata yah prahīnas tenāsamānāgata iti prajñāpyate / kuśalā api dharmā dviprakārā ayatnabhāvino yatnabhāvinaś ca ye ta ucyante utpattipratilambhikāḥ prāyogikāś ceti / tatrāyatnabhāvibhir āśrayasya tadbijabhāvānupaghātāt samanvāgata upaghātād asamanvāgata ucyate samuccinnakuśalamūlah / tasya tūpaghāto mithyādṛṣṭyā veditavyaḥ / na tu khalu kuśalānām dharmānām bijabhāvasyātyantām santatau samudghātāt / ye punar yatnabhāvinas tair utpannais tadutpattir vaśītvāvighātāt santateḥ samanvāgata ucyate / tasmād bījam evātrānapoddhṛtam anupahatām pariprṣṭām ca vaśītvakāle samanvāgāmākhyām labhate nānyad dravyam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 63.20-64.5; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 183-185).

his assertion that what Sarvāstivāda explains by *prāpti* should really be understood in terms of *bīja*. The passages in the *Vibhāṣā* that describe the Dārśtāntika criticism of *samanvāgama* (T. 1545: 479a ff.) and *prthagjanatva* (T. 1545: 231b27-28) fail to mention *bīja*, as does Harivarman (T. 1646: 289a23-b12). On the other hand, in adducing the *Cakravartisūtra* as proof that the term *samanvāgama* is not used to indicate a real *dharma*, Vasubandhu seems to follow the Dārśtāntika of the *Vibhāṣā*.⁶⁴⁷ Thus, as long as the Dārśtāntika/Sautrāntika arguments and those found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* do not conflict, Vasubandhu seems to feel free to borrow from either tradition.

My observation that Vasubandhu relies on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for his *bīja* interpretation of *samanvāgama* is compatible with Yamabe's suggestion that the discussion of *bīja* that follows immediately after⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁷ Compare *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 63.6-7 (*tena tarhi asattvākhyair api samanvāgamah prāpnoti parasattvaiś ca / kiṃ kāraṇam / sūtravācanāt / rājā bhikṣavaś cakravarti saptabhi ratnaiḥ samanvāgata iti vistarāḥ*) with T. 1545 (*Vibhāṣā*): 479a25 ff. (答彼依契經故作是執。謂契經說轉輪王成就七寶, etc.). See also T. 1545: 796b4 ff. for the same argument; these passages are pointed out by Katō (1989: 303). Both passages contain long explanations of why the Dārśtāntikas (according to the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* [Bidon-bu 11: 241 n. 7], the older translation of the *Vibhāṣā* attributes this position to Buddhadeva) reject *prāpti* as a real *dharma*, but neither passage contains any mention of *bīja*.

⁶⁴⁸ Yamabe states that this discussion of *bīja* is found within the *cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra* section (Yamabe 1990: 14), thus suggesting that, in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahāṇī*, *bīja* is in fact a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*. A possible justification for this opinion can be found in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahāṇī* on the *Cintāmayībhūmi*, where the distinction between the real and the provisional is analyzed at great length. According to this passage, all twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* except for *asamjñīsaṃpatti*, *nirodhasaṃpatti*, and *āsamjñīka*, as well as *bīja*, *vijñapti*, and *avijñapti*, are designations for the *samskrītadharma*s (*Viniścaya-saṃgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 208a4-6; T. 1579: 659a12-16; see Schmithausen 1987: 158, 454 n. 1016). However, it is clear that this passage is about *prajñapti*, not exclusively the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*. Coming back to our original passage, we can say that *bīja*, like the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, is simply a designation for the *samskrītadharma*s. Nevertheless, although the other *dharma*s mentioned are elsewhere (for example, in the second *Viniścaya-saṃgrahāṇī* passage) specifically called *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, *bīja* is nowhere so defined in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*⁶⁴⁹ passage is one of the sources of Vasubandhu's definition of *bīja* (1990).⁶⁵⁰ However, it is at odds with Nishi's understanding of the development of *bīja* theory. Nishi remarks on the close relationship between Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda, and he identifies passages from the *Vibhāṣā* containing ideas about *bīja* that are similar to those of Yogācāra but less completely worked out. According to Nishi, the "Sautrāntika" position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is the forerunner of the fully developed Yogācāra doctrine, in which *ālayavijñāna* is established as the basis for the *bījas* (1975: 483-495). Jaini writes under the same assumption (1959a). Nishi's research, nevertheless, does not really take the *Yogācārabhūmi* into consideration and must therefore be considered somewhat dated. Similarly, Cox's statement that "the earliest sources that describe in detail the dynamics of the seed theory are Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, and Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*" (1995: 103 n. 44) clearly must be revised in the light of current research on the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* both rely on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* in denying the real existence of *prāpti*. In fact, the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*⁶⁵¹ also follows the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*'s tripartite division.⁶⁵² However, neither of these

⁶⁴⁹ *de la sa bon gaṇ žé na* / [I have omitted the phrase *sa la* on the basis of the Derge (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 52, line 5)] *sa bon ni* 'du byed rnam las logs žig na rdzas gžan med de / 'du byed de ltar gyur pa daṇ / de ltar byuṇ ba daṇ / de ltar gnas pa de dag nīd la sa bon žes bya bar zad de / 'bras bu žes kyan bya'o (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 29b1-2; Yamabe 1990: 14). 復次種子云何非析諸行別有實物名為種子。亦非餘處。然即諸行如是種性如是等生如是安布。名為種子亦名為果 (T. 1579: 588c10-12).

⁶⁵⁰ *kim punar idam bijam nāma / yan nāmarūpaṇ phalotpattau samarthaṇ sākṣāt pāram paryeṇa vā / santati pariṇāma vīśeṣat / ko 'yam pariṇāma nāma / santater anyathātvam / kā ceyam santatiḥ / hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ samskārāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 64.5-7; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 185; Yamabe 1990: 14).

⁶⁵¹ 得者。此復三種。一諸行種子所攝相續差別性。二自在生起相續差別性。三自相生起相續差別性 (T. 1602: 484a28-b1).

⁶⁵² La Vallée Poussin notes that the discussion of three types of *samanvāgama* in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* follows this passage from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (1928-1929: 57 n. 2; T. 1585: 5b3-4).

texts explains why *prāpti* can only be a *prajñapti*.

c. *Prthagjanatva*

Both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Pañcaskandhaka* give the same very simple definition of *prthagjanatva* that can be found in *abhidharma* texts such as the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*: *prthagjanatva* is the non-possession of the *āryadharma*s.⁶⁵³ The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* identifies two types of *prthagjanas*: the fool (*bāla*), who has been a fool for countless lifetimes, and the untutored one (*aśrutavān*), who follows false paths that diverge from the Tathāgata's teaching.⁶⁵⁴ Although these three texts consider *prthagjanatva*, like the rest of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*, to be *prajñaptis*, there is nothing else about their definitions that distinguishes them from those found in *abhidharma* texts before the *Abhidharmāvatāra*. As I have mentioned above, beginning with the *Abhidharmāvatāra*, *prthagjanatva* is replaced by *aprāpti*.

The Dārśāntika of the *Vibhāṣā* is, again, the earliest source that denies the reality of *prthagjanatva*, but the *Vibhāṣā* does not say on what basis he does so.⁶⁵⁵ Harivarman, on the other hand, gives his own reasoning in detail. There is no nature (*dharma*) of an ordinary person that is distinct from the ordinary person himself. If there were, we would have to accept pot-ness, as well as ideas such as number, measure, sameness, difference, conjunction, disjunction, desirability,

⁶⁵³ *prthagjanatvam katamat / āryadharmaṇām apratilambhe prthagjanatvam iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.5). 云何異生性。謂於諸聖法不得為性 (T. 1612 [*Pañcaskandhaka*]: 849c25). 凡夫性者。謂不得聖法 (T. 1552 [*Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*]: 943b7).

⁶⁵⁴ 異生性者。此有二種。一愚夫異生性。二無聞異生性。愚夫異生性者。謂無始世來有情身中愚夫之性。無聞謂生性者。謂如來法外諸邪道性 (T. 1602: 484b12-15). La Vallée Poussin defines three types according to the *Madhyamāgama*: “Le *bāla*, à qui manque la *prajñā* ‘naturelle’ (*upapatti-lābhikā*) qui provient des traces d’un exercice antérieur (*pūrvābhyaśavāsanānirjatā*); *aśrutavān*, à qui manque la *prajñā* qui naît de l’Ecriture (*āgamajā*); *prthagjana*, à qui manque la *prajñā* née de l’*adhibhāma*, c’est-à-dire du *satyābhīsamaya*” (1971, v. 2: 87 n. 3).

⁶⁵⁵ It simply states: 或復有執。異生性無實體。如譬喻者 (T. 1545: 231b26-27; Katō 1989: 303).

undesirability, etc.⁶⁵⁶ Harivarman goes on to show that the idea that *prthagjana* and *prthagjanatva* are separate is tantamount to the heterodox (Vaiśeṣika) belief that a pot and pot-ness are different, that by means of pot-ness, we know that a pot is a pot. This contradicts the Buddhist principle that a *dharma* is identical with its own-nature.⁶⁵⁷ Finally Harivarman criticizes those who base their *abhidharma* on heterodox scripture, namely those who maintain that *prthagjanatva*, etc., are real, as well as those who say that *asamksṛtas* such as *tathatā*, *dharmatā*, *bhūtakoti*, and *pratītyasamutpāda*, etc., are real. In conclusion, he recommends that they should deeply ponder the principles and not merely follow the letter [of the text].⁶⁵⁸

In contrast to Harivarman's purely negative argument, the first *Viniścayasamgrahānī* passage again explains the designation in terms of seeds. *Prthagjanatva* refers to those seeds of *darśanaheya dharmas* in the three worlds that have not yet been permanently destroyed.⁶⁵⁹ There are four types of *prthagjanatva*, one included in the *gotra* of those not

⁶⁵⁶ 問曰。凡夫法是心不相應行。是事云何。答曰。凡夫法不異凡夫。若別有凡夫法。亦應受別有瓶法等。又數量一異合離好醜等法。皆應別有 (T. 1646: 289c3-6). In response to the Sarvāstivādin argument that, without a *dharma* called *jāti*, the realization that something is born would be impossible, Vasubandhu says something very similar: *tend tarhy anātmavam apy eṣṭavam anātmabuddhisiddhyartham / samkhyāparimānaprthagvatvasamyoगavibhāgaparatvāparatvasattādayo 'pi tirthamkara-parikalpitā abhyupagantavyā ekadvimahadaṇuprthag-saṃyuktaviyuktaparāparasadādibuddhisiddhyartham* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 79.24-26; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 235-236; Jaini 1959b: 537); 為成一大小各別合離彼此有性等覺應如外道法外執有數量各別合離彼此有等別性 (T. 1558: 28c16-18). Since I have not found a similar sentence elsewhere, I suspect that Vasubandhu's immediate source was Harivarman. Yaśomitra mentions the pot: *tathā dravyam etad rūpam idam ghato 'yam ity evam-ādi-buddhi-siddhārtham samkhyādayo 'pi Vaiśeṣika-parikalpitā abhyupagantavyāh* (*Abhidharmakośavākyāḥ*: 180.15-17).

⁶⁵⁷ 外經 (corrected from 瓶 on the basis of the alternate reading in the *Taishō* notes) 書中說瓶異瓶法異。因瓶法知是瓶色異色法異。是事不然。所以者何。法名自體。若汝謂凡夫法異。則色自無體。應待色法故有。是事不然。是故汝不深思故說別有凡夫法 (T. 1646: 289c6-10).

⁶⁵⁸ 有諸論師習外典故造阿毘曇。說別有凡夫法等。亦有餘論師說別有如法性真際因緣等諸無為法故。應深思此理。勿隨文字 (T. 1646: 289c10-13; for Sanskrit equivalents, see Katsura 1974: 87).

⁶⁵⁹ *de la so so'i skye bo ñid gañ že na / khams gsum na spyod pa'i mthoñ bas spañ bar bya ba'i chos kyi sa bon rnams yañ dag par ma bcom pa tsam gañ yin pa de ni so*

possessing the *dharma* of *parinirvāṇa* and one pertaining to *śrāvaka-*, *pratyekabuddha-*, and *tathāgatagotras*, respectively.⁶⁶⁰ As well as differing from those in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Pañcaskandhaka*, and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, this definition is not directly reflected in Vasubandhu's criticism of the Vaibhāṣika position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The first portion is, however, quoted in Fa-pao's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where it seems to be given as an example of an alternate definition of *prthagjanatva* (T. 1822: 540a). Furthermore, it is reproduced almost word for word in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, where *aprāpti*, or *asamanvāgama*, is defined as a state in which the seeds of *darśanaheya dharmas* have not yet been permanently destroyed; this state in turn is equated with *prthagjanatva*.⁶⁶¹

In his discussion of *aprāpti* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu does not mention *bīja* in the definition of *prthagjanatva* that he accepts and attributes to the Sautrāntikas: *prthagjanatva* is the *samṭati* in which the *āryadharmas* have not been produced.⁶⁶² This definition more closely resembles that of the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, according to which *prthagjanatva* is a designation of the state in which the *lokottara āryadharmas* have not yet arisen.⁶⁶³ However, I

so'i skye bo ŋid ces bya'o (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 26b1-2). 復次云何謂異生性。謂三界見所斷法種子。唯未永害量名異生性 (T. 1579: 587b25-26).

