TSADRA

Gone Beyond

Volume One



The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, *The Ornament of Clear Realization*, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyü Tradition

KARL BRUNNHÖLZL

Gone Beyond

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GONE BEYOND

Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras,
The Ornament of Clear Realization,
and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyü Tradition

VOLUME ONE

Translated and introduced by
Karl Brunnhölzl

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
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Much ado about nothing
William Shakespeare

Prajñāpāramitā, beyond speech, thought, and expression,
Unborn and unceasing, the very nature of space,
The sphere of personally experienced wisdom,
Mother of the victors of the three times, I pay homage to You.
Rāhulabhadra

On the stainless canvas of primordially luminous space
The pen of dualistic clinging sketches the outlines of subject and object,
With the bountiful rainbow paintings of self, others, suffering, and happiness appearing vividly—
Other than knots in space being released into space, there is no buddhahood.

Be prepared to be unprepared.
Dare to ground yourself in groundlessness.
Dare to face your mind's own face without make-up.
Don't bring anything at all, especially not yourself.
Drop all agendas, just come naked, as you are.

Space spaces out into infinite spaciousness,
Vibrant and full of fresh air.
Mind faints into mind-lessness—
Radiance without a source embraces its own transparency.

Abbreviations:

AA	*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*
ACIP	Asian Classics Input Project (www.acip.org)
Ālokā	Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā*
AS	*Asiatische Studien*
BT	Karma Trinlépa's commentary on the AA (Ka rma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal 2006a)
CE	The Fifth Shamarpa's commentary on the AA (Dkon mchog yan lag 2006)
CZ	Conze's translation of *The Large Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom*
D	Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka
J	Johnston's Sanskrit edition of the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JG	The Seventh Karmapa's commentary on the AA (Chos grags rgya mtsho n.d.)
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association for Buddhist Studies*
JIBS	*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgakku Kenkyū)*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*
JNS	The Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the AA (Mi bskyod rdo rje 2003)
LN	Butön's commentary on the AA (Bu ston 2001)
LSSP	Tsongkhapa's commentary on the AA (Tsong kha pa 1985)
LTWA	Library of Tibetan Works and Archives
MCG	Mipham Rinpoche's commentary on the AA ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1984)

MPZL Dongag Tenpa'i Nyima's commentary on the AA (Mdo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma 1986)

NSML Ngawang Kunga Wangchug's commentary on the AA (Ngag dbang kun dga' dbang phyug 1987)

P Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1956)

PBG Patrul Rinpoche's word commentary on the AA (Dpal sprul 'jigs med chos kyi dbang po 1997)

PEW *Philosophy East and West*

PK Padma Karpo's commentary on the AA (Padma dkar po 1991)

PSD Patrul Rinpoche's general topics of the AA (Dpal sprul 'jigs med chos kyi dbang po 1997)

PVSD Padmavajra's general topics of the AA (Padmavajra, rdzogs chen mkhan po n.d.)

RT Rongtön's commentary on the AA (Rong ston shes bya kun rig 1988)

SC The Third Karmapa's *Table of Contents of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (Rang byung rdo rje 2004a)

SLG Padma Karpo's *Gate for Entering the Prajñāpāramitā Scriptures* (Padma dkar po 1974)

STT The Third Karmapa's *Synopsis of the Eight Chapters of Prajñāpāramitā* (Rang byung rdo rje 2004b)

Taishō Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (The Chinese Buddhist Canon), ed. J. Takakusu and K.Watanabe. Tokyo: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kanko kai, 1970

TBRC Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (www.tbrc.org)

TJ *Tibet Journal*

TOK Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's *Treasury of Knowledge* (Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 1982)

Vivṛti Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravivṛti*

Vṛtti Āryavimuktisena's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti*

WZKS *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*

YT Yagtön's commentary on the AA (G.yag ston sangs rgyas dpal 1994)

An Aspiration
by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje


You realize that whatever appears dawns within the play of the mind
And that mind itself is the dharmakāya free of clinging.
Through the power of that, you, the supreme siddhas, master apparent existence.
Precious ones of the Kagyü lineage, please bestow excellent virtue.

Through the heart of a perfect buddha awakening in you,
You possess the blossoming glorious qualities of supreme insight.
You genuine holder of the teachings by the name Dzogchen Ponlop,
Through your merit, the activity of virtue,

You publish the hundreds of flawless dharma paintings
That come from the protectors of beings, the Takpo Kagyü,
As a display of books that always appears
As a feast for the eye of intelligence of those without bias.

While the stream of the Narmadā[2] river of virtue
Washes away the stains of the mind,
With the waves of the virtues of the two accumulations rolling high,
May it merge with the ocean of the qualities of the victorious ones.

This was composed by Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje as an auspicious aspiration for the publication of the precious teachings called The Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra *by the supreme Dzogchen Ponlop Karma Sungrap Ngedön Tenpe Gyaltsen on April 18, 2004 (Buddhist Era 2548). May it be auspicious.*




Foreword
by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje

In Tibet, all the ravishing and beautiful features of a self-arisen realm—being encircled by ranges of snow mountains adorned by superb white snowflakes and being filled with Sal trees, abundant herbs, and cool clear rivers—are wonderfully assembled in a single place. These wonders make our land endowed with the dharma the sole pure realm of human beings in this world. In it, all aspects of the teachings of the mighty sage, the greatly compassionate teacher skilled in means, are perfectly complete—the greater and lesser yānas as well as the mantrayāna. They are as pure and unblemished as the most refined pure gold; they accord with reasoning through the power of things; they dispel the darkness of the minds of all beings; and they are a great treasury bestowing all benefit and happiness one could wish for, just as desired. Not having vanished, these teachings still exist as the great treasure of the *Kangyur*, the *Tengyur*, and the sciences, as well as the excellent teachings of the Tibetan scholars and siddhas who have appeared over time. Their sum equals the size of the mighty king of mountains, and their words and meanings are like a sip of the nectar of immortality. Headed by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche with his utterly virtuous and pure intention to solely cherish the welfare of the teachings and beings, many dedicated workers of Nitartha *international*, striving with devotion, diligence, and prajñā, undertook hardships and made efforts over many years to preserve these teachings and further their transmission, and restore them. In particular, they worked toward the special purpose of propagating the excellent stream of teachings and practices of the unequaled Marpa Kagyü lineage, the great family of siddhas, in all directions and times, like the flow of a river in summertime. Through these efforts, the *Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra* publication series, inclusive of all the essential meanings of the perfectly complete teachings of the victor, is magically manifesting as a great harvest for the teachings and beings. Bearing this in mind, I rejoice in this activity from the bottom of my heart and toss flowers of praise

into the sky. Through this excellent activity may the intentions of our noble forefathers be fulfilled in the expanse of peace.

Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje
Gyütö Ramoche Temple
July 19, 2002 (Buddhist Era 2547)



Foreword by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche

The Buddha Shakyamuni's discourses that are known as the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are the heart and soul of mahāyāna Buddhism. This cycle of sūtras from the second turning of the wheel of dharma is understood as having two messages—the direct teachings on the reality of egolessness and emptiness and the indirect teachings on the contemplative journey of the mahāyānists. The great Indian master Nāgārjuna and his Madhyamaka, or Middle Way, tradition further elucidate the explicit teachings on emptiness, whereas the hidden instructions on the paths and bhūmis are clarified further by Maitreya-Asanga and their Yogācāra tradition.

The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, or *Ornament of Clear Realization*, is one of the five treatises of Maitreya,[1] which are all greatly renowned and thoroughly studied in all schools of mahāyāna Buddhism throughout the world. In particular, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* is one of the key texts emphasized in the curricula of all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism. In the Karma Kagyü lineage it is considered as one of the eight great treatises.[2] This text lays out the obstacles and antidotes with regard to the experiences and realizations of the paths and bhūmis of bodhisattvas in detail. If you want to check out the challenges and experiences of an individual's journey to enlightenment, this is a perfect guide. It is an indispensable manual for any practitioner treading on the mahāyāna path.

In the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* Maitreya explains the stages of the realizations reached through the five paths, which lead to the attainment of the three enlightened states of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. The basic structure of the text consists of eight main topics that are further expanded into seventy points. The first three topics are what are to be realized: (1) the knowledge of all aspects, (2) the knowledge of the path, and (3) the knowledge of entities. These are the realizations to be achieved by the three noble ones—completely awakened buddhas, bodhisattvas, and śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhas. The second four topics are the skillful applications toward that end: (4) the complete training in all aspects, (5) the culminating training, (6) the serial training, and (7) the instantaneous training. These are the

paths of the realizations through which the minds of bodhisattvas are led to enlightenment. The final point is the fruition, (8) the dharmakāya, or buddhahood. This is the result of the mahāyāna path that encompasses the four kāyas of full enlightenment.[3]

These two volumes of *Gone Beyond* contain a translation of this classical Buddhist scripture together with the first-ever translation of a complete commentary on it into English. Mitra Karl Brunnhölzl's contribution here reaches yet another benchmark in completely transplanting the genuine buddhadharma to the West.

Karl not only presents a translation and an in-depth exploration of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, but also of its commentaries in the Kagyü School. *Gone Beyond* includes the complete commentary by the Fifth Shamarpa, Göncho Yenla (Tib. dkon mchog yan lag), which is supplemented by extensive excerpts from the commentaries by the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Karmapas, and others.

Mitra Karl Brunnhölzl is an accomplished translator, a wonderful Buddhist teacher in the Nalandabodhi tradition, and my dear friend. He has not only studied classical and contemporary Buddhist scriptures, but has also trained thoroughly in the meditative tradition of the Kagyü and Nyingma schools. Karl has spent many years studying and practicing diligently under my mentor and guru, Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, and myself. I truly rejoice in his accomplishments and I am genuinely proud of him. His works are indispensable for transmitting the genuine dharma to the West and he has been a profound aid for my efforts in supporting Western Buddhism.

These two volumes of *Gone Beyond* are a groundbreaking work and a great treasure for Western Buddhism. I am totally confident that they will bring great benefit to all scholars and practitioners alike. They will make a profound difference in our practices on the path of loving-kindness, compassion, and the realization of selflessness.

Enjoy this feast of wisdom and realization!

Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche,
Nalanda West
Seattle, WA
November 7, 2010

1 The other four are the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, and the *Uttaratantra*.

2 The other seven are Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtra*, Maitreya's *Uttaratantra*, the Third Karmapa's *Profound Inner Reality* (Tib. zab mo nang don), and the *Hevajratantra*.

3 These are svābhāvikakāya, dharmakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya.



Acknowledgments

My deep gratitude and respect go to Khenchen Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche and Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche for their profound teachings on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and the Eighth Karmapa's commentary, which, for the time being, seemingly infused the environment with the elusive scent of prajñāpāramitā's vast openness and her heartbeat of compassion. Without their ongoing scholarly and personal guidance over many years and without Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche's untiring "invitation" to translate these texts, the present trilogy on the Kagyü and Nyingma commentaries on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* would never have appeared. On a more mundane level, words cannot express my heartfelt appreciation for the generous financial support by the Tsadra Foundation that have made the years of translation and research contained in these volumes possible. Many thanks go to Jeff Cox and Sidney Piburn from Snow Lion Publications for their readiness and efforts toward the publication of this work, and to Steve Rhodes for his skilled and meticulous editing. I am also very grateful to Stephanie Johnston for preparing the layout and the index, and also for enduring the many hours of my bringing down the avalanches of the intricacies of the Buddhist paths and bhūmis upon her. Both she and Kim Colwell are to be commended for reading through parts of the manuscripts and offering helpful editorial suggestions.


It lies within the nature of projects like this that there is no certainty of their benefiting anybody other than oneself. What is certain, though, is that I learned a lot during the process of studying, translating, researching, and writing what is found in this trilogy, for which I am very grateful. If there is anything in it that sounds good, makes sense, and serves as an antidote to suffering, may it be enjoyed as coming from realized masters and scholars truly vast in learning, who know what they are talking about. Everything else, including all mistakes, can safely be said to be mine.

I offer this work with the wish that all sentient beings may traverse the groundless paths to meet their true primordial mother, prajñāpāramitā, and

find that they have never been separated from her. May the warmth of her loving heart, which is as wide open and radiant as the sunlit autumn sky, awaken and soften the tender lotus flowers of their own hearts. In addition, may these volumes serve as a contributing cause for the enlightened activity of H. H. the Seventeenth Gyalwang Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, swiftly and unimpededly embracing all beings without exception. May they in particular assist in sustaining the pure scholarly tradition of the Karma Kagyü lineage as it was initiated and upheld by all the Karmapas as a means to liberate beings from ignorance, suffering, and whatever obscures their minds' fundamental peaceful ease.

In the basic space of the attic ḍākinī, Seattle, May 1, 2008

INTRODUCTION



The three cycles of the Buddha's teachings

In the mahāyāna, particularly in the Tibetan tradition, the Buddha's teachings are usually divided into three cycles, called "the three turnings of the wheel of dharma." A dharma wheel is defined as "the teachings of the Buddha, consisting of both scriptures and realization, which eliminate the factors in the mind streams of the beings to be guided that obscure liberation from saṃsāra and a buddha's omniscience."[3] The Eighth Karmapa's JNS defines the dharma of realization as "the reality of the purified phenomena that are produced by having become familiar with the mind that thoroughly discriminates phenomena." This consists of the two realities[4] of cessation and the path. The first one means being free from contaminations by virtue of focusing on suchness. The second one refers to the uncontaminated path (the paths of seeing and familiarization)[5] as the means to attain this cessation. The nature of the dharma wheel of the scriptures is defined as "the cognizance of a disciple that appears either in the form of a buddha's speech, whose main topics are either the causes, the results, or the nature of nirvāṇa, or, the cognizance that appears as the collections of names, words, and letters that serve as the support for such speech."[6] Thus, it represents the understanding of a meaning through the recollection that is connected to certain designations. In other words, in dependence on the dominant condition that is a buddha's wisdom and the causal condition that consists of the relatively pure mind streams of certain beings to be guided, this wheel of dharma is nothing but the very mind of these beings that appears for them in the form of words and letters.[7] Since buddhas have neither any latent tendencies that would give rise to some speech of theirs nor any ignorance of clinging to inner mind as being external sounds, ultimately, such a dharma wheel is not a teaching that results from the wish of a buddha to teach. This is why it is said in many sūtras and treatises that the Buddha never taught even a single syllable. For example, the sūtras say:

> Śāntamati, between the night that the Tathāgata became a fully perfect buddha in unsurpassable utterly perfect enlightenment and the night that he will pass into complete nirvāṇa, the Tathāgata did not speak so much as a single syllable, nor will he speak any.

Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states:

> At no time did the Buddha teach
> Any dharma to anybody.[8]

His *Niraupamyastava* declares:

> Nothing, not even a single syllable,
> Has been uttered by you, O lord,
> But every person to be guided
> Has been satisfied by your rain of dharma.[9]

Thus, from the perspective of various disciples, it seems that the Buddha taught in many different ways according to their individual capacities and needs. Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* says:

> Just as a grammarian
> [Initially] teaches the alphabet,
> The Buddha teaches the dharma
> Just as those to be guided can absorb it.
>
> To some, he teaches the dharma
> In order to turn them away from evil;
> To some, so that they accomplish merit;
> To some, [the dharma] based on duality;
>
> To some, [the dharma] based on nonduality;
> To some, [the dharma that is] profound and frightening to the fearful;
> And to some, the means for enlightenment
> That is emptiness with a heart of compassion.[10]

As for the three wheels of dharma, there are various terminologies and classifications in different sūtras and treatises. The most well-known is found in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, which says:

> Initially, at the site of the antelope grove of Ṛṣivadana near Vārāṇasī, the Bhagavān taught the four realities of the noble ones to those who had correctly entered the śrāvakayāna. Thus, he turned the wonderful and marvelous wheel of dharma. . . . This turning of the wheel of dharma by the Bhagavān is surpassable, and there is a possibility [for refutation]. It is of expedient meaning and a basis for debate.
>
> Then, starting with the lack of a nature of phenomena, he [taught] that they lack arising and lack ceasing, that they are primordial peace and by nature perfect nirvāṇa. Thus, for those who had correctly entered the mahāyāna, in the form of speaking about emptiness, he turned the very wonderful and marvelous second wheel of dharma. This turning of the wheel of dharma by the Bhagavān is [also] surpassable, and there is a possibility [for refutation]. It is of expedient meaning and a basis for debate.
>
> [Finally,] starting with the lack of a nature of phenomena, he [taught] that they lack arising and lack ceasing, that they are primordial peace and by nature perfect nirvāṇa. Thus, for those who had correctly entered all yānas, he turned the exceedingly wonderful and marvelous third wheel of dharma that is endowed with excellent and thorough distinction. This turning of the wheel of dharma by the Bhagavān is unsurpassable, and there is no chance [for refutation]. It is of definitive meaning and not a basis for debate.[11]

Thus, this sūtra speaks of the first wheel that teaches the four realities of the noble ones; the second wheel that speaks about emptiness; and the third wheel that is endowed with the excellent distinction (between expedient and definitive meaning). Obviously, both the second and the third turnings are said here to teach on the lack of nature, nonarising, and so on. The Seventh Karmapa's JG[12] says that the difference lies in the second turning not further differentiating the lack of nature, while the third turning differentiates between three kinds of lack of nature, between existence and nonexistence, and between expedient and definitive meaning (thus, the last turning is considered as the definitive teaching here). The threefold lack of nature is clarified by the Buddha at the beginning of Chapter Seven of the sūtra:

> ". . . With what intention did the Bhagavān say, 'All phenomena lack a nature of phenomena, all phenomena lack arising, lack ceasing, are primordial peace, and by nature perfect nirvāṇa? I ask the Bhagavān the meaning of this." The Bhagavān replied to bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, ". . . it was with the intention of the

> threefold lack of nature of phenomena—the lack of nature in terms of characteristics, the lack of nature in terms of arising, and the ultimate lack of nature—that I taught, 'All phenomena lack a nature. . . .'"[13]

As the sūtra explains further in detail, this threefold lack of nature refers to the imaginary nature, the other-dependent nature, and the perfect nature, respectively.

As for the presentation in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*, though it does not explicitly use the term "wheel of dharma," it describes the process of cleansing an encrusted jewel in three stages with increasingly refined chemical solutions and cloths. This analogy serves to illustrate the progressively more advanced stages of the teachings of the Buddha:

> Likewise, the Tathāgata knows the dispositions of very impure sentient beings and, through his discourses [that cause] revulsion (such as on impermanence, suffering, identitylessness, and impurity), he produces weariness in those sentient beings who like saṃsāra. Thus, he introduces them to the noble dharma of the vinaya. [However,] the Tathāgata does not confine himself to this amount of effort. Thereafter, through speaking on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness, he makes [those to be guided] realize the way of being of the Tathāgata. [However,] the Tathāgata does not confine himself to this amount of effort either. Through speaking on the wheel of irreversibility and the complete purity of the three spheres, he makes sentient beings with their causal [dispositions] of various nature engage in the object of the Tathāgata.[14]

Thus, this sūtra speaks of the discourses on renunciation; the discourses on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness; and the discourses of irreversibility and the purity of the three spheres.[15]

Maitreya's *Uttaratantra* refers to three similar phases of progressively guiding sentient beings—making samsaric beings enter the path to peace of śrāvakas[16] and pratyekabuddhas;[17] bringing śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas to maturation in the mahāyāna;[18] and, on the eighth bhūmi, granting them the prophecy of supreme enlightenment.[19]

Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* says:

> First, what is not meritorious is put to an end.
> In the middle, [any kind of] identity is put to an end.
> Finally, all views are put to an end.
> Those who understand this are skilled.[20]

As for the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, both the sūtras in eight thousand and twenty-five thousand lines, after having referred to the teaching on the four realities of the noble ones, identify their own teachings on emptiness as the second wheel of dharma:

> Then, many thousand of sons of the gods residing in the sky above . . . showered down flowers of divine substances . . . and spoke the following words: "Oh, through the teachings of this prajñāpāramitā, many thousands of sons of the gods have attained poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising. We see the turning of the second wheel of dharma in Jambudvīpa."[21]

Not surprisingly for these sūtras, the Buddha answers that, precisely because of emptiness, there are no two wheels of dharma and such.

Thus, in general, among the three wheels of dharma, the first one teaches mainly the four realities of the noble ones; the second one speaks primarily about emptiness or the lack of characteristics; and the third one mainly distinguishes between the expedient and the definitive meaning in the Buddha's teachings.[22] In this order, the three wheels serve to generate renunciation toward saṃsāra, mature beings in the mahāyāna, and cause them to enter the ultimate sphere of all buddhas.[23]

As for the ways of distinguishing in general which sūtras are of expedient and which are of definitive meaning, JG, JNS, and CE agree that the distinction as put forward in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*, the *Samādhirājasūtra*, and other texts is to be followed. The *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* says:

> "What are sūtras of expedient meaning?" The sūtras that teach seeming reality are of expedient meaning. "What are sūtras of definitive meaning?" The sūtras that are taught in order to reveal ultimate reality are of definitive meaning. The sūtras in which manifold words and letters are used are of expedient meaning. The sūtras that speak about the profound that is difficult to see and difficult to realize are of definitive meaning. The sūtras that use a variety of terms and phrasings in a manner as if there were an owner where there is no owner, such as self, sentient being, soul, life-sustainer, individual, person, Manu-born,[24] son of Manu,[25] agent, or experiencer are of expedient meaning. The sūtras that teach emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, nonapplication, nonorigination, nonarising, nonentity, no self, no sentient beings, no soul, no person, no owner up through the doors to complete liberation are of definitive meaning. Thus, rely on the sūtra collection

> of definitive meaning, but do not rely on the sūtra collection of expedient meaning.[26]

As for the particular distinction that describes which among the three turnings of the wheel of dharma are of expedient and which are of definitive meaning, JG, JNS, and CE present the various models as found in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and so on as well as those by Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna. The gist of their presentations is that all followers of the mahāyāna accept the first turning as being of expedient meaning, while the second and third ones are of definitive meaning. However, the difference is that the False Aspectarians deny that the second wheel represents the definitive meaning that is to be taken literally, whereas the Niḥsvabhāvavādins assert this to be the case.

CE concludes its discussion of this topic by making a further distinction in terms of eliminating superimpositions and reference points while establishing the view through study and reflection versus gaining direct experiences and realizations in meditation:

> Here, the following needs to be understood. For the sake of persons in whom fear of [certain statements] in the middle wheel (such as, "[Phenomena] do not arise by a nature of their own") arises, through clearly distinguishing existence and nonexistence in the last wheel, [the Buddha] said that "the perfect [nature]—the other-dependent empty of the imaginary—exists." In this context, when one cuts through reference points with the view, the middle [wheel] comes to be of definitive meaning, and when one gains one's experiences through meditation, it is the last one that comes to be of definitive meaning.[27]

What is prajñāpāramitā?

In particular, the second turning of the wheel of dharma, which is said to have taken place on the Vulture Flock Mountain[28] near Rājagṛha, is called "the wheel of the lack of characteristics," since it appears as the teachings on the true reality that is beyond speech, thought, and expression—that is, all phenomena from form up through omniscience being utterly devoid of any intrinsic characteristics or nature of their own. In other words, this is known as the teachings on *prajñāpāramitā*. In general, in Buddhism, *prajñā* does not refer to some kind of passive knowledge or to merely knowing some facts. Rather, it stands for the vast range of actively investigating and realizing all the ways in which phenomena appear and the way they truly are. It means

intelligence in its original sense of being able to know or cognize,[29] which entails the capacity to clearly discriminate. Thus, the definition of prajñā is "that which fully discriminates the general and specific characteristics of phenomena." This can be performed on the mundane or the supramundane level, the latter referring to the Buddhist path. Specifically, lesser supramundane prajñā refers to the prajñā on the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, such as realizing the four realities of the noble ones and personal identitylessness. Great supramundane prajñā results from study, reflection, and meditation on the path of bodhisattvas, such as realizing that all phenomena are unarisen and empty of an inherent nature of their own. As the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Seven Hundred Lines* says:

> A son of good family or a daughter of good family who wishes to realize [everything] up through all phenomena being unarisen should train in this prajñāpāramitā in the manner of nonobserving.[30]

Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* states:

> Prajñā is comprehensively explained
> As that which realizes that skandhas,
> Dhātus, and āyatanas are unborn
> And empty of a nature of their own.[31]

Thus, *prajñāpāramitā* means the perfection of such prajñā since it is the most supreme among all prajñās, focuses on ultimate reality, and causes one to proceed to the nonabiding nirvāṇa. Thus, it refers to the great supramundane prajñā, which is the primary mental factor that actively engages in and experiences the progressive path of insight into the nature of all phenomena, thus leading to and finally manifesting as the wisdom of a buddha that is beyond both saṃsāra and the limited personal nirvāṇa of arhats.[32] In this sense, it is used both in a fruitional sense (the highest wisdom of a buddha) and as referring to the main element of the path that leads there. The "transcendent" quality of prajñāpāramitā is especially highlighted in the more creative, but widely used, hermeneutical etymology of *pāramitā* as "having gone beyond or to the other shore" (reflected in the Tibetan *pha rol tu phyin pa*).[33] During this process of going beyond both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, on the first two of the five paths of the mahāyāna (the path of accumulation and the path of preparation),[34] the prajñā that arises from meditation is still somewhat conceptual, though its conceptuality becomes increasingly refined and subtle (according to JNS, on the path of preparation it is nonconceptual self-awareness).

During the meditative equipoises of the paths of seeing and familiarization, this prajñā consists exclusively of nonconceptual yogic cognition since it directly realizes the nature of all phenomena without any mental reference points. During the phases of subsequent attainment[35] on these paths, however, there are still subtle traces of conceptuality in bodhisattvas, whereas there is no such difference in the omniscience of a buddha on the path of no more learning. Such omniscient wisdom is always nonconceptual and free from reference points since it is the constant and panoramic awareness of the nature of all phenomena and does not involve any shift between meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. This prajñā of a buddha and the prajñā of bodhisattvas during their meditative equipoises on the bhūmis are called wisdom or prajñāpāramitā in the strict sense.[36]

In a general way, prajñā can be said to be the basic inquisitiveness and curiosity of our mind, which is very precise and playful at the same time. Iconographically it is often depicted as a double-bladed, flaming sword, which is extremely sharp. Such a sword obviously should be handled with great care, and may even seem somewhat threatening. Prajñā is indeed threatening to our ego and to our cherished belief systems since it undermines our very notion of reality and the reference points upon which we build our world. Thus, it is what questions who we are and what we perceive. Since this sword cuts both ways, it not only serves to slice up our very solid-looking objective reality, but it also cuts through the subjective experiencer of such a reality. In this way, it is also that which makes us see through our own ego trips and self-inflation. It takes some effort to continuously fool ourselves about ourselves. Prajñā means being found out by ourselves, which first of all requires taking an honest look at the games we play. If we keep inflating ourselves, prajñā is what punctures the balloon of ego and brings us back to where we are.

Thus, prajñā cuts not only through delusion but also through any tricky attempt by our ego to take credit for being on the path of a bodhisattva or the like. As the prajñāpāramitā sūtras never tire to emphasize, any colorful fancies of personalized spiritual attainments must be seen through and recognized to be as groundless as everything else. As the prajñāpāramitā sūtras say not only about form and emptiness:

> The path is emptiness. Emptiness is the path. Emptiness is no other than the path. The path is no other than emptiness.

This spotlight quality of prajñā is symbolized by the flames on the sword illuminating our blind spots. There is a sense of no escape. We cannot hide from ourselves or pretend to be unaware of what is going on in our mind. In this way, prajñā also functions as the direct antidote to the more active tendencies

of our ignorance, which does not want to look too closely at ourselves and what we do. Often, we think that knowledge means to come up with all the right answers, but prajñā is more like asking all the right questions. Often the question *is* the answer, or much better than any answer. Trying to get all the right answers down may just create more reference points in our mind and thus more rigidity and problems. Also, often one answer produces ten new questions. To let prajñā unfold in a natural way means to give our basic inquisitiveness more space for its natural acute freshness. The teachings on prajñāpāramitā are a clear message to not restrict prajñā to merely rearranging or expanding our web of dualistic categories. Thus, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras say:

> If you think, "I cultivate prajñā," "Prajñā is this," or "It is for the sake of such and such," this may well be prajñā, but it is not prajñāpāramitā.

Iconographically, prajñāpāramitā is represented as a female deity. She is yellow in color, sits in a cross-legged position, and has four arms, with her first left hand holding a text, her first right hand raising a flaming sword, and the remaining two being in the gesture of meditation. Together, these represent the three types of prajñā: knowledge through study, cutting through and illuminating delusion, and direct realization of the true nature of all phenomena. These are also called the prajñās resulting from study, reflection, and meditation.[37]

Since prajñāpāramitā stands for directly encountering ultimate reality, it is the main highway to liberation and omniscience. Therefore, to be immersed in it is explained to be the supreme of all practices and realizations. This is why its qualities as well as its profound and far-reaching impact on our minds cannot be overestimated and are repeatedly praised in the scriptures. They declare that to rest for a single moment within prajñāpāramitā is of far greater merit than—and in fact includes—all other pāramitās, such as generosity. As the *Vajrasamādhidharmasūtra*[38] says:

> If one does not move away from emptiness,
> The six pāramitās are assembled.

The *Brahmāviśeṣacintiparipṛcchāsūtra*[39] declares:

> Not reflecting is generosity.
> Not abiding in any difference is ethics.
> Not making any distinctions is patience.

Not adopting or rejecting anything is vigor.
Not being attached is samādhi.
Not conceptualizing is prajñā.

Likewise, it is stated that dwelling in prajñāpāramitā is far superior to any studies, reflections, or other meditations on the dharma, even if these are performed for many eons. It is also the supreme way of making offerings, taking refuge in the three jewels, generating bodhicitta, and purifying all negativities. Both the sūtras and treatises such as the AA describe many signs that indicate increasing familiarity and ease with prajñāpāramitā. In brief, one is able to see much more clearly in any given situation and to deal more carefully and compassionately with both oneself and others. One mindfully engages in virtuous actions, afflictions become weaker, the dharma is practiced wholeheartedly, and distractions are relinquished. Clinging in general is reduced, particularly the attachment to this life.

In more technical terms, prajñāpāramitā is glossed in the *Prajñāpāramitā-nāmāṣṭaśatakā*[40] (an enumeration of 108 synonyms of prajñāpāramitā) as omniscient wisdom, suchness, true reality, nonduality, emptiness, mother[41] of all buddhas, the single taste of all dharmas, and so forth. The opening verse of Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* describes prajñāpāramitā as follows:

Prajñāpāramitā is nondual wisdom,
Which is the Tathāgata.
By virtue of being connected to this actuality to be accomplished,
It is [also] the term for both the [related] scriptures and the path.[42]

Accordingly, the commentaries on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA usually classify prajñāpāramitā as

(1) natural prajñāpāramitā
(2) scriptural prajñāpāramitā
(3) the prajñāpāramitā of the path
(4) fruitional prajñāpāramitā.

The Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje's (1507–1554) commentary on the AA (JNS)[43] defines (1) *natural or actual prajñāpāramitā* as "suchness, which is never something other and bears the name 'wisdom that lacks the duality of apprehender and apprehended.'" When this suchness is obscured by various conditioned formational elements, it is given the name "the basic element that is the sugata heart." Once this very Heart has become free from all its fetters (the impregnations of negative tendencies), it represents (4) the *fruitional prajñāpāramitā*—the wisdom of a tathāgata, which is inseparable from the

svābhāvikakāya. This fruition to be accomplished is also taught as being the dharmakāya.[44]

(2) The *scriptural prajñāpāramitā*, which teaches this meaning, is "the cognizance that appears as assemblies of names, words, and letters, and is suitable to be observed in the disciples' consciousnesses that entail dualistic appearances." This primarily consists of the sūtras called "the six mothers and the eleven children" (see below) as well as the treatises that comment on their intention.

(3) The *prajñāpāramitā of the path* is "the prajñāpāramitā that arises as the nature of nonconceptual wisdom when resting in meditative equipoise."[45]

As for the issue regarding which of these aspects of prajñāpāramitā are the actual prajñāpāramitā and which ones are just nominal, Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* says:

> The illusionlike nondual wisdom of a buddha bhagavān is the actual [prajñāpāramitā]. By virtue of being concordant with attaining this, the scriptures (collections of words and sentences) and the paths that have the characteristics of seeing and so forth are also called "prajñāpāramitā," [but] this is nominal. As master Dignāga says:
>
> Prajñāpāramitā is nondual wisdom, . . . [46]

Quoting the above verse from Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha*, Ngog Lotsāwa's *Summary* agrees:

> The actual reality [of prajñāpāramitā] is the nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha. The nominal ones are all the paths [that lead] to that and the words of the victor—the scriptures that express both this fruition and the paths.[47]

Based on JG, JNS makes the following distinction between actual and nominal kinds of prajñāpāramitā:

> As far as the position of the mighty victor, [Karmapa] Chötra Gyatso,[48] and his disciples is concerned, on the buddhabhūmi, the natural, the scriptural, and the path [prajñāpāramitās] are all three the actual prajñāpāramitā. On this level, the scriptural and path prajñāpāramitās are undifferentiable from the natural prajñāpāramitā. [The Karmapa] teaches that the scriptural and the path prajñāpāramitās during the time of the path are fully qualified [as prajñāpāramitā], but are not the completely perfect scriptural

> and path prajñāpāramitās [of the buddhabhūmi]. As for the natural prajñāpāramitā that fulfills this function, there is no difference in its [always and unchangingly] being the actual prajñāpāramitā during any phase of learning and nonlearning whatsoever. [However,] in terms of the definitive meaning, the scriptural prajñāpāramitā that appears as other-dependent cognition is presented as only a nominal prajñāpāramitā.[49]

Sometimes, the texts also speak of a mere "reflection of prajñāpāramitā," which refers to the wisdoms of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. It is called a reflection because, through training in it, one does not attain the nonabiding great nirvāṇa of the mahāyāna, which is entirely beyond both saṃsāra and the limited form of nirvāṇa that is just one's own personal state of mental peace.

The prajñāpāramitā sūtras and their contents

As for the scriptural prajñāpāramitā, the Buddhist mahāyāna tradition holds that the prajñāpāramitā sūtras were directly taught by Buddha Śākyamuni.[50] However, due to not being valued enough among the early Buddhists after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, they disappeared from the earth for about four centuries. They are said to have been hidden away by nāgas in the depth of the ocean until Nāgārjuna retrieved these texts from them. The early Tibetan tradition has it that there exist several extensive versions of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, such as the sūtra in one billion lines[51] in the realm of the gandharvas,[52] the sūtra in ten million lines in the god realms, and the sūtra in one hundred thousand lines in the realm of the nāgas (the one retrieved by Nāgārjuna).[53] However, the most commonly known prajñāpāramitā sūtras in the human realm are called "the six mothers" and "the eleven children" (with the former being said to contain all eight topics as presented in the AA, while the latter do not).[54] "The six mothers" are the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in:

one hundred thousand lines[55]
twenty-five thousand lines[56]
eighteen thousand lines[57]
ten thousand lines[58]
eight thousand lines[59]
and the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*.[60]

"The eleven children" are the following:

Suvikrāntavikrāmīparipṛcchāprajñāpāramitāsūtra[61]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Seven Hundred Lines[62]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Five Hundred Lines[63]

Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Three Hundred Lines[64]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in One Hundred and Fifty Modes[65]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Fifty Lines[66]
Kauśikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra[67]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra of the Twenty-five Gates[68]
The Sūtra of the Heart of Prajñāpāramitā[69]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in a Few Words[70]
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in One Syllable.[71]

The twenty-one volumes of the prajñāpāramitā section in the Tibetan *Kangyur* (Derge and Narthang)—making up about a fifth of the entire collection—contain a total of twenty-three prajñāpāramitā sūtras. These consist of the above seventeen, the *Prajñāpāramitānāmāṣṭaśatakā*, and the five sūtras taught for Sūryagarbha, Candragarbha, Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, and Vajraketu, respectively.[72]

Traditionally, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are said to be taught by way of "the three approaches" and "the eleven instructional specifications." The three approaches are (1) the approach of the concise teaching for those who understand through concise statements; (2) the approach of the intermediate teaching for those who understand through slight elaboration; and (3) the approach of the detailed explanation for those who are very fond of words. According to the *Ālokā*[73] and other commentaries, in terms of the actual scriptures these three approaches refer to the three prajñāpāramitā sūtras in eight thousand lines, twenty-five thousand lines, and one hundred thousand lines, respectively.[74] The eleven instructional specifications refer to the different teachings in the form of dialogues between the Buddha and several of his close disciples in the various chapters of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. In these dialogues, the Buddha's interlocutors are Śāriputra (dialogue 1); Subhūti (dialogues 2, 4, 6, 8, 10); Śakra[75] (3, 7); Maitreya (5, 9); and Ānanda (11).[76]

As for the primary subject matter of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, what they teach explicitly is the actual nature of emptiness, which is explained through various formats such as the three doors to liberation.[77] Through teaching emptiness, implicitly the Buddha also explained the hidden meaning[78] of these sūtras—the eight topics of clear realization—as the means to fully realize this emptiness in meditation.[79] Thus, the hidden meaning refers to the way in which the clear realization of emptiness arises successively in the mind streams of disciples during the process of cultivating the increasingly subtler stages of conceptual and direct insight into the true nature of all phenomena. In other words, the teachings on emptiness—as also explained in detail in the Madhyamaka texts—address the object to be realized. The hidden meaning—as commented on in the AA and its subcommentaries—refers to what

happens on the subjective side, that is, the mind of a bodhisattva who meditates on emptiness, attempting to make it a living experience from the stage of a beginner up through buddhahood. Ultimately, there is no difference between these two aspects of subject and object. However, in terms of cultivating the realization of this unity of the ultimate subject and object on the path, the sūtras also lay out the gradual subjective process of realizing emptiness, that is, how prajñā is perfected in the mind. This is why the texts always refer to "the perfection (pāramitā) of prajñā"—they never say "the perfection of emptiness" or "the perfection of the nature of phenomena." Of course, by definition, there is nothing to be perfected in emptiness or the true nature of phenomena anyway, but there is a lot to be perfected in our awareness of this nature. Thus, prajñāpāramitā means perfecting not the ultimate object to be realized but the realization of this object.

Besides these explicit and implicit teachings on emptiness and the path, respectively, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras also exhibit a very distinct and strongly voiced contrast to the approaches of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in general, and abhidharmic scholasticism in particular. Typically, Śāriputra, who is the wisest of the Buddha's most senior disciples among the śrāvakas, is constantly depicted as someone who cannot grasp prajñāpāramitā and is subordinated to more realized bodhisattvas. Thus, the fact that the Sthavira Subhūti (another śrāvaka) is the Buddha's main interlocutor in these sūtras and even teaches on prajñāpāramitā is typically explained by him having been empowered or blessed by the Buddha since prajñāpāramitā is outside the sphere of regular śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Also, though the sūtras employ many of the (overly reifying and ramifying) default lists of phenomena in the abhidharma tradition, at the same time, they reduce them to dust through declaring them to be without any nature—null and void. This includes such Buddhist hallmarks as the five skandhas, karmic causes and results, the four realities of the noble ones, and nirvāṇa. Conze summarizes the distinction between the mahāyāna approach of these sūtras and the "hīnayāna"[80] in five main points:

> 1) The ideals, aims and career of a *Bodhisattva* are opposed to those of the *Arhat* and *Pratyekabuddha.* 2) The *perfection of wisdom* is contrasted with the *wisdom* of the old schools. 3) The Abhidharmists were constantly occupied in "*reviewing*" *dharmas.* By contrast it is said often that one "should not review dharmas". The Abhidharmists were probably too self-conscious of what they were doing, and presumably not without some touch of self-centred pride. 4) The Abhidharmists acquired great skill in reviewing the *rise and fall* of dharmas. Here they are taught that there is no such thing because of the *nonproduction* of all dharmas. 5) A

> *multiplicity* of separate dharmas was considered to constitute the ultimate reality. Here it is taught that a) there is no such multiplicity because all is one; b) there are no separate dharmas, but what appears to be so are mere words.[81]

Paths and bhūmis

In terms of the hidden meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, during what is experienced on the mental path of refining and uncovering prajñāpāramitā, in itself, this prajñā is completely beyond all reification,[82] inconceivable and inexpressible, yet its realization is to be cultivated progressively. Traditionally, such experiences and realizations are discussed in the technical framework of "paths and bhūmis." In Buddhism, "paths" and "bhūmis" primarily refer to the inner spiritual development of the mind ("mind" is sometimes even given as a synonym for "path"). In other words, this refers to the continuum of cultivating, and familiarizing with, certain states of mind and insights in many different ways from the levels of a beginner up through perfect buddhahood, which entails increasingly positive and powerful mental qualities. This is exactly what the AA discusses at length. The Sanskrit word *mārga* for "path" derives from the verbal root *mārg* (to seek for; to strive after; to trace out; to go or move) and has a wide range of meanings, such as (right) way, path, passage, course, channel; range; search, inquiry; manner, method, style; practice; and hinting at or indicating how something is to happen. TOK defines and classifies "path" as follows:

> The nature of the path on which one is to progress is that which, once one has entered it, serves as a stepping stone for progressing towards more superior mundane or supramundane states. . . . In general, the extensive classifications of paths are limitless—the three paths of the three yānas; the two paths to higher states and liberation, or, higher realms and definite excellence, or, mundane and supramundane paths; the two paths that are contaminated and uncontaminated. . . . a fourfold [classification of] paths, such as the preparatory [path, the uninterrupted path, the path of liberation, and the special path];[83] [another] fourfold classification of paths in terms of being swift, slow, difficult, and easy; the two paths of learning and no more learning; and the two paths of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. There are many different contextual categories of classifications such as these, but the most well-known general outline of all supramundane paths is known as the five paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning.[84]

As for the bhūmis, texts such as the *Ālokā* say that they "refer to the principle of being foundations for qualities."[85] Employing the traditional Sanskrit hermeneutical etymologies as found in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, TOK elaborates on this as follows:

> "The bhūmis of a fully perfect buddha" refer to the familiarization with the two identitylessnesses and the samādhi of emptiness—the nature of all phenomena. These are the ten bhūmis of the mahāyāna. . . . The nature of a bhūmi consists of the prajñā in the mind streams of bodhisattvas (from the first generation of bodhicitta up through complete enlightenment) that realizes identitylessness and is accompanied by the congruent factor of samādhi. This serves as the support or basis for the progressive further arising of special qualities. . . . Its instances consist of the knowledge in the mind streams of learning bodhisattvas, that is, their [respective] wisdoms and their congruently associated factors that are embraced by special means and function as the support for special qualities. . . . Why are these called bhūmis? The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:
>
> > Because of delighting in various accomplishments of virtue,
> > [Bodhisattvas] dwell [on them] always and everywhere.
> > Therefore, the bodhisattvabhūmis
> > Are asserted as abodes.[86]
>
> Accordingly, just like the great earth, they function as the bases, abodes, or supports for all qualities. Therefore, they are called "bhūmis." Alternatively, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* states:
>
> > Since [bodhisattvas] apply themselves to ascend higher and higher
> > On these immeasurable [abodes]
> > For the sake of innumerable beings becoming fearless,
> > They are asserted as bhūmis.[87]
>
> The [Sanskrit] equivalent for "ground" is "bhūmi." Through the certainties [that derive from] eliding or adding [certain] syllables, the general hermeneutical etymologies of "ground" are as follows. *Bhū*, [when interpreted as] *bhūta*, [means] "element"—just as the great element [earth], [the bhūmis] function as supports for the assemblies of qualities. *Mi*, [when interpreted as] *amita*, [means] "immeasurable"—they are attained through immeasurable hardships. Or *bhū* [can be interpreted as] *abhaya*, [which means]

"fearless"—once the bhūmis are attained, one is free from the five fears and so on.[88] Furthermore, *bhū* [can be understood as] *bhūya*," [which means] "higher and higher." Thus, by relying on the [respective] lower ones, [the bhūmis] function as supports for progressing further and increasingly higher. For all these reasons, they are called "bhūmis." In brief, since they, similar to the ground of the earth, function as supports for qualities, they are designated as "bhūmis."

When the bhūmis are classified in a merely common way, [there are] four [ways to do so]. . . . The first one [in terms of beings and noble ones] . . . has two parts:

a) The bhūmis of ordinary mundane beings

b) The supramundane bhūmis.

a) The definition of the first is "that which functions as the support for the qualities of engaging in the attributes of the noble ones." Their instances are suitably classified as two—the bhūmi of beginners and the bhūmi of engagement through aspiration.[89] The first one consists of the phase of the path of accumulation, which starts with the awakening of the disposition for the mahāyāna and the first generation of bodhicitta, since this represents the maturation of one's immature mind stream. The latter one is the phase of the path of preparation since it represents a mere cultivation of aspiring for the actuality of emptiness.

b) The definition of a supramundane bhūmi is "that which functions as the support for the special qualities of the noble ones." Its instances consist of the phases from the path of seeing up through the path of completion. Because these [paths] are what make one familiar with and accustomed to the samādhi of the uncontaminated wisdom of true reality that is directly realized on the first bhūmi. . . .

Secondly, the classification in terms of the manner of attainment is fourfold. The engagement through mainly cultivating the aspiration for the dharmas is called "the bhūmi that is attained through aspiration." The engagement in the ten dharma activities as one wishes is "the bhūmi that is attained through conduct." The direct realization of the nature of phenomena on the first bhūmi and above is "the bhūmi that is attained through realization." In particular, on the eighth bhūmi and above, there is effortless and spontaneous engagement. Therefore, this is "the bhūmi that is attained [through] accomplishment" since this is stated in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* [XX.41].[90]

Apart from these more technical aspects, in terms of actually experiencing prajñāpāramitā, the whole point of the progressive and profound realizations on paths and grounds is to become friends with the basic groundlessness of one's existence and the notion of no-path. This principle applies not only to saṃsāric, or afflicted, phenomena, but also to nirvāṇic, or purified, phenomena, such as any and all experiences, realizations, and conduct on all the paths of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas as well as the ultimate fruition of omniscient buddhahood.

Both the explicit and the implicit subject matter of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—emptiness and the path of realizing it—are aptly summarized by Edward Conze:

> The thousands of lines of the Prajñāpāramitā can be summed up in the following two sentences: 1) One should become a Bodhisattva (or, Buddha-to-be), i.e. one who is content with nothing less than all-knowledge attained through the perfection of wisdom for the sake of all beings. 2) There is no such thing as a Bodhisattva, or as all-knowledge, or as a 'being', or as the perfection of wisdom, or as an attainment. To accept both these contradictory facts is to be perfect.[91]

Or, as Sparham puts it:

> According to Hari, the message of the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* is that the entire path and its result operate on a covering level (*saṃvṛti*) made up of illusory mind, while below, as it were, at an ultimate level, they are empty of any essential nature.[92]

Verse 72 of Nāgārjuna's *Bodhisaṃbhāra* simply says:

> Bodhisattvas benefit sentient beings,
> But do not see any sentient beings.
> This is indeed a very difficult point,
> Superb and ungraspable.

In terms of the actual practice on the path of a bodhisattva, however, it is not simply a matter of "accepting contradictory facts." Rather, this path means to gain an increasingly thorough understanding of each of these two realities—seeming and ultimate—and eventually realize that they are not two separate levels of existence, but the different outlooks of the confused dualistic minds of ordinary beings versus the nonreferential wisdom minds of those who

directly experience how things really are, with the former eventually dissolving within the latter as one progresses on the path. From this perspective, what may seem to be contradictory is seen to be so not at all. This is called realizing the union of the two realities, or the union of prajñā and skillful means (*upāya*).[93] Buswell and Gimello say:

> How is it that deliberate spiritual disciplines can be effective given the inherent emptiness that must mark them all? How can obedience to the precepts, scriptural study, ascetism, calming of the mind and body, exercise of analytical insight, and so on collaborate to sustain a coherent course of spiritual development? How can they lead consistently to a single end? Were one to focus only on the cognitive message of Buddhism, the message of metaphysical indeterminacy, such efficacy would be inexplicable, perhaps even unlikely. But since Buddhists teach *mārga* as insistently as they teach śūnyatā, we have good reason to believe that the practical principles of structure, continuity, and efficacy implicit in the one are as important as the theoretical principles of indeterminacy, discontinuity, and structurelessness in the other.[94]

Especially according to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, in actual fact all afflictions and obscurations as well as their remedies are alike in being completely unreal and without any nature of their own—they never even came into being in the first place. Nevertheless, until this is fully realized and made a living experience, the path consists of applying progressively refined antidotes to progressively subtle obscurations in an illusionlike manner, but eventually one has to let go of even the most refined antidote, once its job of seemingly having eliminated its corresponding factor to be relinquished has been accomplished. From the perspective of the true and unchanging nature of phenomena, anything that appears as either something to be relinquished or a remedy is nothing but an adventitious illusory obscuration. However, from the perspective of the path, one needs to work on recognizing precisely this fact. As the famous female Chinese Buddhist ancestor Kongshi Daoren wrote in a poem on the wall of a bathhouse:

> If nothing truly exists, what are you bathing? Where could even the slightest bit of dust come from? . . . Even if you see no difference between the water and the dirt, it all must be washed away completely, when you enter here.

The Indian commentarial traditions of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras

There are numerous Indian commentaries on individual prajñāpāramitā sūtras,[95] but in terms of the exegesis of the intention of the prajñāpāramitā literature as a whole, the early Tibetan tradition (such as in the table of contents of the *Tengyur* and Butön Rinchen Drub's (1290–1364) *History of Buddhism*[96] as well as the introdcution to his commentary on the AA) speaks of four system founders:

(1) Nāgārjuna (second century CE) with his "collection of Madhyamaka reasonings"[97]

(2) Maitreya with his *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*[98]

(3) Vasubandhu (fourth century CE) with his *Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā* (commenting from the perspective of Yogācāra) and Daṃṣṭrāsena with his *Śatasāhasrikāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā*,[99] which both present the subject in the form of the three approaches and the eleven specifications

(4) Dignāga (fifth century CE) with his *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgrahakārikā* (a.k.a. *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*), which says that it summarizes the sūtra in eight thousand lines in thirty-two topics. However, the text clearly and almost exclusively employs Yogācāra explanations, mainly discussing the sixteen emptinesses, the remedies for the ten kinds of conceptual distractions, and the framework of the three natures.[100]

These masters are proposed by some commentators as distinct system founders since they commented on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in independent ways, without relying on previous commentaries. However, since the texts under (3) and (4) are often considered to be included within the overall approaches of either Nāgārjuna and Maitreya (and moreover rarely consulted), later Tibetan commentators especially usually speak of only (1) and (2) as the two basic ways of commenting on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, with Nāgārjuna's texts clarifying the explicit teaching—emptiness—and Maitreya's AA elucidating their hidden meaning (while teaching emptiness implicitly).[101]

According to the Tibetan tradition, the AA is one of the five major teachings that Maitreya gave to Asaṅga in the god realm Tuṣita to clarify the entire dharma of the mahāyāna. Upon returning to earth, Asaṅga wrote these teachings down and propagated them, so they became known as the "five dharmas of Maitreya."[102] Haribhadra's *Ālokā* says:

> I have heard that, though noble Asaṅga understood all the meanings of the words [of the Buddha in general] and had gained realization, he was still not [able to] determine the meaning of the prajñāpāramitā [sūtras] because of their profundity, their

> numerous repetitions, and his not recognizing the precise significance of individual phrases in the nonrepetitious parts [of these sūtras]. He became depressed about this, upon which the Bhagavān Maitreya expounded the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and composed the verses of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* for his sake. After noble master Asaṅga had heard these [texts], he as well as Vasubandhu and further [masters] explained them [to others].[103]

The transmission of the prajñāpāramitā literature from India to Tibet

To give a brief account of how the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and their related treatises were transmitted to Tibet, during the earlier spread of the teachings there, Lang Kamba Kocha[104] traveled to India, learned the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in One Hundred Thousand Lines* by heart, and subsequently translated it in Tibet. The Tibetan king Trisong Detsen[105] (742–796), out of great respect for the dharma of the mahāyāna, mixed blood from his own body with milk from a white goat, and had this sūtra written down in four volumes. It was kept in a stūpa in Lhasa and became known as "the red notes," being the so-called "lesser supreme translation." During the time of King Trisong Detsen, the paṇḍitas Jinamitra and Śīlendrabodhi and the translator Yeshé Dé[106] translated this and several other prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Also, the two translators Bé Mañjuśrī[107] and Nyang Indravaro[108] brought this text from India and translated it. They wrote it down in four volumes, mixing singed hairs from the monarch's head with the milk from a white goat. Thus, it was called "the blue notes." Since the sūtra's repetitional phrases[109] were only contained in an abbreviated form in this translation, the translator Vairocana reedited it by supplementing the phrases that were missing and spelling out abbreviated passages, thus translating it in a convenient diction. This version in six volumes constitutes the "intermediate supreme translation" and is also known as "the hundred thousand lines in a bag of deerskin," the name being derived from the container this text was kept in at Chimpu[110] Monastery. At the time of Tri Ralbachen[111] (806–841), the Indian paṇḍita Surendrabodhi and the Tibetan translators Gawa Baldseg[112] and Jogro Lui Gyaltsen[113] reedited it, which is known as the "great supreme translation."[114] Thus, the principal translation period of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras into Tibetan was between the years 790 and 840, and also Daṃṣṭrāsena's *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-bṛhaṭṭīkā* was translated during this time. All these texts served as the supports for extensively explaining and practicing the prajñāpāramitā teachings during the early spreading of the teachings.

During the later spreading of the teachings, the translator Rinchen Sangpo[115] (957–1055) studied the AA, including its commentaries, with

Paṇḍita Guṇamitra (a student of Haribhadra's disciple Buddhaśrījñāna) and established a new exegetical tradition of this text, which he primarily taught to Sharchogpa Dawa Sangpo.[116] The latter passed it on to Tenkyong Bumtra Sumpa,[117] who in turn taught the great translator Ngog Loden Sherab[118] (1059–1109). The text also spread greatly through the explanations that Atiśa bestowed upon his disciples, such as Kuchenbo Lhadingpa,[119] Dromdön Gyalwé Jungnay[120] (1004–1064), and Khamba Chagtar Dönpa[121] (born eleventh century). These three transmissions are respectively known as the "Ku tradition," the "Drom tradition," and the "Kham tradition,"[122] which soon merged into the lineage of Dré Sherab Bar[123] (eleventh century; see below).

In particular, the translator Ngog Loden Sherab, who received the complete set of sūtras and tantras from many Indian and Tibetan scholars and siddhas, had studied all five Maitreya works with the Kashmiri paṇḍita Sajjana and the entire scriptures on prajñāpāramitā with Bumtra Sumpa. Based on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in One Hundred Thousand Lines* kept in the temple of Pharping near Kathmandu in Nepal, he revised the existing Tibetan translations, such as supplementing the missing names of certain samādhis. He also revised the translations of the AA and some of its commentaries, or simply translated them anew. In that way, and by writing both an extensive and a brief commentary (or summary) on the AA,[124] he also provided the final determination of the exegesis of these texts in Tibet at the time and he also spread these scriptures.[125] From Ngog, the main transmission continued to one of his four major disciples, Dré Sherab Bar, who wrote two commentaries on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* and the AA. He passed it on to Ar Jangchub Yeshé,[126] who composed commentaries on the AA, *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*, and the *Heart Sūtra*. These two eleventh-century Kadampa masters collected all the prajñāpāramitā transmissions from Ngog Lotsāwa and his other main disciples, as well as those coming through Atiśa and through Rinchen Sangbo. The resulting lineage became the principal one for the subsequent interpretation of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in Tibet.

Via Butön and his principal student, Rinchen Namgyal[127] (1318–1388), it reached the famous Sakya master Yagtön Sangyé Bal[128] (1348–1414), who composed a large, intermediate, and short commentary. Both he and his foremost student, Rongtön Sheja Künrig[129] (1367–1449), are widely renowned for their expertise in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA. According to Śākya Chogden[130] (1428–1507), Rongtön wrote four commentaries on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and nine texts on the AA. Being known as one of "the six gems of the Sakya tradition" and considered as an emanation of Maitreya, Rongtön founded the monastery of Penbo Nalendra[131] in 1436. At its famous monastic college, he taught students from all schools of Tibetan Buddhism,


including six early abbots of the Ganden and Drebung Monasteries. As for the Kagyü and Nyingma Schools, not only the prajñāpāramitā transmission, but also the majority of their other scholastic lineages pass through Rongtön, with the Sixth Karmapa, Tongwa Tönden[132] (1416–1453), having been one of his main disciples. Thus, Rongtön and his numerous works had an immense influence on all other Tibetan schools.

Besides this main lineage of the prajñāpāramitā teachings to the present day, Chaba Chökyi Sengé[133] (1109–1169)—who is mainly known for his contributions in the field of debate and valid cognition—developed a separate and quite different tradition. He had studied prajñāpāramitā with another one of Ngog's four main disciples, Trolungpa Lodrö Jungné,[134] who wrote commentaries on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* and the AA based on Ngog's teachings. Like most of Chökyi Sengé's teachings, this tradition eventually was absorbed into the Gelugpa School.

Nyalshig Jambel Dorje[135] (c. 1160–1220), both a great scholar and siddha, was a throne-holder of the upper campus of the famous Kadampa monastery of Sangpu[136] and studied with direct disciples of both Ar Jangchub Yeshé and Chökyi Sengé. He wrote an interesting commentary on the AA, called *Entrance into the Mahāyāna*,[137] which is a synthesis of the above two traditions. Thus, Nyalshig figures in both transmission lineages, and the lasting influence of his work is not only evident from his being quoted and explicitly referred to in many subsequent commentaries, such as LN, JNS, and the ones by Śākya Chogden and Nyaön Kunga Bal[138] (1345–1439; a disciple of both Butön and Dölpopa), but also from these commentaries generally employing many of his explanations. This is also true for Tsongkhapa's (1357–1419) famous *Golden Garland of Excellent Explanations*.[139] According to the colophon of this text, it is based on the teachings that Tsongkhapa received from the two Sakya masters Töndrub Rinchen[140] and Rendawa Shönnu Lodrö.[141] In addition, he studied prajñāpāramitā at Nyetang Dewachen[142] Monastery based on a commentary written by Jamkya Namka Bal,[143] one of Nyalshig's nine major students who were among the key persons to transmit these teachings during the thirteenth century. Moreover, it is well known that Tsongkhapa's commentary greatly relies on the commentaries by Butön and Nyaön (from whom Tsongkhapa also received teachings on the AA and its commentaries) and also extensively refers to the works of all the above major commentators.[144] However, as Sparham[145] points out, all three commentaries by Butön, Nyaön, and Tsongkhapa share the basic outline and templates of Nyalshig's work, which is thus represented, though mostly unacknowledged, in Tibetan mainstream prajñāpāramitā exegesis to the present day.[146] Two further examples of Nyalshig's far-reaching influence are his appearing in the Fifth Dalai Lama's record of the lineage from which he received the teachings

on the AA[147] and the fact that the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje (1284–1339), studied in a monastic college set up by an indirect disciple of Jamkya.

Last but not least, mention must be made of the great Tibetan siddhā Machig Labdrön[148] (1031–1129), who is said to be the only one to have directly achieved the highest accomplishment (*siddhi*) through the prajñāpāramitā teachings alone. In her own writings, she emphasizes prajñāpāramitā as the foundation of her "Cutting Through" teachings and TOK[149] agrees that these teachings are prajñāpāramitā in essence and also accord with the vajrayāna, thus blending the realizations of sūtra and tantra. According to TOK, the way in which this profound teaching is related to prajñāpāramitā is that, just as one needs to identify the earth as the ground on which one cuts down a tree, prajñāpāramitā is the ground for cutting through ego-inflating thoughts[150] that bind one in saṃsāra.



The Abhisamayālaṃkāra *and Its Commentaries*

The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and its contents

The traditional origin of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* is first described in Haribhadra's *Ālokā*:

> I have heard that, though noble Asaṅga understood all the meanings of the words [of the Buddha in general] and had gained realization, he was still not [able to] determine the meaning of the prajñāpāramitā [sūtras] because of their profundity, their numerous repetitions, and his not recognizing the precise significance of individual phrases in the nonrepetitious parts [of these sūtras]. He became depressed about this, upon which the Bhagavān Maitreya expounded the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and composed the verses of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* for his sake. After noble master Asaṅga had heard these [texts], he as well as Vasubandhu and further [masters] explained them [to others].[151]

As for the meaning of the text's title, the Sanskrit term *abhisamaya* is made up of the prefixes *abhi* (toward) and *sam* (together, fully), and the verbal root *i* (going, understanding), thus generally meaning "coming together," "reunion," "agreement," and "full understanding." In particular, as a Buddhist technical term, it refers to the clear realization of or perfect insight into the supreme spiritual reality, indicating the moments on the path when the meditating mind as the subject fully merges with its object and thus "everything falls into place." In fact, in the Indian and Tibetan commentaries, *abhisamaya* is often glossed as "path" (*mārga*). In Buddhism, this is meant to signify the mind as it progresses in its spiritual insights toward liberation from saṃsāra and buddhahood, with the main factor in this process being prajñā. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explains the term as follows:

> "What is the meaning of 'clear realization' (*abhisamaya*)?" It is clear and true perception (*abhisaṃbodha*).[152] "Why is it solely uncontaminated, but not contaminated?" It is the true (*saṃ/saṃyak*) realization (*aya*) that is directed toward (*abhi*) nirvāṇa, with "true" [referring] to true reality (*tattva*).[153]

The *Yogācārabhūmi*[154] speaks of six clear realizations, which are explained in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*[155] as follows. (1) The clear realization in terms of reflection has the nature of the great prajñā that arises from reflection and of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment that are endowed with such prajñā. (2) The clear realization in terms of confidence has the nature of the great mundane and supramundane confidence that focuses on the three jewels and of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment that are endowed with such confidence. (3) The clear realization in terms of ethics has the nature of the physical and verbal actions that delight the noble ones and of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment that are endowed with such actions. (4) The clear realization of reality that is the knowledge of clear realization has the nature of the prajñā that focuses on presentable reality[156] and of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment that are endowed with such prajñā. (5) The clear realization of reality that is the knowledge which arises from the culmination of clear realization has the nature of the prajñā that focuses on the unpresentable reality and of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment that are endowed with such prajñā. (6) The final clear realization has the nature of the knowledge of termination and nonarising[157] and of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment that are endowed with such knowledge.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*[158] presents clear realization as tenfold in terms of (1) dharma, (2) meaning, (3) true reality, (4) being subsequent, (5) the three jewels, (6) nonbirth, (7) being final, (8) śrāvakas, (9) pratyekabuddhas, and (10) bodhisattvas. (1)–(4) and (7) respectively refer to the clear realizations on the five paths in general, with "the clear realization of true reality" consisting of the attainment of the sixteen mental moments of the path of seeing. The clear realizations of bodhisattvas are superior to those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by virtue of ten differences (explained in more detail in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*)[159] in terms of focal object (the dharmas of the mahāyāna versus those of the hīnayāna), support (the two accumulations of merit and wisdom as the six pāramitās), realization (both types of identitylessness), nonabiding nirvāṇa, the ten bhūmis, purity (relinquishing the latent tendencies of all afflictions and purifying buddha realms), an equal mind toward themselves and others (thus maturing others uninterruptedly), taking birth in the *tathāgatagotra*, the outcome of this (always being born into the retinues of buddhas and being mentored by them), and fruition

(infinite buddha qualities, such as the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, and the eighteen unique qualities; the fundamental change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, attainment of the three kāyas, relinquishment of both afflictive and cognitive obscurations, and so on).

In brief, in general, "clear realization" is understood as either the Buddhist path as a whole, its progressive stages, the methods on the path, or the progressive levels of prajñā or superior insight. In particular, in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, the term also refers to the eight topics of this text, which include the final fruition of the dharmakāya. Thus, according to some commentaries, it is used as a synonym for the text's eight chapters.

Alaṃkāra means "ornament" and refers to a common genre of brief Indian commentary, which does not provide a detailed and comprehensive exegesis of a given subject matter, but just summarizes the most salient points, usually in verses. Metaphorically, here, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are like a naturally beautiful woman whose looks are only further enhanced by the fine ornament of Maitreya's synopsis. As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Just as a physical form that is an ornament and endowed with natural qualities,
> Through being seen in a mirror, produces supreme delight in people,
> So this dharma, which is endowed with the natural qualities of excellent words,
> Always produces distinct satisfaction in the wise when its meaning is discriminated.[160]

As such an ornamental digest of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* is generally related to the three largest sūtras,[161] but most clearly to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines,* as the order of its topics corresponds the closest to the form in which they appear in this sūtra. Essentially, the AA is a giant table of contents for this large sūtra, while fitting each of its sections into its proper place within the progressive stages of the path to buddhahood. This is reflected in the structure of the AA, which consists of eight chapters or topics—"the eight clear realizations"—branching out into seventy points,[162] which are further divided into about 1,200 subpoints. The eight topics are:

(1) the knowledge of all aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*)
(2) the knowledge of the path[163] (*mārgajñatā*)
(3) the all-knowledge (*sarvajñatā*)
(4) the full realization of all aspects (*sarvākārābhisaṃbhoda*)
(5) the culminating clear realization (*mūrdhābhisamaya*)

(6) the serial clear realization (*ānupūrvikābhisamaya*)
(7) the clear realization in a single instant (*ekakṣaṇābhisamaya*)
(8) the dharmakāya[164]

Among these eight topics, (1)–(3) represent what is to be known and realized on the path to buddhahood; (4)–(7) are the four kinds of trainings or yogic practices[165] as the means to realize (1)–(3); and (8) discusses the fruition of these trainings. The eight topics can also be summarized into six by taking (1)–(3) as the object of realization in general or three by additionally taking (4)–(7) as the training in general. The following is an outline of the contents of these eight topics and their seventy subpoints.

1) The knowledge of all aspects

The knowledge of all aspects refers to a buddha's realization of all aspects, signs, and characteristics of all phenomena being unborn. This means being omniscient about all aspects of the true nature of phenomena and the entire variety of seeming appearances. In itself, the knowledge of all aspects encompasses all the remaining seven topics of the AA. However, though the knowledge of all aspects is in essence nothing but the fruition of the bodhisattva path, the text presents it in retrospect, that is, through the ten sets of causes on the bodhisattva path that, when practically engaged in, eventually lead to the attainment of this knowledge and then also make up its intrinsic constituents.

The ten points that define the knowledge of all aspects

The AA's opening stanza pays homage to prajñāpāramitā as the mother of all four noble ones (śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats, bodhisattvas, and buddhas). Verses I.1–2 identify the purpose of the text as realizing the meaning of prajñāpāramitā as taught in the sūtras in an easy way in order to attain buddhahood. There follows a brief synopsis of the entire text through outlining its eight topics and their seventy points (I.3–17).

The actual first chapter on the knowledge of all aspects starts with verses I.18–20 on (1) generating bodhicitta as the foundational motivation for the entire mahāyāna path. The progressive stages of cultivating bodhicitta are illustrated through twenty-two examples that show how it flourishes on the various levels of the path up through buddhahood.

(2) This is followed by the tenfold instructions (I.21–24) on how to practically apply this motivation of bodhicitta. These instructions consist of the nature of such practice (engaging in the union of profound and vast means and prajñā in a nonreferential manner by way of not going beyond the two realities); the focal object of practice (the four realities of the noble ones);[166]

the foundation of practice (the three jewels); and the causes of consummate practice (three kinds of vigor, cultivating extrasensory powers to benefit beings, and the paths of seeing and familiarization). The subpoint of the three jewels includes a supplementary discussion of the twenty types of bodhisattva saṃgha as modeled on the different types of stream-enterers, once-returners, nonreturners, and arhats that are presented in the śrāvaka system.

(3) The path of preparation, called "the branches conducive to penetration" (I.25–36), represents both the first major fruition of having practiced the instructions under (2) and the cause of the path of seeing. It consists of the four levels of heat, peak, poised readiness, and supreme dharma, each one of which has three degrees. All twelve have their own specific focal objects and cognitive aspects under which the former are viewed, with the four realities and their sixteen aspects being the common basis for all of them. During these levels, four sets of nine conceptions[167] about the apprehended (in terms of afflicted and purified phenomena) and the apprehender (in terms of substantially and imputedly existent persons) are progressively relinquished. This section includes the supplementary topic of bodhisattvas being mentored by genuine spiritual friends of the mahāyāna, who are not afraid of profound emptiness and thus skillfully teach others the lack of nature of all phenomena and encourage them to abandon the obstacles in their minds to profound means and prajñā.

(4) The foundation of practice (I.37–39)—the "disposition" for buddhahood—refers to the single indivisible dharmadhātu as the basic ground within which all activities on the path, particularly those of the mahāyāna, take place.[168]

(5) The focal object (I.40–41) or vast scope of mahāyāna practice consists of all phenomena, be they virtuous, nonvirtuous, neutral, mundane, supramundane, conditioned, or unconditioned.

(6) The aim of this practice (I.42) is represented by the three greatnesses—the great wisdom mind of a buddha that establishes all sentient beings in the highest state possible (buddhahood); the great relinquishment of all adventitious stains from this wisdom mind (all views in terms of personal and phenomenal identities); and the great realization of this wisdom's fundamental nature. At the same time, these three greatnesses are taken as the means on the bodhisattva path to accomplish their ultimate consummation.

Finally, the actual nature of mahāyāna practice consists of the last four points of the knowledge of all aspects—armorlike practice, the practice of engagement, the practice of the equipments, and the practice of final deliverance. (7) In general, armorlike practice (I.43) refers to the cause of donning the great armor that primarily consists of the mental vigor to strive for the welfare of others through the basic motivation of the mahāyāna—bodhicitta.

In particular, this practice consists of engaging in the six pāramitās in such a way that the practice of each one of them includes the practice of all.

(8) Generally speaking, the ninefold practice of engagement (I.44–45) is primarily the application of the above mental vigor that is preceded by (7) as its cause. In particular, it includes the trainings in the dhyānas and formless absorptions; the four immeasurables;[169] the pāramitās; the path of the ten bhūmis; nonreferential prajñā; the above three greatnesses; the supernatural knowledges; and the knowledge of all aspects.

(9) In general, the practice of the seventeen equipments (I.46–71) means to unrelentingly embrace the activities that make one attain the fruition of great enlightenment, that is, rendering the two accumulations powerful. In particular, one gathers the equipments of loving-kindness; the pāramitās; calm abiding with superior insight; the path of the union of the vast and the profound; skill in means; wisdom; merit; the twenty-one sets of the path (such as the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment); the four kinds of dhāraṇī; the ten bhūmis as the foundations of qualities; and the remedies to dispel flaws. The bulk of this discussion (I.48–70) consists of the factors that are necessary to achieve each one of the ten bhūmis.[170]

(10) In general, the eightfold practice of final deliverance (I.72–73) delivers one from bhūmi to bhūmi and has the nature of the union of means and prajñā. In particular, it consists of the three greatnesses by virtue of realizing that all phenomena are unobservable; realizing all phenomena as equality; accomplishing the infinite welfare of beings; effortlessness with regard to these; deliverance in terms of the extremes of permanence and extinction; the lasting attainment of all qualities of the three yānas; and deliverance in terms of the final paths of nonlearning (the knowledge of all aspects) and learning (the special path of the tenth bhūmi).

2) The knowledge of the path

The knowledge of the path means that, while bodhisattvas travel through the five paths of the mahāyāna and in particular through the ten bhūmis, they realize that all three types of paths—those of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas—are primordially unborn and without any nature of their own. This knowledge also refers to all the activities performed on the bodhisattva path and primarily serves as the remedy for the cognitive obscurations, eventually resulting in the knowledge of all aspects.

The eleven points of the knowledge of the path

(1) There are five causes for the knowledge of the path to arise in the mind stream of a being (II.1). A mind free from afflictions (the conditions adverse to the arising of this knowledge) becomes a suitable support for this

knowledge (exemplified by the Buddha eclipsing the radiance of the gods through his own radiance in order to overcome their pride). The favorable condition for this knowledge to arise is the generation of bodhicitta. Its substantial cause is the disposition—buddha nature—that dwells in all sentient beings. The enhancing factor is to not relinquish the subtle afflictions that enable bodhisattvas to be willingly reborn in saṃsāra for the sake of accomplishing the welfare of others. The activity of the knowledge of such bodhisattvas consists of liberating sentient beings continuously without manifesting their own buddhahood.

As for the paths to be known through the knowledge that arises from these causes, they include (2) the paths of śrāvakas (II.2–5), (3) the path of pratyekabuddhas (II.6–10), and the mahāyāna path (II.11–31). The former two need to be known by bodhisattvas primarily in order to guide disciples with the dispositions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. However, unlike śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas cultivate the knowledge of these two paths not as their own actual path for their own welfare, but in a nonreferential manner by seeing the lack of nature of all the aspects of these paths.

The mahāyāna path as discussed in this context starts with (4) the path of seeing (II.11–16) with its sixteen moments of realizing the four realities in the mahāyāna way of primarily focusing on the emptiness of all their aspects. The actual nature of the meditative equipoise that is the path of seeing is just a single moment of clear realization of the dharmadhātu, but its sixteen moments are presented from the point of view of how this realization provides the power to eliminate certain kinds of superimpositions during the phase of subsequent attainment. This point includes the great benefits of this path in this and all following lifetimes.

The presentation of the mahāyāna path of familiarization begins with explaining (5) its function (II.17), which is its sixfold benefit, so that bodhisattvas become enthusiastic about this path.

The actual path of familiarization consists of its contaminated phase of subsequent attainment and its uncontaminated phase of meditative equipoise. The first one is represented by the following four activities outside of meditative equipoise from the second up through the tenth bhūmis, which still entail illusionlike conceptions and appearances. (6) Bodhisattvas aspire for prajñāpāramitā (II.18–19) in three ways, as her being endowed with the supreme qualities that consist of the welfare of themselves, others, and both. (7) The fruitions of such aspirations are that buddhas and bodhisattvas shower down praise, eulogy, and laudation (II.20) upon these bodhisattvas. The two supreme kinds of mental engagement during subsequent attainment consist of (8) the nonreferential dedication (II.21–23) for perfect buddhahood that renders all virtue inexhaustible and (9) rejoicing (II.24), which further increases virtue.

The uncontaminated path of familiarization represents the nonconceptual wisdom of the meditative equipoises from the second up through the tenth bhūmis. This path is discussed under two points. (10) The path of familiarization in terms of accomplishment (II.25) refers to the respective uninterrupted paths of these bhūmis and thus represents consummate realization. (11) The pure path of familiarization (II.26–31) refers to the respective paths of liberation of these bhūmis and thus represents consummate relinquishment.[171]

3) The knowledge of entities[172]

Simply put, the knowledge of all entities refers to the full realizations of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats that serve as the remedy for the afflictive obscurations, being the knowledge that all entities—skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas—are empty of a personal self. In the AA, however, the full scope of the knowledge of entities refers to the perspective of bodhisattvas (and buddhas), which includes their being fully aware of both the antagonistic factors and the remedies in the context of the knowledge of the path. This means that, from the perspective of the bodhisattva path, the above realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas (their knowledge of the path) make up the antagonistic factors discussed here because these realizations still entail apprehending characteristics, while their remedies (the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas) essentially consist of being free from apprehending any characteristics. Though the ways in which śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas gain their realizations are not to be cultivated by bodhisattvas and buddhas as something that leads to their own specific realizations on the path of the mahāyāna (and in fact are to be relinquished by them), they nevertheless need to know these ways in order to help and teach those on the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

The nine points of the knowledge of entities

Unlike the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the one pertaining to bodhisattvas dwells neither in (1) saṃsāra (by virtue of the prajñā of knowing the three times to be equality) nor in (2) inferior forms of nirvāṇa (by virtue of compassion for all sentient beings) (III.1).

Consequently (III.2), (3) the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is distant from fruitional prajñāpāramitā due to their lack of skill in means in terms of relinquishing the cognitive obscurations, promoting the welfare of sentient beings, and relying on mahāyāna spiritual friends.

(4) On the other hand, the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas is close to fruitional prajñāpāramitā due to being skilled in means in the above three respects.

As for the antagonistic factors and the remedies in terms of the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas (III.3–7), (5) the former consist of the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in that these cling to the real existence of the factors to be relinquished, their remedies on the path, and the fruition.

(6) The remedy for such clinging is the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas, primarily because it realizes all phenomena in terms of ground, path, and fruition to be empty and without any nature.

(7) The actual training in engaging in the remedial knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas (III.8–10ab) consists of the trainings in nonreferential meditative equipoise that stop clinging to any characteristics in terms of view, meditation, conduct, fruition, subject, and object—which includes the clinging to one's not being attached to any of these.

(8) All these trainings need to be cultivated through realizing all their subjects and objects as being fourfold equality (III.10cd), which serves to eliminate obstacles. This fourfold equality refers to being free from any conceits in terms of clinging to phenomena as having a nature; the characteristics of phenomena; the reference points of "me" and "mine"; and realizing the ways things appear and how they actually are.

(9) The fruition of (7) and (8) is the path of seeing of bodhisattvas (III.11–15), whose sixteen wisdom moments relinquish the two sets of sixteen superimpositions by tīrthikas and śrāvakas, respectively, onto the four realities of the noble ones.

The third chapter concludes with a verse that summarizes the three knowledges (III.16).

4) The complete training in all aspects

The complete training in, or full realization of, all aspects refers to actually engaging in the practice of all the points of the three knowledges (1)–(3). It is the combined familiarization with all entities, all paths, and all aspects, including their respective knowledges, as being without nature in order to realize the three knowledges. The AA discusses the 173 aspects of all three knowledges in terms of practicing, realizing, and mastering them in their entirety.

The eleven points of the complete training in all aspects

(1) "All aspects" refer to that with which bodhisattvas must familiarize themselves—the 173 aspects of all three above knowledges (IV.1–5). Here, "aspects" refer to the particular instances of cognition or wisdom that focus on particular focal objects, which in this case means all the facets of the four realities of noble ones from the perspective of the mahāyāna, the various

stages of the bodhisattva path, and the qualities of the final fruition. In particular, the focusing on the four realities differs from the manner of doing so in the other yānas because it eliminates all extremes and reference points with regard to these four realities as entertained by non-Buddhists as well as by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Thus, all these "aspects" are not aspects in terms of seeming reality (such as outer objects or impermanence), but represent aspects in terms of ultimate reality—they are nothing but the distinctive forms in which the mind that familiarizes with and realizes emptiness, the two kinds of identitylessness, the lack of arising of the three knowledges, and so on appears. In more detail, among these 173 aspects, the twenty-seven aspects in terms of the knowledge of entities and the thirty-six aspects in terms of the knowledge of the path represent the specific ways in which bodhisattvas focus on the four realities as the path. Among the 110 aspects of the knowledge of all aspects, the first set of thirty-seven consists of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment. The second set of thirty-four consists of various sets of samādhis (the three doors to liberation, the eight liberations, the nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding, the four readinesses of the path of seeing) and the ten pāramitās. The final set of thirty-nine describes the nature and the qualities of buddhahood, such as the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses. The description of all these aspects is followed by two verses about the general characteristics of the persons who are suitable recipients for the teachings on prajñāpāramitā (IV.6–7).

(2) The nature of this training or the manner in which bodhisattvas familiarize with these aspects consists of the five natural and the fifteen situational trainings (IV.8–11). The former are practiced on an ongoing basis from the path of accumulation up through the end of the tenth bhūmi, while the latter are only engaged in during certain phases of the path.

The next four points refer to the preliminary factors of the actual trainings. (3) First, there are the fourteen distinct qualities (IV.12ab) that result from cultivating the above twenty trainings. These include vanquishing the power of māras, never being born in the unpleasant realms, firm bodhicitta, the ability to establish many beings in perfect enlightenment, and the promotion of their vast welfare.

(4) On the other hand, while being engaged in these trainings, bodhisattvas need to know and eliminate forty-six flaws (IV.12cd). These obstacles to properly familiarizing with and realizing prajñāpāramitā consist of three main groups—twenty flaws that depend on oneself (such as being distracted in various ways, misconceptions about prajñāpāramitā, and causes for abandoning the mahāyāna), twenty-three flaws in terms of various ways in which teacher and student can be incompatible, and three flaws that depend on others (various activities of māras).

(5) The defining characteristics of the mahāyāna training in all aspects (IV.13–31) consist of (a) the characteristic of supreme knowledge in terms of each one of the three knowledges of bodhisattvas, which demonstrates the capacity of the mahāyāna training to produce the final realization of buddhahood. (b) The characteristic of supreme activity indicates the capacity of this training to accomplish the vast welfare of others. (c) The characteristic of distinctiveness shows that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess such consummate capacities. (d) The characteristic of the nature of the training that possesses these distinctive features (a)–(c) is instantiated by sixteen aspects in terms of the three knowledges.

(6) The first temporary result of such training is the mahāyāna path of accumulation, which is called "the factors conducive to liberation" (IV.32–34). In general, it consists of gathering the accumulations and, in particular, of five faculties—the skill in the means to abide in signlessness through eliminating signs and characteristics by way of confidence in the three jewels; vigor with regard to the pāramitās; mindfulness of bodhicitta; nonconceptual samādhi; and the prajñā of knowing all aspects of phenomena. Classified in another way, the lesser, medium, and great levels of the path of accumulation are the four foundations of mindfulnesss, the four correct efforts, and the four limbs of miraculous powers.

(7) The next path is the path of preparation, which represents the factors conducive to penetration (IV.35–37). In this chapter, its four levels of heat up through the supreme dharma are taught from the perspective of the activities of bodhisattvas during subsequent attainment (in the chapter of the knowledge of all aspects, they were taught from the perspective of their realizations in meditative equipoise). Throughout these levels, the focal objects are all sentient beings, on whom one focuses through seeing oneself and all others as equal, refraining from evil, abiding in the pāramitās, maturing sentient beings, and so on. One also establishes others in such activities and rejoices in their doing so.

(8) The persons who cultivate the complete training in all aspects are the irreversible learning bodhisattvas (IV.38–59). Bodhisattvas of sharp faculties achieve twenty signs of being irreversible from eventually attaining buddhahood already on the path of preparation. Those of medium faculties attain sixteen signs of such irreversibility on the path of seeing, which consist of special expressions of physical and verbal conduct as the natural outflow of the realizations during the sixteen moments of this path. Those of duller faculties show eight signs of said irreversibility on the path of familiarization, which are this path's profundity in terms of arising, ceasing, suchness, and so on.

(9) The training in realizing saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as equality (IV.60) consists of not conceptualizing these two in any way because all phenomena are equally empty and dreamlike. This training is the cause of the dharmakāya.

(10) The training in pure realms means to manifest one's own pure buddha realm, which consists of pure beings and a pure environment with unsurpassable qualities (IV.61). This training is the cause of the sambhogakāya.

(11) The tenfold training in skill in means (IV.62–63) matures others and is the cause of one's enlightened activity in this pure realm.

5) The culminating training

The culminating training, or culminating clear realization, represents the highest forms of familiarization with all entities, all paths, and all aspects as being without nature, which take place on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, respectively. In other words, it consists of the various levels of "breakthrough experiences" and their signs that manifest on the progressive paths of bodhisattvas as the results of their cultivating the complete training in all aspects.

The eight points of the culminating training

(1) The culminating training of the level of heat of the path of preparation (V.1) arises from the cause of having cultivated the complete training in all aspects on the path of accumulation. It is taught through the twelve signs during both the waking state and in dreams that signal its attainment.

(2) The culminating training of the level of peak (V.2) is taught by way of sixteen examples that demonstrate the increase in merit on this level in comparison with the level of heat. These examples show that bodhisattvas on the level of peak, through not being separated from the mental engagement of all phenomena as being dreamlike, engage in prajñāpāramitā and teach it to others, which is far more meritorious than the merits in any of these examples.

(3) The culminating training of poised readiness (V.3) is taught by way of the stability of not regressing into the paths of śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas through never abandoning the three knowledges (by virtue of dedicating them to buddhahoood) or the welfare of sentient beings.

(4) The culminating training of the supreme dharma (V.4) is taught by way of the immeasurable extent of the two accumulations of merit and wisdom that characterize the samādhi of continuously settling on the threefold lack of nature of the three knowledges.

(5) The culminating training of the path of seeing is discussed by starting with the four sets of the nine imputational conceptions about apprehender and apprehended that are the factors to be relinquished through seeing (V.5–16). The two sets of conceptions about the apprehended are in terms of the

objects that bodhisattvas regard as something to be engaged in (the paths and fruitions of the mahāyāna) versus the objects from which they need to withdraw (the paths and fruitions of the hīnayāna). Respectively, the two sets of the conceptions about the apprehender are in terms of ordinary beings taking persons to be substantially existent and noble beings taking them to be imputedly existent. This is followed by discussions of the causes of enlightenment (enlightenment being understood as the actual nature of the culminating training of the path of seeing), its nature, and the manner of familiarizing with it (V.17–21). Unlike the explicit explanations in the sūtras on the individual remedies for the implied four sets of conceptions, the AA explicitly discusses the latter, while their remedies are implied. Thus, the AA gives no details of the remedies, but only summarily refers to the uninterrupted path and the special path (called "the lion's sport") of the path of seeing (V.22–23).