⁶⁶⁰ *de yaṇ mdor bsdu na rnam pa bźi ste / yonis su mya ŋan las mi 'da' ba'i chos can gyi rigs kyis bsdu pa daṇ / ŋan thos kyi rigs daṇ ldn pa daṇ / raṇ saṇs rgyas kyi rigs daṇ ldn pa daṇ / de bźin gṣegs pa'i rigs daṇ ldn pa'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 26b2-3). 此復略有四種。一無船涅槃法種性所攝。二聲聞種性之所隨遂。三獨覺種性之所隨遂。四如來種性之所隨遂 (T. 1579: 587b26-29).

⁶⁶¹ 翻此假立不成就名。此類雖多。而於三界見所斷種未永害位。假立非得名異生性。於諸聖法未成就故 (T. 1585: 5b4-6; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 37; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 57-58). Neither La Vallée Poussin nor the *Shindōjōyuishikiron* refers to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*.

⁶⁶² *evaṇ ti sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / kathaṇ ca sautrāntikānām / anutpannāryadharmasantatiḥ prthagjanatvam iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 66.24-25; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 193).

⁶⁶³ *so so'i skye bo gnas skabs gaṇ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / 'jig rten las 'das pa 'phags pa'i chos ma bskyed pa'i gnas skabs la 'o / rnam pa gsum ste / 'dod pa na spyod pa daṇ / gzugs na spyod pa daṇ / gzugs med pa na spyod pa'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77a8-77b1). 問依何分位建立異生性。此復幾種。答依未生起一切出世聖法分位。建立異生性。此復三種。謂欲界繁。色界繁。無色界繁 (T. 1579: 607c8-10).

do not think that there is a contradiction between Vasubandhu's so-called Sautrāntika definition and the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, since the presence of the seeds of *darśanaheyadharmas* and the absence of *āryadharmas* are equivalent. At least this is what the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* suggests in the passage mentioned above. Moreover, the long passage⁶⁶⁴ preceding Vasubandhu's definition of *bīja*, which contains an explanation of the abandonment or non-abandonment of *kleśas* in terms of states of the *āśraya*, makes it clear that it is the presence of undestroyed seeds of *kleśas* that prevents one from obtaining the *āryadharmas*. Therefore, the *samtati* in which the *āryadharmas* are not present is in fact the *samtati* in which the seeds of *kleśas* still exist, and Vasubandhu's understanding of *prthagjanatva* is actually identical to that of the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage. As we have seen, the Dārśṭāntika and Harivarman both merely criticize the status of *prthagjanatva* as a *dharma* without defining it, while Śrīlāta is silent. Thus, Vasubandhu again identifies as Sautrāntika, with no textual corroboration for his claim, a position taken from the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

4. Yogācāra *Cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*

I now come to the group of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* that are specifically associated with Yogācāra. As I have mentioned above, this group typically consists of ten *dharmas*: (1) *pravṛtti*, (2) *pratiniyama*, (3) *yoga*, (4) *java*, (5) *anukrama*, (6) *kāla*, (7) *deśa*, (8) *saṃkhyā*, (9) *sāmagrī*, (10) *asāmagrī*. However, the order is not always the same. For example, in the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, the list begins with *sāmagrī* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 208a6; T. 1579: 659a14-16). Nor is the number always the same. For example, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes only nine *dharmas*, omitting *asāmagrī*. Our first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is peculiar in that it includes *sāmagrī* after *prthagjanatva* but before *nāma*-, *pada*-, and *vyañjanakāya*. After this, it defines the *dharmas* from *pravṛtti* to *saṃkhyā* in the order given above, with the exception of *deśa*, which it omits entirely. Like

⁶⁶⁴This passage, beginning with the sentence, *āśrayavīśeśād etat sidhyati*, is quoted in note 646.

the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, it also omits *asāmagrī*.

With the exception of the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Yuga-bu III), there is, as far as I know, no translation or study of the definitions of these *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*. Since the definitions in the first passage are by far the longest that we have, I examine them in detail in an attempt to determine why this group was added to the list at the same time that all the members of the category were being criticized as mere *prajñaptis*. I refer to the second *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* passage, the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* by way of comparison, including for the sake of completeness definitions of *asāmagrī* and *deśa* from these three passages.

a. *Sāmagrī*

According to the first passage in the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*, all the causes and conditions that can produce *dharma*s are referred to by the single term *sāmagrī*, which is also equated with *sahakārihetu*.⁶⁶⁵ There are six types of *sāmagrī*.⁶⁶⁶ Experiential *sāmagrī* consists of *sparsā* conditioned by the *saḍāyatanas*, by *rūpa*, etc., and by *manaskāra*, etc., as well as of *vedanā* conditioned by *sparsā*.⁶⁶⁷ *Sāmagrī* that is the actualization of rebirth consists of the *samskāras* conditioned by *avidyā*, *trṣṇā* conditioned by *vedanā*, *upādāna* conditioned by *vedanā*, and all the other members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is to say, all of the

⁶⁶⁵de la tshogs pa gañ žé na / chos de dan de dag skyed pa'i phyir gañ dag rgyur gyur pa dan / gañ rkyen du gyur pa de dag thams cad gcig du bsdus pa ni tshogs pa žes bya ste / de ſnid lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu žes kyan bya'o (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 26b3-4). 次云何和合。謂能生彼諸法諸因諸緣。總略為一說名和合。即此名同事因 (T. 1579: 587b29-c2).

⁶⁶⁶I mention the definition from the second passage in my discussion of *asāmagrī* below.

⁶⁶⁷tshor ba rnams myoñ ba'i tshogs pa yañ yod de / 'di ltar skye mched drug gi rkyen dan / gzugs la sogs pa'i rkyen dan / yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen gyi reg pa dan / reg pa'i rkyen gyis tshor ba'o (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 26b4-5). 或有領受和合。謂六處緣觸。或色等緣或作意等緣。或觸緣受 (T. 1579: 587c2-3).

members except for the ones from *vijñāna* through *vedanā*.⁶⁶⁸ *Sāmagrī* that is the continued existence of the six senses consists of the four *āhāras* and *jīvitendriya*.⁶⁶⁹ *Sāmagrī* that produces skill in the arts consists of knowledge of the arts and the tools and adroitness associated with it.⁶⁷⁰ Pure *sāmagrī* consists of the assemblage of the twelve non-hindrances, namely the wealth of self and others, etc.⁶⁷¹ Finally, conventional *sāmagrī* consists of the fact that beings, due to their unity of mind, do not have disagreement, disputation, contention, or disharmony.⁶⁷²

The association of the terms *sāmagrī* and *sahakārihetu* can be

⁶⁶⁸ *yañ srid pa mnōn par 'grub pa'i tshogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnames dañ / tshor ba'i rkyen gyis sred pa dañ / sred pa'i rkyen gyis len pa nas rgyas par skye ba'i rkyen gyis rga śi'i bar dag go* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 26b5-6). 或有引生後有和合。謂無明緣行等。受緣愛愛緣取。廣說乃至生緣老死 (T. 1579: 587c3-5).

⁶⁶⁹ *skye mched drug gnas pa'i tshogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste / zas bži dañ srog gi dban po'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 26b6). 或有六處住和合。謂四食及命根 (T. 1579: 587c5-6).

⁶⁷⁰ *bzo'i gnas rnames 'grub pa'i tshogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste / bzo śes pa dañ / de dañ ldan pa'i las kyi* (corrected from *kyis* on the basis of *Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 47, line 3) *yo byad dañ skyes bu'i rtsal lo* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 26b6-7). 或有工巧處成辦和合。謂工巧智及彼相應業具士夫作用 (T. 1579: 587c6-7).

⁶⁷¹ *rnam par dag pa'i tshogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste / bdag dañ gžan gyi 'byor pa la sogs pa khom pa bcu gñis 'dus pa'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 26b7). 或有清淨和合。謂十二種無雜集會。即自他圓滿等 (T. 1579: 587c7-9). Tshul khrims skal bzañ (Shirodate Kaiun) suggests that *khom pa* here is the opposite of *mi khom pa* (*akṣaṇa*), “inopportune birth.” A well-known list of eight such births, birth in hell, etc., is discussed by Edgerton (1970: 2-3), and Tshul khrims skal bzañ, although not familiar with a list of twelve, thinks that this passage probably refers to such a list (personal communication). Therefore, birth in a world in which oneself and others do not have adequate wealth would be a hindrance to learning from a Buddha. A list of eight *dal bas*, where *dal ba* is the absence of dwelling in the *mi khom pas*, is given in the *Tsang han ta tz'u tien* (1254).

⁶⁷² *brdar btags pa'i tshogs pa gžan pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste / sems can kyi blo gcig pa'i dpañ du byas nas mi mthun pa med pa dañ / mi 'thab pa dañ / mi rtsod pa dañ / mi 'phrod pa med pa dañ* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 26b7-8). 或有世俗和合。謂諸有情依等意樂增上力故互不相違。無諍無訟亦不乖離 (T. 1579: 587c9-10). I can find no index in which *blo gcig pa'i dpañ du byas* is equated with 等意樂. It would appear as though the Tibetan and Chinese differ here.

traced to the exposition of the ten *hetus* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in which all the *hetus* that are involved in production, namely those from *apekṣāhetu* through *pratiniyamahetu*, are designated as *sahakārihetu*.⁶⁷³ In the case of grain, if any of these causes is lacking, the grain will not mature, and, therefore, the totality (*sāmagrī*) of all these causes is called *sahakārihetu*.⁶⁷⁴ Similarly, in the exposition of the ten *hetus* in the *Savittarkādibhūmi*, *sahakārihetu* is defined in terms of *sāmagryadhiṣṭhāna*. In the case of *sāmagrī* of production, when the totality of causes necessary for the production of any *dharma* is realized, the *dharma* arises. There are four other types: *sāmagrī* of obtainment, of accomplishment, of completion, and of activity.⁶⁷⁵

Therefore, the definitions of *sāmagrī* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, both as an *adhiṣṭhāna* associated with *sahakārihetu* and as a *cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra*, are very broad. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* both preserve the scope of the *Yogācārabhūmi* definitions. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *sāmagrī* is the

⁶⁷³yaś cāpeksā-hetur yaś cākṣepa-hetur yaś ca parigraha-hetur yaś ca nirvṛtti-hetur yaś cāvāhaka-hetur yaś ca pratiniyama-hetur ity etān sarvān hetūn ekadhyam abhisamkṣipya sahakāri-hetur ity ucyate (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 98.3-6).

⁶⁷⁴sarve caite apeksā-hetum upādāya pratiniyama-hetu-amtā hetavah sasyasyābhiniṣpattaye saha-kāri-hetuḥ. na hi tad dhānyam anyatama-hetu-vaikalyān niṣpadyate. tasmāt sarvā sā sāmagrī saha-kāri-hetur ity ucyate (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 100.3-6).

⁶⁷⁵tatra sāmagrīhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hi / svām utpattiśāmagrīm āgama kāmapratisaṃyuktānām dharmāṇām utpādo bhāvāti / yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktānām evam rūpapratisaṃyuktānām ārūpya-pratisaṃyuktānām apratisaṃyuktānām / yathotpattiśāmagry evam prāptisāmagrī siddhiśāmagrī nispattiśāmagrī kriyāśāmagrī / tasmāt sāmagrīm adhiṣṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 110.3-7; *Maulībhūmi* [tib.]: dzi 66a6-bl; T. 1579: 302a5-10). Bhattacharya points out that the Tibetan also includes *sāmagrī* of subsistence (*gnas pa'i tshogs pa dan* = *sthitisāmagrī*). A similar definition can be found in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which includes four types of *sāmagrī*, of production, of subsistence, of completion, and of obtaining result: 十三和合依處。謂從領受乃至差別功能依處於所生住成得果中有和合力。即依此處立同事因。謂從觀得乃至定異皆同生第一事業故 (T. 1585: 41c10-13; *Shindō jōyuishikiron*: 343; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 459).

coming together of the conditions of causes, results, and conditions,⁶⁷⁶ while, according to the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, it is the fact that all *samskrta dharmas* have as their nature the coming together of conditions.⁶⁷⁷ However, the example given by the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* is the specific one of consciousness: the [coming together] of cause and result known as consciousness consists of an unimpaired organ, the transformation [of consciousness?] into the appearance of an object, and the presence of the attention that produces that consciousness.⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁶ *sāmagrī katamā / hetuphalapratyayasamavadhāne sāmagrīti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya* [tib.]: 19.11). I follow Rahula, who translates this as “C'est une désignation pour indiquer la combinaison des causes, des effets, et des conditions” (1980: 17). However, the Sanskrit disagrees with the Tibetan, which seems to take *hetu* and *phala* as modifying *pratyaya*: *rgyu dan 'bras bu'i rkyaen 'dus pa la tshogs pa žes gdags so* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*; 61a8). The Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* quotes the text as saying that *sāmagrī* refers to the fact that causes and effects arise from conditions: *rgyu dan 'bras bu rkyaen las byuñ ba la tshogs pa ces gdags so* (*Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 162b1).