(6) The culminating training of the path of familiarization is explained by starting with its special way of training in samādhi through alternating and skipping various meditative states, called "crossing in one leap" (V.24–25). Among the four sets of the nine innate conceptions about the apprehender and the apprehended to be relinquished through familiarization (V.26–34), the two sets of the conceptions about the apprehended are about what is to be engaged by bodhisattvas (the prajñāpāramitā teachings, their qualities, and the paths related to them) and what is to be rejected by them (not mentally engaging in and familiarizing with prajñāpāramitā or doing so in wrong ways). The two sets of the conceptions about the apprehender refer to imputations (mere persons) and the mere causes for such imputations (mere appearances). This section concludes with the limitless qualities that arise from the culminating training of the path of familiarization (V.35–36) and support the bodhisattvas on this level, enabling them to swiftly become buddhas.

(7) The culminating training of the final uninterrupted path of the path of familiarization (V.37–38) is the "vajralike samādhi" during the very last moment of the tenth bhūmi, which overcomes the most subtle obscurations (the last remainder of the ālaya-consciousness). Here, this training is equated with the knowledge of all aspects (which manifests immediately after it) and is described through its abundance of merit.

(8) Finally, this chapter speaks about sixteen mistaken notions in terms of the two realities seeming to be contradictory (V.39–42). These subtle qualms represent the specific factors to be relinquished during the vajralike samādhi and pertain to its focal object (the lack of entities), its dominant factor (the prajñā of mindfulness), and its aspect (all reference points and characteristics being at peace).

6) The serial training

As for the serial training in a general sense, it is a brief overview of the sequential nature of the entire path, emphasizing the progressive stabilization of momentary and culminating insights in terms of all the different aspects of the three knowledges. More specifically, it refers to being able to train in all these aspects together in a very swift sequential manner due to one's great familiarity with them.

The thirteen points of the serial training

This training is taught through (1)–(6) practicing the six pāramitās (VI.1a) in the manner of not observing the three spheres. This represents conduct (or the consummate training) in which merit is primary.

The six recollections (VI.1b) represent the path of the union of view and conduct (or the consummate way of thinking) and consist of recollecting the three jewels—(7) the Buddha (the aspects of the knowledge of all aspects), (8) virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral dharmas, and (9) the saṃgha of irreversible bodhisattvas; (10) ethics and (11) giving as the bases of the six pāramitās; and (12) taking the noble ones who appear as deities as one's witnesses on the path. The specific manner of familiarizing with all these recollections is to lack recollection and mental engagement.

(13) The training in realizing the nature of the lack of entity (VI.1c) represents the training in equality and the general view for all thirteen aspects of the serial training, which means to primarily familiarize with nonconceptual wisdom.

7) The instantaneous training

The instantaneous training, or the clear realization in a single instant, refers to a bodhisattva's simultaneous realization of all aspects of the three knowledges in the vajralike samādhi during the last moment of the tenth bhūmi, which is immediately followed by the attainment of buddhahood. This training is the natural culminating outflow of training (6), in particular due to having cultivated all the pāramitās in a sequential manner. In terms of its nature, the instantaneous training cannot be divided, but by way of its general characteristics, isolates, or distinct capacities, it is fourfold.

The four points of the instantaneous training

(1) The instantaneous training in terms of nonmaturation (VII.1–2) refers to being in the process of becoming free from the most subtle stains that are the impregnations of negative tendencies. This means that each uncontaminated phenomenon includes all other infinite uncontaminated phenomena.

Therefore, if a single one of them becomes free from these subtle stains, all uncontaminated phenomena will be free from them.

(2) The instantaneous training in terms of maturation (VII.3) refers to this very training being about to become buddha wisdom after being freed from the above impregnations. This means that, in a single instant, personally experienced wisdom dawns as the matured true nature of prajñāpāramitā, which overcomes even the most subtle stains. The inseparability of subject and object at this point represents the knowledge of all aspects.

(3) The instantaneous training in terms of the lack of characteristics (VII.4) means that, through dwelling in the insight that all phenomena arise in a dreamlike fashion, the knowledge of all aspects is manifested in one single instant of discovering the lack of characteristics of these dependently originating phenomena.

(4) The instantaneous training in terms of nonduality (VII.5) means that, upon awakening from sleeplike ignorance, phenomena are no longer seen as the duality of apprehender and apprehended. Thus, the true reality of the purity of nondual mind is seen in one single instant.

8) The dharmakāya

The last topic discusses the final fruition of the four trainings—buddhahood—as the three (or four) kāyas and their enlightened activity. The primary buddhakāya is the dharmakāya. In terms of its nature and purity, it is referred to as the svābhāvikakāya; in terms of its enjoyment of the dharma of the mahāyāna, as the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting in all kinds of pure and impure forms in various realms, as the nairmāṇikakāya.

The four points of the dharmakāya

(1) The svābhāvikakāya (VIII.1–11) refers to twofold purity—the dharmadhātu being primordially pure and also having become free from all adventitious stains. This includes the attainment of the twenty-one sets of uncontaminated qualities, which account for a buddha's all-pervading and permanent activity for the vast and inexhaustible welfare of all sentient beings.

(2) The sāmbhogikakāya (VIII.12–32) is always endowed with the five certainties in terms of body, realm, retinue, teaching the mahāyāna, and time. In the AA, it is described through the thirty-two major and the eighty minor marks, including their causes on the path.

(3) The nairmāṇikakāya (VIII.33) is of three types—(a) artistic nairmāṇikakāyas (great artists, scientists, healers, and so on); (b) incarnate nairmāṇikakāyas (any animate or inanimate manifestations by buddhas for the welfare of beings); and (c) supreme nairmāṇikakāyas who display the twelve deeds of a buddha (such as Buddha Śākyamuni). Though all these

manifestations of the nairmānikakāya arise and cease in great variety, the continuum of their common activity represents an uninterrupted stream for as long as saṃsāra lasts.

(4) The effortless and nonconceptual enlightened activity of buddhahood (VIII.34–40) depends on the dominant condition of the wisdom dharmakāya. In brief, it consists of the twenty-seven aspects of establishing beings in the support of the path, the path itself, and the fruition of this path.[173]

The last two verses of the AA respectively summarize the eight topics into six (taking the three knowledges as one point) and three (taking the three knowledges and the four trainings as one point, respectively).

In sum, the teachings on the three knowledges serve to cut through doubts about what is to be known and practiced, with the respectively higher ones among the three knowledges including the lower. They are taught in order to know what is to be made a living experience—that all entities (skandhas, dhātus, and āyanatas), paths, and aspects are unborn. The four trainings are the means to make the three knowledges a living experience, and the dharmakāya is taught as the outcome of these trainings.

In particular, the ten causes of the knowledge of all aspects in Chapter One are followed by the knowledge of the path since what bodhisattvas strive for through these ten causes depends on this second knowledge. The third knowledge, the knowledge of entities, is taught in order to recognize the concordant and discordant factors of the knowledge of the path. The complete training in all aspects represents the familiarization with all aspects of the three knowledges in order to clearly perceive them. The culminating training refers to familiarizing with them in such a way that they are clearly realized. The serial training is the familiarization in order to gain stability in this clear realization, and the instantaneous training means familiarization with all these aspects in a simultaneous way after having attained stability in their clear realization. The dharmakāya is the full and incontrovertible realization of all three knowledges. This represents the gradual order of topics (1)–(8), but each one of (1)–(6) also teaches the complete path in more or less great detail. Also, the commentaries usually say that the latter five topics are included in the first three.[174] Among the three knowledges, the knowledge of the path and the knowledge of entities are in turn included in the knowledge of all aspects. In this way, the first topic, which in itself already encompasses the entire teachings of the mahāyāna path, is of paramount importance and usually studied most thoroughly. In their briefest form, the three knowledges are contained in the AA's opening verse of homage to Prajñāpāramitā, which thus contains the subject matter of the entire text.

The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* as a text on paths and bhūmis

As can be seen from the above summary, though it is often said that the AA is *the* standard mahāyāna text on paths and bhūmis, it is definitely a far cry from a systematic or even linear presentation of these topics. To begin with, among the five paths, only the standard names of two (the paths of seeing and familiarization) are mentioned in the AA, while the names of the ten bhūmis do not appear at all. Many themes recur, with bits and pieces in one chapter and others in later chapters. Or the same topic appears repeatedly by being discussed from slightly different angles, as pertaining to a different stage of the path, or due to being directed to a different audience. For example, if one wants to know the entirety of what, respectively, makes up the paths of preparation, seeing, or familiarization, one has to search throughout several chapters of the AA for this information. Also, the first of the five paths—the path of accumulation—is mentioned for the first (and only) time in the middle of the fourth chapter (under the name "the factors conducive to liberation"), while all following paths have already been discussed several times in the preceding chapters. In general, the structure of the entire AA does not follow a refined and deliberate pedagogic format, but often represents an elliptical meandering through the inner mental landscape in which a bodhisattva's journey takes place.[175] However, since the AA was never intended as a systematic presentation of one particular topic, but as a summary of the entire content of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as they stand, the text's structure simply follows the course of these sūtras, which are a collection of discourses, mostly in the form of questions and answers, on the same or differing subjects for varying audiences, resembling a travel guide who explains to sightseers the attractions along the way in varying styles to different people at different times. Thus, neither the sūtras nor the AA represent anything close to a strictly linear progression starting from a beginner up through buddhahood, nor a systematic presentation of paths and bhūmis in general.

As for matching the text of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras with the topics and points of the AA, the standard map in terms of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*—which is basically followed by all later commentators—is laid out in detail in Āryavimuktisena's commentary. Both CE and TOK[176] say that, in general, the knowledge of all aspects is taught in the chapter of Subhūti; the knowledge of the path in the chapter of the purity of the two extremes; the knowledge of all entities in the chapter of special conduct; the full realization of all aspects in the chapter of suchness; the culminating clear realization in the chapter of completely pure training; the serial clear realization in the chapter of serial engagement; the clear realization in a single instant in the chapter of the full completion of training; and the dharmakāya

in the chapter of the fruition of training. In more detail, Conze relates these eight topics to all the chapters of the sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, eighteen thousand, and eight thousand lines.[177]

Despite such attempts at matching the prajñāpāramitā sūtras with the AA, the term "hidden meaning" for the latter's contents is only all too fitting since the sūtras themselves just give a clue here and there as to what happens on the path. Consequently, more often than not, the specific matchings of certain points in the AA with certain passages in the sūtras are far from obvious. Thus, what the AA and its commentaries do is to organize the scanty and scattered information in the sūtras into an extremely complex and intricate layout of all the *implied* practices and stages of the path of realizing emptiness. Also, the progression and the various stations on this journey that are presented and reviewed within varying frameworks in each chapter at first seem repetitive. However, given a second look, they may open up concealed perspectives of various stages of no-clinging, in which the play of undoing the web of conceptual complexities and reference points is performed in all its facets. For example, JNS refers to Ngog Lotsāwa as saying that there is no actual repetition of the three paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization in the first six chapters of the AA since the functions, focal objects, and aspects of these three paths are infinite and can thus be described in the form of many distinctive features. In addition, merely the repetition of certain words does not amount to redundancy if the meaning is not repeated too.[178]

Nevertheless, with the AA itself being for the most part nothing but a list of technical terms with hardly any further explanations, it is absolutely unintelligible when read on its own. Therefore, Maitreya's masterful and admirable condensation of the entire contents of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras of about 13,600 pages (Derge *Kangyur*) into only 274 verses in twelve pages is clearly intended for well-versed scholars with an intimate knowledge of the vastness of these sūtras and for realized beings. For everybody else, it requires a huge amount of commentary and must be read together with the corresponding sections in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras.[179] In the traditional commentaries on the AA, sometimes a single or a handful of words in the AA is taken to refer to many pages in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras; sometimes a single or a handful of words in the sūtras is considered to take up considerable space in the AA; and sometimes certain words or phrases in the AA are not found in the sūtras at all, but are still matched with certain passages.[180] In both India and Tibet, the combined efforts of many commentators on the AA have resulted in the largest and most complex corpus of commentarial literature on a single genre in the entire Buddhist exegetical world. Somewhat ironically, the size of this literature surpasses even the prajñāpāramitā sūtras themselves (which are not exactly known for their conciseness), and it proliferates further into many volumes of supplementary elaborations on more or less directly related

topics. In other words, the AA resembles an extremely compressed zip file of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (less than one thousandth of their entire contents) that can only be read when extracted through its commentaries. Or the AA may be considered as the isolated DNA of Prajñāpāramitā, from which the beauty of her entire body with all its limbs and physical expressions can only be brought to life in the laboratory of further sophisticated hermeneutics.

The Indian commentaries on the AA

Given this need to provide further explanations on the AA, there were many Indian commentaries, several of which were transmitted to Tibet.[181] The Tibetan tradition exhibits various ways to classify them, but the most common way is to follow what the table of contents of the *Tengyur* says about distinguishing between those commentaries on the AA that explictly establish its correlations to the pertinent passages in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and those that do not.[182]

I. The twelve commentaries that correlate the AA to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras:

a) one correlated to the sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eighteen thousand lines

Smṛtijñānakīrti's (tenth century) *Aṣṭasamānārthaśāsana*[183]

b) one correlated to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in One Hundred Thousand Lines*

Dharmaśrī's (eleventh century) *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa*[184]

c) four correlated to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*

Āryavimuktisena's (sixth century) *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti*[185]
Bhadanta Vimuktisena's (sixth/seventh century) *Abhisamayālaṃkāravārttika* [186]
Haribhadra's (mid-eighth/early ninth century)[187] revised edition of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*[188]
Ratnākaraśānti's (early eleventh century) *Śuddhamatī*[189]

d) three correlated to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Eight Thousand Lines*

Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā*[190]
Ratnākaraśānti's *Aṣṭāsāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāpañjikāsārottamānāma*[191]
Abhayākaragupta's (eleventh/twelfth century) *Marmakaumudī*[192]

e) three correlated to the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*
Haribhadra's *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikāsubodhinīnāma*[193]
Buddhaśrījñāna's (eighth/ninth century) *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā*[194]
Dharmaśrī's *Prajñāpāramitākośatāla*[195]

II. The nine commentaries that do not establish any correlations between the AA and the prajñāpāramitā sūtras:
Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārānāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravivṛti*[196]
- its subcommentary *Durbodhālokā* by Dharmakīrtiśrī[197] (tenth/eleventh century) from Suvarṇadvīpa
- its subcommentary *Prasphuṭapadā* by Dharmamitra[198] (eighth/ninth century)
- its subcommentary *Kīrtikalā*[199] by Ratnakīrti (eleventh century)
- its subcommentary *Prajñāpradīpāvalī*[200] by Buddhaśrījñāna (twelfth/thirteenth century)
- its summary *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* by Kumāraśrībhadra[201]
- its summary *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttipiṇḍārtha* by Prajñākaramati[202] (late tenth century)

Atiśa's (982–1054) *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa*[203]
Abhayākaragupta's *Munimatālaṃkāra*[204]

As noted, from among these twenty-one texts, some are not even commentaries on the AA, some are just brief summaries, and some only consist of copies, extracts, or summaries of other commentaries. Thus, if we set aside the revised edition of the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines; the *Munimatālaṃkāra*; Bhadanta Vimuktisena's commentary (basically identical to Āryavimuktisena's); Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* (for the most part consisting of extracts from his *Ālokā*); the four very brief texts that are just summaries of the AA or Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*; and the three commentaries of dubitable Indian origin, we are left with only ten actual and undisputed Indian commentaries on the AA that are preserved in the Tibetan canon.

Among all the above commentaries, the Tibetan tradition considers the main ones to be Āryavimuktisena's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti*, Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* (which incorporates significant portions of Āryavimuktisena's commentary), and, in particular, the latter's abbreviated version, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāravivṛti*.[205] As the above list of commentaries shows, more than half of them (eleven) were either composed by Haribhadra himself (four) or, more or less closely, follow his works. This highlights the fact that, in both India and Tibet—with a few rather strong-voiced exceptions, such as Ratnākaraśānti, Ratnakīrti, Abhayākaragupta, and Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen[206] (1292–1361)—most authors considered Haribhadra as the

primary authority on the prajñāpāramitā teachings and the AA. Haribhadra was a student of Śāntarakṣita and had also studied all prior commentaries on the AA with his other teacher, Vairocanabhadra,[207] for seventeen years. However, seeing that these commentaries did not explain everything in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and moreover contradicted each other, he became depressed and supplicated Maitreya himself for guidance. Upon having received direct clarifications from Maitreya in a vision, Haribhadra composed his own commentaries in accordance with these teachings. Eventually, Haribhadra's commentaries came to be regarded by many as the most authentic exegesis of the AA, which is also demonstrated by the fact he is the only commentator to whose works several subsequent Indian masters dedicated subcommentaries or summaries. Later, in the Tibetan tradition, Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* rose to being the almost exclusive focus of further commentarial attention. The reasons for this are the above report about Maitreya directly teaching Haribhadra and also giving a prophecy that the latter would compose the *Vivṛti*, which summarizes and surpasses all other commentaries; its alleged relationship with all three main prajñāpāramitā sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines; and—last but not least—its relative brevity.

The Tibetan commentaries on the AA

As outlined above, though the prajñāpāramitā sūtras were transmitted to and studied in Tibet since the late eighth century, the study of the AA and its Indian commentaries only started in the late tenth century with the translator Rinchen Sangpo (957–1055). The first known Tibetan works on the AA are Ngog Lotsāwa's (1059–1109) above-mentioned commentaries and summaries. His disciples Trolungba Lodrö Jungné and Dré Sherab Bar, as well as the latter's student Ar Jangchub Yeshé, also wrote commentaries on the AA. Dré and Ar collected all the prajñāpāramitā transmissions existing at the time in Tibet, with the resulting lineage becoming the primary source for all subsequent commentaries on the AA. At first, such exegetical activity took place mainly at the Kadampa monastic college of Sangpu, with many of its scholars, such as Chaba Chökyi Sengé (1109–1169) and Nyalshig Jambel Dorje (c. 1160–1220), composing materials on the AA. Chaba, who had studied with Trolungpa, developed an exegetical approach to the AA separate from the above main lineage, while Nyalshig's commentary represents a synthesis of the two traditions. Thus, Nyalshig figures in both transmission lineages and his lasting influence is evident from many subsequent commentaries (such as LN, JNS, LSSP, and the ones by Śākya Chogden and Nyaön Kunga Bal) employing the templates found in his work. Via Butön (1290–1364), who wrote the famous LN, and

his students, this transmisson reached the Sakya master Yagtön (1348–1414), who composed a large, intermediate, and short commentary on the AA. Both he and his student Rongtön Sheja Künrig (1367–1449), who wrote nine texts on the AA, are still greatly renowned for their expertise in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA. In the Kagyü and Nyingma Schools, the commentarial transmissions of the AA pass through Rongtön.

In terms of the other major schools of Tibetan Buddhism besides the early Kadampa School (whose exegesis of the AA started, of course, with Ngog Lotsāwa), the indigenous exegesis of the AA in the Sakya School clearly began with YT and RT. The mainstream of this tradition culminated in Gorampa Sönam Senge's[208] (1429–1489) work, while Śākya Chogden's several massive commentaries did not enjoy great acclaim.[209] The Kagyü School's indigenous commentaries start with the Third Karmapa's brief STT and culminate in the Eighth Karmapa's standard work, JNS, followed by CE, BT, and PK. As for the Nyingma School, without considering the claim in at least some parts of this tradition that LSSP was actually authored by Longchen Rabjampa, the first known original commentaries on the AA are a word commentary and a discussion of the text's general topics by Mindrol Pema Gyurmé Gyatso[210] (1686–1718). Both texts are based on the commentaries by Āryavimuktisena, Haribhadra, and sometimes Rongtön, but also sometimes present "our own tradition." Besides Dza Patrul Orgyen Jigme Chökyi Wangpo's[211] (1808–1887) PSD and PBG (which are almost exclusively excerpts from LSSP), there are Mipham Rinpoche's (1846–1912) MCG and Khenpo Shenga's[212] (1871–1921) annotational commentary on the *Vivṛti*, a brief commentary by Pöba Tulku Dongag Tenpé Nyima[213] (1895/1900–1959), and a number of shorter synopses of the AA.[214] The Gelugpa commentaries naturally start with LSSP, but most subsequent commentators usually disagree with Tsongkhapa on the points where he follows "the earlier Tibetans." Generally, in this school, the AA commentaries by Tsongkhapa's two main disciples, Gyaltsab Darma Rinchen[215] (1364–1432) and Kédrub Geleg Balsangpo[216] (1385–1438), as well as Sera Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen's (1469–1546) and the first Jamyang Shéba's[217] (1648–1721/1722) extensive works on the AA are taken as authoritative. The Jonang School's distinct exegetical tradition starts, of course, with Dölpopa and (to a lesser degree) his student Nyaön, on which all later commentaries are based.

Thus, throughout many centuries, an overwhelming number of Tibetan commentaries on the AA were written. For example, the preface of the Sarnath edition of LN provides a list of 228 such commentaries. However, even this long list is obviously not comprehensive since it at least misses all but one of Trolungpa Lodrö Jungné's commentaries; two of Dölpopa's four commentaries; several of Rongtön's works; a number of Kagyü commentaries,

such as the ones by the Seventh Karmapa, Chötra Gyatso[218] (1454–1506), the Fifth Shamarpa, Göncho Yenla[219] (1525–1583), and the First Karma Trinlépa, Choglé Namgyal[220] (1456–1539); the above-mentioned two commentaries by Nyalshig and Pema Gyurmé Gyatso; the two massive commentaries by the Jonang master Banda Tubden Geleg Gyatso[221] (1844–1904); and Mipham Rinpoche's MCG.[222] From among all these commentaries, the most widely accepted and used ones in the Tibetan tradition are the summary by Ngog Lotsāwa, LN, YT, RT, and LSSP.[223]

Starting with Bhadanta Vimuktisena's commentary and Haribhadra's *Ālokā* incorporating significant portions of Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*, and both Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and *Vivṛti* being incorporated in the *Vivṛti*'s subcommentaries and other later Indian commentaries, from the very beginning the commentarial literature on the AA exhibited a tendency of each subsequent writer incorporating the works of his predecessors. This tendency of building on previous materials and constantly adding new layers of explanation, thus ever increasing in dimension, became even more obvious in Tibet, with its hundreds of bulky commentaries, general explanations, and supplementary topics related to the AA creating a massive exegetical edifice. In many cases, the scope and detail of the explanations go far beyond the actual topics at hand and virtually end up being encyclopedias of both hīnayāna and mahāyāna Buddhism in general.

The Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the AA used in the present study

Indian commentaries

Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti

Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* (198 folios) is the oldest preserved commentary on the AA and the first one to systematically establish the correlations between certain passages in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* and the seventy points of the AA, which are basically followed by all later commentators to the present day. Large parts of the *Vṛtti* consist of plain quotes from that sūtra, but Āryavimuktisena also interweaves many sūtra passages with his own comments. Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* (and almost everybody after him) identifies Āryavimuktisena as a Mādhyamika and he indeed speaks consistently of emptiness, twofold identitylessness, and the all-pervasiveness of the lack of nature of all phenomena, including the path and its fruition (which is hardly surprising, given the sūtras he comments on). He also describes the disposition as the dharmadhātu in the sense of the nature of all phenomena (without any connotation of it being particularly mind's

true nature). However, the colophon of the *Vṛtti* and its commentarial style betray Āryavimuktisena as an author within the wider scope of the general mahāyāna who is at the same time placed squarely in the traditional monastic community of one of the early Buddhist *nikāya* sects. This is evident from his great reliance on the classical abhidharma (he very frequently quotes and relies on the *Abhidharmakośa*) as well as his free use of typical Yogācāra terms and formats in terms of nondual nonconceptual wisdom, the three natures, the eight consciousnesses, and the four wisdoms (such as mirror-like wisdom). On the other hand, he occasionally criticizes certain positions ascribed to Yogācāra (though usually not mentioning any names), such as an ultimately existent substrate of mind. Also, in his comments on generating bodhicitta, he gives detailed explanations of the meditation on the body's repulsiveness; avoiding the deviousness of monastic impostors; and the various realms of gods in the desire and form realms, which are very uncommon within this context. Different from Haribhadra's commentaries, the *Vṛtti* is free from any systematic teachings on valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) that are so typical for later mahāyāna—and in particular Madhyamaka—commentaries after Dharmakīrti.

Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā

The *Ālokā* (341 folios) is Haribhadra's largest AA commentary and the first one ever to correlate this text to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Eight Thousand Lines* (given that the AA is primarily based on the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines, these correlations are naturally often anything but obvious). The thirty-two chapters of the *Ālokā* explain the sūtra in eight thousand lines, word by word, from beginning to end, thus matching the number of chapters in this sūtra. However, the *Ālokā's* actual structure is clearly determined through the eight topics and the seventy points of the AA. Haribhadra's commentary often incorporates passages from Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*, but generally elaborates on them and also provides much more detailed explanations on the specific themes of the AA. Also, though the *Ālokā* occasionally quotes the *Abhidharmakośa*, it clearly prefers the explanations in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and introduces new themes from the later mahāyāna tradition (in particular, the teachings on valid cognition), thus often asserting positions quite different from Āryavimuktisena's. The overall gist of the *Ālokā* is that all paths and bhūmis as well as the factors to be relinquished and the remedies for them are just events of dependent origination on the level of seeming reality, while, ultimately, all of them are empty of any nature of their own. Thus, Haribhadra even speaks of "the actual prajñāpāramitā being the illusionlike nondual wisdom of a buddha." Also the disposition is said to belong to the level of seeming reality alone, being the dharmadhātu in the sense of the bodhisattva as the foundation of the buddha qualities.

Abhisamayālaṃkāravivṛti

Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* (62 folios) basically consists of excerpts from the *Ālokā* (lacking, however, any quotes from any prajñāpāramitā sūtras). In the Tibetan tradition, obviously by virtue of Haribhadra's by then largely undisputed supreme authority with regard to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA as well as the *Vivṛti's* brevity, it came to be the primary source upon which virtually all other commentaries rely. However, despite its prestigious status in Tibetan monastic education, it is the *Vivṛti's* very brevity—not to say terseness and sometimes even obscurity (comparatively, the *Ālokā* is definitely more rewarding to read)—that usually prevents its being read on its own. It is typically only accessed through the lens of later Tibetan commentaries, almost all of which incorporate the *Vivṛti*, but invariably embed it into much more extensive comments on the words of the AA and provide further supplementary explanations.

In addition to these three main Indian commentaries, I occasionally consulted Ratnākāraśānti's *Sārottamā*, Abhayākaragupta's *Marmakaumudī*, Atiśa's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa*, and Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.

Tibetan commentaries

Kagyü commentaries

JNS

As for the Tibetan materials on the AA, the bedrock of the Kagyü commentaries is undoubtedly the Eighth Karmapa's massive *The Noble One's Resting at Ease* (568 folios), which was composed within about a year between 1529 and 1531.[224] Its full title is *The Foundation Endowed with the Scriptures of Prajñāpāramitā That Are the Ambrosial Quintessence of All Dharmas, The Towering Tree Extending into the Land of Plenty Where the Noble [Maitreya] Is Most Delightfully Resting at Ease*. The text consists of four layers—(1) the connections between the AA and the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*; (2) the general topics; (3) Mikyö Dorje's own commentary on the verses of the AA; and (4) Mikyö Dorje's subcommentary on Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*.

JNS explicitly and repeatedly says that both Maitreya's and Nāgārjuna's systems are Madhyamaka[225] and that, in commenting on the texts by Maitreya, one must follow Asaṅga and Vasubandhu,[226] who are also (Great) Mādhyamikas and definitely not so-called "Mere Mentalists."[227] Furthermore, the Karmapa explains that, for those who do not just have faith in prajñāpāramitā, but gain certainty through reasoning, the valid cognition of fully realizing what the AA describes in detail—the three knowledges

being unborn—depends on three steps, which are based on the systems of the *Svātantrika and Yogācāra masters. The first two of these steps pertain to reasoning and the last one to direct realization in meditative equipoise.[228]

JNS's strong reliance on Yogācāra scriptures as well as the *Abhidharmakośa* is evident in many of its general topics and, in particular, through the numbers of quotes from the following texts:

Abhidharmakośa 144 times (its *Bhāṣya*, 12 times)
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra 104
Uttaratantra 35
Pramāṇavārttika 35
Madhyāntavibhāga 28 (Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya*, 6)
Abhidharmasamuccaya 23 (its commentaries, 7)
Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī 23
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17
Bodhicaryāvatāra 12
Pramāṇaviniścaya 11
Yogācārabhūmi (including *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Śrāvakabhūmi*) 9
Madhyamakāvatāra 8
Bṛhaṭṭīkā 7
Hevajratantra 6
Satyadvayavibhāga 4
Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 4
Ratnāvalī 4
Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā 4
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga 3 (Vasubandhu's *Vṛtti*, 2)
Mahāyānasaṃgraha 3 (Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya*, 1)
Vyākhyāyukti 3
Dharmadhātustava 2

In general, many of the commentarial templates in JNS (and thus CE) are clearly identifiable in LN, YT, LSSP (PSD), and BT (however, to trace all of them in terms of where they appeared first would be a huge project of its own). JNS's own comments on the AA end many times with "I presented what was said" (*zhes bya ba gsungs te zhes bkod do*), which indicates that JNS draws on older materials in other AA commentaries. Sometimes, these comments correspond almost verbatim to passages in BT, which is not surprising since the latter's author taught the AA to the Eighth Karmapa. JNS also refers to and quotes the Third and Seventh Karmapas several times (obviously mainly based on their writings on the AA; the former's *Profound Inner Reality*, its autocommentary, and related texts; and the latter's *Ocean of Texts on Reasoning*). On the other hand, Mikyö Dorje sometimes says explicitly that he commented on the AA as he saw fit and, at times, gives very unique

explanations (such as connecting certain passages of the AA to *shentong* and Mahāmudrā) that greatly differ from the mainstream exegetical templates.

Another significant feature of JNS (and Mikyö Dorje's great sūtrayāna commentaries in general) is that it often switches into lengthy discussions in formal Tibetan debate style, using a lot of absurd consequences. It is obvious that Mikyö Dorje went to considerable pains to employ the language and technique of debate used by his opponents (often from the Gelugpa School)—in good *Prāsaṅgika style he flings their own approach back at them so as to refute their positions. However, JNS also contains many topics and elaborations that are related to meditative techniques, experiences, and realizations, even quoting from the dohās of great Indian and Tibetan yogins.

Unlike the other Kagyü commentaries on the AA, which do not mention the terms *rangtong* and *shentong* at all (CE and SLG each do so just once in passing),[229] JNS uses these terms a number of times and the Tibetan tradition usually says that JNS is a commentary on the AA from the *Shentong* perspective. However, this can only be said to be a huge overstatement when one looks at when and how the text actually employs and/or explains the term *shentong*. The first occurrence of this term in JNS is only on page 184 (*rangtong* on page 177) and Mikyö Dorje's own comments on the AA use the term *shentong* only six times in the very limited context of three (!) among the about 1200 subpoints of the entire AA (lines II.12ac, 13a, and 27b), while his subcommentary on the *Vivṛti* uses it three times in the context of two subpoints (both times equating it with Mahāmudrā).[230] Throughout the remainder of JNS, apart from the term's frequent use in a single general topic (thirty-nine times in the equipment of wisdom; Appendix I1G),[231] it appears once in the topic of the three natures (Appendix I3C); four times at the beginning of the topic on emptiness and the sugata heart as existing functional entities; once in the topic of buddhahood and enlightened activity (both Appendix I4F); once in the topic of enlightenment (Appendix I5B); and five times as a school/system elsewhere.

As for the corresponding term *rangtong*, Mikyö Dorje's own comments on the AA use it only twice on a single subpoint in AA I.29cd, while his subcommentary on the *Vivṛti* employs it five times in the context of two subpoints.[232] Throughout the remainder of JNS, apart from the term's rather frequent use in the general topic of the equipment of wisdom, it appears once in the elaboration on nondual wisdom following AA V.21 (Appendix I1G); once in the topic of buddhahood and enlightened activity (Appendix I4F); once in the topic of enlightenment (Appendix I5B); once in the elaboration on the sixteen qualms about emptiness in AA V.40–42 (Appendix I1C); and three times as a school/system elsewhere.

In sum, JNS employs the term *shentong* (and its counterpart *rangtong*) consistently only in a single limited topic, while it is barely mentioned at all

when directly commenting on the AA. Therefore, it can hardly be said that JNS generally comments on the AA from a *Shentong* point of view. Moreover, most of JNS's direct glosses and explanations of the AA read like pure classic Madhyamaka, clearly being—often mind-boggling—approaches to eliminate all possible ways of holding on to anything (such as negating something and then also negating that negation). In this way, the Eighth Karmapa primarily treats the AA exactly as what it is—a digest of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras with their relentless and thoroughgoing attacks on any kind of reification. In this vein, Jamyang Chökyi Gyaltsen[233] (born nineteenth century) concludes his aspiration on the occasion of having finished overseeing the new blockprints of Mikyö Dorje's works being carved at the Kagyü seat of Palpung as follows:

> It is indeed well-known by everybody that this extensive commentary by the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, comments according to *Shentong* Madhyamaka. From the perspective of affirmation, it is *also* suitable [to put it] this way. However, from the perspective of negation, [his commentary] is to be taken as not only not contradictory with *rangtong*, but also as something that accords with it in that it comes down to the same essential point of the view—it is composed in the manner of Haribhadra's commentarial explanations that are well-known to everybody.[234]

The introduction to a contemporary edition of JNS by Khenpo Kyotra Tamchö Dawa[235] states:

> *The Noble One's Resting at Ease* is a marvelous treatise that clearly differentiates the eight topics and seventy points in terms of their general topics and the meaning of the text [of the AA], [throughout providing] the connections [to the sūtras], [its own commentary on] the root text, a [sub]commentary [on the *Vivṛti*], and contextual elaborations and critical analyses [of certain topics], without mixing any of these. [Karmapa Mikyö Dorje] does not just follow what others say, but comments through his own power on the intention of the root text as being *Prāsaṅgika-Shentong-Great Madhyamaka. [His] is an excellent text that understands the intentions of the middle and final wheels [of dharma] as being without contradiction and representing the same essential point.[236]

The classificatory term "*Prāsaṅgika-Shentong-Great Madhyamaka" appears to be unheard of and may even seem outrageous in the context of typical Tibetan doxographical boundary lines (in which *Prāsaṅgika and *Shentong*

are usually considered as antithetical). However, in light of JNS's treatment of the AA and its related topics as described above, such a term actually characterizes the major elements of the Eighth Karmapa's approach correctly. Also, as mentioned above, the introduction to Dongag Tenpé Nyima's commentary on the AA[237] by the contemporary Nyingma Khenpo Rigdzin says that Mikyö Dorje commented on the AA in the manner of *Prāsaṅgika.

In his words of aspiration for the Nitartha *international* reprint of JNS,[238] the contemporary Kagyü and Nyingma master Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche pays homage to JNS's author, Mikyö Dorje, as the one who teaches the definitive meaning of the excellent explanations of the victor and his spiritual heirs as explained by Asaṅga, who in turn was prophesied by the Buddha as the one who unmistakenly distinguishes the essential points of the Buddha's intentions in terms of the expedient and the definitive meanings. In an oral communication, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche further commented on the commentarial approach of JNS as follows. It is based on the Seventh Karmapa's approach of the two major mahāyāna traditions of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga as having the same single intention. Thus, JNS's style of explanation accords with both *Rangtong* and *Shentong*. Though it is said in the tradition that the Eighth Karmapa's own commentary on the AA represents *Shentong* and his subcommentary corresponds to *Rangtong*, this distinction clearly does not apply in general or throughout (as is also shown above by the number of occurrences of the term *shentong*). In addition, when the Karmapa explains *Shentong*, it sounds very often like *Rangtong*—generally speaking, JNS greatly accords with Madhyamaka and, of course, prajñāpāramitā, since its brand of *Shentong* is "the other-emptiness of the [dharma]dhātu" as opposed to "the other-emptiness of luminosity."[239]

Mainly in its general topics, JNS further connects the prajñāpāramitā teachings and the AA with Mahāmudrā, the perfect nature, mind's luminosity, and various terms for buddha nature (such as sugata heart and tathāgata heart), all of which are frequently used. In the general topic on the disposition, JNS also employs the term "ālaya-wisdom" several times (for details on all this, see below under "Some remarks on the distinct commentarial approaches of the commentaries by the Eighth Karmapa and the Fifth Shamarpa").

CE

The Fifth Shamarpa's *Concise Elucidation of the* Abhisamayālaṃkāra (122 folios) was written in 1547. As it is translated in its entirety in Volumes One and Two of this study, it represents the second main Kagyü source besides JNS. As CE's colophon says, it is written as a brief version of JNS for those who "fail to understand the guru's vast and profound excellent explanations." The text indeed represents an excellent digest of JNS, incorporating many

of the latter's essential points from its commentary on the AA, its subcommentary on Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*, and its general topics. However, many of CE's mostly brief general topics are rather cryptic without their full context as found in JNS (one basically needs to have read JNS in order to understand what CE is talking about). In addition, CE manages to add further valuable information that is not found in JNS.

CE does not contain very many quotes, but, similar to JNS, the strong Yogācāra and abhidharma background is very obvious:

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra 9 times
Uttaratantra 6
Abhidharmasamuccaya 4
Abhidharmakośa 2
Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī 2
Dharmadhātustava 2
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 2
Ratnāvalī 2
Bodhicittavivaraṇa 2
Madhyamakāvatāra 2

CE mentions the term *shentong* only once (fol. 2a), saying that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu comment on the AA from a *Shentong* Madhyamaka perspective. The term *rangtong* is found twice, stating that Āryavimuktisena comments on the AA from a *Rangtong* Madhyamaka perspective (fol. 2b) and in the context of explaining verse 28 of the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* from the perspective of *Rangtong* Madhyamaka (that is, *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika). Unlike JNS, CE does not mention Mahāmudrā, but also refers to the sugata heart or tathāgata heart (twelve times); ālaya-wisdom (twelve times); the perfect nature (eleven times); and mind's luminosity (seven times). Since CE uses all these terms in the same ways as JNS, see below for details ("Some remarks on the distinct commentarial approaches of the commentaries by the Eighth Karmapa and the Fifth Shamarpa"). As for Haribhadra's doxographical affiliation, CE only says that his commentaries on the AA and the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā* are in accord with Great Madhyamaka without explaining this any further (fol. 2b).

JG

The Seventh Karmapa's *Lamp of the Three Worlds* (160 folios), which is based on the *Vivṛti*, is only preserved up through AA I.22. As evidenced by references to some of its later parts in JNS, it must have been a complete commentary on the AA. The bulk of this text consists of detailed general explanations on a variety of AA-related topics, such as the three turnings of the wheel of dharma, their expedient and definitive meanings, the two

realities, the three yānas, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and their Indian commentaries (the text lists all these sūtras and commentaries with their authors and translators), the five Madhyamaka reasonings, the generation of bodhicitta, and the nature of the instructions (the actual commentary on AA I.1–2 starts only on p. 208). Historically, JG represents the first known, though incomplete, actual commentary on the AA in the Kagyü tradition. Pawo Rinpoche Tsugla Trengwa's[240] (1504–1566) *History of the Dharma*[241] says that the Seventh Karmapa composed his JG based on Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*. In it, he ascertains all difficult points of the entire sūtra collection in his general topics and presents the well-known division of the three turnings of the wheel of dharma as follows. (1) For the śrāvakas, it was the wheel of dharma on the four realities of the noble ones that was turned three times. (2) According to the intention of the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*, the three turnings consist of the gradual teachings in order to clean the stains of a single person in a threefold progression in terms of coarse and subtle. (3) According to the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, the three turnings are teachings for three different types of disciples to be guided. In general, Pawo Rinpoche says, the Karmapa holds that the final intention in terms of the turnings of the wheel of dharma is that they were taught simultaneously, which is the best explanation. Pawo Rinpoche concludes:

> Though [the Seventh Karmapa] primarily commented on the view of the two [systems of] valid cognition and prajñāpāramitā as being *Shentong*, this does not mean that he commented in accordance with the assertions of some Tibetans who label the Mere Mentalist view with the name *Shentong*. In general, this lord asserted that the two systems of the trailblazers [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga] have a single intention because the lineage of profound view primarily teaches the basic character of mind to be emptiness and the lineage of vast activity primarily teaches [mind's] natural luminosity, with the profundity and lucidity of mind not being separable into two.

JG says that the AA comments on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as being Madhyamaka and that Haribhadra, by following Āryavimuktisena, in turn comments on the AA as being Madhyamaka.[242] As far as JG's discussion of the topics of the AA goes, it contains a significant amount of information that is found in neither JNS nor CE. With CE also providing additional materials not found in JNS, the three commentaries supplement each other well. For excerpts from JG, see Appendices I1A–B and the notes on CE.

STT and SC

The Third Karmapa's brief *Synopsis of the Eight Chapters of Prajñāpāramitā* (STT; 59 pages; translated in Appendix III in Volume Two) is not an actual commentary on the words of the AA, but gives an overview of the scope and the structure of the entire AA through defining and explaining its eight topics and seventy points in a general way (JG, JNS, and CE only define the eight topics). STT's explanations often differ from JNS, CE, and other commentaries. Since Rangjung Dorje studied prajñāpāramitā and the AA in the tradition of Nyalshig, this may reflect the latter's influence. The same author's *Illuminating Lamp* (SC; 88 pages) consists of the verses of the AA with inserted topical headings and subdivisions.

BT

As its full name suggests, Karma Trinlépa's *Argumentative Commentary* (112 folios) is based on JG and, as its colophon adds, also on the Third Karmapa's STT and SC. The text couches its comments on the words of the AA in the typical Tibetan debate format (subject, predicate, and reason). It provides only very few and brief general topics and supplementary explanations, but gives no definitions of the eight topics and seventy points of the AA. As mentioned above, certain parts of BT are incorporated in JNS.

PK and SLG

Like most other Tibetan commentaries, Padma Karpo's[243] (1527–1596) *The Words of Venerable Maitreya* (PK; 170 folios) is primarily based on the *Vivṛti* and the *Ālokā*, but also often relies on Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, while only rarely referring to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. PK focuses mainly on glossing the verses of the AA and its general topics are mostly brief and not always easy to understand. The same author's short *Door to Enter the Prajñāpāramitā Scriptures* (SLG; 39 folios), primarily relying on Ngog Lotsāwa and also on the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, provides the definitions and divisions of the eight topics and most of the seventy points of the AA, occasionally adding some brief further explanations.

In addition, there are two texts by the contemporary Kagyü master Thrangu Rinpoche. His *Commentary on Prajñāpāramitā* (*Sher phyin gyi 'grel pa*; 78 pages) is a compilation of the parts of JNS that comment directly on the verses of the AA, supplemented with a brief introduction on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and their spread in Tibet, which basically consists of excerpts from TOK.[244] The same author's *The Ornament of Clear Realization* presents his oral explanations on the major themes of the AA in a general way, without going through the text's verses word by word or referring to any of its technical details.

Last, but not least, there is the general presentation of the paths, bhūmis, and fruitions of the causal yāna of characteristics in Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's[245] (1813–1899) TOK (translated in Appendix VI in Volume Two).[246] It largely follows the standard explanations of these topics primarily from a mahāyāna point of view.

It is noteworthy that all the above Kagyü commentaries on the AA, despite exhibiting a certain amount of common templates mainly based on the *Vivṛti*, often show significant differences. This is also highlighted by their definitions of the eight topics and the seventy points (only STT and SLG contain the latter) differing, often greatly, while showing hardly any overlaps.

Sakya commentaries

Among the Sakya commentaries on the AA, I mainly relied on YT and NSML. The former (687 pages), called *Mountain of Mighty Wish-fulfilling Jewels*, was written by the widely acknowledged authority on the AA, Yagtön Sangyé Bal, and is one of the early classics of Tibetan AA commentaries. Like BT, it is written mostly in Tibetan debate style, but also provides many additional explanations.

The Mirror That Illuminates the Essence of the Words and Their Meaning (NSML; 337 folios) is a commentary by the twentieth-century Sakya master Ngawang Kunga Wangchug (b. 1921), a student of the famous Jamyang Chökyi Lodrö[247] (1893–1959) and teacher at the monastic college of the latter's Dzongsar Monastery. NSML's very clear explanations incorporate the text of the *Vivṛti*, but usually elaborate substantially on it. Its colophon says that, among Tibetan commentaries, it relies mainly on Gorampa's work and also on RT, YT, MCG, and Khenpo Shenga's brief annotational commentary on the *Vivṛti*, thus primarily presenting the Sakya view on the AA.

Rongtön Shéja Künrig's *Illumination of the Words and Their Meaning* (RT; 150 folios) does not venture into detailed topical elaborations, but, as D. Jackson says, Rongtön's "exegesis was the culmination of three centuries of intensive studies by scholars of the Gsang-phu Ne'u-thog and allied traditions, and it stands in the mainstream of Tibetan exegesis of this work."[248]

Nyingma commentaries


The Nyingma materials on the AA are presented separately in the third volume (for details on them, see there and the bibliography in Volume Two), but the first two volumes also contain excerpts from both Patrul Rinpoche's *General Topics* (PSD; 461 pages) and *Word Commentary* (PBG; 164 pages). Both texts consist almost exclusively of excerpts, often abbreviated, from LSSP (which also greatly informs Patrul Rinpoche's other AA-related texts). PSD and PBG often summarize or omit parts of LSSP's detailed general topics

and supplementary issues (which together comprise about forty percent of LSSP). As mentioned before, at least certain parts of the Nyingma School hold that LSSP was actually composed by Longchen Rabjampa, which means that Patrul Rinpoche's two texts are considered as nothing but an authentic continuation of the indigenous Nyingma commentarial tradition on the AA. However, no matter who the actual author of LSSP is, it can only be repeated that the text greatly relies on many exegetical templates for the AA that were in place even before Longchenpa and Tsongkhapa and definitely did not originate in either the Nyingma or the Gelug tradition.

Other commentaries

In addition, I consulted Butön's thorough *Ears of Scripture* (LN; 880 pages; 363 folios in the Lha sa gzhol gsar edition) and Tsongkhapa's massive *Golden Garland of Excellent Explanations* (LSSP; 670 folios), which was finished in 1392. Both seem to mark overviews of, and fresh looks at, the Tibetan commentarial tradition up to their respective times. Butön says that, unlike many previous Tibetan commentaries that are either too short, too wordy and/or self-styled (that is, not in accord with the Indian commentaries), his work relies on numerous Indian commentaries, the abhidharma teachings, dialectics, and grammar. Thus, his commentary abounds with quotes from numerous Indian sources (abhidharma, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka) and also contains several extensive general topics.

LSSP is one of the most detailed commentaries on the AA (with its introduction and comments on the first chapter of the AA taking up almost half of the entire text). Though LSSP only says that its explanations are based on Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*, throughout its comments on the words of the AA the text exhibits a very thorough three-tier exegetical structure. A given topic is started by briefly explaining the *Vivṛti*'s respective introductory passage for that topic, which is then followed by word-for-word commentaries on both the AA's verses (based on Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*) and the *Vivṛti* (based on Haribhadra's *Ālokā*). As mentioned before, LSSP also greatly relies on the commentaries by Nyalshig Jambel Dorje, Butön, and Nyaön, and includes many lengthy discussions of the general topics of the AA as well as supplementary issues.



What Is the View of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra*?*

As for the question of the AA's affiliation with the view of a particular Buddhist school, it seems often to be forgotten that the text is not about the view of a certain school in the first place, but primarily a commentary on what the prajñāpāramitā sūtras say about the levels of the internal path to develop the wisdom of realizing emptiness. Tellingly, the Indian commentaries do not explicitly address this issue (if at all). Also, most of the earlier Tibetan commentators, such as Ngog, Nyaön, Yagtön, and Rongtön, do not make any such affiliations, or just say that the text represents the Madhyamaka view in general. According to many later, mainly Gelugpa, commentaries on the AA, the view explained in this text is claimed to be the one of the *Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka School, one of the two subschools of *Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.[249] However, historically speaking, this statement is clearly in retrospect and only in terms of later Tibetan doxographical categories since Indian Mādhyamikas never conceived of any subschools among themselves. Also in terms of content, the above attribution is dubitable in at least two ways.

First, it hinges on declaring Haribhadra to be the text's principal commentator, putting him into the above doxographical category, and then simply transposing this category onto the AA. However, in general, it should be more than obvious that a certain author commenting on a text from a certain point of view does not necessarily mean that this is the view of the text itself. In particular, as for Haribhadra's view, his *Ālokā* indeed suggests that he mainly comments from a Madhyamaka point of view in general, without specifying this any further (given the above-mentioned lack of subschools). However, when it comes to the details, Haribhadra's view is a quite complex synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on several levels, not easily reducible to the above narrow category. For example, though Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and *Vivṛti* appear to be critical of certain Yogācāra positions, they still quote and use a lot of typical Yogācāra texts and notions, even giving due recognition to the—everything but typical Madhyamaka—notions of the three natures, the "fundamental change of state," and the four buddha wisdoms, such as mirrorlike wisdom.[250] Also, the *Ālokā* quotes five verses from Vasubandhu's

Vyākhyāyukti, the most important one being the famous stanza on the five principles of how to properly comment on the sūtras. The *Ālokā* explicitly matches these principles in great detail with the sections of the AA, and follows them throughout its own exegesis.[251]

Haribhadra's *Ālokā* speaks several times of mind's luminosity, comparing it to the sun, the sky, and fire.[252] Particularly striking and quite "un-Madhyamaka" is Haribhadra's comment on mind's luminous nature in his *Subodhinī* (his commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*) in the context of the culminating training of the path of familiarization:

> The path of familiarization, which has the defining characteristic of the meditative absorption of crossing in one leap, realizes prajñāpāramitā as being uncontaminated. Through this, just as the sun unobscured by clouds has the power on its own to dispel darkness through radiating its light rays, the self-arisen state of a bhagavān will be attained through overcoming the darkness of ignorance.[253]

This clearly suggests that the self-arisen ultimate nature of the mind has the intrinsic power to illuminate and dispel all ignorance. Though Haribhadra's *Ālokā*, in typical Madhyamaka fashion, makes sure that mind's nature cannot be pinpointed as anything and is beyond existence and nonexistence, he still acknowledges that it possesses the remedial power to eliminate its stains, which are merely adventitious. On the famous passage from the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Eight Thousand Lines*, "The mind is no-mind. The nature of the mind is luminosity,"[254] the *Ālokā* comments as follows:

> Because it is free from the nature of being a unity or a multiplicity, *the nature of the mind*, which is unarisen by nature, *is luminosity*—it is the elimination of the entire darkness of imagining what does not exist. Therefore, *the mind* that is not different from the [cognitive] aspects that consist of nonclinging and so on *is*, in true reality, *no-mind*. The idea here is that, since mind is without nature, how could the aspects that consist of nonclinging and so on and are not different from [mind] serve, in true reality, as a location for clinging? No matter whether one construes the negation "no-mind" in an implicative or a nonimplicative sense, mistakenness is not put to an end through following the pretentious [ideas] about mere existence or nonexistence. Seeing this, [Śāriputra] asks, "Does this mind, which is the mind of no-mind, exist?" . . . Since, by virtue of reasoning, it does not exist in true reality, ["no-mind"] is not

> an implicative negation, but a nonimplicative one. Subhūti, having in mind that there is not even any imputation of mere existence or nonexistence and wishing to give an answer to this [question], poses a counterquestion: "Śāriputra, in this no-mind-ness, is there, or can one apprehend, [any] 'existence' or 'nonexistence'?"[255]

Note that Haribhadra speaks of luminosity as the state of "imagining what does not exist" being eliminated. The expression "imagining what does not exist" appears in Yogācāra texts as an equivalent of the classic Yogācāra term "false imagination" (mind mistakenly constructing its world through the basic split of subject-object duality). The *Ālokā* on AA IV.15b elaborates on the meaning of mind's "natural luminosity":

> As for teaching the knowledge that mind is free from attachment and so on, [the sūtra] speaks about "states of mind that are not afflicted" and so on. As for these [states of mind] being "naturally luminous," if one examines through valid cognition the nature of the impure states of mind that have become so in the state of ordinary beings by virtue of the cause that is mistakenness, one realizes them to have the essential nature of being unarisen and so on. Through having merged with this [realization], by virtue of [mind's] capacity of not reverting from [its state of] the remedies having arisen and to eliminate adventitious [stains] (such as desire), its very own nature is to be naturally luminous and utterly pure.[256]

This latter explanation not only clearly echoes Dharmakīrti's way of presenting mind's naturally luminous nature in *Pramāṇavārttika* II.208cd–211ab, but is just one of many instances of the expression "adventitious stains" being used throughout all of Haribhadra's commentaries on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA.

As mentioned above, the Seventh Karmapa's JG[257] says that Maitreya's AA comments on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as being Madhyamaka, but that some of his followers, such as Vasubandhu, comment on these sūtras from the perspective of Mere Mentalism. Following Āryavimuktisena, Haribhadra comments on the AA as being Madhyamaka.

The Eighth Karmapa's JNS states that the Madhyamaka view held by Asaṅga is the final intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA, and that Haribhadra follows this Madhyamaka as asserted by Asaṅga.[258] Throughout, JNS repeatedly refers to both Haribhadra and Āryadeva as Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas and once even as False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas,[259] which is a Tibetan term often used as an equivalent of *Shentong* Mādhyamika. In

terms of Haribhadra's particular approach to commenting on the intended meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, JNS[260] gives the following interesting characterization. Though Haribhadra asserts the manner of cutting through reference points by way of the view according to the *Sūtrāntācāra-Mādhyamikas,[261] when it comes to making this a living experience through meditation, his position accords with the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas (for more details, see below). This means that the Eighth Karmapa here uses one of the oldest subdivisions of the Madhyamaka School in general and suggests a distinction in terms of a more scholarly versus a more practice-oriented Madhyamaka, but clearly does not refer to the rather late Tibetan division of the two subschools of the *Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas. Thus, nominally speaking, one could say that JNS takes Haribhadra to be a *Sūtrāntācāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. However, in terms of the meaning in the context of commenting on the AA, for Mikyö Dorje, "Madhyamaka" refers to Asaṅga's system (and not Nāgārjuna's) and he clearly establishes the primacy of the Yogācāra approach over the approach of reasoning alone since the latter only operates within the conceptual domains of study and reflection, while the former represents Haribhadra's approach to the direct experiences and realizations in meditation. In the Buddhist tradition, meditation is always considered to be the pinnacle of the progressive triad of study, reflection, and meditation, with direct yogic perception clearly superseding any kind of inferential valid cognition.

Secondly, as for the AA itself, it is true that many of its parts indeed lend themselves easily to a Madhyamaka interpretation, which may account for its becoming the sole text on the stages of the path studied in the Madhyamaka-dominated monastic colleges of Tibet and thus eclipsing other classical (more Yogācāra-oriented) Indian texts on this topic (such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*).[262] However, apart from the fact that large parts of the AA *can* be readily interpreted from a Madhyamaka perspective, it is far from self-evident that the view of the AA is purely or even predominantly Madhyamaka (let alone any of its assumed subschools). Many modern scholars who do not simply follow default Tibetan (primarily Gelugpa) schemata regard the text as Yogācāra. As Conze (1960a, pp. 101–3), Makransky (1997, esp. chs. 6, 7, and 10), and others have pointed out, it exhibits many traits very characteristic of Yogācāra and several of its Sanskrit verses greatly resemble those in the other works by Maitreya (such as AA V.21 being identical to *Uttaratantra* I.154).

To give a few examples, the text's frequently recurring format of the cognitive obscurations consisting of the split into a separate apprehender and apprehended (which are taken to be real on many coarse and subtle levels of both saṃsāric and nirvāṇic phenomena, and whose

relinquishment results in nondual wisdom free from any subject-object dichotomy) is as classical a Yogācāra paradigm as can be and certainly not Madhyamaka. The list of the twenty-two examples of bodhicitta in AA I.19–20 is not found in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, but is almost identical to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.15–20 (with its *Bhāṣya* pointing out its source as being the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*). The description of the "disposition" (*gotra*) in I.38–39 is clearly not sheer emptiness, but the dharmadhātu serving as the foundation for various accomplishments on the path of bodhisattvas.[263] The sixteen moments of the path of seeing as well as the afflictions to be relinquished through the path are also treated in the same way in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, whose presentations (also on other topics) are explicitly used in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā*.[264] Most of the verses of the AA's eighth chapter on dharmakāya match the ideas and terms of certain passages in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Uttaratantra*, the *abhisamaya* chapter in Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the tenth chapter of his *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.[265] Also, to speak of three kāyas is the standard approach of Yogācāra, whereas Nāgārjuna and other Mādhyamikas tend to speak of two kāyas.[266]

Another very noteworthy passage is found in Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*,[267] which explains the most important and encompassing term of the AA—"the knowledge of all aspects"—as the very essence of everything that is included in the ten aspects of knowable objects, such as the ālaya-consciousness, since this knowledge is what focuses on the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna*). Those ten aspects of knowable objects, starting with the ālaya-consciousness, correspond to the ten chapters of Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. Moreover, the entire passage in Āryavimuktisena's text is found almost literally in Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana*[268] on the knowledge of all aspects in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.25 (which corresponds to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.58). That Vimuktisena explains the key term of the AA in this way, using classical Yogācāra terms such as the ālaya-consciousness and the perfect nature, is further clear evidence for the AA being very much based on the Yogācāra tradition and that this was obviously noticed and accepted already by its earliest Indian commentators.

It should also be noted that the AA and its commentaries are greatly based on and use a large number of abhidharma terms and classifications (relying primarily on the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*), though reinterpreting most of them in a mahāyāna sense. These formats include the different types of saṃgha; the classifications of the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation; the sixteen moments of the path of seeing; the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment; the various qualities of a buddha; and even the three doors to liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and

wishlessness,[269] which are usually thought to be one of the unique hallmarks of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras).[270] All of these elements can hardly be said to be typical features of Madhyamaka.

In sum, the AA does not simply echo the contents of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, but also maps a number of terms and schemata unknown in these sūtras onto them (such as the names *svābhāvikakāya*, *sāmbhogikakāya*, and *nairmāṇikakāya*)[271] and even adds things that are not found there (such as the twenty-two examples of bodhicitta and the thirteen aspects of practice based on the disposition). Many of these mappings and additions are typical Yogācāra presentations. In light of what the AA is teaching—the hidden meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as the stages of subjectively realizing emptiness through various kinds of meditative yogic practices—this strong Yogācāra underpinning makes great sense. For this school (as its name says) and its texts always have focused on and specialized in the experiential side of the Buddhist teachings, that is, how mind functions in both its deluded and undeluded states, specifically in meditation. On the other hand, apart from a few more general and usually very brief explanations in certain Madhyamaka texts specifically on meditation, Mādhyamikas were never concerned about going into these kinds of details.[272]

Several Tibetan commentators outside of the Gelugpa tradition—such as Dölpopa, Śākya Chogden, the first Karma Trinlépa, Padma Karpo, the Eighth Karmapa, and the Fifth Shamarpa—regard the AA as being based on both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Sometimes, either by certain ones amongst these authors themselves or by other commentators, this is referred to as "Yogācāra Madhyamaka," "*Shentong* Madhyamaka," or "Great Madhyamaka" (though the exact meanings of these terms may be understood very differently by some of them).

For example, Dölpopa says in his *Mountain Dharma* and elsewhere that all five Maitreya texts teach nothing but *Shentong*, and that the AA in particular does not contain what is known as *Rangtong*. In general, his AA commentaries greatly follow Vasubandhu's *Paddhati* (as outlined in the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusārinīnāmavyākhyā*) and *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.

Śākya Chogden's *Illuminating the Stages of the Path of the Five Maitreya Dharmas*[273] explains that, in all five Maitreya works in general, at the time of studying and reflecting, the entirety of seeming reality is ascertained as *rangtong*. At the time of meditation, what is taught is to rest in meditative equipoise in ultimate reality alone (which represents *shentong*). Thus, in particular, also the AA teaches both *Rangtong* and *Shentong*. In the context of studying and reflecting, the temporary definitive meaning in this text must be explained in accordance with how the Niḥsvabhāvavādins[274] comment on it because what is to be experienced (later) through yogic valid perception needs

to be identified first in the context of study and reflection. However, the manner in which emptiness is determined in the AA during the time of studying and reflecting, which accords with the explicit teaching of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, is geared toward negating all conceptions of clinging to any characteristics of knowable objects from the perspective of ordinary consciousness, but not geared toward resting in meditative equipoise in the spacelike lack of characteristics from the perspective of nonconceptual wisdom. For the former emptiness is only a conceptual isolate (an "elimination-of-other")[275] and therefore not suitable from the perspective of wisdom. In the context of identifying what is to be experienced through having become familiar with it through meditation, this must be explained according to Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's way of commenting because what is to be experienced through yogic valid perception needs to be identified in the specific context of meditation.[276] In general, the AA's philosophical system is nothing other than the position of Asaṅga.

The same author's *Illumination of the Definitive Meaning of the Five Maitreya Dharmas*[277] explains that what is explicitly taught by the AA is the same as the explicit teaching in the sūtras of the second turning of the wheel of dharma—the nonimplicative negation of being empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended. However, this alone is not suitable as the definitive meaning since it does not go beyond being an isolate (an "elimination-of-other"). Therefore, it is definitely nothing but a direct object of conception, but not suitable as the experiential sphere of personally experienced wisdom. Therefore, the ultimate definitive meaning is as identified in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga* because the definitive meaning of the middle turning depends on what is identified as such in the final turning, which is the wisdom without the duality of apprehender and apprehended. This can be considered in terms of what bears the nature of phenomena and the nature of phenomena itself, but what is meant here is solely the latter. Thus, there is no difference whatsoever in the way in which the ultimate view taught in the AA, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, and *Madhyāntavibhāga* is identified. However, they differ in the ways of teaching how to make this view a living experience through engaging in it since the AA explains this by combining the progression of the implicit teaching of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (the clear realizations) with the progression of their explicit teaching (emptiness). Also, the nature of the definitive meaning taught in the *Uttaratantra* and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* does not differ from the one taught in the other three Maitreya texts. In brief, in terms of determining the view in the works of Maitreya, whatever exists must be the dharmadhātu and emptiness, which must be what is called "the wisdom empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended," also bearing the name "perfect nature."

Śākya Chogden's *Explanation of the Origin of Madhyamaka*[278] (composed at the request of the Seventh Karmapa) says that, just as with all other mahāyāna texts composed by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (as well as all those by Dignāga and his spiritual heirs), the main subject of both the AA and the *Uttaratantra* is the Madhyamaka of the definitive meaning, which represents the intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as commented on through the sūtras of the third turning of the wheel of dharma. In the AA, the clear realizations that are the hidden meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are identified from the perspective of the wisdom that is free from apprehender and apprehended. The opposites of the yogas that are these clear realizations are identified as the antagonistic factors to be relinquished through them, which consist of an equal number of conceptions about apprehender and apprehended. Also, the AA says that it is aspects of consciousness that are to be made a living experience. The means to explain this are the AA's seventy points, which ascertain all phenomena as "self-empty" in accordance with the explicit teachings of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Moreover, if the view of the other three Maitreya texts belonged to Mere Mentalism, all presentations of the five paths, the ten bhūmis, and the fruitional buddhabhūmi in them would have to be deprecated as not being in accord with how things actually are.[279] In particular, Śākya Chogden says:

> One of the followers of Śāntarakṣita is master Haribhadra. Everybody in the land of snows agrees that he commented on the meaning of the mother according to the Yogācāra approach and therefore used the reasonings of the Niḥsvabhāvavādins as the manner to put an end to the clinging to characteristics, while he explained the object to be experienced through meditation according to theYogācāra system.[280]

His *Rain of Nectar* states:

> Also both Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert the manner of ascertaining the view according to the *Svātantrikas and *Prāsaṅgikas, but they explain the implicitly taught definitive meaning of the middle [cycle of] the Buddha's words and the definitive meaning of what is made a living experience through meditation as being wisdom . . . This very [approach] represents the intention of venerable [Maitreya] because the [*Abhisamay]ālaṃkāra* explains the main topic of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—the hidden meaning of the progressive stages of clear realization—by way of joining it with [these sūtras'] explicit teaching of the progressive stages of emptiness.[281]

Padma Karpo's SLG says:

> Within the generation of a buddha's bodhicitta, the entire mahāyāna is contained, all sentient beings have the buddha heart, there is a single yāna, and the wheels of dharma are of a single meaning, but [appear to be] many by virtue of [different] ways of understanding [this meaning]. Since explaining and listening, cultivating the path, and the fruition to be manifested appear in an illusionlike manner, they are determined in this way. Therefore, this manner of explanation is called "the illusionlike hidden meaning." It is in terms of this that former masters, such as Asaṅga, Āryavimuktisena, and Haribhadra, have guided [beings] in the illusionlike Madhyamaka—they are the masters of vast activity. The Madhyamaka of nonabiding is to determine the ultimate through not taking the illusionlike appearances during subsequent attainment as primary, but regarding the very prajñā during meditative equipoise as primary. Therefore, master Nāgārjuna and his followers guide [beings] as the masters who teach the profound view. [However,] the actuality [of this] must be made a living experience as the unity of [said profound] view and [vast] activity.[282]

The Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* reports the position of his main teacher, the first Sangye Nyenpa Rinpoche, Dashi Baljor (1457–1519),[283] on the five works by Maitreya:

> All these five dharma works by Maitreya are established as commentaries on the intentions of the entirety of the words of the Buddha in the causal and fruitional mahāyāna for the following reasons. As for the middle three treatises [*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*], it is not the case that they do not teach the principle of the Madhyamaka dharma in an ancillary way, but their explicit teaching is the distinct system of Yogācāra.[284] The first dharma work of Maitreya [AA] is a treatise common to Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. The last dharma work of Maitreya [*Uttaratantra*] is a treatise common to sūtra and tantra.[285]

As mentioned above, JNS repeatedly says that, in commenting on the texts by Maitreya, one must follow Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Furthermore, the Karmapa explains that, for those who do not just have faith in prajñāpāramitā, but who gain certainty by following the dharma through reasoning, the valid

cognition of fully realizing what the AA describes in detail—the three knowledges being unborn—depends on three steps, which are based on the systems of the *Svātantrika[286] and Yogācāra masters (compare this with Śākya Chogden's comments above). The first two of these steps pertain to reasoning and the last one to direct realization in meditative equipoise. First, through the reasonings that put an end to any real identity (primarily through the well-known Madhyamaka reasoning of being beyond unity or multiplicity), the three knowledges that are seeming entities are determined to be unborn by proving their lack of real existence. This is the stage of *rangtong*—establishing the three knowledges as lacking a nature of their own. Through this essential point, the Mādhyamikas explain what is accepted by the world to be real as being "the correct seeming," which is in fact a presentation of what is contrived and thus unreal by virtue of lacking a nature of its own. Secondly, through the reasonings that put an end to all views, the three knowledges that are ultimate entities are determined to be unborn through proving that they do not only not exist as any real entities, but not even as any existent entities, which entails their being unborn. As the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* says:

> If there were even the slightest not being empty,
> There would be a slight being empty.
> But if there is not even the slightest not being empty,
> How could being empty exist?[287]

Thirdly, as for fully realizing the three knowledges as being unborn, based on the above two inferential valid cognitions of conventions, which consist of first refuting any real existence of the three knowledges and then understanding them to be unborn, the three knowledges are directly realized to be not really established and unborn. This is presented as the fully qualified view or outlook that is associated with the mind being immersed in yogic meditative equipoise. At that point, no philosophical position, such as "being unborn," is entertained because all objects of negation have subsided on their own and there is nothing to be proved whatsoever either. As the *Satyadvayavibhāga* says:

> Since there is nothing to be negated,
> It is clear that, actually, there is no negation.[288]

Thus, what is unborn and explained as emptiness is established through its own valid cognition and not invalidated by any other valid cognitions. It is in this way that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti asserted the Buddha to be a true source of valid cognition since he realized that this kind of object (prajñāpāramitā) and this kind of subject (the three knowledges as the wisdom of emptiness)

are unborn. Finally, the Eighth Karmapa says that the self-aware perception of ordinary beings and the self-aware perception of the personally experienced wisdom that represents nondual wisdom are mutually exclusive (thus denying the opposite claim by Dölpopa and Śākya Chogden), because, otherwise, it would follow that ordinary sentient beings and buddhas have, or at least share, the same type of mind stream.[289]

In brief, the Eighth Karmapa makes a clear distinction as to what can be realized through inferential (conceptual) valid cognition (stages one and two) and what can only be realized through direct yogic valid perception in nonconceptual meditative equipoise, which is the genuine view. In light of JNS's other explanations on the relationship between *rangtong* and *shentong*, and since it calls the first stage of conceptual analysis *rangtong*, the third stage of direct meditative insight can be understood as *shentong* in an experiential sense, but clearly not on the same level of conceptual analysis through reasoning that precedes direct realization. Also, as mentioned above, the order in which the Karmapa speaks of *Svātantrika and Yogācāra here is reversed when compared to their order in Tibetan doxographical hierarchies, which means that it is primarily the above third stage of direct meditative insight that pertains to Yogācāra, of course not in the sense of what those doxographies call Mere Mentalism, but rather in the sense of what JNS explains as *shentong*.[290]


The great Nyingma scholar Khenpo Shenga says in the prologue to his annotational commentary on the *Vivṛti*[291] that the five works of Maitreya were taught as commentaries on the intentions of the entire mahāyāna. Among them, the AA explains the intention of the sūtras that teach profound emptiness; the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, the intention of the sūtras that teach vast activity; and the *Uttaratantra*, the intention of the sūtras that teach the inconceivable nature of phenomena. These texts were given for the sake of guiding three types of persons—the three middle treatises were composed for those to be guided through the philosophical system of Mere Mentalism; the AA, for those to be guided through the teachings of the *Svātantrika system; and the *Uttaratantra*, for those to be guided through the teachings of the *Prāsaṅgika system.

Also, the five Maitreya texts are taught as the remedies for six kinds of wrong ideas. As the remedies for (1) the clinging to entities and (2) the clinging to the lack of entities, respectively, the AA teaches the lack of any nature and all the stages of the paths. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* were taught for those who are temporarily unable to understand the meaning of the freedom from extremes. Thus, these texts teach the intentions, the indirect intentions, the three natures, and so on as the remedies for (3) taking said meaning literally. They also teach the infinite varieties of the aspect of skillful means as the

remedy for (4) lacking interest in the vast aspect of the teachings and the narrow-minded wish to merely meditate on identitylessness. The *Uttaratantra* teaches that all sentient beings possess the buddha heart as the remedy for (5) the five faults, such as faintheartedness. As the remedy for (6) the idea that if all beings have buddha nature, there can be neither any decrease of flaws nor any increase in qualities, the text differentiates this in terms of various presentations, examples, utterly pure buddhahood, and so on.

In particular, the AA is based on, and draws on, all prajñāpāramitā sūtras (such as the large, medium, and brief ones). From among the three turnings of the wheel of dharma, it comments on the intention of the sūtras of definitive meaning from the middle turning, which discusses the lack of characteristics, and belongs to the category of pith instructions on profound emptiness. It was composed for the purpose of guiding those who are ignorant about how the stages of clear realization—the hidden meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—are to be made a living experience.

The introduction to Dongag Tenpé Nyima's commentary on the AA[292] by the contemporary Nyingma Khenpo Rigdzin says that, among the many commentators on the AA's intention, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu commented on it in the manner of Mere Mentalism; Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, in the manner of Madhyamaka; Gorampa, Karmapa Mikyö Dorje, and Dongag Tenpé Nyima, in the manner of *Prāsaṅgika; and Tsongkhapa, Khenpo Shenga, and Butön, in the manner of *Svātantrika. Since the intention of the AA is to teach a single disposition and a single yāna, it corresponds to Madhyamaka. However, since it is accepted as a source of valid cognition by all *Prāsaṅgika and *Svātantrika masters and comments in an unmistaken manner on the intention that is the hidden meaning, it is certain to be a text that is common to *Prāsaṅgikas and *Svātantrikas, while its final view and intention is nothing but *Prāsaṅgika.[293]



The Abhisamayālaṃkāra *in Its Traditional Setting*

There seems to be a general perception of texts like the AA and its secondary literature on grounds and paths possessing hardly any practical relevance, if any at all. As for the highly scholastic format of the AA as opposed to a more practically oriented meditation guidebook, it compares well with Buswell's description of the Vaibhāṣika versus the Theravāda approach:

> One might say that the Vaibhāṣikas have developed a *retrospective* approach to soteriology — a system that begins from the premise of the Buddha's own enlightenment and looks *backwards* as it were from the supramundane point, reinterpreting all other experiences in light of that unique event. Because of this rigorously theoretical orientation in discussion of soteriological questions, their interpretation of the *mārga* inevitably takes a heavily scholastic bent; their effort at *synthèse* has managed to wring out of their description virtually all of the actual struggle undergone by the adept in his quest for enlightenment. Such a tack was perhaps inevitable given the historical exigencies within which Vaibhāṣika doctrine developed, for such a rigorous soteriological system would serve to differentiate their school explicitly from rival schools of Indian and Buddhist philosophy and practice. Unfortunately, however, it allows us to know little of the actual content or practice of Vaibhāṣika methods of *bhāvanā* [meditation].
>
> A comparison of the path as outlined by the Theravādins in the *Visuddhimagga* reveals some startling contrasts . . . The Theravāda system is thus proleptic — beginning from the defiled, unenlightened state and looking *forward* in anticipation of purification (*viśuddhi*) . . . the Theravādin have left considerable lore on meditation practice itself . . . There, we find no overriding interpretive tool, such as the four noble truths used by the Vaibhāṣikas . . . Instead, the Theravādins have focused on the process of training itself, an approach that holds more hope for the individual attempting practice because it does not

> gloss over with theoretical descriptions the actual tribulations that spiritual development will demand.[294]

Also the AA starts with the fruition—the knowledge of all aspects—and it is this topic that pervades and determines all others in the text in a top-to-bottom manner. There are no indications or descriptions of personal experiences or difficulties on the spiritual journey, but only generalized templates and recurring fixed sets of elements of the path (many of which are based on or the same as in the abhidharma). Thus, the AA may be considered as a kind of highly formalized mahāyāna abhidharma presentation of the path and realization (similar to Chapters Five to Eight of the *Abhidharmakośa*, which are frequently quoted in the AA commentaries). On abhidharmic schematization in both Sarvāstivāda and the mahāyāna, Lopez says:

> Given the significant quantitative imbalance between the obscurations and their antidote, why was the Sarvāstivādin model of various levels of misapprehension of the four truths in the three realms maintained, while the antidote to ignorance was understood to be the knowledge of selflessness alone . . . ? A traditional positivist response would hold that the mind has been contaminated over countless births, and that the defilements are engrained from the surface to the depths and can be dislodged only through persistent and prolonged purification. As for the single antidote, there may have been a conflation . . . of the purificatory and visionary models of the earlier tradition, with the purification of myriad discrete defilements held to be effected by the vision of a single truth.
>
> For the Mahāyāna, the focus, was not on the three marks of existence but on one, selflessness, and there was an attendant reduction in antidotes from the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths to only one, the third aspect of suffering (albeit reinterpreted), emptiness. It was this vision of emptiness that was said to destroy, in one moment on the path of vision, all seeds for future rebirths in the unfortunate realms . . . Yet this was only the beginning of the first of ten *bhūmis*; . . . two periods of innumerable aeons to complete the path, aeons in which . . . s/he was to enter repeatedly into direct yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) of an emptiness no more profound than that which s/he had first seen. These repeated visions of the same emptiness were to serve as antidotes to a wide variety of afflictions and thus effect the removal of the entire range of obscurations—both those to liberation (the *kleśāvaraṇa*) and those to the omniscience of a buddha (the *jñeyāvaraṇa*). . . . the role of

> the Abhidharma was to express the inexpressible content of the Buddha's enlightenment, in doctrinal formulations of the nature of reality, in the categorizations of veridical and deceptive states of consciousness, and in the delineation of a process of purification.
>
> Indeed, the role of the Abhidharma was to domesticate enlightenment. The infinite prolongation of the path removed enlightenment from the hazardous present and placed it in the safety of the unforeseeable future as the sole possession of the exalted, absent Buddha . . .
>
> If we see the development of the mārga schema as representing a transition from autobiographical to universal experience, then it would seem that experience can become universal precisely to the extent that it is the experience of no one. But such an explanation has almost a scent of conspiracy about it . . . whereby the complex of defilements and their antidotes are viewed as a wholly artificial product of the Ābhidarmikas, the elite of the Buddhist order.[295]

In the traditional higher education in Tibetan monastic colleges, the AA together with its commentaries and the secondary supplementary materials elaborating on various topics are regarded as laying the ground for all the remaining texts to be studied, being a kind of massive encyclopedia of the Buddhist worldview that pervades the entire curriculum. This is illustrated by what, according to the *Blue Annals*, Tsongkhapa's first teacher said to him:

> You will first study earnestly the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, which is the ornament of the three "Mothers."
> If you become learned in it, you will be able to master all the Scriptures.
> Keep this advice in a corner of your mind![296]

Traditionally, the AA is often compared to a map or a travel guidebook, providing a precise and detailed orientation for the path to enlightenment. The question of the possibility of there being such a path and a goal is not thematized in the text—it rather presupposes that the readers have at least resolved to embark on this journey or are already on their way. However, on its own, the text resembles more a succinct catalogue of tours and expeditions to all the places that you never even knew existed, or the coded notes of someone who has made an exhaustive study of all the available guidebooks and maps to these places in all their scales and details so as to have a brief mnemonic device for being on the road, with the ability to readily bring to mind all that has been studied before (which, by the way, is one of the general principles

of the often very terse Indo-Tibetan śāstra literature). For others, such cryptic notes on all kinds of major and minor landmarks and routes must remain completely unintelligible or misunderstood without the benefit of any further explanations by experienced travel guides. Though the AA refers to an overwhelming amount of details, at the same time, it highlights again and again that, actually, neither the travelers, nor their vehicles, nor any journeys or goals exist. Thus, it constantly dissolves or reduces the explorers and their quest into emptiness, the central theme of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras.

However, there are many people, even within the Tibetan monastic educational system, who react to the AA and its commentarial literature not as practical guide books, but as being either particularly annoying pieces of lifeless scholasticism, or, on a more gracious reading, more or less just something that is traditionally part of the curriculum. Most everybody agrees that the AA—despite its topic being the various levels of the path—is not related to practice. Nevertheless, people try to come up with various—more or less convincing—reasons why so much time is spent on studying this text. For example, Hopkins says the following on the text and the materials related to it:

> In the standard dGe-lugs-pa educational curriculum, six years are spent studying Maitreya's *Ornament of Clear Realization* . . . a highly elaborate compendium on the paths that is not practiced in its own form. Rather, the long period of study is used to enrich understanding of a complex structure of the spiritual development that provides an all-encompassing worldview daunting in its intricacy. Though the structure of the path, as it is presented in this text, does not provide the rubric of actual practice, much of its import is brought over to "stages of the path" [*lam rim*] literature, the practical use of which is certified by the great number of short texts in this genre aimed at daily meditation. The more complex system . . . provides a perimeter within which the more practical teachings can be enacted.
>
> . . . the aim is not what would usually be considered practice (i.e., meditation cultivating what has been studied); rather, the goal is endless intellectual reflection . . . It appears that internal practice has given way to external debate on major and minor issues, but the emphasis on intellectual development also stems from stark recognition that these matters are not easily penetrated, requiring much intellectual exploration, and that immersion in topics—even to the point of entering a maze of conceptuality—can bear fruition over lifetimes. This is, at least, the system's self-justification for pursuing ever more refined conceptualization.

> The third genre, "grounds and paths," is generally comprised of . . . texts to structure . . . *Ornament of Clear Realization.* A straight reading of such a text can be an exercise in boredom, but with the oral commentary of a teacher who is versed in a lineage of exegesis, the technical vocabulary can come to life in a vivid realm of imagination, much like a novel about a mythic land. Such stimulation of the metaphysical imagination is at the heart of the process of study in this tradition; whereas it may seem dry and sterile to those for whom the terminology has not been enlivened through evocative commentary, for those who have undergone this process the same technical vocabulary reverberates with meaning and epiphanies of new connections. Exploration of the elaborate architecture of the path itself becomes an important phase of the path, not to the exclusion of actually generating these path-states in meditation, but as an important part of creating a worldview that itself exerts a transformative force on the mind.[297]

Relying on his own experiences of training as a Geshé in the Gelugpa tradition, Dreyfus aptly describes many of the issues around this kind of literature:

> I believe, however, that although the various treatments of the path are meant to address the pragmatic emphasis of Buddhist traditions, it is a mistake to assume that teachings on the path are preparations for actual practice.
>
> Robert Sharf has argued in the same vein, criticizing some modern Buddhist scholars and contemporary Buddhist practitioners for erroneously interpreting the literature describing the structure and results of the path in experiential terms. "In fact," he declares, "it is difficult to imagine how somebody could mistake this kind of religious literature for 'expressions' of personal experiences; they are first and foremost scholastic compendiums, compiled by monks of formidable learning who were attempting to systematize and schematize the confused and often conflicting descriptions of practices and stages found scattered throughout the canon."[298] For Sharf, it is a mistake to assume that the literature dealing with the path either directly reflects Buddhist practice or directly prepares for it. This sweeping claim may not hold true for all traditions, but it applies quite aptly to the Tibetan presentations of the path . . .
>
> I suggested earlier that the importance of the path in Buddhist tradition reflects the tradition's pragmatic orientation. One

might therefore infer that since it teaches the Mahayana path, the *Ornament* must bear directly on actual Mahyana meditative practices and that those who study it intensively, as Tibetan scholars do, must be interested in this text for practical reasons. But though these assumptions are tempting, they are unjustified. We cannot simply deduce a text's application from its content; rather, to understand such a text we must consider how it is used by the communities in which it is embedded.

. . . In the non-Ge-luk commentarial institutions, the *Ornament* is studied for its content—the eight themes, which are explained through seventy topics . . . In this way, students learn about . . . a number of elements of the Mahayana path . . . non-Ge-luk traditions complete this study of the path by examining the other texts attributed to Maitreya, as well as Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's Abhidharma texts.

Ge-luk monastic universities, in contrast, take the *Ornament* as the central text for the study of the path; they treat it as a kind of Buddhist encyclopedia, read in the light of commentaries by Dzong-kha-ba, Gyel-tsap, and the authors of manuals. Sometimes these commentaries spin out elaborate digressions from a single word of the *Ornament*. Several Ge-luk monasteries . . . recognize this tendency to drift away from focused explanation of the text and call these subjects, which are only tangential to the *Ornament*, "special topics" (*zur bkol*). They are studied in relation to but separately from the *Ornament*. In this way, most of the topics relevant to the Buddhist path, generally or from a specifically Mahayana perspective, are covered in the course of studying this one text . . .

Notwithstanding these differences, members of neither Tibetan scholastic tradition find much practical relevance in the *Ornament*, despite some claims to the contrary. Few of the topics directly covered by the *Ornament* or studied in relation to it appear to be related to practice. Among the eight topics, the first three . . . are not meant to be practiced directly. They are taken as the objects of the path, which consists of the four practices [that is, the next four topics]. Similarly, the last theme, the dharma-body of the Buddha, is the goal of practice but gives no direct guidance on reaching it. To be sure, the *Ornament* presents the four practices or realizations, emphasizing particularly "the practice of all the aspects" (*rnam rdzogs sbyor ba*), which is treated in the fourth chapter. In fact, that practice is the central topic of the text and may have been an actual practice in which all the aspects of the three wisdoms are brought together. Here, it is called "meditation summarizing the

three wisdoms" . . . this practice seems to be realistic. Rather than involving some extraordinary feat, as do the miraculous qualities of the buddhas and celestial bodhisattvas, it can be implemented by anybody who is interested.[299]

But—and this is point is crucial—no teacher I have ever met seems to have practiced this meditation or even have been clear on how to do so. Non-Ge-luk curricula treat this practice but generally offer no convincing understanding of the topic, even at the textual level. The students I interviewed appeared to have gotten very little out of this part of the text. And though Ge-luk scholars probably have a better theoretical understanding of the topic, nobody I encountered could plainly state how to practice this text. Clearly, the work's central themes are not practiced in the Tibetan scholastic traditions.

Of the auxiliary topics . . . some do have direct practical applications. For example, the mind of enlightenment . . . is studied in the first chapter. Similarly, the single-pointed concentration that leads to the attainment of tranquillity (*zhi gnas, śamatha*) is studied in great detail. Concentration [dhyānas and formless absorptions] is studied with considerable care for several months . . .Yet even though teachers point out the practical importance of studying these topics, to which much time is devoted, little time is given to those that are of direct relevance to actual meditation . . . The real focus is theoretical . . . When monks become really serious about the practice of concentration and begin extended retreats, they instead focus on the tantric path. At that time, special methods for the attainment of tranquillity are introduced. The texts they have studied seem to have no application.

Worldview and the Study of the Ornament

Once we see how little relation the study of the *Ornament* and other similar texts presenting the path has to actual experience within the Tibetan scholastic traditions, we may wonder why so much time is spent studying them. What meaning do Tibetan scholars find in them?

One answer is suggested by Dzong-ka-ba's own career . . . In a moment of sudden insight Dzong-ka-ba understood the validity of the Buddhist path . . . These "impractical" studies are meant to bring about a strong faith in the validity of the Buddhist tradition, as they did for Dzong-ka-ba in Ngam-ring. The discussion

of the path is central to Tibetan traditions because it habituates students to the universe in which these narratives make sense, and thus strengthens their religious commitment.

. . . Most people do not live by quick fixes; instead, they decide on long-term goals and the means to reach them. Hence, they need narratives to direct them and persuade them that they are on the right track. They also need to sense closure in the narrative, to find a point toward which their efforts are aimed and that makes sense of those efforts. To construct such a universe of meaning and to strengthen the faith of participants in such a soteriological[300] possibility are the main goals of the study of the *Ornament* and other related texts in the Tibetan scholastic tradition.

. . . Haribhadra . . . starts his discussion by stressing the role of faith . . . for Haribhadra, faith is not the central virtue of the tradition; wisdom and compassion surpass it. But faith is the basis from which the development of these virtues starts. Thus it is the paramount concern at the beginning of the process.

. . . The construction of a meaningful universe and the path that transcends it must be made to appear self-evident so that students feel confident in their practice. The steps along the path must appear to them as concrete stages whose relation to Buddhist practice they can understand. Yet that "concreteness" is itself a reification; the map provided by the *Ornament* literature does not refer to anything that exists independently of textuality. Rather, these mental constructs acquire, through texts and teaching, the solidity necessary to inspire and sustain people in their actions. They are best characterized, to use Kenneth Burke's term, as objects of symbolic actions, the representational forces that attempt to influence their audience.[301]

Is this the explanation of the teachers who taught me the *Ornament*? No, or at least not completely . . . my teachers really believed that the descriptions provided by the text were correct, that such stages and paths existed . . . Nevertheless . . . they saw clearly that there are, in the Dalai Lama's own words, "no self-evident (*ldog ldog*) paths existing out there."[302] The more thoughtful members of the tradition take descriptions of the path as attempts to refer to complex individual processes. Thus, my teachers . . . would insist that this literature refers to some states actually obtainable by practitioners, though not necessarily in the exact ways in which this literature describes them.

> . . . Topics such as the mind of enlightenment or the attainments pertaining to the form and formless realms are important not because they directly prepare for meditation but because they help elaborate a universe in which Buddhist narratives and the practices that they inspire makes sense. For Tibetans, the *Ornament* and similar texts are not reports on or direct preparations for Buddhist practice, but rhetorical representations of the meaningful universe envisaged by the tradition. As such, they have great soteriological significance since they develop the faith that participants have in their tradition.[303]

And:

> Buddhist traditions . . . involve a whole range of soteriological practices. Most of them have little to do with meditative experience and pertain to what is usually called merit making . . . In particular, the scholastic studies examined here are understood by participants as a form of merit making. This type of Buddhist practice forms the core of much actual Buddhist practice. It should not be considered at odds with so-called higher meditative practices, but, on the contrary, as continuous with them. Merit making is part of the liberative . . . dimension of the tradition. In some ways, the value that monks find in monastic studies derives from their being meritorious. Studying a text such as the *Ornament* is intrinsically valuable. It is in and of itself virtuous.
>
> Nevertheless, this intrinsic virtuous quality of Tibetan scholastic studies is not their main value. Normatively speaking, the main value of studies . . . is in their leading to the development of virtues such as inner calm, attention and inquisitiveness that will in turn enable the practitioner to be successful in the higher meditative practices.[304]

I agree with most of what Hopkins and Dreyfus say on how the AA and its related texts are treated in the Tibetan tradition. However, it should be clarified that the AA itself does not speak of its purpose being simply the development of faith, but explicitly says:

> May the path of the knowledge of all aspects
> That is explained here by the teacher,
> Though not experienced by others,
> Be seen by the intelligent

> And, having committed to memory the meaning of the sūtras,
> May they easily progress
> In the tenfold practice of the dharma—
> This is the purpose of this undertaking.[305]

Haribhadra's *Ālokā*[306] comments that the subject matter of the AA is the entire unmistaken path taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, consisting of all realizations of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas, as reflected in the eight clear realizations that lead to higher realms and nirvāṇa. Thus, to explain what is taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras is the purpose or goal of this treatise, which in itself is the means to do so. In other words, the unique result of easily internalizing the teachings of all seventy topics is the purpose. Here, the prajñā that arises from studying prajñāpāramitā easily commits to memory said subject matter—the path of the knowledge of all aspects that is not realized by non-Buddhists, who cling to inherent existence and have not familiarized themselves with the identitylessness of all phenomena. The prajñā that arises from reflecting on what one has memorized ascertains the path of the knowledge of all aspects and through the prajñā arising from meditation, one becomes thoroughly familiar with this path. Therefore, the final purpose—the result of having gone through this process—is to manifest this knowledge of all aspects.[307]

Thus, clearly the AA is intended by its author as a mnemonic device for conveniently understanding and remembering the entire path to a buddha's omniscience as taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in order to actually use this knowledge by putting it into practice and thus becoming a buddha. Also, the *Vivṛti*[308] (Haribhadra's other commentary mentioned by Dreyfus) clearly only speaks of the arising of faith—or rather an open mind or inspiration—for prajñāpāramitā (and not for an entire tradition) and it only identifies this as the purpose of the AA's opening stanza of paying homage to "the mother" of the four noble ones. There is no mention of the purpose of the entire text being the growth of faith, but that this homage by Maitreya is intended to first give rise to inspiration or certainty about mother prajñāpāramitā's ability to bring forth the four noble ones (buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvakas). In line with what was said above, the resultant yearning for prajñāpāramitā's qualities then makes one study and practice, through which prajñā—the essential factor to be accomplished—arises and gradually leads one to buddhahood. This position of Haribhadra is followed by virtually all commentaries on the AA, with LSSP, PSD, MCG, and others saying that the opening stanza is the branch of giving rise to an open mind, while AA verses 1–2 represent the branch of making those with realization engage in the treatise. Thus, Khenpo Shenga's prologue to his commentary on the AA says:

> It was composed for the purpose of guiding those who are ignorant about how the stages of clear realization—the hidden meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—are to be made a living experience.[309]

Unfortunately, Dreyfus does not tell us whether the AA and its related texts indeed ever had the effects of increasing faith or of constructing a meaningful universe that he is proposing, be it for himself or any of his colleagues. Frankly, I find it very hard to believe that endless lists, subdivisions, and technical details of things to be accomplished and to be relinquished—which are what the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* mainly consists of—could serve as "faith-boosters" for anyone, and I never heard of anybody for whom the text performed this function. Rather, according to the reports by both Westerners and Tibetans who studied this text, the last thing anybody would think of is an increase of their faith through it. On the contrary, almost everybody has had a hard time stifling the exact opposite feeling of tremendous resistance to all these lists and subdivisions and the urge to run out of the class. Speaking of increasing faith (whether in the Buddhist teachings or their tradition), especially for a Western audience, there are definitely other teachings that seem to serve that purpose much better, such as the ones on buddha nature, mind training, how to work with emotions, or inspirational dohās and poetry. One may also wonder in this regard why this text is practically never taught in the West if it supposedly is so potent for increasing faith. As far as Tibetans are concerned, most of them already have a lot of faith in their Buddhist tradition anyway, but for Western practitioners new to that tradition, it seems much more necessary to work on such faith.

Also, at least for some people in the West, "creating a meaningful universe" and "the representational forces that attempt to influence their audience" may sound dangerously close to some kind of sophisticated brainwashing or cultural conditioning. As Anne Klein remarks:

> Virtually no contemporary Western thinker would take seriously, much less agree with, the notion that conditioned persons can have an experience outside of historical, cultural, psycho-social, and other sets of conditionings. Neither Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, nor those following Kant, for example, would postulate or even seek a resolution between their own positions and the Buddhist claim that there are states of mind unaffected either by personal or cultural histories or by epistemic limitations. Here, the conditioning role of social and personal histories is emphasized in ways that are foreign to Buddhism. From the viewpoint of contemporary theo-

> ries, Buddhist soteriological theories are but one more example of cultural construction.[310]

In this vein, it may be added that, at least for critical Western minds, the many differing (and sometimes even contradictory) ways in which the numerous Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the AA treat certain of its topics can certainly not be considered as aids for enhancing faith in general or the AA's message in particular.

However, as Klein continues, things look very different from a general mahāyāna perspective and the particular point of view of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA:

> From the Buddhist perspective, such a viewpoint is limited and reductionistic in its fascination with conditionality. The Buddhist position also emphasizes conditionality but does not subsume all other perspectives to it. For Buddhists, the unconditioned is epistemologically meta to the conditioned—not the other way round. For them, the emphasis that Foucault and Lacan put on cultural and linguistic constructions of experience is like theorizing the existence of dependent-arising without positing the emptiness that is its inseparable counterpart.[311]

Forman reports on the position of modern constructivists on the single nature of human experience:

> Like any other experience . . . the mystic's experience of God, of Brahma, of the Tao, of śūnyatā and so forth is in significant ways shaped, formed, and/or constructed from his or her expectations and concepts of those notions. . . . Christians virtually never have a vision of multi-armed Kālī, and Neo-confucians never see Jesus. Expectations, concepts, and the background of beliefs clearly limit and form the mystic's visions.[312]

And:

> Modern constructivism argues from an *epistemological monomorphism* . . . that is, that all experiences are mediated and constructed.[313]


On the other hand, Forman describes the Buddhist claim of the possibility of deconstructing every form of constructed experience and arriving at

an unconstructed form of experience that avoids the usual unpleasant by-products of the former:

> Modern constructivists cannot logically accept Paramārtha's[314] assertions of an *epistemological duomorphism*, that is, that some experiences are conditioned and some are unconditioned. Nor can this position coherently admit that one can possibly follow common Buddhist instructions to cease thinking or perceiving in terms of such loaded notions as *Nirvāṇa*, *Bodhisattva*, and *samādhi*. Nor can the modern constructivist accept the common Zen assertion that one can and should cease thinking, using discriminative thought, and so forth. The claim of epistemological duomorphism is that there are (at least) *two* kinds of mental functioning and that they should not be conflated.
>
> . . . I believe that we have something *very* important to learn from the likes of Dōgen and Paramārtha. Even though the constructivistic picture may be applicable to most experiences, these men maintain that . . . there are other epistemological structures, other forms of consciousness, if you will, of which human beings may be (and they would say "are") capable. One such structure results, they say, from progressively eliminating things like habitual expectations, conventional distinctions, emotions based on childhood experiences, and even that most ancient of epistemological structures, the dichotomy between subject and object.
>
> Certainly such a process of dehabituation does not seem utterly inconceivable. Is it not conceivable that the human being is capable of realizing that such distinctions are more or less conventional? Even modern philosophers have noted the conventional character of all conceptual systems. Does the most likely next step—that one can existentially realize this in one's own life—not seem equally conceivable? Does it seem so impossible that, with practice, we can learn to live without employing the old pidgeon holes?
>
> . . . it should be clear that the distinctions that we draw between rich and poor, smart and stupid, beautiful and ugly, better and worse people, health and sickness, and perhaps even life and death, stand at the cognitive foundation of our self-perception and the choices that we make constantly. Even if presently satisfied, to *prefer* wealth or success or happiness over their respective opposites is to live in subconscious or conscious dread of just these opposites. As Buddha saw on his second and third excursions from his father's palace, to prefer health over sickness and life over death is

> ultimately to face disappointment. Life perceived in terms of such distinctions will inevitably lead to suffering.
>
> Paramārtha, in typical Buddhist fashion, prescribes his intellectual and meditative techniques as an antidote to the problem of the constructed nature of ordinary experience. He notes that with a life constructed in part out of terms like "I" and "you," "good" and "bad," "life" and "death" comes suffering. Perhaps, just perhaps, we in the West have something to be gained by an openness to this way of thinking. Given the level of pain, anxiety, and stress in our culture, perhaps it would be wise to remain open to the possibility that epistemologically and technically (that is, through meditation techniques), the Buddhist knows something we don't. This claim—that there may be more than one epistemological structure, and that the atypical (mystical) ones may not be exposed to suffering—may turn out to be more important than anyone expected.[315]

The contemporary Kagyü scholar and yogin Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche explains the purpose of the AA as having all our coarse and subtle conceptions collapse or dissolve and realizing the inseparable unity of the dharmadhātu free from all reference points and its natural basic awareness. Accordingly, as will be elaborated below, the primary goal of the AA (like that of most Buddhist texts) is precisely this, to assist in the task of deconstructing our ordinary coarse and subtle conceptual overlays with their myriad ways of "black-and-white" thinking, thus giving way to increasingly more direct insights into what our mind is in its own true nature without any overlays.



The Place of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra *in Modern Scholarship*

Given the above issues of the amount, complexity, and perceived scholastic dryness of the prajñāpāramitā literature, it seems not surprising that—with the exception of the truly amazing pioneer works of Conze and Obermiller and a few studies on the *Heart Sūtra*—there are no comprehensive translations or studies of the prajñāpāramita sūtras or the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and its commentaries in Western scholarship so far,[316] which is in particularly sharp contrast to the plethora of works on Madhyamaka. As early as thirty-five years ago, Conze commented on the discrepancy between the significance of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the almost complete lack of modern scholarly engagement in them:

> The most outstanding feature of contemporary *Prajñāpāramitā* studies is the disproportion between the few persons willing to work in this field and the colossal number of documents extant in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan.[317]

This situation has not really changed up to the present. In terms of the sūtras themselves, Conze was a true trailblazer and remains the only one who showed significant interest and stamina to deal with the vast corpus of this literature. Not only did he translate almost all of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA, but also wrote a comprehensive bibliography and several general studies on these materials. To access and understand these texts requires extensive study and a certain openness to immerse oneself in their often peculiar styles. As Conze speaks from personal experience:

> To appreciate their background requires more study than the average busy person can afford without neglecting his worldly pursuits, and without giving up one's whole life to them one will never get to the bottom of these Sūtras.[318]

Also, there is a pervasive stance in the West in general and academic philosophy in particular—even in parts of Buddhist studies departments—to strictly separate what is secular from what is perceived as "religious" (often tacitly implying that the former is objective versus the latter just being subjective). On this artificial but persistent separation, the former president of the American Academy of Religion, Wilfred Smith said:

> For the fact is that reasonably well-informed perceptive awareness of the history of our planet over the past thirty or so millennia makes clear that modern Western secularism is an aberration; and that its attempt to interpret religion as some sort of extra in human life is dogmatic, is ideological eisegesis. The notion that human nature and truth are fundamentally secular, are the norm, from which most human beings have, whether for good or other reasons, deviated, is sheer projection.
>
> By this I do not mean that humanity is, rather, fundamentally *homo religiosus*. That is an error that further illustrates my thesis, by its perpetuating the idiosyncratic outlook that the Modern West has defensively constructed. It took us some time to detect this. The concept "religion" has itself been developed by Western secularism as naming something that is supposedly over and above the standard everyday. Religion is in fact not something special, the historian can now see; it is secularism that is odd. "Religion" is a secularist notion, a conceptual element in that particular worldview—but a misleading one, setting up a dichotomy that secularists need in order to justify their own separate peculiarity, but normal people do not and cannot. The dichotomy is retained, in reverted form, in that phrase *homo religiosus*. Actually, there is rather just plain *homo sapiens*, and then a minority of those not quite *sapientes* enough to have sensed what kind of universe we live in and what kind of beings we are.[319]

In this vein, different from the general approach to Western philosophy, the Indian approach to philosophical systems in general and the Buddhist ones in particular does not separate what the West considers secular, philosophical, and religious, but always includes the meditative and practical everyday engagement in whatever view is presented. Traditional Buddhist scholars are also always practitioners of a meditative tradition, thus investigating ultimate reality not only through intellectual analysis, but attempting to make the texts a living experience in both meditation and their daily interactions. In other words, in terms of the three-tier classical progressive

approach of Buddhists to their scriptures—study, reflection, and meditation—Western philosophy only operates on the first two levels, but there is no tradition, method, or encouragement to explore the third level (of meditation) or to make what is studied and analyzed a part of one's daily life. Thus, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and related materials especially not only represent a challenge to Western scholars through their sheer amount, but also, and maybe even more so, through their explicit and constant message of the need for transcending the conceptual rational mind and its seemingly immanent "objectivity"—the cornerstone of Western philosophy and scholarship—in order to approach true reality, as well as integrating this approach in one's daily behavior. As Suzuki says:

> The one most important thing that students of Buddhism have to realize at the very outset of their study is that Buddhism is not a system of philosophy, has nothing to do with speculations as such, has no intention to present a logically coherent formula of thought ... What the Mahāyāna Sūtras contain are plain statements of facts experienced by the Indian Buddhist minds, that is, they are most direct statements based upon the intuitive knowledge these minds gained regarding their religious life. Their statements may be logically untenable or impossible ... Pure logic is not the key to the understanding of Buddhist philosophy.[320]

And:

> The PP is a system of intuitions. Its thorough understanding requires a leap from logic to the other shore. When one tries to unravel it without this experience, the system becomes all the more a mass of confusion or an unintelligible jargon.[321]

This does not at all mean that these sūtras and the AA do not apply and rely on logic, or that reasoning and logic are generally rejected in Buddhism, thus advocating some vague kind of "experientialism." On the contrary, all Buddhist traditions engage—to various degrees—in conceptual study and logical analysis, which are seen as necessary preliminary steps for eventually gaining direct experience and realization of what is studied. However, it is always emphasized that the true nature of things is not just a matter of intellectual understanding, but can only take place on a muḍh more profound level of insight. In this sense, the AA can be regarded as describing—if not proscribing—a defined series of progressive cognitive processes of moving from more superficial, yet progressively refined, levels of conceptual

understanding to direct insights that are beyond the conceptual mind and, upon repeated familiarization, actually dissolve it, giving way to a deeper and more encompassing manner of perceiving and experiencing oneself and the world. On each one of these levels, there are specific objects on which their corresponding mental subjects (usually called "aspects" in the AA) focus in particular ways, thus leading to specific cognitive results and realizations with regard to both these objects and their underlying actual reality. These four factors of soteriological cognitive processes—subject, object, cognitional mode (the interaction between subject and object), and result of this process—are the underlying structure of the AA throughout its discussions of the five paths and the ten bhūmis. In this vein, the AA could be regarded—in the true sense of the word—as the first example of the later so common genre of *lamrim* texts.



Is There Any Practical Relevance to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra*?*

In terms of the AA's relationship to actual meditation practice, as Dreyfus said above, its first three chapters "are not meant to be practiced directly."[322] As for the remaining chapters, the fourth one only contains five verses that actually speak about practice (IV.35–37 and IV.62–63), while the remaining verses just include lists of the 173 aspects of the three knowledges, various defining characteristics, various sets of the signs of irreversibility on different paths, and so on. The fifth chapter mainly speaks about the four kinds of conceptions about apprehender and apprehended and certain signs and qualms. Its few verses that speak about meditation do so in a highly abstract way or just outline a progression of samādhis. The sixth chapter consists of a single verse with a list of practices, the seventh only speaks about the last moment of the tenth bhūmi, and the eighth is about the final fruition of the path. In sum, this seems to leave us without any practical relevance to the AA whatsoever. In the light of this and the above considerations and issues (in particular, the reactions toward what is perceived as overly scholastic spiritual literature), one may wonder whether the AA is only meant for traditional scholars, students who have to go through a set monastic curriculum, or people who simply have too much time. Hopkins suggests:

> Although I am aware of the tendency in dGe-lugs-pa training to endless, conceptual proliferation, it is unwarranted to assume that because the path-structure is complicated, no one ever actually meditates it. There is a small but significant number of persons who, after much arduous study over many years, practice what, at superficial reading, seem to be a hopelessly complicated series of paths. This is not to say that *all* complicated structures are actually practiced; my point is that the assumption that *none* of them can be practiced springs from the lack of awareness that cultures that put at least as much energy into these topics as we do into learning about football, road complexes, and so forth—and from a lack

> of appreciation of the fact that, for some people, the content of these highly elaborate presentations has an inner dynamic impelling them toward practice.[323]

The point that a significant number of people in Buddhist cultures spend as much—or more—time and effort on inner mental technologies of contemplative inquiry as Western cultures do on material technologies and entertainments, and thus are able to achieve results in these areas that Western science only starts to acknowledge and investigate, is certainly a very significant one. However, if the practical significance of texts like the AA is limited only to the famous few "chosen ones" who reach the stratosphere of Tibetan monastic colleges, are these texts lost on the "average" Buddhist practitioner? Rather, the question is whether the just-mentioned—more technical—fourfold structure of the AA can be translated into something with which one can work in a direct and experiential manner without having to go through decades of study.

No matter how the AA and its commentaries may be used in their traditional setting (particularly in higher Tibetan monastic education) and no matter how technical most of these materials are, I would like to suggest that their basic intent and purpose is to convey and promote spiritual experience and realization, though their format may not necessarily make these readily accessible. However, it seems crucial to see that the often arcane quality of the material is not due to the fact that the realization of emptiness as such—or emptiness itself—is complex in any way. In itself, emptiness is extremely simple, being the very fact of nothing to hold on to, that is, the lack of all reference points (*niṣprapañca*). However, what *is* complex are the many layers of belief systems, projections, habitual tendencies, and reference points (*prapañca*) in our saṃsāric minds, be they on the more superficial conceptual level or the more deeply ingrained level of instinctive behavior. It is precisely for this reason that the texts on the grounds and paths for realizing the simplicity of emptiness seem to be its exact opposite, being as complex as one could imagine and even beyond. They are so discursive about nondiscursiveness because they address each and every tiny detail in the tightly woven and multi-layered cocoon of our mind's obscurations as well as their remedies. This is expressed by Mādhyamikas and also Wittgenstein:

> Why is philosophy so complicated? It ought to be *entirely* simple. Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that we have, in a senseless way, put there. To do this it must make movements as complicated as these knots are. Although the *results* of philosophy are simple, its method cannot be, if it is to succeed. The

> complexity of philosophy is not its subject matter, but our knotted understanding.[324]

In this way, one may compare studying these materials with the training of top-notch ballet dancers. Everybody admires their smooth, supple, and seemingly effortless movements, and would like to be able to move just like them. But what we usually tend to forget is that this so simple-looking display requires many years of sophisticated and dedicated training, in which one's attention needs to be focused on and return again and again to every subtle detail. Also, the Buddhist approach to learning and progressing on the path is not a linear one, and repeated familiarization with the same topics from different angles is a standard way of Buddhist spiritual training. Lopez says:

> . . . the Buddhist path seems to be neither a straight line between two points nor a circle endlessly retracing itself but a cone, spiraling in smaller and smaller circles until it ends in a point—the *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*, the nirvāṇa without location—and then continuing from that point, to line, to plane.[325]

Buswell and Gimello present an interesting analogy of the mutual dependence of the path and its "goal":

> Ninian Smart has offered the useful analogy of the relationship between the goal of a game and the rules of that game. Any effort to define a "home run," for example, would inevitably lead to a systematic statement of the rules of baseball. Likewise, the only feasible description of an ineffable religious goal would seem to be an outline of the path leading to it. In both cases, the goal is implicit in the rules of behavior leading to its attainment, and thus may be said to be accessible only through such behavior. Conversely, the meaning of any one element on the path consists principally in the contribution it makes to the achievement of the goal. Hence the conditioned and unconditioned realms have meaning only in relation to one another (just as saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are said to entail each other); without a path there is no destination, and without a destination, no path.
>
> This accords well with . . . that nirvāṇa is not really a destination at all . . . In Mahāyāna . . . nirvāṇa is said to be "nonabiding" . . . To "achieve" nirvāṇa, then, is not to "arrive at," much less to "settle," anywhere.[326]

As for the rules of the game in the AA, considering its many levels of complexities, often we seem to find ourselves in the situation of being told every bit of information about the intricacies and tricks on the twentieth level of a "nerd-only" computer game by afficionados of that game. Leaving aside that this information cannot strike any chord for someone who has never played this game in the first place, it cannot even concern or make sense to someone who is on the first or the second level.

However, just as in the Madhyamaka texts, the AA and its commentaries make it very clear that there is nothing to be realized or achieved per se as far as emptiness—or mind's nature, primordially pure awareness—is concerned. Thus, the actual "work" on the path as it presents itself from the perspective of those who are on it—and not from the perspective of the basic nature or the fruition of realizing it—consists of nothing but dissolving all the various obscuring levels of gross and subtle clinging that represent the natural tendency of dualistic mind grasping in terms of subject and object at whatever comes its way. When following the AA's meticulous scrutiny of the convolutions of our dualistic minds, it can be truly illuminating to see how this grasping works even on increasingly more subtle levels of the path and toward so-called "pure" objects. That is, even if one gets the basic idea of emptiness in general, it does not mean that this insight is readily available in every situation. The AA's recurring descriptions of taking our thoughts in terms of subject and object, which target both saṃsāric and nirvāṇic phenomena, to be real or true constantly point out the fact that our minds keep grasping even at the most rarified ideas, objects, and experiences. To understand that even bodhisattvas on the bhūmis, who have already realized emptiness directly, still grasp at this very realization to certain degrees may help us to create more awareness about our mind's constant tendency to keep jumping from one toy to the next, where the toys just become more subtle once the coarser ones have been taken away. No doubt, triggering this kind of awareness is something practically relevant even for ordinary beings on the Buddhist path right now. Once one progresses on this path, the bhūmis of bodhisattvas indeed provide a wealth of nice new subtle toys never seen before. However, as long as mind keeps being excited by them, no matter how subtle the toys may be—experiences of mental calmness, luminosity, bliss, pure lands, or maṇḍalas of deities—it has not yet found its own natural ease, the detached and utterly relaxed suppleness that is called buddhahood. In this way, the AA and its related materials are like lists of all the toys we have to throw out, and this concerns not only the factors to be relinquished, such as mental afflictions and obscurations, but also their remedies and even the wonderful qualities of bodhisattvas and buddhas. As a kid, we may have many boxes full of toys, but then we outgrow some, lose interest in them,

and replace them with new ones. Then, as an adult, we no longer care about any of these toys, but go after more sophisticated ones, such as fancy dresses, computers, cars, penthouses, and careers, eventually getting tired of these too. Finally, when we die, we must leave all of our toys behind. The five paths and ten bhūmis are just like that. As it is said, "The Buddhist path is one disappointment after the other, the only good thing being that buddhahood is the last one." Of course, there is the difference in that each stage of letting go of a toy on this path is a step closer to the true freedom of having no more worries about anything to lose or to gain. This means that one moves from the superficial and deluded level of conditioned happiness and suffering—gaining and losing toys—to the unchanging state of no worries about anything needing to be removed or to be attained. This is simply mind's own true nature being revealed, which does not lack anything since it is naturally perfect in itself. As the AA says:

> There is nothing to be removed from it
> And not the slightest to be added.
> Actual reality is to be seen as it really is—
> Who sees actual reality is released.[327]

Hopkins remarks on this:

> Thus, on many levels, soteriological experience evokes a sense of dread—dread of the loss of directionality that pursuits of temporary pleasures afford, of the loss of permanence, of the loss of a solidly existent sense of self, and of the loss of one's very being—because it means facing what is awesomely other than one's present, very limited perspective. Nevertheless, after acculturation by means of paths of practice, the very insights that initially evoked a feeling of loss evoke instead the feeling of finding a lost treasure. As the Fifth Dalai Lama said about the experience of realizing emptiness:
>
> > This initial generation of the Middle Way view is not actual special insight; however, like a moon on the second day of the month, it is a slight finding of the view. At that time, if you have no predispositions for emptiness from a former life, it seems that a thing which was in the hand has suddenly been lost. If you have predispositions, it seems that a lost jewel which had been in the hand has suddenly been found. . . .

> This discussion . . . has brought to the fore three phases of experience of the sacred—dreadful, overcoming obstacles, and totally "at-home." All three must be emphasized in order to convey even a minimally rounded picture of the path.[328]


When Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche was giving oral explanations on the AA, at one point he referred to the well-known reports in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras about arhats in the audience of the Buddha when he taught on emptiness who were so shocked by these teachings that they had heart attacks or vomited blood and died. Rinpoche said that the good news is that obviously nobody had suffered this fate in the present audience so far, but the bad news is that this means that probably nobody really understood what emptiness is all about either. Such stories illustrate the profound and, for ill-prepared minds, deeply shocking experience of emptiness that shakes or even evaporates the entire frame of reference in which we seem to live. More often than not, however, the radicalness of the essential message of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—the utter groundlessness of our being—seems to get lost in the maze of highly technical and verbose explanations of even the most minor points in the AA and its commentaries, and one starts to wonder what all of this was about to begin with. So, as far as the AA and the materials related to it go, the point seems to be to connect to this transforming experience right within the complexities of all the technical terms, definitions, classifications, and elaborations supposed to lead to it. As Edward Conze says:

> . . . one must always bear in mind that in these Sūtras we have not to deal with a series of philosophical propositions about the nature of things, but with a set of practices designed to bring about a state of complete detachment by intellectual methods . . .
>
> The AA treats the contents of the *Prajñāpāramitā* as statements of spiritual experiences. While general scientific propositions can be considered in the abstract, experiences derive their meaning and significance from the concrete circumstances in which they take place, and the spiritual maturity of the observer is a decisive factor in the situation. The spiritual world is an essentially hierarchical structure, and the Absolute must appear different on different levels of attainment. Buddhist tradition . . . evolved a clear and detailed picture of the Path which a Buddhist Saint has to traverse through countless aeons, and to each meditation it finds in the *Prajñāpāramitā* the AA assigns its appropriate place on that Path. The reader of the AA must constantly bear in mind the position from which events are observed. What at first sight seems to be a

dry and scholastic treatise does then become a fascinating contribution to transcendental psychology.[329]

Or, as Makransky writes about the commentator Ratnākaraśānti's perspective on the AA:

> The core realization of Buddhahood is a nondual gnosis, a direct yogic experience, not a conceptualization.
>
> What functions, then, do conceptualizations and descriptions of Buddhahood serve? If scholars are to discuss Buddhahood as the ultimate objective of a practice that people are actually trying to accomplish, how is it to be described so the practice to achieve it can be furthered rather than undercut? If scholars inadvertently mistake their own conceptualizations of Buddhahood for Buddhahood itself, and believe they have thereby comprehended it, they subtly point others away from the nonconceptual entry into nondual awareness that actually constitutes it . . .
>
> Yogācāra formulations . . . assumed that the proper position from which to understand Buddhahood was the position of nondual yogic experience itself. Authentic scriptures that expressed that authentic understanding were therefore to be given great weight . . . Ratnākaraśānti . . . believed that such authoritative scriptures and treatises because they were taught by realized beings . . . , expressed the actual nondual essence of Buddhahood as well as it could be expressed in language. Logical inference alone, independent of yogic experience, could not . . . For Ratnākaraśānti, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*'s teaching on Buddhahood, like other authoritative teachings by buddhas and great bodhisattvas, is not an expression of a system of human thought, but the revelation of a nondual awareness that is beyond human thought. Enlightenment points to itself through the language of the text.[330]



The Abhisamayālaṃkāra *as a Contemplative Manual*

In this vein, I would like to offer a few reflections on the AA being a text that not only speaks about spiritual experience and points to enlightenment, but, by doing so, may serve as a contemplative practice manual in itself. From a practice point of view, I suggest that most of the words and phrases in the verses of the AA can be regarded like little koans on their own, or as starting points for contemplations on emptiness. Just as koans point to the same single thing—emptiness—and represent various means to break through all kinds of rigid concepts that obscure this emptiness, the many individual points in the AA function in the same way, chipping away the thick walls of fixation and wrong views. However, as was said before, it seems crucial to see that the AA does not present a linear path and that there is no such path in the first place, but that it is more like spiraling towards a middle and thus passing and reviewing the same issues again and again from different perspectives. If we expect an outline of a linear path, the AA is very likely to be frustrating.[331] Almost all these points and their subpoints in the verses of the AA share the quality of being like hammers that drive home the single nail of emptiness again and again—sometimes from the point of view of various objects, be they virtuous or nonvirtuous; sometimes from the point of view of different subjects (the various mundane and supramundane states of mind of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas); at other times from the perspectives of the five paths and the ten bhūmis; and at yet other times from the perspectives of the many factors to be relinquished or the signs of accomplishment. Thus, all these points resemble ever so many fingers pointing to the same moon of emptiness from ever so many angles. In this way, the entire AA becomes like one big koan because all of these little koans always point to the same point, no matter whether it is called prajñāpāramitā, emptiness, dharmadhātu, or lack of nature.

As others have remarked before, if one looks at the prajñāpāramitā sūtras with their endless repetitions, they were not just intended simply to be read, but to be recited and reread again and again, in fact being contemplative manuals or road maps meant to be used as practice texts to facilitate the single message of emptiness sinking in through repeatedly familiarizing with it by

multifaceted contemplations. Since the AA represents the contents of these sūtras in a nutshell, it just seems to be natural to work with it in the same way—as a contemplative manual—and not get caught up in the sheer numbers of all its lists. Obviously, these numbers are not the main point and, from the fundamental point of view of emptiness, completely irrelevant. The main point is to use those lists as the above-mentioned fingers pointing to emptiness. In principle, it does not matter whether the number of these fingers is four, thirty-six, 110, or any other number, but from a pedagogic point of view, the more fingers that point to emptiness until one cannot help but seeing what they all are pointing at, the better it is. For example, if a single person points to a star in the sky at daylight, it is very hard to see, but if many people point in the same direction from different places on earth and others fly up in the sky, pointing at this star from above, below, left, and right, and the same is repeated at dusk, dawn, and at night, one will eventually see this star clearly. Likewise, if one wants to buy some real estate, to really get a comprehensive picture of it, one may want to look at it from all sides, walk around the property, check out all the rooms from the attic to the basement, test the doors, floors, and windows, take pictures everywhere from all angles, and then study and compare these pictures at home, and so on.

When adding all the additional explanations on those pointing fingers in the commentaries on the AA, they not only broaden the contemplative perspective on the about twelve hundred individual points of the AA as well as their overall picture, but emptiness is virtually encircled by a host of pointing fingers. At the same time, the clinging to a real self, persons, and things is besieged by these fingers until it surrenders into its own utter groundlessness. In this way, the journey through the AA may be regarded like a rollercoaster ride during which you look at the same things again and again from different perspectives—the main point being to enjoy the ride and not just get sick and vomit.

So, it seems not so much a question whether the AA speaks *about* spiritual experiences and how what it says *relates* to one's practice (whatever that practice may be), but how to *make* the AA itself a practice—or allow it to *be* one, for that matter. At least this approach seemed to suggest itself to me as I, for many years, was translating and pondering over the many different points of the AA, many of which furthermore are presented in greatly differing ways by the various commentaries (sometimes even saying the exact opposite). Such differing comments not only broaden the contemplative perspective by adding more pointing fingers, but also highlight the fact that many of the points of the AA do not have just one single or fixed meaning. Especially in the case of the Eighth Karmapa's JNS with its many unexpected twists, which often feel like more than one carpet being pulled out from under one's feet, one cannot but wonder whether such commentarial activity does not in itself

represent an increasingly obvious attempt to make one's dualistic conceptual mind—which wants things to be orderly and rationally make sense—collapse and give up through applying its own weapons against itself. On the nature of such deconstruction in Buddhism, Forman says:

> Like most instructions, words like "place your right foot on your left thigh, and your left foot on your right thigh" function as a *description* of the act of getting into the lotus position, and as an *instruction* to do so. Similarly, words like "do not think" also seem simultaneously to *describe* and *instruct*. Hence, it would appear from surface grammar that these two statements function similarly.
>
> Having heard the instruction "place your right foot . . . ," someone may perceive or imagine such an act in just these terms. Having done so, she/he may employ these words or notions in part to construct his/her perception. To perceive something as a foot, as over or under, or as a religious act (an act in a religious context) already introduces interpretive and discriminative categories. It acts, *mutatis mutandis*, like "look at the door" or "paint those Gothic archways!"
>
> "Do not think" seems to be similar. It appears at first glance to be another constructive perceptual description or instruction which sets up a category by means of which one will see or perceive something. Here, however, is where the mistake is. The advocate of this position [the constructivist] is mistaking a *deconstructive* instruction for a constructive perceptual description or instruction.
>
> Not every instructive utterance serves to set up experiential categories. If you say to Monet, "forget about your Gothic expectations and look again,"[332] you will not be providing him with new categories for his experience. Perhaps some other of his previously acquired expectations or beliefs about buildings may start playing a role . . . But in giving your instruction, you, the instructor in this case, *have not introduced that expectation or any other* to him. You have only told him that his old one had misled him. You have spoken in the *via negativa*, if you will. You have simply deconstructed, in more modern parlance, his constructive expectation on the basis of which he had painted. If he obeys you, your statement will have played a role in stopping him from constructing his experience in terms of his habits and expectation.
>
> Many instructions serve to deconstruct: "Forget it," "Put aside your expectations," "Just listen!" and so forth . . . Such instructions do not attempt to provide a new set of expectations; all counsel

someone to stop perceiving or behaving on the basis of old perceptual or behavioral patterns . . .

The fact that there are deconstructive instructions may go largely unnoticed. That is because had Monet been told that he had imposed his expectations onto his perception, he might have dropped "Gothic" but he would not have been able to drop every expectation and belief. There are many complex and interconnecting levels of construction in ordinary experience, and no one, relatively simple deconstructive process could possibly address all of these.

However, Buddhist instructions and meditation practices are not as simple as a single deconstructive remark. The Buddhist procedures are, as I see them, complex and polyvalent systems of physiological, psychological, and intellectual practices and performances which together, it is hoped, will bring about a progressively less discriminated form of experience until an entirely nondiscriminatory event occurs . . . taken together and practiced for years, [they] are designed to reduce systematically the number and significance of perceptual and behavioral discriminations. Such interactive deconstructive techniques together may serve to do what the system claims for itself, that is, to allow one to cease discriminating and seeing in terms of subject and object . . .

Since the constructivist lays such stress on the formative role of the tradition itself, it is especially revealing that Buddhist texts like the *Diamond Sūtra* and the *Fukan zazengi* overtly attempt to dissuade the practitioner from employing expectations about Buddha, *Nirvāṇa*, Bodhisattvaship, and so forth. When Dōgen instructs, "having stopped the various functions of your mind, give up even the idea of becoming a buddha," he singles out the key concept which may lead one to expect and construct in Buddhist terms. He encourages his reader or disciple to cease employing such a loaded idea. As any piece of language must, this utterance does stand as part of the language of the tradition; yet his intention is clearly *de*constructive. His instruction is not designed to function like a constructive perceptual description. To confuse the two forms of instruction would be a mistake.[333]

Evidently, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, the AA, and its commentaries are among the clearest embodiments of this dismantling approach, constantly speaking about the emptiness and the lack of nature of all phenomena up through the omniscience of a buddha, and equally constantly driving home

the point that the person or the mind that realizes all this is just as empty and unreal as everything else. In other words, these texts are true "de-construction manuals," prescribed for repeated application.

To be sure, I am far from any attempt to advertise here for the prajñāpāramitā sūtras or the literature on grounds and paths in order to make them sound like more palatable "products" that sell better to a contemporary Western audience (which sometimes seems to be an almost inescapable expectation about Buddhist texts these days). I can only say from my own limited experience of having been taught and studied these materials for about a decade at this point that, behind all the words and complexities, it seems possible to at least have some glimpses of the radical but healthy shock of groundlessness as it is exemplified by the dramatic fate of the poor arhats mentioned above, managing to at least poke a few holes into the stuffy cocoon of our fixed ideas and letting in some breeze of fresh air. There may be moments of a few of our fixations exhibiting a more "see-through" quality, when conceptual fixating mind has been defeated with its own weapons.

The classical analogy for this is that if one rubs two sticks against each other, heat is produced that eventually results in fire. The fire burns the two sticks and then dies itself. In the same way, in conceptual analysis during reflection and meditation, we rub the two sticks of the factors to be relinquished and their remedies against each other. This increasingly subtle conceptual activity produces the heat that is an early sign of the actual fire of nonconceptual wisdom on the path of seeing, when the nature of phenomena is directly seen for the first time. When this luminous wisdom blazes forth, both the factors to be relinquished and their remedies melt away. Thus, although the sticks and the fire are different, when rubbed against each other, the sticks have the capacity to give rise to the fire. Likewise, our wrong ideas and their remedies appear to be different from both each other and nonconceptual wisdom, but when we work on our mistaken notions through study, reflection, and meditative analysis, there is definitely the chance to see that the factors to be relinquished and their remedies are alike in being illusory, which makes this wisdom shine forth in an equally illusionlike manner.

Conceptual thinking—by overheating, so to speak, in the process of such analysis—is potentially self-dissolving. Thus, it has its ordinary quality of being discursive and referential, but it also has a liberating quality of acute sharpness. In a way, it is a matter of how we direct and use its energy. For example, a soft, diffuse light does not illuminate very much, and its glare might even blind us and prevent us from seeing things clearly. However, if this light is concentrated into a laser beam, it is very sharp and penetrating, and we can use it for a lot of purposes, such as cutting hard materials, running sophisticated technical equipment, and heating up things. Likewise, when we

use a pencil sharpener, we are not interested in the sharpener, or the pencil, or even the sharpening of the pencil as an end in itself. Rather, what we really want is to write legibly or draw nicely, which is the outcome of having sharpened the pencil. From one point of view, Buddhist studies (and the texts on grounds and paths are no exception) are just like that. For the crucial point is not so much *what* we study—which is just some means—but the outcome of these means, which is invariably intended to be an increase in prajñā. Once the pencil of our prajñā has been sharpened, we can write or draw whatever we want, and finally be the great artists who are called buddhas. In other words, such studies are always primarily about what happens to the one who studies, that is, our mind, while doing it. They are about the subject, not the object, so the focus is on what a certain text or topic does to our mind, how we react to it, and how it challenges our own belief systems. Also, if we try to make everything in the Buddha's teachings just very general and oversimplified, it is like trying to draw a finely shaded sketch with a blunt pencil—we simply lose the precision that is the hallmark of prajñā.

However, these days, it seems that many people at least attempt to "live by quick fixes," successful or not, wishing for swift and easy solutions for their lives and spiritual journeys. So who would ever even dream of spending twelve years supplicating in a cave to meet Maitreya face to face, as Asaṅga did, or studying the AA and its commentaries for seventeen years, as Haribhadra and many others did? Especially in an age in which, for many people, the most important thing is "how it feels"; in which we find an ever-growing lavish buffet of all kinds of spiritual fast food; in which attention deficits are rampant; and in which many people respond only to "sound bites" and video games, being intimidated by any sentence that uses more than five words (let alone reading complex materials), the things that people like Asaṅga and Haribhadra did sound completely absurd to almost everybody, just as in those kung fu movies in which the apprentices first have to sweep the floor for many years before they are even allowed onto the training ground. Unfortunately, texts like the AA and its related materials are the absolute antithesis of any type of spiritual fast-food that is free of religious or philosophical jargon (or complies with the particular jargon of the want-to-be spiritual consumer). Instead, these materials require considerable amounts of time and effort to just familiarize with the terminology, let alone the time and effort to digest their meanings. In other words, to get a glimpse of what these texts are all about, at least a certain degree of commitment to seriously immersing oneself in them seems indispensable.

Also, many people seem to like just hearing and being inspired by the highest and most profound Buddhist teachings, similar to being touched by some masterfully played piece of music or an award-winning movie, and then

move on. In this way, there is no follow-up on such initial inspirations and no opportunity to let these teachings sink in and thus turn them into a readily accessible experiential part of one's mind. In this way, such teachings may become more like an entertaining show, maybe recorded in a book or on a tape on one's shelf, or just something one has heard. If asked about their contents, apart from just recalling some vague pleasant feelings while listening, many people are unable to repeat or retain even a single word. Moreover, whatever they may have heard in such a way often becomes mixed with their own ideas and inclinations, which have little to do with a profound, thorough, and undistorted understanding of the Buddha's essential messages. Even people who have been Buddhists for decades and have heard hundreds of dharma teachings or read many books surprisingly often show an amazing lack of active knowledge about even basic Buddhist principles. The same people have no problem with intensely studying for ten or more years to become a surgeon, engineer, or psychotherapist, but seem to deny the need for applying the same seriousness and persistence to studying the dharma. Who would dare to perform open-heart surgery after just having listened to some lectures on how to do this and without having thoroughly familiarized oneself with every little detail of the necessary techniques and procedures? But this is precisely the approach of many people when they think they can perform the most advanced Buddhist practices without a thorough grounding in the underlying view and an idea of the bigger picture into which such practices fit.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that almost all major Buddhist texts were originally written by the highest caliber of Buddhist master scholars for other masters, and not for any "generally informed reader," since such readers simply did not exist at a time when education and literacy were restricted to a small intellectual elite. Thus, without a rather specific background, which is hard to acquire in the West, it is all the more difficult to access such texts. How effective can it be to read books on the latest developments in modern physics without having at least gone through high school? So, if one cannot or does not want to prepare for the "higher teachings," it seems better to study some "lighter" Buddhist reading since frustration is almost guaranteed.

In 1973, the pioneer Buddhologist Edward Conze addressed the issue of whether Buddhist texts in general and the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in particular are still "up-to-date" for a "modern Western audience." This issue is still very much relevant, maybe even more so, today:

> Finally one could also treat them as *spiritual* documents which are still capable of releasing spiritual insights among people separated from their original authors by two thousand years and vast disparities in intellectual and material culture. There is, however, a certain


> absurdity about interpreting spiritual matters in the abstract and in general terms since everything depends on concrete conditions and the actual persons and their circumstances. Some will regard this literature as rather strange and alien, and may long for something more homespun. They will, I hope, allow me to retort with a remark that so endeared me to my students at Berkeley. Asked what Buddhism should do to become more acceptable to Americans, I used to enumerate with a smile a few concessions one might perhaps make respectively to the feminist, democratic, hedonistic, primitivistic and anti-intellectual tendencies of American society. Though in the end I invariably recovered my nerve and reminded my listeners that it is not so much a matter of the Dharma adjusting itself to become adaptable to Americans, but of Americans changing and transforming themselves sufficiently to become acceptable to the Lord Buddha.[334]

Of course, this applies not only to North American society, but to all so-called "modern societies." Among both Buddhists and non-Buddhists there is a strong tendency of just wanting to extract from the Buddha's teaching what one likes or thinks is interesting, relevant, or "sexy" enough, leaving everything else behind as ancient scriptures or rituals of only cultural or historical nature. With buzz words such as "modernizing" or "westernizing" Buddhism (whatever that means), "getting to the essence," "avoiding cultural trappings," "working with emotions," or "it needs to be immediately relevant to my life and my problems," the preliminaries are skipped and one jumps to the "highest" teachings right away, more often than not ending up in just happily superimposing one's own cultural biases on the Buddha's teachings and then pretending to have found something culturally neutral or "modern." It seems necessary, however, to take a closer look at, become aware of, and question one's own hang-ups too, which are not at all any better than those of other cultures. Also, the question is why one needs teachers and teachings if one just follows what one likes anyway.

To be sure, I am not advocating some kind of fundamentalism, strict conservatism, having to study the entire Buddhist canon, or simply mimicry of certain Asian forms of Buddhism. I am all for adapting the Buddha's teachings to the present times, societies, cultures, and problems, as it always has happened in each era and country during the long history of Buddhism, but there is much more that is needed to do so than just following whatever is the latest spiritual fashion. In its long history, Buddhism never succumbed to the idea of spiritual fast-food, but usually always spoke from a long-term perspective. First, we need to be well-informed about the Buddhist teachings in

a comprehensive way before we can decide what their indispensable contents as opposed to external cultural forms are, and not just look for what we can get rid of if we don't like it or don't see its significance right away.

In that vein, the nowadays ever-present question of what the immediate benefit of a certain Buddhist teaching like the AA is is like asking how sharpening a pencil enables you to immediately be a master drawer. Well, it obviously doesn't, but there are many conditions that are all necessary to become someone like Leonardo da Vinci. Some conditions, like being inspired by nature or an intense experience, or taking part in a course on sketching may be of more immediate benefit, while others are more like the sharpening of a pencil. Likewise, some Buddhist teachings are of a more inspirational and immediate nature, while others are more of the "slowly grinding away" type. Moreover, nobody would seriously expect to see the full picture of a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle when they have just laid out the first five pieces here and there, but precisely this seems often to be the attitude among Western Buddhists. Given the long-term perspective of the Buddhist path, many things one studies often only fall into place once one has proceeded a bit further on that path, and/or assume a different or greater significance when one has had certain experiences on it. Then, one may think, "Oh, that's what these teachings were referring to," which can enrich one's perspective tremendously. To avoid further ado—as the Buddha always said, "I can only show you the path, but you need to check it out for yourself and decide whether you want to walk on it or not."



Some Remarks on the Distinct Exegetical Approaches of the Commentaries by the Eighth Karmapa and the Fifth Shamarpa

As mentioned above, mainly in its general topics, but also at times in its direct comments on the AA and the *Vivṛti*, the Eighth Karmapa's JNS uses the terms *shentong* (sixty times), Mahāmudrā (twenty times), mind's luminosity, the perfect nature, and various terms for buddha nature (such as sugata heart, tathāgata heart, and buddha heart) in relation to prajñāpāramitā. JNS also employs the term Great Madhyamaka (twelve times) and the general topic on the disposition speaks about ālaya-wisdom (seven times). Either explicitly or implicitly, JNS takes all these terms to be synonyms. CE does not refer to Mahāmudrā and mentions *Shentong* and Great Madhyamaka each just once at its beginning (as the respective ways in which Asaṅga/Vasubandhu and Haribhadra comment on the AA), while its presentations of the other terms basically agree with JNS (for variations, see below).

The Eighth Karmapa's Shentong

As outlined in more detail elsewhere,[335] what is generally known as the *Shentong* tradition is far from being a monolithic or uniform system, but for individual masters, *shentong* obviously means very different things, as evidenced by their giving their own distinct views on its meaning and its relation to *rangtong*. Certain Tibetan scholars use the term *shentong* to refer to a doctrine with set positions (which can differ greatly as well). Others speak about it in the sense of a philosophical or an experiential outlook. Some refer to it as a tradition of how to practice meditation (*sgom lugs*), and others take it to be a combination of theory and practice, that is, view and meditation. Some even argue that *Rangtong* and *Shentong* represent sūtrayāna and vajrayāna, respectively. Among all these different presentations of *Shentong*, the explanations on *shentong* that are found in JNS are certainly among the most unique, often differing greatly from any other brands of *Shentong*.

Due to its nature of primarily being a commentary on the AA as representing the hidden meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, JNS is obviously neither a doxographical text that outlines the details of the views of different Buddhist philosophical systems in general, nor a treatise that is devoted to *Shentong* Madhyamaka in particular (this term is mentioned only once).[336] Though there are occasional references to *shentong*, its meaning and the details of the associated view are not explained in just one place, but bits and pieces of information are scattered throughout JNS. What is very clear throughout, however, is that the Eighth Karmapa consistently denies any reifying or absolutist interpretation of what *shentong* means and emphasizes that it does not refer to a philosophical position per se, but to what is directly realized by nonconceptual wisdom in the meditative equipoise of the first bhūmi and above, thus essentially being beyond the domain of conceptual analysis and description.

In comparison with other texts on *Shentong* (especially Dölpopa's), one is tempted to call the presentation in JNS "*Shentong* Lite," since it very much accords with and uses the classical Madhyamaka approach of Nāgārjuna (as is also attested in the above statements by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, Jamyang Chökyi Gyaltsen, and Khenpo Kyotra Tamchö Dawa on JNS greatly conforming with *Rangtong* and *Prāsaṅgika). When judged from the very common view of *Rangtong* and *Shentong* as being diametrically opposed positions and the former being the only correct way to explain the AA, it may appear very peculiar to use *Shentong* in a commentary on the AA. However, as explained above, when considering the overall strong Yogācāra underpinnings of the AA and almost all of its Indian and Tibetan commentaries, this is not so surprising as it may seem at first because the very bedrock of *Shentong* consists of nothing but classic Indian Yogācāra and the teachings on buddha nature.

The Kagyü School sometimes distinguishes between "the other-emptiness of luminosity" (*gsal ba gzhan stong*) and "the other-emptiness of the [dharma] dhātu" (*dbyings gzhan stong*). Briefly speaking, the first one refers to buddha nature's wisdom being empty of adventitious stains (the "other"), while this wisdom itself is not empty, but exists as the ultimate nature of luminosity. Thus, the ultimately real existence of the luminous nature of mind and its innate buddha qualities is emphasized. Typical proponents of this include Dölpopa, Tāranātha (who even wrote two commentaries on the *Heart Sūtra* from the perspective of "other-emptiness"), and Jamgön Kongtrul. "The other-emptiness of the dhātu" means that, in and as itself, both dharmadhātu and the nondual nonconceptual experience of the wisdom that realizes this dharmadhātu as mind's true nature are free from any reference points and any grasping at reference points (such as being real or unreal, existent or nonexistent). This latter view is found, for example, in JNS and the works of the Sixth Shamarpa.

The contemporary Kagyü master Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche explains that distinction as just representing the two sides of the same coin—the inseparable unity of the expanse of the dharmadhātu and its own awareness (*dbyings rig dbyer med*), which means that the dharmadhātu naturally possesses the element or quality of basic wakefulness or luminosity. As the two facets of this unity, "the other-emptiness of the dhātu" refers to the dharmadhātu being free from all reference points and "the other-emptiness of luminosity" stands for this dharmadhātu's basic awareness. In both cases, the word "other" refers to the entirety of all reference points of seeming reality. Thus, as for commenting on the AA, there may be many explanations in terms of either *Rangtong* or *Shentong*, but ultimately the AA deals with nothing but said unity of the dharmadhātu and its awareness since both its purpose and essential key point lie in realizing exactly this unity. Consequently, the best way to explain the AA is in terms of this unity of the dharmadhātu's unreifiable nature and its basic awareness, which is by definition beyond *rangtong* and *shentong*.

Pawo Rinpoche's *History of Dharma*[337] states that the Karmapa's early teacher Chödrub Senge, who fully ordained him and gave him extensive instructions on the *Shentong* view, had requested him to uphold this view through giving many great explanations on it, which resulted in the Karmapa's subsequent composition of JNS according to the systems of Jonang and Silung.[338] The Eighth Karmapa's higher scriptural education is reported to have begun with an intense study of the major texts of both the sūtrayāna and the tantrayāna with Karma Trinlépa for three years (from age twenty to twenty-two), which included the AA and its commentaries. Pawo Rinpoche also informs us about the Karmapa's statement that it is not reasonable for the view of all teachings on valid cognition, abhidharma, Madhyamaka, and the vajrayāna to be *Shentong*.[339]

So far, the Eighth Karmapa's scriptural legacy remains largely unread by modern scholars and there is only a single systematic study of his Madhyamaka view.[340] Instead, both Tibetans and Westerners are seen to make unfounded claims about Mikyö Dorje's view, such as that he was one of the main proponents of *Shentong* in the Kagyü lineage.[341] Even a brief overview of Mikyö Dorje's texts shows that this is definitely not the case—besides JNS with its occasional references to a very unique form of *Shentong*, only very few of the Eighth Karmapa's texts mention, usually quite briefly, the term *shentong* or related topics. Among them, *The Lamp that Excellently Elucidates the System of the Proponents of Shentong Madhyamaka* only discusses buddha nature and its adventitious stains (largely based on the first chapter of the *Uttaratantra* and Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* on it), but does not give a general systematic presentation of the *Shentong* view either.[342] In particular, Mikyö

Dorje's later commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, in which he considers Nāgārjuna and Saraha as those who hold the ultimate view, is generally said to represent his final stance on the correct mahāyāna view. In it, he repeatedly rejects at length any notions of a *Shentong* view or tradition (let alone it being Madhyamaka) and of a Madhyamaka system of Maitreya and Asaṅga .[343] Thus, as Kapstein rightly says:

> I would suggest, therefore, that . . . doxographic labels such as *gzhan stong pa* and *rang stong pa* are best avoided, except of course where they are used within the tradition itself. Our primary task must be to document and interpret precise concepts and arguments, and in many cases the recourse to overly broad characterizations seems only to muddy the waters.[344]

Likewise, Huntington's statement about Indian mahāyāna naturally also applies to Tibetan authors:

> In working to develop a critical intellectual history of early Indian Mahāyāna, then, the focus of our attention must shift from "tenets" and "schools" . . . to individual authors and their own original words.[345]

In this vein, in the Buddhist tradition in general (at least in theory), it is regarded as one of the signs of a commentator of the highest caliber to expound each scripture according to its own system and context, without mixing different traditions or constantly imposing one's own "highest" view.[346] Pawo Rinpoche's *History of the Dharma*[347] says that this approach is reflected in all commentaries by the Eighth Karmapa since he always taught in accordance with the propensities of his disciples and through keeping to the main principles that are characteristic for a given text, and not just by clinging to a single meaning throughout all of his comments on different texts. In his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Mikyö Dorje himself states that the systems of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra must be treated independently in their own contexts. As the materials from JNS in the present two volumes show, the Eighth Karmapa's works are often hard to read and require careful examination in order to determine exactly what his points in highly complex matters are, which makes the task of gaining a well-founded picture of his view not any easier. However, it is hoped that his explanations that are contained here help in shedding some more light on his unique and complex ways of presenting the view in various settings.

The following excerpts from JNS are presented in an attempt to give an overview of Mikyö Dorje's position on *Shentong* in this text. JNS's elaboration on the nature of phenomena and wisdom in terms of being other-empty versus self-empty starts as follows.

> *Wisdom refers to the dharmadhātu (the nature of phenomena empty of all adventitious phenomena) and, by virtue of it also being aware of itself, to the pure subject called "personally experienced wisdom."*[348] Such emptiness and wisdom are referred to as unborn emptiness and wisdom . . .
>
> According to the victor Maitreya, there are three emptinesses—[the emptiness of] existence, [the emptiness of] nonexistence, and natural emptiness. He stated that, among these, *not understanding the natural emptiness and wisdom of the perfect nature simply means to not understand its emptiness and wisdom.* Some people say, "It is very much true and justified that venerable [Maitreya] said so and that also the mother sūtras declare the nature of phenomena—the perfect nature—to be emptiness. This means that it is taught to be self-empty and not taught to be other-empty." This is not the case. *The Sūtra [in Eight Thousand Lines]* teaches:
>
> The mind is no-mind. The nature of the mind is luminosity.[349]
>
> Therefore, *since the adventitious mind is self-empty, it does not exist. Since natural luminosity is other-empty, it is not taught as empty, but as "luminosity."* Maitreya's [*Uttaratantra* I.155c] says:
>
> It is not empty of unsurpassable dharmas . . .
>
> *This declares that the dharma that is the unsurpassable nature of phenomena is not empty of its own nature.*[350]

And:

> *What is other than the vajra mind (the buddha heart or natural luminosity) and can be separated from it (sentient beings, stains, the seeming, mistakenness, and ignorance) is adventitious because it is not an established basis in the first place.* Thus, on the temporary level, it is terminable and relinquishable. If it were an established base right from the start, it would not be terminable or relinquishable because it is established primordially. So who would be able to relinquish it and who would be able to terminate it?[351]

JNS identifies the correct referent of using the term "other-empty" in an expedient functional way, but emphasizes that, in actual fact and from the perspective of direct realization within meditative equipoise, the nature of phenomena is neither self-empty nor other-empty anyway, let alone bearing any reifiable intrinsic nature.

> Furthermore, *there is also not the flaw of the other-empty's own nature not being empty.* Since the name "other-empty" is applied to emptiness [in the sense] of the other features within this basis [—the nature of phenomena—] being empty of their own respective natures, the other-empty's own nature does not become nonempty. *The reason for this is that the name "other-empty" is [only] applied to the compound meaning of this basis [—the nature of phenomena—] being empty of said respective [features, but not to this basis in itself being other-empty].*[352] However, it is not asserted that this basis—the nature of phenomena—is empty of its own nature. [Likewise, as was just said,] this [basis itself] is not other-empty either. Therefore, *if it is not other-empty, forget about it being self-empty.* Nevertheless, it functions as the basis of emptiness in terms of being other-empty, whereas it is not suitable as the basis of emptiness in terms of being self-empty. The reason for this is that only what is concordant in type with an emptiness that embraces that of which it is empty—the bearers of this [empty] nature that are other—is suitable as the basis of emptiness of this [other-empty emptiness], whereas the other one [—the basis of emptiness in terms of being self-empty—] is not suitable as such. The meaning of being "concordant in type" is as follows. The emptiness that consists of the prajñā of knowing that what is other—the adventitious stains—is terminated and does not arise [again] concords in terms of focal objects and aspects with the basis that is the nature of phenomena—the [sugata] heart. The reason for the other one [—the basis of emptiness in terms of being self-empty—] not being concordant in terms of focal objects and aspects with this [nature of phenomena] is that all adventitious phenomena are empty in such a way that, by virtue of being impermanent right upon their sheer presence, their own natures cease. Therefore, they do not concord in terms of focal objects and aspects with this basis that is the genuine nature of phenomena. Since this basis—the nature of phenomena—lacks any being impermanent, any perishing of its own nature right upon its sheer presence, any ceasing, and any arising whatsoever, it is not concordant in terms of focal objects and aspects with these [adventitious phenomena]. [On the other hand,] when the prajñā of knowing that what is other (the stains) is

terminated and does not arise [again] focuses on the permanent and unchanging nature of phenomena (the nature of phenomena that is free from the triad of arising, abiding, and ceasing), it concords in terms of focal objects and aspects [with this nature].

There is also *another reason for the other-empty's own nature being self-empty.* The subject in question—the other-empty, which is all the while empty of what is other (the adventitious bearers of the nature [of phenomena])—is what entails the adventitious stains (which are other than this basis) being all the while empty in that their own nature does not remain for an instant because these bearers of the nature [of phenomena] are seeming reality. For this reason, *one definitely needs to accept that what is other-empty is necessarily self-empty.* But if one claims that the emptiness which is asserted to be self-empty is the emptiness that actually fulfills this function, it is not suitable to assert any other-empty that is other than self-empty.

Now, *the reason that this basis—the nature of phenomena—is [actually] neither other-empty nor self-empty is that it is not even suitable as a sheer emptiness that is not specified as being empty or not being empty of itself or something other.* For it has the essential character of being the utter peace of all reference points in terms of being empty or not being empty. Thus, *from the perspective of the [actual] freedom from reference points, no characteristics whatsoever of being empty of itself or something other transpire within the basis that is the nature of phenomena.* [However,] from the perspective of entertaining reference points, among the two emptinesses of being empty of itself or of something other, being other-empty is superior and being self-empty is inferior. The reason for this is that if one does not realize the actual way of being of being self-empty, just as it is, one does not realize or infer the actual way of being of being other-empty. As for understanding and inferring being self-empty, even if one does not understand the actual way of being of being other-empty, an inferential understanding of being self-empty is easily accomplished. Since this is a valid cognition that is definite through experience, may the minds of those with the proper fortune rely on it.[353]

JNS's general topic on emptiness and wisdom differentiates the positions of various brands of Mādhyamikas on this as follows.

b) The system that is in common with the Mādhyamikas who propound self-emptiness

Through presenting all phenomena of suchness and variety as the bases of emptiness, the objects of negation based on these are the mental states of clinging to these phenomena as existing in the form of being established through a nature of their own. In this context, this nature that is referred to as "phenomena's own nature" has to be divided into the two realities. Thus, in terms of the ultimate, one may say, "*Since all phenomena do not have a nature, they are empty of nature, which is their nature or essence.*" *However, such is only said in terms of conveniently concise conventions* . . . In terms of the seeming, when taking a pillar as an example, the fact that this very aspect of a pillar possesses the function of supporting a beam and so on is presented as its nature . . . The nature of pillars, vases, and so on is what is directly observed, such as their performing a function. Apart from that, a substantially existent nature of pillars, vases, and so on that lies not within the sphere of the sense faculties or is not observable by them is not something that is suitable to appear . . .

However, to assert the fact of the above-mentioned nature of seeming phenomena being nonexistent or empty as being the nature of ultimate reality refers only to the context of accepting a presentation of ultimate reality. When such a presentation is not accepted either, one must state that the very nature of the ultimate (being empty of any essence of the seeming) is empty of this very nature. *Nāgārjuna said again and again that,* if one does not state it in this way, *the view of regarding emptiness as being emptiness is a view that leads to very great ruin. Therefore, that which is the emptiness of something does not exist as the nature of this something. For it is asserted that entities are empty of any nature in terms of both realities.* Also, when it is asserted that pillars, vases, and so on lack a nature of their own, an ultimate reality or basic nature that serves as the nature or core of this lack of nature is not asserted either.

As for the emptiness of something being empty of that something, (1) the *Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas* and (2) the *Mādhyamikas who follow common consensus* have their own individual positions.

1) As long as not reading a presentation of emptiness, *the former assert that its nature is cognition,*[354] because they assert that the basis of emptiness of the fourth emptiness[355] is cognition. As Haribhadra says:

> By virtue of all phenomena being empty, also the emptiness that is the nature of the cognitions that have the emptiness of the internal and so on as their focal objects is emptiness. Therefore, it is the emptiness of emptiness. The mere cognition that all phenomena are emptiness is the emptiness of all phenomena. By virtue of this, emptiness is also empty because it relinquishes the conceptions of clinging to this [emptiness].[356]

2) *The latter assert the nature of being empty of something to be a spacelike nonimplicative negation.* Āryavimuktisena says that emptiness is the focal object of wisdom (the subject):

> You may wonder, "What is the focal object of nonconceptual wisdom?" It is said to be "the emptiness of all phenomena."[357]

. . . you may wonder, "How is this asserted in Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's own system, who take the tradition of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas as their basis?" The meaning of "the emptiness of all phenomena" (as in the above quote from Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*) does not refer to the nonexistence of the appearances of the seeming, but to seeing the appearances of the seeming, which are specified through being empty of a nature of their own, as being illusionlike. Having put forward such a thesis, the proof for this is set up as follows: "Any cognition that engages in the focal object under discussion here is necessarily one that focuses on illusionlike appearances, just like a dream consciousness. Also the wisdoms as they are explained here (as the perceiving subjects of the twenty emptinesses) are cognitions that engage in such focal objects" . . . *Therefore, it is negated that illusionlike appearances have any real existence, but the lack of real existence is not affirmed. Consequently, just through saying that what is empty of reality and merely appearing is not existent, one does not end up with something really established.* As the *Vṛtti* says:

> There is no flaw because Devadatta will not rearise if his killer has been killed.[358]

It may be said, "However, does this not contradict the statement in the mother sūtras that the focal object of the knowledge of all aspects is the lack of entity?" The meaning of this statement is not

that it was made with the intention of taking the nonimplicative negation that is the lack of entity as an object of wisdom. Rather, if it had been made with this intention, it would follow that the subject that takes such an object is a mental state that operates by way of an isolate, that is, an elimination-of-other. Therefore, this is not reasonable. So what is the meaning of this statement? It refers to the focal object of wisdom as what appears as the various manifestations of the dependent origination of the seeming, which are specified by having negated any real entities. Here, superimpositions are cut through by focusing on mere appearances through study, reflection, and meditation on the mundane level of the path. Once these superimpositions have been severed through that, there is certainty about nothing but sheer suchness. Consequently, all focusing through anything on anything as anything is nothing but emptiness of these respective factors. That this is the case in terms of the path of learning is stated by the *Vṛtti*:

> Much indeed remains to be said in terms of classifying it into mirrorlike wisdom and so on. However, this presentation of the equipment of wisdom is just a fraction.[359]

Thus, the *Vṛtti* teaches that the above does not apply to the mahāyāna wisdom of nonlearning. You may wonder, "How about this wisdom then?" *Once all latent tendencies of dualistic appearance have been eradicated in this wisdom, there is no chance for any appearances of the seeming in it.*[360]

As for the difference between *rangtong* and *shentong* and what is of expedient versus definitive meaning, JNS says:

> To teach the "nonbeing" or "the lack of nature" of entities (such as form) from the perspective of people who entertain reference points is done for a purpose. To teach "the lack of nature" as "the nature" is not a presentation as the nature of something in the sense that it is the very nature of the lack of nature itself. Rather, it means that the lack of nature is not something other than the nature of the lack of nature, which is nothing other than the meaning of "the emptiness of emptiness." This meaning represents the final system of those who assert that everything is empty of a nature of its own.
>
> However, some *Shentongpas* who do not know how to speak properly of *Shentong* claim it to be "the entity of the nonexistence

of entities" and *assert that the lack of nature is established as the nature of the lack of nature, thus being an existent. Those people do not speak in accordance with Maitreya.* That the phenomena of seeming reality are empty of a nature of themselves is exclusively explained by him as their not abiding as any nature of their own, while the nature of the lack of nature never turns into anything else than a nonimplicative negation. Therefore, *to proclaim an implicative negation in terms of the nature of the lack of nature being a remainder is not the system of the Shentongpas.*

What the supreme proponents of *Shentong* say is that the ultimate perfect nature, which *has* a nature, is the nature that actually fulfills this function. But when such is said, *this nature is not nonempty either and the existence of this nature is not something that consists of or is included in reference points and characteristics.* Therefore, it does not fall into any extremes of reference points. Since said existence abides ultimately, it is free from all extremes of permanence and extinction. However, *to teach said nature as the nature of the nonexistence of seeming entities and to teach it as the nature that is the existence of the ultimate entity must be understood as being what entails an intention and this intention, respectively.* To teach this nature as the nature of the nonexistence of entities is done from the perspective of people who entertain reference points and out of the concern that these people may become afraid of emptiness. From the perspective of the noble ones without reference points, the very same nature is explained as the nature that is the existence of an entity. Therefore, the explanation of the ultimate perfect nature as the nature of the nonexistence of entities is the expedient meaning and its explanation as the nature that is the existence of an entity is the definitive meaning.[361]

When commenting on the sixteen moments of the path of seeing in AA II.12–16, JNS[362] says that the statement, "Seeming form and so on are realized to ultimately be the dharmadhātu" accords with neither *Rangtong* Madhyamaka nor *Shentong* Madhyamaka. According to the former, it is impossible for something like form and such to be realized as the dharmadhātu (the cause of the noble ones), which is declared to be the sole reality of nirvāṇa by the victors. For form and the dharmadhātu discord in their defining characteristics; seeming form is empty of any nature of its own; and its appearing as if it were able to perform a function is deceiving.

According to the *Shentongpas*, through the power of dependent origination, neither what is false (seeming form and such) nor what is correct (the

ultimate dharmadhātu) sheds their respective own natures. However, it is neither possible for what is false to be realized through valid cognition as what is correct, nor is it possible for what is correct to be realized as what is false. If such were possible, endless flaws would accrue, such as it following that all presentations of valid cognition and nonvalid cognition become destroyed and that the true nature of dependent origination does not operate in terms of the power of entities.

Mikyö Dorje also clearly states that when he discusses *shentong* in JNS, he does so merely from a conventional and conceptual perspective. However, this conceptual form of *shentong* is actually just *rangtong*, as opposed to the direct yogic perception of the actual other-empty through the nonconceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise. JNS[363] says that the unchanging perfect nature, which is the true basis of emptiness, is not taught explicitly in the middle turning of the wheel of dharma. For one would not be able to relinquish the clinging to it as being something real—if one has not even eliminated the clinging to the reality of form and so on, which are much coarser than this profound and subtle basis of emptiness, forget about eliminating the clinging to this very basis as being something real. However, in the final turning of the wheel, when something like the vajra heart—which is introduced subsequent to having eliminated all reference points—is taught as the basis of emptiness, its recipients are completely ready for such a teaching, because, at this point, all reference points and characteristics with regard to the entirety of phenomena and their true nature have already been cut through.

Also, in the context of the twenty emptinesses, the *Ālokā* and the *Vṛtti* neither put forward the final actuality of the mother (which is the profound other-empty) nor the basis of emptiness that actually fulfills this function and is found in the final turning of the wheel of dharma. The reason for this is that this context of the second turning is the proper occasion to negate assertions of existence in terms of (1) being established through a nature of its own; (b) arising through its own specific characteristics; and (c) abiding through a nature. Nevertheless, not to ascertain any of the phenomena of the seeming, which are only established from the perspective of ordinary mental states, and yet not to speak about the basis of emptiness that is profound other-emptiness is done with the implication of buddhas and bodhisattvas being skilled in the progressive stages of teaching the dharma.

As for the two ways in which all phenomena are empty, JNS says:

> The twenty bases of emptiness that are the bearers of the nature of emptiness are empty of the respective own natures of what these bases of emptiness are. For, if they were not empty of their respective own natures, the other-empty also would not actually fulfill the

function of being empty of these respective natures of theirs. This is why they are asserted as the twenty emptinesses, but they are not divided in this way from the perspective of their *being* emptiness. *Certain people do not accept that these bases of emptiness are empty, but search for something of which they are empty that lies outside of these bases. Those people contradict all systems of the proponents of pure self-emptiness.*

The fact that Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra commented on all the twenty bases of emptiness that are the bearers of the nature of emptiness as being self-empty does not mean that they did not teach or assert the profound other-empty. For they taught those bases to be self-empty with the intention of (a) this being the context of putting an end to any kind of identity and (b) all twenty emptinesses referring solely to the seeming that is suitable to appear to (ordinary) mental states. However, *when these two masters discussed the ultimate, in terms of its being beyond such mental states, they did not speak about it being self-empty.* You may wonder, "How do you know that they speak about this in terms of the seeming?" All the twenty numbers in the list of twenty emptinesses and all twenty bases of emptiness that are the bearers of the nature of emptiness consist exclusively of what are suitable to be observed as objects of (ordinary) mental states. Therefore, it is not suitable for them to pertain to something other than the seeming—the ultimate. In the ultimate (the other-empty), numbers are not tenable. Although this actual basis of emptiness (the other-empty) exists, if it is not even something that is suitable to be observed, how could it be suitable to appear as an object of (ordinary) mental states? Thus, this presentation is exclusively based on phenomena of the seeming.

Some people may say, "Therefore, it follows that also the profound other-empty (the sphere of those who see beyond), such as the flawless dharma,[364] is the seeming because its twenty bases of emptiness are the ones mentioned." Also the flawless dharma can be classified as the two aspects of self-empty and other-empty for the following reasons. *The imputed other-empty*, such as the flawless dharma that is presented as the conceptual object of those who just see this life, *is self-empty. The other-empty that actually fulfills this function*—what is clearly manifest for nonconceptual wisdom (such as the flawless dharma of those who see beyond)—*is nothing but other-empty.* In this system here, the topic is treated in terms of the former one of these two.

After having reflected well on this,
Without it being very absurd,
I explained Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's intention of this section
Just as it rests in Yogācāra.[365]

In this vein, JNS says about prajñāpāramitā being difficult to realize (AA III.6ab)[366] that, just as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Haribhadra asserts the seeing of the reality of the nature of phenomena on the first bhūmi as representing the fully qualified seeing of this reality if the fundamental nature of the ultimate—the profound other-empty—is seen. However, without seeing this fundamental nature, just by virtue of realizing the fundamental nature of the seeming—the nonprofound self-empty—as a nonimplicative negation, this is not the fully qualified seeing of reality.

Elaborating on the nondual wisdom that represents this fully qualified seeing of reality, JNS comments on the *Vivṛti* in the context of the fourth stage of yoga as follows:

> Though the elimination of the thesis that nondual consciousness empty of apprehender and apprehended exists does not clearly appear in Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*, he speaks of nondual wisdom being twofold—*the nominal nondual wisdom whose nature is dependent origination and the nonnominal nondual wisdom whose nature is not dependent origination.* In the system of the Niḥsvabhāvavādins, it is nothing but the first one that is presumed to be the ultimate reality that actually fulfills this function. In order to eliminate reference points about this wisdom in terms of thinking that it truly exists, through the reasoning of its being dependent origination, they reject that it is a permanent existent. This is expressed in the *Vivṛti* through the passage starting with, "Having gained certainty in the sense of thinking that this sheer nondual wisdom . . ." *The latter wisdom is a permanent existent and beyond dependent phenomena since reference points and characteristics are not supported by it.* Thus, without adducing any reasonings that eliminate reference points, the *Vivṛti* explains that cognitive obscurations are relinquished through resting in the meditative equipoise of this nondual wisdom having arisen. This is expressed in the passage, ". . . is to be experienced personally . . ."
>
> I think that this manner in which Haribhadra comments here appears to represent the unsurpassable system of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. The Seventh Karmapa comments that the *Vivṛti*,

> through saying in the context of explaining the third stage of yoga that "also mere cognizance is eliminated," implicitly teaches that the notion of a truly existing nondual consciousness must be eliminated. In the context of explaining the fourth stage of yoga, by virtue of taking this need to eliminate the notion of a truly existing nondual consciousness as the basis of the explanation, this notion is not mentioned explicitly anymore. Though truly existing nondual wisdom being the outcome is taken as the basis here, this nondual wisdom is twofold—from the perspective of others, it appears as the aspect of dependent origination, and from its own perspective, it exists as the self-arisen nature. The first one—appearing as the aspect of dependent origination—actually exists, but it is what eliminates mind's mistakenness.[367]

Elaborating on AA V.21, JNS[368] adds that the outcome of this is as follows. If one purifies one's mind stream through the reasonings in the context of studying and reflecting that explain all phenomena as being empty of phenomenal identity, finally the power of meditation reaches perfection because such purification is the supreme means to manifest the path of seeing that phenomena are empty of identity. *Uttaratantra* I.154 and AA V.21 identify the emptiness beyond dependent origination, which is the nonnominal nondual wisdom to be seen during the path of seeing. In the nature of this nondual wisdom, no obscurations are to be removed and no wisdom is to be added. Rather, this nondual wisdom is the object to be seen by personally experienced wisdom, but there is no chance ever of it being viewed by something else, that is, any form of ordinary consciousness. Also, this nondual wisdom that is the object to be viewed is an entity (for details on wisdom being a permanent entity, see below).

All of this (as well as other passages below) emphasizes the experiential thrust of the actual meaning of *shentong*, which is the most crucial distinction in any meaningful discussion of *rangtong* and *shentong*—that these notions apply to two different realms of experience and discourse. As Ruegg says:

> [O]ne could assume an incompatibility, at one and the same level of reference, between two philosophical propositions, both of which cannot be true in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Alternatively, one might perhaps suppose a complementarity — perhaps even an incommensurability — between two doctrines that relate to different levels of reference or discourse, and which are accordingly not mutually exclusive or contradictory.[369]

In fact, this is precisely one of the major points in Dölpopa's original presentation of *rangtong* and *shentong*, which was often overlooked by later *Shentongpas* as well as their opponents (whether deliberately or not). Despite the claims of his opponents, Dölpopa's use of this distinction is epistemological in nature and not ontological or reifying. In one of his main works, *The Ocean of Definitive Meaning* (Tib. nges don rgya mtsho), he himself makes a clear distinction between a "philosophical system" (Skt. siddhānta, Tib. grub mtha'), which is based on certain explanations and arguments, and a "point of view" in the sense of a more encompassing and experiential outlook (Skt. darśana, Tib. lta ba). He understands the latter as not being primarily focused on, or limited to, what can be determined through scholarly analyses. Rather, all such intellectual approaches represent only a preliminary part of a worldview that is primarily grounded in direct meditative experiences and realizations (often in the context of advanced vajrayāna practices). It is the entirety of this that Dölpopa calls "Great Madhyamaka" and *Shentong*—the outlook of noble beings who have directly realized how their minds and phenomena really are. In this sense, *Shentong* is clearly contrasted with ordinary Madhyamaka or *Rangtong* as a mere system of conceptual philosophical analysis.

Thus, on those two levels, the entire perspective of what ultimate reality or the nature of phenomena is, how it is perceived, and any style of discourse about this must be very different. For a number of reasons, many later *Shentongpas* and their opponents did not follow this epistemological distinction and often treat both *Rangtong* and *Shentong* on the same level of philosophical schools, while Dölpopa himself never spoke about proponents of *Rangtong* versus proponents of *Shentong*. Rather, he sees *Rangtong* as a philosophical system that he accepts as far as it can take one on the conceptual level of philosophical analysis, but not as adequately portraying the experiential level of direct insight into the ultimate nature of phenomena, thus by definition not applying to the latter level. Consequently, the major basis of the later controversy about *Rangtong* and *Shentong* lies in the confusion as to whether their contrast pertains to the level of philosophical systems or to the level of the nonconceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise (often these levels are even mixed). For Dölpopa, it clearly was the contrast between a philosophical system on the one hand and a direct vision of true reality on the other. In brief, the *rangtong-shentong* issue is only a problem if what *rangtong* and *shentong* refer to are regarded as mutually exclusive on the same level of discourse and realization, which JNS clearly and repeatedly denies.

Obviously, it is very much in the light of this distinction that one has to understand JNS's statements about the ultimately real existence of nondual wisdom, the sugata heart, and so on and their being a permanent entity. Thus, for JNS, nondual wisdom, "the profound other-empty," and so on only come to life within the perspective of the actual nonconceptual realization

of ultimate reality in the meditative equipoise that is free from all reference points (from the first bhūmi onward), but these terms are not to be understood as referring to some absolute philosophical positions within the confines of discourse through words and thoughts. For, on the latter level, nothing withstands analysis, while the direct realization of the nature of phenomena, just as it is, is by definition beyond all words, thoughts, and reasoning, thus being outside the sphere of any analysis, just as the sheer experience of the taste of chocolate, in itself, can never be subject to analysis, but undeniably takes place. Conventionally and conceptually more or less correct analytical attempts to describe this experience may be made either subsequent to it by people who actually had the experience of tasting chocolate or by those who never had it. However, none of these descriptions, however articulate and conventionally "correct" they may seem, can ever match or truly portray the direct experience of eating chocolate, let alone the realization of the true nature of phenomena. Thus, JNS says:

> *. . . it is solely in the nondual wisdom that is the nature of ultimate reality that there is no clinging to extremes. For it is this very wisdom that completely eradicates said extremes, but this wisdom has the nature of it being impossible for it to entertain any views about extremes about itself, such as its being existent or nonexistent. On the other hand, it is equally impossible for any cognitions of those who possess a mind stream of clinging to extremes to cling to any extremes (such as existence and nonexistence) with regard to this wisdom.* For if this wisdom is not even suitable to appear in the form of a mere object generality as an object of any cognitions that cling to extremes, it is certainly impossible for any cognitions of those who possess a mind stream of clinging to extremes to take this wisdom as their basis of analysis and then cling to it as existent, nonexistent, or anything else. For this reason, the reasoning of this really established nondual wisdom lacking or being empty of a nature is not something that can be conceived.
>
> Thus, this is the manner in which both true reality and what appears as if being false reality are free from extremes. If one rests in meditative equipoise in accordance with this manner being just as it is, the seeds of all obscurations are eradicated.[370]

And:

> In the final turning of the wheel, *when something like the vajra heart—which is introduced subsequent to having eliminated all*

> *reference points—is taught as the basis of emptiness, it is not the case that one is not in a state of poised readiness for such a teaching. For, at this point, all reference points and characteristics with regard to the entirety of phenomena and their true nature have already been cut through.*[371]

And:

> *When the own nature of all imaginary and other-dependent phenomena* (such as the skandhas) *is analyzed, their own nature is emptiness,* just as in the example of a banana tree without pith. *As for the perfect nature (the emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects), in general, it cannot be analyzed and, no matter how it may be analyzed, it does not become like that—empty of a nature of its own. For it never changes into anything else than this supreme kind of wisdom.* Some people say, "The other-empty emptiness does not actually fulfill the function of emptiness *since its own nature is not emptiness." This is not justified.* As for being emptiness, the mahāyāna abhidharma explains that an emptiness without a presentation of (a) a basis of emptiness, (b) something that it is empty of, and (c) what is empty of what does not actually fulfill the function of emptiness. *It is taught that an emptiness that actually fulfills this function is an emptiness in terms of that which is the basis of emptiness being empty of what it is empty of.* This means being empty in a way that actually fulfills this function. However, if something is counted as an emptiness that actually fulfills this function by virtue of being empty in such a way that it is empty of its own nature, then something whose own nature does not abide in it is explained as being self-empty. Consequently, since it follows in this case that all emptinesses in the sense of extinction (such as the child of a barren woman) are emptinesses that actually fulfill this function, this is not tenable.[372]

In brief, emptiness as it is explained here is not just a logical abstraction or a mere fact that applies to all phenomena in a general sense, but is understood as "the emptiness that actually fulfills this function," which is clearly the soteriological function of realizing the true nature of one's mind, just as it is, and being liberated from all delusional fictions that obscure it. In other words, the sheer fact that everything is empty of itself or lacks a real nature of its own is both overextensive (since it applies even to nonexistents, such as the horns of a rabbit) and, in terms of realizing this emptiness to be mind's

true nature, basically misses the point. To understand that the horns of a rabbit lack a nature of their own or are empty of themselves has no liberating effect whatsoever since nobody believes in their real existence or having a nature in the first place. Consequently, nobody engages in any actions motivated by attachment to or aversion for them, wishing to acquire or get rid of them. But for everything that we take to be really existent (be it material or mental), the exact opposite is true—the belief in really existing phenomena triggers attachment and aversion, followed by corresponding actions, all of which lead to suffering. Since this is the basic problem of saṃsāric existence, in order to be liberated, emptiness needs to be realized in a double fashion (or as two sides of the same coin, so to speak). (1) It must be realized that everything (including mind's nature) that seems to be real and have a nature of its own is actually unreal and lacks any nature, which liberates from the clinging to illusory yet afflictive phenomena. (2) To realize the true nature of the mind that realizes (1), which is empty of everything under (1), including any tendency to reify the true nature of this realizing mind itself, reveals mind's natural qualities. However, the sheer lack of real existence of this mind per se does not qualify as buddhahood with all its inconceivable qualities of wisdom, compassion, and enlightened activity (otherwise, there would be no difference between realizing the emptiness of the horns of a rabbit and of one's mind). Rather, from an experiential perspective (as also explained in Appendix I1E3), the point is to let mind's natural luminosity (the actual basis of emptiness)—which cannot be pinpointed or reified in any way—unfold itself just as it is, which can only happen once it is not obscured by the adventitious stains of the illusory phenomena of which it is empty.