See Hirakawa 1990: 179-185 for the relationship among *hetu*, *pratyaya*, and *phala*.

⁶⁷⁷ 和合者。謂諸行緣會性 (T. 1602: 484b26-27).

⁶⁷⁸ *hetuphalapratyayānām samavadhānam tadyathā vijñānākhyasya hi hetuphalasyendriyāparibhedo viśayābhāsagamanā tajjanakām* (Following Sakuma [1996: 7], I emend from Tatia's *tajjñānam*. Tatia says that the Chinese and Tibetan give *tajjanaka* for *tajjñāna*, but the Chinese really gives something like *tajjñānajanaka* [生此識—T. 1606: 701a12]. On the other hand, Tatia is correct about the Tibetan [*de skyes pa'i*—*Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 162b2]) *manaskārapratyupasthānam ceti / evam anyatrāpi yojitavyam* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*; 10.25-11.2). This passage is difficult; my summary is based mainly on the Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, which I find easier to understand than the Sanskrit: *rgyu dan 'bras bu'i rkyaen rnams tshogs pa ni 'di lta ste / rnam par šes pa žes pa'i rgyu 'bras ni dbañ po ma mñam pa dañ / yul snañ bar gyur pa dañ / de skyes pa'i yid la byed pa ūe bar gnas pa ste / de bžin du gžan la yañ sbyar bar bya'o* (*Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [tib.]: 162b1-2). The Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* is yet different: *rgyu dan 'bras bu'i rkyaen rnams 'dus pa ni 'di ltar ste / rnam par šes pa žes bya ba'i rgyu'i 'bras bu'i rkyaen ni dbañ po mñams pa dañ / yul snañ bar byur pa dañ / de skyed pa'i yid la byed pa ūe bar gnas pa ste / de bžin du gžan la yañ sbyar bar bya'o* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* [tib.]: 9b1-2).

If P'u-kuang is correct in saying that the *sāmagrī* that Samghabhadra considers to be a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* is equivalent to monastic concord, then Samghabhadra's *sāmagrī* would seem to correspond to the conventional *sāmagrī* of the first *Viniścayasamgrahañī* passage (see section B3). Obviously, however, the Yogācāra definition of *sāmagrī*, although it includes Samghabhadra's, is far more extensive. I think that both the *Viniścayasamgrahañī* and Samghabhadra derive their notion of *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* from the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*, *saṃghabhedā*, in the *Vibhāṣā*; that is to say, they give the status of a *dharma* to the opposite of *saṃghabhedā*. However, unlike Samghabhadra, the *Viniścayasamgrahañī* extends the scope of the term to encompass a broadly applicable, causal principal.

b. (*Asāmagrī*)

Although *asāmagrī* is not mentioned in the first *Viniścayasamgrahañī* passage, I discuss it here, since it, like *sāmagrī*, is a possible point of connection between the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra lists of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*.

A definition of *asāmagrī* is found only once in the *Yogācārabhūmi*: in the second *Viniścayasamgrahañī* passage *asāmagrī* is simply said to be the opposite of *sāmagrī*.⁶⁷⁹ In this passage *sāmagrī* is defined as the non-absence of the constituents of action and consists of three types: assemblage *sāmagrī*, singleness-of-purpose *sāmagrī*, and perfection *sāmagrī*.⁶⁸⁰ These types are not further defined, but singleness-of-purpose *sāmagrī* perhaps corresponds to the conventional *sāmagrī* of the first passage. Outside of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *asāmagrī* is defined

⁶⁷⁹ *ma tshogs pa gnas skabs gañ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / ma tshogs pa'i gnas skabs dañ / rab tu dbye ba ni tshogs pa las bzlog pa las rig par bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahañī* [tib.]: zi 78a2-3); 問依何分位建立不和合。此復幾種。答與和合相違。應知不和合若分位若差別 (T. 1579: 608a4-6).

⁶⁸⁰ *tshogs pa gnas skabs gañ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / bya ba'i yan lag ma tshañ ba med pa'i gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsum ste / 'dus ba'i tshogs dañ / don gcig gi tshogs dañ / yoñs su rdzogs pa'i tshogs pa'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahañī* [tib.]: zi 78a1-2); 問依何分位建立和合。此復幾種。答依所作支無闕分位建立和合。此復三種。謂集會和合。一義和合。圓滿和合 (T. 1579: 608a2-4).

similarly in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*⁶⁸¹ and in P'u-kuang's *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun shu* 大乘百法明門論疏,⁶⁸² where it is said to be the non-coming together of conditions.

Unlike the majority of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* lists in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and that of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, the list of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not include *asāmagrī*. P'u-kuang offers two explanations for its omission. The first is based upon Hsüan-tsang's addition of the word "et cetera" after *sāmagrī* in his translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: P'u-kuang says that "et cetera" refers to *asāmagrī*.⁶⁸³ Since neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation includes "et cetera," we can discount this first explanation. P'u-kuang's second explanation is more convincing: *asāmagrī* is omitted because one type is included in *prthagjanatva*, which is the non-obtaining of the *āryamārga*, and the other types can be inferred from this.⁶⁸⁴

Thus, we can see that, like *sāmagrī*, *asāmagrī* is defined broadly in these *Yogācāra* texts. While *sāmagrī* refers to the concatenation of causal factors that results in production, *asāmagrī* is a designation for the fact that if something fails to be produced, it is because the conditions necessary for production do not cooperate. In addition, special cases of *sāmagrī* are mentioned in both the *Viniścayasamgrahani* passages and defined in detail in the first. Special cases of *asāmagrī*, on the other hand, are implied in the second passage and are referred to by P'u-kuang. Therefore, the opposite of conventional *sāmagrī*, or perhaps of singleness-of-purpose *sāmagrī*, probably corresponds to *saṃghabhedā* in the *Vibhāṣā*.

Unlike those of most *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, the positions of

⁶⁸¹不和合者。謂諸行緣乖性 (T. 1602: 484b27).

⁶⁸²諸行緣乖名不和合 (T. 1837: 60a3).

⁶⁸³—解云。對法論云和合等者。論既言和合等。當知則等取不和合 (T. 1837: 60a11-12).

⁶⁸⁴又一解云。略故不說。問曰。等略何故不略餘數但略不和合耶。解云。已說在所說中。所以但偏略不和合性也。言說在所說中者。謂異生性是見道煩惱。假建立。望聖道有不得義故。即是不和合義。不和合中略舉一隅。餘不和合類亦可知。所以偏略不和合性 (T. 1837: 60a12-18).

sāmagrī and *asāmagrī* vary in the Yogācāra lists. Most frequently they are found at the end of the entire list.⁶⁸⁵ However, in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* passage, *sāmagrī* is defined after *prthagjanatva* and before *nāmakāya*, in other words, before the group including *pravṛtti* and the other Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 26b 3-8; T. 1579: 587b29-c10). In the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī*, moreover, *sāmagrī* and *asāmagrī* occur as the first two of the final group of ten (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 208a6; T. 1579: 659a14-15). This inconsistency suggests that they are somehow separate from, or more important than, the other eight Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*.

In fact, *sāmagrī* is the most basic aspect of causality denoted by this group of *dharmas*. The fundamental role of *sāmagrī* in the causal process is emphasized, although outside of the context of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, in the *Paramārthagāthās*. Together with a commentary, these verses are found in the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi*, and Schmithausen describes them as “authoritative utterings at the level of ultimate truth, from various (canonical or paracanonical) sources or (oral) traditions” (1987: 223-224). Five of the verses (27-31) explain in terms of seed theory how the operations of cause and result come to be mistaken for a self. According to the commentary, the first of these is a refutation of possible objections to the statement that “there is, from the point of view of ultimate reality, no proprietor nor doer nor feeler but only cause(s) and result(s).”⁶⁸⁶ The verse itself reads as follows: “because of the non-destruction of the course of causes, activity proceeds due to *sāmagrī*; [samskṛtadharmas] arise from their own cause, and they make a totality.”⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁵ *Manobhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 69.3-4); second *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* passage (*Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 78a1-3; T. 1579: 608a2-6); *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (18.22; *sāmagrī* only); *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T. 1602: 484a27); *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* (T. 1614: 855c15-16).

⁶⁸⁶ Schmithausen 1987: 235. Wayman's translation (1961: 183) seems inferior.

⁶⁸⁷ *hetuvartmā* [sic] *nupacchedāt sāmagryā vartate kriyā / svasmād dhetoś ca jāyante kurvanti ca parigrahām* [MS: *parigrahāḥ*] (Wayman 1961: 171). I do not understand the phrase *kurvanti ca parigrahām*; Wayman's translation, “and take control,” does not seem to be helpful.

Aside from *sāmagrī*, we can find in the *Paramārthagāthās* other features of causality that appear in the *Yogācāra* expositions of *pratīyasamutpāda* and the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. For example, the non-destruction of the course of causes corresponds to *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha* in the expositions of *pratīyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.24; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 33.23-34.1) and the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.16), as well as to the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra, pravṛtti*.⁶⁸⁸ Similarly, the statement that *dharmas* arise from their own causes describes the same aspect of causality as the definition of *anurūpa-hetuphalārtha* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 26.25; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 35.1; *Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.16-17) and the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra, yoga*.⁶⁸⁹

c. *Pravṛtti*

Pravṛtti, as I have mentioned above, is usually the first of the *Yogācāra cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, although in the case of the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage it follows *nāma-, pada-,* and *vyañjanakāya*, which are preceded by *sāmagrī*. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and

The commentary states that the four *padas* show, respectively: (1) how rebirth occurs even when a self is non-existent; (2) how the effect is not simultaneous with the cause; (3) how it is not the case that everything arises from everything (Wayman's translation, "how nothing at all occurs," does not make sense [Wayman 1961: 183]); (4) how there is no destruction of the course of causes (*tatra yathātmany asati punarbhavo bhavati / nocchedah / yathā ca hetuto yugapat phalam na bhavati / yathā ca sarvataḥ sarvam na bhavati / yathā ca yasya hetuvartmanah ucchedo na bhavati / tad ekayā gāthayā paridīpayamś ca caturvidham codyam paridīpayati harati / caturbhiḥ padair yathākramam* [Wayman 1961: 176; 183]).

⁶⁸⁸ *pravṛttih katamā / hetuphalaprabandhānupacchede pravṛttir iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.5-6). See also *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*: 謂諸行因果相續不斷性 (T. 1602: 484b21).

⁶⁸⁹ *yogah katamah / hetuphalānurūpye yoga iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.7). *hetuphalasārūpyam* anyavte 'pi yad yasya phalam yujyate / tadyathā dānasya bhogasam̄pad ity evam ādi (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 10.18-19). See also *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*: 流轉者。謂諸行因果相稱性 (T. 1602: 484b22-23).

See section 4e below.

the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, *pravṛtti* is defined very simply as a designation for the non-interruption of the stream of causes and results (see note 688); these definitions, especially that of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, are almost identical to the basic definition in the first passage of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*.⁶⁹⁰ Non-interruption is, in turn, one of the features of causality designated by the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as imports of conditioned origination, in this case *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha* (see above).

In addition, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* describes in detail a number of different types of *pravṛtti*, some of which are of particular interest to us. The first three types all are defined with relation to seeds. *Bijapravṛtti* consists of *dharmas* that possess seeds although they are not yet actualized.⁶⁹¹ The next type of *pravṛtti* consists of actualized *dharmas* the seeds of which have already been destroyed.⁶⁹² This type of *pravṛtti* seems to correspond to the explanation of *hetuphalapra-*

⁶⁹⁰ *de la 'jug pa gaṇ žé na / 'du byed rnames kyi rgyu daṇ 'bras bu'i rgyun mi 'chad pa ni 'jug pa žes bya'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27a7). 復次云何流轉。謂諸行因果相續不斷性 (T. 1579: 587c25-26). The second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage defines *pravṛtti* simply as a *prajñapti* designating the state of the stream of causes and results and distinguishes three types: the succession of moments; the succession of births; and the succession of defilement and purification ('*jug pa gnas skabs gaṇ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / rgyu daṇ 'bras bu'i rgyun gyi* [corrected from *gyis* on the basis of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 376, leaf 146, line 7] *gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsum ste / skad cig gcig nas gcig tu 'jug pa daṇ / skye ba gcig nas gcig tu 'jug pa daṇ / kun nas ūnon moṇs pa daṇ rnam par byaṇ ba gcig gnas gcig tu 'jug pa'o*—*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b1-2; 問依何分位建立流轉。此復幾種。答依因果相續分位建立流轉。此復三種。謂剎那展轉流轉。生展轉流轉。染污清淨展轉流轉—T. 1579: 607c11-13).

⁶⁹¹ *'jug pa sa bon gyi 'jug pa yaṇ yod de / 'di lta ste sa bon daṇ bcas pa'i chos mñon du ma* [missing in the Peking edition, but added on the basis of the Derge edition (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 48, line 3) and the Chinese] *gyur pa rnames kyi'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27a7-8). 或有種子流轉。謂有種子不現前諸法 (T. 1579: 587c26-27).

⁶⁹² *daṇ gi stobs kyis 'jug pa yaṇ yod de / 'di lta ste / sa bon mñams par byas pa kun tu spyod pa daṇ ldn pa rnames kyi'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27a8). 或有自在勢力流轉。謂被損種子現行諸法 (T. 1579: 587c27-28). I have not been able to retranslate into Sanskrit the name of this type of *pravṛtti*. A very awkward English translation would be something like “*pravṛtti* by way of inherent power.”

bandhānupacchedārtha in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, according to which the non-interruption of the stream of causes and results is due to the simultaneousness of the destruction of cause and the production of the result. The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*, however, does not mention seeds in this context.⁶⁹³ The last of this group of *pravṛtti*, *bijaphala-pravṛtti*, is said to consist of seeds as well as of *dharmas* that are actualized but whose seeds have not been destroyed.⁶⁹⁴ After this come definitions of *pravṛtti* of the streams (*rgyun*) of *nāma* and *rūpa*, of the streams of *kāma*-, *rūpa*-, and *ārūpyadhbātus*, of the streams of pleasure, suffering, and indifference, and of the streams of good, bad, and neutral (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27 b1-6; T. 1579: 587c29-588a8).

Finally, *pravṛtti* of the *anuloma* stream is said to consist of *pratītyasamutpāda* in its progressive order, while *pravṛtti* of the *pratiloma* stream is defined as *pratītyasamutpāda* in its regressive order.⁶⁹⁵ The term *pravṛtti*, which Schmithausen, although not in the context of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, translates as “origination-and-continuance” (1987: 173, 463 n. 1107), is frequently used in connection with *pratītyasamutpāda* to describe the process of conditioned production in its progressive order, in other words *samsāra*. Its opposite, *nivṛtti*, refers to the reversal that leads to the cessation of *samsāra*. However, this reversal is not always referred to by the term *nivṛtti*; for example, the summary of the *śarīra* portion of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* exposition describes it as the purification of *pravṛtti*.⁶⁹⁶ In our definition of the

⁶⁹³ *kāraṇaṅkṣaṇanirodhasamakālāṁ kāryaṅkṣaṇotpādāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 33.24-34.1; see Chapter 2, section B7).

⁶⁹⁴ *sa bon dañ 'bras bu'i 'jug pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste sa bon dañ bcas pa sa bon mñams par ma byas pa kun tu spyod pa dañ ldan pa rnams kyi'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27b1). 或有種果流轉。謂有種子種不被損現行諸法 (T. 1579: 587c28-29).

⁶⁹⁵ *mthun pa'i rgyun gyi 'jug pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba lugs su 'byuñ ba'i'o / mi mthun pa'i rgyun gyi 'jug pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste / rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba lugs su mi 'byuñ ba'i'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27b6-7). 又有順流流轉。謂順緣起。又有逆流流轉。謂逆緣起 (T. 1579: 588a8-10).

⁶⁹⁶ *pūrvāntāṁ madhyāntē pravṛttito madhyāntād aparāntē pravṛttito madhyāntē ca pravṛttivisuddhitah / itīdam pratītyasamutpādasya śarīram* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 203.4-5). See also *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: 'i 287b5-6; T. 1579: 828c10-12.

cittaviprayuktasamskāra, pravṛtti, pratilomapravṛtti is similarly equivalent to *nivṛtti*.⁶⁹⁷

Jaini has suggested that *pravṛtti*, like most of the Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, corresponds to a member of a Vaiśeṣika category, in which context it is defined as effort, zeal, or resolution.⁶⁹⁸ However, I fail to see the relation between this and even the simple definition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, to which he refers.⁶⁹⁹ If I am correct that the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is the earliest Yogācāra treatment of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, it seems that the Yogācāras have drawn instead from their expositions of *bīja* and *pratityasamutpāda* to invent a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* the definition of which describes the progression of causes and results that comprises *samsāra*.

⁶⁹⁷ We have seen the term *pravṛtti*, although not as a *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*, appear in a discussion of *anuloma* and *pratiloma* *pratityasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbhāṣya* comment on the last section of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya pratityasamutpāda* exposition ([*saṃ*]kleśānulomapratilomata iti pravṛttyānupūrvīm adhikṛtya, avidyāpratyayāḥ samskārā ity evam ādy anulomanirdeśāḥ / jarāmaranām jarāmara[na]samudayo [jarāmaranānirodho] jarāmaranānirodhagāmīni pratipad iti satyavavasthānām adhikṛtya pratilomanirdeśo veditavyah / [*vyavādānānulomapratilomata* iti] tadyathā 'vidyānirodhāt samskāra-nirodha ity evam ādi yyavādānānulomanirdeśāḥ / kasmin na sati na jarāmaranām bhavati kasya nirodhāj jarāmaranānirodha iti pratilomanirdeśāḥ—*Abhidharma-samuccayabhbhāṣya* 35.14-20). See Chapter 2, section B10.

⁶⁹⁸ Jaini quotes from the *Praśasta-pādabhbhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*: *prayatnah samrambha utśāha iti paryāyāḥ* (Jaini 1959b: 538).

⁶⁹⁹ According to the definition of *prayatna* that follows the sentence quoted by Jaini, there are two types. *Jīvanapūrvaka prayatna* is what keeps a person breathing while he is asleep and allows his mind to [re]-unite with his sense organs when he awakes. *Icchādvesapūrvaka prayatna* is the cause of action that enables one to obtain the agreeable and to avoid the disagreeable and is the support of the body (*sa dvividho jīvanapūrvakah icchādvesapūrvakaś ca / tatra jīvanapūrvakah suptasya prāṇāpāna-santānprerakah prabodhakāle cāntah-karaṇasyendriyāntaraprāptihetuh / asya jīvanapūrvakasyātmanasoh samyogād dharmādharmāpekṣād utpattiḥ / itaras tu hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamarthasya vyāpārasya hetuh śarīravidhārakaś ca / sa cātmamanasoh samyogād icchāpekṣād dveṣāpekṣād votpadyate* (*Praśasta-pādabhbhāṣya*: 216). Although *prayatna*, according to this definition, does not seem to resemble the Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasamskāra pravṛtti*, it does seem to fulfill some of the functions of *ālayavijñāna*.

d. *Pratiniyama*

Pratiniyama is defined in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as a designation for the variety of causes and results. The *Bhāṣya* explains this as the fact that every result has its own separate cause; for example, a good action is the cause of a desirable result, etc.⁷⁰⁰ Similarly, the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* defines *pratiniyama* as the manifoldness of causes and results.⁷⁰¹

Again, the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is much more detailed and explicit. Its basic definition stresses the absolute nature of this principle of causality: whether or not a Tathāgata appears in the world, from beginningless time it is the nature of all *dharmas* that the various causes and results do not get mixed up.⁷⁰² Of the various types of *pratiniyama*, *pravṛttinivṛttipratiniyama* (this and the following are all my Sanskrit retranslations) refers to *pratīyasamutpāda* in progressive and regressive order. *Sarvadharmapratiniyama* refers to the fact that all *dharmas* are included in the twelve āyatanas. *Vedānāpratiniyama* refers to the fact that all sensations are included in the three types of *vedānā*. *Sthitipratiniyama* refers to the fact that all bodies endure for their allotted

⁷⁰⁰ *pratiniyamah katamah / hetuphalanānātve pratiniyama iti prajñaptiḥ* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.6-7). *hetuphalanānātvaṁ* iṣṭasya phalasya sucaritam anīṣṭasya duścaritam ity evam ādi / phalānām prthak prthag anyonyahetukatvam (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 10.17-18).

⁷⁰¹ 定異者。謂諸行因果各異性 (T. 1602: 484b21-22).

⁷⁰² *de la so sor nes pa gan že na / de bžin gšegs pa rnams byuṇ yaṇ ruṇ ma byuṇ yaṇ ruṇ / thog ma med pa daṇ ldan pa'i dus nas bzuṇ ste / chos rnams kyi rgyu daṇ 'bras bu snā tshogs ma 'dres pa ūid kyi chos ūid so sor nes pa'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27b7-8). 復次云何定異。謂無始時來種種因果決定差別無雜亂性。如來出世若不出世。諸法法爾 (T. 1579: 588a11-13; see also T. 1584: 1025a15-16). According to the second passage, *pratiniyama* is a *prajñapti* designating the state of the differing characteristics of *dharmas*, and it consists of three types, *lakṣaṇapratiniyama*, *hetupratiniyama*, and *phalapratiniyama* [my retranslation] (*so sor nes pa gnas skabs gan la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / chos tha dad pa'i mtshan ūid kyi gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsum ste / mtshan ūid so sor nes pa daṇ / rgyu so sor nes pa daṇ / 'bras bu so sor nes pa'o*—*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b2-3; 問依何分位建立定異。此復幾種。答依法別相分位建立定異。此復三種。謂相定異。因定異。果定異 (T. 1579: 607c14-16).

time and that external things endure for a *kalpa*. *Pramāṇapratiniyama* refers to the fact that the size of the bodies of beings born in the various *rūpa* births and the size of the four external continents are fixed.⁷⁰³

As in the case of *sāmagrī*, there is a connection here between the list of *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras* and the Yogācāra expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the ten *hetus*. I have mentioned in note 119 that two of the *arthas* appear to be related to *pratiniyama*: *vicitrāhetuphalārtha* refers to the variety of causes and results mentioned in all the definitions of *pratiniyama*, while *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* refers to the fact that a given cause produces a determined result. A similar observation is the focus of the first *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* definition.⁷⁰⁴

In the exposition of the *hetus*, we find that in the earliest version in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *pratiniyamahetu* is defined as the fact that the various heterogeneous things have their own separate causes.⁷⁰⁵ In the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, *pratiniyamahetu* is related to *śaktivaicitrya-hetvadhiṣṭhāna*; *śaktivaicitrya* refers to the multiplicity of forces necessary to produce the variety of *dharma*s associated with *kāma*-, *rūpa*-, and *ārūpyadhātus*, as well as non-associated (*anāśrava*)

⁷⁰³ de la 'jug pa dañ ldog pa so sor nes pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba lugs su 'byuñ ba dañ / lugs su mi 'byuñ ba'i'o / chos thams cad so sor nes pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste skye mched bcu gñis po rnams gyi de las goñ na yañ med de las lhag pa yañ med pa'o / tshor ba so sor nes pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste tshor ba gsum po dag gi de las goñ na yañ med la de las lhag pa yañ med pa'o / gnas pa so sor nes pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste lus thams cad tshe ji srid pa dañ / phyi rol gyi dños po rnams bskal pa chen por [corrected from *po* on the basis of the Derge edition (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib. *derge*]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 49, line 6)] gnas pa'o / boñ tshod so sor nes pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste sems can skye ba'i gnas gzugs can de dañ de dag tu skyes pa rnams kyi boñ tshod dañ / phyi rol gyi gñiñ bñi pa rnams kyi tshad so sor nes pa'o (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 27b7-28a3). 或有流轉還減定異。謂順逆緣起。或有一切法定異。謂一切法十二處攝無過無增。或有領受定異。謂一切受三受所攝無過無增。或有住定異。謂一切內分乃至壽量。一切外分經大劫住。或有形量定異。謂諸有情於彼彼有色生處。所受生身形量決定。及諸外分四大洲等形量決定 (T. 1579: 588a13-20).

⁷⁰⁴ Again as I mentioned above (see note 119), Hsüan-tsang in his translation of the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* renders *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* as 因果決定無雜亂義 (T. 717: 841b25-26).

⁷⁰⁵ nānā-vijātīye vibhinna-kāraṇatvam pratiniyamahetu. (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 98.2-3).

dharma.⁷⁰⁶ The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines *pratiniyamakāraṇa* as the variety of conditions, and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* explains this by saying that the various different results are produced by different conditions. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* gives as an example the conditions of rebirth in the five destinies, which produce rebirth in those destinies.⁷⁰⁷ Finally, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* gives the most detailed explanation of *pratiniyamahetu* and the *adhiṣṭhāna* that is its support. *Śaktivaicitryahetvadhiṣṭhāna* is the special force possessed by all *samskr̥tadharma*s due to which there is production or experience⁷⁰⁸ of their respective results. *Pratiniyamahetu* is based on this because each *dharma* can produce a result pertaining only to its own *dhātu*, etc.,⁷⁰⁹ and can obtain a result pertaining only to its own vehicle.⁷¹⁰

Jaini notes that *pratiniyama*, like *yoga*, does not correspond to a member of the Vaiśeṣika lists, but he does not suggest a possible source for this *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra* (Jaini 1959b: 536). In trying to establish a source, I have shown that the same principle of causality that is given the status of a provisional *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra* by the

⁷⁰⁶tatra śaktivaicitryam hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hi / kāmapratisamyuktā dharmā vicitrasvabhāvā vicitrād svabhāvaviśeṣāc chaktivaicitryād utpadyante / yathā kāmapratisamyuktā evam rūpapratisamyuktā ārūpyapratisamyuktā apratisamyuktāḥ / tasmāc chaktivaicitryam adhiṣṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate (Yogācārabhūmi: 109.19-110.2).