In sum, the Eighth Karmapa's presentation of *shentong* clearly exhibits two very distinct levels of discourse, treating the same topic from two radically different perspectives between which there is no overlap, with their frames of mind and modes of perception being mutually exclusive. A classical *via negativa* Madhyamaka stance on ultimate reality when discussing *shentong* on the level of conventional philosophical parlance contrasts with a strongly affirmative terminology when speaking about the level of nonconceptual meditative experience and realization. Through understanding this two-leveled approach and the shifts from one level to the other, seeming contradictions in the Karmapa's presentation can be resolved easily. The critics of his *Shentong* view (mainly from the Gelugpa School) usually failed to acknowledge this approach and just harped on the incompatibility of sthose two levels through solely addressing them within the narrow boundaries of dialectical discourse through formulaic reasonings.

Great Madhyamaka

As mentioned before, both JNS and CE repeatedly declare that not only Nāgārjuna, but also Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu are Mādhyamikas, and JNS says several times that, in commenting on the works of Maitreya, one must follow Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In particular, JNS states that the Madhyamaka view held by Asaṅga is the final intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA and that Haribhadra follows this Madhyamaka as asserted by Asaṅga. Also, there is no way that Vasubandhu would comment on the intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as being Mere Mentalism as it is included in the four Buddhist philosophical systems.[373] JNS mentions the term *Shentong* Madhyamaka only once and usually speaks of Great Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Madhyamaka (which are taken to be equivalent) instead. JNS clearly and repeatedly sets off these terms from the "Mere Mentalists" (be they Real or False Aspectarians), the Niḥsvabhāvavādins (be they *Svātantrikas or *Prāsaṅgikas), and the Mādhyamikas who follow common consensus, even saying that there is no Buddhist philosophical system above Great Madhyamaka.[374] The Indian masters who, according to JNS, belong to this highest philosophical system of Great Madhyamaka are Nāgārjuna, Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, and, by implication, Āryavimuktiṣena and Haribhadra, while Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, and even Śāntarakṣita (at least as far as the position of the latter two on buddhas perceiving seeming reality is concerned) are explicitly or implicitly said to not be Great Mādhyamikas.[375] In addition, JNS criticizes the Niḥsvabhāvavādins several times, such as for their lack of understanding of the position of the Buddhist tantras, Maitreya, Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and others who declare that the dharmadhātu exists as an entity which performs a function.[376] JNS also equates Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and the Mādhyamikas who follow common consensus with the traditions of vast activity and the profound view, respectively.[377] As for JNS's manner of employing the term Yogācāra alone, as ever so often in Tibetan texts, it appears not to be consistent, but needs to be understood through its respective contexts—sometimes it is used when speaking about Yogācāra-Madhyamaka positions (as what is to be adopted) and sometimes it refers to what the so-called Mere Mentalists hold (as what is to be rejected).

In particular, JNS several times refers to Āryavimuktiṣena and Haribhadra as Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas[378] and once as "False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas"[379] (which, as is clear from JNS's explanations, is very different from what Tibetans call "False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists"). In Tibet, this term is sometimes used as another name for Great Madhyamaka, Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, and *Shentong* Madhyamaka, with "the meditative tradition of

the texts of Maitreya" and "the Madhyamaka of profound luminosity" being further synonyms.

As explained above, JNS is neither a doxographical text nor a treatise that is devoted to *Shentong* Madhyamaka—or its equivalents Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Great Madhyamaka—in particular. None of these three terms is explicitly defined anywhere, nor is the associated view explained systematically. The most coherent discussion of some crucial features of Great Madhyamaka (in particular versus Mere Mentalists and Niḥsvabhāvavādins) is found in the context of explaining the fourth of the four stages of yoga (Appendix I5D2d). There, JNS says that, in general, what is explained as the Madhyamaka view is the prajñā free from all four extremes of reference points and there are two ways of commenting on the meaning of this view:

a) The way of commenting on the intention of Great Madhyamaka that delights the victors and their children

b) The way of commenting on the intention of Madhyamaka that delights the people during the last five hundred years of the Buddhist teachings.

In explaining the first way of commenting, JNS first goes through the refutation of the four extremes with regard to all imaginary and other-dependent phenomena, concluding that they are neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both, nor neither. In the context of what the refutation of the third one among these extremes means, JNS rejects the position of certain proponents of *Shentong* Madhyamaka:

> Nowadays, some Mere Mentalists who propound *Shentong* and claim this to be Madhyamaka explain "not having the nature of being both existent and nonexistent" to mean that the imaginary does not have the nature of existence, while the other-dependent does not have the nature of nonexistence. This is not a good reasoning—through distinguishing between the aspects of what is correct and false, merely within the seeming reality of childish beings (such as, "Not being existent from the perspective of being mistaken as a snake, while not being nonexistent from the perspective of appearing as a rope"), "not having the nature of being both existent and nonexistent" is explained by having different instances for each one of the two possibilities of being existent and nonexistent in mind. However, in the context of Great Madhyamaka as taught here, if one does not individually distinguish the respective aspects of appearance and imputation of all beings who are affected by ignorance (from those who have not entered the path up through those who have reached the end of the continuum) and yet applies said kind of reasoning at the time of proving that

all seeming phenomena which obscure the nature of phenomena do not have the nature of being both existent and nonexistent, one does not go beyond the extreme of being both existent and nonexistent. That is, the imaginary is said to not have the nature of being existent and therefore does not go beyond the extreme of being nonexistent, while the other-dependent is said to not have the nature of being nonexistent and thus does not go beyond the extreme of being existent. In this way, *not having* the nature of being both existent and nonexistent is not established because it follows that, based on each one of these two instances (imaginary and other-dependent), what is established is *having* the nature of being both existent and nonexistent.[380]

After having refuted all four extremes, JNS continues:

Through being explained in this way, all seeming cognitions and their objects are magical creations by nothing but the states of mind that cling to characteristics. Since these states of mind obstruct the arising of the wisdom without characteristics, in all respects they are factors to be relinquished. Though these states of mind are relinquished, *it is solely in the nondual wisdom that is the nature of ultimate reality that there is no clinging to extremes. For it is this very wisdom that completely eradicates said extremes, but this wisdom has the nature of it being impossible for it to entertain any views about extremes about itself, such as its being existent or nonexistent.* On the other hand, *it is equally impossible for any cognitions of those who possess a mind stream of clinging to extremes to cling to any extremes (such as existence and nonexistence) with regard to this wisdom.* For if this wisdom is not even suitable to appear in the form of a mere object generality as an object of any cognitions that cling to extremes, it is certainly impossible for any cognitions of those who possess a mind stream of clinging to extremes to take this wisdom as their basis of analysis and then cling to it as existent, nonexistent, or anything else. For this reason, the reasoning of this really established nondual wisdom lacking or being empty of a nature is not something that can be conceived.

Thus, this is the manner in which both true reality and what appears as if being false reality are free from extremes. If one rests in meditative equipoise in accordance with this manner being just as it is, the seeds of all obscurations are eradicated. By virtue of having realized said manner, just as it is, during such meditative

equipoise, its subsequent attainment increases the roots of virtue that make the two kāyas manifest.[381]

On (b) the way of commenting on the intention of Madhyamaka that delights the people during the last five hundred years of the Buddhist teachings and how it contrasts with Great Madhyamaka, JNS explains:

> The great elder Buddhapālita and others explain the following. The reasoning just explained—all seeming phenomena being free of extremes (such as existence and nonexistence)—is used as a preliminary. However, without reflecting on the reasonings that determine nondual wisdom as lacking real existence through refuting all reference points about it (such as its existing, not existing, and so on), merely through forcefully putting an end to the conceptions that cling to extremes in terms of the seeming, one is not able to relinquish the seeds of all conceptions that cling to extremes. *However, due to certain purposes, these masters either do not explain the above principle of Great Madhyamaka well or they do not understand its element that consists of the manner through which this principle is as it is.* But apart from that, the flaw stated by them does not apply for the following reasons. *Nondual wisdom cannot be determined as lacking real existence through any reasonings in the mind streams of those who just see this life and consequently there is no need to determine nondual wisdom in this manner. Therefore, though nondual wisdom is not determined as lacking real existence, once nondual wisdom dawns as unobscured natural luminosity, through becoming familiar with it while resting in it in equipoise for a long time one is able to eradicate all seeds of conceptions . . .*
>
> Therefore, the *Mahāyānottaratantra* explains that the nondual wisdom which bears the name "uncontaminated dhātu" (the buddha heart) exists solely as the reality that is permanent, stable, and changeless. *Since any situation of it being affected by impairments (such as being real or unreal) is impossible, the* Uttaratantra *does not teach any extra remedies for clinging to it as being really existent or clinging to it as lacking real existence.*
>
> Therefore, the third stage of yoga consists of the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists going beyond mere mind, which consists of apprehender and apprehended, and then resting in nondual consciousness, which is nonreferential, lacks appearance, and exists ultimately. *In the context of explaining the fourth stage of yoga, it is negated that this nondual consciousness exists ultimately, but it is not affirmed that nondual wisdom lacks real existence . . .*

Differing from the above, according to the Mādhyamikas who guide the beings during the last five hundred years of the Buddhist teachings, one familiarizes one's mind stream with emptiness through the conceptuality that consists of the cognitions in the mind streams of those who just see this life and have analyzed true ultimate reality—"the great being empty," which is genuinely permanent—and found it to be nonexistent. *However, these Mādhyamikas say that, having done so, it would represent a form of clinging to extremes if one were to subsequently familiarize with the existence of naturally luminous nondual wisdom, which is obtained through the nature of phenomena and found in the scriptural tradition of the Great Madhyamaka that teaches the definitive meaning of the sūtras and tantras taught by the supreme victor. Therefore, these Mādhyamikas say that resting in meditative equipoise within nondual natural luminosity is a great mistake. But I do not regard this as the supreme system.*

Still, saying, "This is the system of the Niḥsvabhāvavādins, such as master Rendawa Shönnu Lodrö,"[382] it is asserted that nothing but sheer emptiness (which is not suitable as anything such as the existence or nonexistence of consciousness free from apprehender and apprehended) is the ultimate basic nature, but that there is no wisdom which is other than that. In our opinion, this assertion evidently does not go beyond Mere Mentalism. The False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists and those who make the above assertion accord in that there is no extra nondual wisdom that is other than consciousness. From just that perspective, there is no difference between these people and the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists—the difference obviously lies in the former asserting that consciousness is empty and devoid of a nature of its own, while the latter do not assert such. Therefore, the Madhyamaka view of these people is that "consciousness empty of apprehender and apprehended does not exist as a nature of its own." On the other hand, they say, "The view of the False Aspectarians is merely that the aspects of appearances are not real as mind." However, these people being so concerned about having to claim this is due to their being afraid of the Madhyamaka view consisting of nondual wisdom. To assert the Madhyamaka view in such a way that the boundary lines of its own system do not surpass the False Aspectarians results in their implicitly being forced to say that what is actually the view of the Real Aspectarians represents the view of the False Aspectarians.[383]

Through connecting the four stages of yoga with different Buddhist schools, JNS[384] says that they represent an instruction on the manner in which the beings to be guided gradually engage in the mahāyāna path. First, in order to turn these beings away from non-Buddhist views and make them suitable vessels for teaching phenomenal identitylessness, the first stage of familiarizing with there being no self in the person is in common with the śrāvakas. Within the actual familiarization with phenomenal identitylessness, there is a progression in terms of increasing subtlety. The second yoga of familiarizing with the lack of real existence of outer referents is in common with the pratyekabuddhas and the Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists. The third yoga of familiarizing with the lack of real existence of the cognitive aspects that are the apprehenders of such (nonexistent) referents is in common with the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists. The fourth yoga of familiarizing with the lack of real existence of an ultimately existent consciousness that is empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended is the unique position of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas. This accords with JNS's concluding summary of the four stages of yoga in verse:

> Consciousness being empty of apprehended and apprehender,
> progressively,
> Represents the assertions of Real Aspectarians and False
> Aspectarians.
> That wisdom is as empty as consciousness
> And that wisdom itself is not empty of wisdom's own nature—
> These assertions, respectively, represent the difference
> Between those who propound Madhyamaka and Great
> Madhyamaka.
> In brief, the assertions of nondual consciousness
> And nondual wisdom being really established, respectively,
> Appear as "Mere Mentalism" and "Madhyamaka"—
> The two systems as prophesied by the victor.[385]

On the nature of phenomena being profound in terms of arising (AA IV.59a), JNS comments as follows:

> If seeming arising is examined, it is nonarising, and *this nonarising is the ultimate that depends on this seeming itself. Those who assert that this is the ultimate that actually fulfills this function are the Niḥsvabhāvavādins, whereas the Great Mādhyamikas hold it to be the nominal ultimate.* As for the ultimate [sugata] heart arising in a manner that is free from proliferations, within a mental state

> of examination and analysis not even a mere object generality (a conceptual elimination) [about it] can possibly appear. For this reason, since this kind of arising does not represent any extreme, such as being permanent, impermanent, existing, or nonexisting, it is profound arising.[386]

On the two realities, the way in which they are inexpressible as being the same or different, and what is real versus delusive in Great Madhyamaka, JNS says:

> *The nature of phenomena (ultimate reality) and the bearers of this nature (seeming reality) are not one* because they have mutually exclusive features in that the ultimate nature of phenomena exists in an undeceiving manner, while the seeming bearers of this nature are deceiving instances of nonvalid cognition, that is, they lack a nature. This excludes that the ultimate and the seeming are one.
>
> *The nature of phenomena (ultimate reality) and the bearers of this nature (seeming reality) are not separate either* for the following reasons. (a) The ultimately existing nature of phenomena cannot be determined through being any superior "existence" that is other than being characterized through the seeming being nonexistent. Therefore, from the perspective that any "seeming" which is other than the mere nonexistence of the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena is not established, the two realities are not separate. Or they are not separate because (b) a seeming that is other than the existence of the ultimate nature of phenomena is not established and thus there is no seeming that is different in nature from the nature of phenomena alone being really existent. Or (c) it is said that they are not separate by considering that the very fact of the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena not being established is the nature of phenomena, that is, ultimate reality. *Since (a) and (b) accord in their meaning, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas explain them as the meaning of the two realities not being separate, while (c) is the explanation on this by those Mādhyamikas who follow common (worldly) consensus. No matter in which one of these two systems, seeming reality is not asserted as being existent.*
>
> Those who are trained in the latent tendencies of cognizance say, "... since the ultimate nature of phenomena is undifferentiable from the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena, the other-dependent seeming exists as mere appearance and its nature—the perfect nature—exists as the nature of cognizance." No matter

where such is found, you should understand that it is nothing but the position of the Mere Mentalists. *Here, in the context of Great Madhyamaka, the bearers of the nature of phenomena (consciousnesses together with their accompanying mental factors) are delusive and the nature of phenomena (wisdom together with its accompanying factors) is real.*[387]

And:

In brief, *the scope of considering the proponents of entities that are refuted by the Mādhyamikas is confined to the entities of the seeming,* and the refutation goes, "All seeming phenomena are neither entities nor the lack of entity and so on because they are not established as anything such." However, *the proponents of Great Madhyamaka say that the nondual wisdom beyond dependent origination exists as the ultimate entity because it engages in the actual way of being of objects. This statement does not entail the flaw of the proponents of entities because—different from what the latter hold to be entities—this wisdom actually* is *an entity.* It is an entity because it is explained in the Buddha's sūtras and tantras of definitive meaning as an entity and because *there is no philosophical system above this Great Madhyamaka, due to which there are no explanations of any reasonings that refute this wisdom being an entity.*[388]

And:

As for the meaning of [the statement], "What is without arising is without final deliverance" [in AA I.31c], many Indians and Tibetans, by applying this to the ultimate, say that unarisen phenomena being delivered from arising represents the freedom from extremes. However, this is not the intention of the Buddha and his spiritual heirs—there is no entailment in teaching, "Since they are unarisen ultimately, arising forms and so on are without final deliverance and therefore free from extremes." This explains the meaning of "what is without arising is without final deliverance" in a mistaken manner. For, according to the above stance, there is then nothing else to teach but, "What has arising lacks final deliverance." Some others say, "That seeming phenomena without arising are without final deliverance is the aspect of ultimate reality. The aspect of seeming reality is merely what entails arising and also entails final deliverance." But this just means that these people

never heard of the system of the Great Mādhyamikas. In that system, the realization that what looks as if it entails arising on the level of the seeming is unarisen or without arising is just something that accords with how the basic nature of seeming reality is. But the basic nature of ultimate reality is not suitable to exist in this way. Thus, seeming reality means to be unarisenness per se. For that reason, everything that has arisen is delusive and deceptive. Whatever is delusive is necessarily not real, and whatever is unreal does necessarily not exist in the way it is superimposed as existent. So whatever is existent in a way of not being suitable as existent is necessarily unarisen. On the other hand, *ultimate reality cannot be ascertained through valid cognition as being known or realized to be either arisen or unarisen.*

Nowadays, some people who boast about themselves being the crown jewels of those who propound the definitive meaning assert that, when taking the instance of a phenomenon that is not differentiated in terms of the two realities, the fact that the aspects of arising and ceasing exist in it represents seeming reality, while the aspect of realizing these aspects of arising and ceasing being discontinued represents ultimate reality. *Forget about such being the distinction of the two realities by the Mādhyamikas, it does not even go beyond the distinction made by the Vaibhāṣikas.* For Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas assert that if something is eliminated and the mind does not engage it anymore, this represents subject and object in terms of seeming reality. If one attempts to eliminate something, but the mind still engages it, this represents subject and object in terms of ultimate reality. This means that all generally characterized phenomena (what are similar in type) represent seeming reality, while the distinct consciousnesses and their referents that are specifically characterized phenomena are ultimate reality.[389] Thus, if not even these two schools assert the above mistaken presentation of the two realities, it is impossible for any other Buddhists to accept it.

So how is our own system? The arising of the mere seeming lacks any arising as this mere seeming, which means that this kind of arising does not qualify as arising in the first place. If this unqualified arising existed as a reality that represents the nature of the seeming and what is consensus among the Mādhyamikas themselves, any reality other than that could not be found. However, ultimate reality is not like that—ultimate reality is the reality that is the opposite of everything delusive. Thus, it is undeceiving and

> indestructible—the indestructible vajra of the genuine reality of all buddhas and all great bodhisattvas like Mañjuśrī. *This is the manner in which the two realities are distinguished in the Madhyamaka of definitive meaning of both Maitreya and Nāgārjuna.* Though it is true that there are people who are habituated to their bad propensities toward something else that is supposedly profound, those who are fortunate do not even turn their ears toward it.[390]

On the appearances of seeming reality not appearing for buddhas, JNS says:

> Some have the following concern, "If the seeming does not appear to buddha wisdom, it follows that they are not omniscient" . . . there is nothing in the mahāyāna scriptures of definitive meaning that proves that seeming appearances emerge for buddha wisdom. For the followers of the mahāyāna explain the following. In general, since all aspects of the seeming are unreal, from the perspective of the yoga of yogins who are engaged in what is truly real there is absolutely no seeing of anything as being mistaken and, in particular, there are absolutely no external entities. Therefore, if what does not exist at the time of being a sentient being appears as existent at the time of being a buddha, what could be more unreasonable than that? Especially, *no matter whether you take the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas who engage in vast yogas or the Mādhyamikas who engage in common consensus and fearlessly propound the profound,*[391] *in any system of anybody among them there is not even a single word in their scriptures that seeming appearances appear to buddhas.*[392]

Prajñāpāramitā and Mahāmudrā

In JNS's comments on the second, fourth, and ninth moments of the mahāyāna path of seeing (indicated by "greatness," "no measure," and "emptiness" in AA II.12d, II.13a, and II.14a, respectively), Mahāmudrā is explained as follows:

> *As the object of wisdom, greatness (Tib. chen po)—such as the form of the nature of phenomena—is beyond all dimensions (Tib. rgya; lit."seals"), or, all dimensions (seals) are not something other than this very greatness itself. This is the profound Mahāmudrā (Tib. phyag rgya chen po; "Great Seal")* and the momentary aspect of realizing it is the dharma cognition of suffering . . .

> Though the form and such of the profound other-empty are beyond the characteristics of the form and such that consist of minute particles, *the great form of luminous Mahāmudrā* is difficult to fathom or measure because it is not suitable to be observed in sentient beings. The aspect of realizing this is the subsequent cognition of suffering . . .
>
> *Seeming phenomena (such as form) are the emptiness of the very nature of Mahāmudrā—the actual nature that is the profound other-empty.* This means that the ultimate nature of phenomena does not abide in seeming phenomena, which is the quintessence of all the definitive meanings in sūtras and tantras.[393]

On AA III.6, JNS[394] says that profound suchness—Mahāmudrā—is not realized through simply rejecting emptiness (the profound actuality free from reference points) being an object that is seen, heard, touched, or experienced by consciousness. This object of suchness is difficult to realize even through nonconceptual wisdom if its prowess is not perfected. All seeming phenomena (such as seeming form) are not observable as objects of this profound prajñāpāramitā. Therefore, wisdom does not cognize such objects, which are just nonexistent yet appearing. Or, in other words, since the special other objects—ultimate form and so on—are not objects of the consciousnesses of sentient beings, such objects are not cognized by them. For these reasons prajñāpāramitā is not realized through consciousness and she is also difficult to be realized through ordinary wisdom. Since she is not any direct object or referent object whatsoever of both these cognitions, she is beyond the constraints of all conceiving and thus inconceivable.

Commenting on the *Vivṛti* on the same verse, JNS explains that, let alone profound prajñāpāramitā not being realized through any ordinary consciousness, the nature of ultimate prajñāpāramitā—profound Mahāmudrā—is difficult to realize even through simply eliminating all collections of consciousnesses together with their objects. The fundamental nature of the ultimate—the other-empty (which here bears the name of the knowledge of entities in the mind streams of bodhisattvas)—is taught to be more profound than the seeming, which is self-empty. Therefore, JNS concludes, just as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Haribhadra asserts that the seeing of the reality of the nature of phenomena on the first bhūmi represents the fully qualified seeing of this reality if the fundamental nature of the ultimate—the profound other-empty—is seen. However, without seeing this fundamental nature, just by virtue of realizing the fundamental nature of the seeming—the nonprofound self-empty—as a nonimplicative negation, this is not the fully qualified seeing of reality. In brief, prajñāpāramitā being difficult to realize is presented

in the AA as the reason for her being profound, while her being inconceivable is given as the reason for her being difficult to realize.

Commenting on the *Vivṛti* on AA V.2, JNS[395] says that bodhisattvas train in eliminating the stains that obscure prajñāpāramitā— the permanent moment of Mahāmudrā, the supreme awareness that is other. Though a moment being permanent is untenable among the Niḥsvabhāvavāda-Mādhyamikas, among the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas such being tenable is a philosophical system without any flaw.

On AA V.18, JNS[396] explains that the wisdom of Mahāmudrā, in which the stains are terminated primordially and which does not arise as anything conditioned from the very start, is called, and taught as, "the nature of enlightenment." For there is no sudden termination of previously existing stains, nor is it the case that a previously existing arising, through suddenly being obstructed, has become the lack of arising. In due order, these two should be understood as the wisdom of the termination of stains and the wisdom of nonarising.

On AA VII.3, JNS[397] says that, when the uninterrupted samādhi at the end of the continuum is attained, it seems as if the nature of all purified spotless phenomena—the mother of the victors, prajñāpāramitā, Mahāmudrā, the fully complete nature of phenomena, which is matured right from the beginning, spontaneously present, and free from stains—arises since this is the state of its having become free from stains. At that point, this is the instantaneous training—the wisdom of simultaneous realization in one single instant, which realizes true reality in a fully complete manner. Therefore, the *Dharmadhātustava* says:

> On the fifteenth day of waxing,
> Eventually the moon is full.
> Just so, when the bhūmis' end is reached,
> The dharmakāya's full and clear.
> . . .
> Once the vajra of samādhi
> Has completely smashed this vase,
> To the very limits of all space
> It will shine just everywhere.[398]

On the utterly pure path of familiarization, JNS[399] says that the nature of purity is Mahāmudrā, the ultimate entity of the unchanging perfect nature.

On buddhahood, JNS[400] states that it is clear in all great sūtras, tantras, and treatises that tathāgata, enlightenment, and Mahāmudrā are permanent entities.

On the instantaneous training, JNS[401] explains that, when mastery over a single quality of the buddhabhūmi is gained, one is able to master all such qualities of concordant type because they are all included completely in a single such quality. The reason for this is that all these qualities are inseparable as the nature of phenomena—Mahāmudrā.

To relate the prajñāpāramitā teachings and the AA to Mahāmudrā may seem to be a very unique approach, but there are a number of Indian and Tibetan predecessors who equated prajñāpāramitā with Mahāmudrā, such as Jñānakīrti (eighth/ninth century) in his *Tattvāvatāra*, Sahajavajra (eleventh century) in his commentary on Maitrīpa's *Tattvadaśaka*, and the anonymous *Padmanināmakālacakrapañjikā*. The *Tattvāvatāra* says:

> As for those of highest capacities among the persons who exert themselves in the pāramitās, when they perform the meditations of calm abiding and superior insight, even at the stage of ordinary beings this grants them the true realization characterized by having its origin in Mahāmudrā. Thus, this is the sign of irreversible [realization] . . .
>
> All these results are accomplished through the meditation of the nondual training in Mahāmudrā. As the prajñāpāramitā sūtras extensively say that "those who wish to train in the bhūmis of the śrāvakas should listen to just this prajñāpāramitā . . . and should practice the yoga of just this prajñāpāramitā." The same is said there for [those who wish to train] "in the bhūmis of the pratyekabuddhas" and "in the bhūmis of buddhas."[402] Another name of mother Prajñāpāramitā is Mahāmudrā because it is the very nature of nondual wisdom.[403]

Later, in its section on the stages of the meditation of superior insight, the text quotes and explains the famous two verses *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* X.256–257:

> By relying on mere mind,
> One does not imagine outer objects.
> By resting in the focal object of suchness,
> One should go beyond mere mind too.
>
> Having gone beyond mere mind,
> One must even go beyond nonappearance.
> The yogin who rests in nonappearance
> Sees the mahāyāna.

After having explained the first verse according to the first three of "the four yogic practices"[404] used in the mahāyāna's meditation on emptiness, Jñānakīrti comments on the second verse as follows. Since suchness is unborn, it exists as neither an entity nor the lack of an entity. This means that suchness is the complete lack of reference points since entities and the lack of entities include all possible reference points. Through realizing that, all beings are understood as having the nature of dharmakāya, thus going beyond the understanding of mere mind. The yogin must even transcend the state of true reality not appearing in the manner of being a unity or a multiplicity and the like. To fully rest in the nonappearance of any reference points whatsoever is to realize true reality, here called "the mahāyāna," with another form of that name being "Mahāmudrā." Thus, Jñānakīrti indicates that the final realization of the freedom from reference points even in the mahāyāna of the sūtras is nothing but Mahāmudrā, which he further equates with the famous "nonseeing is the supreme seeing" in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras:

> What is the eye of wisdom of the Buddha Bhagavān? It is not seeing anything through anything . . . Likewise, what is seeing the ultimate? It is the nonseeing of all phenomena.

The *Padmanināmapañjikā* states:

> "Mahāmudrā" is she who gives birth to all tathāgatas appearing in the past, future, and present, that is, Prajñāpāramitā. Since she seals bliss through the nonabiding nirvāṇa . . . , she is the seal. Since she is superior to karmamudrā and jñānamudrā and free from the latent tendencies of saṃsāra, she is great.[405]

Sahajavajra's *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā* says:

> Master [Maitrīpa] wished to compose the brief pith instructions on prajñāpāramitā that accord with the principles of mantra. Therefore, the subject of this treatise is what is to be accomplished, the means of accomplishment, and the nature of true reality, whose essential character is the nature of phenomena—otherwise bearing the name "prajñāpāramitā"—and is the essence of the three kāyas.[406]

and

> Those who do not dwell in remedial factors,
> Are not attached to true reality,

> And do not wish for a fruition of anything,
> They understand Mahāmudrā.[407]

> Here, "Mahāmudrā" refers to the pith instructions on the true reality of Mahāmudrā that is fully penetrating the true reality of [all] entities.[408]

The text further says:

> When the Madhyamaka of union is realized through the pith instructions of pāramitā adorned with the words of the guru, just this spontaneously and continuously engaging prajñā of the ultimate—the emptiness that is endowed with the supreme of all aspects[409]—is calm abiding and nothing else . . .[410]
>
> Some express this as "the wisdom of true reality," "Mahāmudrā."[411]

The writings of the famous Tibetan siddhā Machig Labdrön emphasize that her "Cutting Through" teachings are based on prajñāpāramitā and she also calls them "The Cutting Through of Mahāmudrā," which she further equates with Great Madhyamaka and Dzogchen. Jamgön Kongtrul's *Pleasure Grove*[412] comments:

> "The Cutting Through of Mahāmudrā" presents the intention of the middle turning [of the wheel of dharma] conjoined with the mantra[yāna] practices for the confronting enhancement of awareness.[413] It is a radical means to cut through the inflation of fixating on a self by readily taking upon oneself what is undesirable, searching out adverse conditions, realizing that gods and demons are one's own mind, and understanding the total equality of oneself and others.[414]

The famous Tibetan historian Gö Lotsāwa Shönu Bal's[415] (1392–1481) *Blue Annals*[416] cites parts of the above sections from Jñānakīrti's text and agrees that this Mahāmudrā system

> is clearly explained in Sahajavajra's *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā* as the wisdom of suchness that has the three characteristics of its nature being pāramitā, according with the secret mantra, and its name being "Mahāmudrā."[417]

The Blue Annals continues:

> Therefore, the Mahāmudrā of the prajñāpāramitā of Lord Gampopa was described by Lord Götsangpa as being a doctrine of Maitrīpa. The Mahāmudrā which belongs to the path of the tantra was also expounded by Lord Gampopa to his "inner" disciples.[418]

In the introduction to his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*,[419] the Eighth Karmapa describes the various sources and systems in both India and Tibet in which Madhyamaka as the explicit teaching of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras is linked with or considered to be equivalent with the teachings of (such as the teaching approaches by Saraha, Śavari, Nāgārjuna, Maitrīpa, Sahajavajra, and Gampopa). In particular, the explicit teaching of Maitrīpa's Mahāmudrā system is the Madhyamaka of emptiness free from reference points as taught in the sūtras. Implicitly, this Mahāmudrā system also teaches the profound actuality of both sūtras and tantras, that is, the ordinary and extraordinary ultimate sugata heart. The Karmapa also quotes Götsangpa Gönpo Dorje[420] (1189–1258) and his disciples as saying that the initiators of this dharma of Mahāmudrā are both the great Brahman Saraha and Nāgārjuna, with the former teaching Mahāmudrā from the side of affirmation and Nāgārjuna teaching it from the side of negation.[421]

The key notion of "mental nonengagement" in Maitrīpa's Mahāmudrā is also frequently found in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, such as when they say that actual virtue is mental nonengagement, while nonvirtue is mental engagement. In the context of the six recollections (of the three jewels and so on) in the serial training, JNS says the following on mental nonengagement:

> How does recollection take place through these six? When analyzed through discriminating prajñā, one does not mentally engage in the characteristics of these six—they are aspects of the freedom from reference points that is free from mental engagement. For example, in actual fact, the lack of recollection of the deity is the supreme recollection of the deity. For what is presented as recollection in this context is to recollect the cognitive aspect of realizing the basic nature of the deity, whereas to recollect the focal object that appears as a deity on the level of the seeming is not the recollection that actually fulfills this function in this context here. *Therefore, the sūtras say that mental nonengagement is virtue and mental engagement is nonvirtue. This kind of mental nonengagement is also what is intended here, but it is not something like the stopping of any thoughts in terms of experience and recollection* (as a subcategory of mental factors) in the system of a Chinese master who boasted about the Madhyamaka view.[422] In brief, it is from the perspective of the sixth consciousness

> itself becoming without any characteristics that it is clearly manifest as the actuality of mental nonengagement. However, *the explanation nowadays that being free from apprehending generalities—as the kind of cognition that impairs the sixth consciousness—is the view of Mahāmudrā free from mental engagement is nothing but the occurrence of a dharma famine.*[423]

This means that mental nonengagement (or "mental disengagement") is just the subjective side of what is called "freedom from reference points." The only way in which the mind can engage in this "object"—the absence of any mental discourse and reification—is precisely by not engaging in or fueling any reference points, but rather letting it naturally settle of its own accord. In other words, it is only by a nonreferential mind that the absence of reference points can be realized since that is the only cognitive mode that exactly corresponds to it.[424]

This is precisely what TOK explains as "Sūtra Mahāmudrā" within the later Kagyü classification into Sūtra Mahāmudrā, Tantra Mahāmudrā, and Essence Mahāmudrā:

> Within the object—luminosity free from reference points that accords with the sūtra approach—the subject rests in meditative equipoise through the instructions of mental nonengagement.[425]

Alluding to AA V.21 and *Uttaratantra* I.154, TOK continues on Sūtra Mahāmudrā:

> In this luminous nature of the mind there are no stains to be removed because this nature is without stains right from the start. Nor are there any previously nonexistent qualities to be added or produced anew because it primordially has the nature of intrinsic qualities . . . Therefore, both wishing to remove stains and wishing to add qualities mean being obscured by thoughts of hope and fear. Hence, through relinquishing these, without affecting or contriving this actual true reality—the present ordinary mind, which is the inseparability of appearance and emptiness free from being real or delusive—through adopting and rejecting anything, one should look at and familiarize with nothing but this through personally experienced prajñā. What is called "view" means to know and look through prajñā and what is called "meditation" refers to resting one-pointedly and undistracted within that state. This manner is made clear by venerable Rangjung [Dorje in his *Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart*]:

All is neither real nor delusive—
Held to be like [a reflection of] the moon on water by the learned.
Just this ordinary mind
Is called "dharmadhātu" and "Heart of the victors."[426]

. . . Thus, seeming reality consists of the adventitious stains that are like [mistakenly seeing] a [white] conch as being yellow. Ultimate reality is the tathāgata heart, which is like the [natural] white of the conch. Except for the mere appearances from the perspective of a mistaken [perceiving] subject, within the object—the conch—there is nothing white or yellow to be added or to be removed. Therefore, the pith instruction is to rest naturally and uncontrived. In brief, what are called "saṃsāra" and "nirvāṇa" are set up from the point of view of mere seeming appearances, while the nature of both—luminosity free from reference points—is called tathāgata heart. Consequently, in terms of the definitive meaning, mere appearances and their nature cannot be separated, just like fire and its heat. For this reason, the mother [sūtras] say:

Form is emptiness. Emptiness is form. Emptiness is nothing other than form. Form is nothing other than emptiness.

Venerable Rangjung [Dorje] says:

The basic nature free from reference points—Mahāmudrā—
Is empty of all characteristics of conceptual reference points.
Its nature is being lucid, without clinging, and pure,
Which is also called "tathāgata heart."[427]

After quoting a part of the above passages from Jñānakīrti's *Tattvāvatāra* and referring to Sahajavajra's *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā*, TOK refers to Gampopa's Mahāmudrā approach:

It is said that Tagpo Rinpoche gave rise to the realization of Mahāmudrā even in beginners who did not receive empowerment, which is this system of the pāramitās. It primarily consists of the instructions that come from the Kadampas—the pith instructions of "The Second Armor of Mahāmudrā, Union with the Connate (*phyag chen lhan cig skyes sbyor*)" composed by Lord [Atiśa][428] and this present system are alike in all aspects and even the progression

of the four yogas [of Mahāmudrā] is clearly taught there. Thus, he guided most [of his students in a given] group through the stages of the path that come from the Kadam [tradition], while he guided the extraordinary ones through the path of means that comes from Lama Mila[repa]. What is meant [here] is the former [approach]. With this in mind, venerable Mikyö [Dorje] said:

> Those in whom the fully qualified exemplifying and actual wisdoms are not manifest through the three upper empowerments do not possess the fully qualified siddhi of Mahāmudrā in the teaching lineage of great Nāropa as transmitted from great Vajradhara. Nowadays, from the perspective of those who are to be guided in this degenerate age and are fond of very high yānas, venerable Gampopa and the protector Pamo Truba applied the name "Mahāmudrā, Union with Connateness" to the system of guidance through calm abiding and superior insight that is common to the causal pāramitāyāna—the pith instructions of the *Bodhipathapradīpa* as transmitted by the protector Atiśa, which are known as Geshé [Drom]tönpa's and Geshé Gönpapa's "Union with Connateness."

However, it has been the practice of most heart disciples of Tagpo [Rinpoche] to give the instructions on Mahāmudrā to those upon whom empowerment had been bestowed before, which is the position of the tradition of sūtra and tantra [Mahāmudrā] in common.[429]

Thus, following the *Blue Annals*, TOK defines Sūtra Mahāmudrā as follows:

> What came to be asserted later as the Mahāmudrā of blending the realizations of sūtra and mantra corresponds to what is clearly explained in the *Tattvadaśaṭīkā* composed by master Sahajavajra as the wisdom of realizing suchness that is endowed with the three characteristics of its nature being prajñāpāramitā, according with mantra, and its name being "Mahāmudrā."[430]

In terms of ground, path, and fruition Mahāmudrā, TOK describes (1) the basic nature; (2) the manner of being mistaken about it; and (3) the pointing-out of the actual way of being:

1) The ground is the basic nature that is the fundamental way of being of [all] entities, which is not established as the nature of either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, not biased in any way, and free from all extremes of reference points (such as existence, nonexistence, permanence, and extinction). Therefore, it is beyond being an object of speech, thought, and expression. From the very start, it is never bound by mistakenness, nor is it ever liberated through realization. By virtue of the essential point of not being established as any specific characteristic whatsoever, it is the basic nature that pervades all phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa like space. In the sūtras and tantras, it is taught through many synonyms, such as Mahāmudrā, prajñāpāramitā, tathāgata heart, primordial buddha, and causal tantra. It is the ultimate reality of profundity and lucidity being nondual, the pure basis of purification, the nature of the mind . . .

2) This naturally pure luminosity is the vajra of mind. By virtue of its own creative display being unaware of its very own nature, mentation stirs from the ālaya. Through the power of that, basic awareness (*rig pa*) is taken as a self and its own appearances as objects, with subject and object [thus seeming to be] different. Under the sway of these dualistic appearances, various karmas and latent tendencies are accumulated and one wanders in saṃsāra without end in an endless loop of mistakenness. This manner of being mistaken represents seeming reality—the adventitious stains of mind, which are to be purified. Since they do not abide in the fundamental way of being, they appear, but are not really established. Therefore, one is able to be liberated through the remedy of recognizing their own nature.

3) All phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa arise from the play of the mind and this mind naturally abides as the unity of being lucid and empty. Through the power of that, [these phenomena] represent the three kāyas' great display of these very mere appearances being free from the triad of arising, abiding, and ceasing. Here, the unarisen fundamental way of being is the dharmakāya; its unceasing radiance, the sambhogakāya; and its appearing as anything whatsoever, the nairmāṇikakāya. All three are primordially and spontaneously present as being inseparable in their nature. Through recognizing this actual way of being, one recognizes the very nature of the ground—the view of Mahāmudrā, the basic nature—as all phenomena being free from any stopping or accomplishing and adopting or rejecting within the dynamic sphere of the infinite expanse of fundamental suchness.[431]

As can be seen from the above exemplary quotes from JNS and the details in its general topics, all the elements of Mahāmudrā described here can be found in JNS in the same or very similar ways. Also, in an oral communication, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche confirmed that the AA can be understood as representing Sūtra Mahāmudrā.

Note that there is also a Gelugpa Mahāmudrā lineage, which distinguishes between Sūtra and Tantra Mahāmudrā in essentially the same manner as above.[432] On the connection between prajñāpāramitā and Mahāmudrā, even a Gelugpa commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* by Gungtang Göncho Denpé Drönmé[433] (1762–1823) declares:

> In general, all sūtras flow into Mantra, but among these [sūtras], the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras have ways of directly flowing into Mantra that are unlike other sūtras . . . such as . . . how the name "mother of Conquerors" is asserted to teach the great seal (*mahāmudrā*) of definitive meaning.[434]

Mipham Rinpoche's *Lamp of Certainty*[435] says several times that the final realization in the sūtrayāna from the Madhyamaka point of view is the same as the one in the systems of Mahāmudrā and Dzogchen. Naturally, the writings of masters such as Dölpopa and Tāranātha on prajñāpāramitā equate it with Mahāmudrā, tathāgatagarbha, nondual wisdom, and ultimate bodhicitta.

Prajñāpāramitā and the perfect nature

In JNS's general topic on the three natures (Appendix I3C), they are explained according to both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the Yogācāra system. In the first explanation, JNS describes the perfect nature as follows:

> [The perfect nature] refers to the form and so on of the nature of phenomena, which are empty of superimpositions onto false imagination's aspect of appearance as being such and such [aspects]. This is called "what is complete," which refers to realization being complete as the [perceiving] subject that is wisdom. It is classified [as twofold]—the unchanging perfect [nature] and the unmistaken perfect [nature]. Both of these are [further] divided into two each—the aspect of dharmadhātu wisdom and the aspect of the qualities that bear this nature. *As for these boundary lines of presenting the three characteristics,*[436] *both Mādhyamikas and Mere Mentalists agree in their assertions about the other [two characteristics], but when presenting the perfect [nature], they differ as follows.*

> *The Mādhyamikas present it as the other-dependent being empty of its own nature and the Mere Mentalists present it as the imaginary being empty of its own nature.*[437]

Also, on AA IV.29d, JNS comments:

> Because the aim is poised readiness for *the perfect nature, it is devoid of the distractions of the other [two] characteristics* [—the imaginary and the other-dependent].[438]

On the *Vivṛti* on AA VIII.2–6, JNS states:

> The twenty-one sets [of uncontaminated qualities] have the nature of *wisdom—the perfect nature without any reference points of the other-dependent nature—which is the element of the change of all states to be relinquished [in the sense of] being liberated from them.* [Thus,] all these dharmas of the perfect nature are described as the dharmakāya.[439]

On what is ultimately perceived, JNS says:

> The definition of *saṃvṛti* (the seeming) is *that which has never existed as a referent with a nature of its own and which consists of the aspect that is the other-dependent nature* (consciousness as the subject together with its objects). The definition of *paramārtha* (the ultimate) is *that which has never been nonexistent as true actuality's own nature and which consists of the aspect that is the perfect nature together with its object. The first one appears in the mind streams of those who just see this life, while the second one clearly appears in the minds of those who behold the supreme other.*[440]

And:

> "So what is the entity that is independently known by buddhas themselves?" *They solely perceive* the nature of ultimate reality, that is, *the perfect nature—the true end free from meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment.*[441]

According to Yogācāra, JNS explains the perfect nature as

> *the actuality of the basic nature—being empty of the imaginary (the object of negation) within the other-dependent (the bearer of this [perfect] nature). It is classified [as twofold]—the unchanging perfect [nature] and the unmistaken perfect [nature]. The first one consists of the two kinds of identitylessness and the second is the wisdom that directly realizes these.*[442]

Matching the three natures with the two realities, JNS says:

> *The first two characteristics are presented as the seeming reality* because they are afflicted focal objects. The imaginary is that which, from the perspective of being affected by ignorance, appears as the aspect of being real because it is seemingly real. However, *the imaginary is not even conventionally real* because it is delusive and empty of a nature of its own even conventionally. Therefore, this fact that the imaginary lacks a nature is the general system of everyone from the Mere Mentalists upward.
>
> *The other-dependent is the conventional reality that actually fulfills this function* because the essence and nature of the other-dependent are established conventionally, due to which it is not empty of its own nature. *Although the nature of the other-dependent is really established, the other-dependent itself is not really established because it is not established in the way it appears,* just as illusory horses and oxen appear as such [horses and oxen], but are not established as such. You may wonder, "*What is the difference between the other-dependent and the nature of the other-dependent?*" Though the other-dependent is of the nature of the other-dependent, the nature of the other-dependent is not the other-dependent. "Nature" in this context has two aspects—the conventional one and the ultimate one. The first one is the aspect of the seeds within the ālaya and the latter one is the nondual wisdom within it.[443] Among these, the first nature is conventionally real, because, when giving a presentation in terms of conventions, one gives a presentation of real and delusive by straightforwardly referring [to these notions]. However, [this conventional nature of the other-dependent] is not ultimately real. For when the conventional reality of dualistic appearance is realized to be empty, the aspect of the dualistic appearances of apprehender and apprehended together with their seeds must be explained as the imaginary. *The latter nature [of the other-dependent] is ultimately real because it is nothing but the unchanging perfect [nature].*

You may say, "But if the other-dependent is not empty of a conventional and an ultimate nature, it follows that it is not empty of reality either; and in that case, it is really established." This is not the case. Since the followers of this system explain that the boundary lines of presenting emptiness are primarily [stated] in terms of being other-empty, they are able to present [emptiness] as merely being empty of another nature. Therefore, though [emptiness] is not empty of its own nature, it is not presented as not being emptiness. *The profound dharmadhātu's own nature is empty*[444] *of dependent origination, but it is not really established because said nature of its own cannot be said to be exclusively real or delusive and is free from being real and delusive.*[445]

Finally, JNS summarizes the three natures as follows:

The outcome of this explanation is as follows. *The boundary lines of presenting the other-dependent are that it is presented as the collection of both the imaginary and the perfect [natures], just like space with clouds. The part that is dualistic appearance (the stains) is the imaginary, which is like clouds. The part that is the nature of the [other-dependent] (lucid awareness) is the perfect [nature], which is like space.* Therefore, one of the two parts [of the other-dependent] is represented by the imaginary and the other part is the perfect [nature]. In this way, it is called "the other-dependent" because its arising as having stains (the consciousness of dualistic appearance—the imaginary) is produced under the influence of something other, that is, ignorance. In this way, *the imaginary characteristic is false seeming reality and the other-dependent characteristic is correct seeming reality.* The last characteristic [*(the perfect nature)] is definitely nothing but ultimate reality* because it serves as the focal object of the wisdom of the meditative equipoise of noble ones that completely purifies stains . . .[446]

[The perfect nature] is the ultimate because this ultimate is the supreme object to be striven for by buddhas and bodhisattvas. It is also real because it is real as nothing but nondual wisdom.[447]

And:

The imaginary nature lacks a nature in terms of characteristics because referents do not exist through their own specific characteristics. *The other-dependent nature lacks a nature in terms of arising*

> because it does not arise from itself. *The perfect nature is the ultimate lack of nature* because it is the ultimate and does not exist as the nature of the two kinds of identity.[448]

Thus, according to JNS (and CE), the ultimate true basis of emptiness is the unchanging perfect nature (or mind's natural luminosity, the sugata heart, Mahāmudrā), which is empty of all imaginary and other-dependent phenomena of seeming reality. Though this is a typical *Shentong* position,[449] it differs from other such explanations in that JNS consistently describes the perfect nature and its equivalents in a nonreifying manner and not as some absolutely or substantially existing remainder after the other two natures have been relinquished. For, as was explained above, the perfect nature belongs solely to the domain of what is experienced through nonconceptual wisdom, which is by definition free from all reference points, including any about, or intrinsic to, this very nature. However, JNS says, in the context of the second turning of the wheel of dharma and the AA, when discussing emptiness in general and the twenty emptinesses in particular, the ultimate true basis of emptiness is explicitly said to not be the subject under discussion:

> However, in this context, *the "basis of emptiness" is not identified as something like the unchanging perfect nature, which is the basis of emptiness that actually fulfills this function.* The reason why something like this perfect nature is not identified as the basis of emptiness here is as follows. *If such a basis of emptiness were explicitly taught in the middle turning of the wheel of dharma, one would not be able to relinquish the stains of clinging to it as being something real.* In this context of the middle turning, if one has not even eliminated the stains of clinging to the reality of form and so on (which are not this profound basis of emptiness), forget about eliminating the stains of clinging to the perfect nature as being something real. Therefore, the latter is not taught in this turning. However, in the final turning of the wheel, *when something like the vajra heart—which is introduced subsequent to having eliminated all reference points—is taught as the basis of emptiness, it is not the case that one is not in a state of poised readiness for such a teaching. For, at this point, all reference points and characteristics with regard to the entirety of phenomena and their true nature have already been cut through.*[450]

Unlike in other presentations of "other-emptiness," though the perfect nature is said to be ultimately real, not lacking a nature of its own, and being experiencable ultimately, JNS does not assert it as any kind of absolute that is an exception to being empty:

> *Therefore, to proclaim an implicative negation in terms of the nature of the lack of nature being a remainder is not the system of the* Shentongpas. *What the supreme proponents of* Shentong *say is that the ultimate perfect nature, which* has *a nature, is the nature that actually fulfills this function. But when such is said, this nature is not nonempty either and the existence of this nature is not something that consists of or is included in reference points and characteristics.* Therefore, it does not fall into any extremes of reference points. Since said existence abides ultimately, it is free from all extremes of permanence and extinction.[451]

And:

> Thus, *the imaginary and the other-dependent represent the emptinesses of being empty of a nature of being established in the way they are imagined and appear, respectively. Since the perfect nature is empty in an independent manner, it is not that its fundamental character of being empty needs to be a reversal of the previous two emptinesses.*[452]

Thus, in the context of the twentieth flaw to be eliminated on the seventh bhūmi (AA I.61b), JNS comments:

> *As for the two statements of the perfect nature—ultimate true reality—not being empty of a nature of its own and all other-dependent and imaginary phenomena being empty of any nature of their own, through not understanding the reasons in this scriptural approach here for the difference between these two explanations, one clings to the emptiness of the perfect nature and the other two emptinesses as opposing each other.*[453]

CE's presentation of the three natures basically corresponds to JNS, except for CE adding the division into the pure and impure other-dependent nature, with the former being equivalent to the perfect nature and the latter to consciousness appearing in the dualistic manner of apprehender and apprehended:

> To take an illusion as an example, the basis for the magical creation [of an elephant]—a piece of wood—refers to ālaya-wisdom, the perfect [nature], or the pure other-dependent [nature]; the consciousness that appears as an elephant at this time, to the impure

> other-dependent [nature]; and the elephant, to the imaginary [nature]. The respective former ones are empty of the respective latter ones . . .
>
> [The other-dependent nature] is twofold—the impure [other-dependent] that entails dualistic appearance and the pure other-dependent (the aspect of luminosity that is free from dualistic appearance). The pure other-dependent is [equivalent to] the twofold perfect [nature]—the unmistaken [perfect nature (nonconceptual wisdom)] and the unchanging one (its object, suchness). These two [aspects of] the perfect [nature] are a unity and this is the dharmakāya, which is inconceivable as being real, unreal, and so on. Among these, the imaginary [nature] represents the seeming, the perfect [nature] is ultimate reality, and the impure other-dependent [nature] makes up seeming reality.[454]

And:

> [Conception] is what obscures the disposition for nirvāṇa (the ālaya-wisdom). It has the nature of being the consciousness that entails the dualistic appearances of apprehender and apprehended. This possesses [many] names, such as ālaya-consciousness, impure other-dependent [nature], nonafflicted ignorance, sentient being, and false imagination.[455]

Emptiness, wisdom, and the sugata heart as a permanent entity

In line with the above, as one of its most distinctive features JNS repeatedly describes ultimate reality—be it called emptiness, prajñāpāramitā, the dharmadhātu, the sugata heart, nondual wisdom, the perfect nature, Mahāmudrā, or buddhahood—as a permanent entity that performs functions:

> As for "the existence of an entity" in this context, some say indeed, "If the emptiness that is ultimate reality and actually fulfills that function is explained as an entity, why should that be any different from those who propound (really existing) entities?" However, the entity in this context is "the existence of an entity" among the triad of "nonexistence of entities," "bad entities," and "existence of an entity" that is differentiated in all three mother sūtras. The fact that this is an entity is clearly evident in all the Sugata's sūtras and tantras of definitive meaning because they explain that this kind of emptiness that is the buddha heart performs the functions

that are represented by the distinctive qualities of this very buddha heart. Thus, the nature of phenomena as described in this way is definitely an entity. It is said nowadays that one does not belong to the Mādhyamikas if one accepts suchness as an entity. However, in that case it would be reasonable that venerable Maitreya and master Asaṅga do not belong to the ranks of the Mādhyamikas either. For the former and master Asaṅga explain in the *Uttaratantra* root text and its commentary that the vajra of suchness is an entity and furthermore explain this entity to be pure, permanent, and blissful. If this referred to the nonexistence of any entity (or a nonentity), how could it be suitable as being pure, permanent, and blissful?[456]

And:

Thus, it is clear in all great sūtras, tantras, and treatises that tathāgata, enlightenment, and Mahāmudrā are permanent entities . . . "But how does permanent liberation—the dharmadhātu, emptiness—produce the entity that performs the function of promoting the welfare of others?" In the above example in the *Uttaratantra*, when the one painter who is the expert in painting heads is missing among the painters who are each skilled in painting a particular body part, the painted form of the king will not be complete in that it lacks the head. Likewise, on the path of learning, the stains that obscure permanent liberation are removed and liberation is excellently accomplished through the means (such as the ten pāramitās) that produce the appearance of the two genuine kāyas. Therefore, the genuine permanent emptiness that has been accomplished through its being endowed with all aspects of the means is described as the entity that is able to perform functions and serves as the kāya or the form of the nature of phenomena. For, without each and every aspect of those means being complete, the two kāyas of perfect buddhahood will not clearly manifest.

Thus, with the pure mirrors of the mind streams of the beings to be guided serving as the remedial factors and through the power of the dependent origination within the facet of their minds that is the lucid and aware cognition which is close to the nature of genuine liberation and accords in its realization with the nature of phenomena, the obscurations of sentient beings are relinquished in dependence on the aspects of the rūpakāyas appearing in the above facet of their minds by virtue of permanent liberation—the Tathāgata—functioning as the dominant condition for such

appearance. Since the functions such as generating the remedies arise or are accomplished naturally, despite the Tathāgata's being permanent, by way of profound dependent origination, the triad of agent, object, and action is justified. The example to illuminate that this is justified is as follows. Though all seeming and ultimate phenomena are permanent emptiness, it is seen that, through the principle of dependent origination, the triad of agent, object, and action operates in a conventional manner on the level of the seeming. This is the way in which the Yogācāra masters present this justification and its example to the Niḥsvabhāvavādins.

Some people will say here, "It is not justified that the *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika masters refer to emptiness as 'permanent.'" But then, it would be likewise unjustified for the mother sūtras to exclusively speak of emptiness as being unconditioned because emptiness is not permanent. The reason is accepted, the entailment is established through valid cognition, and if these people say, "We accept," they are in direct contradiction to the sūtras. Therefore, in accordance with the intention of the victor Maitreya, even a bodhisattva of the Madhyamaka model texts—master Śāntideva—says in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.35–37:

> Just as a wish-fulfilling jewel and a wish-fulfilling tree
> Fully satisfy [all] desires,
> Likewise, appearances of the victors are seen
> Because of their aspiration prayers and those to be guided.
>
> For example, when a worshipper of Garuḍa
> Has built a pillar and passed away,
> It still neutralizes poisons and such
> Even when he has been long dead.
>
> Likewise, through following enlightening conduct,
> The pillar of the victor is built too.
> It continues to promote all welfare
> Even after the bodhisattva has passed beyond.

The meaning of this is that there is no actual activity that a wish-fulfilling jewel or a wish-fulfilling tree perform—it is not that they in fact practice generosity by magically creating all that is needed and desired according to whatever wishes someone may have. Nevertheless, the hopes of persons who intensely focus on such a

wish-fulfilling jewel or a wish-fulfilling tree are fulfilled accordingly. In such a case, it is by virtue of the interaction of a wish-fulfilling jewel and a person focusing on it meeting that the performance of activity—the arising of all that is desired—appears. Likewise, it is through the power of (a) the pure mind streams of those to be guided, (b) the attainment of the permanent genuine entity of the Tathāgata, and (c) the full completion of the aspiration prayers of this Tathāgata (which entail the function of promoting the welfare of sentient beings) that it is not contradictory for the Tathāgata to be a permament entity and yet, from the perspective of those to be guided, to appear as the kāyas of the victor that arrive and leave, come and go, and so on. "But then it follows that it is not this permanent entity that performs the triad of agent, object, and action because what function as the support for the triad of agent, object, and action are the mere appearing aspects of what appears as those kāyas in the pure mind streams of those to be guided." This reason just perfectly proves our point here because the aspects of the kāyas of the victor are excellently cast by virtue of the dominant condition that is the profound natural outflow of the dharmadhātu which exists as the permanent entity of the Tathāgata.[457]

... One may use reasonings such as "Something permanent does not cast an aspect—if it possesses activity, this contradicts being permanent," or "If something impermanent casts an aspect, how could it do so since it is something that has already ceased once it has arisen?" This means that, ultimately, the notion of an aspect being cast by anything—be it permanent or impermanent—cannot withstand analysis through reasoning. Nevertheless, the manner in which the permanent nature of phenomena casts aspects and the manner in which the impermanent bearers of this nature cast aspects should be understood through the principle of illusionlike profound dependent origination. This is how this should be understood according to what is said in the Madhyamaka system.[458]

JNS elaborates that what are usually considered as entities that perform functions are not ultimately able to do so, while the only true entity that actually performs a function is the permanent nature of phenomena or buddhahood:

As for this kind of permanent entity, there are the two situations of Mādhyamikas determining the self-empty bearers of the nature of phenomena and determining the other-empty nature of

phenomena. In the first situation, since what performs a function by way of being impermanent and changing is not something that is genuinely able to perform a function, entities that simply appear as if they perform a function are not genuine entities in this sense of truly performing a function. In fact, there is nothing whatsoever that serves as such an entity, as is illustrated by *Pramāṇavārttika* III.360:

> Once entities are analyzed through this,
> In true reality, their nature does not exist,
> Because they do not have a nature
> Of unity or multiplicity.

Thus, Dharmakīrti negates all that appears as an entity, but he does not affirm the lack of entity. For, in true actuality, something being the lack of entity or the existence of the lack of entity is impossible. Since there is no need to affirm the lack of entity and, if it were affirmed, one would not go beyond characteristics and reference points, to do so is flawed. Nevertheless, as for the manner in which the nature of phenomena and the Tathāgata are permanent entities, ultimately, as the object of self-aware wisdom, liberation—the Tathāgata endowed with the four qualities—abides as an entity that is able to perform functions. It is permanent because a situation of it becoming interrupted is impossible, that is, liberation and the Tathāgata can never be reversed and change into something else. Also the intention of glorious Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is nothing but this—the opening lines of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* say:

> To the one who embodies valid cognition and wishes to benefit beings,
> The teacher, the Sugata and protector, I pay homage.

Thus, the fruition that arises from the cooperative cause which consists of the consummate motivation and application of this motivation—the teacher who has the character of being the Sugata in terms of his own welfare and performing the activity of protection in terms of the welfare of others—is clearly described as an entity. In accordance with this, the opening verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika* says:

> To the embodiment of profundity and vastness
> In which the web of conceptions is eliminated,
> The ever-excellent one, whose light
> Radiates everywhere, I pay homage.
>
> Thus, it teaches on the entity that performs the function of the light rays of the profound and vast kāyas radiating, and the phrase "radiates everywhere" indicates that this radiating is not something intermittent, but is displayed permanently.[459]

As for the concern of it being a flaw in the Madhyamaka system to assert any entity, JNS[460] says that, according to Madhyamaka analysis, all the respective kinds of the ultimate that the lower yānas assert belong to the seeming and thus just take what is not an entity as being an entity. Likewise, the claim that the aspect of being empty that consists of mere appearances being self-empty is an entity is flawed because one clings to the lack of entity as being an entity. Therefore, both the Niḥsvabhāvavādins and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas agree in not asserting the empty aspect of all phenomena—mere appearances being empty of themselves—as constituting any kind of nature. However, the position of the Buddha's mantrayāna, Maitreya, Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and others who declare that the dharmadhātu, which is not suitable as a mere appearance, exists as an entity did not arrive in the minds of the Niḥsvabhāvavādin masters.

Though Candrakīrti in particular has refuted this position of wisdom or the dharmadhātu existing as an entity well, the reason for it being unassailable by refutations is as follows. In general, all explanations that both those who propound entities and those who propound the lack of entity are flawed refer to them as being flawed by having in mind that they are deceiving with regard to the actual way of being of objects. However, to accept, just as it is, what exists or does not exist as an entity on the level of having entered the actual way of being of objects is absolutely free of flaw. For this is the context of accepting the outcome of Madhyamaka with an impartial and straightforward mind after having relinquished all extremes of superimposition and denial.

In brief, the scope of considering the proponents of entities that are refuted by the Mādhyamikas is confined to the entities of the seeming, and their refutation goes, "All seeming phenomena are neither entities nor the lack of entity and so on because they are not established as anything such." However, the proponents of Great Madhyamaka say that the nondual wisdom beyond dependent origination exists as the ultimate entity because it engages in the actual way of being of objects. This statement does not entail the flaw of the proponents of entities because—different from what the latter

hold to be entities—this wisdom actually *is* an entity. For it is explained in the Buddha's sūtras and tantras of definitive meaning as an entity and there is no philosophical system above this Great Madhyamaka, due to which there are no explanations of any reasonings that refute this wisdom being an entity.

As for the reason for it not being contradictory to explain this nondual wisdom as a permanent entity that performs a function, JNS says that this wisdom is able to perform the function of existing at its own time and (as explained in the texts on reasoning) therefore is established as being permanent. On nondual wisdom existing at its own time, Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* says:

> Thus, one clearly sees that when something does not exist somewhere, the latter is empty of the former. Furthermore, in accordance with true reality, one understands that what remains in this place exists as a real existent.[461]

According to JNS, this clearly explains the following. With nondual wisdom (ultimate reality) not existing during any phase of nondual consciousness (seeming reality), one sees or realizes in a supreme way (that is, in the manner of according with the actual way of being through the prajñā of identitylessness that is a natural outflow of the dharmadhātu) that this wisdom is empty of nondual consciousness (seeming reality). In this nondual wisdom there always exists the remainder that remains primordially and is primordially empty of the adventitious stains of nondual consciousness—the nondual wisdom that is not enshrouded in these adventitious stains. Also, the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* on verse I.25 says:

> Within the hosts of sentient beings there is no being whatsoever into which tathāgata wisdom has not entered in its entirety. However, by virtue of clinging through discriminating notions, tathāgata wisdom is not manifest.[462]

In explaining the meaning of this, JNS touches upon another one of its recurring themes—equating sentient beings and adventitious stains (with the former just being another name of the sum total of the latter) and thus saying that it is impossible for sentient beings to become buddhas. In sentient beings or adventitious stains (which are like darkness), the nondual all-accomplishing tathāgata wisdom in its entirety (which is like light) exists primordially. There is not a single sentient being into which this wisdom has not always entered in its entirety because this all-accomplishing wisdom, through entering all sentient beings, eliminates the adventitious stains (these very sentient beings), just as light eliminates darkness. That this wisdom is able to eliminate

sentient beings in this way is said in terms of not analyzing it through reasoning. But if one analyzes through reasoning, sentient beings or adventitious stains are not eliminated by buddhahood or nondual wisdom because what is to be eliminated (sentient beings or adventitious consciousness) does not exist from the very beginning. Thus, it is already eliminated in the first place and needs not to be eliminated again. Also, buddhahood or nondual wisdom does not enter beings again in order to eliminate stains because it has the nature of always having entered them as that which eliminates the stains right from the start.

Thus, the above statement about what is eliminated and what eliminates it—that there is no sentient being into which tathāgata wisdom has not entered in its entirety—is just made in terms of loose conventional parlance. However, sentient beings are obscured by virtue of clinging through their discriminating notions—the adventitious stains of not realizing that, as explained above, sentient beings and nondual wisdom are not established as what is to be eliminated and what eliminates it. For the mistaken appearances of such sentient beings, adventitious stains and wisdom appear as if they were what is to be eliminated and what eliminates it, which is for the following reasons. Due to not realizing that sentient beings (or adventitious stains) do not exist from the very start, they think that what existed before is eliminated later. Due to not realizing that any factors to be eliminated have already ceased through the power of how entities are (that is, the factors to be eliminated being phenomena that are unarisen), beings think that these factors have been put to an end through the power of remedies. Due to not realizing that nondual wisdom exists primordially, beings think that this wisdom eliminated the adventitious stains newly through the power of its sudden arising.

Consequently, the manner in which buddha wisdom actually accomplishes the welfare of sentient beings is as follows. The two mutually exclusive phenomena of real nondual buddha wisdom (whose existence at all times is by virtue of the power of how entities are) and unreal sentient beings (adventitious stains, whose nonexistence at all times is equally by virtue of the power of how entities are) are possible within the sphere of knowable objects. Thus, it is in this manner that one uses the designation of "buddhas accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings." For this reason, since all sentient beings are pure in themselves, it is impossible for any sentient being not to become a buddha. Because buddhahood and sentient beings are mutually exclusive in terms of being existent and nonexistent, respectively, when having become a buddha, tathāgatahood itself has become buddhahood. However, it is neither suitable for anything or anyone else to become buddhahood, nor is it suitable for sentient beings and buddhahood to represent a substantial continuum of cause and result. Therefore, the impossibility of "sentient beings becoming buddhas" and "sentient beings attaining buddhahood" is well established.

Elsewhere, JNS[463] further elaborates on this by referring to the explanations of the Seventh Karmapa. Unlike many other Tibetan masters, he says that there is no such thing as the beings to be guided (who have one of the three dispositions of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas) directly relying on the omniscience that has the nature of the three knowledges, nor is there any familiarizing with these three knowledges through these beings directly relying on them in their mind streams. For the intention of the words of the Buddha and the treatises on them is that the consciousnesses that represent the mind streams of those to be guided and the three knowledges are mutually exclusive. The consciousnesses (such as self-aware perception) of ordinary beings are not able to perform the function of familiarizing with the three knowledges by actually relying on them. Rather, all obscurations of these beings becoming relinquished is only justified because the process of becoming familiar with the realization of the three knowledges being unborn happens through the power of the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas within the consciousnesses of ordinary beings, which do not exist by any nature of their own. In other words, the relinquishment of obscurations in order to accomplish perfect buddhahood happens by virtue of becoming familiar with the operations of the compassion and enlightened activity of prajñāpāramitā, which is endowed with the qualities of the knowledge of all aspects.

Thus, according to the intention of the Seventh Karmapa and in my own opinion, Mikyö Dorje says, the self-aware perception that consists of the consciousness of those with impure minds (no matter how much it may be empty of the conceptions of apprehender and apprehended) and the self-aware perception of personally experienced wisdom are mutually exclusive in the sense of it being impossible for them to coexist. However, Dölpopa and Śākya Chogden—those present-day Tibetans who boast about themselves being Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas—claim that, except for respectively being or not being empty of both the imaginary and the conceived, the self-aware perception of the personally experienced wisdom that represents nondual wisdom is not different not different from the stream of the self-aware perception of those with impure minds. This does not accord with any scriptures that are authentic sources. For otherwise it would follow that ordinary sentient beings and buddhas have the same underlying mind stream.

Prajñāpāramitā and ālaya-wisdom

The explicit distinction between "ālaya-consciousness" and "ālaya-wisdom" seems to have been made first by Dölpopa (such as in his *Mountain Dharma*, *Fourth Council*, and *Differentiation of the Ālaya*[464]). Dölpopa's disciple Sabsang Mati Paṇchen Lodrö Gyaltsen[465] (1294–1376), who was also an early

teacher of Tsongkhapa, refers to these two types of ālaya in his commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,[466] which shows how this distinction is implied in several sūtras and the writings of Asaṅga. Indeed, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, upon which the presentation of the disposition and the ālaya-wisdom by JNS greatly relies, distinguishes between the "ālaya-consciousness" and "the supramundane mind."[467] The latter is said to come from the latent tendencies for listening that are the natural outflow of the very pure dharmadhātu (which is said to be equivalent to the dharmakāya) and is equivalent to nonconceptual wisdom (JNS says that these latent tendencies are associated with or based on the ālaya-wisdom, which is nothing other than the sugata heart; see below).

The Third Karmapa's autocommentary on his *Profound Inner Reality*[468] also describes such a distinction—though without using the specific terms "ālaya-consciousness" and "ālaya-wisdom." Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on the same text[469] quotes some passages from the Karmapa's autocommentary and elaborates on the topic by saying:

> Ālaya-wisdom is the sugata heart that was discussed above. It is taught to be the nature of the mind in the prajñāpāramitā [sūtras] and the *Uttaratantra*.

In terms of the meaning, Jamgön Kongtrul also makes this distinction in his commentary on Rangjung Dorje's *Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom*.[470]

In his *Treasury of Philosophical Systems*,[471] Longchen Rabjampa distinguishes between "the ālaya of the actual real nature, which is the dharmadhātu, natural luminosity, the tathāgata heart" and "beginningless ignorance . . . which is called 'the ālaya of various latent tendencies.'" The Sakya master Śākya Chogden also accepts and uses this distinction in some of his works.[472]

In a contemporary exposition of the Jonang school,[473] it is said that the actual ālaya-consciousness is the support for all tendencies of afflicted phenomena that constitute saṃsāra. It exists in ordinary beings and ceases as such a support in the case of arhathood as well as on the first bodhisattvabhūmi. From this bhūmi onward, when one speaks about the ālaya, what is meant is not the ālaya-consciousness, but the support for all tendencies of purified phenomena (the remedies). This support is the ālaya-wisdom. Thus, in the most general sense, ālaya-wisdom—or buddha nature—is the fundamental basis of the ālaya-consciousness too. This is to be understood in the sense that it accomodates all phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, just as the sky accomodates a greater or lesser density of clouds.

In its general topic on the disposition (Appendix I1E1), JNS says the following on ālaya-wisdom:

> Hence, the meaning of "disposition" that is taught here is that it is an adequate substantial cause for its result to come about. Such a cause is classified as twofold—the causes for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The cause that is taught here is the disposition which is the cause for nirvāṇa. According to the followers of the mahāyāna, it is asserted that this very causal disposition abides as a seminal aspect based on the ālaya. *The causal disposition for nirvāṇa is founded on the ālaya-wisdom, and the causal disposition for saṃsāra is founded on the ālaya-consciousness.*
>
> Thus, these two causal dispositions are founded separately on the pure and the impure ālaya, respectively. *However, the assertion that does not clearly differentiate between pure and impure ālayas, but presents the causal dispositions for both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as based on a single ālaya as the bearer of such a property is a mistaken understanding of the meaning of the abhidharma scriptures. The Abhidharmasūtra* says:
>
> The dhātu of beginningless time
> Is the matrix of all phenomena.
> Since it exists, all beings
> And also nirvāṇa are obtained.
>
> Thus, it is declared that both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are justified since all phenomena, by way of the three characteristics,[474] are present within the ālaya that is the dhātu of beginningless time. Here, the meaning of the sūtras is that one needs to differentiate between these two factors of wisdom and consciousness with respect to the ālayadhātu that does not reach a limit of beginning in time . . . Therefore, the necessity of making this distinction between consciousness and wisdom within the dhātu of beginningless time has been stated by the invincible protector [Maitreya] in his *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* . . .
>
> Therefore, *it is clearly declared that there are four flaws if there is no such support that does not allow for any operation of the factors to be relinquished and [allows for] the operation of their remedies and so forth—the ālaya-wisdom as the basis of the fundamental change of state—and that there are four benefits if it exists. Hence, the distinction between consciousness and wisdom within the ālaya is the assertion of the Buddha Bhagavān.*

If, according to the tradition of some people, the causal disposition for both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is presented as nothing but the ālaya-consciousness, the order of all principles of the dharma of the mahāyāna is mixed up from its very foundation. Since the ālaya-consciousness is canceled upon becoming a buddha, the ālaya-consciousness is no [longer] existent. But the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness into ālaya-wisdom (which is its opposite) must be presented as the wisdom of having changed state. So it follows that, according to those [who hold the above position], it is not suitable for the wisdom of having changed state to arise, once the ālaya-consciousness is canceled. The reason for this is that the canceled ālaya-consciousness is something that is [already] canceled, while a shift from this ālaya-consciousness to wisdom (which has changed state by having cast away the ālaya-consciousness) is impossible within the sphere of knowable objects. A presentation that the mere factor of cancellation of the canceled ālaya-consciousness exists as the nature of the wisdom of having changed state contradicts reasoning—a phenomenon that has become nonexistent is in no case suitable as a cause for something existent . . .

Most Tibetans . . . say, "The twofold distinction between ālaya-consciousness and [ālaya-]wisdom is the system of the Mere Mentalists" and also, "The twofold distinction between ālaya-wisdom and [ālaya]-consciousness does not appear in any system whatsoever." Their own words are self-contradictory because if [this distinction] appeared in the system of the Mere Mentalists, it contradicts not appearing in any system at all . . .

As for the manner in which uncontaminated seeds are input based on the ālaya-wisdom, *the actual ālaya-wisdom is "the sugata heart," "the vajra of mind," and "the naturally abiding disposition." These are synonyms for the emptiness that actually fulfills this function*, which are taught briefly by Lord Maitreya in *Madhyāntavibhāga* [I.14].[475] *Uncontaminated seeds are not something that must be input newly under the influence of conditions . . .* In particular, they appear in the great texts of Lord Maitreya under the names "the latent tendencies for listening," "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas," and "uncontaminated seeds." *These latent tendencies for listening are associated with ālaya-wisdom . . .*

Though [the latent tendencies for listening] are the remedy for what is mundane, they are not contained in mundane mind streams, but are the natural outflow of the supramundane dharmadhātu. The gist of "natural outflow" is that it addresses the definite need for

some [factor] that is other than the completely pure dharmadhātu itself and [at the same time] outside of everything that exists within the class of impure phenomena whose nature is [the dharmadhātu]. So, from the perspective of this factor of the natural outflow being associated with a mind stream, it is both presented as a bodhisattva and yet this factor is also included in the dharmakāya. During this time, *there are two [modes of engagement] in the single body of a yogin that appears as the other-dependent nature—the mode of engagement of the continuum of consciousness and the mode of engagement of the power of wisdom.* Noble Nāgārjuna says [in verses 62–63 of his *Dharmadhātustava*]:

> Just as from a mix of milk and water
> That is present in a vessel,
> Geese just sip the milk, but not the water,
> Which remains just as it is.
>
> Just so, being covered by afflictions,
> Wisdom dwells within this body, one [with them].
> But yogins just extract the wisdom
> And leave the ignorance behind.[476]

In its comments on the *Vivṛti* on AA VIII.1, JNS gives the following description of the manner in which the essence of buddhahood—the svābhāvikakāya—is attained through this process of extracting wisdom and leaving consciousness or the obscurations behind:

> In the sense of not being contrived through any formations, the svābhāvikakāya of the supramundane uncontaminated path is attained through the nature of phenomena, but it is not something that is produced through the natural dharmadhātu. Rather, *this luminosity [of the svābhāvikakāya] exists within the ālaya-consciousness (that which obscures this luminosity) as having the remedial nature of the seeds for listening that are the natural outflow of the dharmadhātu. Through their power increasing, the factors to be relinquished within the ālaya-consciousness are progressively relinquished.* As for the manner in which this happens, illusion-like consciousnesses (which have the nature of listening and so on) realize all mistaken seeming phenomena to be free from any nature of their own. By virtue of the familiarity with this realization reaching its consummation, the two obscurations (the factors to be

> relinquished) cease through the gathering of the two accumulations (the remedies). Finally, when the power of the knowledge of all aspects of the buddhabhūmi (the indivisible vajralike samādhi, which is endowed with the unimpeded power of the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya) operates in a bodhisattva at the end of the continuum, the ālaya-consciousness ceases through not being able to withstand the power of this samādhi. Once it has ceased, the illusionlike consciousnesses that are based on it and represent the dispositions or causes for attaining the knowledge of all aspects—the virtues at the time of the path that bear the nature of the latent tendencies for listening—cease too. Therefore, *this is the meaning of the roots of virtue being extinguished on the level of complete buddhahood. However, unlike that, to say that the uncontaminated virtues that make up the buddhabhūmi and exist as the nature of the knowledge of all aspects do not exist is not suitable. Since I explain the correct definitive meaning of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka here*, there is no need for doubt.[477]

In the context of explaining the three natures, JNS says:

> It is taught that labeling the ālaya as a consciousness that is cognizance [refers to] the nominal [ālaya] and not to the [ālaya] that fully qualifies as such. In terms of the teaching that one portion of the ālaya (the aspect of cognizance) is the other-dependent, [this portion of the ālaya] is necessarily false imagination. However, *the entire ālaya is not necessarily the other-dependent and false imagination. The aspect of the latent tendencies of dualistic appearances within the ālaya represents the imaginary; its matured aspect is the other-dependent; and from the point of view of its being lucid awareness, it is the perfect [nature].*[478]

CE's description of ālaya-wisdom generally corresponds to JNS. In particular, in addition to equating ālaya-wisdom with nirvāṇa and the pure other-dependent,[479] CE gives the following list of its equivalents:

> This [ālaya-]wisdom has many synonyms, such as suchness, sugata heart, the unchanging perfect [nature], ultimate reality, unconditioned dharmadhātu, prajñāpāramitā, dharmakāya, the true nature of mind, the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, and uncontaminated seeds. It is the unity of lucidity and emptiness, the changeless and permanent genuine self.[480] Also that which serves

> as the foundation of practice in this context here—the naturally abiding disposition—is nothing but this.[481]

For more details on Mikyö Dorje's specific understanding of buddha nature and mind's natural luminosity besides what was explained above, see primarily the general topic on the disposition (Appendix I1E).

Other unique positions of JNS include its refutation (several times and at great length) of the view of buddha nature with all its qualities existing in sentient beings, which is often regarded as one of the epitomes of the *Shentong* view and no doubt maintained by many followers of the Kagyü School. Also, JNS denies the claim that the ālaya-consciousness is refined into mirrorlike wisdom. From the perspective of almost all other brands of *Shentong*, such refutations are very remarkable (to say the least) for a text that is supposedly written to uphold the *Shentong* view.

Furthermore, JNS offers highly complex presentations of the factors to be relinquished in terms of afflictive and cognitive obscurations, in particular the distinct sets of four kinds of conceptions on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, respectively (for overviews and details, see Appendices I1D, I1H3, I4B, and I5A as well as Charts 15–18).

Another remarkable feature of JNS is the statement that the view of the pratyekabuddhas is Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalism because they assert that, after having relinquished the conceptions about the apprehended, single awareness is real as the nonduality of object and subject.[482] Thus, in terms of the view, though not in terms of their motivation, practice, and fruition, this puts the pratyekabuddhas into the fold of the mahāyāna.

When commenting on the verses of the AA, JNS—conforming to the typical diction of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras themselves—often uses double negations by adding yet another negation to what the AA and other commentaries explain, such as saying that form and so on are not only free from abiding, but also *not* free from abiding; that bodhisattvas should be without clinging and also *not* without clinging; and that all phenomena are empty and also *not* empty.

In his concluding verses in JNS,[483] the Eighth Karmapa says that, though there are many learned ones who follow Nāgārjuna's and Maitreya's systems of the progressive stages of the explicit and hidden meanings of prajñāpāramitā, supreme paṇḍitas such as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and the master of the *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* extensively commented on the true reality of Maitreya's texts. By virtue of the meaning of their comments being vast and profound in meaning, childish beings cannot fathom them, but Haribhadra composed many excellent explanations on the meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Since I was a child, Mikyö Dorje says, I had devotion

toward the Buddha's teachings and interest in prajñāpāramitā since I was little. At nineteen, I studied the AA and Haribhadra's commentaries from genuine masters, and based on that, started writing JNS. May those who say that my way of commenting does not accord with Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra not speak with hatred, but ascertain that it does accord so through explanation and study. Finally, the Karmapa criticizes those who are not really learned and who are lazy, but just loudly proclaim things about which they have no idea and deceive themselves and others through their studies, reflections, and meditations not serving as remedies for the afflictions so that their minds and the dharma do not blend.

Throughout JNS, the Karmapa expresses his enthusiasm and propensity for the works of Maitreya, such as saying:

> I had the good fortune of the propensities for the dharma system of Ajita[484]
> Being clearly manifest already from the time of my youth,
> But now, through the power of being cared for by my spiritual friends,
> Great enthusiasm for it flourishes in my mind, which was familiar with it from before.[485]

And:

> I realized the intention of the texts of Maitreya since when I was little.[486]

In addition, Mikyö Dorje declares his great self-confidence in grasping the meaning of the AA:

> I understand well the meaning of this meaningful
> Amazing treatise of the venerable lord [Maitreya].
> Though not having trained, the unmistaken prajñā of analyzing
> Through my own mind is the eye that views what is to be known—
> Nowadays in Tibet, who is there
> As youthful as me that equals me in that?[487]

A few additional glimpses into the young Eighth Karmapa's view are offered by his earliest doxographical statements in the colophon of his new edition of the Seventh Karmapa's *Ocean of Texts on Reasoning*, which he offered to his teacher Karma Trinlépa at age twenty-two. Here, Mikyö Dorje not only

discusses the four Buddhist philosophical systems (in particular, the relationship between Mere Mentalism, Maitreya/Asaṅga's system, and Madhyamaka), but also the correct views of the Third Karmapa and the siddha Götsangpa. In this way, the Eighth Karmapa already exhibits a typical feature of his exegetical approach (which is found in many of his great commentaries on both sūtra and tantra) of relying on both scholarly analysis and the views of great yogins.

[There are] those whose insight engages in philosophical systems
And the worldlings who do not so engage.
Among these two, those who do not so engage lack the analysis
Of bondage and liberation and thus simply remain ordinary.

Those whose insight engages in philosophical systems
Consist of non-Buddhist and Buddhist proponents.
Among these, since non-Buddhists lack the path to liberation,
It is appropriate for those who wish for liberation to refute their systems.

Buddhist proponents are known as four—Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas,
Mere Mentalists, and Mādhyamikas.
Among these, the gist that emerges from the philosophical systems
Of Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas
Is that they prioritize mere personal identitylessness.

Though they are able to [attain] mere liberation from this saṃsāra,
Through being under the sway of taking all phenomena of apprehender and apprehended as real
They [still] possess the obscurations that obstruct omniscience.
Therefore, it is fitting for those who wish for omniscience to refute these superimpositions and denials.

The proponents of Mere Mentalism only realize
That outer referents lack real [existence], but cling to a really established
Mind as such that is self-lucid and free from obscurations.

Therefore, through ascertaining one portion of knowable objects—the apprehended—
As lacking real [existence], they are able to progress only to the mahāyāna path of preparation,
But lack the relinquishment of the obscurations of clinging
To the real [existence of the] factor of the apprehender among knowable objects.[488]

Thus, since they have no chance to manifest
The emptiness of realizing the lack of nature
Of any phenomenal identity, which pervades all knowable objects,
It is appropriate to also refute this philosophical system of the Vijñapti[vādins].

Nevertheless, the statement that lucid and aware mere mind,
Which is taught as being really established ultimately
In the sevenfold collection and the sūtra of Dignāga and [Dharma]kīrti,[489]
Abides as Madhyamaka was made by the victor Maitreya

To the great noble master Asaṅga
In order to guide Vasubandhu,
Proclaiming that the three latter dharmas of Maitreya[490] and the system
That extensively teaches the dharma principles of
Vijñapti[vāda] are Madhyamaka.

The Vijñapti[vādin]s who follow
The system of this trailblazer
Say that their own imperfect philosophical system
Represents the Madhyamaka system.

Here, when seeing no chance for [their system]
To be in accord with the system of the glorious protector Nāgārjuna,
Some Yogācāra masters explain
The scriptural system of Nagārjuna as entailing a [certain] intention,
Because the system of Nāgārjuna amounts to the extreme of extinction.

Some Yogācāra masters, such as Dharmapāla
And [Ratnākara]śānti, comment on the Madhyamaka
That was asserted by Nāgārjuna as representing
Vijñaptimātra.

Though many such systems of amending [Nāgārjuna's]
position arose,
The mighty victor by name Rangjung [Dorje] said,
"Though cognizance is indeed devoid of being established
ultimately,
As a mere illusion and from the perspective of undeceiving
conventionalities
It is real as the foundation of what is called saṃsāra and
nirvāṇa.

On the basis of this as a mere common worldly consensus,
Within the unimpeded aspect of mind's being lucid,
All of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is suitable to occur—
This is what the great master Asaṅga emphasized in his
explanations.

Within the aspect of mind's being empty that is without
arising and ceasing,
There is freedom from all reference points of saṃsāra and
nirvāṇa—
This is what the great glorious protector Nāgārjuna
emphasized in his explanations.
[However,] the intention in both [explanations] is without
contradiction."

Some who do not fathom the intention of this [statement]
Say that the position of the mighty victor Karmapa
In terms of the definitive meaning represents a blend of
Vijñapti[vāda] and Madhyamaka,
[But] I have no patience with these [people].

Rather, the intention of the great mighty victor is as follows.
He said that the principle of Madhyamaka is dependent
origination being justified within being empty,
While the Vijñaptivādins assert dependent origination as an
entity.

Also, dependent origination being free from reference points
is said to be Madhyamaka.

[However,] in terms of both systems, to merely speak of
dependent origination
As an entity is the position of master Asaṅga,
Which is established as being absolutely noncontradictory
As the very entrance door and stepping stone for mind
progressively [engaging]
In the dependent origination free from reference points that
is asserted by Nāgārjuna.