⁷⁰⁷pratiniyamakāraṇam, pratyayavaicitryam, tadyathā pañcagatipratyayāḥ pañcānām gatīnām (Abhidharmasamuccaya: 27.15). pratiniyamakāraṇam bhinnasvabhāvata�ānyonyaphalatvāt (Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya: 36.20-21).

⁷⁰⁸起證. According to the *Shindōjōyuishikiron*, 起 refers to *samskr̥tadharma*s while 證 refers to *asamskr̥ta*, presumably, that is, to *pratisamkhyānirodha* (*Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 343). However, La Vallée Poussin ignores the term 證 in his translation (1929: 458).

⁷⁰⁹The *Shindōjōyuishikiron* explains that a *dharma* of a certain *dhātu* will be the cause of a *dharma* of the same *dhātu*, a *dharma* within a *dhātu* of a certain nature will be the cause of a *dharma* of the same nature, and a *rūpadharma* of a certain nature will be the cause of another *rūpadharma*, etc. (*Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 343; see also La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 458).

⁷¹⁰十二差別功能依處。謂有為法各於自果有能起證差別勢力。即依此處立定異因謂各能生自界等果及各能得自乘果故 (T. 1585: 41c7-9; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 458; *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 343).

Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī is described in the definition of *pratiniyamahetu*. The use of the terms *pratiniyama* and *pratiniyata* to describe the fact that causes, despite their infinitely large number, give rise only to the appropriate results is, as far as I can tell, limited to the Yogācāra expositions of causality and to the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*, a text that explains *pratītyasamutpāda* in a manner similar to that of Yogācāra (Matsuda 1982a: 48). All references to the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra*, *pratiniyama*, and to *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* are later than our first reference to *pratiniyamahetu* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which is one of the oldest portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The relative positions of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras* and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*, however, are not so clear, since the chronological relationship between the portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which they occur has not been definitely established.

However, whether or not the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is, as I believe, generally older than the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, the Yogācāra exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* exists in at least one form (in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*) that is undoubtedly older than any Yogācāra discussion of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*. Therefore, although the earliest reference to *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* that we have is found in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*,⁷¹¹ it is not impossible that the category of the *pratītyasamutpādārthas* was borrowed from another, no longer extant exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, later than the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which does not mention them, but earlier than the *Savitarkādibhūmi*. Thus, I would tentatively suggest that the term *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* is later than *pratiniyamahetu* but earlier than the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*. In any case, I think that the origin of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra*, *pratiniyama*, can be found in earlier expositions of causality, specifically in *pratiniyamahetu*.

e. *Yoga*

The definitions of *yoga* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* are almost identical. They both seem to be based

⁷¹¹As for the *Ādīviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*, Matsuda thinks that it is contemporaneous with, if not authored by, Vasubandhu (personal communication).

on the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, according to which *yoga* is a designation applied to the conformity between cause and result.⁷¹² The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* explains this conformity as meaning that causes have appropriate results, despite the fact that cause and result are different, and it gives the example of the obtainment of wealth that can result from giving charity.⁷¹³

The definition in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, however, is somewhat different. According to it, *yoga* consists of the established names of *dharma*s, their differentiation, and the means by which they can be discerned. *Yoga*, when subdivided, corresponds to the four types of *yukti*: *apekṣayukti*, *kāryakārānyukti*, *upapattisādhanayukti*, and *dharmaṭāyukti*.⁷¹⁴ Finally, a reference is made to the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, in which the four *yuktis* are explained in greater detail.⁷¹⁵

The four *yuktis* appear exclusively in Yogācāra texts,⁷¹⁶ where they

⁷¹² *Abhidharmasamuccaya*—*yogaḥ katamah / hetuphalānurūpye yoga iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.7). *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*—相應者。謂諸行因果相稱性 (T. 1602: 484b22-23). *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*—*rgyu dan 'bras bu mthun pa'i gnas skabs la'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b3); 答依因果相稱分位建立相應 (T. 1579: 607c17).

⁷¹³ *hetuphalasārūpyam* anyavte 'pi yad yasya phalam yujyate / tadyathā dānasya bhogasam̄pad ity evam ādi (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya*: 10.18-19).

⁷¹⁴ These Sanskrit equivalents are from the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (Wayman 1961: 78-80).

⁷¹⁵ *de la sbyor ba gaṇ že na / chos de daṇ de dag gi kun tu tha sñad gdags pa daṇ / rnām par bžag pa daṇ / so sor rtogs par bya ba'i thabs gaṇ yin pa de ni sbyor ba žes bya'o / rab tu dbye na rigs pa bži po 'di lta ste / ltos pa'i rigs pa daṇ / bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa daṇ / 'thad pas sgrub pa'i rigs pa daṇ / chos nñid kyi rigs pa dag nñi sbyor ba žes bya ste / rigs pa de dag gi rab tu dbye ba ni 'di lta ste / nñan thos kyi sa las 'byuñ ba bžin du rig par bya'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 28a3-5); 復次云何相應。謂彼諸法為等言說為等建立為等開解諸勝法便。是謂相應。又此相應差別分別有四道理。謂觀待道理。作用道理。因成道理。法爾道理。此諸道理當知如聲地等已廣分別 (T. 1579: 588a21-25).

⁷¹⁶ Sources aside from the *Śrāvakabhūmi* include: *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which mentions the four *yuktis* and refers to a previous explanation, presumably in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 293.17-18); *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 794a7-8—the *sūtras* [T. 99: 8b-c, *sūtras* nos. 37-38; see Mukai 1985: 30] on which this passage comments do not mention them; also 880a25-28, which refers to the *Śrāvakabhūmi* by name); *Śrutamayībhūmi* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: dzi 186a4; T. 1579: 346a2), which defines *yukti* as consisting of *pratityasamutpāda* and the four *yuktis*; *Samdhinirmocanasaṃśāra* (T. 676: 709b11-710a18; Lamotte 1935: 262-265), which is

play an important role in *vipaśyanā* meditation.⁷¹⁷ The *Śrāvakabhūmi* seems to be the earliest extant source, and it enumerates and defines the *yuktis* in two separate passages.⁷¹⁸ The first of these explains that when one examines the teaching of the *skandhas* by reasoning, as opposed to enumeration, one should employ four types of reasoning.⁷¹⁹ *Apeksāyukti* is reasoning applied to the relation of dependence whereby the *skandhas* appear due to causes and conditions and the relation of dependence whereby the *skandhas* are designated by words, sentences, and syllables.⁷²⁰ *Kāryakāraṇayukti* is reasoning applied to cause and result, specifically to the fact that the various *dharmas* have their own particular causes and results and that there is a correlation between cause and result.⁷²¹ *Upapattisādhanayukti* is reasoning applied to

notable for its long discussion of *upapattisādhanayukti*, which it divides into two types, pure and impure; *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (T. 1605: 687a15-21; Rahula 1980: 136; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 99.7-16); *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T. 1602: 582b8-583a2); and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*: 168.5-11; Lévi 1911: 275). See also Mochizuki 1974: 3920.

⁷¹⁷ Especially *Śrāvakabhūmi*: 369.8-370.2 (*Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 163a5-b3; T. 1579: 451c20-452a2; Wayman 1961: 111-113).

⁷¹⁸ *Śrāvakabhūmi*: 141.7-143.21 (*Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 68a1-69a5; T. 1579: 419b5-c14; Wayman 1961: 78-80 includes partial text and translation) and *Śrāvakabhūmi*: 369.8-370.2 (*Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 163a5-b3; T. 1579: 451c20-452a2; Wayman 1961: 111-113 includes complete text and translation).

⁷¹⁹ *kathāṇi yuktupaparīkṣākārāyā cintayā skandhadeśanām cintayati / catsrabhir yuktibhir upaparīkṣate / katamabhiḥ catasrabhir yad utāpeksāyuktyā kāryakāraṇayuktyā upapapattisādhanayuktyā dharmatāyuktyā* (Wayman 1961: 78-79 [where Wayman includes the complete text, I give his text since it is generally more accurate than Shukla's; I give Shukla's, however, when Wayman's text is incomplete]; *Śrāvakabhūmi*: 141.7-10; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 68a1-2; T. 1579: 419b5-8).

⁷²⁰ *apeksāyuktiḥ katamā / dvividhā apeksā utpattyapeksā prajñaptiyepeksā ca / tatrōtpattyapeksā yair hetupratyayaiḥ skandhānām prādurbhāvo bhavati / tasyām skandhotpattau te hetavas te pratyayā apeksyante / yair nāmakāyapadakāyavyamjanakāyaiḥ skandhānām prajñaptir bhavati / tasyām skandhaprajñaptau te nāmapadakāyavyamjanakāyā apeksyante / iyam ucyate skandheśūtpattyapeksā / prajñaptiyepeksatā (kṣā) ca / yā cotpattyapeksā / yā ca prajñaptiyepeksā sā yuktir yoga upāyah / skandhotpattaye / skandhaprajñaptaye tasmatā apeksāyuktir ity ucyate* (*Śrāvakabhūmi*: 141.11-142.2; *Śrāvakabhūmi* [tib.]: 68a2-7; T. 1579: 419b8-16).

⁷²¹ *kāryakāraṇayuktir yā [ta]d utpannānām skandhānām svena hetunā svena pratyayena tasmiṁs tasmin svakāryakaraṇe viniyogas tadyathā / cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi*

proving, by means of the three types of valid knowledge, statements about the *skandhas*, for example, that they are impermanent, conditionally originated, etc.⁷²² Finally, *dharmaṭāyukti* is reasoning applied to the question of why things are the way they are, for example, why the *skandhas* are impermanent, and why *nirvāṇa* is peaceful.⁷²³

Returning to the first *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* passage, we find that it thus defines *yoga* very broadly in terms mainly of the relationships between words and their referents and between reality and the understanding of it. The second passage, on the other hand, which seems to rely on the definitions of the first type of *apeksāyukti* and of *kāryakāraṇayukti*, focuses on the causal aspect of *yoga*. As I have mentioned, the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* do likewise. Similarly, it is the causal aspect of *yoga*, specifically the facet corresponding to *kāryakāraṇayukti*, that is related to *anurūpahetuphalārtha*.

*draṣṭavyāni / śrotrena śabdā[h] śrotavyāḥ / yāvan manasā dharmā vijñeyā iti / rūpena cakṣuṣo gocare avasthātavyam / śabdēna śrotṛasya evam yā[va]*d dharmair manasa iti / yad vā punar anyad apy evambhāgīyam / tatra tatra dharmāṇāṁ anyonyam** kāryakāreṇa pratiyuktir yoga upāya iyam ucyate / kāryak[ā]raṇayuktiḥ* (Śrāvakabhūmi: 142.3-11; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 68a7-b3; T. 1579: 419b16-23).

*I have added the bracketed syllable.

**Shukla gives *anyo [a]nyam*, but her emendation does not seem necessary.

⁷²² *upapattisādhanayuktiḥ katamā / anityā[h] skandhā iti pratītyasamutpannā duḥkhā[h] śūnyā anātmāna iti tribhīḥ pramāṇair upapariṣkṣate yad u(ta)tāptīgamena pratyekṣeṇānumānena ca / ebbis tribhīḥ pramāṇair upapattiyuktaiḥ satāṁ hṛdaya- grāhakair vyavasthāpanā sādhanā kriyate / yad uta skandhāṇītyatāyā vā pratītya- samutpannatāyā vā duḥkhatāyā[h] śūnyatāyā iyam ucyate upapattisādhanayuktiḥ* (Śrāvakabhūmi: 142.12-143.3; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 68b3-5; T. 1579: 419b23-28).

⁷²³ *dharmaṭā-yuktiḥ katamā / kena kāraṇena tathābhūtā ete skandhā(s) tathābhūto lokasamīniveśāḥ kena kāraṇena khara-lakṣaṇā prthivī drava-lakṣaṇā āpah usṇa- lakṣaṇām teja(h) samudrāṇa-lakṣaṇo vayuḥ / anityāḥ skandhā(h) / kena kāraṇena sāntām nirvāṇam iti / tathā rūpa[ṇa]-lakṣaṇām rūpam anubhavana-lakṣaṇā vedanā samjānanā-lakṣaṇā samjñā abhisamkaraṇa-lakṣaṇāḥ samskārā vijānanā-lakṣaṇām vijñānam iti / prakṛtir eṣām dharmāṇām idam svabhāva eṣa idṛśāḥ dharmataiṣā(m) caiva cāsau dharmatā / saivātra yuktir yoga upāyah evam vā etasmāt / anyathā vā naivā vāsmāt sarvatraiva ca dharmataiva pratiprasaraṇām dharmataiva yuktih / cittanidhyapanāya cittasamjñāpanāya iyam ucyate dharmatā-yuktiḥ* (Śrāvakabhūmi: 143.4-16; Śrāvakabhūmi [tib.]: 68b5-69a4; Wayman 1961: 79; T. 1579: 419b28-c9).

f. Java

Again, the definitions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*⁷²⁴ are very similar to that of the second *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* passage, according to which *java* is a designation referring to the fact that origination-and-continuance proceeds rapidly.⁷²⁵ This in turn is based upon the basic definition of the first passage, namely that *java* is the rapid motion that is constituted by the production and destruction of the *samskrtadharmas*. The first passage then defines ten⁷²⁶ types of *java*: (1) the speed of the origination-and-continuance of the *samskrtadharmas*, which is equivalent to their rapid production and annihilation; (2) the speed manifested in the motion of those dwelling on the earth, for example, that of men, elephants, horses, etc.; (3) the speed of those dwelling in the air, for example, that of birds, certain gods, and *yakṣas*; (4) the speed of sounds; (5) the speed of water, that is, the flowing of the current of rivers, etc.; (6) the speed of fire, that is, the movement of a fire consuming fuel; (7) the speed of wind;⁷²⁷ (8) the speed of force, for example, that of turning a wheel; (9) the speed of knowing, for example, the speed with which a *yogin* is able to analyze that which is to be known; (10) the speed of psychic powers, for example, the speed of mind and movement available to the possessors of great psychic powers.⁷²⁸

⁷²⁴ *javaḥ katamah / hetuphalāśupravṛttau java iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharma-samuccaya*: 19.7-8). 謂諸行流轉迅疾性(T. 1602: 484b23-24).

⁷²⁵ *mgyogs pa gnas skabs gaṇ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / myur du 'jug pa'i gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsum ste / 'du byed kyi mgyogs pa daṇ / skyes bu'i byed pa'i mgyogs pa daṇ / rdzu 'phrul gyi mgyogs pa'o* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b4-5). 間依何分位建立勢速。此復幾種。答依迅疾流轉分位建立勢速。此復三種。謂諸行勢速。士用勢速。神通勢速(T. 1579: 607c19-20).

⁷²⁶ The Chinese translation only includes nine, as does the *Chüeh ting tsang lun* (T. 1584: 1025a26-b4).

⁷²⁷ This type of *java* is not mentioned in the Chinese.

⁷²⁸ (This passage is difficult, and I have not translated it in full but only paraphrased it as best I could.) *de la mgyogs pa gaṇ že / 'du byed rnam kyi 'byuṇ ba daṇ / 'jig pa'i tshul gyis myur du 'gro žin rgyu ba ñid ni mgyogs pa žes bya'o / de la 'du byed rnam kyi 'jug* (corrected from 'jugs on the basis of the Derge edition—*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*

Only the first subdivision of *java* in the lists of both the first and second *Viniścayasamgrahanī* passages is directly related to causality. However, the basic definitions in both passages, as well as the definition found in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, refer to the arising and destruction of conditioned *dharmas* and hence are clearly about cause and effect. Furthermore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines *java*, as it does all but one (*samkhyā*) of the last group of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, specifically with reference to *hetuphala*. Therefore, the primary significance of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*, *java*, is related to cause and result. Although Jaini points out a correspondence between *java* and the Vaiśeṣika *vega*, I do not see any real similarity aside from the nearly synonymous names.⁷²⁹

[tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 2) *pa'i mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste 'du byed rnames kyi myur du skye ba dañ 'gag pa'o / sems can sa la gnas pa rnames kyi rtul ba'i mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste mi dañ glañ po che dañ rta la sogs pa'i'o / sems can bar snañ la gnas pa rnames kyi mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste bya rnames dañ / bar snañ la gnas pa'i lha dañ gnod sbyin la sogs pa'i'o / sgra skad gyi mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste sgra 'byuñ ba'i'o / chu'i mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste chu kluñ gi rgyun la sogs pa'i 'bab pa (corrected from *bar ba* on the basis of the Derge edition—*Viniścayasamgrahanī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 4) *ñid do / me'i mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste sreg bya'i me'i 'gro ba ñid do / rluñ gi mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste rluñ gi tshogs chen po rgyun gyi'o / śugs kyi mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste mda' dañ / 'khor lo la sogs pa'i 'phans pa'i'o / śes pa'i mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste rnal 'byor pa'i śes rab myur ba ñid kyi śes bya rab tu 'byed pa ñid kyi'o / rdzu 'phrul gyi* [corrected from *gyis* on the basis of the Derge edition—*Viniścayasamgrahanī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 4] *mgyogs pa yañ yod de / 'di lta ste rdzu phrul chen po dañ ldan pa rdzu 'phrul gyis 'gro ba'i lus 'gro ba dañ / yid mgyogs pa'o (Viniścayasamgrahanī* [tib.]: zi 28a5-28b3). 復次云何勢速。謂諸行生滅相應速運轉性。是謂勢速。又此勢速差別多種。或有諸行流轉勢速。謂諸行生滅性。或有地行有情輕健勢速。謂人象馬等。或有空行有情勢速。謂諸飛禽空行棄又及諸天等。或有言音勢速。謂詞韻捷利。或有流潤勢速。謂江河等迅速流注。或有燒然勢速。謂火焚燎猛焰飈轉。或有引發勢速。謂放箭轉丸等。或有智慧勢速。謂修觀者簡擇所知迅速慧性。或有神通勢速。謂大神通者所有運身意勢等速疾神通 (T. 1579: 588a6-b7).*

⁷²⁹Jaini quotes from the *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*: *Vego...niyata-dik-kriyā-prabandhahetu* (Jaini 1959b: 538).

g. *Anukrama*

The basic definitions of the two *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* passages and the definitions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* all agree that *anukrama* is a designation for the fact that the constituents of conditioned existence appear one by one in a determined order.⁷³⁰ The first *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* passage lists seven types of *anukrama*: (1) *pravṛttyanukrama*,⁷³¹ which is the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula in the progressive order of defilement;⁷³² (2) *nivṛttyanukrama*, which is the formula in the progressive order of purification;⁷³³ (3) *anukrama* pertaining to entering and staying in the

⁷³⁰ *de la go rims gaṇ žé na / 'du byed kyi rgyud so so* [corrected from *so so so so* on the basis of the Derge edition—*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 6] *dag la re re nas go rims sna phyis 'jug pa gaṇ yin pa de ni go rims žes bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 28b3). 復次云何次第。謂於各別行相續中。前後次第一一隨轉。是謂次第 (T. 1579: 588b8-9).

go rims [corrected from *rim* on the basis of the Derge edition—*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 376, leaf 147, line 4] *gnas skabs gaṇ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / 'du byed re re nas 'jug pa'i gnas skabs la'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b5-6). 間依何分位建立次第。此復幾種。答依一一行流轉分位建立次第 (T. 1579: 607c21-23).

anukramah katamah / hetuphalaikatavapravṛttāv anukrama iti prajñaptih (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.8). *ekaikasyaiva pravṛttir ayugapat pravṛttir veditavyā* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 10.20).

次第者。謂諸行一一次第流轉性 (T. 1602 [*Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*]: 484b23-24).

⁷³¹ The Sanskrit equivalents are all my retranslations. In some cases I have not been able to retranslate the names of the types of *anukramas*.

⁷³² *de la 'jug pa'i go rims kyaṇ yod de / 'di lta ste ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnams žes bya ba nas / rgyas par skye ba'i rkyen gyis rga śi'i bar du'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 28b3-4). 或有流轉次第。謂無明緣行。廣說乃至生緣老死 (T. 1579: 588b10-11). See also Chapter 2, section B10.

⁷³³ *ldog pa'i go rims kyaṇ yod de / 'di lta ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed rnams 'gags ces bya ba nas rgyas par [sky]e ba 'gags pas rga śi'*—added on the basis of the Derge edition (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib. derge]: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 51, line 1)] *'gags pa'i bar du'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* [tib.]: zi 28b4-5). 或有還滅次第。謂無明滅故行滅。乃至生滅故老死滅 (T. 1579: 588b11-12). See also Chapter 2, section B10.

condition of being a householder or a monk;⁷³⁴ (4) *anukrama* of growth, namely, the procession through the eight stages of childhood, youth, etc.;⁷³⁵ (5) *abhisamayānukrama*, namely, the order in which one understands the four noble truths, starting with the truth of suffering;⁷³⁶ (6) *saṃāpattyanukrama*, namely, the order in which one enters the nine *saṃāpatti*s;⁷³⁷ (7) *śikṣānukrama*, namely, the fact that one produces *adhicitta* based on *adhiśīla* before producing *adhiprajñā* based on *adhicitta*.⁷³⁸ The three types in the second passage are difficult to understand, and I do not see exactly how they correspond to the seven types of the first passage.⁷³⁹ Translated literally, these comprise: the order in which moments proceed, the order in which the body proceeds (i.e., grows), and the order in which the accomplishment of what is to be done proceeds. If we compare these divisions with those of the first passage, we could say that the first type perhaps includes *pravṛtti*- and

⁷³⁴ *khyim pa dañ rab tu byuñ ba rnam kyi rgyu ba dañ / gnas pa'i go rims kyan yod de* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 28b4). 或有在家出家行住次第 (T. 1579: 588b12-13). There follows a long list of activities of the householder and monk that must be done in a certain sequence.

⁷³⁵ *mñon par 'grub pa'i go rims kyan yod de / 'di lta ste / byis ba dañ gzon nu la sogs pa'i gnas skabs brygad po dag rims kyis 'byuñ ba'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 29a2-3). 或有增長次第。謂嬰孩童子等八位次第生起 (T. 1579: 588b23-24). The *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation lists eight states but does not indicate the origin of the list (Yuga-bu 3: 329 n. 3).

⁷³⁶ *mñon par rtogs pa'i go rims kyan yod de / 'di lta ste sdug bñal la sogs pa 'phags pa'i bden pa bži po dag rims kyis mñon par rtogs pa'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 29a3-4). 或有現觀次第。謂於苦等四聖諦中次第現觀 (T. 1579: 588b24-25).

⁷³⁷ *sñoms par 'jug pa'i go rims kyan yod de / 'di lta ste mthar gyis gnas pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa dgu po dag la rim gyis sñoms par 'jug go* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 29a4). 或有入定次第。謂次第入九次第定 (T. 1579: 588b20-21). The *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation explains that these are the four *dhyānas*, the four *ārūpyas*, and *nirodhāsaṃāpatti* (Yuga-bu 3: 329 n. 4).

⁷³⁸ *bslab pa'i go rims kyan yod de / 'di lta ste lhag pa'i tshul khrims la brten pa'i go rims gyis lhag pa'i sems skye ba dañ lhag pa'i sems la brten nas lhag pa'i žes rab skye ba'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 29a4-5). 或有修學次第。謂增上戒學為依。次生增上心學。增上心學為依。後生增上慧學 (T. 1579: 588b26-28).

⁷³⁹ *rnam pa gsum ste / skad cig pa'i 'jug pa'i go rim dañ / lus 'jug pa'i gó rim dañ / bya ba sgrub pa 'jug pa'i go rims so* (*Viniścayasamgrahānī* [tib.]: zi 77b6). 此復三種。謂剎那流轉次第。內身流轉次第。成立所作流轉次第 (T. 1579: 607c23-24).

nivṛtyanukrama, the second, *anukrama* of growth, and the third, *abhisamaya-*, *samāpatti-*, and *śikṣānukrama*.

h. *Kāla*

The definitions of *kāla* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* are phrased differently but are similar in meaning. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *kāla* is a designation for the forward movement of the stream of causes and results.⁷⁴⁰ The *Bhāṣya* explains that the time in which cause and result have both arisen and been destroyed is called the past. Similarly, the time in which they have not yet arisen is called the future, and the time in which they have arisen but not yet been destroyed is called the present.⁷⁴¹ The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* says that *kāla* refers to the fact that *samskṛtadharma*s progress by arising and being destroyed again and again.⁷⁴² The second *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* definition is even more abstract, but it also amounts to the same thing: *kāla* is the non-interruption of the stream of *samskṛtas*.⁷⁴³

The basic definition in the first *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passage is more complicated. *Kāla* is explained both in astronomical terms and in terms of the *samskṛtadharma*s: divisions of time are established and manifested due to the rising and setting of the sun as well as to the arising and destruction of the *samskṛtadharma*s. Measures of time in diminishing order (epoch, year, month, etc.) are given as examples, as

⁷⁴⁰ *kālah katham* / *hetuphalaprabandha* *pravṛttau kāla iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharma-*
samuccaya: 19.8-9).