As for the manner of such being established, the Buddhist
Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas,
In order to refute permanent entities without momentary
change,
Extensively prove that impermanent entities, which entail
momentary change,
Are representing dependent origination.

Through such [proofs being used] as the pith instructions on
mind gradually engaging
In dependent origination free from reference points,
Most learned ones such as Dignāga and [Dharma]kīrti,
Who know the constitutions and faculties of those to be
guided,
Employ all kinds of means to progressively lead [these
beings'] insight
From the lower philosophical systems to the higher ones.[491]

Thus, it is with this intention that [Rangjung Dorje] declared
said two systems to be noncontradictory.
[However, some] who do not fathom the intention of this
say,
"The statement that even Nāgārjuna has no Madhyamaka
That is superior to [the one of] the False Aspectarians
Is the intention of the mighty victor Karmapa."

But if this were the case,
How could such idle and self-contradictory talk

Of [in effect] saying that mere cognizance is both real and unreal
Be appropriate for the noble Karmapa,
Who has cast far away false words?

If there are any people who follow the striving for omniscience
And are not adherents who just follow their biases,
Don't sever the vital root of liberation!
When the words of the Kagyü forefathers, which are difficult to realize,
Are commented on by those who possess limited minds,
A great many mistaken statements are seen.

For example, when the dharma king Götsangpa
Explains that the two of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa arise
From the two aspects of mind being lucid and empty,
[Some] claim that the intention of the Tagpo Kagyü lies in
Emptiness as a nonimplicative negation being the cause of nirvāṇa
And all aspects of lucidity producing saṃsāra.

But in that case, it would not be reasonable for the nonabiding three kāyas,
The five wisdoms, and so on to arise even on a mere conventional level—
What result could a primordially empty and unarisen cause have?

If there were nothing else but solely saṃsāra
To be produced by mind's aspect of being lucid,
Even the very wisdom of omniscience would be saṃsāra,
Or the cause of this [wisdom] would be nothing but a non implicative negation.

If this nonimplicative negation functioned as the cause of omniscience,
Why couldn't the horns of a rabbit too function as its cause?
Such ways of amending the Kagyü position are amazing indeed!

You may wonder, "So what was the intention
Of the victor Götsangpa when he said this?"
His intention is that, when one rests in meditative equipoise in the emptiness
Of all knowable phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, such as mind,
Being free from all characteristics in terms of entities and all obscurations in terms of attachment and obstruction,[492]
One will attain unsurpassable perfect enlightenment.

When all knowable phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa—one's own mind—
While appearing in a lucid manner, are grasped at as if they were real entities
And thus karmas and afflictions are taken as [representing certain] characteristics,
The two obscurations and their latent tendencies will increase without exception,
Which means to plunge into the ocean of saṃsāra with its three realms.

Certain people who lack such profound and secret pith instructions—
The excellent words of supreme gurus who have a lineage—
But boast about explaining the intention of the Tagpo Kagyü
And all those who presume to propound the philosophical system of the Karma Kagyü
Are like [people who] take the shine of a lamp to be a jewel—
Whose minds would rely on such people who speak in mistaken ways?

Through the power of having supplicated with great respect
Some in the dharma system of the glorious Tagpo Kagyü,
Such as venerable [Sangyé] Nyenpa [Rinpoche],
Whose scope [of mind] never involves any stains of mistakenness,
I have established the point of distinguishing dharma from what is not dharma.

Out of the wish to repay their profound and vast kindness,
Through properly offering the teachings of the Gyalwa Karmapas here

With my three doors for the sake of [all my] previous
mothers,
Have I not gathered any virtuous karma
Of completing the six pāramitās
That consist of merit and wisdom?[493]

In brief, the main points on Maitreya/Asaṅga's and Nāgārjuna's views in these verses are as follows. Asaṅga is not considered as a Mere Mentalist or Vijñaptivādin in the above sense of only realizing the lack of nature of the apprehended, but follows what Maitreya taught as Madhyamaka (lucid and aware mere mind). According to the Third Karmapa, Asaṅga emphasized mind's aspect of being lucid, which can mainfest as anything in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, while Nāgārjuna highlighted mind's aspect of being empty, which refers to anything that appears in the mind being free from all reference points. Rangjung Dorje's position of these two explanations not being contradictory does not just represent some kind of mixture of Vijñaptivāda and Madhyamaka, but rather refers to the subjective and objective sides, respectively, of the very same cognitive process toward buddhahood. This means that Asaṅga's system outlines the progression and refinement of mundane and supramundane states of mind (the subject) in terms of first conceptually and then directly realizing the ultimate reality of the dependent origination free from reference points (the final object) as emphasized by Nāgārjuna.

To conclude, let me sketch some of the major differences (which, of course, does not represent an exhaustive list) between the presentations of *Shentong* by Dölpopa and the Eighth Karmapa in JNS.[494]

1) Dölpopa's presentation of the three turnings of the wheel of dharma and which ones among them are of expedient versus definitive meaning relies solely on the distinction made in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, thus saying that the first two turnings are of expedient meaning, while solely the last one is of definitive meaning. Mikyö Dorje presents different models by adding those of the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*, the *Uttaratantra*, and by Nāgārjuna to the above and concludes that all mahāyānists take the first turning as being of expedient meaning, while the second and third are of definitive meaning. However, the difference is that the False Aspectarians deny that the second wheel represents the definitive meaning that is to be taken literally, whereas the Niḥsvabhāvavādins assert this to be the case.

2) Though both Dölpopa and Mikyö Dorje say that the two realities are inexpressible as the same or different, Dölpopa concludes from this that they are "different in the sense of negating oneness" (*gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad*), while the latter always emphasizes the unity of the two realities and even says that, actually, both only pertain to the level of seeming reality.

3) Dölpopa usually distinguishes sharply between what belongs to the spheres of the seeming and the ultimate reality. For example, he says that the domains of ordinary consciousness and nondual wisdom are two separate kingdoms because consciousness is merely seeming and empty of itself, while nondual wisdom is really established and only empty of other seeming phenomena. The object of consciousness is exclusively saṃsāra and the object of wisdom is exclusively nirvāṇa. Mikyö Dorje agrees on seeming reality and consciousness being self-empty, but says that ultimate reality or nonconceptual wisdom is actually neither self-empty nor other-empty.

4) Dölpopa explicitly declares that nondual wisdom and ultimate reality withstand analysis. In other words, self-emptiness—phenomena being empty of a nature of their own—pertains only to conventional reality, but it does not pertain to ultimate reality, which is not empty of itself. Consequently, the views of *Svātantrikas and *Prāsaṅgikas—who assert the opposite—are impure. Mikyö Dorje never says that wisdom and ultimate reality are able to withstand analysis, but he holds that they are simply outside the ballpark of analysis. Nor does he reject the approaches of *Svātantrikas and *Prāsaṅgikas altogether, but only on a few distinct points (such as nondual wisdom and buddhahood being permanent entities that perform functions), while he greatly uses, and even praises, them in other respects.

5) Dölpopa says that nondual wisdom and ultimate reality are neither an entity nor a nonentity, while JNS explains at length that they are a permanent entity.

6) Dölpopa holds that ultimate buddhahood is taught to be unconditioned, which is also intended to mean that it is free from moments. This applies equally to nondual wisdom, while Mikyö Dorje speaks of "the permanent moment of Mahāmudrā, the supreme awareness that is other."

7) Dölpopa asserts that emptiness is not necessarily the ultimate (for example, self-emptiness), while Mikyö Dorje takes emptiness and ultimate reality to be equivalent.

8) Dölpopa typically describes buddha nature, the dharmakāya, ultimate reality, and so on as being really established (*bden grub*), enduring (*brtan pa*), immutable (*ther zug*), and eternal (*g.yung drung*), all terms that may be taken to reify ultimate reality and so on.[495] JNS never uses the latter three terms and explicitly and repeatedly denies any reifying or absolutist understanding of ultimate reality, buddha nature, the dharmakāya, and so on.

9) In terms of the three natures, Mikyö Dorje does not speak about a "pure other-dependent nature," while Dölpopa—though acknowledging that it is not found in Indian texts—frequently uses and explains the term in detail.

10) In this vein, Dölpopa says that the unmistaken perfect nature actually belongs to the "pure other-dependent nature" and is only included in the perfect nature in a nominal sense—the perfect nature being the unchanging

perfect nature alone. Mikyö Dorje clearly describes the perfect nature as consisting of both its unmistaken and its unchanging aspect.

11) Mikyö Dorje does not hold that the sixty-four qualities of a completely perfect buddha exist in a complete and unobscured manner at the time of the ground, that is, in ordinary sentient beings. In other words, he does not hold that the fruition is present right now in these beings, while Dölpopa does. As JNS says:

> Nowadays some people say, "The intention of the Omniscient Rangjung Dorje is that the tathāgata heart that is not empty of qualities, such as the [ten] powers, exists in sentient beings. This is clearly explained by the mighty victor, [the Seventh Karmapa] Chötra Gyatso." This is [just] putting to melody what others say, but it is not our own [Kagyü] system. You may wonder, "Which other great ones assert such a system?" In Tibet, the land of snows, there are indeed also many others who assert something like that, but the one who explains it by excessively promoting it is Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen. He declares that "such a Heart, which is free of all flaws and endowed with all qualities, exists in sentient beings. Through it *existing* in sentient beings, sentient beings do not have to *be* it. Therefore, one must make a difference between existing and being [something], without mixing them."[496]

12) According to Dölpopa, all buddha qualities have both an aspect that pertains to the ultimate qualities of the dharmakāya and an aspect that pertains to the seeming qualities of the rūpakāyas. In particular, the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya also pertain to the rūpakāyas and the major and minor marks pertain to the dharmakāya too. Like almost everybody else, Mikyö Dorje clearly separates the qualities of the dharmakāya from those of the rūpakāyas.

13) Mikyö Dorje says that not realizing the nature of one's mind, wisdom, or buddha nature is saṃsāra and realizing it is nirvāṇa, while Dölpopa explicitly rejects this at length.[497]

14) Dölpopa says that the five Maitreya works do not represent different tenets, but all teach nothing but *Shentong*, with even the AA containing nothing that is *Rangtong*. Mikyö Dorje says that the AA clearly teaches on the middle cycle of the Buddha's teachings (the lack of characteristics). Though, on the level of conventions, the AA contains elements of both *rangtong* and *shentong*, it does not teach the actual other-empty, which is only taught in the third cycle.

15) Besides obviously agreeing with the Eighth Karmapa on Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Nāgārjuna as being Great Mādhyamikas, Dölpopa explicitly excludes Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra from the ranks of such Mādhyamikas, while Mikyö Dorje includes them. Dölpopa includes Āryadeva, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti, Kamalaśīla, Jñānagarbha, and Śāntideva within the Great Mādhyamikas, while Mikyö Dorje excludes Candrakīrti, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Śāntarakṣita. Though Mikyö Dorje refers to Śāntideva favorably throughout, he does not call him a Great Mādhyamika, but "a bodhisattva of the Madhyamaka model texts."

Of course, there are also agreements to be found in Mikyö Dorje's and Dölpopa's positions, such as both denying that the ultimate or actual emptiness represents a nonimplicative negation; asserting that the essence of buddha nature during ground, path, and fruition is the same; that the fruition of buddhahood is not something newly produced through the path; that buddha nature, ultimate reality, and nondual wisdom are not, or beyond, dependent origination; that the actual basis of emptiness is the perfect nature; and that Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Nāgārjuna are all Great Mādhyamikas.[498]

Overview of the Present Three-Volume Study of Commentaries on the AA

As outlined above, the present study of primarily Kagyü and Nyingma commentaries on the AA peruses all the Kagyü materials that, to my knowledge, are available; all the Nyingma texts; and several representative Sakya and Gelug commentaries, either in the form of direct translations, paraphrases, or excerpts in the endnotes.

To give a brief overview of the contents and scope of each one of the three volumes, the first and second form a unit that focuses on the Kagyü commentaries. The first volume presents an English translation of the first three chapters of the AA and its commentary by the Fifth Shamarpa. The Shamarpa's often very brief commentary is supplemented by three layers of additional explanations found in the Eighth Karmapa's JNS (and, for parts of the first chapter, the Seventh Karmapa's JG). The Eighth Karmapa's corresponding (1) direct comments on the first three chapters of the AA and (2) his subcommentary on Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*[499] (if different from and/or more extensive than CE) are included in the endnotes to the respective sections of CE. (3) Appendix I contains JG's and JNS's extensive general discussions of the major subjects in the first three chapters of the AA as well as many supplementary topics, such as bodhicitta, the two realities, the dharmadhātu as the "disposition," nondual wisdom, emptiness, the ten bhūmis and the five paths with the obscurations to be relinquished on them, the knowledges of the paths of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, and the three natures (imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect natures). In addition, various endnotes include selected relevant passages from other commentaries (JG, BT, PK, SC, LN, YT, RT, LSSP, PSD, PBG, and NSML). Appendix II contains a number of charts that are relevant for the study of the AA in general as well as those that specifically pertain to its first three chapters.

The format of the second volume follows the first one. Thus, it contains the translation of the remaining five chapters of the AA and its commentary by the Fifth Shamarpa (thus concluding the first translation of an entire commentary on the AA into any language other than Tibetan). These are

again supplemented by the above-mentioned three layers of JNS in the endnotes and Appendix I. In particular, Appendix I provides supplementary discussions of topics such as the classifications of afflictive and cognitive obscurations and the manner of relinquishing them, ultimate reality and buddhahood representing permanent entities that perform functions, the five great Madhyamaka reasonings, dependent origination, the four stages of yoga, the discussion about whether there are three or four kāyas, and enlightened activity. Appendix II includes the charts that are relevant to the last five chapters of the AA as well as an overview of its eight topics and seventy points. The remaining appendices provide translations of the Third Karmapa's STT and *Stanzas That Express Realization* (a poem that summarizes the path of prajñāpāramitā based on the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment), the definitions of the eight topics and seventy points of the AA according to JG, JNS, CE, STT, SLG, and LSSP/PSD, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's presentation of paths and bhūmis, brief biographies of the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Karmapas as well as the Fifth Shamarpa, and the text of the AA proper.[500] Volume Two will also contain the glossaries and bibliography for both volumes. These will be made available online at www.snowlionpub.com when Volume One is published.

In brief, both Volumes One and Two provide a four-tier structure of commentaries on the AA—(1) CE on its own; CE's endnotes with (2) JG and JNS on the AA as well as (3) JNS on the *Vivṛti*; and (4) JG's and JNS's general topics in Appendix I. In addition, there are the excerpts in various endnotes from the other commentaries mentioned above.

This complex structure with its numerous, and often extensive, endnotes and supplementary explanations may seem overwhelming at first. However, it is conceived as a framework for progressively being able to go deeper into the equally complex structure of the AA itself in order to make it as "user-friendly" as is possible for a text of this caliber. Therefore, it seems advisable for most readers to first gain an overview of the AA through studying the relatively brief and straighforward explanations in CE alone. The next steps would be to supplement this overview with the comments under (2) and (3), then consult the background information in (4) that pertains directly to the points of the AA, and, finally, approach the additional supplementary topics under (4).

CE is no exception to commentaries on the AA typically abounding with difficult technical terms, templates, and lengthy enumerations, often touching on highly complex topics just very briefly, while taking it for granted that the reader is familiar with the underlying details due to previous study. By virtue of its relative brevity, CE provides a rather accessible introduction to the AA, but it is impossible to gain a clear understanding of all the many details of this text and the many issues that are implicitly related to them if no substantial

additional explanations are provided. It is with this in mind that the original project of translating CE alone was expanded to include all the materials in the endnotes and the appendices.[501]

The third volume (*Groundless Paths*) contains solely Nyingma materials on the AA, that is, primarily translations of Patrul Rinpoche's PSD and PBG, which are supplemented by relevant excerpts from other Nyingma commentaries (for details, see the third volume). This volume also includes translations of the same author's shorter texts related to the AA and the subject of paths and bhūmis in general, TOK's presentation of the paths, bhūmis, and fruitions in the causal yāna of characteristics, and the definitions of the eight topics and the seventy points as they are found in the Nyingma works on the AA.

Translation:
A CONCISE ELUCIDATION OF THE *ABHISAMAYĀLAṂKĀRA*
(Topics One to Three)



A Concise Elucidation of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra

{1b}[502] Namaḥ Prajñāpāramitāyai

Suchness of all phenomena,
Utter peace of reference points and characteristics,
To the mother of the victors and their children
I pay homage with a completely open mind.

The progression of the pāramitā's clear realization,
As excellently summarized by the son of the victors,
I shall explain a little bit in a manner that is
Clear in meaning and easy to understand.

In order to lead all beings out of the dreadful abyss of [saṃsāric] existence, in which they are greatly obscured through the darkness of ignorance, the completely perfect Buddha, who knows and sees [their situation], taught the eighty-four thousand dharma collections. If these are summarized, they are included in the three progressive [turnings of the] wheel [of dharma]. Among these, the middle wheel—the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—is divided by earlier [Tibetan masters] into the definite number of the six mothers and the eleven children. [The former] are [the sūtras] in {2a} one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, eighteen thousand, ten thousand, and eight thousand [lines] as well as the *[Prajñāpāramitā]saṃcayagāthā*. [The latter] are the prajñāpāramitā [sūtras] in seven hundred, five hundred, and three hundred [lines], the *[Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] in One Hundred and Fifty Modes*, the one in fifty [lines], the *[Prajñāpāramitāsūtra of] the Twenty-five Gates*, the *Kauśika[prajñāpāramitāsūtra]*, the *Suvikrāntavikrāmīparipṛcchā[sūtra]*, the *[Sūtra] in a Few Words*, the *[Sūtra] in One Syllable*, and the *[Sūtra of the] Heart of Prajñāpāramitā*. Chomden Rigpé Raltri[503] says that this definite number is not justified because the *Prajñāpāramitānāmāṣṭaśatakā* and [the sūtras taught for] Sūryagarbha, Candragarbha, Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, and Vajraketu are prajñāpāramitā [sūtras too], but not included in these sev-

enteen.[504] Ar Jangchub Yeshé divides them into nine [sūtras] of extensive, medium, and brief [length].[505]

As for the commentaries on the intention of [the sūtras of] mother [prajñāpāramitā], there are the four approaches of the following system founders that are well known:

(1) the victor Ajita's *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, which mainly teaches the hidden meaning [of these sūtras]—the progressive stages of clear realization

(2) Nāgārjuna's sixfold collection of Madhyamaka reasoning,[506] which instructs on the explicit teaching [of these sūtras]—the meaning of emptiness

(3) Dignāga's *[Prajñāpāramitā]saṃgraha* of [the sūtra in] eight thousand [lines]

(4) *Śūra's *Ṭīkā* on the [sūtra in] one hundred thousand [lines].[507]

Among the commentaries that follow the first [text], Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] comment on it in terms of *Shentong* Madhyamaka. {2b} Āryavimuktisena comments in terms of *Rangtong* Madhyamaka, and Bhadanta Vimuktisena according to his own analysis. [Further] commentaries were composed by [Ratnākara]śānti, [the earlier] Buddha[śrī]jñāna, Ratnakīrti, [the later] Buddhaśrī[jñāna], Abhayā[karagupta], and so on. Subsequent to the [first four] earlier scholars, master Haribhadra saw their treatises and relied on his spiritual friend [Vairocanabhadra] for seventeen years, finally receiving a prophecy by Maitreya. He composed the following [four] commentaries on this *Alaṃkāra*, which are in accord with Great Madhyamaka:

(1) the summary in eight chapters, which is connected to the medium mother [sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines]

(2) the large commentary on the [sūtra in] eight thousand lines, which is connected to [these] eight thousand [lines]

(3) the commentary on the *Saṃcayagāthā*, [called] *Subodhinī*, which is connected to the *Saṃcayagāthā*

(4) the commentary *Clear Meaning*, which is superior to all others and connected to all three mother [sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines].[508]

On this [latter commentary], among the translated Indian commentaries, there are Kulandatta's *Durbodhālokā*, Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā*, *The Western Door Frame*,[509] and the Kashmirian Kumāraśrī's *Piṇḍārtha*. From among the many commentarial explanations that have come about in the land of snows, the excellent explanations composed by my foremost guru, the victorious Karmapa Mikyö Dorje,[510] [serve as] the basis in accord with which I shall explain [the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*] in a concise manner.

This has three parts:

1) The ancillary features provided by the lotsāwas[511] who translated the treatise

2) The actual treatise that is endowed with these ancillary features
3) Conclusion

1. The ancillary features provided by the lotsāwas who translated the treatise
[This has two parts:]
1) Stating the title due its noble source and in order to realize its meaning
2) Paying homage in order to complete the translation

1.1. Stating the title due its noble source and in order to realize its meaning

In Indian language: **Abhisamayālaṃkāranāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstra**
In Tibetan language: Sherab kyi pa rol tu chinpé men ngag gi denchö ngönbar dogpé gyen
[In English: The Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called The Ornament of Clear Realization][512]

In India, there were four kinds of language: Paiśācī (demonic language), Apabhraṃśa {3a} (corrupt language), Prakṛta (ordinary language), and Saṃskṛta (highly elaborated language).[513] Among these, the title of this treatise in Sanskrit is *Abhisamayālaṃkāranāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrakārikā*. In Tibetan [English], this refers to introducing those to be guided to the teachings (*bstan*) of the victor through *pith instructions* that teach the vast meaning of *prajñāpāramitā* in a few words. Therefore, it is the remedy that cures (*bcos*) the disease of the afflictions, which is *called* "An *Ornament* that Illuminates *Clear Realization*." It is set in *stanzas*, that is, [put to] verse in its entirety.[514]

1.2. Paying homage in order to complete the translation

I pay homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas.[515]

Buddhas are those who have *eliminated* (or awoken from) ignorance and [all its] latent tendencies, while their wisdom, which knows [all] knowable objects without any clinging to characteristics, has *unfolded*.[516] [Bodhisattvas are those members of] the saṃgha who [solely] have ***enlightenment*** on their ***mind*** and are ***courageous*** in overcoming māras.[517] **To all** of them, the [Tibetan] translators **pay homage** in order to pacify obstacles.

2. Explanation of the actual treatise that is endowed with these ancillary features
[This has three parts:]
1) Paying homage, which is the cause for other persons giving rise to openness for the fruitional mother

2) The purpose and the connection, which are the causes for giving rise to openness for this treatise
3) The explanation of clear realization—the subject matter of the treatise to be engaged—after openness [for it] has arisen

2.1. Paying homage, which is the cause for other persons giving rise to openness for the fruitional mother

While resting in meditative equipoise in the personally experienced wisdom that is free from speech and expression, venerable Maitreya took the dharmadhātu as his object [of meditation].[518] In the state of subsequent attainment, motivated by right thought, he then verbally paid homage [to mother prajñāpāramitā,][519] which consists of

1) Proclaiming her qualities by way of the three knowledges
2) Paying homage to the fruitional mother, who is endowed with these qualities. {3b}

1a) Teaching that [prajñāpāramitā], through the knowledge of entities, is able to accomplish what śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas desire

> **She is the one who, through the all-knowledge, guides the śrāvakas who search for peace to utter peace.**[520]

She is the one who, through the means that consists of **the knowledge** of **all** inner and outer phenomena being identityless, is able to **guide the śrāvakas** and pratyekabuddhas (the persons **who search for**, or desire to attain, **peace**) to what they desire, which is the **utter peace**[521] with and without remainder. In this context, the term śrāvakas means "hearers," that is, those who proclaim to others what they have heard themselves. They can be classified into śrāvakas who [simply] assert the view [of śrāvakas], emanated ones, those with an uncertain [disposition], and those with the certain disposition [of being śrāvakas]. The first two are bodhisattvas who are [only] designated with the term śrāvakas, whereas the latter two are the [śrāvakas] who fully qualify as such. Pratyekabuddhas can be classified as threefold: those who are like rhinos, and the greater and lesser group practitioners.[522] What they desire is the temporary nirvāṇa, that is, the nirvāṇa with remainder (the afflictions being at peace while the formations of one's life-force have not yet been left behind) and the one without remainder (the [life-force] having been left behind, [all] suffering being relinquished, and the continuum of roots of virtue[523] and the path being severed).[524] For the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> In the expanse of the nirvāṇa without remainder, śrāvakas relinquish the entire path through abandoning it by completely severing its continuum, but bodhisattvas do not.[525]

[The followers of] the hīnayāna assert that the continuum of awareness is severed in this state, whereas the Mere Mentalists hold that its continuum is not severed because awareness never reaches an end.[526] The main cause for these [two kinds of] nirvāṇa is {4a} the all-knowledge (the clear realization of the noble ones among śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas) because the root of saṃsāra—clinging to a self—is relinquished through it.

1b) Teaching that [prajñāpāramitā], through the knowledge of the path, is able to accomplish what bodhisattvas desire

> **She is the one who, through the knowledge of the path, makes those who promote the benefit of beings accomplish the welfare of the world.**

She is the one who, through the means that consists of **the knowledge of** the three **paths**[527] being without nature, is able to **make** bodhisattvas (**those** persons **who** desire to **promote the benefit of beings**) **accomplish** what they desire, that is, the three [kinds of] enlightenment that are **the welfare** strived for by the people **of the world.** There are three [kinds of] bodhisattvas, that is, the bodhisattvas who are endowed with the kinglike, the ferrymanlike, and the shepherdlike generation of bodhicitta.[528] The first one in this division is accomplished by virtue of the aspiration prayer of enlightening conduct, and the latter [two] by the aspiration prayer of excellent conduct.[529] What they desire is accomplished through the knowledge of the path in the noble bodhisattvas' own mind streams because they realize all three paths [through] prajñā and being endowed with great compassion—the means.

1c) Teaching that [prajñāpāramitā], through the knowledge of all aspects, is able to accomplish what noble buddhas desire

> **Being united[530] with her, the sages proclaim this variety endowed with all aspects.**

Being united with her, the fruitional mother, **the sages** (the persons who are free from the three contaminations[531] and desire to turn the wheel of dharma), through the means of being **endowed with**[532] the knowledge of **all aspects** (signs and characteristics) being unborn, are able to do what they desire, that is, **proclaim this variety** of dharma collections. They are able to accomplish this desire through their own clear realization—the knowledge

of all aspects—because through it they engage the constitutions[533] of those to be guided.

Here, [I add] a critical analysis of the wheel of dharma, [which has three parts]:

1) Definition {4b}
2) Explanation of the term of the definiendum
3) Classification of its instances

1) [The definition] is the genuine dharma that is taught by the teacher [Buddha Śākyamuni] and serves to eliminate the suffering and obscurations [to liberation and omniscience] of those to be guided. For it is said:

> What serves to eliminate all suffering
> And all obscurations is the genuine dharma.

2) Since "dharma" refers to *dhṛ* or *dharaṇa* (holding/bearing), it is what bears its own specific characteristic, such as the specific characteristic of the knowledge of all aspects being to bear [the feature of] directly knowing all phenomena. [The dharma is referred to as] a "wheel" since its properties, such as traveling swiftly, resemble the precious wheel [of a cakravartin].

3) [The dharma is classified as]
   a) the dharma of realization
   b) the dharma of scriptures.

3a) The definition of the [dharma of realization] is the reality of the purified phenomena[534] that are produced by having become familiar with the mind that thoroughly discriminates phenomena. It is classified as two [—the realities of cessation and the path]. The first one is the reality of cessation of being free from contaminations by virtue of focusing on suchness. This refers to the [respective] relinquishments of learning and nonlearning, the nirvāṇa without remainder, or the dharmakāya.[535] The second one is the reality of the uncontaminated path as the means that makes one attain this cessation, [which consists of] the path of seeing and the path of familiarization.[536]

3b) [The explanation of the dharma of scriptures has five parts:]
   a) Definition
   b) Nature
   c) The manner of being proclaimed
   d) Classification
   e) The difference between expedient[537] and definitive

3ba) [The dharma of scriptures is defined as] the verbal utterances that teach as their subject either the nature, the causes, or the results of nirvāṇa, and consist of any one among the twelve branches of a buddha's speech. These

twelve are (1) the sūtra collection, which [here refers to] teaching in a manner of discoursing by seeing the ten benefits;[538] (2) proclamations in song, which have stanzas at the beginning and end; (3) prophecies of what will happen; (4) proclamations in verse, [ranging] from two to six lines of verse; {5a} (5) joyful aphorisms, [spontaneously uttered by the Buddha] based on his rejoicing, for the sake of the teachings remaining; (6) counsels, that is, advice spoken for the sake of [particular] persons; (7) legends, including parables; (8) narratives, which teach what happened to other persons [in exemplary ways]; (9) reports on [the Buddha's] former lives about his own way of engaging in enlightening conduct; (10) extensive discourses, which include the scriptural collection of bodhisattvas; (11) [discourses on] marvelous qualities, that is, the amazing [features] of the noble ones; (12) ascertaining discourses, which unmistakenly teach the [general and specific] characteristics [of phenomena]. The first five of these represent the sūtra collection of the śrāvakas, the next four the vinaya, the following two the sūtra collection of bodhisattvas, and the [last] one is the scriptural collection of the abhidharma of both the śrāvakas and the mahāyāna.[539]

3bb) These scriptural dharmas consist of the eighty-four thousand collections of dharma. The Vaibhāṣikas [hold] that these dharma collections are spoken words, and the Sautrāntikas assert them to be names. The *Abhidharmakośa* says [that the dharma collections]:

> Are spoken words or names, [respectively]
> Included in form or formation.[540]

The Mere Mentalists assert that they are [nothing but] cognition that appears as sounds included in the mind streams of the listeners. As for the extent of a "dharma collection," [there are various] assertions, such as [this term referring to] six thousand ślokas; each discourse that teaches a [particular] topic, such as the skandhas; the remedy for each affliction, such as desire; or one dharma collection that can be written with the [amount of] ink that the elephant Bhūmipratiṣṭita[541] can carry.

3bc) [The scriptural dharma] {5b} is excellently proclaimed in terms of ten aspects. These ten are firm resolve, mastery, engagement, stability, classification, support, creating understanding, labeling, time, and seizing [all] qualities.

3bd) The classification into three progressive wheels of dharma is the system of the mahāyāna, and there are four different presentations of this. The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* calls the first [set of] the Buddha's words "the wheel of the four realities"; the middle one, "the wheel of the lack of characteristics"; and the last one, "the wheel of excellent distinction." The

Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra speaks of "the principle of the four realities," "the principle of emptiness," and "the principle of the tathāgata heart." As a commentary on the intention of this [sūtra], the *Uttaratantra* refers to the [three] wheels of "introducing the world to the path of peace," "maturation," and "prophecy." Nāgārjuna speaks of "the wheels of first teaching identity," "teaching identitylessness in the middle," and "finally putting an end to all views."[542] From among these explanations, the first three concord in [explaining that,] in the first [wheel], the four realities are taught; in the middle one, freedom from reference points; and in the last one, dharmadhātu wisdom as being really established. The last system [by Nāgārjuna says that,] first, the aspect of means is taught; in the middle, the nominal ultimate; and finally, freedom from all reference points.[543] {6a}

Therefore, in terms of the final definitive meaning, since there are no causes for speech (the elements and the motivation [to speak]) on the buddhabhūmi, the Buddha did not even teach a single word. In terms of the plain definitive meaning, he spoke all three progressive [wheels of dharma] simultaneously, but under the influence of the inclinations of those to be guided they were heard as separate [teachings]. For it is said:

> Encouraged by the thinking of sentient beings,
> The speech of the Buddha occurred.
> He had no thoughts about this at all.

And:

> Though he indeed gave just a single speech,
> It was heard separately as many.

In terms of the expedient meaning, the wheels of dharma were spoken progressively. In terms of the first presentation [in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* above], each of the three progressive stages is explained through four [features], that is, the place, the time, the retinue, and the dharma. Among these, the first stage is twelvefold since [the Buddha] was repeating each one of the four realities three times for the "group of five"[544] and many gods at Vārāṇasī for seven years. The middle [stage] represents the teachings on prajñāpāramitā for five thousand fully ordained male and female monastics, male and female lay people, and a hundred thousand trillions of bodhisattvas on Vulture Flock Mountain for twenty-seven years. The last [stage] consists of the teachings on the imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect [natures][545] for a retinue [of beings] who were inclined toward various yānas at Mount Malaya, Vaiśālī, and so on for ten years.[546]

3be) The sūtras of expedient meaning are those that mainly teach on seeming reality. These can be classified as two—those that teach the false seeming, such as saying, "You should kill father and mother," {6b} and those that teach the correct seeming, such as saying, "Happiness arises from gathering the accumulations."

The sūtras of definitive meaning are those that mainly teach on ultimate reality. As for their classification, the system of Asaṅga and his brother says that, [within the category of the sūtras of definitive meaning,] those that are not to be taken literally are [the sūtras] of the expedient meaning of the definitive meaning, while those that are to be taken literally are the sūtras of the definitive meaning of the definitive meaning.[547] The system of Nāgārjuna and his spiritual heirs says that those [sūtras] that teach the suchness which puts an end to certain portions of reference points are [the sūtras of] the temporary definitive meaning, while those that teach the suchness that puts an end to all reference points without exception are the sūtras of the final definitive meaning.[548] Therefore, if one distinguishes between what the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* says to be expedient and definitive in the three progressive wheels, there are indeed portions in the first wheel that are of definitive meaning and portions in the latter two [wheels] that are of expedient meaning. Still, in terms of what is most prominent [in these respective wheels], [all] followers of the mahāyāna agree that the first one is of expedient meaning and the latter two are of definitive meaning. However, the difference is that the False Aspectarians do not assert the middle wheel to represent the definitive meaning that is to be taken literally, whereas the Niḥsvabhāvavādins assert that it is the definitive meaning that is to be taken literally.[549]

Here, the following needs to be understood. For the sake of persons in whom fear of [certain statements] in the middle wheel (such as, "[Phenomena] do not arise by a nature of their own") arises, through clearly distinguishing existence and nonexistence in the last wheel, [the Buddha] said that "the perfect [nature]—the other-dependent empty of the imaginary—exists." In this context, when one cuts through reference points by means of the view, the middle [wheel] comes to be of definitive meaning, and when one makes one's experiences through meditation, {7a} it is the last one that comes to be of definitive meaning.[550]

2) Paying homage to the mother, who is endowed with [all the above] qualities

I pay homage to this mother of the Buddha with his assemblies of śrāvakas and bodhisattvas.

At the beginning of composing this treatise, venerable Maitreya **pays homage to this mother** who is endowed with the qualities of benefiting **the assemblies**

of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by way of the all-knowledge; the **bodhisattvas** by way of the knowledge of the path; and **the buddhas** by way of the knowledge of all aspects.[551]

Here, as for the manner of presenting [prajñāpāramitā] as the mother of the four [kinds of] noble ones, the fruitional mother possesses the three aspects that are the qualities of [the knowledges of] entities, the paths, and [all] aspects being unborn. These three are the individual clear realizations of the four noble ones, which is the meaning of what the medium mother says:

> Subhūti, the all-knowledge is the one of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. The knowledge of the path is the one of bodhisattvas. The knowledge of all aspects is the one of the tathāgatas, the arhats who are completely perfect buddhas.[552]

[Prajñāpāramitā] serves as their mother because she benefits them by way of accomplishing their respective own desires through these clear realizations. The mother who fully qualifies as such exists [only] in the mind streams of persons who have attained the path of the noble ones and onward, but not in those below that. For the knowledge of entities and the knowledge of the path that fully qualify as such do not exist during the level of engagement through aspiration since they do not cancel out the seeds of the factors to be relinquished. Before the end of the continuum [of the tenth bhūmi], the knowledge of all aspects that fully qualifies as such does not exist either because the aspects, signs, and characteristics of all phenomena {7b} have not been directly realized to be unborn. However, one should regard [their] approximately concordant [forms] as existing [during the above phases].

Here, [some] may have the following concerns: "Since this praise of the mother by way of the three knowledges is too extensive, it is [more] reasonable to praise her by way of the knowledge of all aspects alone," or, "It is too concise, so she needs to be praised by way of all eight topics." The first [assumed] flaw does not exist because then openness [for her] would not arise in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. The latter flaw does not exist either since the other topics [among the] eight are included in the three knowledges. The manner in which they are included is that the dharmakāya does not exist apart from the knowledge of all aspects; the four trainings do not exist apart from the three knowledges; and the four trainings are [also] the causes of the three knowledges, so that [the latter] are like results that include their causes.

Here, as an elaboration on praising the mother—the true reality of [the knowledges of] entities, paths, and aspects—by way of her being unborn

and free from reference points, the manner in which the characteristics of reference points are negated is explained. [This has two parts:]

1) Refuting the clinging to the person
2) Refuting the clinging to phenomena

The first one [has two parts:]

1a) Presenting the positions of the opponents
1b) Refuting them

1a) The innate clinging to a personal identity is the sheer clinging to "me" by focusing on the collection of the skandhas that exists in the mind streams of all beings, [even those] whose minds have not been altered by philosophical systems. The imputational [clinging to a personal identity] refers to the mind imputing all kinds of things onto this [clinging to "me"], which represent what non-Buddhists say. The principal division of [Indian] non-Buddhists is fivefold:

(1) Lokāyatas
(2) Sāṃkhyas
(3) Aiśvaras
(4) Vaiṣṇavas
(5) Nirgranthas[553]

{8a} The first are nihilists since they assert that there is no world beyond [this one], and the remaining are eternalists.

(1) The Lokāyatas originated based on Bṛhaspati's treatise about there being no further lifetimes, which he composed for the sake of [the gods] winning their battles against the asuras. In Jambudvīpa,[554] they existed as the six who cultivated meditative absorption, such as Udraka,[555] the son of Rāma; the six proclaimers, such as Cārvāka; and the six dialectic teachers, such as Pūraṇa Kāśyapa.[556] Their assertions include that the self is not manifest at the time of the four elements, while the self becomes manifest once body and mind unite.[557]

(2) The Sāṃkhyas originated from the sage Kapila (who lived during the time when humans became infinitely old) teaching others what he himself had realized in a certain way. They divided into those with remainder and those without remainder.[558] Their assertions include that the self, which exists as the primary mind, is the experiencer, permanent, and what is cognizant.

(3) The Aiśvaras originated from the sages Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda[559] having relied on Īśvara. They divided into the four [subschools] of Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, *Vyañjakas,[560] and Those with Unpierced Ears. Their assertions include that the self pervades everything, such as body, sense faculties, and mind, but dwells only in alive bodies and possesses ten qualities.

(4) The Vaiṣṇavas originated from Jaimini and Kumārila.[561] They divided into the five [subschools] of Brāhmaṇas, Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas. They assert a self that is permanent cognizance.

(5) The Nirgranthas originated from the sage Jina[562] and {8b} divided into twenty-five [subschools] by following Vṛṣa and others. They assert the self to be a substance.[563] In brief, all [these schools] claim the self to be permanent.

1b) The *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* says:

> The self that is imputed by the tīrthikas,
> When analyzed through reasoning,
> Is not found as anything that dwells
> Within any of the skandhas.
>
> The skandhas exist, but they are not permanent.[564]

Also the *[Madhyamak]āvatāra* states that a self imputed in this way (the subject [of this reasoning]) does not even conventionally exist as an entity because it is not the object of one's clinging to "me." For it is not what the innate clinging to "me" apprehends. Even in our own [Buddhist] faction, some, such as the Vātsīputrīyas[565] (a subsect of the Saṃmitīyas), assert a self that exists neither as the same nor something other than the skandhas. The *[Madhyamak]āvatāra* refutes this by saying that it then would follow that [there are] many and substantially existent selves, and that the views about a real personality are not imputations because the skandhas are the self.

2) Refuting the clinging to phenomena
This also has two parts:
[2a) Presenting the positions of the opponents
2b) Refuting them]

2a) The innate clinging to phenomenal identity is the sheer clinging of thinking, "This is a sprout" when focusing on a sprout. [This clinging] is unaltered by philosophical systems. The imputational [clinging to phenomenal identity] refers to imputing all kinds of things onto the [innate clinging]. The classification [of the imputational clinging] is into
a) saying that the apprehended is really established
b) saying that consciousness is really established.

2aa) The first one has two parts:
1) The classification of proponents of philosophical systems
2) Stating the progression of their assertions in terms of their coarseness

2aa1) {9a} One hundred and sixty years after the passing away of the teacher [Buddha Śākyamuni], at the time of King Aśoka, the saṃgha entered into a

dispute [during the second council] in Pāṭaliputra, after which it split into the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras. [Some say that] the first divided into eight and the latter into ten [subschools.] Or [it is said that] the first divided into six and the latter into twelve. Or [Bhāvaviveka says that there was a third major school,] the Vibhajyavādins, in addition to the [above] two main ones, with the first one dividing into eight, the Sthaviras into six, and the Vibhajyavādins into four. Or, according to Vinītadeva's explanation, there were seven [subschools] of the Sarvāstivādins, five of the Mahāsāṃghikas, three of the Sthaviras, and three of the Saṃmitīyas, thus [making] four main sects and eighteen subsects. These represent the differences in the ways of deriving [the subschools of the hīnayāna]. If they are grouped in terms of their main philosophical positions, they are classified as two through dividing them into the five that assert a self (such as the Vātsīputrīyas) and the remaining ones who do not assert one. Alternatively, [all these schools] are included in the two [schools] of the Sautrāntikas (that is, the Mahīśāsakas as a subdivision of the Sarvāstivādins) and the Vaibhāṣikas (the remaining ones).[566]

2aa2) Their assertions [are classified as twofold]:
- a) Discordant
- b) Concordant

2aa2a) I am afraid of being too verbose [in writing up all] the fine details of the individual positions of the eighteen sects, but the differences between the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas lie in their respective following assertions. The seven works on abhidharma are or are not [held to be] the Buddha's words.[567] The scriptural dharma [belongs] to the skandhas of form or formation. Minutest particles abide in a way that they do not have or have contact. Imperceptible form[568] is affirmed or negated. The sense faculties that possess form are or are not valid cognizers. Causes and results are asserted or not asserted to be simultaneous. It is asserted or not asserted that the consciousnesses for which referents appear apprehend these outer referents in an immediate way without an aspect. Appearances are not asserted or asserted to be mind. It is either asserted that shape, the three times, and nonassociated formations are self-sufficient substances, or that they are imputations imputed upon [certain] factors. The reality of cessation is asserted or not asserted to be an entity. Suchness is not asserted or asserted. {9b} Self-aware consciousness is not asserted or asserted. It is asserted that actions and what is connected are other than or the same as the agent, what is connected, and the hearer. A pleasant body consciousness is not asserted or asserted as a branch of dhyāna.[569] There is or is not any regressing from the fruition of arhathood. Seeds of mind within the body are not asserted or are asserted. In order to form coarse [phenomena], all eight atomic substances are necessary or not necessary. It is either asserted that thirty-eight mental factors are mutually

different in substance, or it is asserted that they, except for the five omnipresent ones, are imputedly existent and one in substance. It is asserted that each [link of] dependent origination is a collection of the five skandhas, or that it is each one of the skandhas. These are the differences [between Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas].

2aa2b) [Their concordant] assertions include the classifications of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas; the four ways of being born; the five [kinds of] beings;[570] the four foods; the smallest minute particles being really established and coarse [phenomena] being delusive; mind and mental factors; elemental derivates arising from the elements, consciousness from being congruent [with its mental factors], and nonassociated formations from [certain] situations; the four realities; the five paths; the ways in which śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas proceed on the paths; asserting that [Buddha Śākyamuni] was an ordinary being at the time of being Prince Siddhārtha; most of their positions on the dhyānas and the formless [absorptions]; the skandhas of [karmic] maturation existing on the buddhabhūmi; awareness being terminated [in the nirvāṇa] without remainder; the presentation of the contaminations; [phenomena] that can be destroyed or mentally broken down (such as a vase) represent seeming reality, whereas forms, happiness, and so on that cannot [be broken down] in these ways represent ultimate reality.[571]

2ab) Those who say that consciousness is really established are the Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists because they assert that the aspects of the referents that appear to the mind are real. They are classified into three: the Half-Eggists, who assert that the factors of apprehender and apprehended each {10a} are real as different substances; the Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehender and Apprehended, who assert as many [aspects of] consciousness as there are apprehended aspects; and the Proponents of Nondual Variety, who assert that, despite the variety of these aspects, they have the nature of a single consciousness.[572]

2b) Refuting these [positions]
This has two parts:
- a) Identifying the Mādhyamikas
- b) The reasonings taught by them

2ba) Among the Mādhyamikas in the mahāyāna there are two principal system founders. By way of determining the two realities, Nāgārjuna commented on the middle [cycle of] the Buddha's words as being the definitive meaning. By way of determining the three natures, Asaṅga commented on the last [cycle of] the Buddha's words as being the definitive meaning. The followers [of these two] are infinite [in number]. Even in the land of the noble ones, the followers of the former [master] came to be referred to as

Nonaspectarians, and the followers of the latter one as Real Aspectarians and so on ([the latter thus] being a little bit further away from the ultimate), with such nonsense [also] being proclaimed in the land of snows. As for the two positions [of these masters], they present their philosophical systems by the former one having in mind that what is adventitious (the bearers of the nature of phenomena) is that which is to be emptied, while the latter has in mind that the actual way of being (the nature of phenomena) is the basis of being empty [of the adventitious stains (that of which it is to be emptied)]. Therefore, these two [masters] accord in their presentations of the ground (the changeless sugata heart); the path (that which eliminates being mistaken about this [sugata heart]); and the fruition (the kāyas—this [sugata heart] being free from obscurations).

2bb) Asaṅga puts an end to the conceptions that apprehend [phenomena] by conflating names and referents. He says that it is contradictory for the referent that is something which has a round belly to be one with the name "vase." If they were one, it would follow that it is possible for the thought "This is a vase" to arise in the minds of children who do not know any terms when they see this something that has a round belly. However, such a [thought] does not arise [in them]. Furthermore, there would be the faults of many Indras,[573] object and subject being mixed, {10b} one's mouth being burned when pronouncing "fire," and so forth.

Nāgārjuna taught the five [Madhyamaka] reasonings that negate [the notion of] being really established. The last one of these, the reasoning of dependent origination, [says that] outer and inner entities (the subject) do not really exist because they are mere dependent origination. The subject property of this [reasoning] is easy to prove. Its entailment [is established] too since [all] lower [Buddhist] philosophical systems assert dependent origination and hold that it means being established in dependence, while being established in dependence and being really established are [obviously] contradictory.[574] Therefore, this is a reason that proves nothing but conventions.[575]

[To conclude,] this homage here by venerable [Maitreya at the beginning of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*] is a commentary on the setting of the [prajñāpāramitā] sūtras since it matches the phrases "about five thousand fully ordained monks" with "the śrāvakas who search for peace," "trillions of bodhisattvas" with "[who promote the benefit] of beings," and "Bhagavān" with "the sages."[576]

2.2. The purpose and the connection, which are the causes for others giving rise to openness for this treatise

Right after the homage, the commitment to compose [this treatise] is taught through [the fourfold set of] "purpose and connection."[577] This is explained by way of the five rubrics that are the methods to expound the meaning of the sūtras. These five rubrics are as stated [in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*]:

> Those who relate the meaning of the sūtras
> Should state their purpose, their topical summary,
> The meaning of the words, their coherence,
> And the rebuttal of objections.[578]

Their order as exemplified by this *[Abhisamay]ālaṃkāra* is that (1) the purpose is taught through [the set of] "purpose and connection" [in verses I.1–2]; (2) the topical summary, through the presentation of the body [of the text in verses I.3–17]; and (3) the meaning of the words, through the detailed explanation of the branches [of the text in the remaining verses]. (4) Coherence [means that] the order is not mixed up. The two [kinds of] (5) rebutting objections in terms of not contradicting reasoning as well as earlier and later [passages] {11a} not being contradictory are taught at the respectively [appropriate] occasions. It is reasonable to explain (1) [the fourfold set of] the purpose and so on first since it is said:

> For as long as its purpose is not taught,
> Who would embrace [a text]?[579]

[This explanation has two parts:]

1) The [four properties of] purpose and so on within the [fourfold] set of "purpose and connection" [itself]
2) The [four properties of] purpose and so on within the body of the treatise [at hand]

1) The "subject matter" of the [fourfold] set of "purpose and connection" [itself] consists of the four properties of a [given] treatise, such as its purpose. "Purpose" means that, by virtue of this set, it is understood at the outset that this treatise has a purpose and so on. "Essential purpose" means that, based on this understanding, those endowed with analytical [skills] will engage in this treatise. "Connection" means that the respectively earlier [passages in this fourfold set] are [coherently] connected to the respectively later ones.

2) [Accordingly, the specific purpose and so on of the treatise at hand are explained by the following two verses:]

So that the path of the knowledge of all aspects
That is explained here by the teacher,
Though not experienced by others,
Will be seen by the intelligent, [I.1]

And that, having committed to memory the meaning of the sūtras,
Which has the character of the ten dharma practices,
They may realize them in an easy way
Is the purpose of this undertaking.[580] [I.2]

To explain [the fourfold set of "purpose and connection"] by matching it with the text, **what is explained** in these mother [sūtras] **here by the teacher** (the Tathāgata) of **the path**, which consists of the ten dharmas that define **the knowledge of all aspects**[581] and so on and leads to the attainment of buddhahood, is also the subject matter (1) of this treatise [called *Abhisamay*]-*ālaṃkāra*. Its essential purpose (3) is **that, though** the dharmakāya cannot be **experienced by others** (such as non-Buddhists, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas), **intelligent** bodhisattvas **will see** or realize it when they enter this path by **having committed to memory the meaning** taught in **the sūtras**—that one is able to accomplish the dharmakāya through that **which has the character of the ten dharma practices**, such as generosity.[582] **The purpose** (2) **of this undertaking** of [composing] the treatise is [to write it] for the sake of the need to **realize** the actuality of the mother **in an easy way** in order to accomplish enlightenment. As for the connection (4) of the essential purpose deriving from the purpose, and the purpose from the subject matter, one is able to realize this through the subject matter, the purpose, and the essential purpose being taught.[583] {11b}

You may wonder whether the purpose and so forth are definitely four in number. They are definite because there are four wrong ideas to be eliminated [by these four]—thinking that there is no subject matter [of the treatise], no fruition, no accomplishing of the desired aim, and no means. Therefore, [the subject matter and so on as] the means to eliminate these [four] are also definitely four in number.

2.3. The explanation of clear realization—the subject matter of the treatise to be engaged

This has three parts:

1) Teaching [the clear realizations] as eight for persons interested in the detailed version
2) Teaching them as six for persons interested in the intermediate version

3) Teaching them as three for persons interested in the brief version

2.3.1. Teaching the clear realizations as eight for persons interested in the detailed version

This has two parts:

1) Presentation of the body [of the text]
2) Detailed explanation of its branches

2.3.1.1. Presentation of the body of the text

This has two parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation

2.3.1.1.1. Brief introduction

> **Prajñāpāramitā is proclaimed**
> **By way of the eight topics.** [I.3ab]

The subject matter of the scriptural **prajñāpāramitā** lies in the meaning of **the eight topics**—the prajñāpāramitā of the path and the fruition. These are what is **proclaimed** here. From among these three [kinds of] prajñāpāramitā that there are in this context, the fruitional prajñāpāramitā is the suchness of phenomena that is free from all adventitious stains of apprehender and apprehended. The prajñāpāramitā of the path refers to the progression of the [fruitional prajñāpāramitā] becoming free from stains. It is classified as twofold: the principal one and the ordinary one. Within the former one, there are the contaminated [prajñāpāramitā of the path] during the level of engagement through aspiration and the uncontaminated one during [the paths of] seeing and familiarization since the *[Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] Requested by Candragarbha* says:

> During the level of engagement through aspiration, there are the conceptions about the apprehender and the conceptions about the apprehended. What relinquishes these is the contaminated prajñāpāramitā. O son of noble family, the uncontaminated prajñāpāramitā here is the nonconceptual wisdom of the path of seeing.[584]

The ordinary [prajñāpāramitā] refers to the realizations of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats, as is explained in the *Śatasāhasrikāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā*:

> Also the wisdoms of the paths of arhats, which consist of the final levels of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, {12a} are natural outflows of prajñāpāramitā. Therefore, they are called "prajñāpāramitā."[585]

The scriptural prajñāpāramitā is the collection of the names and words that teach the means to attain the fruitional prajñāpāramitā. Therefore, the fruitional prajñāpāramitā is the actual prajñāpāramitā, while the path is prajñā, but not prajñāpāramitā. Nevertheless, [the latter represents a case of] the cause being labeled with the name of the fruition. The scriptures are not even mere prajñā, but [a case of] the means of expression being labeled with the name of what is to be expressed [by them]. As [Haribhadra's] *Ālokā* says:

> The illusionlike nondual wisdom of a buddha bhagavān is the actual [prajñāpāramitā]. By virtue of being concordant with attaining this [actual prajñāpāramitā], the scriptures (collections of words and sentences) and the paths (which have the characteristics of seeing and so forth) are also called "prajñāpāramitā," [but] this is [just] nominal.[586]

2.3.1.1.2. Detailed explanation

This has two parts:

1) The eight topics as what is to be explained
2) The seventy points as the means to explain the [eight topics]

2.3.1.1.2.1. The eight topics as what is to be explained

This has three parts:

1) The meaning of each of the eight topics
2) The definite order of the [eight topics]
3) Matching them with the sūtras

2.3.1.1.2.1.1. The meaning of each of the eight topics

> **The knowledge of all aspects, the knowledge of the path,**
> **Then the all-knowledge, [I.3cd]**
>
> **The full realization of all aspects,**
> **The attainment of culmination, the serial one,**
> **The full realization in a single instant,**
> **And the dharmakāya—these are the eight.**[587] [I.4]

This has eight parts:

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.1. The knowledge of all aspects

This has four parts:

1) Definition
2) Explanation of the term

3) Classification
4) Boundary lines

1) [The definition] is "the wisdom that directly realizes all phenomena to be unborn and represents the final two welfares."[588] Here, some say, "Since there are no [primary] minds and mental factors[589] on the buddhabhūmi, within [a buddha's] own appearances there is no wisdom." Some explain that there is illusionlike wisdom. You may wonder, "Does buddha wisdom involve appearances of seeming [reality] or not?" Some masters say, "Though the entire variety of the bearers of the nature of phenomena appears like a fresh myrobalan fruit placed on the palm of one's hand, {12b} the mistakenness of apprehending characteristics does not arise because the seeds of the two obscurations have been relinquished without exception." Here, it is said, ". . . because through knowing, no phenomena are seen." Therefore, it must be explained that [wisdom] does not involve any mistaken appearances.

2) "**The knowledge of all aspects**"[590] refers to the direct **knowledge** that **all aspects**, signs, and characteristics of all phenomena are unborn.

3) There are two [kinds of this knowledge]—the meditative equipoise of knowing the nature of phenomena, just as it is, and the subsequent attainment of knowing the variety of the bearers of this nature, which are inseparable from it. On the first one, the sūtras say:

> Subhūti, what is called "knowledge of all aspects through a single dharma" is by virtue of the aspect of peace.

Accordingly, [the knowledge of all aspects in meditative equipoise] is presented from the perspective of its own nature being lucid and empty. The latter is presented from the perspective of knowing that all aspects of knowable objects are unborn.

4) The knowledge of all aspects that fully qualifies as such exists solely on the buddhabhūmi. In its approximately concordant [forms], it also exists on the paths of the noble ones below the [buddhabhūmi], with the [wisdom of] suchness [existing] from the first bhūmi onward and the [wisdom of] variety [existing] from the eighth bhūmi onward.[591]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.2. The knowledge of the path

Just as the previous one, this also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "that which realizes the three paths to be primordially unborn and serves as the remedy for the cognitive obscurations."
2) "**The knowledge of the path**" refers to that which realizes or **knows** all **paths** and also performs the activities of these paths.

3) [It is classified as] two—the realizations of the three paths of the three yānas and the knowledge that these realizations are primordial peace.[592]
4) It exists from the first bhūmi onward.[593]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.3. The all-knowledge

This {13a} also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "that which serves as the remedy for the afflictive obscurations through realizing personal identitylessness."
2) "**Then, the all-knowledge**" refers to that which, **then**, **knows all** entities (skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas) to lack a self.
3) [It is classified as] two—the knowledges of entities [of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas] that represent factors to be relinquished (which entail apprehending characteristics) and the knowledge of entities that is their remedy (which is being free from apprehending characteristics).
4) The first one exists from the paths of seeing of śrāvakas and pratyeka buddhas onward, and the latter from the first bhūmi onward.[594]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.4. The training in completely realizing all aspects

This also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "the [combined] familiarization with the triad of entities, the path, and the aspects being without nature in order to realize the three knowledges."
2) "**The full realization of all aspects**" refers to training in this familiarization in order to **completely realize all aspects** of the dharmas of the buddhabhūmi and so forth.
3) [It is classified as] four or twenty trainings.
4) It exists from the path of accumulation up through the end of the continuum [of the bodhisattvabhūmis].[595]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.5. The culminating training

This also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "the highest form of familiarizing with the triad of entities, the path, and the aspects being without nature."
2) "**The attainment of culmination**" refers to the **attainment of** the **culmination** or the consummation of all aspects.
3) [It is classified as] four: the culminating trainings of the [paths of] preparation, seeing, familiarization, and the [final] uninterrupted [path].[596]
4) [It exists] from the [level of] heat [on the path of preparation] up through the end of the continuum [of the bodhisattvabhūmis].[597]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.6. The serial [training]

This also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "the sequential familiarization in order to gain stability in the culminating training."
2) "**The serial one**" refers to familiarization in a sequential way, that is, by progressively linking the [respective] later [stages] with the preceding ones.
3) [It is classified as] thirteen.
4) {13b} [It exists] from heat up through [the moment] just before the end of the continuum [of the bodhisattvabhūmis].[598]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.7. The instantaneous training

This also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "the simultaneous familiarization by virtue of having gained stability in familiarizing with the three knowledges in a combined manner."
2) "**The full realization in a single instant**" refers to the ability of **full realization in a single instant** of completing an action,[599] which is due to having familiarized with the pāramitās in a sequential manner [before].
3) By way of defining characteristics, it is fourfold.
4) [It exists] solely at the end of the continuum [of the bodhisattvabhūmis].[600]

2.3.1.1.2.1.1.8. The dharmakāya

This also has four parts.

1) [Its definition] is "the final fruition of the four trainings."
2) "**The dharmakāya**" is **the kāya** that is endowed with the branches that consist of all uncontaminated **dharmas.**
3) [It is classified as] the three kāyas and enlightened activity.
4) [It exists] solely on the buddhabhūmi.[601]

2.3.1.1.2.1.2. The definite order of the eight topics

As for "**these are the eight**," their general order is that the three knowledges are taught in order to know what is to be made a living experience—the three [respective kinds of] being unborn. The four trainings are the means to make these [three] a living experience. The dharmakāya is taught as the fruition of having made them a living experience. In particular, the order of the three knowledges is as follows. Since the ten dharmas, such as generating bodhicitta, are the causes of the knowledge of all aspects, they are taught first. Since what is strived for, which consists of these [ten dharmas], depends on the knowledge of the path, the knowledge of the path is taught [next]. [Then,] the knowledge of entities is taught in order to recognize the concordant and antagonistic factors of the [knowledge of the path]. The order of the four

trainings is as follows. The training of full realization means to familiarize with the three knowledges in order to clearly manifest them. The culminating training is the familiarization in the manner of clearly realizing these [three]. The serial [training] is the familiarization in order to gain stability in them. {14a} The instantaneous training refers to familiarizing with them in a simultaneous way after having attained stability in them. Thus, these are the eight topics, which represent the meanings of the eight chapters [of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*], but each topic also teaches the complete paths of [certain] beings. The definitions, classifications, and so on of the three knowledges as taught above are the three knowledges [in the sense of] the means to gather the clear realizations connected to [certain] persons, while the three knowledges [in the sense of] that which is to be gathered are what define the [former], thus representing the subject matters of the first three chapters.[602]

2.3.1.1.2.1.3. Matching them with the sūtras

The knowledge of all aspects is taught through the chapter of Subhūti; the knowledge of the path, through the chapter of the purity of the two extremes; the knowledge of entities, through the chapter of special conduct; [the full realization of] all aspects, through the chapter of suchness; the culminating training, through the chapter of completely pure training; the serial [training], through the chapter of serial engagement; [the clear realization] in a single instant, through the chapter of the full completion of training; and the dharmakāya, through the chapter of the fruition of training.

2.3.1.1.2.2. Explaining the seventy points as the means to explain the eight topics

This has three parts:

1) Explaining the three knowledges by way of what defines them
2) Explaining the four trainings by way of their natures
3) Explaining the dharmakāya by way of its classification

2.3.1.1.2.2.1. Explaining the three knowledges by way of what defines them

This has three parts:

1) [The knowledge of all aspects]

Generating bodhicitta, the instructions,
The four branches of penetration,
The foundation of practice,
Whose nature is the dharmadhātu, [I.5]

The focal object, the aim,
The activities of [donning] the armor and engaging,

The equipments, and final deliverance
Represent the knowledge of all aspects of the sage. [I.6]

[The knowledge of all aspects consists of] (1) **generating bodhicitta**, which represents the seed of perfect enlightenment; (2) **the instructions** of the mahāyāna, which are the conditions for maturing and purifying this [seed]; (3) the first fruition of making this a living experience, **the branches of** the path of seeing's **penetration**,[603] which are the **fourfold** path of preparation that serves as its cause; {14b} (4) the disposition as **the foundation of practice, which** has **the nature** of **the dharmadhātu** since the disposition [of being established] in the mahāyāna is definite, once the [path of preparation] is attained; (5) **the focal object** of this practice; (6) **the aim** of this practice; then, in terms of classifying this practice's own nature, (7) the practice of donning the **armor** in order to not be struck by antagonistic factors;[604] (8) the practice of **the activities of engaging** in the battle of the mahāyāna, after the armor has been donned; (9) the practice of accumulating **the equipments** of combat, once one has entered the battle; and (10) the practice of **final deliverance**, the [eventual] victory over the enemies.[605] Through these ten points, **the knowledge of all aspects of the sage** is taught by way of defining the subject through its objects, or the fruition through its causes.

2) [The knowledge of the path]

Eclipsing and so on,
The paths of disciples and rhinos,
The path of seeing, which is of great benefit
By virtue of the qualities in this [life] and others, [I.7]

As well as function, aspiration,
Praise, eulogy, and laudation,
Dedication and rejoicing
(Both unsurpassable mental engagements), [I.8]

Accomplishment, and utter purity
(The path of familiarization)
Describe the knowledge of the path
Of skillful bodhisattvas. [I.9]

(1) In order to make them a support for the arising of the knowledge of the path, the light of the tathāgatas **eclipses** the light of the gods **and so on** (which includes [the remaining four branches necessary for this knowledge to arise, that is,] the object being definite, pervasiveness, nature, and function). As

for the paths to be known, [these include] (2) **the path of the disciples** (the śrāvakas); (3) the path of the pratyekabuddhas, such as the **rhinos**; and the path of the mahāyāna. [The latter] is classified into (4) **the path of seeing, which is** endowed with **great benefit by virtue of** having **qualities in this** life **and others** (the following ones), as well as the path of familiarization, with (5) the **function** of [the latter] being its benefit. The path of familiarization that possesses this function is twofold—the contaminated subsequent attainment and the uncontaminated meditative equipoise. The first one of these is divided into the threefold [contaminated] path of familiarization—(6) the [three kinds of] **aspiration** of apprehending the mother as being endowed with qualities; (7) the fruitions of these [levels]—the triad of **praise, eulogy, and laudation**; and **both unsurpassable mental engagements**—(8) dedication, which renders virtue inexhaustible, and (9) {15a} rejoicing, which makes it increase. The second one, the uncontaminated [path of familiarization] is twofold—(10) the path of familiarization in terms of **accomplishment** (consummate realization) and (11) **the path of familiarization** in terms of **utter purity** (consummate relinquishment). **The knowledge of the path of skillful bodhisattvas** [as represented] by these eleven [points] is taught by way of defining the subject through its objects.

3) [The knowledge of entities]

> **Not dwelling in existence through prajñā,**
> **Not dwelling in peace through compassion,**
> **Being distant due to lacking the means,**
> **Not being distant due to the means,** [I.10]
>
> **Antagonistic and remedial factors,**
> **Training, its equality,**
> **And the paths of seeing of śrāvakas and so on**
> **Are asserted as the all-knowledge.** [I.11]

[The knowledge of entities consists of] (1) **not dwelling in** [saṃsāric] **existence through** the **prajñā** [of knowing] the three times to be equality; (2) **not dwelling in** inferior **peace through compassion** for sentient beings; (3) **being distant** from the fruitional mother **due to lacking** the skill in **the means** to relinquish the cognitive obscurations; (4) **not being distant** from the fruitional mother **due to** being skilled in **the means** to relinquish these [obscurations]; (5) the **antagonistic** factor being [the knowledge of entities] of śrāvakas (which entails discriminations of apprehending characteristics); (6) the **remedial factor** being the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas

(which is free from such discriminations);[606] (7) the **training** in engaging in the remedial knowledge of entities; (8) realizing **its** subjects and objects to be **equality**; and (9) the fruition of this training, **the paths of seeing of śrāvakas and so on** ([pratyekabuddhas and] bodhisattvas), which are taught implicitly and explicitly, respectively. It is **asserted** that **the all-knowledge** is taught through these nine [points] by way of defining the subject through its objects and the fruition through its causes.

2.3.1.1.2.2.2. Explaining the four trainings by way of their natures
This has four parts:
1) [The full realization of all aspects]

> **Aspects, trainings,**
> **Their qualities, flaws, and characteristics,**
> **The factors conducive to liberation and penetration,**
> **The assembly of irreversible learners,** [I.12]
>
> **The equality of existence and peace,**
> **And unsurpassably pure lands**
> **Make up the full realization of all aspects,**
> **Which includes skill in means.** [I.13]

[The full realization of all aspects consists of] (1) that with which [bodhisattvas] should familiarize—the **aspects** of consciousnesses with referents; (2) how they should familiarize with them—the **trainings**; (3) the **qualities** of their having familiarized in this way; {15b} (4) the **flaws** that interrupt this [training]; (5) the **characteristics** of [the divisions of] this training; (6) the [first temporary] result of training—the path of accumulation that represents **the factors conducive to liberation**; (7) its maturation—[the path of preparation] that represents the factors conducive to **penetration**; (8) the persons as those who cultivate the training—**the assembly of irreversible learners**; (9) the training in realizing saṃsāric **existence** and nirvāṇic **peace** as **equality**; (10) transforming one's own **pure lands** into [having] **unsurpassable** qualities; **including** (11) the training in **skill in means**, which makes others mature.[607] The training in **the full realization of all aspects** is taught through these eleven [points].

2) [The culminating training]

> **Its sign, increase,**
> **Stability, continuous abiding of the mind,**

The four conceptions'
Four kinds of remedy [I.14]

On the paths called "seeing"
And "familiarization," respectively,
The uninterrupted samādhi,
And mistaken notions [I.15]

Represent the culminating clear realization. [I.16a]

[The culminating clear realization consists of] (1) heat—the **sign** of the consummate combined familiarization; (2) peak—the **increase** of merit; (3) poised readiness—the **stability** in not abandoning the three knowledges and the welfare of sentient beings; (4) the supreme dharma[608]—the **continuous abiding of mind** on its focus; (5)–(6) the **four kinds of remedy** for the **four conceptions** about apprehender and apprehended (each one being divided into two) on the stages that are **the paths called "seeing" and "familiarization," respectively**; (7) **the samādhi** for becoming a buddha that is **uninterrupted** by other paths; and (8) the **mistaken notions** of qualms in terms of the two realities being contradictory, which are the factors to be relinquished on the uninterrupted path. **The culminating clear realization** is taught through these eight dharmas.

3) [The serial training]

The serial [training] is thirteenfold. [I.16b]

The serial training is taught through the **thirteenfold** [division] of the six recollections (the consummate thinking); the six pāramitās (the consummate training); and the training in [realizing] the nature of the lack of entity. {16a}

4) [The instantaneous training]


The full realization in a single instant
Is fourfold by way of characteristics. [I.16cd]

This refers to the powerful capacity of **the full realization in a single instant** to complete an action. It cannot be divided into different entities, but **is fourfold by way of** its general **characteristics** [or isolates].[609]

2.3.1.1.2.2.3. Explaining the dharmakāya

As svābhāvika[kāya], sambhoga[kāya],
And also as nairmāṇika[kāya], which is other,
The dharmakāya, together with its activity,
Is proclaimed to be fourfold. [I.17]

[The dharmakāya consists of] (1) the **svābhāvikakāya** of being primordially free from stains; (2) the **sambhogakāya**, which is endowed with the five certainties;[610] (3) **also** the **nairmāṇikakāya**, which is an unceasing continuity as long as saṃsāra lasts and is other than [the kāya that is] endowed with the five certainties; **and** (4) enlightened activity—**the activity** whose dominant condition is **the dharmakāya** of wisdom. In this **fourfold** way, the classification of the dharmakāya **is proclaimed.**[611]



2.3.1.2. Detailed explanation of the branches
This has three parts:
1) The three knowledges (the objects)
2) The four trainings (the means)
3) The dharmakāya (the fruition)

2.3.1.2.1. The three knowledges (the objects)
[This has three parts]:
1) The knowledge of all aspects (what is to be attained)
2) The knowledge of the path (the means to attain it)
3) The knowledge of entities (the root [of the knowledge of all aspects], which includes the points to go astray)

2.3.1.2.1.1. The knowledge of all aspects (what is to be attained)[612]
This has two parts:
1) The generation of bodhicitta (the motivation)
2) The practice (the training)

2.3.1.2.1.1.1. The generation of bodhicitta (the motivation)
This has two parts:
1) General topic
2) Meaning of the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.1.1. General topic
This has three parts:
1) Definition
2) Definiendum
3) Instances

1) [The definition] is "the mind that focuses on perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others," since [the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*] says:

> The arising of the bodhicitta of bodhisattvas
> Is the intention that pertains to the two welfares.[613]

2) [The term "generation of bodhicitta" consists of] "enlightenment" (*bodhi*) due to all knowable objects being fully realized; "mind" (*citta*) due to the accumulations as the causes for this [enlightenment] being gathered;[614] and "generation" due to its arising from limitless causes.

3) There are two [instances]: (a) the generation of ultimate bodhicitta and (b) the generation of seeming bodhicitta.

3a) The first one [has four parts]:
- a) Nature {16b}
- b) Classification
- c) Boundary lines
- d) Manner of attainment

3aa) It is that which focuses on the enlightenment of the ultimate dharmadhātu and arises as the nature of uncontaminated wisdom.

3ab) [It is classified as] the bodhicitta of pure superior intention,[615] maturation, and the relinquishment of obscurations.

3ac) The first one is presented as [referring to] the [impure] bhūmis from the first to the seventh; the second one, to the three pure bhūmis; and the third one, to the buddhabhūmi.

3ad) Its causes are the three [factors of] ultimacy since [the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*] says:

> By virtue of the perfect buddhas having been attended well,
> The accumulations of merit and wisdom having been gathered,
> And the nonconceptual wisdom about phenomena having arisen,
> It is the most supreme one.[616]

Its conditions are the attainments through the power of familiarization.

3b) The second one [—seeming bodhicitta—] also has four parts.

3ba) The nature [of seeming bodhicitta] is the mental factor of focusing on the enlightenment of the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena. As for this [bodhicitta], aspiration refers to desiring, and application to intention.

3bb) The two [forms of the seeming bodhicitta]—aspiration and application—are [distinguished] in terms of what is predominant. The first one is the mere aspiration to undertake the training in bodhicitta, while the latter means to take it on and engage in it. Here, Asaṅga and his brother use the conventional terms "generation of bodhicitta" and "its vows,"[617] thus holding that a common locus between the initial generation of bodhicitta and the later taking of vows through a ceremony is impossible. The conventional terms "aspiration" and "application" are asserted by Śāntideva. In his approach, it is

held that the bodhicitta of aspiration does not depend on a ceremony, while [the bodhicitta of] application must definitely depend on it. {17a} However, there also originated [the approach of] taking the vows through a ceremony without separating [the bodhicitta of] aspiration and application.

3bc) The bodhicitta of aspiration does not go beyond the path of preparation, while the bodhicitta of application exists on all [levels of] bodhicitta in either a manifest or a latent manner.

3bd) The causes are as stated [in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*]:

> Through the power of a friend, the power of a cause, the power of roots,
> The power of study, and the cultivation of virtue . . .[618]

The conditions correspond to

> The generation of bodhicitta taught by others is explained.[619]

2.3.1.2.1.1.1.2. Meaning of the text

[This has four parts]:

1) Definition
2) Focal object
3) Classification
4) Boundary lines

2.3.1.2.1.1.1.2.1. Definition

> **The generation of bodhicitta is, for the welfare of others,**
> **The desire for completely perfect enlightenment.** [I.18ab]

Since the generation of bodhicitta is the cause of all noble persons, it is explained at the beginning. In terms of what arises first, what is taught [here] is the generation of the bodhicitta of aspiration, which is as follows. **The generation of bodhicitta is the desire** (or the aspiration or resolve) to attain **completely perfect enlightenment for the welfare of other** sentient beings.[620] The sūtras say:

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva is one who strives like this: "By all means, I shall awaken to unsurpassable enlightenment and accomplish the welfare of others."[621]

[Some] may wonder, "In this way, the term 'generation of bodhicitta' does not apply to a mental factor." There is no fault since this [term] is applied in a wider sense.[622]

2.3.1.2.1.1.1.2.2. Focal object

> **Briefly and in detail, this and that**[623]
> **Are expressed according to the sutras.** [I.18cd]

You may wonder, "As for what serve as the objects of this generation of bodhicitta, what is perfect enlightenment and what is the welfare of others?" The answer is as follows. **This** perfect enlightenment (the object to be attained) **and that** welfare of others (the objective) **are expressed briefly and in detail according to the** statements in the large, medium, and brief [prajñāpāramitā sūtras], which agree with **sūtras** such as the *Akṣayamati[nirdeśasūtra]* and the *Gaṇḍavyūha[sūtra]*. {17b} [In the prajñāpāramitā sūtras,] the enlightenment that is the object to be realized is taught in brief as follows:

> Śāriputra, here, a bodhisattva mahāsattva who desires to become completely and perfectly enlightened with regard to all phenomena in all aspects should make efforts in prajñāpāramitā.

[This object to be realized is also taught] by way of a detailed explanation, applying it to the other pāramitās too:

> Śāriputra, here, a bodhisattva mahāsattva should abide in prajñāpāramitā in the manner of nonabiding, thus perfectly practicing the pāramitā of generosity in the manner of no giving since something to be given, a giver, and a recipient are not observable in generosity and all other [pāramitās].[624]

The welfare of others (the objective) is taught in brief as follows:

> [Bodhisattvas] who desire that all sentient beings there are will pass into nirvāṇa in the expanse without any remainder of the skandhas . . . should practice this prajñāpāramitā.

[This objective is also taught] by way of a detailed explanation:

> They should train in the object of bodhicitta, which is the desire to establish miserly sentient beings in generosity; those with distorted ethics, in [proper] ethics; the malicious, in patience; the lazy, in vigor; the distracted, in dhyāna; and those with distorted prajñā, in consummate prajñā.[625]

[Thus,] it is realized that these two words ["the latter and the former"] in the passage [I.18ab] teach the generation of the bodhicitta of application, with "the [latter]" [referring to] applying oneself to the path and "the [former]" to introducing others onto the path.

2.3.1.2.1.1.1.2.3. Classification

Earth, gold, moon, fire,
Treasure, jewel mine, ocean,
Vajra, mountain, medicine, friend,
Wish-fulfilling gem, sun, song, [I.19]

King, treasure-vault, highway,
Vehicle, fountain,
Pleasant melody, river, and cloud—
Through [being like] these, it is twenty-twofold. [I.20]

You may wonder how many [kinds of] generating bodhicitta there are. This is explained [here] by matching the twenty-two examples that follow sūtras other [than the prajñāpāramitā sūtras][626] in terms of generating the bodhicitta of application; the twenty-two aids that are explicitly taught in the mother [sūtras];[627] and {18a} the twenty-two concordant features that are presented by master [Haribhadra in his commentaries].

(1) The generation of bodhicitta that is congruently associated with the resolve [to attain enlightenment for the sake of all beings][628] as its aid resembles the example of the **earth** since it concords with the [latter's] features in that it is the basis for all pure dharmas [—the buddha qualities and the collection of their causes].

[Through] applying the same [principle to the remaining kinds of generating bodhicitta], (2) the one that is associated with the intention [that, when focusing on bringing together all six pāramitās, is oriented toward the benefit and happiness in this and all future lifetimes] resembles **gold** since it does not change until enlightenment.

(3) The one that is associated with the superior intention [to familiarize with and accomplish all virtuous dharmas, such as the four foundations of mindfulness, without exception] is like the waxing **moon** since [all these] virtuous dharmas will increase.

(4) The one that is associated with the training [in familiarizing, in an approximately concordant manner, with all three knowledges being without nature] is like **fire** since it [is the supreme remedial training that] burns the firewood of [the obscurations that are the antagonistic factors of the three knowledges, such as] the afflictions.[629]

(5) The one that is associated with generosity is like a **treasure** since it satisfies all sentient beings [when they enjoy material things, without ever becoming depleted].

(6) The one that is associated with ethics is like a **jewel mine** since [it functions as the foundation] from which all [infinite and precious mundane and supramundane] qualities come forth.

(7) The one that is associated with patience is like an **ocean** since its ground is unperturbed, [that is, one's mind is unruffled by any undesired physical and mental harms and sufferings that may befall one].

(8) The one that is associated with vigor is like a **vajra**, since, [through the firm trust in the causes and the result of unsurpassable enlightenment,] it is not split through the activities of māras [and one's own antagonistic factors].

(9) The one that is associated with dhyāna is like the [king of] **mountains** since it is not agitated by the distractions [of being focused on objects such as one's own antagonistic factors].

(10) The one that is associated with prajñā is like **medicine** since it pacifies the two obscurations [including their latent tendencies, which are like] diseases, [since they produce suffering].

(11) The one that is associated with the skillful means of dedication is like a **friend** since it does not abandon the welfare of sentient beings [in any and all situations].

(12) The one that is associated with the ten great aspiration prayers and so forth is like a **wish-fulfilling gem** since [the fruitions of] these aspirations are accomplished [as aspired].

(13) The one that is associated with power is like the **sun** since it ripens the harvest of those to be guided [through teaching the dharma by way of the four discriminating awarenesses in ways that are individually appropriate].

(14) The one that is associated with the wisdoms [of suchness and variety] is like a **song** of the gandharvas[630] [or a pleasant dharma melody] since it teaches the dharma for which those to be guided aspire.

(15) The one that is associated with the [six] supernatural knowledges is like a **king** since it accomplishes the welfare of others through these supernatural knowledges with unimpeded power.

(16) The one that is associated with the two accumulations [of merit and wisdom] is like a **treasure-vault** since it is the foundation [or treasure of numerous collections of] merit and wisdom. {18b}

(17) The one that is associated with the thirty-seven [dharmas] concordant with enlightenment[631] is like a **highway** since the noble ones travel on it.

(18) The one that is associated with compassion [as the essence of] superior insight is like a **vehicle** since it moves by not abiding in either [saṃsāric] existence or [nirvāṇic] peace.[632]

(19) The one that is associated with the power of total recall[633] [of not forgetting the words and the meanings of the dharma, which is associated with mindfulness,] and the self-confidence [of explaining them to others in an unimpeded manner, which is associated with prajñā,] is like a **fountain** [or a well that is an inexhaustible source of bringing forth fresh water and yet retaining its essence]. For [through the power of total recall,] it retains the dharmas [that one has heard] and, [through self-confidence, it brings forth in an] inexhaustible [manner the dharmas that one has not heard].

(20) The one that is associated with the feast of dharma [of embracing the fully qualified way of being of the three jewels through explaining the four epitomes of the dharma][634] is like a **pleasant melody** [that satisfies all, just as the sweetly resounding sound of the drum of the gods or their nectar does] since [the four epitomes and so on] resound sweetly for those [to be guided] who wish to attain liberation [and omniscience].

(21) The one that is associated with the single path that [all buddhas] travel is like a **river** since the welfare of others is an incessant stream.[635]

(22) The one that is associated with the dharmakāya is like a [big] **cloud** (the cause for abundance) since it is the source of the activities of the nairmāṇikakāya, [allowing for these activities (such as dwelling in the realm of Tuṣita) being displayed in all worldly realms. Thus, all activities of maturing the harvest of benefit and happiness—the welfare of sentient beings—depend on it].

Through these ways of being, [the generation of bodhicitta] **is twenty-twofold.**[636]

2.3.1.2.1.1.1.2.4. Boundary lines

The first three [kinds of] generating bodhicitta (1)–(3) make up the [lesser, medium, and great] path of accumulation; the next one (4), the path of preparation; the following ten (5)–(14), the ten bhūmis; the next five (15)–(19), the special paths of the [three] pure [bhūmis]; and the following three (20)–(22), the buddhabhūmi in terms of preparation, main part, and conclusion.[637]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2. The practice (the training)

This has three parts:

1) The instructions that teach the means of practice
2) The branches of penetration (the result of practicing the [instructions])
3) Explanation of practice's own nature

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1. The instructions that teach the means of practice

This has two parts:

1) General teaching on the ten instructions
2) The particular explanation of the jewel of the saṃgha

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1. General teaching on the ten instructions

This has two parts:

1) Summary corresponding to the text
2) Explanation by outlining each one separately

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.1. Summary corresponding to the text

Practice, the realities,
The three jewels (such as the Buddha),
Nonclinging, being completely untiring,
Fully embracing the path, [I.21]

The five visions,
The six qualities of supernatural knowledge,
The path of seeing and the one called "familiarization"—
The instructions on these should be known as tenfold. [I.22]

Persons who are endowed with the generation of bodhicitta give rise to the striving for the instructions that make them attain the qualities which they have not attained [yet]. The ordinary instructions {19a} are certainly also obtained by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and those [bodhisattvas] who have not attained the samādhi of "the stream of dharma."[638] However, the special [instructions] are [only obtained by] those individuals who dwell on the [great] path of accumulation of the mahāyāna and have attained this samādhi of the [continuous] ability to not forget the words and meanings of the dharma. They are the ones who are directly instructed by a buddha nairmāṇikakāya saying, "Practice such and such yogas!"[639]

When such instructions are classified, [they consist of] the instructions on (1) the principal object of **practice**, which say, "Realize that the ultimate is [the fact of] these mere appearances of seeming [reality] lacking a nature";[640] (2) **the four realities**, which are the objects that have the aspect of phenomenal identitylessness; (3) **the three jewels (such as the Buddha)** in order to make one not cling to the three causal and fruitional jewels; (4) vigor in order to make one **not cling** to one's own happiness; (5) **completely untiring** vigor in order to accomplish the power of the remedies; (6) the vigor of **fully embracing** one's own **path** in order to not travel on other paths; (7) **the five visions** in order to be independent of others; (8) **the six qualities of supernatural knowledge** in order to promote the welfare of others; (9) **the path of seeing**, which is the concordant cause of perfect enlightenment; **and** (10) **the one called** "path of **familiarization.**" In this way, **the instructions should be known as tenfold.**[641]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2. Explaining each one separately

This has three parts:

1) Instruction on the focal object of practice, the four realities
2) Instruction on the foundation of practice, the three jewels
3) Instructions on the causes of consummate practice

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1. Instruction on the focal object of practice, the four realities

This has two parts:

1) [Instruction on] the two realities (the main ones)
2) [Instruction on] the four realities (the inferior ones) {19b}

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1.1. Instruction on the two realities (the main ones)

The practice of bodhisattvas is especially distinguished in terms of prajñā in that it does not go beyond the two realities, and it is especially distinguished in terms of means in that it is embraced by compassion and the six pāramitās. In not going beyond seeming [reality], [bodhisattvas] gather the accumulation of merit during subsequent attainment. In not going beyond the ultimate, they gather the accumulation of wisdom during meditative equipoise.

Thus, [the discussion of] the two realities has three parts:

1) Definition
2) Definiendum
3) Instances

1) The definition of the ultimate is "that which abides free from reference points of a nature." The *[Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] Requested by Candragarbha* says:

> Without a nature and free from reference points—
> This is the sphere of the ultimate.[642]

The definition of the seeming is "that which appears as various forms of dependent origination." [Jñānagarbha's] *Satyadvaya[vibhāga]* states:

> Just these very appearances, as they [appear],
> Are the seeming . . . [643]

2) "Seeming reality" [is called that way] because it exists in a deceiving way. "Ultimate reality" is called that way because it exists in the definitive sense.

3) [The instances of the two realities] are twofold:

3a) [The instances of seeming reality] consist of all the cognitions that are impaired by ignorance and the factors that appear for them. When classified, they are twofold—the false seeming (such as perceiving two moons) and the correct seeming (such as perceiving vases and pillars).