⁷⁴¹ *hetuphalasya prabandhena pravṛttau satyām* *yat tatra hetuphalam*
utpannāniruddham *so 'titāḥ kāla iti prajñapyate, yad anutpannam* *so 'nāgataḥ kālah,*
yad utpannāniruddham *sa pratyutpannah kāla iti* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*:
10.20-22).

⁷⁴² 時者。謂諸行展轉新生滅性 (T. 1602: 484b24-25). Compare with the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 何等為時。謂於因果相續流轉。假立為時 (T. 1605: 665c27-28).

⁷⁴³ *dus gnas skabs gan la gdags / rnam pā du yod ce na / smras pa / 'du byed kyi*
rgyun mi 'chad pa'i gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsun pa ste / 'das pa dañ / ma 'oñs pa
dañ / da ltar byuñ ba'o (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b6-7). 問依何分位建立時。此復幾種。答依行相續不斷分位建立時。此復三種。謂去來今 (T. 1579: 607c24-26).

well as past, future, and present; Hsüan-tsang's translation suggests that the measures are divisions of astronomical time, while past, present, and future pertain to the *samskratas*.⁷⁴⁴ Again, our other passages focus on only one of the aspects described in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage.

Interestingly, in the *Abhidharmakośabhäṣya* Vasubandhu, in order to refute those (presumably the Vaiśeṣikas) who think that *kāla* is a permanent and substantial entity, asks, "What is this *dharma* called *kāla*?" His answer is that it is an appellation designating the *samskrata-dharmas*.⁷⁴⁵ Yaśomitra adds that the name indicates the *samskrata-dharmas* of the past, future, and present.⁷⁴⁶ As P'u-kuang points out (T. 1821: 223b28-c11), a similar position can be found in the *Vibhāṣā*, which concludes that a *kalpa*, like the smaller units of time of which it is composed, is nothing other than the *skandhas*.⁷⁴⁷ Furthermore, as P'u-

⁷⁴⁴The Tibetan and Chinese translations vary considerably here: *de la dus gaṇ žé nā / ū ma 'char ba daṇ nub pa'i dbaṇ du byas te dus yoṇ su chad pa daṇ / ū bar mtshon pa rnam par gžag pa daṇ / 'du byed rnam kyi 'byuṇ ba daṇ 'jig pa'i dbaṇ du byas te / dus yoṇ su chad pa daṇ ū bar mtshon pa'i rnam par gžag pa ni 'di lta ste / dus ts̄higs daṇ / lo daṇ / zla ba daṇ / zla ba phyed daṇ / ūn mo daṇ mtshan mo daṇ / skad cig daṇ / thaṇ cig daṇ / yud tsam rnam daṇ / 'das pa daṇ ma 'oṇs pa daṇ / da ltar byuṇ ba rnam kyi dus žes bya'o (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 29a5-7). 復次云何時。謂由日輪出沒增上力故。安立顯示時節差別。又由諸行生滅增上力故。安立顯示世位差別。總說名時。此時差別復有多種。謂時年月半晝夜剎那臘縛牟呼栗多等位。及與過去未來現在 (T. 1579: 588b29-c4). Portions of the Chinese that seem to be Hsüan-tsang's interpretive additions are underlined. Compare with the *Chüeh ting tsang lun* (T. 1584: 1025b19-24).*

⁷⁴⁵*kālo nāma ka esa dharmah / samskāraparidīpanādhivacanam etat* (*Abhidharmakośabhäṣya*: 212; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 62). Elsewhere in the *Abhidharmakośabhäṣya*, Vasubandhu discusses the relationship between time and causation (*Abhidharmakośabhäṣya*: 130.25-28; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 59-60—*ādau hi parikalpyamāne tasyāhetukatvam eteṣu sajyeta sati cāhetukatve sarvam evedam ahetukam prāduḥ syāt / drṣṭam cāñkurādiṣu bijādīnām sāmarthyam deśakāla-pratiniyamād agnyādīnām ca pākajādiṣv iti nāsti nirhetukam prādurbhāvah*). See the section on *deśa* below for a discussion of this passage.

⁷⁴⁶*kāla ity asyābhidhānasya kim abhidheyam ity arthah / samskāra-paridīpanādhivacanam etad iti. samskārānām atītānāgata-pratyutpannānām abhidyotakam nāmeti. tad-yathā 'tītah kālo yāvāt pratyutpanna iti traiyadhvikāḥ samskārā eva gamyante* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 375.5-8).

⁷⁴⁷如是說者。晝夜等位無不皆是五蘊生滅。以此成劫劫體亦然。然劫既通三界時分。故用五蘊四蘊為性 (T. 1545: 700b29-c3).

kuang also mentions, Samghabhadra agrees with Vasubandhu's answer and says that *kāla* is nothing but the *samskrtradharmas*.⁷⁴⁸ However, none of these sources refers to the fact that the *Yogācārabhūmi* considers *kāla* a *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāra*, albeit a *prajñapti*.

i. (*Deśa*)

Deśa is not mentioned in the first *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passage.⁷⁴⁹ According to our second passage, which contains what must be the earliest extant definition of this *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāra*, it is a designation for a state of that which is included in *rūpa*. There are three types: that which is above, that which is below, and that which is to the side.⁷⁵⁰ The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* says that *deśa* is equivalent to the nature of *material dharmas* to be distributed equally everywhere.⁷⁵¹ Finally, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states that *deśa* is simply a designation for cause and result in all ten directions (but the text only mentions six: east, south, west, north, above, and below); the *Bhāṣya*, echoing the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* definition, points out that *deśa* only refers to cause and result consisting of *rūpa*, because that which does not consist of *rūpa* cannot pervade the directions.⁷⁵²

All of these definitions describe the peculiar quality of matter whereby it has a spatial location. Although the causal implications of

⁷⁴⁸ 何法名時非離諸行 (T. 1562: 551c2-3).

⁷⁴⁹ In the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* (T. 1614: 855c14-15), its position is transposed with that of *kāla*, while all the other *cittaviprayuktasamṣkāras* appear in the same order as in the second *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passage, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*.

⁷⁵⁰ *yul gnas skabs gaṇ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / gzugs yoṇ su bzuṇ ba'i gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsum ste / og gi yul daṇ / steṇ gi yul daṇ / thad ka'i yul lo* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b7-8). 問依何分位建立方。此復幾種。答依所攝受諸色分位建立方。此復三種。謂上下傍 (T. 1579: 607c26-28).

⁷⁵¹ 方者。謂諸色行遍分齊性 (T. 1602: 484b25). I am not confident about my translation of this definition.

⁷⁵² *deśaḥ katamaḥ / pūrvadakṣiṇapaścimottarādhordhvāsu sarvato daśasū dikṣu hetuphala eva deśa iti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.9-10). *hetuphalasya digvyāptau deśopacārah / rūpasamgrhītām cāra hetuphalām veditavyam arūpiṇām digvyāpanasāmarthyābhāvāt* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 10.23-24).

deśa are not immediately clear, a passage from the *Abhidharma-kośabhaṣya* can perhaps help us understand why *deśa* has found its way onto most of the Yogācāra lists of *cittaviprayuktasamkāras*. In verse thirteen of Chapter Three, Vasubandhu states that the circle of existence is without beginning.⁷⁵³ He then discusses the undesirable consequences of positing a beginning: if there is a beginning, then it would have no cause, and if one thing has no cause, then everything arises without a cause. To prove that things cannot arise without a cause, he adduces the examples of the seed and the sprout, and fire and that which is cooked, and he says that the efficacy of the seed and fire can be verified by the determination of place and time.⁷⁵⁴ The *Abhidharma-kośavyākhyā* explains that, in the case of the seed, the sprout will arise only in the place in which the seed is planted, and it will appear immediately following [the destruction of] the seed. Similarly it suggests that, in the case of fire, that which is cooked will appear only in the place where the fire is located and only at the appropriate time. Yaśomitra concludes that if something arose without a cause, the efficacy of the seed to produce the sprout would not be subject to the determinations of place and time, and so everything would appear everywhere at all times.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵³ *ity anādibhavacakrakam* (*Abhidharma-kośa* III 19d; *Abhidharma-kośabhaṣya*: 130.23; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 59).

⁷⁵⁴ *ādau hi parikalpyamāne tasyāhetukatvam eteṣu sajyeta sati cāhetukatve sarvam evedam ahetukam prāduḥ syāt / drṣṭam cāñkurādiṣu bijādīnām sāmarthyam deśakālapratiniyamād agnyādīnām ca pākajādiṣv iti nāsti nirhetukam prādurbhāvah* (*Abhidharma-kośabhaṣya*: 130.25-28; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 59-60).

⁷⁵⁵ *tasyāhetukatvam* iti. āder *ahetukatvam* sati cāsyāhetukatve, tadvad eva *sarvam* *ahetukam* *prāduh* syāt. *drṣṭam cāñkurādiṣu bijādīnām sāmarthyam*. *amkura-nāla-kānda-patrādiṣu bijāmīkura-nāla-kāndādīnām sāmarthyam* *utpādanāya* kasmāt. *deśa-kāla-pratiniyamāt*. *deśa-kālayos* tu *pratiniyamāt*. tatra *deśa-pratiniyamo* *bijādi-sambaddha* eva *deśa* *utpatteh*. *kāla-pratiniyamo* *bijānātaram* *utpatteh*. *agny-ādīnām cāgnī** *śitōṣṇābhīghāta-caksur-ādīnām pāka-jādiṣu pāka-ja-sukha-duhkha-śabda-caksur-vijñānādiṣu drṣṭam sāmarthyam* *deśa-kāla-pratiniyamāt*. yadi hi *nirhetukah* *prādurbhāvah* syāt, *bijādīnām amkurañdiṣu agny-ādīnām ca pāka-jādiṣu deśa-kāla-pratiniyam* *menotpatti* *prati sāmarthyam* na syāt. *sarvam* *sarvatra* *sarvadot* *padyeta* (*Abhidharma-kośavyākhyā*: 283.31-284.8; Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 151).

*Corrected from *yā gni* according to Yamaguchi and Funahashi (1955: 5).

Although Vasubandhu here is not suggesting that *kāla* and *deśa* are *dharmas*, he does show their importance in the causal process. In particular, Yaśomitra's description of the way in which causal efficacy is inextricably associated with space and time reminds us of the definitions of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra*, *pratiniyama*, which has a similar role in assuring that all the manifold results in the world of conditioned things are connected with only their appropriate causes. Thus we can understand how *deśa* became included among the *dharmas* that the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhbāṣya* describes as designations for states of cause and result.

j. *Samkhyā*

According to the first *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passage, *saṃkhyā* establishes and manifests the different standards for enumerating various things, for example, one, two, many, and innumerable.⁷⁵⁶ The second passage says that it is a designation for the state that manifests the enumeration of *dharmas* and that there are three types: one, two, and many.⁷⁵⁷ These two definitions are basically the same.

In the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, *saṃkhyā* represents not only enumeration but also the nature of *dharmas* that underlies the fact that they can be counted. The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* says that the nature of *samskṛtadharma*s, etc., whereby their *svalakṣaṇas* proceed in a stream [consisting] of individual

⁷⁵⁶ *de la rnam grāṇ gaṇ žé na / rdzas tha dad pa bgraṇ ba'i tshad yōṇ su chad pa dan / ū bar mtshon pa rnam par gžag pa ni grāṇ žes bya'o / de yaṇ grāṇ gcig dan / grāṇ gñis dan / de phan chad kyi grāṇ maṇ po dan / mthar thug pa'i grāṇ med pa ste / de phan chad bgrāṇ ba thams cad kyi grāṇ 'jug par mi 'gyur bas / de'i phuir mthar thug pa'i grāṇ žes bya'o* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 29a7-29b1). 復次云何數。謂安立顯示各別事物。計算數量差別。是名為數。此數差別復有多種。謂一數二數。從此已去皆名多數。又數邊際名阿僧企耶。自此已去一切算數所不能轉。是故數之邊際名不可數 (T. 1579: 588c5-9).

⁷⁵⁷ *grāṇ gnas skabs gaṇ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / chos yōṇ su gžal ba yaṇ dag par mtshon pa'i gnas skabs la'o / rnam pa gsum ste / gcig gi grāṇ dan / gñis kyi grāṇ dan / maṇ po'i grāṇ so* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [tib.]: zi 77b8-78a1). 間依何分位建立數。此復幾種。答依法齊量表了分位建立數。此復三種。謂一數二數多數 (T. 1579: 607b28-608a2).

[*dharma*s, etc.], is called *saṃkhyā*.⁷⁵⁸ The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is clearer: *saṃkhyā* is a designation for the distinctness between each and every *saṃskṛtadharma*, to which the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* adds that, if there were no such separation, one could not enumerate [using the numbers] two, three, etc.⁷⁵⁹ Thus, these texts interpret the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*, *saṃkhyā*, as a description of the plurality of entities that is at the heart of the Buddhist understanding of existence. This interpretation goes beyond what is suggested in the two *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passages.