3b) [The instances of ultimate reality] consist of all nonconceptual cognitions that are free from mistakenness and their objects. When classified, they are twofold—the nominal ultimate (realizing a partial freedom from reference points) and the nonnominal ultimate (realizing the freedom from all reference points without exception). {20a}

In the sūtras, [we find Śāriputra's] question, "Bhagavan, how should a bodhisattva mahāsattva train in prajñāpāramitā?" Within the answer to this, the following passage teaches [the bodhisattva's practice] being especially distinguished in terms of prajñā:

> Here, when bodhisattva mahāsattvas engage in prajñāpāramitā, they do not see any bodhisattva mahāsattvas as if they were existing bodhisattvas . . . "bodhisattva" . . . are mere words. [644]

The following passage teaches [this practice] being especially distinguished in terms of means:

> Śāriputra, bodhisattvas who engage in prajñāpāramitā and cultivate it for a single day outshine the prajñās of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas . . . the prajñās of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are not comparable to this . . .[645]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1.2. Instruction on the four realities (the inferior ones)

The śrāvakas practice the four realities in such a way that they cling and are attached to them as being the sixteen aspects of impermanence and so forth. But here, the instruction is, "Make them a living experience in accordance with emptiness by way of being free from such clinging."[646]

The critical analysis of the four realities given here has two parts:

1) Cause and result in terms of saṃsāra
2) Cause and result in terms of purified phenomena

1) [Saṃsāra] has two parts:

1a) What is to be known (the result)
1b) What is to be relinquished (the two causes)

1a) [The reality of suffering[647]—what is to be known—] has two parts:

1aa) Defining characteristics
1ab) Instances

1aa) The four aspects [of suffering] are as follows. It is *impermanent*, since it disintegrates without depending on anything else. It is *suffering*, since its essence is harm. It is *empty*, since it lacks a nature. {20b} It is *identityless*, since it is free of an apprehender.[648] Among these, both empty and identityless are

entailed in all knowable objects; impermanent, in all conditioned phenomena; and suffering, in all contaminated phenomena.

1ab) [Its instances] are two—sentient beings as the matured results of karma and afflictions and the worlds (their containers) as the dominated results of these [karmas and afflictions]. Therefore, here follows the explanation of

1) the ones who are born (sentient beings)
2) the container into which they are born
3) their measures

1ab1) Sentient beings are (a) classified as the five [kinds of] beings (hell beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods) as well as [the beings of] the intermediate state. (b) Their manner of being born is represented by the twelve [links of] dependent origination. (c) The cause for them remaining and being alive is food. Edible food, which exists in the desire realm, has the nature of smell, taste, and being a tangible object. The food of contact, which exists in all three realms, is what arises from the coming together of object, sense faculty, and consciousness. The food of intention is mental karma. [Finally, there is] the food of consciousness. All of these are nothing but contaminated. From among these four [kinds of food], the former two nourish the body and mind of this life, while the latter two propel one into a rebirth and complete it.[649] (d) The manner in which sentient beings die and transit [into their next life] is that their life faculty (the support) ceases, through which the mental consciousness (what is supported [by this support]) transits.

1ab2) [The container consists of] the three maṇḍalas [of wind, fire, and water] as the support; Mount Meru and the seven mountain ranges; the surrounding mountain range; the twelve continents [and subcontinents]; sun, moon, and stars; the six abodes of desire gods; and the seventeen abodes of the form realm.[650] {21a}

1ab3) [Their measures] are twofold—[in terms of] (a) objects and (b) time. (a) [Spatial dimensions range from] a minutest particle, a minor particle, a metallic particle, a water particle, a rabbit particle, a sheep particle, an ox particle, a dust mote particle, a louse egg, a louse, and a barley grain to a finger width (with each one resulting from the former through multiplication by seven). Twenty-four [finger widths] are a cubit, four of which are an armspan. Five hundred of those are an ear-shot, and eight of these one yojanā.[651] (b) [Temporal dimensions include] the smallest moment in time, which is a single one of the sixty-four fractions into which a quick finger snap can be divided. 120 of these [smallest moments] are an "instant," and sixty of them a "brief interval." A "while," a full day, and a month are each arrived at through respective multiplications by thirty. Twelve [months] plus leap days are one year.

1b) [The reality of the origin of suffering—the two] causes that are to be relinquished—has two parts:

1ba) Defining characteristics

1bb) Instances

1ba) The four aspects [of the origin of suffering] are as follows. It is a *cause*, since it appropriates [saṃsāric] existence. It is an *origin*, since all suffering without exception originates [from it]. It is *arising*, since it intensely produces results. It is a *condition*, since it leaves the previous suffering behind and induces the following one.[652]

1bb) The causes of the reality of suffering are karma and afflictions. The manner in which they serve as causes is that they serve as maturing causes through propelling one [into a rebirth], and as concordant causes through completing [this rebirth]. Both karma and afflictions serve as enabling causes of [the world as] the container.[653]

Here, in a critical analysis of (1) afflictions and (2) karma, the first one [has four parts]:

a) Causes

b) Nature

c) Classification

d) Manner of expanding

1a) [The causes of the afflictions] are three—not having relinquished the seeds of the afflictions; closeness of objects that give rise to them upon being focused on; {21b} and improper mental engagement of focusing on such [objects].

1b) [Their nature is that they] are mental factors that, once they have arisen, greatly agitate the mind stream.

1c) They are classified in terms of (a) nature, (b) the manner of relinquishment, and (c) names.

1ca) There are two—primary afflictions and secondary afflictions. The former are sixfold—desire, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, and view. View is further classified into five—views about a real personality, views of clinging to extremes, wrong views, views of holding a view as paramount, and views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount. Thus, there are ten [primary afflictions altogether].[654]

1cb) [The manner of relinquishment] is twofold in terms of

1) the set of the imputed afflictions that arise from one's mind being altered by philosophical systems (the factors to be relinquished through seeing)

2) the set of the innate [afflictions] that do not depend on such [alterations] (the factors to be relinquished through familiarization).

1cb1) According to the hīnayāna, the factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to [the reality of] suffering in the desire realm are [the above] ten [primary afflictions]. The factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to [the realities of] origin and cessation are seven each ([the above ten] except for the first two and the last one [of the five] views). The factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to [the reality of] the path are eight ([the above ten] except for the first two views). According to the mahāyāna, [the factors to be relinquished through seeing] in the desire realm are those ten afflictions with regard to each one of the four realities. In the [two] higher realms, they are nine each (except for anger).

1cb2) As for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization, according to the hīnayāna, in the desire realm {22a} they are the four [afflictions] desire, anger, pride, and ignorance. In the [two] higher realms [they are the same] except for anger. According to the mahāyāna, the two [views about] a real personality and extremes are added on top of the ones just mentioned [for each realm]. No matter in which one of these two systems, on the nine levels of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization each affliction is divided into lesser, medium, and great [degrees], and each one of these is again divided into lesser, medium, and great [degrees], so that there are nine on each [of these nine levels].[655] The reason that there is no anger in the two higher realms is that they are free from the nine causes of a malicious mind.[656]

1cc) [There are] twenty-four [names for the afflictions]—fetters, bonds, latencies, secondary afflictions, snares, floods, yokes, graspings, knots, obscurations, rigidities, stains, evils, stings, accessories, wrongdoings, contaminations, ruins, torments, troubles, battles, fevers, thickets, and obstructions.[657]

1d) They expand[658] in two [ways]:
- a) by way of their focal objects
- b) by way of being associated

1da) The all-pervasive views, doubts, and ignorances with regard to [the two realities of] suffering and its origin that are to be relinquished through seeing expand by focusing on [all] five categories of the factors to be relinquished with regard to the three realms. Any afflictions other than these expand by focusing on their own specific class [of factors to be relinquished]. However, those afflictions that focus on uncontaminated phenomena and the higher realms do not expand {22b} because these focal objects are not made into something that is "mine" through craving and views about a self. According to the hīnayāna, it is asserted that afflictions [can] focus on the actual uncontaminated phenomena, but according to the mahāyāna, they are not able to focus on these actual [uncontaminated phenomena].

1db) Any affliction that is associated with some phenomenon will expand by way of being associated with this [phenomenon] until this [affliction] has been relinquished.[659]

2) As for the origin [of suffering] that is karma, the followers of the mahāyāna assert that the seeds of karma dwell in the ālaya-consciousness. Both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas agree in asserting that the support for karma is the mental consciousness. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that the continuum of karma is the possession of obtainment,[660] which is a substance, while the Sautrāntikas hold that it is the substantial possession of not getting lost. Such karma is classified as twofold—volition (mental karma) and the physical and verbal karma motivated by the [former].[661] Motivational force is twofold—the causal motivation that initially propels a given action and the motivation at the time [of engaging in that action], which operates simultaneously with that action. There are also [cases of] a nonvirtuous motivation at the time [of engagement] arising from a virtuous causal motivation and so on. If [karma] is classified in terms of its maturation, it is twofold—certain karma and uncertain karma.[662] The former is classified as threefold—[karma] that will be experienced as a visible phenomenon [in this lifetime]; [karma] that will be experienced [after having assumed one's next] place of birth; and [karma] that will be experienced after any other number [of lifetimes]. Among these, [the karma] that will be experienced as a visible phenomenon [in this lifetime] is solely [the type of karma] that completes maturation, while the latter two also propel maturation. Propelling is like the lines of a sketch and completing is like filling in colors.[663] {23a} Furthermore, [karma] is classified as follows. White [actions] with white maturations are the virtues in terms of the two higher realms, whose results do not move to any other levels [of saṃsāra]. Black [actions] with black maturation are nonvirtuous or nonmeritorious [karmas].[664] [Actions] that are [both] black and white with equally mixed maturations are the virtuous or meritorious karmas of the desire [realm]. [Actions] that are neither black nor white and whose maturations are never black are uncontaminated karmas. These uncontaminated karmas are not presented as the origin [of suffering]. Rather, whatever is the origin [of suffering] must be either nonvirtue or contaminated virtue and whatever is the reality of suffering must be unobscuring and neutral.[665]

2) Cause and result in terms of purified phenomena
This has two parts:
- 2a) The result to be attained
- 2b) The cause to be relied on

2a) [The reality of cessation to be attained] has two parts:
- 2aa) Defining characteristics
- 2ab) Instances

2aa) The four [aspects of cessation] are as follows. It is *cessation*, since the afflictions have been relinquished. It is *peace*, since it is freedom from suffering. It is *excellence*, since there is nothing to be desired that is more supreme than it. It is *final deliverance*, since relinquishment is irreversible.[666]

2ab) [Its instance] refers to being pure of adventitious stains (what is to be ceased), right within suchness (the basis of cessation), through the prajñā of realizing identitylessness (the means to cease). Since this is a result of freedom, it has no cause that fully qualifies as such.[667] This is classified as two—symbolic cessation {23b} and ultimate cessation. The first refers to the deterioration of the seeds to be relinquished through the contaminated path. The second means the complete eradication of the seeds to be relinquished through the uncontaminated path. The latter is again threefold—fully complete, incomplete, and especially distinguished.[668]

2b) The path to be relied on has two parts:
- 2ba) Defining characteristics
- 2bb) Instances

2ba) The four [aspects of the path] are as follows. It is the *path*, since it makes one proceed to the city of liberation. It is *accomplishment*, since one accomplishes mind in an unmistaken way. It is *appropriate*, since it functions as the remedy for the obscurations. It is *conducive to deliverance*, since it delivers to the permanent ultimate abode.

2bb) [Its instances] refer to the prajñās of realizing identitylessness, including their accompanying [mental factors].[669]

The order of these four realities is taught in accordance with the way in which clear realization arises.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.2. Instruction on the foundation of practice, the three jewels

This has two parts:
1) The nature of the [three] jewels
2) The way in which they are presented as places of refuge

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.2.1. The nature of the three jewels

Ultimately, the Buddha is the dharmakāya that is endowed with eight qualities. These are the qualities of one's own welfare—(1) unconditioned natural purity, (2) spontaneously present purity of adventitious [stains], (3) not being realized by others, except for buddhas [recognizing] each other; and the qualities of the welfare of others—(4) knowing [all] knowable objects, just as they are, (5) loving-kindness toward those who do not realize this, (6) the power to overcome, through these two, the sufferings of sentient beings including their causes.[670]

Ultimately, the dharma is the wisdom that is endowed with eight qualities. These are the qualities of the reality of cessation (that which is free from attachment)—(1) being inconceivable due to being free from the four extremes of reference points, {24a} (2) lacking any duality of apprehender and apprehended, (3) lacking any conceptions of the three realms; and the qualities of the reality of the path (that which makes free from attachment)—(4) the purity of primordial peace, (5) the lucidity of clearly realizing the basic nature, (6) being the remedy by virtue of eradicating the seeds to be relinquished.[671]

The saṃgha refers to the persons that are endowed with eight qualities. These are the qualities of awareness—(1) being aware of naturally luminous mind, just as it is, (2) being aware of its variety (seeing that it pervades all sentient beings), (3) inner awareness (seeing it as the sugata heart); and the qualities of liberation—(4) the first of these wisdoms being liberated from the stains of attachment, (5) the second [wisdom] being liberated from the obscurations of obstruction, (6) therefore being liberated from the obscurations of inferiority by virtue of serving as the places of refuge for all beings.

The hīnayāna asserts that buddha and saṃgha are the reality of the path and that the dharma is the nirvāṇa without remainder.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.2.2. The way in which they are presented as places of refuge

In the final picture, the Buddha alone is presented as the place of refuge,[672] but temporarily, all three [jewels] are presented as places of refuge. As [the *Uttaratantra*] says:

> In terms of the teacher, the teaching, and the disciples,
> The three jewels are presented
> With regard to those who follow the three yānas
> And are interested in three activities.[673]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.3. Instructions on the causes of consummate practice

[Among these instructions, those on] (4)–(6) [the three kinds of] vigor that relinquish the factors antagonistic to practice {24b} are easy to understand.[674]

(7) The instruction on the five visions (being independent of others in one's practice) refers to (a) fleshly vision, (b) divine vision, (c) prajñā vision, (d) dharma vision, and (e) buddha vision. In due order, through these one sees [all] things within eight thousand yojanās; the ways of dying, transition, and rebirth of all sentient beings; the actuality of the nature of phenomena, just as it is; the scopes of the mind streams of those who are [inferior and] equal to oneself in terms of relinquishment and realization; and that [the actual way of being and the ways of appearance of] all phenomena are

completely realized. The first two arise from [karmic] maturation, with their causes being the six pāramitās. As for their boundary lines, the first two exist even on the [paths of] accumulation and preparation; the middle two exist also during the meditative equipoises and subsequent attainments of the ten bhūmis; and the last one exists solely on the buddhabhūmi.[675]

(8) The instruction on the six supernatural knowledges (the causes for accomplishing the welfare of others) refers to the six supernatural knowledges of (a) miraculous powers; (b) the divine ear; (c) knowing the minds of others; (d) recollecting former states [of existence of oneself and others]; (e) the divine eye, which involves application; and (f) knowing the termination of contamination.[676] The first one among these represents purity of body; the second, purity of speech; and the latter four, purity of mind. As for their boundary lines, the first five are in common with ordinary beings, but the last one arises [only] after the bhūmis of the noble ones have been attained.

(9)–(10) The instructions on the path of seeing and the path of familiarization (the causes of ultimate practice) will be explained below.[677]

In brief, all these instructions instruct on not going beyond the nature of phenomena by virtue of subject and object being nondual. {25a}

In the sūtras, the instruction on the four realities is given, in due order, by [the four passages starting with], "If bodhisattvas train in form being emptiness . . ."; "Form is regarded as neither subject to arising . . ."; "Śāriputra, emptiness does neither arise nor cease . . ."; and "Śāriputra, furthermore, bodhisattvas do not regard themselves as training in the pāramitā of generosity . . ." The instruction on the three jewels is given, in due order, by [the passages starting with], "Śāriputra, when bodhisattva mahāsattvas engage in the mother . . . they do not join form . . . to the knowledge of all aspects . . ."; "they do not join prajñāpāramitā to the notion that form is an entity . . ."; "Bhagavan, from where was this bodhisattva mahāsattva born here . . ." [The instruction] on [the three kinds of] vigor is given by [the passage], "Bhagavan, a bodhisattva mahāsattva should provide no chance for physical . . . wrongdoings . . ." The instruction on the five visions is given by [the passage], "Śāriputra, a bodhisattva mahāsattva's fleshly vision . . ." The instruction on the six supernatural knowledges is given by [the passage], "Śāriputra, through engaging in the mother, the pāramitā of supernatural knowledge is attained." [The instruction] on the path of seeing is given by [the passage], "Subhūti, starting with the mother of the bodhisattvas . . ." The instruction on the path of familiarization is given by [the passage], "Subhūti, the unconditioned dhātu cannot be indicated without the conditioned dhātu . . ."[678]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2. The particular explanation of the jewel of the saṃgha
This has two parts:

1) The exemplary saṃgha that is the means to illustrate
2) The actual saṃgha that is to be illustrated[679]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1. The exemplary saṃgha that is the means to illustrate[680]
This has two parts:

1) The persons who are the attainers
2) The fruitions to be attained

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.1. The persons who are the attainers
This has three parts:

1) Those who have previously become free from attachment[681]
2) Those who relinquish simultaneously[682]
3) Those who [attain] the fruitions gradually[683]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.1.1. Those who have previously become free from attachment

[These kinds of practitioners] are solely [found among] (1) once-returners and (2) nonreturners because, in both cases, their main factors to be relinquished {25b} have [already] been relinquished through the mundane path of familiarization before the [Buddhist] path of seeing. Among both stream-enterers and arhats, there are no [persons] who have previously become free from attachment because one is not able to relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing ("the three fetters")[684] and the affliction of the Peak of Existence[685] before the path of seeing. Therefore, (1) the once-returners who have previously become free from attachment are twofold—(a) approaching and (b) abiding [once-returners].[686] (1a) The first are those who, before the path of seeing, have relinquished any number from six to eight [of the nine degrees] of the [innate] afflictions of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization and presently abide in any one of the [first] fifteen moments of the path of seeing. (1b) The abiders in this fruition are these same persons once they have attained the realization of the sixteenth moment [—the beginning of the path of familiarization]. As for the persons who abide in the fifteen moments of the path of seeing, those of duller faculties are called "pursuers by means of confidence"[687] and those of sharper faculties are called "pursuers by means of the dharma."[688] At the time of attaining the realization of the sixteenth moment, these two persons are called "those who are convinced through confidence"[689] and "those who attain through seeing,"[690] respectively. This also applies to the ones below.[691] (2) The nonreturners who have previously become free from attachment are also twofold—(a) approaching and (b) abiding [nonreturners]. (2a) The first are those who, before the path of seeing, are free from attachment to any number of afflictions from the ninth [innate degree of afflictions] of

the desire realm up through [those of] Nothing Whatsoever and presently abide in any one of the [first] fifteen moments of the path of seeing. (2b) The abiders in this fruition are these same persons once they have attained the realization of the sixteenth moment.[692]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.1.2. Those who relinquish simultaneously

These are the persons who abide in the fruition of a stream-enterer and then, by [exclusively] relying on the uncontaminated preliminary stage of the first dhyāna,[693] relinquish the first through the ninth [degrees of the innate] afflictions of the desire realm, with the same happening [simultaneously] for [all nine degrees of the afflictions of] the higher realms too. Thus, upon attaining the path of liberation of having relinquished the ninth [degrees of all these afflictions], they become abiders in the fruition of an arhat. {26a} This does not happen for the two middle fruitions [of once-returner and nonreturner] because these two are presented on the basis of solely the relinquishment of the afflictions of the desire realm.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.1.3. Those who attain the fruitions gradually

These are four—(1) stream-enterer (approacher and abider); (2) once-returner (approacher and abider); (3) nonreturner (approacher and abider); and (4) arhat (approacher and abider).

1) (a) Approaching [stream-enterers] are those who abide in any one of the [first] fifteen moments of the path of seeing and have either not relinquished the slightest amount of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization before the path of seeing, or have relinquished less than five of the [nine degrees of the] afflictions of the desire realm on the contaminated path. (b) The abiders in this fruition are these same [persons] once they have attained the sixteenth moment. They are twofold—(b1) those who have not relinquished the slightest amount of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization will take seven rebirths [at most][694] in the desire realm [until attaining arhathood], while (b2) those who have relinquished [at least] the third [or even] the fourth [degrees] of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization on the uncontaminated [supramundane] path will take two or three rebirths of the same type in the desire realm.[695]

2) (a) Approaching [once-returners] are those who, after the path of seeing, have relinquished the fifth [degree] of the factors in the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization and make efforts in relinquishing the sixth one. (b) The abiders in this fruition are twofold—(b1) those who are mere abiders on the path of liberation of having relinquished the sixth [degree of said afflictions] and (b2) those who have relinquished both the

seventh and eighth [degrees], thus being [only separated by] a single interval of one lifetime[696] [from becoming an arhat].

3) (a) Approaching [nonreturners] are nothing but these [latter] once-returners who are [separated by] a single interval of one lifetime. (b) The abiders in this fruition are [twofold]—(b1) the mere nonreturners who are liberated from the ninth [degree of the] afflictions of the desire realm and (b2) the special [nonreturners] (all noble ones who [make efforts to] become free from attachment to the first dhyāna up through the eighth [degree of the] afflictions of the [Peak of] Existence). These [special nonreturners] are classified as fivefold:

a) Those who progress to the form [realm][697]
b) Those who progress to the formless [realm][698]
c) Those who pass into nirvāṇa amidst visible phenomena[699]
d) Those who change state after being born in the desire [realm][700] {26b}
e) Those who witness with the body[701]

a) The first are fivefold:

1) Those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate [state][702]
2) Those who pass into nirvāṇa after birth[703]
3) Those who pass into nirvāṇa through application[704]
4) Those who pass into nirvāṇa without application[705]
5) Those who progress higher[706]

a1) These are the nonreturners with the [psychophysical] support of [an existence within] the desire realm who pass into nirvāṇa during the intermediate state [after their present life in the desire realm and before] being born in the form realm because they have relinquished the fetters of being born in the form realm, but have not yet relinquished [all] fetters of coming into being [in general].[707]

a2) These persons are the ones who pass into nirvāṇa immediately after being reborn [in the form realm] since they have relinquished [neither the fetters of coming into being in general] nor the fetters of being born [in the form realm in particular].

a3) These persons pass into nirvāṇa around the middle of their lifetime in the form realm through diligently applying themselves [to the path].

a4) These [persons] pass into nirvāṇa at the end of their lifetime in the form realm without applying themselves [diligently].[708]

a5) These [persons] move on by progressing to higher levels [within saṃsāra] because they are not able to pass into nirvāṇa on the level on which they were born, [thus needing at least two more lifetimes to attain arhathood]. These [nonreturners] are twofold—(a) those who progress to Akaniṣṭha[709] (those whose superior insight is predominant and who attained the alternating

cultivation of dhyāna) and (b) those who progress to the Peak of Existence (those who engage predominantly in calm abiding and did not attain this alternating cultivation).

a5a) Those who progress to Akaniṣṭha are again threefold. (1) The leapers[710] are the nonreturners with a [psychophysical] support of [an existence within] the desire realm who have regressed from the three higher dhyānas and thus are born in Brahmakāyika[711] in their next life. By virtue of the [latter psychophysical] support, they restore the greatest alternating cultivation of dhyāna. Thus, in their next life, they are born in the Akaniṣṭha that is a pure abode and attain nirvāṇa there.[712] {27a} (2) The half-leapers[713] are those who restore either one among the first three alternating cultivations [in Brahmakāyika] and then are born in their next life in one of the [corresponding] three lower pure abodes. By virtue of this [psychophysical] support, they restore the greatest alternating cultivation of dhyāna and then attain nirvāṇa in Akaniṣṭha in their next life. (3) Those who [are born and] die in, and transit through, all abodes[714] die in, and transit through, the abodes of the form realm except for Mahābrahmāṇa,[715] because they have not attained the greatest possible alternating cultivation [before]. Finally, they manifest nirvāṇa in Akaniṣṭha.

As for the manner of cultivating dhyāna in an alternating manner, there are such alternating cultivations for all four dhyānas. However, the fourth one is [cultivated in this] alternating manner first because it is the supreme among the convenient paths.[716] As for the manner of alternating, there are five [levels]—small (alternating three [states of dhyāna]), medium (alternating six), great (alternating nine), greater (alternating twelve), and greatest (alternating fifteen). To illustrate this with the first [level] among these, three [alternations are counted by first] entering a prolonged uncontaminated meditative absorption of the fourth dhyāna, then entering its [prolonged] contaminated [form], and then reentering the [prolonged] uncontaminated one.[717] [One continues in this way by gradually reducing the duration of each one of] these three [dhyānas until one is able to] enter them for [just] two instants each. This is the preparation. The main practice consists of being able to alternate these three contaminated and uncontaminated [dhyānas with them lasting] just a single instant each, which is the gauge for having accomplished [the small level of] alternating cultivation.[718] Master Vasubandhu says that being able to switch in each instant applies only to the Teacher, the Buddha, {27b} whereas in others [the gauge of accomplishment] refers to the accomplishment of the ability to enter [these three dhyānas] in a prolonged way [for as long] as they wish.[719] You may wonder why this alternating cultivation is performed. Nonreturners with the sharpest faculties engage in it in order to dwell in bliss [during this life] and to be born in the pure abodes [later]; arhats with the sharpest faculties do so in order to abide in bliss; and those of duller

faculties among these two do so in order to not regress from their [respective] fruitions and paths.[720]

a5b) Those who progress to the Peak of Existence[721] [are born,] die in, and transit through the abodes of the form and formless realms (except for the pure abodes) and finally attain nirvāṇa by virtue of the [existential] support that is the Peak of Existence.

b) [The nonreturners] who progress to the formless [realm] are those who, by virtue of being free from desire for the form [realm], do not go to the form realm in their next life, but progress to the formless realm. They are classified as four—the three who pass into nirvāṇa except those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state,[722] and those who progress higher.[723]

c) [Those who pass into nirvāṇa amidst visible phenomena] are those who manifest nirvāṇa in the very lifetime in which they have seen reality [on the path of seeing], just like one of the supreme pair.[724]

d) [Those who change state after being born have already gone through] assuming a succession of births as noble ones. [In these births, they can be] endowed with [psychophysical] supports [within any one among] all three realms. Those who change state after being born in the desire realm do not progress to other realms.[725]

e) [Those who witness with the body] are those nonreturners who have attained the meditative absorption of cessation[726] and do not regress from it because their consciousness has ceased within the body.[727]

4) (a) Approaching [arhats] are all those who abide in [any one of] the uninterrupted paths of relinquishing the first [degree] of the afflictions of the first dhyāna up through relinquishing the ninth [degree of the] afflictions [of the Peak of] Existence. The uninterrupted path of relinquishing this [ninth degree] is called "vajralike samādhi."[728] (b) Abiders in this fruition {28a} are those in whom, simultaneously with attaining the analytical cessation that terminates the ninth [degree of the] afflictions [of the Peak of] Existence, the path of liberation that is the wisdom of knowing the termination [of contamination] arises. If [these abiders] are of the immovable type, the wisdom of knowing that [contamination will] not arise [again] arises too. In general, there are six [types of] arhats—(1) those who have the feature of regressing [from their state]; (2) those who have the feature of killing themselves; (3) those who have the feature of guarding; (4) those who have the feature of not being shaken from abiding; (5) those who have the fortune to realize; and (6) those who have the feature of being immovable.[729] [Note that] these types exist not only among nonlearners, but also among learners.[730]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.2. The fruitions to be attained

This has three parts:

1) Nature
2) Classification
3) Manner of attainment

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.2.1. Nature

An uncontaminated uninterrupted path is called "the approach of virtuous effort,"[731] and being liberated from obscuration through the power of that is called a "fruition of virtuous effort."[732] Some may say, "But the two middle fruitions [of once-returners and nonreturners], when they are characterized by being relinquishments through the mundane path, are not suitable to be fruitions of virtuous effort because they are not fruitions of the uncontaminated path." There is no flaw because in the case of these two fruitions having been attained through [the previous cultivation of] the path of familiarization of childish beings, the [two] relinquishments that consist of the relinquishments of the factors to be relinquished through seeing and the factors to be relinquished through [such] cultivation are blended [into a single attainment of relinquishment] and [such persons] are then endowed with a conditioned uncontaminated attainment.[733]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.2.2. Classification

[The fruitions to be attained] are classified as twofold—the conditioned path of liberation and the unconditioned analytical cessation. When classified in detail, there are eighty-nine for each, that is, being liberated from and having terminated the eight factors to be relinquished through [the corresponding paths of liberation on the path of] seeing and the eighty-one [degrees of the] factors to be relinquished through [the paths of liberation of the] uncontaminated [path of] familiarization. These {28b} represent [a classification] in terms of gauging the possibility of such fruitions, whereas the fruitions of virtuous effort in which five causes are complete are definite as the four [fruitions] of stream-enterer and so on.[734]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.1.2.3. Manner of attainment

You may wonder through which paths these four fruitions of virtuous effort are attained. The first and the last fruitions [(stream-enterer and arhat)] are solely attained through the supramundane path because the factors to be relinquished through seeing [cannot be relinquished] through the path of familiarization and the afflictions pertaining to [the Peak of] Existence cannot be relinquished through the path of familiarization of childish beings. As for the two middle fruitions, in the case of being attained through the

path of seeing [alone preceding them], they are attained through the supramundane path [of familiarization], and when they are attained through [the path of seeing being preceded by a mundane] path of familiarization, they are attained through both [a mundane and a supramundane path]. [In other words,] the first fruition [is attained] through the path of seeing. As for the two middle ones, in the case of gradualists, they are attained through the [supramundane] path of familiarization and, in the case of those who have previously become free from attachment, through the path of seeing [preceded by a mundane path of familiarization]. Arhathood is attained through the [supramundane] path of familiarization. One cannot regress from the fruitions attained through the supramundane path, but it is possible to regress from contaminated attainments.

As for the mental supports of these fruitions, the first two are attained through the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna and [the fruition of] a nonreturner [is attained] through [any one of] the actual four dhyānas, but they do not rely on [any meditative absorptions of] the formless realm. The [latter] are not suitable as remedies since they are [too] distant from the desire realm in their four degrees. Arhathood is attained through relying on any one of the nine uncontaminated grounds.[735] As for the physical support, the first three fruitions have [physical] supports within the desire realm, while the fourth one can have [any physical] support within all three realms.[736]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.2. The actual saṃgha that is to be illustrated

This has three parts:

1) Scope of the presentation
2) Classification
3) Boundary lines

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.2.1. Scope of the presentation

The twenty [kinds of] saṃgha in the context [of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*] here {29a} refer solely to the assembly of irreversible learning bodhisattvas,[737] being taught through [using] the names of the saṃghas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by virtue of their being similar in certain respects, such as [assuming] physical supports [that are suitable to perform the activities of relinquishment and realization] and ways of taking birth. These [twenty kinds of bodhisattvas] are [only] presented from the perspective of the manner in which [specific] factors to be relinquished (the conceptions that are the cognitive obscurations)[738] are relinquished. For, otherwise, noble bodhisattvas would have already relinquished all afflictive obscurations below the eighth bhūmi and even the noble bodhisattvas with a prior realization of the arhathood of the hīnayāna would have to be included and presented in this definite number of twenty [kinds of saṃgha].[739]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.2.2. Classification

Those of duller and sharper faculties,
Those who attain through confidence and seeing, those from family to family,
Those with a single interval, in the intermediate [state], after being born,
With effort, without effort, who progress to Akaniṣṭha, [I.23]

Three leapers, those who progress to the highest peak of existence,
Those who overcame attachment to form,
[Attain] peace amidst visible phenomena, are a bodily witness,
And the rhinos—these are twenty.[740] [I.24]

In the [prajñāpāramitā] sūtras, the saṃgha of bodhisattvas who abide on the paths of the noble ones of the mahāyāna is said to be [classified as] forty-five, twenty-five,[741] and so on. Venerable [Maitreya] summarized these [classifications] into twenty and their subdivisions are

1) Those who bear the names of śrāvakas
2) Those who bear the name "pratyekabuddha"

1) The first ones are fourfold:
   a) Stream-enterers
   b) Once-returners
   c) Nonreturners
   d) Arhats

1a) [Stream-enterers] are twofold:
   1aa) Approachers
   1ab) Abiders

1aa) The [bodhisattvas] who abide in any one of the first fifteen moments of the path of seeing of the mahāyāna are the two approaching stream-enterers—(1)[742] **those of duller** faculties who pursue by means of faith **and** (2) those of **sharper faculties** who pursue by means of the dharma. The sūtras say:

> Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas who are absorbed in this yoga of prajñāpāramitā, after having died in and transited from this buddha realm . . .[743]

1ab) [Abiders are twofold—] mere ones and special ones. The first ones are (3) the mere abiders in the fruition of a stream-enterer who abide in the

sixteenth [moment of the path of seeing]—the subsequent cognition of [the reality of] the path. (4) The second ones are the abiders in the fruition of a stream-enterer who are born **from family to family**. After having relinquished the third or fourth cognitive obscurations with regard to the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization, {29b} they either take two rebirths among the gods of the desire realm or two rebirths among humans as they wish. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are also those bodhisattva mahāsattvas . . . who are born like a big sāla tree in a royal family, like a big sāla tree in a brahman family, or like a big sāla tree in a householder's family . . . Also, Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas are born as the same kind as the gods who belong to the family of the four great kings . . . and are born as the same kind as the gods who have power over others' emanations.

1b) Once-returners are [threefold]:
- 1ba) Approachers
- 1bb) Mere abiders in the fruition
- 1bc) Special abiders in the fruition

1ba) [The approachers] are (5) either **those who** are convinced **through confidence** or those who **attain** through **seeing** (which are counted as one here). After having relinquished the fifth cognitive obscuration contained in the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization, they are in the process of relinquishing the sixth one. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are also those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who are not skilled in means . . . whose faculties are dull and not sharp.[744]

1bb) Mere abiders in the fruition of a once-returner are (6) those immediately after having attained the path of liberation after having relinquished the [sixth cognitive obscuration of the desire realm].

1bc) [Special abiders] are (7) those abiders in the fruition of a once-returner who are [separated by] **a single interval** of one lifetime. They take on a single rebirth in the desire realm as they wish, have relinquished the seventh and eighth cognitive obscurations with regard to the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization, and are engaged in relinquishing the ninth one. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas who have attained the four dhyānas up through attaining the eighteen unique buddhadharmas

{30a} . . . You should know that such bodhisattvas are [only] separated by a single lifetime.

1c) Nonreturners are twofold:
1ca) Approachers
1cb) Abiders

1ca) These are (8) the approaching nonreturners of duller and sharper faculties (counted as one) who are in the process of relinquishing the ninth cognitive obscuration with regard to the desire realm. [The reference in] the sūtras is just as in the case of the approaching once-returners above.

1cb) [Abiding nonreturners are as follows.]

(9) Those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state are the ones who demonstrate the manner of passing into nirvāṇa during the intermediate state before being born in the form realm and right after having relinquished the ninth cognitive obscuration of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas . . . will be born among the gods of Brahmakāyika up through the gods of Akaniṣṭha and, having become unsurpassable completely perfect buddhas there . . .

(10) Those who pass into nirvāṇa after being being born do so during the first half of their lifetime **after being born** in the form realm. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas, through first generating bodhicitta, will awaken to unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment . . .

(11) Others—those who pass into nirvāṇa **with effort**—do so through great diligence at the end of their lifetime [in the form realm] as above. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas who engage in the six pāramitās . . . never say meaningless words.

(12) Those who pass into nirvāṇa **without** the **effort** of great diligence do so in the middle of their lifetime as above.[745] [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who, through first generating bodhicitta, {30b} go beyond the flawlessness of

> bodhisattvas, dwell on the irreversible bhūmi, and newly establish all the buddhadharmas.

Bodhisattvas who abide in the fruition of a nonreturner and progress to Akaniṣṭha through having attained the alternating cultivation of dhyāna are classified as follows. (13) Nonreturners who are leapers have relinquished the ninth cognitive obscuration of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization and are in the process of relinquishing the cognitive obscurations with regard to the form realm to be relinquished through familiarization. In their next life, they are born in Brahmakāyika, and in the next one after that, in Akaniṣṭha. Based on the [psychophysical] support of the [latter], they demonstrate the manner of passing into nirvāṇa. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who practiced the four dhyānas, fell away from [the higher three], and thus are born among the gods of Brahmakāyika through practicing [only] the first dhyāna. Having practiced the dhyānas there, they are reborn in Akaniṣṭha and will then awaken in a completely perfect way to unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment in various buddha realms.

(14) Others—the half-leapers—are just as above. However, [after having been born in] Brahmakāyika in their next [life], [they are reborn] in any one of the three lower pure abodes in the next [life] after that. In the following [life], they are reborn in Akaniṣṭha, where they demonstrate the manner of passing into nirvāṇa. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who are born in the pure abodes after they died in and transited from the Brahma world. Through crossing over one or two of these pure abodes, they are born in Akaniṣṭha and will then awaken to unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment in various buddha realms.

(15) Yet others—those who die in, and transit through, all abodes—are [also] just as above. However, they progressively take rebirth in [all] types of the abodes of the form realm in their next lives {31a} and [finally] demonstrate the manner of passing into nirvāṇa in the [psychophysical] support of [a birth in] Akaniṣṭha. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who manifest their own body like the body of a tathāgata and thus train in the

abode of Tuṣita. They are born among the gods of Brahmakāyika up through the gods of Akaniṣṭha. Since they are skilled in means, they teach the dharma [even] to hell beings . . . and will then awaken in a completely perfect way . . .

(16) Among such nonreturners, there are **those who progress to the highest peak of existence**, that is, **those who overcame attachment to the form** realm. [The sūtras say:]

Śāriputra, there are those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who attained the dhyānas and the formless absorptions and take birth from the āyatana of Infinite Space up through the Peak of Existence. Then, they are born in various buddha realms.[746]

(17) [There are also] those who attain **peace amidst phenomena** in the very lifetime that they **viewed** reality [on the path of seeing]. [The sūtras say:]

Śāriputra, while they engage in the six pāramitās, the bodies of some bodhisattva mahāsattvas are ornamented with the thirty-two marks of a great being and they are endowed with completely pure and unsurpassable power.

(18) Those who **are a bodily witness** witness the meditative absorption of cessation with their body. [The sūtras say:]

Śāriputra, bodhisattva mahāsattvas who engage in prajñāpāramitā and attain the four dhyānas . . . then absorb themselves in the first dhyāna. {31b} When they rise from that, they absorb themselves in the meditative absorption of cessation. Having risen from that, they absorb themselves in the second dhyāna.

1d) Arhats [here only refer to] (19) approaching arhats[747] who are in the process of relinquishing the ninth cognitive obscuration with regard to the Peak of Existence to be relinquished through familiarization. [The sūtras say:]

They shine the buddhadharma on sentient beings and awaken to unsurpassable enlightenment themselves . . .

2) Those who bear the name "pratyekabuddha" are (20) those bodhisattvas who are **rhinolike** pratyekabuddhas. [Outwardly acting like pratyekabuddhas,] they manifest nirvāṇa in a realm without śrāvakas and buddhas and

teach the dharma not through words, but by way of physical expressions.[748] [Thus,] they are twenty. [The sūtras say:]

> Śāriputra, there are also those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who awaken to enlightenment in a completely perfect way in a worldly realm in which no buddhas reside and in which there are no śrāvakas either.

This manner of counting twenty [kinds of saṃgha of noble bodhisattvas] is based on the intention of master Haribhadra. Though there are many other assertions in terms of the manner of counting these [twenty kinds of saṃgha], I will not write them down here.[749]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.2.2.3. Boundary lines

The first two [of the above bodhisattvas] refer to the first bhūmi; the two who are born from family to family, to the second, third, fourth, and fifth bhūmis; the approachers to the fruition of a once-returner, to the sixth bhūmi; [the mere abiding once-returners and the special abiders who are only separated by] a single interval of one lifetime, to the seventh bhūmi; the approaching nonreturners, to the eighth and ninth bhūmis; all abiders in the fruition of a nonreturner, to the tenth bhūmi; approaching arhats and those who are rhinolike, to the uninterrupted path of the tenth bhūmi. These represent the intention of noble [Maitreya] as explained by Abhayākaragupta.[750]

You may wonder, "Why are the bodhisattvas who relinquish the factors to be relinquished simultaneously classified as gradualists in this context?" Some bodhisattvas {32a} who have the disposition of very dull faculties relinquish the cognitive obscurations with regard to the three realms in a gradual manner. Or [it could also be answered that,] in dependence on those to be guided, this [presentation] is adapted to the presentation of the śrāvakas. Therefore, it is without flaw.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2. The explanation of [the branches of] penetration[751] (the result of practicing the [instructions])

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.1. General topic

This has three parts:

1) Supports
2) Nature
3) Analysis of the type of mind

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.1.1. Supports

The physical support is the same as the support in which the path of seeing [can] arise, [that is, only a human or divine body within the desire realm]. As for the mental support, according to the hīnayāna one [can] rely solely on the six grounds of dhyāna. In the mahāyāna system, since bodhisattvas are skilled in means, the path of preparation can arise in a fully complete manner even by relying on a mind within the desire realm.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2. Nature

This has three parts:

1) Definition
2) Definiendum
3) Divisions

1) [The definition of the path of preparation is] "the clear realization of reality that arises from [mundane] meditation before the path of seeing arises."[752]

2) [It is called "the path of preparation" because] it directly prepares one for [and eventually joins one with] the path of the noble ones and serves as its cause.[753]

3) When divided in terms of time, it is threefold—for the lesser branches of penetration, it is uncertain in which lifetime the path of seeing will arise; for the medium ones, merely the time [of a future lifetime] is certain; and for the great ones, it is certain that the path of seeing will arise in this very lifetime.

When divided in terms of nature, it is fourfold:

a) heat
b) peak
c) poised readiness
d) the supreme dharma

As for identifying each one of these, (a) heat is the samādhi in which one, through the force of having trained through studying and reflecting on the path of accumulation,[754] attains a slight [degree] of the illumination of the prajñā about the lack of nature of something apprehended that is different from consciousness. (b) Peak is the samādhi of the particularly clear illumination [of the prajñā] about the nonexistence of the apprehended, [which arises] through making efforts in order to increase this illumination of phenomena. (c) Poised readiness is the samādhi in which the illumination of the wisdom that realizes the nonexistence of the apprehended is stable and in which the clear illumination [of the prajñā] about the lack of nature of an apprehender that is a substantially existent person {32b} arises. (d) The supreme dharma is the samādhi in which the clear illumination [of the prajñā] about the lack of nature of an apprehender that is an imputed phenomenon arises.[755] Each

one of these [four levels] has three [degrees] (lesser, medium, and great) in terms of differences in focal objects and aspects.[756] As for the reason for the fourfold division of the path of preparation in this way, it is divided by way of four different [stages] with regard to the distinctive feature of [being more distant from or closer to] realizing the actuality of the nature of phenomena to a slight degree, which serve to relinquish merely the manifest four conceptions [about apprehender and apprehended]. The way in which the path of preparation is abandoned[757] is as explained in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> Noble ones abandon this level by leaving it behind.
> Nonnoble ones [abandon it] through dying,
> And the first two also through regressing.[758]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.1.3. Analysis of the type of mind

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> False imagination; neither correct
> Nor false; nonimagination;
> And neither imagination nor nonimagination—
> This expresses all knowable objects.[759]

Accordingly, [the type of mind on the path of preparation] is the mundane wisdom that, to a slight degree, realizes the nature of phenomena and is not conception.[760]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2. Meaning of the text

This has two parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.1. Brief introduction

> **By virtue of focal objects, aspects,**
> **Causes, and being mentored,**
> **Based on being associated**
> **With the four conceptions in due order,** [I.25]
>
> **Compared to śrāvakas and rhinolike ones,**
> **A protecting bodhisattva's**
> **Lesser, medium, and great degrees**
> **Of heat and so on are more distinguished.**[761] [I.26]

After having obtained the instructions of the mahāyāna, [bodhisattvas] meditate well on their meaning through the six focuses,[762] the eleven mental engagements,[763] and the nine methods for settling the mind.[764] Through this, the branches of penetration, which are more distinguished than the paths of preparation of the lower yānas through [the following] five distinctive features, arise. Therefore, they are explained [next]. (1) The **objects to be focused** on [through the branches of penetration] are the four illusionlike realities. (2) [These branches] entail the [cognitive] aspects of not clinging to these [focal objects] and so forth. {33a} (3) They function as the **causes** for the realization of the [mahāyāna] path of seeing, in which [all] types of realization of all three yānas are complete. (4) They are embraced by **being mentored** internally and externally. (5) As for these [branches of penetration] **(heat and so on)** of **bodhisattvas** who are endowed with the activity of **protecting** beings, **in the due order** of their division in terms of their **degrees**, they are **based on**—in the manner of relinquishing them—**the** manifest congruently **associated four conceptions** about apprehender and apprehended that are the factors to be relinquished through the mahāyāna path of seeing. **By virtue** of these five factors, this path of preparation (which possesses the twelvefold subdivision of [each of its four levels] being **lesser, medium, and great) is more distinguished** when **compared to** the paths of preparation of śrāvakas and rhinolike pratyekabuddhas.[765]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2. Detailed explanation

This has three parts:

1) Explanation of the triad of focal object, aspect, and cause [in terms of the path of preparation]
2) Explanation of conceptions as its associated phenomena
3) Explanation of being mentored as the dominant condition

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1. Explanation of the triad of focal object, aspect, and cause in terms of the path of preparation

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.1. General topic

The Vaibhāṣikas assert that focal objects are objects in a general way (such as form), while aspects are particular features of these objects (such as blue). The Sautrāntikas hold that focal objects are the causes that cast aspects[766] [toward consciousness] and that aspects are what appear as these. The Mere Mentalists assert that focal object refers to the apprehended part [of consciousness] and that aspect means the apprehending part. [In this context]

here, "focal objects" must be explained as being the objects [to be realized] and "aspects" as being the modes of apprehension through which the mind realizes these objects.[767] Therefore, the path of preparation of the hīnayāna [still entails] clinging to characteristics and is produced in this manner as a remedy for merely the clinging to personal identity. On its two [levels of] heat and peak and on the lesser [level of] poised readiness, through focusing on the four realities with regard to the desire realm and the higher realms, {33b} one meditates on their sixteen aspects (such as impermanence) with regard to each [(the desire realm and the two higher realms taken together)], which totals thirty-two [aspects]. On the level of medium poised readiness, from among these thirty-two aspects, first, one drops [meditating on] the four aspects of the reality of the path with regard to the higher realms, thus [only meditating on] twenty-eight. Then, by dropping the [same] four with regard to the desire realm, [one only meditates on] twenty-four. Through subtracting [the respective aspects] of the other [three] realities in the same manner, [one progressively meditates on] twenty, sixteen, twelve, eight, and finally [only] on the four aspects of the reality of suffering with regard to the desire realm. Next, one meditates two times on a single aspect of this. Up to this point, this makes eighty-nine moments. As for great poised readiness, the single time of mentally engaging in this very aspect constitutes the single moment [of this level]. As for the supreme dharma, its focal object and aspect likewise constitute a single moment.[768] The nature of [the four levels of] the path of preparation is the prajñā that is based on dhyāna [as opposed to the prajñā resulting from study and reflection]. However, in terms of [the set of] what is associated with [such prajñā], imperceptible form exists [in that set] too. Therefore, by including their retinues, [each one of these levels] is asserted to consist of the five skandhas.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2. Meaning of the text

This has four parts, which are the explanations of the focal object and aspects of each one of the following:

1) Heat—the realization, through focusing on the four realities, that the apprehended in terms of afflicted phenomena is without nature
2) Peak—the realization that the apprehended in terms of purified phenomena (the fruition) is without nature
3) Poised readiness—the realization that the apprehender in the sense of a substantially existent person is without nature
4) The supreme dharma—the realization that the apprehender in the sense of an imputedly existent individual is without nature

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.1. Heat—the realization, through focusing on the four realities, that the apprehended in terms of afflicted phenomena is without nature

> **The focal objects are impermanence and so on,**
> **Which are the substrates of the realities.**
> **Their aspects are to refrain from clinging and so on,**
> **The cause for attaining all three yānas.** [I.27]
>
> **[The further ones] are the rising and falling of form and so on,**
> **Nonabiding, abiding, imputations, and being inexpressible.**
> [I.28ab]

a) **The focal objects** of lesser heat **are** merely **impermanence and so on, which are the substrates of the** four **realities**, whose subdivisions they are. **Their aspects are** the peaceful [states of mind] of **refraining from** [entertaining any] reference points and characteristics, that is, **clinging and so on.**[769] The sūtras say:

> Here, when bodhisattva mahāsattvas engage in the mother, they cling to form being impermanent . . .[770] {34a}

This functions as **the cause for attaining** the path of seeing, in which the qualities of **all three yānas** are complete.[771] The sūtras say:

> . . . all three yānas are taught in detail in prajñāpāramitā.[772]

b) The focal object of medium heat is that phenomena (**form and so on**) **are** empty **of rising** (affirming) **and falling** (negating).[773] [The sūtras say:]

> There is no rising and falling of form . . . they are unobservable.[774]

The aspect is **nonabiding**, which means that [form and such] do not abide as anything other than names. [The sūtras say:]

> . . . names do not abide.

c) The focal object of great heat is that all the ways of **abiding**[775] of phenomena (such as form) and also the conventional terms through which they are **imputed** as such [phenomena] are not established [ultimately].[776] [The sūtras say:]

> . . . because they are merely conventional terms for and imputations as phenomena.

The aspect is that [phenomena] are **inexpressible** because names are not observable and cannot be included under virtue, nonvirtue, and so on. [The sūtras say:]

> For example, what is called "dream" cannot be expressed by anything whatsoever.

These three [levels of] lesser, medium, and great [heat] are called "heat" because they portend the arising of the fire of the nonconceptual wisdom of the path of seeing.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.2. Peak—the realization that the apprehended in terms of purified phenomena (the fruition) is without nature

> **Not abiding in form and so on**
> **Is their lack of nature by virtue of being such.** [I.28cd]
>
> **These two having a common nature,**
> **There is no abiding in their being impermanent and such.**
> **Their being empty of being that**
> **Is their common nature.** [I.29]
>
> **There is no grasping at phenomena.**
> **Not seeing the characteristics of these,**
> **Prajñā investigates**
> **In terms of all being unobservable.** [I.30]

a) The focal object of lesser peak is that [all phenomena] (**form and so on**), which do **not abide** ultimately, cannot be made to abide. Ultimately, their own-being **in such** [a way—being empty of any own-being—] **is their lack of nature.**[777] [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas who engage in the mother should not abide in form . . .[778]

The aspect is that **these two**—the nature of phenomena and the bearers of this nature—**have a common nature.** {34b} Form and so on abide as emptiness and emptiness appears as form and so on. Therefore, **there is no abiding** of any clinging to **them as being impermanent and such.**[779] [The sūtras say:]

> Bhagavan, impermanent form is empty of being impermanent form.[780]

b) The focal object of medium peak is **their** (what is impermanent, emptiness, and so on) **being empty of** their respective own-being. Therefore, as for what is impermanent and so on, emptiness **is their common nature.**[781] [The sūtras say:]

> In phenomena that are empty of their own specific characteristics,
> no phenomenon whatsoever is apprehended.[782]

The aspect is that **there is no grasping at** any nature or distinctive features of **phenomena.** [The sūtras say:]

> Not grasping at and not rejecting phenomena, this is the mother.[783]

c) The focal object of great peak is **not seeing the characteristics of these** [seeming] phenomena. Therefore,[784] they are clearly present as the essence of the perfect [nature]. The *[Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] in Eight Thousand Lines* says:

> Not grasping . . .[785]

The aspect is to realize that, when **prajñā investigates** suchness, **all** aspects **are unobservable.** [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas should investigate what prajñāpāramitā is, whose prajñāpāramitā she is, how she is so, and why she is called " prajñāpāramitā."[786]

Thus, these three [levels] of lesser, medium, and great [peak] are called "peak" because they are the peak on which the stream of those roots of virtue that can be shaken [through adverse conditions] is discontinued. This means that, once this [peak] is attained, it is impossible for the roots of virtue to become extinguished.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.3. Poised readiness—the realization that the apprehender in the sense of a substantially existent person is without nature

> **Form and so on are without nature,**
> **Their nature being their nonbeing.**
> **They are without arising and without final deliverance,**
> **Are purity, and without characteristics.** [I.31]

Not dwelling on their characteristics,
There is no aspiration and no discrimination. [I.32ab]

a) The focal object of lesser poised readiness is that **form and so on are without a nature** of their own.[787] [The sūtras say:]

Form {35a} is devoid of the nature of form.[788]

The aspect is to apprehend **their nonbeing** as **being the nature** of form and so on.[789] [The sūtras say:]

The nature of form is nonbeing.

b) The focal object of medium poised readiness is that **they** (form and so on) **are without arising** (as the nature of saṃsāra) **and without** nonarising (**final deliverance** as the nature of nirvāṇa).[790] [The sūtras say:]

Form is empty of the nature of form. In it, neither arising nor deliverance are observable.

The aspect is that the stains of the three doors [of body, speech, and mind] become pure through the power of realizing the **purity** of the nature of phenomena, which is [the explanation] in terms of the cause [for these stains becoming pure.[791] The sūtras say:]

Bodhisattvas attain the perfect purity of body . . .

c) The focal object of great poised readiness is that these [instances of] suchness appear **without characteristics** of reference points.[792] [The sūtras say:]

When bodhisattvas engage in form, they engage in characteristics.[793]

The aspect means **not dwelling on the characteristics** of form and so on, which results in the [perceptional] mode of **there being no aspiration** to mentally engage [in them] **and no discrimination** of apprehender and apprehended.[794] [The sūtras say:]

Bodhisattvas do not dwell on form.

Thus, these three [levels of] lesser, medium, and great "poised readiness" are so called because once they are attained, one is not helplessly reborn in the

unpleasant realms[795] and is endowed with poised readiness for the actuality of nonarising.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.4. The supreme dharma—the realization that the apprehender in the sense of an imputedly existent individual is without nature

> **Samādhi, its function,**
> **Prophecy, termination of conceit,** [I.32cd]
>
> **The common nature of the three,**
> **And the nonconceptuality of samādhi—** [I.33ab]

a) The focal object of the lesser supreme dharma is the **samādhis** of [all phenomena] nonarising, heroic stride, and so on,[796] through which the nature of form and so on is realized. [The sūtras say:]

> This samādhi of bodhisattvas is called "the nonarising of all phenomena" . . .[797]

The aspect is {35b} [the fact of] swiftly becoming enlightened in a completely perfect way through the power of the **function** of samādhi, which is [the explanation] in terms of the fruition.[798] [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas who engage in this samādhi will swiftly awaken to unsurpassable enlightenment.

b) The focal object of the medium supreme dharma is the samādhi that approximately concords with the **prophecies** by the buddhas.[799] [The sūtras say:]

> The past tathāgatas have prophesied that bodhisattva mahāsattvas who dwell in this samādhi [will attain] perfect enlightenment.

The aspect is the **termination of conceit** when resting in the equipoise of the samādhi of realizing the nature of phenomena.[800] [The sūtras say:]

> Those who rest in such meditative equipoise are without any conceit, thinking, "I rest in meditative equipoise," "I shall rest in meditative equipoise," or "I will rest in meditative equipoise."

c) The focal object of the great supreme dharma is **the common nature of the following three**—mother prajñāpāramitā, the means of meditative equipoise, and the bodhisattva as the person on this level—being unseen. [The sūtras say:]

> The very mother is samādhi. The very samādhi is the bodhisattva.
> The very bodhisattva is the samādhi.[801]

The aspect is **the nonconceptuality of samādhi.**[802] [The sūtras say:]

> Since all phenomena do not exist, there are no conceptions. In this way, bodhisattvas do not have conceptions about these samādhis.

Thus, these three [levels] of lesser, medium, and great "supreme dharma" are so called because they are the supreme among mundane dharmas by virtue of their capacity to induce the uncontaminated path right after them.[803]

> **These are the lesser, medium, and great degrees**
> **Of the factors conducive to penetration.** [I.33cd]

In this order, {36a} each one of the four **factors conducive to penetration**, during which [the degrees of] focusing on the four realities increase, has three [degrees]—**lesser, medium, and great**—in terms of the manner in which [the focusing on each level] arises first, in the middle, and at the end.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2. Explanation of conceptions as the associated phenomena [of the path of preparation]

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.1. General topic

This has two parts:

1) General identification of conception
2) The particular meaning of each [kind of conception] as taught in this text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. General identification of conception

[Conception] is what obscures the disposition for nirvāṇa (the ālaya-wisdom). It has the nature of being the consciousness that entails the dualistic appearances of apprehender and apprehended. This possesses [many] names, such as ālaya-consciousness, impure other-dependent [nature], nonafflicted

ignorance, sentient being, and false imagination.[804] Just as dreams arise from being asleep, certain coarse [forms of] apprehender and apprehended [arise] from this [conception or false imagination and] are seized as a self by the afflicted mind. Through this, afflictions (such as attachment) [arise], which in turn lead to accumulating various karmas. Thus, we experience suffering. [The conceptions that] apprehend by conflating terms and their referents cling to certain more subtle [forms of apprehender and apprehended] as being different in substance, same in substance, and so on. By virtue of that, the conceptions in terms of the three spheres arise and one falls into [the nirvāṇa of personal] peace. In this way, cloudlike adventitious stains obscure spacelike suchness.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. The particular meaning of each kind of conception as taught in this text

This has two parts:

1) The meanings of apprehender and apprehended
2) Divisions in terms of their referent objects

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.1. The meanings of apprehender and apprehended

[The conceptions] that are taught here [in the AA] are predominantly the conceptions that apprehend [by conflating] terms and their referents. For they are presented in terms of the clinging to real [existence] that fixates on the nonexistent yet appearing bases onto which a self is imputed. Therefore, here, [the clinging to] a self is presented as the conceptions about the apprehender, and [the clinging to] what is "mine," as the conceptions about the apprehended, but {36b} [these conceptions] do not refer to matter and awareness as being apprehender and apprehended, respectively.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.2. Divisions in terms of their referent objects

The factors to be relinquished in this context of the path of preparation are [the conceptions about the apprehended that consist of] adopting and rejecting purified and afflicted phenomena, respectively, and [the conceptions about the apprehender that consist of] clinging to the skandhas and so on (the entities that are regarded as a person) as either being substantially or imputedly [existent]. The factors to be relinquished through the path of seeing are [the conceptions about the apprehended that consist of] adopting and rejecting the path of bodhisattvas and inferior paths, respectively, and [the conceptions about the apprehender that consist of] clinging to consciousness (the basis that is regarded as phenomena) as either being substantially or imputedly [existent]. The factors to be relinquished through the path of familiarization are solely [the conceptions of] clinging to merely imputed bases onto which [the

notions of certain] phenomena are imputed. [On each one of those paths,] the mental states[805] that cling to their respective [factors to be relinquished] are relinquished. [In the case of] the path of preparation, [this means that they are] relinquished [in the sense of suppressing them] through merely mentally engaging in aspiring [for true reality]. The complete eradication of [all] seeds [of the factors to be relinquished] through mentally engaging in true reality [in a direct manner takes place] from the path of seeing onward.[806]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2. Meaning of the text

This has two parts:

1) Explanation of the conceptions about the apprehended
2) Explanation of the conceptions about the apprehender

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. Explanation of the conceptions about the apprehended

This has two parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Brief introduction

> **The conceptions about the apprehended are twofold**
> **In terms of entities and their remedies,**
> **Each of which is subdivided into nine**
> **Based on ignorance, skandhas, and so on.** [I.34]

In terms of the division into the **entities** that are apprehended (impure afflicted phenomena) **and their remedies** (purified phenomena), **the conceptions about the apprehended,** which mentally engage in [these objects] by focusing on them [as being what are to be rejected and adopted, respectively], **are** also **twofold. Each of** these two [sets of] conceptions about the apprehended **is subdivided into nine based on** focusing on **ignorance** (or unawareness) and so on in the first [set] and focusing on the purified **skandhas and so on** in the latter [set].

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Detailed explanation

This has two parts:

A) There are nine [kinds of] conceptions about the apprehended that have afflicted phenomena as their supports or objects because they cling to nine objects by focusing on them and thinking, "Since these are afflicted phenomena, they are to be rejected." These nine objects are

1) ignorant unawareness about karma (cause and result) and true reality,[807] [as expressed in] the sūtras: {37a}

These phenomena do not exist in the ways that ordinary childish beings cling to them.[808]

2) the skandhas, such as form, that are produced through the karma motivated by this [ignorance]:

Form does not exist because it is the emptiness of the internal.

3) clinging to these [skandhas] as a self and what is "mine":

After having imputed these onto nonexistent phenomena, they cling to name and form.[809]

4) regarding these [skandhas] as either permanent or becoming extinct:

They conceive of the two extremes, which do not exist.

5) through the power of this, not knowing the faults and qualities of afflicted and purified phenomena, respectively:

They neither see nor understand that form is afflicted or that form is purified.

6) by virtue of not understanding this, not abiding on the path of the noble ones:

They do not abide in the pāramitā of generosity and so on.

7) through deviating from the path in this way, observing phenomena in a mistaken way:

Bodhisattvas proceed to the knowledge of all aspects by way of not observing it.

8) attachment to the aspect of "self"[810] and aversion toward the aspect of "others":

Bodhisattvas do not observe a self because it is utterly pure.

9) the causes that produce the pure phenomena of nirvāṇa and so on (that is, the contaminated virtuous karmas [that cause the attainment of higher realms within saṃsāra]):

> Purity is what does not arise, does not originate, and is not formed.

Among these [nine] subdivisions, the first one is ignorance; the third one refers to the views about a real personality; and the fourth one consists of the views about extremes. Therefore, they are the origin [of suffering] that consists of the afflictions. {37b} The second one is the origin [of suffering] that is birth, thus being the nature of affliction. As respectively appropriate, the remaining ones pertain to the shortcomings or the nature of affliction.

B) There are nine conceptions about the apprehended that have purified phenomena as their objects because they cling to nine objects by focusing on them and thinking, "Since these are purified phenomena, they are to be adopted." These nine objects are

1) the purified skandhas, [as expressed in] the sūtras:

> Those not skilled in means conceive of and cling to form and so on . . .

2) the āyatanas as the gates of the arising of purified phenomena:

> . . . conceive of the eyes and so on . . .

3) the disposition[811] as the cause of purified phenomena:

> . . . conceive of the dhātus of the eyes, form, and the eye consciousness . . .

4) the progressive order of the arising of the dependent origination of purified phenomena:

> . . . conceive of ignorance . . .

5) emptiness free from reference points:[812]

> . . . conceive of the emptiness of the internal . . . the emptiness of the nature of nonentities . . .

6) the six pāramitās as the causes for the two welfares [of oneself and others] since emptiness as a mere nonexistence is not suitable as their cause:

> . . . conceive of six pāramitās . . .

7) the path of seeing, which has the character of the sixteen [moments of] cognition and readiness:

> . . . conceive of the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment . . .

8) the path of familiarization, whose nature consists of the dhyānas and form[less absorptions]:

> . . . conceive of the dhyānas . . . formless absorptions . . .

9) the path of nonlearning by virtue of having fully completed the trainings:

> . . . conceive of the ten powers . . . the knowledge of all aspects . . .

In due order, the first six of these [subdivisons] refer to the entities, the conditions, the cause, the dependent origination, the focal object, and the conducts of purified phenomena, {38a} while the last three refer to their divisions.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Explanation of the conceptions about the apprehender
This has two parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. Brief introduction

> **Likewise, those about the apprehender are asserted as twofold,**
> **Based on substance and imputation**
> **In terms of the nature of an independent self and so on,**
> **And what is based on the skandhas and so on.** [I.35]

There are two [kinds of] objects that are apprehended [here]—the bases onto which a person is imputed are apprehended as being either **substantially** established or **imputedly** existent. Therefore, **based on** these [two types of objects], **the** conceptions **about the apprehender** that mentally engage them **are also asserted as twofold.** The first one is [divided] **in terms of** what has a mental **nature** ([such as] apprehending **an independent self**) **and** the second one is divided in terms of **what is based on the skandhas and so on.** Thus, just **like** with the conceptions about the apprehended, there are nine [subdivisions] each here too.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Detailed explanation

A) There are nine [kinds of] the conceptions whose objects are substantially existent phenomena that are the bases for imputing a person onto them because there are nine objects to which [these conceptions] cling by focusing on [certain] substances that represent mere phenomena. These nine are

1) apprehending the self as being independent, that is, not dependent on any other apprehender of objects, [as expressed in] the sūtras:

> Bodhisattvas do not observe a self . . . and do not observe a seer.

2) apprehending it as something singular without a companion:

> . . . do not observe form . . .

3) apprehending it as the cause of consciousness:

> . . . do not observe the eyes . . .

4) apprehending it as the watcher and the knower:

> . . . do not observe the eyes, form, the eye-consciousness . . .

5) apprehending it as the support of afflicted phenomena:

> . . . do not observe dependent origination . . .

6) apprehending it as the support of the mundane path—that which makes one free from desire for inferior levels: {38b}

> . . . do not observe the first dhyāna . . .

7) apprehending it as the support of the path of seeing:

> . . . do not observe the realities of the noble ones . . .

8) apprehending it as the support of the uncontaminated path of familiarization:

> . . . do not observe the eight liberations and the nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding . . .[813]

9) apprehending it as the support of the path of nonlearning—that in which the welfare of oneself and others has been accomplished:

> . . . do not observe the ten powers . . . and the knowledge of all aspects.

The first four of these subdivisions refer to being mistaken about skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, thus conceiving them as having the characteristics of a self. The remaining ones are conceptions that are connected to such a self.

B) There are nine [kinds of] the conceptions whose objects are imputedly existent bases for imputing an individual onto them because [these conceptions] focus on nine objects and cling to them as mere imputations. These nine objects are

1) apprehending the five skandhas (such as form) as mere imputations[814] ([the words] "apprehending as mere imputations" apply to the following [entries] as well), [as expressed in] the sūtras:

> Subhūti, do you think that form is one thing and an illusion another?

2) the āyatanas, such as the eyes:

> Are the eyes one thing and . . .?

3) the eighteen dhātus:

> Are the eyes, form, and the eye consciousness one thing and . . .?

4) the twelve [links of] dependent origination, such as ignorance:

> Is dependent origination one thing and illusion another?

5) the thirty-seven purified phenomena, such as confidence:

> Are the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment one thing and . . .?

6) the path of seeing:

> Are emptiness, {39a} signlessness, and wishlessness one thing and . . .?

7) the path of familiarization:

> Are the dhyānas and the formless meditative absorptions one thing and . . .?

8) the special paths[815] of realizing emptiness, which are superior to the hīnayāna [paths]:

> Are all emptinesses one thing and an illusion another?

9) the path of nonlearning:

> Are the ten powers . . . and enlightenment one thing and . . .?

The first four of these subdivisions refer to the mere imputations that are produced by the illusions of karma, and the remaining ones, to those [that are produced] by the illusions of wisdom.[816]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.3. Explanation of being mentored as the dominant condition

The path of preparation is characterized through its specific features of the triad of focal object, aspect, and cause as well as the conceptions that are the phenomena associated with it. Since its arising depends on being mentored, the spiritual friend—the mentor with three features—is explained in three parts.

1) The feature of skill in means

> **The mind not being intimidated and such,** [I.36a]

By virtue of themselves not being separated from mentally engaging in the knowledge of all aspects, [bodhisattvas] are skilled in the means to make **the minds** of others to be guided **not being intimidated** by the actuality of profound emptiness **and so on** (that is, not being afraid and not being terrified of it). The sūtras say:

> Bodhisattvas who thus engage in the mother will not become cowed, will not be afraid, and will not be terrified.[817]

2) The feature of teaching the dharma

> **Those who teach the lack of nature and so on,** [I.36b]

This refers to **those who**, in precise accordance with the thinking of those to be guided, **teach** that all phenomena **lack the nature** of being established as [any kind of] identity **and so on** (["and so on"] refers to the six pāramitās, the generation of bodhicitta, dedication, and so forth). [The sūtras say]:

> The spiritual friends of bodhisattvas are those who teach them that "form and so on is impermanent and so forth" {39b} in the manner of not observing any of these. They do not dedicate all these roots of virtue to either the levels of śrāvakas or the levels of pratyekabuddhas, but solely to the knowledge of all aspects.

3) The feature of relinquishing adverse conditions

> **And abandoning the antagonistic factors of these**
> **Means being mentored in every way.** [I.36cd]

This refers to **abandoning the antagonistic factors of the** former one [among the two above features] (that is, [the characteristics of] those who, by virtue of possessing the mental engagements of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, are cowed, afraid, and terrified of the actuality of emptiness) and the antagonistic factors of the latter [feature] (that is, the characteristics of evil companions who engage in rejecting the texts, the path, and the fruition of the mahāyāna). [The sūtras say]:

> The evil companions of great bodhisattvas . . . separate them from prajñāpāramitā.

Bodhisattvas who are spiritual friends with these qualities are the **mentors** of those who have entered the path of the mahāyāna **in every way.**[818]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3. Explanation of practice's own nature

[This has four parts]:

1) The disposition as the foundation for the arising of practice
2) The focal object as the object of practice
3) The aim of practice
4) Practice's own nature

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1. The disposition as the foundation for the arising of practice

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.1. General topic

This has two parts:

1) The nature of the disposition
2) Its classifications

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.1.1. The nature of the disposition

The hīnayāna system explains that the nature of the disposition is the mental factor "detachment."[819] When classified, this is fourfold—the noble ones' dispositions of being content with just the poorest kinds of dharma robes, alms, and bedding, and the noble ones' disposition of being fond of relinquishment and meditation. The first three demonstrate [proper] discipline and the last one [their] karma. However, this is only an instruction on the mere signs that the disposition exists, but not a teaching on its actual specific characteristics.

In the tradition of the mahāyāna, {40a} the disposition is a substantial cause[820] whose result is suitable to arise. The cause of nirvāṇa rests on the ālaya-wisdom and the cause of saṃsāra rests on the ālaya-consciousness. As [the *Abhidharmasūtra*] says:

> The dhātu of beginningless time
> Is the matrix of all phenomena.

This [ālaya-]wisdom has many synonyms, such as suchness, sugata heart,[821] the unchanging perfect [nature], ultimate reality, unconditioned dharmadhātu, prajñāpāramitā, dharmakāya, the true nature of mind, the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, and uncontaminated seeds. It is the unity of lucidity and emptiness, the changeless and permanent genuine self.[822] Also that which serves as the foundation of practice in this context here—the naturally abiding disposition—is nothing but this. Thus, the *Vṛtti* says:

> That in which there is not the slightest formation is unconditioned. What is unconditioned is the disposition of the noble ones. By virtue of being equal to space, the disposition is indivisible. Since this disposition is the suchness of phenomena at all times, it is the single taste of phenomena. Therefore, it is permanent.[823]

You may wonder, "Did Nāgārjuna and his spiritual heirs not refute this ālaya in the Madhyamaka texts?" In these [texts], the clinging to the real existence of the ālaya is refuted, but its nature is not refuted—the aspect of wisdom is explained as emptiness and the aspect of consciousness is taught in the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* as follows:

Likewise, the ālaya-consciousness
Is not real but appears as if it were real.[824]

From the perspective of the [ālaya]'s own nature, it is endowed with twofold purity. The *Dharmadhātustava* declares:

At all times without afflictions,
Stainless through beginning, middle, end.[825]

Therefore, the statement "Sentient beings *have* the [buddha] heart that fully qualifies as such" is not suitable ultimately because sentient beings must be presented as the ālaya-consciousness, which is the aspect of being mistaken {40b} and has never been established right from the start. You may wonder, "So *are* sentient beings buddhas then?" That is not the case either because adventitious [stains] are certain to perish—it is impossible for them to be permanent. Nevertheless, from the perspective of convention, at the time of the ground, it is suitable to present merely the existence of one part of this Heart—its aspect of natural purity—in sentient beings, without it, however, being contained in, being mixed with, or being connected to the mind streams of these sentient beings.[826] The *Uttaratantra* says:

The dhātu of sentient beings is not connected
To the beginningless cocoons of afflictions—
The natural stainlessness of the mind
Is declared to be beginningless.[827]

In this context, the following statement applies: "Sentient beings are not the cause of buddhahood, but it is buddhahood itself that has become buddhahood." The position of the glorious venerable Rangjung [Dorje] agrees with this. In the section on the [buddha] heart in his autocommentary on *The [Profound] Inner Reality*, he says:

Not understanding these reasons, [others] explain that the fruition exists [already] right now, that the afflictions are not to be relinquished, that new remedial wisdom cannot be produced, and that natural purity is the partial aspect of nothing but a nonimplicative negation.[828] Such explanations are a far cry from the vajrayāna.[829]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.1.2. Its classifications

The main classification refers to the divisions [under (2)] in terms of the unfolding disposition.

1) [In general,] the disposition is twofold. The naturally abiding disposition is the suchness of the mind with stains, which is the beginningless foundation or nature of nirvāṇa and becomes the dharmakāya once it is free from stains. The unfolding disposition refers to the process of the stains of the [naturally abiding disposition] becoming exhausted, which serves as the cause for the rūpakāyas.

2) The five [divisions of the unfolding disposition]—the definite dispositions of the three yānas, the indefinite disposition, and the extinct[830] disposition—are stated in the *Laṅkāvatāra[sūtra]*. The first three refer to {41a} not going anywhere else than one's own specific path [of either the śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna, or mahāyāna] until one attains their respective [kinds of] nirvāṇa. This is stated in the *Vṛtti*:

> Since nothing but the dharmadhātu is the cause of all qualities of the noble ones, the foundation of practice is the naturally abiding disposition.[831]

And:

> All noble persons are distinguished by the unconditioned.[832]

Accordingly, by virtue of the single Heart that is to be realized being divided in terms of inferior, medium, and supreme ways of realization, it is presented as threefold. In this way, through realizing the identitylessness of persons, only a fraction of the dharmadhātu is realized. However, in terms of the definitive meaning, the nature of the disposition is nothing but the single dharmadhātu. Therefore, Mādhyamikas and Mere Mentalists agree in asserting only a single yāna and a single nirvāṇa as its fruition. To assert three yānas in terms of the expedient meaning is the system of the Mere Mentalists.

The indefinite disposition means to enter the paths of other yānas before one has completed one's own [present] path. Śrāvakas with an indefinite disposition who are ordinary beings and abide on [the stages of] heat and peak [of the path of preparation] can become [followers of] the mahāyāna and those on [the stage of] medium poised readiness [can still become] pratyekabuddhas. As for noble [śrāvakas], it is possible for once-returners and nonreturners to become pratyekabuddhas or buddhas by assuming rebirths in the desire [realm] through the power of aspiration prayers and emanation. As for pratyekabuddhas, the rhinolike ones are indefinite up through [the stage of] heat; the greater group practitioners, up through great poised readiness; and the lesser [group practitioners], up through the path of seeing. As for bodhisattvas, those of sharp faculties are indefinite up through the path of

preparation; those with medium faculties, up through the path of seeing; and those of duller faculties, up through the eighth bhūmi.

As for the extinct disposition, [this term is used] with the [underlying] intention that liberation is difficult and thus is a label for the four [states] of engaging in the [five] actions without interval;[833] having wrong views; the factors conducive to liberation not having arisen; and possessing just a little bit of the accumulation [of merit], but it being [very much] incomplete.[834] {41b}

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.2. Meaning of the text

This has two parts:

1) The classification of the disposition
2) Rebutting objections to this classification

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.2.1. The classification of the disposition

> **The foundation for the six dharmas of realization,**
> **Both remedy and relinquishment,**
> **The complete consumption of these,**
> **Prajñā with compassion,** [I.37]
>
> **What is not in common with the disciples,**
> **The progression of the welfare of others,**
> **And the effortless operation of wisdom**
> **Are called "the disposition."** [I.38]

That which serves as the foundation for engaging in the practice of the mahāyāna is called "the buddha disposition." [Here,] the meaning of foundation and what is founded on it is not like in the case of some contents being founded on a vessel. Rather, it means that, once the nature of the disposition becomes clearly manifest [in a gradual manner], the thirteen practices are temporarily attained in that gradual manner. These thirteen are as follows.

(1)–(6) The six dispositions that are the foundations for **the six dharmas of realization** are the four [stages of] the path of preparation, the path of seeing, and the path of familiarization up through the seventh bhūmi. The sūtras say:

> Subhūti, it is as follows. For example, the traces of a bird in the sky do not exist and are unobservable. Subhūti, likewise, a meaning of the word "bodhisattva" does not exist and is unobservable. The same goes for the traces of a dream, an illusion, a mirage, an echo, an optical illusion, a reflection of the moon in water, a city of gandharvas, and a magical creation being neither existent nor observable.[835]

These nine examples illustrate the nine conceptions [about the apprehended to be relinquished on the level] of heat [of the path of preparation] and [implicitly] teach the dharmadhātu, which is the remainder of the negation that says that the [above nine] "do not exist," as the disposition that is the foundation for heat. Likewise, the other [stages of] the path of preparation as well as the paths of seeing and familiarization are discussed by matching their respective conceptions to be relinquished with examples.

(7) Since the uninterrupted path—the **remedy** for the two obscurations to be relinquished—arises through the force of the dharmas of these conceptions, [the next one is] the disposition that is the foundation of this [remedy. The sūtras say:]

> When the orb of the sun has arisen, no trace of darkness is found.

(8) Through the force of this, the path of liberation that is the **relinquishment** of all afflictive obscurations without exception [arises]. Its foundation [is illustrated as follows:]

> When the fire at the end of an eon blazes, no trace of any formations is found. {42a}

(9) **The complete consumption of these** [remedies and factors to be relinquished] is the foundation for the path of liberation of the eighth bhūmi that relinquishes the cognitive obscurations.[836] [The sūtras say:]

> In the ethics of a completely perfect buddha, no trace of bad ethics is found.

This [process of the interaction of] remedy and relinquishment [in practices (7)–(9)] is like expelling a thief and then locking the door [behind him so that there is neither any thief in one's house nor any chance for him to come back]. Thus, when the remedy that is the uninterrupted path arises, [the mind] is directed toward putting an end to the factors to be relinquished, and once they have been put to an end, this is the arising of the path of liberation.[837]

(10) The foundation for the special qualities of **prajñā with compassion**, which realizes the lack of nature and makes one not abide in either [saṃsāric] existence or peace,[838] [is illustrated as follows:]

> No trace of the light of the sun and the moon is found.

The [above] practices of remedy, relinquishment, and prajñā with compassion are presented as [pertaining to] the eighth bhūmi. The *Madhyamakāvatāra* says:

> On the eighth bhūmi, these stains together with their roots are fully pacified.
> Though the afflictions are extinguished and one is unsurpassable among the three levels . . .[839]

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* states:

> Due to the change of mentation, perception,
> And conception, there is fourfold command
> Over nonconceptuality . . .[840]

[The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*] says:

> Existence and peace are not conceptualized.[841]

The *Gayaśīrṣasūtra* declares:

> It is evident that everything up through the eighth bhūmi and from the path of knowledge upward accords with the explanation as the path of relinquishment.

(11) Therefore, the foundation for the wisdom that pervades immeasurably many mundane realms and **is not in common with the disciples** (śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas) [is illustrated as follows:]

> No trace of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, nor any of the light of planets, stars, gems, and lightning is found.

(12) For the sake of establishing **others** to be guided, {42b} who possess the dispositions of the three yānas, in [their respective] fruitions in accordance with **the progression of the welfare** that each one of them has in mind, [bodhisattvas teach them through] the four intentions and the [four] indirect intentions.[842] The foundation for their practicing in this way [is illustrated as follows:]

> No trace of the light of the gods, from the Four Great Kings up through the highest gods, is found.

As for statements with [certain] intentions in this context, [there are] four [kinds]:

a) The intention in terms of the three equalities means to take the three equalities [between all buddhas] in terms of accumulations, dharmakāya, and welfare of beings as the reason for saying something like "At that time, I was the Tathāgata Vipaśyī."

b) The intention in terms of another meaning means to take the threefold lack of nature of the three [natures]—the imaginary, the other-dependent, and the perfect—in terms of characteristics, arising, and the ultimate, respectively, as the reason for saying something like "All phenomena lack a nature."[843]

c) The intention in terms of another time means to take the time [in the far future] when [a certain person will actually be] born in Sukhāvatī as the reason for saying something like "If you make the aspiration prayer to be born in Sukhāvatī, you will be born there."

d) The intention in terms of the thinking of a person refers to something like disparaging ethics and praising generosity by intending to make persons who content themselves with ethics alone engage in other means, such as generosity, [too].

There are four indirect intentions.

a) The indirect intention in terms of introducing refers to saying something like "Form exists" in order to relinquish the fear [of emptiness] of those who have the śrāvaka disposition for the sake of introducing them [into the teachings].

b) The indirect intention in terms of characteristics refers to saying something like "There is no nature" out of the wish to clearly teach the specific characteristics of the threefold lack of nature.

c) The indirect intention in terms of a remedy refers to saying something [that serves] as a remedy to control the eight flaws.[844]

d) The indirect intention in terms of transforming {43a} refers to saying something like [the *Udānavarga*]:

> If someone kills father and mother,
> Vanquishes the king, his two learned brahmans,
> His kingdom, and his ministers,
> That person will be pure.[845]

[This is said] in order to counteract the thoughts by some people that this genuine dharma is not profound because it is easy to understand. The meaning of the [above verse] is that father and mother refer to craving and grasping; the king is the ālaya; the two learned brahmans are the views about

the two extremes [of permanence and extinction]; and the kingdom and its ministers are the six [inner] āyatanas and their objects. Having taught [these factors] through such names, the meaning [of the remaining words] is that one will attain enlightenment if one annihilates these [factors].

The difference between intention and indirect intention is that the first merely refers to something that the speaker bears in mind, while the second is for the sake of making an input into someone else's [mind and thus guiding them]. Thus, the statements "Spoken by intending the following" and "Spoken for the sake of the following" [indicate] the need to search for a meaning apart from the literal one. Therefore, both [these kinds of statement] are of expedient meaning.[846]

(13) [Also] **the foundation for the effortless** spontaneous **operation of wisdom** [for the welfare of others] **is called "the disposition."** [The sūtras say:]

> No trace of the light of the Tathāgata Arhat, the completely perfect Buddha, is found.

Thus, the progression of these thirteen practices that are founded on the disposition accords with the manner in which clear realization arises and teaches the complete path of the persons who strive for perfect buddhahood. As for their boundary lines, the first six refer to [the stages of the path] up through the seventh bhūmi; the following four, to the eighth bhūmi; and [the remaining three], to the ninth bhūmi, the tenth [bhūmi], and the end of the continuum [of the ten bhūmis].[847]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.2.2. Rebutting objections to this classification

This has two parts:

1) The thesis of the opponents
2) The answer

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.2.2.1. The thesis of the opponents

> **Because the dharmadhātu is indivisible,**
> **Divisions of the disposition are not tenable.** [I.39ab]

It is possible for some people of inferior insight {43b} to think, "When you assert the dharmadhātu as the disposition because **the dharmadhātu is indivisible** into different [parts], **divisions of the disposition** (such as into three [yānas] or thirteen [practices]) **are not tenable.**" Thus, this qualm is raised here.[848]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.1.2.2.2. The answer

> **But by virtue of the divisions of the phenomena founded on it,**
> **Its divisions are expressed.** [I.39cd]

This [above] flaw does not apply for the following reason. For example, even though a jar (the foundation) is a single one, **by virtue of the divisions of the phenomena** that are contained in it and **founded on it** (such as honey or ground sugar), **the divisions** of this foundation **are expressed** as it sometimes being "a honey jar" and sometimes "a sugar jar."[849] Likewise, though the disposition to be realized is a single one, by way of being founded on it, different superior and inferior ways of realizing it occur. Therefore, it is divided in these ways.[850]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2. The focal object of practice

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.1. General topic

This has two parts:

1) Refutation of what is not tenable
2) Presentation of our own system

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.1.1. Refutation of what is not tenable

[Others] say, "Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert that, in the meditative equipoise of noble ones, all phenomena of correct seeming [reality] appear clearly and in an unmixed way, just like a pattern on brocade." That this is not justified [is demonstrated by] it then following that this meditative equipoise entails reference points because it is a mental state of cutting through superimpositions based on the appearances of seeming [reality].

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.1.2. Presentation of our own system

The intention behind Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's statements [in this matter] is that they are made in terms of spacelike meditative equipoise and illusionlike subsequent attainment being noncontradictory because the yogas of the great noble ones are inconceivable. Or they had in mind that, in one sense, the object—the ultimate that is not affected by mistakenness and is endowed with all aspects—appears to be inseparable from the subject. However, at the time [of such meditative equipoise], it is definitely the case that all subjects and objects in terms of dualistic appearances have vanished on their own. {44a} Therefore, in this context of the focal object [of the

knowledge of all aspects], [the focal object] is taken to be the object of the inseparability of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. Or, at the time of training in meditative equipoise, the focal object is presented as that with regard to which superimpositions are to be cut through.[851]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.2. Meaning of the text

This has three parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation
3) The ways of focusing

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.2.1. Brief introduction

The focal object consists of all phenomena. [I.40a]

You may wonder, "What is **the focal object** of the practices founded on the disposition?" It **consists of all phenomena**—this is what one focuses on.[852]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.2.2. Detailed explanation

They are virtuous and so on,
Those called mundane realizations,
Those asserted to be supramundane, [I.40bd]

Contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena,
Those that are conditioned and unconditioned,
Phenomena in common with the disciples,
And the uncommon ones of the sage. [I.41]

When "all phenomena" are classified, **they are** elevenfold as follows.

(1)–(3) The first [three] categories refer to three actions. The uncontaminated approach of virtuous effort represents **virtuous** [actions], such as the uninterrupted paths. [The phrase] "**and so on**" includes the antagonistic factors of such [virtuous actions] (nonvirtuous [actions]) and neutral ones, which are [all] others than these two. Here, virtue is what yields pleasant results. What is virtue by nature consists of the eleven virtuous [mental factors], such as confidence.[853] Congruently associated virtue consists of the [primary] minds and mental factors that are congruently associated with these [eleven]. Motivated virtue consists of the physical and verbal actions and so on that are motivated by [any of] these [primary minds and mental factors].

Nonvirtue is what yields suffering as its [karmic] maturation. What is nonvirtue by nature consists of the two [views about a] real personality and

extremes as well as the primary and secondary afflictions of the desire realm (except for ignorance) that are congruently associated with them. As for the afflictions of the [two] higher realms, [their views about] a real personality and extremes, and the ignorance that is congruently associated with these two [views], they are obscuring yet neutral. Congruently associated nonvirtue consists of the [primary] minds and mental factors that are congruently associated with the [above]. {44b} Motivated nonvirtue consists of the physical and verbal actions that are motivated by the [above].

What is neutral is not able to yield [karmic] maturations, being just like a rotten seed. Those [neutral phenomena] that are obscuring yet neutral do not motivate any physical or verbal actions. The two that are unobscuring and neutral—space and nonanalytical cessation[854]—are called "ultimate neutrals." They do not only not motivate [any actions], but even the conventional term "being congruently associated" does not apply to them. Therefore, what is neutral by nature is fourfold—(1) the mind that naturally arises from maturing causes without making any efforts;[855] (2) [the mind] that focuses on the forms that are the objects at the time of behaviors such as walking and standing; (3) the abiding [mind] at the time of either training in arts and crafts or [actually] engaging in them; (4) the mind that focuses on the objects at the time of wishing to produce magical creations or [actually] producing them. These [four states of mind] are unobscuring and neutral. In the desire realm, there are all four; in the form realm, [all] except for [the mind engaged in] arts and crafts; and in the formless realm, solely the one that arises from maturing causes. Congruently associated neutral [actions] are the [primary] minds and mental factors that are congruently associated with [any of] the [above]. Motivated neutral [actions] are the physical and verbal actions that are motivated by the [above].[856]

If you wonder whether these are the only three divisions [of phenomena], they can also be divided in other ways [as follows].

(4)–(5) [Phenomena] can be divided as twofold—[mundane and supramundane. The former are] the skandhas, the dhātus, the āyatanas, the ten virtues, the dhyānas, the formless [absorptions], and the supernatural knowledges that are contained in the **realizations** in the mind streams of **mundane** ordinary beings. **Those asserted to be supramundane** {45a} are the dhyānas, the thirty-seven dharmas [concordant with enlightenment], the faculties, the samādhis, the eight liberations, the ninefold progressive abiding, and so on that are contained in the wisdoms in the mind streams of noble beings.

(6)–(7) Another twofold division is into **contaminated** phenomena (which entail views about a self [—the five skandhas]) **and uncontaminated phenomena** (the remedies for such views, [such as the four foundations of mindfulness]). Here, the meaning of contaminated and uncontaminated

refers to [those phenomena] in dependence on which contaminations—afflictions—arise or do not arise, respectively. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, all conditioned phenomena except for the reality of the path are asserted as contaminated, while the reality of the path and the three unconditioned phenomena[857] are uncontaminated. Therefore, they hold the rūpakāya of a buddha to be contaminated. In the system of the mahāyāna, contaminated phenomena are explained as those that produce the four flaws of unruly behavior, inner and outer change,[858] motivating for mistaken engagement, and functioning as causes for [saṃsāric] existence. Those that do not produce these [four] are uncontaminated. Thus, also the rūpakāya of a buddha is asserted to be uncontaminated.

As for the way in which these contaminations expand, what is found in the *Abhidharmakośa* has already been explained a little bit above.[859] The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* speaks of six doors of expanding. (a) [Mental factors] like the primary and secondary afflictions are [those doors whose] very character is contamination. (b) The [primary] minds and mental factors that are congruently associated with [any of] these are [the door] of being connected with contaminations. (c) Something like the existence of the latent tendencies of afflictions that are other than the ālaya-consciousness on other levels is [the door] of being related to contaminations. (d) Virtues such as the dhyānas at the time of one's mind stream not being liberated from contaminations are [the door] of being bound by contaminations. (e) Something like the path of accumulation, which concords with contaminations in terms of its focal objects and aspects, {45b} is [the door] of being approximately concordant with contaminations. (f) The five contaminated skandhas of someone like an arhat are the door of what has arisen from contaminations.[860]

(8)–(9) Yet another twofold division is into **those** phenomena **that are conditioned** (arisen from the collections of causes and conditions on the level of seeming [reality]) **and** those like suchness, which are **unconditioned** (not depending on causes and conditions and being free from arising and ceasing).

(10)–(11) [The final] twofold division is into the **phenomena** that are the qualities **in common with** the mind streams of **the disciples** (śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas), such as the four dhyānas, **and the** qualities **of the sage** (the Buddha) that are **uncommon** [when compared] to others, such as the ten powers.

These are the eleven focal objects [of practice].[861] The sūtras say:

> Śūbhuti, "all phenomena" refers to virtuous, nonvirtuous, neutral, mundane, supramundane, contaminated, uncontaminated, conditioned, unconditioned, common, and uncommon ones. Subhūti, these are called "all phenomena."[862]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.2.2.3. The ways of focusing

To think, "This is to be adopted," "This is to be rejected," and "This just let be" [are the ways of] focusing on the first three [focal objects of virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral actions, respectively]. As for what is to be adopted among these [actions], to think, "This is to be adopted first" and "This is to be adopted later" [are the ways of focusing on] the mundane and supramundane paths, respectively. Then, [on the supramundane path,] to think, "This is to be relinquished on the supramundane path" and "This is its nature" [are the ways of focusing on] what is contaminated and uncontaminated [on this path]. Next, [on the uncontaminated path,] to think, "This is the focal object of the uncontaminated path" [is the manner of focusing on] conditioned phenomena (seeming [reality]) and unconditioned phenomena (ultimate reality). [Finally,] having realized that the former among these [two phenomena] are not established, through focusing on the latter, to think, "Inferior or superior fruitions will arise in this way" are [the ways of] focusing on the common and uncommon qualities, respectively.

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.3. {46a} The aim of practice

> **This aim of the self-arisen ones,**
> **By virtue of the three greatnesses, should be known as threefold—**
> **The mind of the highest state of all sentient beings,**
> **Relinquishment, and realization.** [I.42]

You may wonder, "Are the focal objects also the aim of practice?" They are not. The focal objects pertain to present [objects], just like fitting the notch of an arrow [onto a bow string]. The aim to be strived for is an [object] that is suitable to arise in the future, just like that arrow hitting the target. Therefore, the aim is **threefold**—(1) the nondual wisdom (the dharmakāya) that is **the mind** which represents **the highest state of all sentient beings**, starting with those who have not entered the path (that which is to be practiced) up through those who abide at the end of the continuum of the ten bhūmis; (2) the **relinquishment** of having eliminated the adventitious stains that obscure this [wisdom]; **and** (3) the **realization** of its entire fundamental nature. This is the aim that is endowed with the power **of the three greatnesses** that are the means to accomplish it.[863]

Among the [latter], "great mind" refers to the six [states of mind] in the mind streams of noble bodhisattvas, such as "the vajralike mind."[864] The sūtras say:

> Bodhisattvas are called "mahāsattvas" because they cause the great host of sentient beings, the great assembly of sentient beings, to be in the highest state of all . . .[865]

"Great relinquishment" refers to the uninterrupted paths in the mind streams of these [bodhisattvas] that relinquish all views about the two [kinds of] identity.[866] [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas are called "mahāsattvas," because they teach the dharma in a nonreferential manner. For they relinquish these kinds of views through being skilled in means.[867]

"Great realization" is the realization in the mind streams of these [bodhisattvas. The sūtras say:]

> Bhagavan, bodhisattvas are called "mahāsattvas" because they are not attached even to their bodhicitta, the mind which equals the unequalled . . . they dwell in the ranks of those called "bodhisattvas."[868]

Thus, **this aim** of the practice of bodhisattvas who will themselves arise as buddhas **should be known** with certainty as these three. It is comparable to the example of the aim of engaging in a battle, {46b} which is certain to be threefold in terms of rendering oneself unrivaled; vanquishing others, the enemies; and enabling one to obtain their country and so on for oneself.[869]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4. Practice's own nature

This has three parts:

1) The general nature of practice
2) The boundary lines of the particular [practices]
3) The meaning of each one

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.1. The general nature of practice

The nature of mahāyāna practice as such [without going into its divisions] consists of the activities that, through dwelling in the generation of bodhicitta, are the vast efforts for the welfare of oneself and others and definitely make one attain the fruition of great enlightenment. Here, the four trainings, such as [the training in] all aspects, have two [parts]—the part of the view (taking the three knowledges as objects) and the part of conduct (practicing the six pāramitās). The former will be elucidated in the detailed explanations of the four trainings, while the latter consists of the [following] four [practices in the context of the knowledge of all aspects], such as armorlike practice. [In

due order], these [four] represent the two causal activities whose nature is the vigor in terms of motivation and application and the two activities that yield the fruition in an indirect and direct manner.[870]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.2. The boundary lines of the particular practices

[In both his *Ālokā* and *Vivṛti*,] master [Haribhadra] draws the boundary lines of attaining these four practices for the first time as respectively pertaining to the three [paths of] preparation, seeing, and familiarization, and the wisdom at the end of the continuum.[871] The *Ālokā* on [the *Sūtra*] *in Eight Thousand Lines* [also] says that, in terms of training in the path of preparation in an indirect, close, and direct manner, respectively, the path of accumulation, the [first] three [levels of the path of preparation] (such as heat), and the supreme dharma represent the boundary lines of attaining the first three practices for the first time. The boundary line for the practice of final deliverance is as above.[872]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3. The meaning of each one

This consists of the detailed explanations on

1) The armorlike practice in six sets of six
2) The practice of ninefold engagement
3) The practice of the seventeen equipments
4) The eightfold practice of final deliverance

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.1. The armorlike practice in six sets of six

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.1.1. General topic

This consists of

1) The natures of each one of the six pāramitās {47a}
2) Their definite number
3) Their order
4) Their fruitions
5) Explanation of the terms

1) In due order, the natures of the six pāramitās are (1) being endowed with the four dharmas of giving; (2) the mind of relinquishment; (3) not being upset; (4) delight in virtue;[873] (5) a one-pointed mind; and (6) clearly discriminating phenomena. [Each one of the six pāramitās] possesses the four dharmas. These four dharmas are linked with [the pāramitās] as they are taught in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* [for generosity]:

Generosity defeats its antagonistic factors,
Operates through nonconceptual wisdom,
Completely fulfills all desires,
And matures sentient beings in three ways.[874]

When these [six pāramitās] are subdivided, generosity consists of [granting] the dharma, material goods, and fearlessness. Ethics consists of what is correctly adopted (the prātimokṣa vows)[875] and what is attained through the nature of phenomena ([the vows of] dhyāna and the uncontaminated vows).[876] Patience consists of not being afraid of harm, not being concerned about suffering, and realizing certainty about the dharma [through knowing that all phenomena are without nature]. Vigor is sevenfold—the six kinds of making physical and mental efforts in the three trainings as well as devoted application and constant application, which are common [to all].[877] The dhyānas consist of those that entail examination and analysis, those without examination and only analysis, and those with neither examination nor analysis.[878] Prajñā consists of mundane [prajñā], the lesser supramundane [prajñās] of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, and the great [supramundane] prajñā of the mahāyāna.[879]

2) In terms of the three trainings, the first three [pāramitās pertain to] ethics and the last two to samādhi and prajñā, respectively. Vigor is the aid of all [trainings].[880]

3) [Their order] is as stated in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*:

Since the latter arise in dependence on the former,
Since they are inferior and superior,
And since they are coarse {47b} and subtle,
They are taught in this order.[881]

4) Their temporary and ultimate fruitions are as stated in the *Ratnāvalī*:

Riches are accomplished through generosity, happiness through ethics,
Radiance through patience, splendor through vigor,
Peace through dhyāna, liberation through prajñā,
And all aims through compassion.

Through the pāramitā of these seven
Together without exception,
The object of inconceivable wisdom,
Being a protector of the world, will be attained.[882]

5) [The explanation of the terms] is as in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*:

> Because of eliminating poverty,
> Attaining coolness, terminating anger,
> Connecting with the supreme, seizing the mind,
> And realizing the ultimate, they are explained [in these ways].[883]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.1.2. Meaning of the text

> **Armorlike practice is explained accordingly**
> **Through six sets of six**
> **By combining each one**
> **Of the six, such as generosity.** [I.43]

The nature of the practice that is founded on the disposition is fourfold. From among [these four], armorlike practice is taught at the beginning in order to not be struck by harm. By focusing solely on the welfare of others (the vast motivation), **armorlike practice is explained according** to the sūtras **through six sets of six** by way of **combining each one of the** six pāramitās explained above (the vast practice) with each one of these **six** pāramitās, **such as generosity**, one by one.[884] The sūtras say:

> Great Bodhisattvas who engage in the pāramitā of generosity in this way embrace all six pāramitās. Therefore, they are called "the ones who don the great armor."[885]

As for the manner in which these six are combined with each other, the giving of dharma, material goods, and fearlessness is the generosity of generosity. {48a} To relinquish any mental engagement in one's own welfare and so on represents the ethics of generosity. Not becoming angry with beggars and others saying unpleasant things is the patience of generosity. To give rise to the striving to increase this [generosity] further and further is the vigor of generosity. To dedicate it to perfect enlightenment through a one-pointed mind that is not mixed with the yānas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is the dhyāna of generosity. Sealing it through not entertaining any reference points of recipient, giver, and object given is the prajñā of generosity. These [six] make up the armorlike practice of the pāramitā of generosity.

In due order, the same applies for the remaining [pāramitās], such as ethics. The [prajñāpāramitā sūtra in] eight chapters[886] says that the generosity of ethics and all other [pāramitās] is to share their virtue with [all] sentient beings, that is, dedicating it to enlightenment. The next three [pāramitās]

correspond [to what was said about them in relation to generosity above]. The dhyāna [of all pāramitās] is to dedicate their roots of virtue through the mind being one-pointed toward the knowledge of all aspects. Prajñā corresponds to [what was said about it in relation to generosity] above.[887]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2. The practice of ninefold engagement

This has two parts:

1) General explanation
2) Specific explanation of what is difficult to understand

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.1. General explanation

> **Dhyānas and formless states, generosity and such,**
> **Path, love and so forth,**
> **Not having anything as a focal object,**
> **Purity of the three spheres,** [I.44]
>
> **Aim, the six supernatural knowledges,**
> **And the principle of the knowledge of all aspects—**
> **One should know that the practice of engagement refers to these,**
> **Which means mounting the mahāyāna.** [I.45]

After having donned the armor in this way, the practice of engaging in the path of the mahāyāna is ninefold.

(1) The practice of engaging in the **dhyānas and formless** samādhis without observing any aspects, signs, or characteristics is [undertaken] in order to stabilize the mind. The sūtras say:

> Bodhisattvas who engage in the pāramitā of generosity are detached from desire . . .[888]

(2) [One engages in] the six pāramitās, **such as generosity,** in order to gather the accumulations. [The sūtras say:]

> The pāramitā of generosity of mahāsattvas is to think, "I shall teach the dharma in order to relinquish the afflictions of all sentient beings."

(3) In order to realize true reality, [one engages in] **the path** of seeing; the path of familiarization up through the seventh bhūmi; the path of nonlearning[889] {48b} (the eighth bhūmi); and the special path (the ninth and tenth bhūmis). [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas familiarize with the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment in every respect . . .

(4) [One engages in] the four immeasurables, **love and so forth**, which accomplish the welfare of others. [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas abide with a mind full of love, which is vast, extensive . . .

(5) In order to relinquish the clinging to real existence, which fetters these [other beings], [one engages in] **having** the prajñā that does **not** cling to **anything as a focal object**, [be it entities or nonentities. The sūtras say:]

> The cognition of "the emptiness of the internal" is not [taking place] in the manner of observing.

(6) Through the power of that, [one practices] being **pure of** entertaining **the three spheres** of agent, object, and action. [The sūtras say:]

> Giver, recipient, and giving are unobservable.

(7) [One engages in] the three greatnesses—the **aim** that is one's own welfare. [The sūtras say:]

> In the sense of undoing their meditation, bodhisattvas meditate in the manner of not observing the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment.

(8) [One engages in] **the six supernatural knowledges** in order to attain the distinctive features of power. [The sūtras say:]

> . . . because of perfecting all supernatural knowledges.

(9) The practice of engaging in **the principle of** the wisdom that is **the knowledge of all aspects** [is undertaken] in order to turn the wheel of dharma. [The sūtras say:]

> After having attained the knowledge of all aspects, they turn the wheel of dharma.

One should know that the practices of engagement refer to [engaging in] each one of these nine paths in the [above] ways, which means mounting the mahāyāna.[890] The meaning of mahāyāna is presented as being endowed with the seven greatnesses. These seven consist of (1) focusing on the vast words of the Buddha; {49a} (2) accomplishing the two welfares; (3) the wisdom that realizes both kinds of identitylessness; (4) vigor; (5) skill in means that is not tainted by afflictions; (6) perfect accomplishment of the powers and so forth; and (7) great enlightened activity.[891]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2. Specific explanation of what is difficult to understand

This has two parts:

1) The dhyānas and formless states
2) The immeasurables[892]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1. The dhyānas and formless states

This has four parts:

1) Supports for arising
2) Causes of attainment
3) Their own natures
4) Fruitions

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1.1. Supports for arising

All beings [can be the physical supports for giving rise to the actual dhyānas and formless absorptions], except for those with obscurations of [karmic] maturation (those in the three unpleasant realms and [those on the northern continent] Kuru) and those with karmic obscurations (hermaphrodites and neuters). They may possess [the supports for] the causal meditative absorptions [that are cultivated] on the respectively lower levels as well as the supports for the fruitional meditative absorptions on the [respective absorption's] own level.[893] Those who newly attain the preparatory stages and the actual stage of Brahmakāyika [can only do so in a physical] support within the desire realm, while those who [newly attain] the [same two stages] of Brahmapurohita [can have the physical support of] Brahmakāyika or [any one] below. The same applies [for the remaining dhyānas and formless meditative absorptions] from Mahābrahmāṇa up through Neither Discrimination nor Nondiscrimination.[894] Those who abide in [whatever meditative absorption] they have already attained can manifest [this abiding] in all [kinds of physical supports] from the desire realm up through the Peak of Existence.

As an elaboration on this, there follows an analysis in terms of which persons possess which of the [nine] meditative absorptions of progressive abiding. There are those who have not entered the [Buddhist] path and possess any among the first eight meditative absorptions of progressive abiding

and those who have entered this path, thus [belonging to any one of] the three yānas. [Here, only the latter three will be considered.]

1) As for those śrāvakas who [relinquish the afflictions] in a simultaneous manner, up through immediately before attaining arhathood they possess solely the preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika. [Right upon attaining arhathood,] they represent [those arhats] who are liberated through prajñā alone.[895] Those [among these arhats who subsequently] practice the actual first dhyāna are "arhats with adornment." Individually, these [arhats] may or may not possess [any number of] meditative absorptions above the first dhyāna. {49b}

As for those once-returners who are of the type of having previously become free from attachment, up through the supreme dharma of their path of preparation they definitely possess the first four preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika. Individually, they may or may not possess the last two [of these stages].[896] From their dharma readiness of suffering [on the path of seeing] up through attaining the fruition of an [abiding] once-returner, they may or may not posses the last three [of said stages].

As for those nonreturners who are of the type of having previously become free from attachment, up through their [level of the] supreme dharma they definitely possess the actual [dhyāna] of Brahmakāyika. Individually, they may or may not possess [any number of meditative absorptions] from Brahmapurohita up through the Peak of Existence. From their dharma readiness of suffering [on the path of seeing] up through the end of their continuum, [that is, abiding in the vajralike samādhi,] they may or may not possess [any number of meditative absorptions] from Brahmapurohita onward.[897]

As for gradualist stream-enterers, up through the supreme dharma of their path of preparation they definitely possess the first preparatory stage of Brahmakāyika. Individually, they may or may not possess [any number of] the three middle [stages], but they definitely do not attain the last two. The same applies for all [gradualists] beyond the [fruition of a stream-enterer] up through reaching the fruition of a once-returner. At the point of abiding in the fruition of a once-returner, individually, they may or may not possess the last two [preparatory stages], but they definitely do not possess the actual [dhyāna of Brahmakāyika].[898] As for gradualist nonreturners, the same applies as [what was said] under those nonreturners who have previously become free from attachment.

2) Pratyekabuddhas are twofold in terms of (a) birth and (b) the path. (a) Up through being separated by just a single birth [from pratyekabuddha arhathood], they possess the preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika. From their last existence onward, individually, they may or may not possess the [corresponding] actual [dhyāna].[899] (b) As for the rhinolike ones, from the path of

preparation onward they definitely possess the actual dhyānas.[900] The group practitioners, from the path of accumulation up through [the path of] nonlearning, may or may not attain the actual dhyānas.[901]

3) In the mahāyāna, there are even bodhisattvas who do not attain any of these meditative absorptions [or their preparatory stages].[902] {50a} Even on the level of the medium path of accumulation of the mahāyāna, there can be those who have attained these [meditative absorptions] and those who have not. On the level of the great path of accumulation, [bodhisattvas] definitely possess the actual first dhyāna.[903] At the end of the path of preparation, they definitely attain the actual [meditative absorption] of the Peak of Existence.[904] Noble buddhas do not have any particular meditative absorption, but possess them [all] in an unobscured manner.[905]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1.2. Causes of attainment

The five [causes for] attaining [the dhyānas and meditative absorptions] are (1) being familiar with these samādhis from before; (2) extensive karma of having been born in the higher realms [of form and formlessness]; (3) having studied and reflected on the Buddha's words that instruct on these meditative absorptions; (4) [attaining them] through the power of others' pith instructions; or (5) through the nature of phenomena at the time when an eon perishes.[906]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1.3. Their own natures

This has two parts:

1) The preparatory stages
2) The actual stages

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1.3.1. The preparatory stages

This has two parts:

1) Divisions
2) Presentation

1) [The preparatory stages] consist of the six mental engagements of (a) discriminating characteristics; (b) arising from aspiration; (c) separation; (d) joy and withdrawal; (e) analysis; and (f) final training. (a) [The certainty that arises from] the mind studying and reflecting [in the manner] of regarding the desire realm as coarse and the first dhyāna as peaceful consists of settling the mind in order to relinquish [the former] and adopt [the latter]. (b) The meditation of calm abiding and superior insight in union that focuses on this coarseness [of the desire realm] versus the peacefulness [of the first dhyāna] consists of making efforts in the correct training in this for the sake of relinquishing [the former] and adopting [the latter]. (c) Through becoming

familiar with calm abiding, the three great [degrees of the] afflictions [of the desire realm] are relinquished.[907] (d) Through having attained the slight joy and bliss of having relinquished these three, one mentally engages in the enthusiasm to relinquish the others too, thus relinquishing the three medium [degrees of these] afflictions. (e) Through analyzing [with alertness] again whether there is anything to be relinquished, {50b} one realizes that there are [still] subtle [afflictions left], discriminates them through mentally engaging in the characteristics of suffering, and thus renders oneself being without pride about the qualities attained. (f) By mentally engaging in relinquishing even the subtle [afflictions], the three lesser [degrees of said] afflictions are relinquished.[908]

By way of [corresponding to the number of] the abodes of the form realm, there are seventeen of each one of these [six preparatory stages]. In terms of the lucid path of mental engagement, the six can also be included in four. The two mental engagements of (a) discriminating characteristics and (b) arising from aspiration are the approximately concordant mental engagement—the path of preparation. The two mental engagements of (c) separation and (f) final training are the remedial mental engagement—the uninterrupted path. (d) Joy and withdrawal is the mental engagement of lucidity, which [pertains] to all four paths.[909] The mental engagement of (e) analysis is the mental engagement of discrimination, which makes up the special path.

2) The preparatory stages of the first dhyāna are twofold—pure and uncontaminated.[910] For the [preparatory stages] above the first [dhyāna], there are no uncontaminated ones because the uncontaminated path is practiced based on the [mental] supports that are the actual [dhyānas] of the lower levels. This differs for the first [dhyāna] because stream-enterers and so forth who have not attained its actual stage must rely on its preparatory stage. Therefore, since one is able to transcend the three realms by relying on the preparatory stage of the first [dhyāna alone], it is also called "not ineffective."[911] Because the preparatory stages are nothing but paths that make one free from attachment to lower levels, it is impossible for them to be afflicted. [On the other hand,] the actual stages [of the dhyānas] do not make one transcend lower levels. In particular, the contaminated [actual dhyānas] constitute "the path of blissfully abiding amidst visible phenomena"[912] and "[the path of] accomplishing qualities." {51a} But they do not make one free from attachment because they are fettered by the cravings of their respective own levels and are lower than the respectively higher levels. [However,] since the uncontaminated [actual dhyānas] function as the remedies for [both] their respective own levels and higher levels, they also represent paths that make one free from desire. Said [six] preparatory stages [as they pertain] from the first dhyāna up to the Peak of Existence are for the most part alike as far as their manner of meditating is

concerned, but in a support of the formless realm, the first [one among these six] mental engagements arises from meditation [and not from studying and reflecting as explained above].[913]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1.3.2. The actual stages

This has two parts:

1) The four dhyānas that transcend lower levels by way of their branches
2) The four formless [absorptions] that transcend lower levels by way of discrimination[914]

1a) The actual first dhyāna has five branches. The two remedial branches are examination and analysis, whose natures consist of the mind [scrutinizing] in coarse and fine ways, respectively. The two branches of benefit are the arising of mental exhilaration and physical bliss. The branch that is the basis is the samādhi of a one-pointed mind. As for "examination" in this context, since it is very coarse, it can be relinquished even by those who are not free from attachment to the first dhyāna. Therefore, there is a twofold division into the ordinary actual [first dhyāna] that is endowed with both examination and analysis and the special actual [first dhyāna] that [entails] only analysis without examination.[915]

1b) The second [dhyāna] has four branches. The remedial branch refers to [mind's] inner serenity by virtue of its being beyond the dhyāna flaws of examination and analysis [due to mindfulness, alertness, and equanimity]. The two branches of benefit are the exhilaration and bliss whose nature is the feeling of mental pleasure. The branch that is the basis is the samādhi [of a one-pointed virtuous mind]. {51b}

1c) The third [dhyāna] has five branches. The three remedial branches are the mindfulness of seizing the focal object and aspect without forgetting them; the alertness of analyzing whether any flaws have arisen in one's dhyāna or not; and the mental formation of equanimity, which means being free from the mental formations of happiness, suffering, [attachment, aversion, being close, being distant, and so on]. The branch of benefit is the mental feeling of bliss. The branch that is the basis is samādhi [as above].

1d) The fourth [dhyāna] has four branches. The two remedial branches are the mindfulness of being liberated from the eight flaws of dhyāna and the mental formation of the equanimity [of being liberated from them]. The branch of benefit is the feeling of equanimity.[916] The branch that is the basis is samādhi [as above].

[Here,] the meaning of "branches" refers to the nature of these respective [dhyānas].[917] If these [four dhyānas] are subdivided in terms of abodes, they are seventeen. If divided by nature, they are threefold—afflicted, pure, and

uncontaminated. The first one means being [free from all afflictions of the desire realm and those of the respectively lower dhyānas, but still being] fettered by the primary or secondary afflictions of the respective [dhyāna]'s own level.[918] The second one [means not being so fettered and] entails the aspect that consists of the mundane virtue of [discriminating] coarse [lower levels from] peaceful [higher ones], which has four [divisions], such as approximately concordant with regressing.[919] The third one has the nature of the superior insight [of the supramundane path], entails the [sixteen] aspects of the [four] realities, and is not endowed with examination and analysis.

2) As for the four formless [absorptions], during their preparations, the notions of form, [color, shape,] physical resistance, [and good and bad that correspond to the respective levels below them] are destroyed.[920] Then, one thinks, "All phenomena are infinite like space"; or thinks, "They are infinite like consciousness"; or thinks, "There is nothing coarse to be apprehended whatsoever"; or thinks, "It is neither that anything coarse can be apprehended nor that anything subtle cannot [be apprehended]." Through having mentally engaged [in these ways], {52a} in due order, [one then enters the four actual] meditative absorptions in which these [states] manifest. If they are divided by nature, the Mādhyamikas assert the same three [types—afflicted, pure, and uncontaminated—] as above [for all four absorptions]. For the Peak of Existence, the Vaibhāṣikas do not assert the uncontaminated [type].

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.1.4. Fruitions

The fruitional dhyānas and formless [absorptions of actually] being born [in the respective realms] and the persons of these [realms] are equivalent. The container [of the pure surroundings] and [the special qualities such as] the [five] visions and the [six] supernatural knowledges of the form realm are dominated results; the appropriated skandhas are [karmically] matured results; and the dharmas concordant with enlightenment are results that concord with their causes. [The same goes for the formless realm as applicable.]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.2.2.2. Explanation of the four immeasurables

This has three parts:

1) Manner of arising
2) Natures
3) Fruition

1) [The four immeasurables arise from four conditions.] Their causal condition is the [naturally abiding] disposition. Their dominant conditions are the treatises and spiritual friends teaching the [four immeasurables]. Respectively, their object conditions are those sentient beings who are without happiness, are oppressed by suffering, possess happiness, and possess attachment and aversion.

[Their immediate condition is that the four immeasurables arise in dependence on one's previous familiarity with them through having examined the benefits of cultivating them and the shortcomings of not cultivating them.][921]

2) [The natures of the four immeasurables] are (a) the wish that [sentient beings] encounter happiness; (b) the wish that they are free from suffering; (c) the wish that they are not separated from happiness; and (d) the wish to accomplish these [three states] for all sentient beings without difference. In due order, they represent the roots of virtue of being without any (a) maliciousness; (b) violence; (c) lack of rejoicing; and (d) attachment and aversion.

3) [Their fruition] is the accomplishment of the vast two welfares, both temporarily and ultimately.[922]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3. The practice of the seventeen equipments

1) General instruction
2) Particular explanations of some [of these seventeen]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.1. General instruction

> **Loving-kindness, the six such as generosity,**
> **Calm abiding with superior insight,**
> **The path of union,**
> **Skill in means,** [I.46]
>
> **Wisdom, merit,**
> **The path, dhāraṇī, the ten bhūmis,**
> **And the remedies—these should be known**
> **As the progression of the practice of the equipments.** [I.47]

Since the two accumulations become powerful when one engages in the mahāyāna in these ways, they are explained as the practice of the equipments, which is seventeenfold.

(1) The equipment of the motivation is great **loving-kindness.** The sūtras [say]:

> Great bodhisattvas {52b} appease the suffering of hell beings . . .[923]

[The word] "equipment" equally [applies] to the following [sixteen].

(2)–(7) The application consists of **the six pāramitās, such as generosity.** [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas abide in the pāramitā of generosity . . . establish sentient beings in the paths of the ten virtues . . .[924]

(8) Meditative equipoise is the **calm abiding** of being one-pointedly [oriented] toward the welfare of others. [The sūtras say:]

> Bodhisattvas abide with their minds endowed with the knowledge of all aspects . . .[925]

The meaning of "calm abiding" is that the mind abides one-pointedly once distraction is calmed. Its focal objects are twofold—with characteristics and without characteristics. In terms of its own nature, it is twofold—mundane and supramundane. The methods for settling the mind are nine. (1) The mind is made to settle on the focal object. (2) By prolonging that, it is made to settle continuously. (3) If it strays away [from the object], it is resettled repeatedly. (4) In order that it does not stray away, it is settled closely [on the object] with mindfulness. (5) Not considering sense pleasures, the mind is tamed. (6) Through considering distractions as shortcomings, the mind is pacified. (7) Even if obvious thoughts occur, through not readily pursuing them, [the mind] is pacified completely. (8) Through putting an end to dullness and agitation, [the mind] is made one-pointed. (9) Once it is familiar [with that], it is settled evenly without any effort.

(9) At that point, [the settled mind is connected] **with the superior insight** of realizing the actual way of being. [The sūtras say:]

> On account of the emptiness of specific characteristics, bodhisattvas should be known as not having any armor . . .[926]

The meaning of the term ["superior insight"] {53a} is to see or attain the ultimate mode of being [of phenomena] in an undeceiving superior manner through having engaged in it by analysis. The superior insight that engages through analysis exists also on [the level of] engagement through aspiration, [but] the superior insight of attainment [exists] solely on the supramundane path. Through this [superior insight], all three [kinds of nonvalid cognition]—nonrealization, wrong cognition, and doubt—are eliminated. Its nature is prajñā, which is twofold through being classified in terms of [realizing] the freedom from any personal and phenomenal identity.

(10) **The path of the union** of profound [prajñā] and vast [means is referred to in the sūtras as follows:]

> By virtue of form and so on being neither fettered nor liberated, bodhisattvas will realize a knowledge of all aspects that is neither fettered nor freed . . .[927]

(11) **Skill in means** is to liberate sentient beings when not resting in meditative equipoise. [The sūtras say:]

> Giving inner and outer entities, bodhisattvas share them with all sentient beings and . . .[928]

(12) The view is **wisdom.** [The sūtras say:]

> The mahāyāna is as follows—the emptiness of the internal . . .[929]

(13) The conduct is to accumulate the **merit** that relies on numerous samādhis. [The sūtras say:]

> The mahāyāna is as follows—the samādhi of "heroic stride" . . .[930]

(14) The **path** that accomplishes the fruition consists of twenty-one sets—(1)–(7) the seven sets of the [dharmas] concordant with enlightenment; (8) the three doors to liberation; (9) the eleven cognitions;[931] (10) the three faculties;[932] (11) the three samādhis;[933] (12) the ten recollections;[934] (13) the four immeasurables; (14) the four dhyānas; (15) the four formless [absorptions]; (16) the eight liberations; (17) the nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding; (18) the ten powers; (19) the four fearlessnesses; (20) the four discriminating awarenesses; (21) and the eighteen unique dharmas.[935] {53b} [The sūtras say:]

> The mahāyāna is as follows—the four foundations of mindfulness . . .[936]

(15) The **dhāraṇī** of not forgetting the excellent path [is referred to in the sūtras as follows:]

> Because "A" refers to being unborn, it is the gate to all phenomena.[937]

There are four [kinds of] dhāraṇī. (a) Bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis possess the dhāraṇī of words or dharmas—immediately upon hearing vast collections of names, words, and letters, they retain and do not forget them. (b) The dhāraṇī of meaning is to realize the meanings of these [words] and to not forget them. (c) From the [level of] poised readiness of the path of preparation onward, [bodhisattvas] possess the dhāraṇī of poised readiness. This refers to something like the following. Having gained certainty that "A" symbolizes being unborn, one meditates by sealing all phenomena with this

meaning [of being unborn]. Through this, once one is completely familiar with it, one is able to attain the poised readiness of realizing that all phenomena are unborn.[938] (d) The dhāraṇī of secret mantra refers to [feats] such as bodhisattvas who dwell on the bhūmis blessing letters of mantras, by virtue of which these mantras are able to overcome epidemics and so on. The first two among these [four] are the actual dhāraṇīs, while the latter two are presented from the perspective of the mind streams of such bodhisattvas retaining said respective powers.[939]

(16) **The ten bhūmis** serve as the foundations for qualities.

(17) **The practice of the equipment of the remedies** dispels flaws.

The sūtra passages for the [last two] of these seventeen will be explained below. As for **the progression of** these [seventeen], there are the two [sets] of (1) what establishes [bodhisattvas in] dwelling in the [mahā]yāna and then donning the great armor and (2) the yāna's own nature. Thus, {54a} the first one [of these two sets] consists of the first ten practices. The second one is again twofold—the path that makes [bodhisattvas] progress and the causes for reaching its end. The first one consists of the following five practices, and the second one of the last two practices. Thus, **these** practices **should be known as** being connected in such a way that the respectively latter ones arise from the respectively former ones.[940]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2. Particular explanations of some of these seventeen
This has three parts:

1) [Explanation of the equipment of] wisdom
2) [Explanation of the equipment of] the bhūmis
3) Explanation of the equipment of the remedies

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.1. Explanation of the equipment of wisdom
This has two parts:

1) Divisions
2) Boundary lines

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.1.1. Divisions

In adaptation to the context of the middle [stage or wheel of dharma] that puts an end to [any kind of] identity, the divisions [of emptiness] are made by virtue of realizing all phenomena of seeming [reality] to be empty. Therefore, the basis of emptiness in this context refers to the bearers of the nature [of emptiness], which represent what is empty. However, this is not the basis of emptiness that actually fulfills this function—the unchanging perfect [nature]—because the [latter] is beyond mind and cannot be enumerated.[941] Therefore, [all of the following] represent [enumerations of] emptiness [in the sense of the respective bearers of this emptiness being empty] of their

respective own natures. [The twenty emptinesses are those of] (1) internal phenomena (such as the eyes); (2) external phenomena (such as form); (3) what are both internal and external (the sense organs and the body); (4) the wisdom that realizes emptiness—the empty entity; (5) what is vast (the ten directions); (6) the ultimate (the path to nirvāṇa); (7) the three realms that arise from the conditioning of causes and conditions; (8) unconditioned phenomena (such as space) as their counterpart; (9) what is beyond extremes (dependent origination free from permanence and extinction); (10) saṃsāra, which is without beginning and end; (11) virtuous factors that are not rejected (such as [the dharmas] concordant with enlightenment); (12) the primordial nature that is not produced through the knowing or seeing of the noble ones; (13) all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena; {54b} (14) characteristics (such as the arising of phenomena and what is suitable as form); (15) the [three] times (such as past and future) being mutually unobservable; (16) the nature of the lack of any entities that entail the coming together [of causes and conditions]; (17) the entities that are the five skandhas (as the counterpart [of the preceding one]); (18) nonentities (such as space); (19) the self-entity of phenomena—emptiness; (20) the entity that is the sphere of the noble ones, which is other than the phenomena in the mind streams of those who just see this life. Thus, by focusing on these twenty objects as being empty of reality, just like illusions, [there] are twenty wisdoms that realize them. This number accords with the positions of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, which represent a combination of the sixteen emptinesses that the sūtras mention in the beginning and the last four that [follow] separately [later].[942]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.1.2. Boundary lines

The first three [emptinesses and wisdoms] are presented as [pertaining to the level of] engagement through aspiration in general; the fourth one, to the supreme dharma; the following seven (5)–(11), to the first through the seventh bhūmi; and the next three sets of two (12)–(17), to [one of] the three pure bhūmis, respectively. The following three (18)–(20) are presented as [pertaining to] the buddhabhūmi. On the [level of] engagement through aspiration, they are realized in an approximately concordant manner and on the other [levels, they are realized] directly.[943]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.2. Explanation of the equipment of the bhūmis

This has two parts:

1) The general presentation of the bhūmis
2) Explaining the distinctive features of the purifications of each [bhūmi] by matching them with the text

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.2.1. The general presentation of the bhūmis[944]
This has four parts:

1) Definition
2) Definiendum
3) Instances
4) Presentation of the factors to be relinquished

1) [The definition of a bhūmi] is that which has the nature of the direct realization of identitylessness and serves as the foundation for the qualities [associated with that realization].

2) From the term "bhūmi" the meaning of progressing higher and higher derives, {55a} which is presented [for all bhūmis] in general. The explanations of the terms for the individual [bhūmis] will be given one by one below.

3) [The instances are explained in three parts:]

3a) Divisions
3b) Definite number
3c) Distinctive features

3a) [The bhūmis] are divided into ten by way of [primarily] engaging in [one of] the ten pāramitās, respectively.

3b) They are presented in this way because they exist as the ten dharmas that are the means of purifying [their respective stains].

3c) The equipment of the bhūmis consists of the phase of subsequent attainment, during which merit is accumulated in an illusionlike manner and certainty about the nature of phenomena, which has already been realized [during meditative equipoise], is gained. During meditative equipoise, one focuses on the naturally existent appearances of the ultimate by cutting through the mistaken appearances of the seeming and eradicates the two obscurations. This is presented in two ways, that is, as the equipments of wisdom and the remedies, repectively.

The manner of realizing the nature of phenomena on the bhūmis corresponds to the example of the sky being seen more and more by virtue of the clouds in this sky evaporating progressively. During that time, though the sky does not have any parts, in terms of its becoming free from clouds, it may be presented as having parts [that are with and without clouds]. Likewise, what is to be realized does not have any parts, but its clear realization will increase by virtue of the mistakenness in one's own mind stream becoming exhausted in a progressive manner. Therefore, by virtue of these differences, on the first bhūmi, [one realizes that] the nature of phenomena pervades oneself and everyone else (which is the actuality of its omnipresence). On the second one, one realizes that the stains which obscure the nature of phenomena can

be relinquished (the actuality of [the nature of phenomena] being supreme). On the third one, [one realizes that] hearing the dharma of the mahāyāna is the actuality that is the natural outflow of realizing the nature of phenomena. On the fourth one, [one realizes] the actuality of being without the clinging [that arises] by virtue of craving for the nature of phenomena. On the fifth one, through being aware of the ten equalities,[945] [one realizes] the actuality of the nature of phenomena in one's own and others' mind streams as not being different. On the sixth one, [one realizes] that the afflictions are not pure (the actuality of their being adventitious). On the seventh one, {55b} since different characteristics of mere dharmas (such as the sūtras) do not occur, [one realizes] the actuality of being free from characteristics. On the eighth one, one realizes that afflicted and purified phenomena are without increase and decrease, and that [the dharmadhātu] is the matrix of mastery over nonconceptuality (by virtue of the seeds of the afflicted mind having changed state) and pure realms (by virtue of the sense consciousnesses having changed state). On the ninth and tenth [bhūmis], respectively, one realizes that the dharmadhātu, by virtue of the mental consciousness having changed state, is the matrix of mastery over the [fourfold] wisdom of discriminating awareness and the enlightened activity of promoting the welfare of beings just as one pleases.[946] Furthermore, [there are] the distinctive features of the signs of having entered [the respective bhūmis] and in dreams; their general and particular qualities; the [different] ways of [the bodhisattvas on the respective bhūmis] taking rebirth; and the [respective] ways of engaging in the pāramitās. [But] since this [text] here is concise, I do not go into these.[947]

4) [The presentation of the factors to be relinquished has three parts:]
   4a) Cognitive obscurations
   4b) Afflictive obscurations
   4c) Manner of relinquishment

4a) In general, the cognitive obscurations consist of the 108 conceptions about apprehender and apprehended.[948] In particular, on each bhūmi, there are the negative tendencies of two [kinds of] ignorance, which are mentioned in the *Saṃdhinirmocana[sūtra]*.[949] On the first bhūmi, this refers to [the ignorance of] clinging to persons and phenomena and [the ignorance] of the afflictions of the unpleasant realms; on the second one, [the ignorance of] the mistakenness of subtle breaches [of ethics] and [the one] about the various aspects of karma; on the third one, [the ignorance] of desire [for meditative absorption] and [the one] of the dhāraṇī of what is heard[950] not being complete; on the fourth one, [the ignorance of] craving for meditative absorption and [the one] of craving for the dharma; on the fifth one, [the ignorance of] neither exclusively turning away from nor being headed for saṃsāra and [the one] of neither exclusively turning away from nor being headed for nirvāṇa;

on the sixth one, [the ignorance of great weariness by virtue of] realizing [how] the formations [of dependent origination] operate and [the one] of the arising of many signs (such as form); on the seventh one, [the ignorance of] the arising of subtle characteristics of mere phenomena {56a} and [the ignorance about] the means to mentally engage in signlessness; on the eighth one, [the ignorance of] neither [gaining] mastery over [dispassionate] efforts [to abide] in signlessness nor over signs; on the ninth one, [the ignorance about] gaining mastery over dhāraṇī (teaching the dharma, infinite words and letters of the dharma, and the increasing self-confidence of prajñā) and [the one] about gaining mastery over self-confidence; on the tenth one, [the ignorance] about great supernatural knowledge and subtle secrets; and on the eleventh one, [the two ignorances] by virtue of attachment and obstruction, respectively,which obscure not being attached to and being unobstructed with regard to all knowable objects.

4b) [Afflictive obscurations] are twofold:

4ba) The factors to be relinquished through seeing

4bb) The factors to be relinquished through familiarization

4ba) When [the factors to be relinquished through seeing—the ten afflictions[951]—] are divided in terms of the manner of wrong engagement, there are three [kinds]:

(1) direct [wrong engagement]

(2) indirect [wrong engagement]

(3) wrong engagement under the sway [of something else]

4ba1) The first three [of the five] views, ignorance, and doubt [wrongly] engage in the [four] realities [in a direct manner] without being interrupted by other afflictions. In due order, [the views about a real personality, the views about extremes, and wrong views mean to] cling to the [four] realities as being a self and what is "mine"; being permanent or extinct; and being without any reality. [The remaining two refer to] being ignorant about the characteristics of these realities and to entertaining doubts about whether what is taught by them is the case or not.

4ba2) Clinging to a view or ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount, desire, and pride [wrongly] engage in the [four] realities [in an indirect manner] through their focusing on [certain of the above] afflictions that focus on [these realities in a direct manner]. Respectively, they refer to clinging to bad views as paramount or bad ways of conduct connected with such [views] as paramount; craving for these [views or conducts]; and one's mind being haughty [while being involved] in them.[952]

4ba3) Anger engages [in the four realities] under the sway of a mind malicious toward what is not in accord with one's own view. {56b}

Though the afflictions [can]not focus on the actual realities of cessation and the path, they focus on just their names. The [general] manner of engaging in the bases of wrong engagement—the four realities—is by way of taking suffering and its origin as mutual causes and by way of being afraid of cessation and the path. Therefore, once the actual way of being of the [four] realities is seen, the afflictions are put to an end.

4bb) [The factors to be relinquished through familiarization] are the six innate afflictions,[953] which wrongly engage their objects.

4c) [The manner of relinquishment] is twofold [according to]
4ca) the mahāyāna
4cb) the hīnayāna

4ca) The factors that obscure the realization of personal identitylessness and phenomenal identitylessness are respectively called (1) "afflicted [ignorance]" and (2) "nonafflicted ignorance." (1) The first one includes the two portions of desire that consist of (a) the actual factors of binding in saṃsāra and (b) the latent tendencies that are input through these [factors]. (2) The latter include the two factors that obscure (a) natural purity and (b) the purity of adventitious [stains]. The respectively first [—factors (1a) and (2a)—] among these are relinquished on the first bhūmi and the respectively latter [—factors (1b) and (2b)—are relinquished] on the path of familiarization. Therefore, in terms of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing, the dharma readiness [of the reality] of suffering relinquishes both [the afflictive and the cognitive] obscurations among the factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to the suffering of all three realms; the dharma cognition [of suffering] clearly perceives the path of liberation; and the subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition [of suffering], through focusing on the former two and subsequent readiness, respectively, apprehend these [two and subsequent readiness] as the causes of the qualities of the noble ones. The same [pattern of two cognitions and two readinesses] applies for the remaining [three realities]. In terms of moments, all factors to be relinquished through seeing {57a} are relinquished in the moments that are the smallest units of time. As for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization, the respectively three levels of the small and medium path of familiarization from the second through the seventh bhūmis relinquish the respectively great and medium degrees of the [108] conceptions and the afflictions [to be relinquished]. The pure bhūmis—the three levels of the great path of familiarization—relinquish the three lesser degrees of those conceptions [and afflictions].[954] The manner of relinquishment is exclusively simultaneous [in terms of the corresponding degrees of obscurations pertaining to the three realms].

4cb) The factors to be relinquished through seeing [with regard to the reality] of suffering of the desire realm are relinquished through dharma readiness and dharma cognition and [those with regard to the reality] of suffering of the higher realms [are relinquished] through subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition. This also illustrates [the factors to be relinquished with regard to] the other [three realities].[955] As for the factors [pertaining to the three realms] that are to be relinquished through familiarization, there can be both gradual and simultaneous relinquishment. Through the mundane path of familiarization, [the meditative absorptions of the higher realms] are regarded as peaceful [in comparison with] the coarse [states of the desire realm], which results in a mere suppression of manifest afflictions. On the other hand, the path of the noble ones—the clear realizations of the [four] realities—eradicates also the latencies [of these afflictions].

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.2.2. Explaining the distinctive features of the purifications of each bhūmi by matching them with the text

This has two parts:

1) [Explaining] the purifications of the [first] nine bhūmis as the causes
2) Explaining the characteristics of the tenth bhūmi as the fruition

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.2.2.1. Explaining the purifications of the first nine bhūmis as the causes

When abiding on a given bhūmi, the stains of this very bhūmi are purified during its respective phase of subsequent attainment, which also represents the preparatory training in order to attain the qualities of the respectively higher bhūmi.[956] Therefore, the explanation of this [process] is ninefold.

1) [The first bhūmi has two parts:]
   1a) The means to purify
   1b) Prajñā as the manner of purifying

1a) [The means to purify]

Through tenfold purification
The first bhūmi is attained.
Intention, beneficial things,
An equal mind toward sentient beings, [I.48]

Giving away, serving friends,
Searching for the genuine dharma as focal object,
A constant mindset of leaving,
Longing for the buddhakāya, [I.49]

Teaching the dharma, and true speech,
Which is asserted to be the tenth. [I.50ab]

Through tenfold purification, the first bhūmi is attained. It is endowed with [and called] supreme joy because [bodhisattvas] realize the nature of phenomena, which they had not attained before. {57b} [The ten purifications are] (1) the [unwavering][957] superior **intention** of accomplishing [all kinds of] virtue [through the mental engagement of the knowledge of all aspects]; (2) accomplishing **beneficial things**—[virtuous] activities of the three gates [of body, speech, and mind for all sentient beings]; (3) practicing the four immeasurables as [the expression of] **an equal mind toward sentient beings**; (4) **giving away** things through being pure of the three spheres [of agent, recipient, and action]; (5) **serving friends** who establish one in the knowledge of all aspects [through practicing in accordance with their instructions that touch one's heart]; (6) **searching for** the meaning of **the genuine dharma** of the three yānas through taking it **as one's focal object** [in order to teach it to those to be guided in accordance with their mindsets]; (7) **a constant mindset of leaving** one's home [by virtue of seeing its shortcomings and remaining in the homelessness of the Buddha's teachings]; (8) [consequently,] **longing for** accomplishing **the buddhakāya**; (9) **teaching the dharma** [of the twelve branches of the very vast scriptures of the mahāyāna] that matures sentient beings;[958] **and** (10) honest **true speech** [(acting in accordance with one's words)], **which is asserted to be the tenth** purification.

1b) [Prajñā as the manner of purifying]

Through not observing any nature
These are to be understood as purifications. [I.50cd]

This also applies to the following [bhūmis].[959] The sūtras say:

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the first bhūmi should perform these ten purifications . . .[960]

2) The second bhūmi is [The Stainless One, which means] being without the stains of mentally engaging in corrupt ethics and inferior paths.[961]

Ethics, gratitude, patience,
Utter joy, great compassion,
Respectful service, listening to the guru with reverence,
And the eighth, vigor for generosity and such. [I.51]

[The eight purifications on this bhūmi] are (1) the three [types of the pure] **ethics** [of bodhisattvas, without engaging in inferior paths];[962] (2) **gratefully** repaying [even small beneficial] actions of others [for oneself]; (3) **patience** toward harm [through not holding on to any bases for grudge]; (4) the **utter joy** of not regretting to practice virtuous dharmas [—naturally accomplishing virtue oneself and maturing others in the three yānas]; (5) **great compassion** for all sentient beings [which even entails the enthusiasm to experience the sufferings of the unpleasant realms in order to benefit each sentient being individually]; (6) making efforts in **respectful service** to the guru; (7) **listening to the genuine dharma with reverence for the guru** [and then accomplishing it exactly as it was taught]; **and** (8) **the eighth** purification—**vigor for** the six pāramitās **such as generosity.** [The sūtras say:]

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the second bhūmi should mentally engage in eight dharmas . . . {58a}

3) The third bhūmi is The Illuminating One, which shines the light of the dharma onto oneself and others through the power of samādhi.

> **Insatiable desire to study,**
> **Giving the dharma without expecting any reward,**
> **Purification of the buddha realm,**
> **Not being weary of saṃsāra,** [I.52]
>
> **And shame and embarrassment**
> **Represent the fivefold lack of conceit.** [I.53ab]

The fivefold purification [of this bhūmi] **represents the lack of a conceited** mind about (1) the **insatiable desire to study** [all] the words of the Buddha; (2) **giving the dharma without** depending on **expecting** to receive any **reward**[963] [—if one has not even any expectations about enlightenment when teaching the dharma, there is no need to mention material gain and such]; (3) **purification** of the surroundings and the contents **of the buddha realms** [that are attained by oneself and others upon becoming a buddha]; (4) **not being weary** of the flaws **of saṃsāra** [—not even of ignorant beings who repay one's kindness with the opposite]; **and** (5) **shame and embarrassment** [in the sense of] turning away from [regarding] the mindsets of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas [as good qualities].[964] [The sūtras say:]

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the third bhūmi should abide in five dharmas . . .

4) The fourth bhūmi is The Radiating One, whose fire burns the two obscurations through the prajñā of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment.

> **Dwelling in forests, having little desire, being content,**
> **Resorting to strict abstinence,** [I.53cd]
>
> **Not abandoning the training,**
> **Despising sense pleasures,**
> **Turning away, renouncing all there is,**
> **Being uncowed, and disregard.** [I.54]

The ten purifications [of this bhūmi] are (1) **dwelling in** secluded **forests**; (2) **having little desire**—not even desiring enlightenment for one's own welfare; (3) **being content** with what is obtained [—not even being conceited about full enlightenment, even if it is attained]; (4) taking the twelve qualities of **strict abstinence**[965] as a **resort**[966] [represents the readiness for profound reality]; (5) **not abandoning the** three **trainings** even at the cost of one's life, [since one is free from the reference points and characteristics of all trainings]; (6) **despising** the qualities of **sense pleasures** due to not liking them [or due to not even a mere object for desire appearing]; (7) making efforts in joining those to be guided with the path of **turning away**[967] [from saṃsāra] as is fit [or turning away in the sense of being without any formational efforts with respect to phenomena]; (8) **renouncing all there is**[968] (such as the body), [since inner and outer entities are not seen as entities]; (9) one's mind **being uncowed** with regard to what is virtuous [because of remaining unmixed with a mind stream that consists of (ordinary) consciousness]; (10) **disregard**[969] for reification, [since the flux of consciousness and labeling expressions has stopped].[970] [The sūtras say:]

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the fourth bhūmi should not abandon these ten dharmas . . .

5) The fifth bhūmi {58b} is Difficult to Master, which refers to performing the two difficult activities of maturing sentient beings and one's own mind not becoming afflicted [through that].

> **Intimacy, jealousy in terms of families,**
> **Places that invite crowds,**
> **Praising oneself, disparaging others,**
> **The ten paths of nonvirtuous actions,** [I.55]
>
> **Conceit and arrogance, mistakenness,**
> **Deficient states of mind, and tolerance for afflictions—**

If these ten are relinquished,
The fifth bhūmi is attained. [I.56]

[The ten purifications of this bhūmi] are that **the fifth bhūmi is attained if the** following **ten flaws are relinquished** and purified—(1) exceeding **intimacy** with lay or ordained persons; (2) **jealousy**[971] **in terms of the families** of one's own sponsors, thus being miserly [in terms of teaching them when they (also) support others]; (3) relying on **places that invite crowds**; (4) **praising oneself**; (5) **disparaging others**; (6) **the ten paths of nonvirtuous actions** (such as killing); (7) a mind with **conceit and arrogance** about one's qualities; (8) **mistakenly** clinging to what is to be adopted and to be rejected; (9) **deficient states of mind** that are wrong views; **and** (10) **tolerance for afflictions**, that is, not regarding them as flaws but following after them.[972] [The sūtras say:]

A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the fifth bhūmi should relinquish ten dharmas . . .

6) The sixth bhūmi is [called "The Facing One"] in terms of directly facing saṃsāra and nirvāṇa by virtue of not abiding in either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa through relying on prajñāpāramitā.

Through generosity, ethics, patience, vigor,
Dhyāna, and prajñā being perfected,
The mind of longing for the disciples and the rhinos
And being afraid are relinquished, [I.57]

One is uncowed by beggars,
Not sad even when one has given away everything,
And not rejecting beggars even when poor.
Through these the sixth bhūmi is attained. [I.58]

The [twelve] purifications [of this bhūmi] consist of (1)–(6) the sixfold generation of the path **through** the six pāramitās of **generosity, ethics, patience, vigor, dhyāna, and prajñā being perfected** as well as the sixfold relinquishment of what is not the path—(7)–(8) the twofold relinquishment of **longing for** the states of **the disciples** (the śrāvakas) **and the rhinos** (the pratyekabuddhas); (9) **relinquishing the mind of being afraid** of what is vast and profound [—the welfare of others and the definitive meaning]; (10) one's mind **being uncowed by beggars** as those who ask for something; (11) **not being sad even when one has given away everything** [spontaneously and naturally]; **and** (12) **not rejecting beggars even when** oneself is **poor. Through these** twelve, **the sixth bhūmi is attained.**[973] {59a} [The sūtras say:]

A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the sixth bhūmi should complete six dharmas . . . Furthermore, six dharmas should be relinquished . . .

7) The seventh bhūmi is [called "Gone Afar"] in terms of having gone far beyond the clinging to characteristics by virtue of being joined with the path of the single progress [to buddhahood]. Its purification has two parts:

a) The [twenty] factors to be relinquished

Clinging to a self, sentient being,
Soul, person, extinction, and permanence;
With regard to characteristics, causes, skandhas,
Dhātus, āyatanas, [I.59]

And the three realms, dwelling on,
Being attached to, and one's mind being cowed by them;
Clinging to views about the three jewels
And ethics as being such, [I.60]

Disputing emptiness,
And opposing it—
Those in whom these twenty flaws are removed
Attain the seventh bhūmi. [I.61]

[The twenty factors to be relinquished here] are (1)–(8) the eight factors that are afflictive obscurations (**clinging to a self; sentient being; soul; person; extinction; permanence; characteristics;** and clinging to **causes** that are different from the afflictions) as well as the [twelve] cognitive obscurations. These consist of (9)–(14) the sixfold entertaining of characteristics with regard to the ground (clinging to, **dwelling on,** and **being attached to skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, and the three realms, and one's mind being cowed by them,** thinking, "I am not able to go beyond saṃsāra"); (15)–(18) the fourfold entertaining of characteristics with regard to the path (**clinging to views about** the characteristics of **the three jewels and ethics as being such** [jewels and ethics]); and (19)–(20) the twofold clinging to characteristics with regard to aspects (**disputing** the meaning that the adventitious bearers of the nature [of emptiness] are **empty** and thinking that this statement and the statement of suchness not being empty are **opposing**[974] [each other]). **Those in whom these twenty flaws are removed** and relinquished **attain the seventh bhūmi.**

b) The [twenty] factors to be adopted

Knowing the three doors to liberation,
Being pure of the three spheres,
Compassion, no conceit,
Knowing the equality of phenomena and the single principle, [I.62]

Knowing nonarising and poised readiness,
The single flow of dharmas,
Overcoming conceptions,
Relinquishing discriminations, views, and afflictions, [I.63]

Familiarizing with calm abiding,
Being skilled in superior insight,
A tamed mind, wisdom
Unobstructed in all respects, [I.64]

Not being a ground for attachment,
Going all at once to other realms as one pleases,
And displaying one's own being everywhere—
These are the twenty. [I.65]

[Among the twenty factors to be adopted, there are] the eight remedies for [the above eight] afflictive obscurations— (1)–(3) **knowing the three doors to liberation** (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness);[975] (4) practicing the ten virtues [perfectly] through **being pure of the three spheres**; (5) great unbiased **compassion**; (6) **no conceit** about anything at all; {59b} (7) **knowing the equality of phenomena** in the sense of all phenomena of the seeming being unobservable [or empty of a nature of their own]; **and** (8) [knowing] **the single principle** of the ultimate [nature of phenomena whose own nature is unchanging]. [Among the twelve remedies for the above cognitive obscurations,] the six remedies for conceptions about the ground are (9) **knowing** that all phenomena are **nonarising**, [since all phenomena primordially do not exist as anything established or existent that actually fulfills this function]; (10) knowing the **poised readiness** for the profound dharma [of emptiness]; (11) **the single flow of** [all] **dharmas** that is the actuality of the mahāyāna;[976] (12) **overcoming conceptions**; (13) **relinquishing discriminations** of characteristics, the five **views, and afflictions** (such as desire); and (14) **familiarizing with** the one-pointed **calm abiding** in the knowledge of all aspects. The four remedies for conceptions about the path are (15) **being skilled in** prajñā through **superior insight**; (16) **a tamed mind** [that is not directed outwardly, but dwells peacefully within]; (17) **wisdom unobstructed** by ignorance with **respect to all** phenomena [and their true nature]; and (18) knowing this as

not being a ground for the mind being **attached** to objects [by virtue of the six inner āyatanas not engaging them]. The two remedies for conceptions about aspects are (19) simultaneously [with the buddhas,] **going to** various other buddha **realms, just as one pleases, at one** and the same time **and** (20) **displaying** the **being** of **one's own** body as all kinds of emanations [for different retinues] **everywhere** [and at all times. The last two operate] by virtue of cutting through superimpositions after having joined the company of buddhas.[977] Thus, **these are the twenty** [factors to be adopted]. [The sūtras say:]

> For a bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the seventh bhūmi, twenty dharmas are not suitable . . . A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the seventh bhūmi should complete these twenty dharmas . . .

8) The eighth bhūmi is [called "The Immovable One"] in terms of being immovable by the two discriminating notions of making efforts in terms of characteristics or the lack of characteristics.

> **Knowing the minds of all sentient beings,**
> **Playing with supernatural knowledges,**
> **Manifesting a superb buddha realm,**
> **Tending to the buddhas in scrutiny,** [I.66]
>
> **Knowing the faculties, purifying**
> **The realm of a victor, dwelling in illusionlikeness,**
> **And assuming existence at will—**
> **These are said to be the eight activities.** [I.67]

[The eight purifications of this bhūmi] are (1) **knowing** the behaviors of **the minds of all sentient beings**; {60a} (2) **playing with** the **supernatural knowledges** of magical powers in various pure and impure [worldly] realms for the sake of the welfare of others; (3) **manifesting a superb buddha realm**; (4) **tending to the buddhas** in order to [perfect the] **scrutiny** of phenomena in terms of how they actually are and how they appear; (5) **knowing** the deaths, transitions, and rebirths [of beings] through **the faculty** of the divine eye; (6) **purifying** the surroundings and their contents as **the realm of a victor**; (7) **dwelling in** the **illusionlikeness** of [all endeavors that involve] the triad of agent, object, and action; **and** (8) autonomously **assuming** births in **existence at will** [for the welfare of sentient beings].[978] **These are said to be the eight activities** of purification. [The sūtras say:]

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the eighth bhūmi should complete these four dharmas . . . Furthermore, another four dharmas should be completed . . .

9) The ninth bhūmi is the Excellent One because the excellent insight of [fourfold] discriminating awareness in terms of being skilled in teaching the dharma is attained.[979]

> **Infinite aspiration prayers,**
> **Knowing the languages of gods and so on,**
> **Streamlike eloquent presence,**
> **Supreme descent into a womb,** [I.68]
>
> **Excellency of family, descent, lineage,**
> **Retinue, birth,**
> **Renunciation, bodhi trees,**
> **And perfection[980] of qualities.** [I.69]

The twelve purifications [of this bhūmi] are (1) **infinite aspiration prayers** being accomplished as one aspired; (2) **knowing the languages of** [all] beings (**gods and so on**) in order to teach the dharma; (3) an **eloquent presence**[981] that is uninterrupted **like** a **river** and cannot be outshined; (4) the **supreme descent into a** flawless **womb** (and not miraculous birth and so forth); the **excellency of** (5) a royal **family** and such, which is highly renowned in the world; (6) being of supreme **descent**, such as "the friend of the sun";[982] (7) being born in a supreme **lineage** in which [all] relatives (such as one's parents) have been engaged in the dharma for at least seven generations; (8) gathering one's own pure **retinue** [of bodhisattvas]; (9) a **birth** from the space between the ribs [of one's mother] and so on; (10) being encouraged by the buddhas {60b} to **renounce** [one's home]; (11) dwelling under **bodhi trees** that fulfill all needs and desires; **and** (12) making efforts in [the **perfection of**] the buddha **qualities** (such as the ten powers) [in both oneself and others].[983] [The sūtras say:]

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the ninth bhūmi should complete twelve dharmas . . .

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.2.2.2. The characteristics of the tenth bhūmi as the fruition

Having passed beyond nine levels,
This dwelling on the buddhabhūmi
By virtue of wisdom should be known
As the tenth bodhisattvabhūmi. [I.70]

Having passed beyond nine levels (the seven levels of śrāvakas, the one level of pratyekabuddhas, and the nine bodhisattvabhūmis being counted as one [level]) in this way, the **wisdom** that includes all qualities [up to the tenth būmi] in the manner of the lower being incorporated in the higher represents the [tenth] bodhisattvabhūmi. However, **by virtue of** the reason of [these bodhisattvas] being able to display the nairmāṇikakāyas of a buddha during subsequent attainment, it is appropriate to express **this** [bhūmi] as **"dwelling on the buddhabhūmi,"** but it is not actual completely perfect buddhahood.[984] **It should be known** that **this** is the defining characteristic of **the tenth bodhisattvabhūmi**—the cloud of dharma that consists of (a) the [cloudlike] two gates of dhāraṇīs and samādhis pervading the skylike foundation in which they are immersed—the dharma that was heard [by these bodhisattvas on all the preceding bhūmis]—and (b) its [ensuing] showering down the rain of dharma.[985] [The sūtras say:]

> Subhūti, thus, after having passed beyond nine levels . . . a bodhisattva mahāsattva dwells on the buddhabhūmi. Subhūti, this is the tenth bodhisattvabhūmi.[986]

The seven levels of the śrāvakas are (1) the level of the disposition; (2) the eighth level; (3) the level of seeing; (4) the level of diminishing; (5) the level of freedom from desire; (6) the level of having done what had to be done; and (7) the level of śrāvakas. {61a} In due order, these are presented as the levels of the supreme dharma; approaching stream-enterers; abiders in the fruition of a stream-enterer; the three abiders in the fruitions of a once-returner, a non-returner, and an arhat; and [all] the approachers to the [last] three [counted as one].[987]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.3.2.3. Explanation of the equipment of the remedies

One should know the eight kinds of remedies
On the paths of seeing and repeated exercise
In order to pacify the eight[988] conceptions
About the apprehended and the apprehender. [I.71]

During the phases of meditative equipoise **on the path of seeing and** the path of **repeated exercise**, which familiarizes with what [was seen on the path of seeing], the respective factors to be relinquished on each one [of these paths] are **the two conceptions about the apprehended and** the two conceptions about **the apprehender**, including their latencies. **One should know**[989] that, **in order to pacify** these, **the remedies** that are presented from the perspective of these [eight conceptions] are of eight kinds too, that is, four each on [the uninterrupted paths of] the two [paths of] seeing and familiarization. The sūtras discuss this by way of the [Buddha's] answers in relation to the aspects of both realities, which are his answers to [Subhūti's] questions [in the eighteenth chapter of the *Sūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* that start with], "From where will the mahāyāna deliver?" The answers in terms of the seeming, in which a place of final deliverance, someone who is delivered, and a manner of delivering are accepted, [discuss] the remedies for the factors to be relinquished through seeing. The answers in terms of the ultimate—a place of final deliverance and so on being unobservable—speak about the remedies for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization.[990]

2.3.1.2.1.1.2.3.4.3.4. The practice of final deliverance

Final deliverance in terms of the aim, equality,
The welfare of sentient beings, effortlessness,
And being beyond extremes,
Final deliverance characterized by attainment, [I.72]

Final deliverance in terms of the knowledge of all aspects,
And the one that has the path as its sphere.
One should know that the practice of final deliverance
Consists of these eight kinds. [I.73]

Since it is certain that the final fruition is attained through having completed the equipments, this is presented by way of the [following eight kinds of final deliverance. The first] six represent the manner of final deliverance—(1) **the three aims** [as the three greatnesses] by virtue of the aspect of realizing that all phenomena without exception are unobservable; (2) the [ultimate] realization of all phenomena being **equality**; (3) the [ultimate] accomplishment of **the infinite welfare of sentient beings**; (4) spontaneous **effortlessness** with regard to these; {61b} (5) the **final deliverance in terms of being beyond the extremes** of permanence and extinction; and (6) the **final deliverance** that has the **characteristic** of the [ultimate] lasting **attainment** of [all] the qualities of the three yānas. (7) The ultimate [path of] nonlearning is the

final deliverance in terms of the knowledge of all aspects in which dhātu and wisdom have become of one taste.[991](8) The ultimate path of learning is the special path of the tenth bhūmi[992]—**the wisdom that has as its sphere**[993] **the path** which makes one attain this [knowledge of all aspects]. In brief, **one should know that the practice of final deliverance consists of these eight kinds** and that they are connected through the respectively former depending on the respectively latter.[994] The sūtras say:

> Outshining the world with its gods, humans, and asuras, this mahāyāna will deliver.[995]
>
> **This is the first chapter, on the knowledge of all aspects, in *The Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called* The Ornament of Clear Realization.**

This is the commentary on **the first chapter in the** versified ***Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called* The Ornament of Clear Realization.**



The Second Chapter, on the Knowledge of the Path

2.3.1.2.1.2. The knowledge of the path (the means to attain the [knowledge of all aspects])
This has two parts:
1) Presenting the connection
2) Explaining the defining points

2.3.1.2.1.2.1. Presenting the connection
The attainment of the knowledge of all aspects (the fruition that has been defined through the [above] ten dharmas) depends on the knowledge of the path. Therefore, the following consists of the meaning of the defining points of the knowledge of the path, which was taught [by the Buddha] to the gods (from the four great kings up through those in the [five] pure abodes) when they had newly gathered as retinues.[996]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2. Explaining the defining points
This has two parts:
1) The causes of the knowledge of the path
2) The knowledge of the path that arises from these [causes]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.1. The causes of the knowledge of the path

Eclipsing the gods through light
So as to make them suitable,
Definite object, pervasiveness,
Nature, and its activity. [II.1]

[There are five causes or branches of the knowledge of the path.]

1) Once the mind is free from the adverse conditions that consist of the afflictions which agitate it, {62a} [it is fit for] the knowledge of the path to arise. The instruction on such a mental support is that the Bhagavān causes the gods (such as Śakra) to be without manifest pride by way of **eclipsing** and

thus outshining their light through his own light so as to make them suitable supports for the arising of the knowledge of the path. The sūtras say:

> Next to the natural light of the Tathāgata, the light of the gods, which has arisen as a result of karmic maturation, is not brilliant.[997]

2) The favorable condition is [a mind without the above afflictions, in which] the object of the arising of the knowledge of the path—the generation of bodhicitta—is definite. [The sūtras say]:

> Those sons of the gods who have not yet generated the mindset for complete enlightenment should give rise to the mindset for unsurpassable complete enlightenment.

3) The substantial cause is the sugata heart—the disposition that dwells in all sentient beings in a pervasive manner. For it is definitely one with the yānas through which the noble ones are to progress [on the path] and also [one with] the final fruition of all its stains having been purified without exception.[998] [The sūtras say]:

> I shall rejoice if they too give rise to the mindset for unsurpassable enlightenment.

4) The enhancing factor is to have the nature of not relinquishing the afflictions that are the causes for rebirth in [saṃsāric] existence for the sake of accomplishing the welfare of others. The portion of the afflictions that fetters one in [saṃsāric] existence and makes the mind agitated is naturally relinquished on the first bhūmi. What is taught here [as the causes for the rebirths of bodhisattvas] is twofold—(a) the latencies of desire that have the power [to enable them] to assume births [in saṃsāra as they please] {62b} (which are deliberately not relinquished) and (b) nonafflicted ignorance (which is something to be relinquished). (a) The first ones exist during the impure bhūmis of those who have not gone through inferior paths before and [are the factors that] establish the contaminated skandhas [of the deliberate rebirths of such bodhisattvas]. (b) The latter one must be presented as [existing on] the three pure bhūmis and [also] the lower bhūmis of those who have gone through inferior paths before. It is what establishes the uncontaminated skandhas [of the deliberate rebirths of such bodhisattvas]. This latter one is also what establishes the skandhas of those who enter the mahāyāna path of accumulation after they have been awakened [by the buddhas] from the inferior nirvāṇa without remainder.[999] [The sūtras say]:

I shall not obstruct this virtuous feature of theirs.

5) The efforts in the **activity of the** [knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas who have the above nature] consist of liberating sentient beings [continuously] without manifesting the true end[1000] by virtue of not completing the triad of completion, maturation, and purification in order to not stray into the extreme of [one-sided] peace.[1001] [The sūtras say]:

> From among distinguished dharmas, the most distinguished dharmas should be attained.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2. The knowledge of the path that arises from these causes
This has three parts:

1) [The manner of the knowledge of the path of] śrāvakas
2) [The manner of the knowledge of the path of] pratyekabuddhas
3) The manner of the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1. The manner of the knowledge of the path of śrāvakas
This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.1. General topic
This has two parts:

1) Classification of the path
2) The manner of the knowledge of the path of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.1.2.1.1. Classification of the path
The path of accumulation consists of studying and reflecting on [the śrāvakas'] own piṭaka and cultivating the four foundations of mindfulness, all by relying on the ethics of the prātimokṣa [vows]. The path of preparation consists of focusing on the [four] realities (the manner of which has already been taught) and progressively cultivating the four correct efforts, the four limbs of miraculous powers, the five faculties, and the five powers. {63a} As for the path of seeing, [its first stage]—dharma readiness—consists of the uninterrupted path that is the realization of the basic nature of the reality of suffering of the desire realm. Its dharma cognition consists of the [ensuing] path of liberation. Its subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition are the uninterrupted path of realizing the nature of the reality of suffering of the [two] higher realms and the [ensuing] path of liberation, respectively.

Through applying the same [pattern] to the other three realities, [the path of seeing has] sixteen mental moments. From among these, the first fifteen represent the path of seeing, which has the nature of the eightfold path of the noble ones. The path of familiarization, when classified in terms of the factors to be relinquished on its nine stages by gradualists, has eighty-one [levels]. In the case of simultaneists, it has nine [levels].[1002] It has the nature of the seven branches of enlightenment.[1003] The path of nonlearning means that one attains the termination of the ninth [degree of] the afflictions [with regard to the Peak of] Existence and knows [that all afflictions will never arise again]. As long as one is alive, [this state] represents the nirvāṇa with remainder, and after death it is the one without remainder.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2. The manner of the knowledge of the path of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas

Since all realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are complete on the path of seeing of the mahāyāna in the manner of the lower being incorporated in the higher, through their dharma vision and so on [bodhisattvas] know the paths of realization in the mind streams of other persons. However, in their own mind streams, during meditative equipoise [bodhisattvas] know the realizations [that correspond to those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas] in a nonreferential manner through the aspect of phenomenal identitylessness, but they do not cultivate them in any of the ways that correspond to those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.[1004]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.2. Meaning of the text

This has two parts:

1) The manner of the knowledge of the path of noble ones
2) Explaining its cause—the path of preparation

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.2.1. The manner of the knowledge of the path of noble ones

> **Within the scope of the knowledge of the path,**
> **Through not observing the aspects**
> **Of the four realities of the noble ones**
> **This path of the śrāvakas is to be understood.** [II.2]

As for the knowledge of the path of the śrāvakas **within the scope of the knowledge of the path** [of bodhisattvas], **the** [thirty-three] **aspects of the four realities of the noble ones** [as described in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras] are as follows. The four [aspects] of the reality of suffering are (1) impermanence; (2) suffering; (3) identitylessness (being empty);[1005] {63b} and (4) its

own nature being peace.[1006] The four [aspects] of the reality of the origin [of suffering] are (5) being like a disease (cause); (6) its own nature being like an abscess (origin); (7) being like a thorn/spear (arising); and (8) being like evil that destroys virtue (condition).[1007] The seven aspects common to [both the realities of] suffering and its origin are (9/16)[1008] [being like one's] adversaries; (10/17) destructiveness; (11/18) unsteadiness; (12/19) disintegrating; (13/20) frightening; (14/21) plague; and (15/22) calamity. The *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* says that the first two of these [seven] are classified [in terms of the focus] of the disillusionment on the path of seeing; the next two, [in terms of the focus] of the freedom from desire on the path of familiarization; and the last three, in terms of the focus of the cessation of suffering and its origin on the path of nonlearning.[1009] The seven [aspects] of the reality of cessation are (23) identitylessness (by virtue of the afflictions having ceased); (24) peace; (25) being free from the factors to be relinquished (the excellent fruition); and (26) emptiness, (27) signlessness, (28) wishlessness, and (29) nonformation [of any causes for further rebirth], (which are the subdivisions of final deliverance).[1010] The four [aspects] of the reality of the path are (30) path; (31) appropriateness; (32) accomplishment; and (33) being conducive to deliverance.[1011] **Through not observing** these kinds of aspects, they **are said to be** that which makes **this path of the śrāvakas understood.**[1012] The sūtras say:

> What is the mother of a bodhisattva mahāsattva? . . . Here, bodhisattva mahāsattvas, through their generation of bodhicitta that is endowed with the knowledge of all aspects, mentally engage in a nonreferential way in form being impermanent . . .[1013]

This teaches both the path and the manner of knowing it.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.2.2. Explaining its cause—the path of preparation

> **Since form and so on are empty,**
> **By virtue of their emptinesses being undifferentiable**
> **This represents heat. Through not observing them**
> **This is asserted as having gone to the peak.** [II.3]

> **The poised readinesses [arise] through preventing**
> **Any abiding in them by way of being permanent and so on.**
> **Starting with the ten bhūmis,**
> **Through the detailed teachings on nonabiding** [II.4]

The supreme dharma is explained
On the path of the noble śrāvakas.[1014]
For what reason is that? Because the Buddha,
Upon realization, did not see any phenomena. [II.5]

Since the realization of the [four] realities arises from the path of preparation, whose focal objects and aspects are approximately concordant with true reality, {64a} the manner in which the śrāvakas complete the path of preparation [as experienced through the lens of the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas] is taught [here] too. [On the four stages of] **the path** [of preparation] that are to be cultivated by **the noble śrāvakas**, while focusing **on** the four realities, **since** [all] phenomena—**form and so on**—**are empty, the emptinesses** [of all these phenomena] **are** mutually **undifferentiable.** (1) To familiarize with them as being just one and the same **represents** the aspects of **heat.** (2) To familiarize with **these** phenomena **through not observing** their respective own natures **is asserted** as the aspects of **having gone to the peak.** (3) **The** aspects of **poised readiness** consist of familiarizing **through preventing any abiding in** extremes **by way of** not conceiving of **these** [phenomena] as anything such as **being permanent and so on**, which includes being impermanent, both, or neither. (4) In the sūtras, [there are] **the detailed teachings on** the manner in which one should **not abide** in anything through entertaining clinging to its being real, **starting with the ten bhūmis** up through the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment.[1015] **Through** having understood these [teachings], to familiarize with them free from any appearances of seeming [reality] **is explained** as the aspects of **the supreme dharma.** You may wonder, "At this point, is what assesses the object (a nonimplicative negation) a validly cognizing mind?" Yes, it is. **For what reason is that?** [It is so,] **because** even **the Buddha, upon realizing** the actual way of being and the way of appearance of [all] phenomena, **did not see any phenomena** produced through the causes of mistakenness.[1016] The sūtras say:

Kauśika . . . form is empty of form . . .[1017]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2. The manner of the knowledge of the path of pratyekabuddhas
This has two parts:
1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1. General topic
This has three parts:
1) Definiendum

2) Divisions
3) Distinctive features

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.1. Definiendum
They are called "Realized Ones through Conditions" because they realize enlightenment through the conditions of aspiration prayers. {64b} [They are called] "Self-buddhas" because they become buddhas without depending on others.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.2. Divisions
There are three [types]—rhinolike ones as well as greater and lesser group practitioners. [These three] are of greater, medium, and lesser faculties, respectively.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.3. Distinctive features
This has two parts:
1) The manner of progressing on the path
2) The fruition

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.3.1. The manner of progressing on the path
When the rhinolike [pratyekabuddhas] have completed the path of accumulation after having gathered the accumulations for one hundred eons, knowing that they still will take a [last] rebirth, they train in the six topics of erudition (skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, the [four] realities, dependent origination, and what is and what is not the case). At the point of dying, they make the following aspiration prayer: "May I be born in a realm without buddhas and śrāvakas! There, may I progress on the path without depending on others! After having attained enlightenment, may I [teach] those to be guided [through] physical displays and not teach any verbal dharma!" After their death and transition, in their next life [they are born with] the physical support of a male in a realm empty [of buddhas and śrāvakas] on [any of] the three continents [other than Uttarakuru] and in [any caste] that is not the śūdra caste.[1018] In [this male body], by virtue of the condition of becoming weary [of saṃsāra through seeing the bones] in a charnel ground [and thus remembering death and the entire reverse order of the twelve links of dependent origination], they familiarize themselves [again] with the topics of erudition through a mind [that rests] in the fourth dhyāna. Through this, they complete the paths of preparation, seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning in this very lifetime. [In this process,] they relinquish both the afflictive obscurations and the conceptions about the apprehended to be relinquished through seeing. The conceptions about the apprehended to be relinquished

through familiarization and the nine [degrees of the] afflictive obscurations of the [two] higher realms are relinquished in a combined manner, while the afflictions of the desire realm have already been relinquished before the path of seeing.

As for the greater and lesser group practitioners, after having gathered the accumulations for just one-third or two-thirds of one hundred eons, they respectively attain the greater poised readiness [of the path of preparation] {65a} or [any level above that] up through the path of seeing in the life [that follows this accumulation]. In the next life, they progress through the remaining [stages of the] paths and thus attain the fruition [of pratyekabuddha arhathood].

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.3.2. The fruition

In terms of body, the rhinolike [pratyekabuddhas] remain alone; in terms of speech, they don't talk; in terms of mind, when thinking about the [four] realities and so on and engaging in their alms rounds, they guide those to be guided through the miraculous powers of their body and wander all by themselves. The two [types of] group practitioners [display] only fractions of these features. The philosophical system of the pratyekabuddhas is Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalism. The presentation of the path corresponds to the one of the śrāvakas.[1019]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2. Meaning of the text

This has three parts:

1) The manner of being more distinguished [than the śrāvakas]
2) The nature of the path
3) Its cause, the path of preparation

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1. The manner of being more distinguished than the śrāvakas

This has two parts:

1) The manner of realizing wisdom
2) The manner of teaching the dharma

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. The manner of realizing wisdom

They do not need instructions by others
Since they realize the self-arisen by themselves.
This expresses the profundity
Of the wisdom of the rhinos. [II.6]

Persons who are pratyekabuddhas are more distinguished than persons who are śrāvakas **since they** [—by virtue of their previous aspiration prayers—] **realize** the wisdom that knows termination and nonarising as having the nature of being **self-arisen.**[1020] The reason for this is that, during their last existence, even if they [received] **instructions by other** masters, **they do not need** them because they realize **the** greatly **profound wisdom of the rhinos** in this very moment. This is implicitly clear through the following scriptural passage:

> Śrāvakas pursue the words of liberation.