5. *Kāla*, *Deśa*, and *Saṃkhyā* and the Eleven *Vijñaptis*

Kāla, *deśa*, and *saṃkhyā* appear elsewhere in Yogācāra literature, in a list of eleven *vijñaptis* in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, which is also referred to in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*.⁷⁶⁰ The *Mahāyānasamgraha* defines dependent nature (*paratantralakṣaṇā*) as consisting of notions (*vijñapti*) that have *ālayavijñāna* as their seed and that are included in false imagination (*abhūtāparikalpa*),⁷⁶¹ and it mentions thirteen⁷⁶² of these. The two commentaries, Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasamgrahabhaṣya* and Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana*, define these *vijñaptis*, and Lamotte's translations of the definitions of *adhva-*,⁷⁶³ *saṃkhyā-*, and *deśavijñapti* are as follows: “6. *kālavijñapti*: ‘c'est l'ininterruption dans le courant du *Samsāra* (*saṃsārapravāhā-*

⁷⁵⁸ 數者。謂於諸行等各別相續體相流轉性 (T. 1602: 484b25-26). Again, my translation is tentative.

⁷⁵⁹ *saṃkhyā katamā / saṃskārāṇām pratyekaśo bhede saṃkhyeti prajñaptih* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 19.9-10). *pratyekaśo bhede samkhyety abhinnaikātmakatve dvitrisaṃkhyādyanupapateḥ* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya*: 10.24-25).

⁷⁶⁰ T. 1584: 46a25-26; *Shindōjōyūshikiron*: 370; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 524.

⁷⁶¹ *de la gžan gyi dbaṇ gi mtshan ŋid gaṇ že na / gaṇ kun gži rnam par ſes pa'i sa bon can yaṇ dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas bsdus pa'i rnam par rig pa'o* (*Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 24.28-30).

⁷⁶² Nagao says that this list is not intended to be inclusive (1982, v. 1: 289).

⁷⁶³ This is Aramaki's retranslation (Nagao 1982, v. 1: 58). Lamotte gives *kāla-* (1973: 88).

samucceda).’ (Bh)⁷⁶⁴—‘C'est l'idée qui se manifeste avec l'apparence des trois époques (*tryadhvan*).’ (U)⁷⁶⁵ 7. *samkhyāvijñapti*: ‘c'est la numérotation (*gaṇana*).’ (Bh)—‘C'est l'idée qui se manifeste numériquement, avec l'apparence de 1, etc.’ (U) 8. *deśavijñapti*: ‘c'est le monde-réceptacle (*bhājanaloka*).’ (Bh)—‘C'est l'idée qui se manifeste avec l'apparence d'un village (*grāma*), d'un jardin (*ārāma*), etc.’ (U)” (Lamotte 1973: 88 n. 2).

As I have mentioned earlier, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* is a very different kind of text from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in that it systematically and explicitly presents such characteristically Yogācāra doctrines as *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātra*. Here we see explained in terms of *ālayavijñāna*, *trisvabhāva*, and *vijñaptimātra*⁷⁶⁶ three of the same phenomena that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and other Yogācāra *abhidharma* expositions (which is how I would characterize both of the *Viniścayasamgrahañī* *cittaviprayuktasam-skāra* expositions, as well as that of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*) explain by means of *cittaviprayuktasam-skāras*. That the *cittaviprayuktasam-skāra*, *kāla*, and *adhvavijñapti*, in particular, refer to the same thing is supported by the fact that Vasubandhu's definition in the *Mahāyānasamgrahabhbhāṣya* is almost identical to that of the second *Viniścayasamgrahañī* passage.⁷⁶⁷

6. Conclusion

The chronological relation among the non-Sarvāstivādin sources discussed in this chapter is beginning to seem clear. The Dārśāntika of the *Vibhāṣā* is the earliest to criticize the reality of the *cittavipra-*

⁷⁶⁴Bh=*Mahāyānasamgrahabhbhāṣya*.

⁷⁶⁵U=*Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandha*.

⁷⁶⁶ji ltar rnam par rig pa 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam ūid du gnas par 'gyur ūe na / mdor bsdu na rnam pa gsum gyi ste / ... de ltar rnam par rig pa 'di dag thams cad ni don med pas de tsam yin la, etc. (*Mahāyānasamgraha* [tib.]: 29.1 ff.; Lamotte 1973: 99-100; Nagao 1982: 303).

⁷⁶⁷Compare Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Mahāyānasamgrahabhbhāṣya* (世識者。謂生死相續不斷性 [T. 1597: 338a15]) with the second *Viniścayasamgrahañī* passage (*du byed kyi rgyun mi 'chad pa'i gnas skabs la'o* [*Viniścayasamgrahañī* [tib.]: zi 77b6-7], 答依行相續不斷分位建立時 [T. 1579: 607c25-26]). See note 745.

yuktasamskāras. Katō has identified seven references to Dārśāntika opinions, one regarding *prthagjanatva*, two regarding *samanvāgama* (=*prāpti*) and/or *asamanvāgama*, three regarding the *samskrtalakṣaṇas*, and one regarding *nāma-*, *pada-*, and *vyañjanakāya* (1989: 303-304). Our next earliest source is Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, which contains a fairly long section in which each *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* is shown to lack independent existence. Harivarman is of particular interest to us because of the way in which he invokes the principle of causality to show the superfluousness of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, particularly *jāti*.⁷⁶⁸ Finally, Śrīlāta's denial of the reality of the *samskrtalakṣaṇas* is similar to Harivarman's (Katō 1989: 306-307).

One of the earliest sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, although it does not discuss the category of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* or even mention the term, denies the separate existence of the *samskrtalakṣaṇas* on the grounds that they refer to nothing other than the *samskrtadharma*s. This argument is no different from those of the Dārśāntika and Harivarman. However, in the first passage of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, we find a radical interpretation of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*. Only part of this interpretation, the insistence that the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* are merely *prajñapti*, can be traced to those earlier sources. The explanation of many of the *cittaviprayukta-*

⁷⁶⁸Harivarman identifies as the deep meaning of the Buddhadharma the statement that, since all *dharma*s arise due to the coming together of a variety of conditions, no [single] *dharma* can produce another *dharma* (又佛法深義。謂衆緣和合有諸法生。是故無法能生異法—T. 1646: 289b21-22). And he states that *jāti* is defined by the Buddha in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula: 又十二因緣中。佛自說生義。諸衆生處處生受諸陰名為生。是故現在世中初得諸陰名生 (T. 1646: 289b25-27). Sastri translates this as follows: "The Buddha himself explains the import of the term *Jāti* in the *Dvādaśa-Nidāna-Sūtra* thus: The birth (*jāti*) of such and such living beings in the midst of such and such places is the gaining of the five aggregates of elements. So *jāti* is the first appearance of five aggregates of elements" (Sastri 1978, v. 2: 189). However, he does not further identify the *Dvādaśa-Nidāna-Sūtra*; the *Répertoire du Canon Bouddhique Sino-Japonais* (Demiéville 1978: 70) identifies one *sūtra* by the short title of 十二因緣 (T. 713), but it does not contain such a definition of *jāti*. The last sentence of this passage contradicts the three lifetimes/twofold causation theory, which locates *jāti* in the future.

samskāras in terms of *bīja* is the original contribution of this passage and marks a divergence from, or advance upon, the philosophy of the earlier critics of Sarvāstivāda, who did not use the term *bīja*, at least not in any systematic way.⁷⁶⁹ Furthermore, the addition of the final group of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* is an example of the tendency in portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to construct a new *abhidharma*, that is to say, an *abhidharma* different from those of the Hinayāna schools. Moreover, the references to other expositions of causality within the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which are also examples of this new *abhidharma*, show a willingness to consider it as authoritative.

Vasubandhu in his discussion of *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* in the *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya* thus relies on two groups of texts. For his criticism of the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*, he goes back directly to the earliest sources as well as to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But in his explanation that certain *dharmas* are really *bījas* he reveals his knowledge of the *Yogācārabhūmi*⁷⁷⁰ and his acceptance of ideas found in it but not in the works of the earlier Sautrāntikas. Therefore, if we call Vasubandhu a Sautrāntika, he is a different kind of Sautrāntika than, for example, Harivarman or Śrīlāta.

Honjō, as I have mentioned above, contrasts the orthodox Hinayāna Sautrāntikas, the earliest of whom predate the *Vibhāṣā*, and who include the Dārṣṭāntika, Harivarman, and Śrīlāta, with the Mahāyāna Sautrāntika, namely Vasubandhu (1992: 152). In characterizing Vasubandhu thus, Honjō takes into account Vasubandhu's affinity with the earlier Sautrāntikas, as well as his use of their name, while alluding to his reliance on the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, might we not just as

⁷⁶⁹Honjō, who identifies Aśvaghoṣa's school as Sautrāntika (Honjō 1993), has, in a personal communication, drawn my attention to the fact that Aśvaghoṣa uses the term *bīja*. However, an examination of the occurrence of the term in, for example, the *Buddhacarita* shows that it is used in a simile and not with the technical significance it acquires in the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇi*: *rtubhūmyambuvirahād yathā bijam na rohati / rohati pratyayaais tais tais tadvat so 'pi mato mama* (*Buddhacarita* XII 72; Johnston 1972: 137, 179).

⁷⁷⁰For other contexts in which Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya* shows his familiarity with, and presumably approval of, doctrines originating in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see Hakamaya 1986.

well characterize the Dārśṭāntika, et al., as Hīnayāna Yogācāras? Better still, we should perhaps call them pre-*Yogācārabhūmi* Yogācāras, thus acknowledging the fact, repeatedly pointed out by Schmithausen (1987), that much of the material in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other early Yogācāra texts, although not identifiable as Sarvāstivāda, cannot be designated as Mahāyāna.

Hakamaya, in his discussion of the term *pūrvācārya* in the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, sees the Yogācāra school as we generally define it as a group that emerged from among the *yogācāras*, in the sense of practitioners of yoga, who had a much longer history than the school that later took the name. According to Hakamaya, this group, which was more theoretically inclined than the general run of practitioners, came to be known as the *pūrvācāryas*, and it is by the name *pūrvācārya* that Vasubandhu refers to Asaṅga, the most illustrious representative of the group (1986: 100). Hakamaya does not identify any texts associated with the pre-Yogācāra *yogācāras*, nor does he state clearly whether the *pūrvācāryas* existed before the time of Asaṅga. Nevertheless, by enlarging the scope of the term *yogācāra*, he suggests another way of looking both at non-Mahāyāna material in Yogācāra texts and at figures who are identified as Dārśṭāntika or Sautrāntika and whose ideas are similar to those of the Yogācāra.

In this context, it is interesting to note that there are several texts, generally considered Hīnayāna, that bear the title *Yogācārabhūmi*. The best-known of these is the work of Saṅgharakṣa, which has been translated and studied by Demiéville (1954). This text, although it is perhaps later than Hakamaya's original *yogācāras*, is probably earlier than any of the sources to which I have been referring. Significantly, Demiéville wonders whether Saṅgharakṣa, because of his frequent use of comparisons, should not be called a "dārśṭāntika" (1954: 339 n. 2), and he notes that Saṅgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi* is mentioned in a work, the *Ch'u yao ching* 出曜經 (T. 212),⁷⁷¹ attributed to the Dharmatrāta who was a prominent Dārśṭāntika in the *Vibhāṣā* (1954: 406 n. 3). Another

⁷⁷¹ Demiéville describes this as "la partie en prose de l'*Udānavarga*" (Démieville 1954: 406 n. 3).

text the original Sanskrit title of which was perhaps *Yogācārabhūmi* is the *Ta mo to lo ch'an ching* 達摩多羅禪經 (T. 618);⁷⁷² the Chinese title suggests a connection with Dharmatrāta, but the identity of the Dārśāntika Dharmatrāta and the author of this text is questionable.⁷⁷³ Perhaps these other *Yogācārabhūmis* may contain some clues concerning the still obscure relationships among the philosophers, texts, and arguments variously designated as Sautrāntika, Dārśāntika and Yogācāra, and between this group and the mainstream of Sarvāstivāda, from which they emerged.

⁷⁷²Yamabe is currently studying this text and has been kind enough to identify several occurrences in it of the word *bija* (e.g., T. 618: 316c23; 321a17; 322a8; 323a15).

⁷⁷³Willemen summarizes Lin (1949: 314-351) as distinguishing three different Dharmatrātas: the Dārśāntika Dharmatrāta or Bhadanta of the *Vibhāṣā*; the author of the *Samyuktābhidharmaḥṛdaya* and the commentary on the *Pañcavastu*; and the one connected with the *Ta mo to lo ch'an ching* (Willemen 1975: xv). Yamada devotes a very long section to the identity of the various Dharmatrātas (1959: 416-437), but in the end he seems unwilling to say definitely that they are different people (437). Lamotte, on the other hand, accepts Lin's opinion (1988: 696).

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