The sūtras say:

> All phenomena are like magical creations. In this, nobody can demonstrate anything.[1021]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. The manner of teaching the dharma

> **In certain ones who wish to hear**
> **Certain topics in certain ways,**
> **Even without words, these very topics**
> **Will appear in them accordingly.** [II.7]

In certain [beings] to be guided [by pratyekabuddhas], **who wish to hear** and realize **certain topics** to be expressed, {65b} **these very topics** and words **will** be understood and realized **in their** [minds] **in** these very **certain ways** in which they wish to hear them, **even without** [the pratyekabuddhas] expressing anything through **words** that entail distraction—they [just] have physical expressions that **accord** [with these topics] **appear.**[1022] The sūtras say:

> O sons of the gods, those who listen to the dharma from me should wish to be like beings in a dream.[1023]

These [pratyekabuddhas here] are bodhisattvas who change into being like pratyekabuddhas in reaction to [certain] beings to be guided.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2. The nature of the path

> **Through the conceptions about apprehended referents being relinquished,**
> **Through the apprehender not being relinquished,**
> **And through the foundation, the path of the rhinos**
> **Should be understood to be encompassed.** [II.8]

[The line] "**Through the conceptions about apprehended outer referents being relinquished**" represents [the distinctive feature of] the realization that there is nothing apprehended. The sūtras say:

> Form is neither profound . . .[1024]

[The line] "**Through the apprehending** of consciousness as being real **not being relinquished**" refers to [the distinctive feature of] not being able to relinquish [the apprehender]. The sūtras say:

> Nothing whatsoever is to be heard . . .[1025]

You may wonder, "Isn't it said [in line 28c of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*] that 'without something apprehended, there is no apprehending of it'?" There is no flaw [here] because this is like in the example of being free from apprehending an illusion to be real, but still not being free from apprehending as real the consciousness that apprehends this [illusion].[1026]

The distinctive feature of **the foundation** refers to both (a) [the psychophysical support of someone on] the path and (b) the disposition. (a) The former represents the meaning that is taught in the sūtras as the answer to the question, "Who will be those to grasp this mother?" [This answer] teaches on those on the path of preparation, those on the path of seeing, arhats, and those on the path of accumulation.[1027] (b) The latter is taught through the sūtras' example of "these flowers thrown by the gods."[1028] These magically created flowers are equal in that they are one in being empty, but they differ in terms of the ways they appear. Likewise, the disposition is definite as being one ultimately, but, through temporary conditions, it may have become the one of a pratyekabuddha. {66a}

Thus, it **should be understood** that these three distinctive features represent **the path of the rhinos** and that the mind streams of noble bodhisattvas **encompass** this [path]. This teaches both the path and the manner of knowing it.[1029]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.3. Its cause, the path of preparation

> **The aspect of pointing out that imputations**
> **Do not contradict the nature of phenomena**
> **Represents heat. Peak is distinguished by**
> **Form and so on being without decrease and so on.** [II.9]
>
> **Since form and so on are not apprehended**
> **By virtue of the emptiness of the internal and so on,**

This is poised readiness. The supreme dharma consists
Of the aspects of form and so on being without arising and so on.
[II.10]

While focusing on the four realities, (1) **heat** is **represented by the aspect of pointing out** and familiarizing with [the fact that] seeming phenomena, which are superimpositions, **do not contradict the** ultimate **nature of phenomena** in that they do not exist [anyway]. (2) The aspect of **peak** is the familiarization through **distinguishing** objects **(such as form)** as **being without decrease and so on** (increase) because they do not exist. (3) **Since form and so on are not apprehended** as being established through a nature of their own **by virtue of** the aspects of familiarizing with **the emptiness of the internal and so on, this is poised readiness.** (4) **The supreme dharma consists of the aspects of** familiarizing with **form and so on being without arising and so on** (being without ceasing [or anything to be adopted and to be rejected]).[1030] The sūtras say:

> Kauśika, form and so on are mere imputations. What is a mere imputation is the nature of phenomena . . .[1031]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3. The manner of the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas
This has two parts:
1) The path of seeing
2) The path of familiarization

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1. The path of seeing
This has two parts:
1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.1. General topic
This has four parts:
1) Supports
2) Definition
3) Definiendum
4) Instances

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.1.1. Supports
The physical supports [for the path of seeing of bodhisattvas] can be any men or women on the three continents [other than Uttarakuru] or any gods of the desire realm. The mental supports can be any of the six grounds of dhyāna.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.1.2. Definition
[The definition of the path of seeing of bodhisattvas] is the clear realization of the [four] realities [in the mahāyāna], which has the nature of the [seven] branches of enlightenment.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.1.3. Definiendum
{66b} [It is called "the path of seeing" because] it is the path to nirvāṇa and the new seeing of the nature of phenomena in a self-aware manner. In detail, it consists of the direct cognition of the defining characteristics of the dharmas of the four realities, the cognition subsequent to that, and the [two respectively preceding phases of] poised readiness by virtue of not being afraid of these [two] cognitions.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.1.4. Instances
The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

> Right upon dharma cognition,
> If there were a distinction in it . . .[1032]

Thus, [the path of seeing] is explained to be a single moment. In accordance with that, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* speaks about it in terms of the ultimate freedom from reference points:

> Starting with the nature of the single mind that is congruently associated with cognizing suchness, the path of seeing is fully completed.[1033]

From the perspective of entailing reference points, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> There are the four minds that accord with the factor of dharma cognition, the four minds that accord with the factor of subsequently realizing cognition, and . . . at their end, a single engagement in the meditating mind that is mere calm abiding. Through all these nine [states of] mind together, the path of seeing is fully completed.[1034]

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* speaks of [the path of seeing in terms of] both object and subject. The former is twofold—suchness and perfect wisdom—and the latter consists of the two subjects of these two [objects]. The first of these [are represented by] the four [moments of] dharma readiness and the four [moments of] dharma cognition, while the second [are represented by] the four [moments of] subsequent readiness and the four [moments of]

subsequent cognition. Thus, there are sixteen moments of mind. This accords with the intention of the *[Abhisamay]ālaṃkāra* and its commentaries. [This means that,] though there are no divisions in the single session of meditative equipoise in which the nature of phenomena is revealed, {67a} it is divided [into sixteen moments] by virtue of the manner of inducing certainty in relation to each individual bearer of this nature.[1035]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.2. Meaning of the text

This has two parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.1. Brief introduction

> **Through four moments of readiness and cognition**
> **For each one of the realities,**
> **The path of seeing and its benefit**
> **Are explained within the knowledge of the path.** [II.11]

For each one of the realities of suffering, its origin, cessation, and the path, [there are] **four moments of readiness** for dharma cognition, dharma cognition, readiness for subsequent cognition, **and** subsequent **cognition. Through** these clear realizations, **the path of seeing** of bodhisattvas **and its benefit** in this and following [lifetimes] **are explained within** the chapter on **the knowledge of the path.**[1036] The sūtras say:

> Prajñāpāramitā should be searched for in the chapter of Subhūti.[1037]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2. Detailed explanation

> **Suchness and buddhahood**
> **Not being accepted as synonyms**
> **Because of their not existing as mutual support and supported,**
> **Greatness, no valid cognition,** [II.12]
>
> **No measure, no extremes,**
> **Ascertaining the form and such**
> **Of one who dwells in it to be buddhahood,**
> **Nothing to be adopted or to be discarded and so on,** [II.13]
>
> **Love and so on, emptiness,**
> **Attaining buddhahood,**

Laying hold of all that is purified,
Eliminating all fears and diseases, [II.14]

The grasping at nirvāṇa being at peace,
Being protected and so on by the buddhas,
Beginning with not killing sentient beings,
Oneself abiding in the principle of the knowledge of all aspects [II.15]

And establishing sentient beings [in it],
As well as dedicating generosity and such
For perfect enlightenment
Are the moments of the knowledge of the path. [II.16]

The manner of inducing certainty [on the path of seeing of bodhisattvas] is divided in terms of [the sixteen moments of] eliminating superimpositions. [It starts with] the four [wisdoms of the] dharma readiness and so on [of the reality] of suffering. These are (1) the realization that, since **suchness** at the time of the cause **and buddhahood** at the time of the fruition are inseparable in terms of their own nature, they **are not accepted** by anyone **as** (that is, they are not) **synonyms because of not existing** in the manner of being any **mutual support and supported**; (2) the **greatness** of the wisdom of realizing the objects that are the form and so on of the nature of phenomena; (3) imaginary and conceived forms and so on are **not** to be seen (that is, are unobservable) through the **valid cognition** of the noble ones; and (4) the realization that the form and so on of the nature of phenomena are **not measurable** because they are not the objects of sentient beings. The sūtras say:

> The Tathāgata can neither be observed in the suchness of form and so on . . .[1038]

The four [wisdoms of the] dharma readiness and so on [of the reality] of the origin of suffering are (5) the realization that the dharmadhātu has no middle and **no extremes** [or no end]; (6) **ascertaining the** ultimate **form and such** that are the objects of the meditative equipoise **of one who dwells in this** [prajñāpāramitā][1039] **to be buddhahood**; {67b} (7) meditating in such a manner that, with regard to all phenomena, there is **nothing to be adopted or to be discarded and so on** (that is, that there is no chance for obstacles); and (8) realizing the four immeasurables—nonreferential [ultimate] **love and so on.** The sūtras say:

> Since form and so on are infinite, this pāramitā of bodhisattva mahāsattvas is infinite.[1040]

The four [wisdoms of the] dharma readiness and so on [of the reality] of cessation are (9) the wisdom of familiarizing with **emptiness** in a nonreferential manner; (10) the realization of purifying buddha realms and **attaining buddhahood**; (11) [the wisdom] by virtue of **laying hold of all purified** buddhadharmas; and (12) the wisdom of **eliminating all fears** about antagonistic factors, as well as [eliminating all] demons **and diseases**. The sūtras say:

> Because they greatly familiarize with the emptiness of the internal in a nonreferential manner . . .[1041]

The four [wisdoms of the] dharma readiness and so on [of the reality] of the path are (13) the wisdom of **the** desirous **grasping at nirvāṇa being at peace** and nonexistent; (14) the wisdom of **being protected and so on** (that is, being guarded and sheltered) **by the buddhas** of the ten directions [in order to attain such wisdom]; (15) the wisdom of **oneself abiding in the principle of the knowledge of all aspects** through one's preceding ten virtues (**beginning with not killing sentient beings**) **and** also **establishing** other **sentient beings** in it; (16) **as well as** the wisdom of **dedicating** the results of having engaged in the virtues of **generosity and such for perfect enlightenment**, that is, [making them into] something that is shared with all sentient beings [in a nonreferential way and thus becomes inexhaustible].[1042] The sūtras say:

> Prajñāpāramitā appeases the grasping at nirvāṇa and does not increase it.[1043]

{68a} These **are the** sixteen **moments of** the path of seeing in [the chapter on] **the knowledge of the path.** They represent not only the mere division of the path of seeing, but also teach its aspects because they demonstrate the progression of clear realization [on this path].[1044]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2. The path of familiarization

This has two parts:

1) The function of the path of familiarization
2) The path of familiarization that has this function

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.1. The function of the path of familiarization

> **Being disciplined in every respect, bowing down**
> **In all respects, victory over the afflictions,**

> **Being invulnerable to attacks,**
> **Enlightenment, and the foundation for worship.** [II.17]

In order to give rise to enthusiasm for this path, the six benefits of the path of familiarization are explained as (1) conceptions about the three spheres **being disciplined in every respect**; (2) by virtue of lacking pride, **bowing down to all** beings; (3) through the **victory over the afflictions**, the mind not being disturbed; (4) **being invulnerable to attacks** by adversaries; (5) swiftly attaining the fruition of **enlightenment**; **and** (6) the places and so on at which bodhisattvas [on the path of familiarization] dwell and on which they are **founded** being objects of **worship** for beings.[1045] The sūtras say:

> It is wonderful that this mother is set up in such a way as to discipline and make bodhisattva mahāsattvas be without pride.[1046]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2. The path of familiarization that has this function
This has two parts:
1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.1. General topic
This has three parts:
1) Supports
2) Definition
3) Divisions

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.1.1. Supports
The physical supports in which the previously nonexistent supramundane path of familiarization newly arises are the [same] supports [as those] in which the path of seeing has arisen. As for sustaining [an already arisen path of familiarization], for śrāvakas this can be a support in any one of the three realms; for pratyekabuddhas, a support in the desire realm; and for bodhisattvas, a support in either the desire or the form realms. [To speak of] bodhisattvas who progress to the formless realm and so on bears the intention of their going there by way of emanations or of the mere existence of the power to be born there. {68b} As for the mental supports, according to the abhidharma one relies on any one of the nine uncontaminated grounds. Here it is explained that, though bodhisattvas have not relinquished [all] seeds of the afflictions, through their skill in means they are not harmed by these afflictions. Therefore, they [can] also rely on [mental supports] in the desire realm and on the Peak of Existence.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.1.2. Definition

[The definition of the path of familiarization] is [the path] that has the nature of the [eightfold] path of the noble ones, on which one further enhances and familiarizes with clear realization.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.1.3. Divisions

In general, the path of familiarization is twofold—mundane and supramundane. In particular, the latter one is twofold here—the contaminated and the uncontaminated path of familiarization of bodhisattvas. The contamination of this [path] consists of false imagination, which entails the dualistic appearance of apprehender and apprehended. Therefore, since such imagination does not arise in a manifest way during meditative equipoise, it is the uncontaminated [path of familiarization]. Since the subsequent attainment [of this path] entails the appearance of such [imagination], which operates simultaneously with wisdom, it is the contaminated path of familiarization. Though the [latter], in terms of its aspect of dualistic appearance, is not the path, it is presented [as the path] by virtue of its illusionlike aspect of apprehending [these appearances as illusionlike]. This is dissimilar from [the meditative equipoise] without appearances. For there is the difference that, when engaging in the preparation for meditative equipoise, in the case [of the meditative equipoise with appearances] it is the various dualistic appearances that are taken as the bases of analysis, while [in the case of the meditative equipoise] without appearances it is nondual consciousness that is taken as the basis of analysis [right from the start]. There is also the difference of there being or not being the appearances of the ultimate with all aspects.[1047]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2. Meaning of the text

This has two parts:

1) The contaminated path of familiarization
2) The uncontaminated path of familiarization

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1. The contaminated path of familiarization

[This has three parts:]

1) [The path of familiarization as] aspiration, which accumulates virtue
2) [The path of familiarization as] dedication, which makes it not going to waste {69a}
3) The path of familiarization as rejoicing, which makes it increase

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1. The path of familiarization as aspiration, which accumulates virtue

This has two parts:

1) The actual [aspirations]
2) Its benefit

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.1. The actual aspirations

Aspiration is to be understood as threefold
In terms of one's own welfare, the welfare of oneself and others,
And the welfare of others, . . . [II.18ac]

The confidence of trusting that prajñāpāramitā is the source of the three welfares is the path of familiarization as **aspiration.** On the seven impure bhūmis, [bodhisattvas] aspire for the mother as being the source **of one's own welfare** (the svābhāvikakāya) and accomplish their own welfare for the sake of others. On the eighth and ninth bhūmis, they aspire for the mother as being the source for **the welfare of** both **oneself and others** (the dharmakāya) and accomplish both their own welfare and that of others together. On the tenth bhūmi, they aspire for the mother as being the source of **the welfare of others** (the rūpakāyas) and accomplish solely the welfare of others. Through this, one's own welfare is accomplished as a matter of course. This **is to be understood as the threefold** basic division [of the path of familiarization as aspiration].[1048] Its subdivisions are

. . . each one of them
Being regarded as threefold— [II.18cd]

Lesser, medium, and great.
Dividing these into the lesser of the lesser and so on
Makes them threefold too.
Thus, it is asserted as twenty-sevenfold. [II.19]

The sūtras say:

A son or daughter of good family writes down this profound mother, makes a copy of her . . .[1049]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2. Its benefit

Praise, eulogy, and laudation
On the levels of aspiration
For prajñāpāramitā
Are considered through a triad of nines. [II.20]

All victors and their children give rise to enthusiasm for the bodhisattvas on the levels of aspiration for prajñāpāramitā. Thus, during the triad of nines of the levels of [bodhisattvas aspiring for and accomplishing] their own welfare, the welfare of both [themselves and others], and the welfare of others, they are considered to receive praise during the first [nine], eulogy during the second [nine], and laudation during the third [nine].[1050] The sūtras say:

> "Śakra, if you had to choose between Jambudvīpa being filled with as many relics of the Tathāgata as there are sand grains in the Ganges {69b} and a portion of the mother, which one would you take?" "I would take this prajñāpāramitā."[1051]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2. The path of familiarization as dedication, which makes virtue not going to waste

[This has three parts;]

1) Explanation of the term
2) General presentation
3) Connecting this to the text

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2.1. Explanation of the term

[Literally, the Sanskrit term] *pariṇāma*, [which is rendered as "dedication,"] means transformation. Thus, [here it refers to] transforming all virtue into perfect enlightenment.

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2.2. General presentation

Aspiration prayers are presented as aspiring in a merely general way without specifically selecting any particular roots of virtue. Dedication means to specifically select any conditioned or unconditioned virtues and dedicate them to perfect enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings. Though there is no change in nature in the unconditioned nature of phenomena, through its stains being weakened it is merely that its own nature becomes clear in a progressive manner. From the perspective of its self-isolate, [the nature of phenomena] is not something to be dedicated, but [when it is dedicated] through dedicating it within the scope of simulating to do so through aspiration, [such dedication] is superior to dedicating conditioned virtue.[1052]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2.3. Connecting this to the text

> **As for special dedication,**
> **Its function is supreme.**
> **It has the aspect of nonreferentiality**
> **And the characteristic of unmistakenness.** [II.21]

It is free, the sphere of mindfulness about the nature
Of the abundance of merit of the buddhas,
Endowed with means, without characteristics,
Entails rejoicing by the buddhas, [II.22]

And is not included in the three realms.
The three other aspects of dedication
Lie in its character of producing great merit
To lesser, medium, and great degrees. [II.23]

As for nonreferential **dedication** for perfect enlightenment for the welfare of sentient beings, **its function is** to make one attain the **supreme** fruition. This is the identification of its nature. The sūtras say:

> This . . . dedication of bodhisattvas for perfect enlightenment is declared to be the best . . .[1053]

Through being divided in terms of isolates, [dedication] is twelvefold. (1) Nonreferential dedication for perfect enlightenment makes it more **special** than [dedication for] inferior [kinds of] enlightenment. [The word] "dedication" is to be supplemented in the following [points as is fit]. (2) The substances to be dedicated [are dedicated] in a manner of **having the aspect of nonreferentiality.** (3) [They are dedicated] in the manner of having **the characteristic of** a mind with **unmistaken** discrimination. {70a} (4) **It is free** from clinging to the one who makes [the dedication] as being a person or a phenomenon. (5) It is **the sphere of mindfulness about the** vast **abundance of merit of the buddhas** having arisen from the nonreferential unconditioned **nature** because virtue is certain to be natural emptiness. (6) Not regarding the six pāramitās as good or bad, it is **endowed with** all the **means.** (7) It is **without** the **characteristics** of clinging to nothing but the lack of entity. (8) [Bodhisattvas] dedicate in the manner of **rejoicing** in the dedications by **the buddhas,** without clinging to anything. (9) This manner [of dedicating] **is not included in the three realms,** that is, it does not abide [anywhere in them]. **The three** [points] (10)–(12) are taught as the **lesser, medium, and great degrees of dedication** that are **other** than the ones before. In due order, these **three aspects are** [to first imagine the virtue of] all sentient beings being established in the ten virtues up through the five supernatural knowledges; [the virtue of someone throughout their entire life] making offerings to these [sentient beings] who all have become stream-enterers up through arhats; and the virtue of [all] referential offerings to all of them having become buddhas. Compared to these [three kinds of virtue], the three [instances of] a

bodhisattva rejoicing in these three and then dedicating the virtue of this [threefold rejoicing] in a nonreferential manner have the **character of producing great merit**, that is, being supreme.[1054] The sūtras say:

> Compared with the meritorious entities (such as generosity) of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, this . . . dedication of bodhisattvas for unsurpassable perfect buddhahood is declared to be the best . . . {70b}

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.3. The path of familiarization as rejoicing, which makes virtue increase

> **Through both means and nonobservation,**
> **One rejoices in roots of virtue.**
> **The mental engagement in rejoicing**
> **Is stated here to be familiarization.** [II.24]

One rejoices in the accomplishment of the **roots of virtue** that are others' **means** (the accumulation of merit) **and the nonobservation** of these [merits] (the accumulations of wisdom). This **mental engagement in rejoicing** with an elated mind **is stated** [in this treatise] **here to be** the contaminated path of familiarization.[1055] The sūtras say:

> A son or daughter of good family who is endowed with rejoicing in the roots of virtue . . .[1056]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2. The uncontaminated path of familiarization
This has two parts:

1) The nature of the uninterrupted path—the path of familiarization as accomplishment
2) The nature of the path of liberation—the pure path of familiarization[1057]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. The nature of the uninterrupted path—the path of familiarization as accomplishment

> **Its nature, supremacy,**
> **Nonformation of anything,**
> **Procuring without observing**
> **Phenomena, and the great goal.** [II.25]

[The five aspects of the path of familiarization as accomplishment are as follows.] The meditative equipoise in order to clearly accomplish the qualities or the nature of the mother is the uninterrupted path of the second bhūmi. (1) **Its nature** is luminous wisdom. (2) It is the **supreme** of [all] paths. Its manner of familiarizing consists of (3) **not** [mentally] **forming anything** (such as form) through characteristics and, (4) **without observing** any seeming **phenomena, procuring** the [mental] aspect [of not observing phenomena] during the time of preparation [for meditative equipoise] and engaging in this [aspect] during the time of the actual [equipoise]. (5) It accomplishes the fruition that is **the great goal** [for oneself and others]—the dharmakāya.[1058] The sūtras say:

> Śāriputra said, "This mother illuminates."[1059]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2. The nature of the path of liberation—the pure path of familiarization

This has two parts:

1) Identifying what is to be relinquished and adopted as the cause for attaining purity
2) The fruition that is actual purity

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.1. Identifying what is to be relinquished and adopted as the cause for attaining purity

> **Attending to the buddhas, generosity and such,**
> **As well as skill in means**
> **Are the causes for aspiration in this case.**
> **The causes for being destitute of the dharma are** [II.26]
>
> **Being under the power of māras,**
> **Not aspiring for the profound nature of dharmas,**
> **Clinging to the skandhas and so on,**
> **And being seized by bad friends.** [II.27]

You may wonder, "What are the causes for realizing prajñāpāramitā?" The causes for the arising of the pure [path of familiarization] consist of (1) **attending to many buddhas**; (2) having engaged in the pāramitās (**generosity and such**) for incalculable eons[1060] [in a nonreferential manner]; **as well as** (3) through **skill in means**, {71a} not observing these [pāramitās], and [receiving] the prophecy and so on in accordance with the degree of one's faculties.

These are the causes for bodhisattvas of highest faculties aspiring for this prajñāpāramitā. The sūtras say:

> These bodhisattvas have come here after . . . having paid services to countless buddhas . . .[1061]

The causes for being destitute of (that is, rejecting) the dharma of the mother are (1) being obscured[1062] under the power of māras; (2) not aspiring for the profound dharma;[1063] (3) clinging to seeming phenomena (the skandhas and so on); and (4) being seized by bad friends.[1064] [The sūtras say:]

> Possessing these four aspects, one is a foolish person who opposes prajñāpāramitā.[1065]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2. The fruition that is actual purity

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. General topic

If presented in terms of the definitive meaning, since the stains (the seeming) are primordially nonexistent, the utterly pure dharmadhātu (the sugata heart), which cannot be mentally set up as the phases of ground, path, and fruition, is what is called "purity." If presented according to the expedient meaning, the *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* says:

> Form and such are what are to be purified. Prajñāpāramitā is what purifies. The fruition refers to stream-enterers and so on. Not existing as two is the nature.[1066]

Accordingly, pure liberation (the fruition) depends on the factors to be relinquished having become become pure, and the factors to be relinquished becoming pure depends on liberation's own specific cause—the uninterrupted path.[1067]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Meaning of the text

This has four parts:

1) General instruction on purity
2) Detailed explanation
3) The reason for being utterly [pure]
4) Removing qualms

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. General instruction on purity {71b}

> **The purity of the fruition is nothing but**
> **The purity of form and such since these two**
> **Are not different and are indivisible.**
> **It is in this sense that purity is proclaimed.** [II.28]

As for **the purity of the fruition** (the dharmadhātu's own nature not being any reference point) and **the purity** of adventitious stains (**such as form**) being primordially nonexistent, these two are **nothing but** one **since these two** purities **are not different and are unexaminable** as being the same or other. Thus, everything is **proclaimed** to be of one taste as **purity.**[1068] The sūtras say:

> It is thus that the purity of form . . . the purity of the fruition, and the purity of the mother do not exist as two, cannot be made two, are not different, and are not divisible.[1069]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Detailed explanation

> **The purities of disciples, rhinos, and the children of the victors**
> **Are due to their having relinquished**
> **Afflictive, cognitive, and [the obscurations] of the three paths,**
> **But the Buddha's [purity] is utterly so in all aspects.** [II.29]

The three [types of] clear realization of the **disciples** (śrāvakas), the **rhinos** (pratyekabuddhas), **and the children of the victors** are called "**purity**" **due to** being presented in terms of respectively **having relinquished** the **afflictive** stains; these plus [the portion of] the **cognitive stains** that consists of the conceptions about the apprehended; **and** those [two] plus the conceptions about the apprehender (that is, the stains **of** all **three paths**). **But** compared with these, **the Buddha's** wisdom of the knowledge of **all aspects** is called "**utter** purity" because it is free from two obscurations including their latent tendencies.[1070] The sūtras say:

> What is the purity of self is the purity of form . . .[1071]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.3. The reason for being utterly pure

> **Purity is the path that consists**
> **Of the lesser of the lesser remedies and so on**
> **For the greater of the great degrees of the stains and so on**
> **On the nine levels.** [II.30]

It is solely the wisdom of the Buddha that is proclaimed to be utterly pure. For it is the final fruition of [all] the [eighty-one] portions of **the greater of the great degrees of the stains and so on** (the factors to be relinquished through familiarization in the three yānas) **on the nine levels** [of saṃsāra] (such as the desire realm [and the respectively four levels of the two higher realms]) having been **purified through the path that consists of the lesser of the lesser remedies and so on** (the respectively corresponding wisdoms of the meditative equipoises of the path of familiarization).[1072] The sūtras say: {72a}

> Moreover, Subhūti, what is the purity of prajñāpāramitā is the purity of form, and the purity of form is everything up through the knowledge of all aspects.[1073]

2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.4. Removing qualms

> **Through removing qualms about this,**
> **It is asserted that the path's**
> **Equality of what verifies and what is to be verified**
> **Is the remedy for the three realms.** [II.31]

Someone may raise **qualms about this**, saying, "It is not reasonable that one [needs to] produce great remedies for the lesser factors to be relinquished and that the remedies existing in one realm eliminate the obscurations of all three realms." There are no such flaws for the following reasons. The [lesser] factors to be relinquished are **removed** just as one needs to generate great efforts to wash away subtle stains [on a piece of cloth, whereas the coarser stains come off easily]. **It is asserted that the remedy for the three realms** (the factors to be relinquished) is just a single one because [the wisdom of] the knowledge of **the path** that exists in one realm (the subject **that verifies**) **and the dharmadhātu** (the all-pervading object **that is to be verified**) become nondual **equality**.[1074] What is to be understood here is that manifest factors to be relinquished and their remedies do not occur simultaneously because mental consciousnesses of two different types do not arise simultaneously. Therefore, just upon the arising of the uninterrupted path, the manifest factors to be relinquished subside and the mere seeds that dwell in the ālaya are relinquished.[1075] The sūtras say:

> Purity means to not be born in the desire realm . . .[1076]

This is the second chapter, on the knowledge of the path, in *The Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called* The Ornament of Clear Realization.

This is the commentary on the second chapter in the versified *Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called* The Ornament of Clear Realization.



The Third Chapter, on the Knowledge of Entities

2.3.1.2.1.3. The knowledge of entities (the root of the [knowledge of all aspects], which includes the points to go astray)
This has three parts:

1) Presenting the connection
2) Explanation of the knowledge of entities
3) Concluding summary of the three knowledges

2.3.1.2.1.3.1. Presenting the connection
The knowledge of the path, which was explained through being defined by eleven dharmas, {72b} arises from its specific cause—the concordant [or remedial] knowledge of entities. Since it is necessary for the [knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas] to not fall into the extreme of peace, [the remedial knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas] represents the meaning that is an elaboration on Subhūti's teaching that the mother does not fall into the extremes of existence or peace.[1077]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2. Explanation of the knowledge of entities
This has two parts:

1) Ascertaining the phenomena to be known
2) Explanation of the classificatory templates of the knowledge of entities (that which knows them)

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1. Ascertaining the phenomena to be known
This has three parts:

1) Explanation of the five skandhas
2) The manner in which these correspond to the dhātus and āyatanas
3) Instruction on other classificatory templates

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1.1. Explanation of the five skandhas
This has three parts:

1) General definition

2) The meaning of each [skandha]
3) Instruction on certainty

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1.1.1. General definition

[A skandha] is a conditioned phenomenon that is a collection of many [parts]. The form skandha [has parts in terms of] spatial dimensions and the four name [skandhas] have parts in terms of time. Both also have many parts in terms of isolates.

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1.1.2. The meaning of each

Among the five skandhas from form up through consciousness, (1) form is actual matter, which consists of (A) the five sense faculties (from the eye sense faculty up through the body sense faculty) and (B) the five [sense] objects (from [visible] form up through tangible objects). Among the [latter], (a) [visible] form is twentyfold—the four [primary colors] blue, yellow, red, and white; [the eight shapes] long, short, square, round, high, low, regular, and irregular; and [the eight secondary colors of] clouds, smoke, dust, mist, shadow, sunlight, brightness, and darkness.[1078] (b) Sounds are eightfold, the [first] twofold [division] being conjoined and not conjoined with [the actions of] beings. Each one of these is again twofold in terms of neutral or nonneutral meanings, and each of these is again twofold in terms of being pleasant or unpleasant. (c) Smells are fourfold, with the twofold [division into] good and bad [smells] being further divided into balanced and unbalanced. (d) Tastes are sixfold—sweet, sour, salty, hot, bitter, and astringent. (e) Tangible objects are elevenfold, [consisting of] the factors that are the elements {73a} (solidity, moisture, warmth, and movement) and the elemental derivatives (smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst). Among [all] these [forms], [visible] forms can be shown and are obstructive. The five sense faculties and sounds are obstructive, but cannot be shown. As for the imputed imperceptible forms and the forms of the totalities and so on,[1079] they are indeed not anything outside of the ten sense faculties and objects. However, if labeled by conventional terms, they are forms that cannot be shown and are not obstructive.

The latter four [skandhas] are merely distinguished by names. Among them, (2) feelings are what is present as experience. They are threefold—pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent. [Or there are] the six [kinds of] feelings arising from the contact when the eyes and so on meet [their respective objects].

(3) Discrimination refers to apprehending distinctive characteristics. [There are] the six [kinds of] discriminations arising from the contact when the eyes and so on meet [their respective objects].

(4) Formations are the conditioned phenomena that are other than the four remaining skandhas. They are twofold—not being or being congruently associated with mind. The first are fourteen processes in terms of form or mind, such as attainment, which are superimpositions [onto form, mind, and mental factors] made only by the Vaibhāṣikas [and thus actually do not exist as separate substances]. The second are the formations that are not included under feelings and discriminations and are congruently associated with primary minds in terms of congruent support (the sense faculty), congruent respective substance, congruent time of arising, and congruent focal object (such as form).[1080] Here, the specific meaning at hand—the fifty-one [mental factors] congruently associated with awareness that are stated in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*—are put into verses [in JNS]:

Feeling, discrimination, impulse,
Mental engagement, and {73b} contact—these five
Are the omnipresent factors because they embrace all minds.
Striving, conviction, recollection,
Samādhi, and prajñā, since they engage
In what is desired and so on, are the five object-determining factors.
Confidence, shame, embarrassment,
Lack of greed, lack of hatred, lack of ignorance,
Vigor, suppleness, heedfulness,
Equanimity, and nonviolence—
These eleven are known as "virtuous."
The six such as desire are the primary afflictions.
Wrath, resentment, concealment, spite,
Envy, avarice, deceit, hypocrisy,
Self-satisfaction, violence, lack of shame,
Lack of embarrassment, lethargy, agitation, lack of confidence,
Laziness, heedlessness, forgetfulness,
Distraction, and lack of introspection—
These twenty are the secondary afflictions.
The four of contrition, sleep, examination, and analysis
Are the changeable factors since they change into many [forms],
Such as being virtuous or neutral.[1081]

(5) Consciousness is that which discriminates the mere nature of a referent. According to the hīnayāna, there are six [consciousnesses] (from the eye consciousness up through the mental consciousness). In the mahāyāna, [one speaks of] the eight collections [of consciousness]—mind (the ālaya); the afflicted mind of clinging to the [ālaya] as "me"; and the six operating

consciousnesses. The latter seven are not of the same nature as the ālaya—[the latter] is like a mirror and [the former are like] the reflections [in it]. During deep sleep and meditative absorption, the ālaya does not cease, while the others do cease. The ālaya-consciousness is what is put to an end once buddhahood [is attained, while the ālaya-]wisdom is the very nature of nirvāṇa. The consciousnesses [mentioned] are different in substance, but one in substance with the mental factors that arise as their respective retinues.

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1.1.3. Instruction on certainty

{74a} Both form and mind exist as entities. Among mental factors, the two of feelings and discrimination are taught separately because they are coarse by virtue of serving as the causes for disputes among householders and those who engage in philosophical systems, respectively. Since the other [mental factors] are similar, they are taken as a single [skandha]. As for the eight consciousnesses, they are definite in number because they exist as entities. The order [of the five skandhas] through teaching their progression in terms of being [more] coarse [versus more subtle is as follows]. By focusing on form, feelings arise; from these, mistaken discriminations [originate]; and through this, [the formations] make one afflicted. Thus, these four [skandhas] obscure consciousness.

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1.2. The manner in which these correspond to the dhātus and āyatanas

Since they function as the gates for the arising of minds and mental factors and exist as different types, they are the [āyatanas] and the [dhātus], respectively. The [former] are divided into the five sense faculties and their five objects, with the consciousnesses being represented by the āyatana of mind. The difference between the mental faculty and the mental consciousness lies in their being [respectively] earlier and later moments [of consciousness]. The dhātu of phenomena consists of the three [middle skandhas] (such as feelings) and the eight unconditioned phenomena—the three suchnesses of virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral [phenomena]; space; the unmoving;[1082] analytical cessation (freedom); nonanalytical cessation (what prevents the arising [of a specific result]); and the cessation of discrimination and feeling.[1083]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.1.3. Instruction on other classificatory templates

The Vaibhāṣikas assert that all knowable objects are included in the five bases—form, mind, mental factors, nonassociated formations, and unconditioned phenomena (space and the two cessations). In the mahāyāna system, knowable objects are taught as the five dharmas—causal features, imagination, names, perfect wisdom, and suchness. {74b} The first three among these

five represent the imaginary and the other-dependent [natures], while the latter two are the perfect [nature].[1084] What is common to all is that phenomena are included either in the four realities, the pair of conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, the pair of contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena, or the two realities (and so on).[1085]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2. Explanation of the classificatory templates of the knowledge of entities (that which knows them)

This has three parts:

1) The knowledge of entities (the object of engagement)
2) The training (the engagement)
3) The path of seeing (the fruition of engagement)

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1. The knowledge of entities (the object of engagement)

This has two parts:

1) General [topic]
2) [Meaning of] the text

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.1. General topic

The knowledge of entities that is explicitly taught in this context is the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas (that is, not to abide in [saṃsāric] existence or peace), whereas the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is taught implicitly. You may wonder, "Since the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas is included in the knowledge of the path, what is the point of again teaching it separately?" It is taught here for the sake of [demonstrating] the manner of it being more distinguished than the knowledges of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and [also in order to show that bodhisattvas] must go beyond [the latter two] and not dwell in them. This means that [this topic here] teaches the need for [bodhisattvas] to fully realize phenomenal identitylessness. "Isn't it that master Candrakīrti explains that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize phenomenal identitylessness?" [He said] this with the intention of praising phenomenal identitylessness or [with the intention] that they merely realize a fraction [of it], just as it is taught here too that the clear realization in the mind streams of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is a fraction of the mother.

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2. Meaning of the text

This has three parts:

1) The nature of the knowledge of entities
2) The reason for being close or distant
3) The divisions of antagonistic factors and remedies

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.1. The nature of the knowledge of entities
This has two parts:
1) The explicit teaching
2) The implicit teaching

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1. The explicit teaching

> **Not abiding on the near or the far shore,**[1086]
> **Nor in between these two,**
> **By virtue of understanding the times as equality,**
> **She is asserted as prajñāpāramitā.** [III.1]

The mother in the mind streams of noble bodhisattvas does **not abide on the near** [shore] ([saṃsāric] existence) **or the far shore** (peace), {75a} **nor** does it abide anywhere **in between these two.** By virtue of her being the unity of emptiness and compassion, and **by virtue of understanding** the phenomena in **the** three **times as equality** in that they are without arising, **she is asserted as** the actual knowledge of entities [that derives] from **prajñāpāramitā.**[1087] The sūtras say:

> The mother of bodhisattva mahāsattvas is not on this shore . . .[1088]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.1.2. The implicit teaching
[What is taught implicitly here] is the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, which is the state that entails being afraid of [saṃsāric] existence and being focused on peace.[1089] The *[Prajñāpāramitā]saṃcayagāthā* says:

> Through being without means and lacking prajñā, one falls into being a śrāvaka.[1090]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.2. The reason for being close or distant

> **Through lack of means she is distant**
> **Because characteristics are observed.**
> **Through skill in means**
> **Her proper closeness is proclaimed.** [III.2]

You may wonder, "Is there a difference between these two [kinds of] knowledge of entities?" There is a difference for the following reasons. **Through lack of means** (vast merit) and **because characteristics** with regard to their own enlightenment **are observed,** the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and

pratyekabuddhas **is distant** from the fruitional mother. The one of noble bodhisattvas **is proclaimed** as the **proper closeness** to the fruitional mother, which does not observe any characteristics even with regard to enlightenment and **is skilled in means.**[1091] The sūtras say:

> If any sons or daughters of good family entertain any notions by focusing on the mother, they will drive this mother off . . . It is wonderful to see the extent to which this mother of bodhisattvas has been taught well and rounded off well.[1092]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3. The divisions of antagonistic factors and remedies
This has two parts:
1) Detailed explanation
2) Summary

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1. Detailed explanation
This has two parts:
1) The antagonistic factors and remedies in terms of ground and path
2) The antagonistic factors and remedies in terms of the fruition

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.1. The antagonistic factors and remedies in terms of ground and path
This has two parts:
1) Antagonistic factors
2) Remedies

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.1.1. Antagonistic factors

> **The antagonistic factors are discriminating notions about engaging**
> **In the skandhas (such as form) being emptiness,**
> **The phenomena included in the three times,**
> **And the factors of enlightenment (such as generosity).** [III.3]

Thus, the knowledge of entities that entails characteristics is not only distant from the fruitional mother, but its aspects of characteristics, {75b} in the case of their possible arising in a bodhisattva's own mind stream, are taught to be factors to be relinquished [by bodhisattvas]. The **emptiness of the five skandhas (such as form)** [being empty] of a person and any apprehended object indeed represents their actual way of being. However, the **discriminating notions** of clinging to this [emptiness], clinging to **the phenomena included**

in the three times as being different substances, **and** [clinging] to **engaging in the factors of enlightenment (such as generosity)** as being such [factors of enlightenment] **are the antagonistic factors** [of the path of bodhisattvas].[1093]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.1.2. Remedies

> **No clinging to "me" with regard to generosity and such**
> **And enjoining others to this**
> **Stop the extreme of attachment.** [III.4ac]

Through being free from conceptions about the three spheres, [bodhisattvas] have **no** grasping in terms of **clinging to "me" with regard to** the path (the six pāramitās, **such as generosity**) **and** also are **enjoining others** to be guided **to this** kind [of nonclinging] since it **stops the extreme of attachment** to exclusive peace.[1094] The sūtras say:

> If bodhisattvas who are unskilled in means have the discriminating notion that form is empty, this is attachment . . . "What is the detachment of bodhisattvas . . .?" When bodhisattvas . . . engage in the mother, they lack discriminating notions about form being form . . .[1095]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.2. The antagonistic factors and remedies in terms of the fruition

This has two parts:

1) Factors to be relinquished and remedies
2) Explaining the mother to be profound

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.2.1. Factors to be relinquished and remedies

This has two parts:

1) Antagonistic factors
2) Remedies

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.2.1.1. Antagonistic factors

> **Thus, attachment to the victors and so on is subtle.** [III.4d]

> **Since the path of dharma is free by nature,**
> **This is its profundity.** [III.5ab]

Even clinging to the victors (the buddhas) and so on is a subtle attachment. Since the path of manifesting the dharmakāya is free from reference points by nature, it is the accumulation of profound wisdom. Therefore, not even merit is deliberately seized.[1096] The sūtras say:

> If a son or daughter of good family mentally engages in the Tathāgata, it is attachment . . . Subhūti said, "Profound, O Bhagavan, is prajñāpāramitā." The Bhagavān answered, "Because all phenomena are free by nature."[1097]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.2.1.2. Remedies

> **The knowledge of phenomena being of a single nature**
> **Is the relinquishment of attachment.** [III.5cd]

This [subtle attachment] is relinquished through the mother of the bodhisattvas. {76a} For the knowledge of seeming phenomena not being established and, consequently, all [of them] being of the single nature of the ultimate (that is, inseparable from it) is the relinquishment of even subtle attachment.[1098] The sūtras say:

> Since all phenomena are not of two natures, they are of nothing but one. What is the nature of phenomena is not a nature.[1099]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.1.2.2. Explaining the mother to be profound

> **By virtue of rejecting what is seen and such,**
> **She is said to be difficult to realize.**
> **Since she is not known as form and such,**
> **She is asserted to be inconceivable.** [III.6]

As for the fundamental nature of the mother, [simply] by virtue of rejecting her being an object that is seen and such (heard, touched, or experienced) by consciousness, the mother is not [realized]. She is said to be difficult to realize even [through] nonconceptual wisdom if its prowess is not greatly perfected. Since the fundamental nature of the mother is not known through the prajñā that focuses on seeming form and such, she is asserted to be inconceivable.[1100] The sūtras say:

> The mother is difficult to realize . . . The mother is inconceivable.[1101]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.1.2.3.2. Summary

Thus, within the scope of the all-knowledge,
This entire division of
Antagonistic factors and remedies
Should be known as it was explained.[1102] [III.7]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.2. The training (the engagement)
This has two parts:
1) Divisions
2) The manner of familiarizing with equality

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.2.1. Divisions
This has two parts:
1) The actual [divisions]
2) Giving a presentation [of the three natures]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.2.1.1. The actual divisions

The trainings that stop engaging in
Form and so on, their impermanence and so on,
Their being incomplete or complete,
And detachment from them, [III.8]

The trainings in terms of no change, no agent,
The three kinds of what is hard to do,
Wishing for fruitfulness,
Since fruitions are attained according to destiny, [III.9]

Being independent of others,
And what makes seven kinds of appearance understood. [III.10ab]

What is to be taught [here] is the training in the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas (the one of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is the opposite and thus emerges implicitly). This has ten [parts, starting with] **the trainings that** respectively **stop** clinging to and **engaging in** the following four—(1) seeming **form and so on**; (2) **their** features (the **impermanence**, emptiness, **and so on** of form and so on); (3) **their being incomplete** as the support for qualities {76b} (imaginary form) **or complete** as the support for qualities such as the [ten] powers (perfect form and so on); **and** (4) **detachment from them.** These are the actual yogas of training, while the following [six] are supplementary

elaborations—(5) **the trainings** of bodhisattvas **in terms of no change** in the mother's own nature; (6) there being **no** stains that represent the **agents** which obscure the mother; (7) **the three kinds of what is hard to do** (not becoming fainthearted when the mother is taught, making efforts toward the mother, and not turning away from the mother); (8) teaching that those who **wish** to accomplish **fruitfulness** need to practice the yogas with regard to the mother **since** [these yogas] **are** capable of making them **attain** the **fruitions** they strive for **according to** the respective **destinies** of the three yānas; (9) being grounded in the mother means **being independent of** being protected and so on by **others**, such as Indra; **and** (10) the reason for the [latter] being taught by way of the examples **that make** this **understood** [since] this is just like **seven kinds of** what **appears** while not existing (illusions, mirages, dreams, [echoes,] optical illusions,[1103] [the reflection of] the moon in water, and magical creations) not needing to be protected and guarded by others.[1104] The sūtras say:

> Here, Subhūti, if bodhisattvas, while being engaged in the mother, do not engage in form and so on, they engage in the mother.[1105]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.2.1.2. Giving a presentation of the three natures

The first four [trainings] refer to the phase of meditative equipoise and exist from the path of preparation up through the end of the continuum [on the tenth bhūmi]. {77a}

To elaborate here on [line III.8c] "their being incomplete . . . ," the three characteristics[1106] are explained in two parts:

1) The way they are stated in the sūtras
2) The way they are stated in the Yogācāra texts

1) The way they are stated in the sūtras

Imaginary form and so on are said to be incomplete; conceived form and so on (false imagination), to be both incomplete and complete; and perfect form and so on, to be complete. In due order, [these statements] bear the intention of [these three types of form] being nothing but mistakenness; having portions of both [mistakenness and wisdom]; and being nothing but wisdom.

2) The way they are stated in the Yogācāra texts

a) Identification through example

To take an illusion as an example, the basis for the magical creation [of an elephant]—a piece of wood—refers to ālaya-wisdom, the perfect [nature], or the pure other-dependent [nature]; the consciousness that appears as an

elephant at this time, to the impure other-dependent [nature]; and the elephant, to the imaginary [nature].[1107] The respective former ones are empty of the respective latter ones.

b) The individual subdivisions

[The imaginary nature] is twofold—[the imaginary] without any characteristics (such as a self or minute particles) and the nominal imaginary (the appearance of object generalities for conceptions and the duality of apprehender and apprehended for the sense consciousnesses).[1108] [The other-dependent nature] is twofold—the impure [other-dependent] that entails dualistic appearance and the pure other-dependent (the aspect of luminosity that is free from dualistic appearance). The pure other-dependent is [equivalent to] the twofold perfect [nature]—the unmistaken [perfect nature (nonconceptual wisdom)] and the unchanging one (its object, suchness). These two [aspects of] the perfect [nature] are a unity and this is the dharmakāya, which is inconceivable as being real, unreal, and so on. Among these, {77b} the imaginary [nature] represents the seeming, the perfect [nature] is ultimate reality, and the impure other-dependent [nature] makes up seeming reality.[1109]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.2.2. The manner of familiarizing with equality

> **The fourfold lack of conceit about form and such**
> **Is asserted to be its equality.** [III.10cd]

After the training in stopping engagement in clinging, there follows the familiarization with [the subjects and objects in this training] as being equality. **The fourfold lack of** (1) a mind with **conceit about** phenomena, **such as form** [being form]; and likewise, a mind lacking conceit (2) by virtue of form; (3) about form as being "mine"; and (4) about form **is the familiarization with its equality.** The sūtras speak about the clarity of the fruition.[1110]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.3. The path of seeing (the fruition of engagement)

This has two parts:

1) Brief introduction
2) Detailed explanation

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.3.1. Brief introduction

> **Within the scope of the all-knowledge, the path of seeing**
> **Has the character of momentary readinesses and cognitions,**
> **[Such as] dharma cognition and subsequent cognition,**[1111]
> **With regard to the realities of suffering and so on.** [III.11]

This teaches [the path of seeing of bodhisattvas] needing to be free from thirty-two superimpositions—the sixteen imputed by tīrthikas (such as permanence) and the sixteen [imputed] by śrāvakas (such as impermanence).[1112]

2.3.1.2.1.3.2.2.3.2. Detailed explanation

Form being neither permanent nor impermanent,
Beyond extremes, pure,
Neither arising nor ceasing and so on,
Like space, without contagion, [III.12]

Free from grasping,
Inexpressible through a nature of its own,
With its meaning thus being impossible
To convey to others through expressions, [III.13]

Not serving as a focal object,
Being utterly pure, no diseases arising,
The unpleasant realms being extinct,
Nonconceptuality with regard to manifesting the fruition, [III.14]

No connection with characteristics,
And no arising of any consciousness
With regard to both entities and names—
These are the moments of the all-knowledge. [III.15]

The four aspects[1113] of focusing on the reality of suffering are (1) not clinging to **form** and so on as anything whatsoever in terms of **being neither permanent nor impermanent**; (2) [suffering] being **beyond** the **extremes** of being or not being suffering; (3) its nature of being empty or nonempty being **pure**; and (4) its having or not having an identity **neither arising nor ceasing and so on**. The four [aspects] of the origin of suffering are (5) its being or not being a cause being **like space**; (6) its being **without** afflictions (such as attachment)[1114] because of being unviewable as either being or not being an origin; (7) its being **free from grasping** at arising or nonarising; and (8) its being or not being a condition being **inexpressible through a nature of its own.** {78a} The four [aspects] of cessation are (9) its not being observable as cessation or noncessation, **with its meaning thus being impossible to convey to others through** verbal **expressions**; (10) its **not serving as a focal object** that is peace or nonpeace; (11) its being or not being excellence **being utterly pure**; and (12) **no diseases arising** [in it] since it is not observable as being or not

being final deliverance. The four aspects of the path are (13) **the unpleasant realms being extinct** by virtue of [this path] being free from the reference points of being or not being the path; (14) its **nonconceptuality** even **with regard to manifesting the fruition** (buddhahood) because of its lacking being or not being appropriate; (15) **no connection with the characteristics** of its being or not being accomplishment; **and** (16) **no arising of any consciousness** that clings to real [existence] **with regard to both entities** (the objects of expression) **and names** and words (the means of expression) because of being unobservable as being or not being conducive to deliverance. **These are the moments of the all-knowledge** of noble bodhisattvas. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas fall into the respectively former extremes [among each one of the above sixteen pairs of extremes]. Since the path of seeing of bodhisattvas transcends these [extremes], it is taught here again. However, since the realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are not something that [bodhisattvas] have to familiarize with, there is no need to teach [the latter's] path of familiarization [here too].[1115] The sūtras say:

> After Maitreya has attained unsurpassable buddhahood, he will not teach the dharma by saying that form is either "permanent" or "impermanent" . . .[1116]

2.3.1.2.1.3.3. Concluding summary of the three knowledges

> **The three [knowledges] are this one,**
> **Then this one, and next this one.**
> **This announces the conclusion** {78b}
> **Of these three topics.** [III.16]

This teaches [the three knowledges] in their regular order.[1117] The sūtras say:

> This mother does not make one attain or not attain any dharmas . . .[1118]

> **This is the third chapter, on the all-knowledge, in *The Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called* The Ornament of Clear Realization.**

This is the commentary on **the third chapter in the** versified ***Treatise on the Pith Instructions on Prajñāpāramitā, Called* The Ornament of Clear Realization.**



Appendix I: Selected General Topics from JG and JNS[1119]

1) The knowledge of all aspects

A) Bodhicitta

JG's Presentation[1120]

General explanation
This has two parts:
1) The supports
2) The phenomena that are supported

1) The supports are twofold:
a) The physical supports
b) The mental support

1a) The bodhicitta of aspiration can be generated in any physical supports within the desire and form realms except for those of the highest level of the latter (the gods without discrimination). For in terms of possible physical supports, the section on the knowledge of the path in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras speaks of the gods; the *Sāgaranāgarājaparipṛcchāsūtra* speaks of twenty-one thousand nāgas; and the Buddha generated bodhicitta in one of his former rebirths as a hell-being pulling a cart. The bodhicitta of aspiration does not arise in the gods without discrimination because the sixth consciousness is not manifest in their state. Nor does this bodhicitta arise in the formless realm because the beings there do not take each other (or anybody else) as focal objects. As for the bodhicitta of application, the explanation in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Bodhipathapradīpa* that the physical supports for its arising must possess the prātimokṣa vows is given in terms of the special support of a human being. However, since the bodhicitta of application also exists in bodhisattvas whose physical supports are those of gods in the desire and form realms, said need for the prātimokṣa vows is not absolutely definite.

1b) The mental support of bodhicitta is the special taking refuge of the followers of the mahāyāna, as stated in the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*[1121] and by Jetāri.[1122]

2) The mental phenomena that are supported in this way are threefold:
   a) The causes of bodhicitta
   b) Its nature
   c) Its benefit

2a) As for the causes of bodhicitta, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* explains that it arises in dependence on four conditions, four causes, and four powers coming together. The *Śikṣasamuccaya* lists the four ways of generating bodhicitta by virtue of seeing the physical appearance of a buddha and thinking, "Wouldn't it be great if I attained such an appearance?"; seeing or hearing about the inconceivable powers of buddhas and bodhisattvas; not being able to bear the mahāyāna teachings vanishing; and not being able to bear sentient beings being tormented by suffering.

In brief, the arising of bodhicitta depends on (1) its substantial cause and (2) its cooperative conditions. (1) The first one is the power of the mahāyāna disposition that is awakened by certain conditions. (2) The cooperative conditions are three—(a) confidence, (b) hearing/studying the benefit of bodhicitta, and (c) compassion. (a) is fourfold because the special motivation of desiring to attain buddhahood arises from the two kinds of confidence that consist of being open for the qualities of the victors and their teachings, the confidence in the conduct of bodhisattvas, and the confidence in the unsurpassable enlightenment of buddhahood from among the three kinds of enlightenment (the other two being śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhathood). As *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.3a says, it is compassion that is the main causal condition for the generation of bodhicitta by bodhisattvas who strive for the welfare of others. For by virtue of the compassion that cannot bear the suffering of other sentient beings, the state of mind of desiring to eliminate such suffering arises, which in turn leads to the mindset of desiring great enlightenment.[1123]

2b) The nature of bodhicitta has three parts:
   a) Instances
   b) Definition
   c) Divisions

2ba) Instances has three parts:
   1) The system of other masters
   2) The systems of the commentators on the AA

3) Demonstrating that both kinds of systems are not contradictory

2ba1) Earlier Tibetans explain bodhicitta as being the mental factor "intention,"[1124] saying, "In his *Bodhisattvabhūmi* master Asaṅga states, 'The generation of bodhicitta is the supreme aspiration of bodhisattvas.'[1125] Thus, he describes 'resolve' or 'aspiration' as the nature of the two kinds of bodhicitta and further asserts 'aspiration' as being the mental factor 'intention,' which is associated with its mental aid 'striving.' *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVIII.74ab says:

> The aspiration of the steady ones
> Consists of intention associated with resolve.

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IV.1 states:

> It is the intention of bodhisattvas
> With great enthusiasm, great endeavor,
> Great purpose, and great outcome
> That is the arising of the mind endowed with the twofold welfare.

Master Vasubandhu comments on this: "The intention that possesses three qualities and two focal objects is called 'bodhicitta.'"[1126]

2ba2) The systems of the commentators on the AA has two parts:
a) The system of Āryavimuktisena and those who follow him
b) The systems of others

2ba2a) Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* says:

> [The word] "mind" (*citta*) in "generating bodhicitta" refers to consciousness, that is, cognizance. What is cognizance [here]? It is the mental consciousness because it is that in which being focused on all virtuous dharmas is possible. The word "generating" points out the generating of what has not been generated and therefore is for the sake of indicating the initial stage of the entity that is mind's quality of attention.[1127]

Thus, Āryavimuktisena explains "mind" (*citta*) as the mental consciousness, which is the primary factor that is suitable to be focused on virtuous phenomena,[1128] while "generating what has not been generated" and "mind's quality of attention" refer to that mind needing to be focused on the welfare of others and perfect enlightenment. Haribhadra's *Ālokā* first quotes and interprets *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1 and then presents and elaborates on the qualm and its answer that are found in Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*:

According to this explanation [in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1], isn't the generation of bodhicitta a [primary] mind (*citta*) that arises with its congruently associated intention and appears with a special object?[1129]

You may wonder, "But 'the desire for completely perfect enlightenment' [in AA I.18b] is a mental factor (*caitta*)—the striving for this [enlightenment], the resolve for [accomplishing] virtuous dharmas. So how could this [mental factor] then be the generation of bodhicitta?"

This is true indeed, but here [in AA I.18ab] the result [(generating bodhicitta)] is indicated through its cause [(striving)]. For when the [bodhisattvas], who look at beings without protection drowning in the ocean of suffering and then intend to bring them out [of this ocean], have the striving that is characterized by the resolve for [accomplishing] virtuous dharmas, they generate bodhicitta for the sake of becoming buddhas. Therefore, [the AA's use of the term "desire"] is based on a [wider] metaphorical use [of the terms "striving" or "desire"], which is in order to make one understand that all the virtuous dharmas of bodhisattvas who resolve and strive in this manner will increase. Therefore, [the AA's use of the term "desire" here] is flawless. Alternatively, "the desire for completely perfect enlightenment" [in AA I.18b] means striving in the sense of aspiring. [However,] what is indicated by this term [here] is the generation of [the primary mind of] bodhicitta, which operates simultaneously with this [striving] because said striving is the primary element at the time when bodhicitta is generated. Thus, it is justified [for the *Vṛtti*] to say, "In bodhisattvas, the mind (*citta*) that is associated with [the mental factor] 'aspiration' arises."[1130]

Also Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*[1131] agrees with this. Thus, according to Haribhadra, the reason for there being no flaw in AA I.18b speaking of the generation of bodhicitta as a desire is that if the striving that is characterized by the resolve for accomplishing virtuous dharmas is present as the cause, the generation of bodhicitta (its result) is labeled with the name of this cause ("desire"). Or the name of the mental aid ("desire") is given to what operates simultaneously with this aid (the generation of bodhicitta).[1132] In this way, Haribhadra explains "desire" as the nominal bodhicitta and "mind" as the fully qualified one.

Bhadanta Vimuktisena's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravārttika* identifies the generation of bodhicitta in accordance with both Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra.[1133]

2ba2b) Abhayākaragupta's *Munimatālaṃkāra* presents the same qualm and its answer as in the commentaries by Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra,[1134] while his *Marmakaumudī*[1135] gives the mental consciousness as the instance of generating bodhicitta. Atiśa's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa* says:

> Its nature is wishing.[1136]

Buddhaśrījñāna's *Prajñāpradīpāvalī* rebuts the system of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra and asserts the generation of bodhicitta as being a striving resolve:

> Since striving has the character of cognizance [anyway], it is sufficient to use the designation ["striving"]. Elsewhere it is said that the result is labeled with [the name of its] cause or what possesses [its mental] aid, with the name of its simultaneously [associated mental aid], but how should that establish its specific characteristic?[1137]

Ratnākaraśānti holds bodhicitta to be both mentation and desire. His *Śuddhamatī* explains:

> What is called "the entity of generating bodhicitta" is mind (that is, mentation) and desire . . . Thus, its definition is that the generation of bodhicitta is the desire for completely perfect enlightenment for the sake of the welfare of others.[1138]

2ba3) Thus, the explanation of the generation of bodhicitta in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as being the mental factor "intention" is given in terms of explaining the meaning of the term "generating bodhicitta" by virtue of this mental factor being the one that makes one generate bodhicitta because intention is the main element in the mind forming and engaging in an object. However, this does not mean that the generation of bodhicitta is asserted here as being nothing but a mental factor because Vasubandhu speaks of "the intention that possesses two focal objects."

Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra take the generation of bodhicitta (lit. "mind-generation"; Skt. cittotpāda) to be a primary mind (the mental consciousness). They do so with the intention of the basic meaning of the term "mind-generation" (which contains the word *citta*) not being preserved if it were a mental factor (*caitta*). For, otherwise, it would not be clearly indicated that that primary mind is the nature of the generation of bodhicitta and that it is what is to be generated.

In particular, Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* first says that generating bodhicitta refers to striving, thinking, "May I awaken to perfectly complete enlightenment" and "May I accomplish the welfare of others."[1139] Next, he presents the following qualm:

> But then it would not be the generation of bodhicitta because mind (*citta*) has the defining characteristic of cognizing specific objects, while "striving" is craving.

In other words, this means that striving or desire (as in AA I.18b) is not the generation of bodhicitta. Because striving is focused on the future, it represents craving, while the generation of bodhicitta entails the nature of the twofold welfare appearing at present. The *Vṛtti*'s answer is:

> This is true indeed, but here the result is indicated by its cause. For when [bodhisattvas] possess the striving that is characterized by the resolve for [accomplishing] virtuous dharmas, they generate bodhicitta for the sake of buddhahood.

Thus, the generation of bodhicitta being explained as a mental factor in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1 and here in AA I.18ab as "the desire for the welfare of others" means that the result (the generation of bodhicitta) is labeled with the name of its cause (desire).

Alternatively, the *Vṛtti* explains that striving refers to aspiration, which is the primary element at the time when bodhicitta is generated. According to this, line AA I.18b ("the desire for completely perfect enlightenment") is a case of giving the name of the aid (desire or striving) to what possesses this aid (the generation of bodhicitta). Thus, the *Vṛtti* concludes:

> In bodhisattvas, the mind (*citta*) that is associated with [the mental factor] "aspiration" arises.

The *Ālokā*'s discussion of this, which starts with citing *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1, was already presented above.

In sum, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*'s explanation of the generation of bodhicitta being an aspiration is given in terms of there being no generation of bodhicitta without there being such an aspiration in the sense of striving and resolve. Likewise, Vasubandhu's commentary on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1 does not refer to the generation of bodhicitta as being nothing but a mental factor either. Rather, both his and Asaṅga's explanations were given by their having in mind that the mental factor "intention" represents the main

element in the process of mind forming and engaging in an object. Nor do Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert the generation of bodhicitta as being nothing but a primary mind because both the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā* explain it as being a case of the result being labeled with the name of its cause and, in particular, as being a case of the name of the mental aid given to that which is associated with this aid. As it is said:

> Without mental factors,
> Mind never arises—
> Just as the sun and its light rays,
> It arises together with them.[1140]

Accordingly, here too, the primary mind in question (the mental consciousness that is focused on the welfare of others and enlightenment) arises simultaneously with and by way of being associated with its mental aid (the intention that entails striving). As for that primary mind here, it is only the mental consciousness that is suitable as the support for all virtuous dharmas because the five sense consciousnesses are solely oriented outwardly, while the ālaya-consciousness and the afflicted mind are neutral (that is, neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous). Thus, the generation of bodhicitta refers to the mental compound in which the above mental consciousness and intention are associated simultaneously.

2bb) Thus, the definition of the generation of bodhicitta is "the mind that is congruently associated with its specific aid—the striving desire of being focused on completely perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others."[1141]

2bc) The ways to divide bodhicitta are four in terms of
1) Nature
2) Manner of arising
3) Boundary lines
4) Aids or examples

2bc1) Its nature is twofold—aspiration and application. As the *Śikṣasamuccaya* says:

> Bodhicitta is twofold—the mind of aspiring for enlightenment and the mind of setting out for enlightenment. The *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* states:
>
> > O son of noble family, sentient beings who aspire for unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment are rare in the realm of sentient beings. Even rarer than those are sentient

> beings who have set out for unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment.[1142]

This sūtra also says that the mind of aspiring for enlightenment means "I should become a buddha." As for the question of whether there is or is not a formal vow for this aspiration, it says that there is only a vow for the bodhicitta of application. *Bodhicaryāvatāra* I.15–16 says:

> In brief, bodhicitta
> Should be known as twofold:
> The mind of aspiring for enlightenment
> And the mind of setting out for enlightenment.
>
> Just as the difference is understood
> Between the desire to walk and walking,
> So should the learned understand,
> In due order, the difference between these two.

Accordingly, Kalyāṇadeva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasaṃskāra*[1143] says that the bodhicitta of aspiration is only like the desire to travel to a certain country, but not the actual traveling.

Prajñākāramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*[1144] comments on I.15–16 by saying that both kinds of bodhicitta do not go beyond the desire for completely perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others, but that the difference in terms of their respective mental activity should be understood by virtue of their entailing or not entailing physical, verbal, and mental actions that correspond to this desire.

Kamalaśīla's first *Bhāvanākrama*[1145] gives the same division of bodhicitta, quotes the above passage from the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, and explains that the bodhicitta of aspiration is the initial striving: "May I become a buddha for the sake of benefiting all beings." The bodhicitta of application begins with the subsequent taking of the bodhisattva vow and refers to being engaged in gathering the accumulations.

Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā* explains that the bodhicitta of aspiration is nothing but an aspiration, which is not even adopted through the ceremony of generating the kind of bodhicitta that intends to gather the accumulations. The bodhicitta of application refers to the conduct of practicing that aspiration, starting from the generation of bodhicitta that arises from formally taking the bodhisattva vow from a spiritual friend up through the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum.[1146]

Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and Sāgaramegha's *Bodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā* also assert that the bodhicittas of aspiration and application are distinct and that it is only the latter one that is adopted through a ceremony.

Śāntideva's explanation by way of the example of the desire to walk and actually walking appears to refer to the meaning of the sūtras. Thus, though the desire of traveling to a certain country may arise, this does not necessarily mean that one is actually entering the road and taking any steps in that direction. Likewise, first great compassion by way of focusing on sentient beings arises, based on which the mere desire of attaining perfect buddhahood for the welfare of all these beings arises. This is the bodhicitta of aspiration. Then, in order to attain this state of buddhahood, through engaging in the trainings in accomplishing enlightenment (such as taking the bodhisattva vow) one actually sets out on the path of putting this aspiration into practice. This is the bodhicitta of application.

Some claim that Ratnākaraśānti's *Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya*, Kṛṣṇapāda's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraduravabodhanirṇayanāmagrantha*,[1147] Jetāri's explanation of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*'s intention, and Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittotpādasamādānavidhi*[1148] explain that there are a formal ceremony and a vow for the bodhicitta of aspiration. However, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* itself says in verses I.17–19:

> From the bodhicitta of aspiration
> A great fruition arises while wandering in saṃsāra,
> But there is no ceaseless arising of merit
> As with the bodhicitta of application.
>
> From whatever point in time
> This mind is properly adopted
> Through an irreversible state of mind
> In order to liberate infinite realms of sentient beings,
>
> From that very point in time onward
> Many forms of ceaseless engagement in merit,
> Equaling the sky [in their vastness], will arise,
> Even when one is asleep or heedless.

This explains the difference between the bodhicitta of aspiration (first verse) and the bodhicitta of application (last two verses). That is, unlike with the bodhicitta of application, for the bodhicitta of aspiration, there is neither a ceremony nor a vow that is taken through a ceremony. Therefore, there is no ceaseless arising of merit from the latter. Rather, ceaseless merit arises

by virtue of properly taking the bodhisattva vow through the ceremony in which one generates the bodhicitta of application through one's mind being irreversibly set on perfect enlightenment from the point of taking this vow up through having liberated all sentient beings. It is clear from this that Śāntideva does not assert any ceremony for the bodhicitta of aspiration. Thus, he says in verses III.23–24:

> Just as the former tathāgatas
> Have generated bodhicitta
> And progressively dwelled
> In the trainings of a bodhisattva,
>
> So will I give rise to bodhicitta
> For the sake of benefiting beings
> And progressively train
> In the trainings of a bodhisattva.

The first verse shows the example to be followed; the next two lines indicate the ceremony of generating bodhicitta; and the last two lines show the commitment to earnestly train in the trainings that are prescribed by this ceremony without falling away from them. This appears to be the manner of adopting the bodhicitta of application alone.

Some assert that these verses indicate the manner of adopting bodhicitta by way of a ceremony that does not distinguish between the bodhicittas of aspiration and application and that they teach the ceremony of adopting the trainings of both. However, according to this, Śāntideva would contradict himself because, as stated above, he says that ceaseless merit does not arise for the bodhicitta of aspiration and, by setting off the bodhicitta of application, he explains that ceaseless merit only arises from having adopted this latter type of bodhicitta through a ceremony. It is with the intention of the bodhicitta of aspiration being just a kind of mere virtue until it is embraced by the bodhisattva vow that Śāntideva gives the explanation of ceaseless merit not arising from this type of bodhicitta. His *Śikṣasamuccaya* agrees with this and also the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* does not explain any ceremony for the bodhicitta of aspiration, while it discusses the ceremony for taking the vow of the bodhicitta of application. Sāgaramegha's *Bodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā* explains the two kinds of bodhicitta as the bodhicitta of aspiration of not having taken up the trainings and the bodhicitta of application through having taken the bodhisattva vow.

Therefore, the passage at the beginning of the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* that says, "Thus, through the aspect of the seeming, having generated the

bodhicitta whose nature is aspiration, . . ." teaches, in a general way, the generation of the seeming bodhicitta of aspiring to attain enlightenment for the welfare of others, but it does not teach any ceremony for the bodhicitta of aspiration as distinguished from the bodhicitta of application. Also in Jetāri's text, such a ceremony does not appear clearly—all he says is, "The characteristic of aspiration is to be manifested." Though it is claimed that Nāgārjuna explains such a ceremony for the bodhicitta of aspiration in his *Bodhicittotpādasamādānavidhi*, he only explains the ceremony for generating bodhicitta as such, but does not make any distinction in it between aspiration and application.[1149] Therefore, if one were to treat this as the ceremony for the bodhicitta of aspiration, the text would not teach any ceremony for the bodhicitta of application because none other appears in it.

When the bodhicitta of aspiration arises first, it is merely the motivation of entering the path. Thus, one has not actually entered the path. The time of starting to enter the path occurs only upon having obtained the vow of the bodhicitta of application and it is only upon having first attained the lesser path of accumulation that one actually has entered the path. Thus, the meaning of the sūtras and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* refers to the mere motivation of desiring to go, which is not associated with the act of going, and to the substance of this motivation of desiring to go also existing continuously during the time of its being associated with the actual act of going. Likewise, the generation of bodhicitta, before being associated with the vow of application, is merely the generation of the bodhicitta of aspiration, but the substance of the bodhicitta of aspiration is also existing continuously during the time of being associated with that vow. However, at this point, the bodhicitta of aspiration does not exist as being different from the bodhicitta of application because the mind stream of a person in which the vow of the bodhicitta of application exists cannot but be embraced by the bodhicitta of aspiration. On the other hand, if one, after having taken the vow of application, were to give up the bodhicitta of aspiration versus the bodhicitta of application in an isolated way, one would give up the virtuous dharmas of the mahāyāna from the point of having obtained the vow of application onward. For it is explained that one gives up the mahāyāna dharma if one gives up the bodhicitta of aspiration. That is, if one gives up the aspiration of striving for enlightenment for the welfare of others, one gives up the bodhicitta of both aspiration and application. That is why it is explained that one gives up all virtuous dharmas, but it does not mean to give up just the bodhicitta of aspiration as set off from the bodhicitta of application. For even if one did, the substantial continuum[1150] of the bodhicitta of aspiration is not given up and thus still exists. Though the vow of application and the bodhicitta of application are not the same, one should understand that the generation of the latter occurs by virtue of taking

the vow. Thus, on its own, the bodhicitta of aspiration exists from its arising up to becoming associated with the vow, while the bodhicitta of application exists from having taken the vow up through the end of the continuum.

Some assert that the bodhicitta of aspiration exists from the lesser path of accumulation onward, while the bodhicitta of application exists from the medium path of accumulation onward. For they say, in the section on the second one among the twenty-two types of generating bodhicitta, the one associated with intention, the sūtras explain the training in the six pāramitās. Also, Devendrabuddhi's *Commentary on Familiarizing with the Topics of Prajñāpāramitā*[1151] explains bodhicitta as twofold (aspiration and application), with the former being like earth and the latter referring to the remaining twenty-one examples in AA I.19–20 (gold up through cloud).[1152] However, the corresponding passage in the sūtras is a mere statement on training in the six pāramitās, but it cannot serve as a scriptural support that provides a rationale for there being no bodhicitta of application on the lesser path of accumulation. Instead, in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, the *Bhāvanākrama*, and elsewhere, it is said that bodhicitta is applied once one has obtained the bodhisattva vow. Devendrabuddhi's position is not good either. For there is no pure scriptural source for his drawing such a boundary line within the twenty-two kinds of bodhicitta in terms of the bodhicittas of aspiration and application. Also, without any bodhicitta of application on the lesser path of accumulation, one would have to assert that, despite obviously being associated with the activities of having entered the path, one is still not setting out for enlightenment. In addition, after one has taken the bodhisattva vow, a progressive development of the bodhicitta of application from the lesser path of accumulation onward would be impossible and bodhisattvas on the lesser path of accumulation would have no bodhisattva vow. If such is accepted, it contradicts the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* speaking of "the desire to go and going" and Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama* saying:

> After having taken the vow, to engage in the accumulations is the bodhicitta of application.[1153]

2bc2) The way of dividing bodhicitta in terms of its manner of arising has two parts:

a) Arising through taking the vow and the view
b) Arising through the power of familiarization

2bc2a) *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.7 says:

Through the power of a friend, the power of a cause, the power
of roots,
The power of study, and the cultivation of virtue,
The generation of bodhicitta taught by others is explained
As arising in a stable or unstable manner.

Here, the generation of bodhicitta by virtue of the teachings and representative indications of others refers to the generation of bodhicitta that arises from taking the bodhisattva vow through certain symbols or signs. This may happen through five powers—(1) a spiritual friend; (2) the cause that is the mahāyāna disposition; (3) the flourishing of this disposition due to accumulating roots of virtue; (4) studying the scriptural collection of the mahāyāna; and (5) being familiar with virtue, that is, bodhicitta arising from cultivating virtues such as studying, memorizing, and explaining the dharma again and again. Among these five ways of bodhicitta arising, the first one is unstable, while the remaining four are stable.

2bc2b) *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.8–9 says:

By virtue of having attended the perfect buddhas well,
Having gathered the accumulations of merit and wisdom,
And the nonconceptual wisdom about phenomena having arisen,
It is the ultimate one.[1154]

Once one attains being equal minded
Toward phenomena, sentient beings,
Their actions, and supreme buddhahood,
By virtue of these, its joyfulness is outstanding.

The first line refers to bodhisattvas receiving the supreme scriptural instructions; the second, to their accomplishing the supreme causes; and the third, to the distinctive feature of their realization by virtue of supreme insight. Once they have generated bodhicitta through these three features, it is explained to be the ultimate one. The next verse, through indicating the attainment of the first bhūmi, Supreme Joy, teaches the causes for its joy being outstanding. Through bodhisattvas on this bhūmi realizing phenomenal identitylessness, they are equal minded toward phenomena. Through realizing the equality of others, they are equal minded toward sentient beings. Through desiring to put an end to the sufferings of others as if these sufferings were their own, they are equal minded toward the actions of beings. Through realizing the

dharmadhātu of the buddhas and their own dharmadhātu to be inseparable, they are equal minded toward phenomena.

The middle *Bhāvanākrama* discusses the division into seeming and ultimate bodhicitta as follows:

> Bodhicitta is twofold—the seeming and the ultimate. Among these, the seeming one is the first generation of bodhicitta in the form of making the commitment to bring all śentient beings out [of saṃsāra] and thus desiring for unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment, thinking, "May I become a buddha in order to benefit beings." Here, as [explained] in the ceremony taught in the [*Bodhisattvabhūmi's*] chapter on ethics, one should generate bodhicitta based on someone else who is skilled in keeping the bodhisattva vow. Having thus given rise to the seeming bodhicitta, one should make efforts to give rise to the ultimate bodhicitta. The ultimate bodhicitta is supramundane, free from all reference points, very lucid, the sphere of the ultimate, stainless, unmoving, and unwavering like the continuum of an oil lamp in the absence of wind.[1155] This is accomplished by virtue of always having devotedly cultivated the yogas of calm abiding and superior insight for a long time.[1156]

The same is also explained in Vimalamitra's **Kramapraveśikabhāvanārtha*.[1157]

2bc3) The way of dividing bodhicitta in terms of its boundary lines is fourfold. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.2 says:

> The generation of bodhicitta is held
> [To exist] on the levels of aspiration,
> Pure superior intention, maturation,
> And the relinquishment of obscurations.

Respectively, these four levels refer to engagement through aspiration, bhūmis 1–7, bhūmis 8–10, and the buddhabhūmi. The *Ālokā* presents the boundary lines of the first one as being the four factors conducive to penetration, but it is better to identify it as starting from the path of accumulation.

2bc4) The way of dividing bodhicitta in terms of its aids or examples refers to the twenty-two examples that are presented in AA I.19–20. Furthermore, the earlier Tibetans explain that the desire for oneself becoming a buddha through establishing all sentient beings in buddhahood is the shepherdlike generation of bodhicitta; the desire for oneself and others becoming buddhas

simultaneously is the ferrymanlike generation of bodhicitta; and the desire to promote the welfare of others after oneself has become a buddha first is the kinglike generation of bodhicitta. However, I do not see any pure scriptural source for such an explanation of these three examples and of their number being definite. In general, the inconceivable ways of bodhisattvas generating bodhicitta are not absolutely definite as these three.

2c) The benefit of generating bodhicitta has two parts:
- a) The temporary fruitions
- b) The ultimate fruition

2ca) The temporary fruitions are threefold:
1) One's own welfare
2) The welfare of others
3) The welfare of both

2ca1) One's own welfare is twofold—(a) the qualities of terminating wrongdoing and (b) the qualities of attaining vast merit. (a) is again twofold in terms of wrongdoings that were previously accumulated and those that will not be accumulated later. The first one corresponds to *Bodhicaryāvatāra* I.13–14ab:

> Even if they committed very unbearable evil,
> They are instantly liberated from great fear,
> Just as when relying on a hero,
> So why would the fearful not rely on this [bodhicitta]?
>
> Just as the conflagration at the end of time,
> It definitely burns great wrongdoing in an instant.

The benefit of not further accumulating wrongdoing is as in the following lines:

> Right upon those with insight having generated the supreme mind,
> Their mind is under control so as to not engage in infinite flaws.

and in verse 89 of Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*:

> Those who possess the motivation of protecting sentient beings,
> Though they are born in the swamp of [saṃsāric] existence,
> Are not tainted by the flaws that arise from it,
> Just as the petals of a lotus [above] the water.

(b) The qualities of attaining vast merit are as the *Vīradattaparipṛcchāsūtra* says:

> What is the merit of bodhicitta?
> If it possessed form,
> It would be filling all of space
> And even go beyond it.[1158]
>
> When you take all the many collections
> Of merit of all sentient beings,
> [The merit] that arises from the bodhicitta
> Of bodhisattvas is just as much.

2ca2) The fruition in terms of the welfare of others consists of taking joy in oneself suffering for the welfare of others and becoming an object of veneration in the three worlds. As *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.22cd says:

> Taking delight in happiness and suffering,
> They always increase both virtue and compassion.[1159]

Bodhicaryāvatāra I.9 says:

> Once bodhicitta has arisen in them, in an instant,
> The feeble who are fettered in the dungeon of saṃsāra
> Are called "children of the sugatas"
> And worldly gods and humans will pay homage to them.

The scriptures of the Abhayagirivāsins[1160] say:

> I, the Bhavagat, pay homage also to bodhisattvas who have given rise to bodhicitta for the first time. I even pay homage to animals who have given rise to bodhicitta.

2ca3) The fruition in terms of both welfares consists of delighting the buddhas and maturing sentient beings. As the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and AA II.15b say, both one's own and the welfare of others are accomplished through the victors and their children protecting, guarding, and sheltering bodhisattvas. As the *Śikṣasamuccaya* says:

> This is to please the buddhas,
> This is to mature sentient beings,
> And this is to accomplish one's own welfare.

The *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* states:

> Since bodhicitta accomplishes all aims, it is like the king of wish-fulfilling jewels. Since it fulfills all wishes, it is like an excellent [wish-fulfilling] vase.

Bodhicaryāvatāra III.30ab and 32cd–33ab declares:

> This is also the supreme nectar
> That overcomes the lord of death of beings.
> . . .
> It is the rising moon of mind
> That removes the torture of the afflictions of beings.
>
> It is the great sun that dispels
> The blurred vision of the ignorance of beings.

2cb) The ultimate fruition corresponds to what the *Śūraṃgamasamādhisūtra* says:

> If even a wavering generation of bodhicitta is said to be the cause of buddhahood, there is no need to mention a generation of bodhicitta by way of acting virtuously.

Bodhicaryāvatāra I.10 states:

> Just as a supreme alchemistic elixir to transform [iron into] gold,
> It takes this impure body and transforms it
> Into the priceless jewel of the body of a victor,
> So seize what is called "bodhicitta" firmly.

Though earlier Tibetans have given detailed explanations about the ceremony of generating bodhicitta and the major downfalls of the bodhisattva vow according to the distinct systems of Mere Mentalism and Madhyamaka and so on,[1161] I shall not write these down for fear of being too verbose and merely wrote what pertains to the topic at hand.[1162]

Comments on the generation of bodhicitta in AA I.18–20

This has three parts:

1) Definitions of generating bodhicitta
2) Its focal objects

3) Its divisions

1) AA I.18ab speaks about the nature and the focal object of generating bodhicitta. The definiendum here is "the generation of the mind[set] of the mahāyāna." This can be defined in two ways through explaining it as (1) a mental aid (desire) by way of connecting it with its fruition (enlightenment as the cognizing subject) or as (2) a cause by way of connecting it with its aim (the welfare of others as the object).

The definition of (1) is "the special cognition that is congruently associated with the desire for completely perfect enlightenment as what is to be attained in order to achieve the aim that consists of the welfare of all sentient beings other than oneself." Here, "for the welfare of others" specifies this generation of the mahāyāna mindset as being more eminent than those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas because they also possess the mere desire for enlightenment, which is, however, for their own welfare alone.

The definition of (2) is "the cognition that is congruently associated with the aid of being motivated by the desire for the welfare of others, thinking, 'Once I attain completely perfect enlightenment, I shall make efforts for the welfare of others for as many eons as it takes.'"

According to the first manner of explaining the definition of the generation of bodhicitta, one's desire is to attain completely perfect enlightenment which is for the sake of the welfare of others. According to the second manner of explanation, one's desire is for the welfare of others, which is to happen after one has attained completely perfect enlightenment. Therefore, in both cases, what is actually to be accomplished is the welfare of others, while enlightenment is merely what is to be accomplished in order to achieve this aim, but enlightenment is not the main thing. Therefore, the claim by some that bodhisattvas possess a striving for their own welfare, which must lead to the assertion that they possess a mind of desiring the attainment of perfect enlightenment for their own welfare, is outside the mahāyāna.

2) As for the two focal objects of the generation of bodhicitta, AA I.18cd says that both enlightenment (the object to be attained) and the welfare of others (the object that is the aim) are explained in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in a brief and detailed manner as explained in the *Ālokā* (see CE), which is also found in Ratnākaraśānti's *Śuddhamatī*, Ratnakīrti's *Kīrtikalā*, and others. Thus, "briefly and in detail" in AA I.18c refers to explaining these two focal objects in brief and in detail, but not to the definition (I.18ab) and the twenty-twofold division (I.19–20) of the generation of bodhicitta, respectively. For in the sūtras, after the definition of the generation of bodhicitta, there follow these passages that explain those two focal objects in brief and in detail, which are clearly indicated as being finished before the division into the twenty-two kinds of generat-

ing bodhicitta. Though this division represents a detailed explanation of the generation of bodhicitta, it is not one in terms of its focal objects.

3) The divisions of the generation of bodhicitta has two parts:

a) Removing qualms about Haribhadra's presentation of the boundary lines of the twenty-two types of generating bodhicitta

b) Analysis of whether a generation of bodhicitta exists or does not exist on the buddhabhūmi

3a) The way in which the twenty-two types of generating bodhicitta are explained here represents the intention of Āryavimuktisena. However, some Tibetans say, "Āryavimuktisena asserts that the stage of the generation of bodhicitta that is the relinquishment of obscurations, which is explained in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.2, refers to the eight types of generating bodhicitta that are included in the special path.[1163] This is excellent." However, Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* does not clearly distinguish any boundary lines. Still, some claim, "Ratnākaraśāntī holds that one understands the boundary lines of these twenty-two types of bodhicitta through the explanation in Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on IV.15–20, which matches them with the eighty inexhaustibilities." The great Ngog Lotsāwa also explains it that way. Furthermore, some Tibetans, such as Ngog Lotsāwa, assert, "Haribhadra's matching the last three types of bodhicitta with the buddhabhūmi is not good. For the explicit teachings in the sūtras speak about all twenty-two as referring to bodhisattvas and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XX.37ab explains the bodhicitta of the single path in the generation of bodhicitta (20) as applying from the eighth bhūmi onward since it says,

> Due to being joined with the path of single progress,
> It is held to be the bhūmi Gone Afar.[1164]

Also, to match the four epitomes of the dharma in (21) with the generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi is not good because the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* explains them as pertaining to the ninth bhūmi. The cloudlike bodhicitta (22) must be presented as both the tenth and the eleventh bhūmis because *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.20ab says:

> The generation of bodhicitta of the children of the victor
> Is similar to a cloud."

However, all that Ratnākaraśāntī's *Śuddhamatī* says is:

> The learned explain that the *Akṣayamati[nirdeśa]sūtra* speaks of the eighty inexhaustibilities, on which the twenty-two [types of] generating bodhicitta comment.[1165]

As for the boundary lines of the twenty-two kinds of generating bodhicitta, the positions of masters other than Haribhadra are as follows. Abhayākaragupta's *Marmakaumudī* says:

> The sixth one is the first one of the fifteen generations of bodhicitta of the supramundane path of familiarization—it is associated with the [eight] branches of the path of the noble ones. The first nine (6)–(14) of these [fifteen] represent the nine bhūmis, such as The Stainless. The other six (15)–(19) [refer] to the special path of the level of [the tenth bhūmi] Dharma Cloud, with the last one of them being the uninterrupted path for the buddhabhūmi. For this reason, the assertion by Haribhadra that [this last one] is included in the buddhabhūmi is not reasonable since there is no purpose in labeling it in that way. The twenty-first and twenty-second generations of bodhicitta represent the buddhabhūmi in terms of the actual [bhūmi] and [its] subsequent [attainment].[1166]

Thus, this text says that the generations of bodhicitta (15)–(19) share the same boundary lines, while (20) consists of the uninterrupted path at the very end of the tenth bhūmi. However, the latter is not the actual buddhabhūmi and, even if it is asserted to be so nominally, there is no purpose in doing so.

Buddhaśrījñāna explains that, among the last eight generations of bodhicitta, the first four pertain to the eighth bhūmi; the next two, to the ninth bhūmi; and the last two, to the tenth bhūmi.

As for the last three generations of bodhicitta being presented in terms of preparation, main part, and conclusion, Abhayākaragupta asserts that the dharmakāya and the sāmbhogikakāya or the mirrorlike wisdom and the wisdom of equality represent the main part, while the nairmāṇikakāya or the all-accomplishing wisdom makes up the conclusion.[1167]

However, the above position of the *Marmakaumudī* on the generation of bodhicitta (20) not referring to the buddhabhūmi does not invalidate Haribhadra's assertion of (20) merely consisting of the preparation for the buddhabhūmi. For the *Ālokā* says:

> This one is connected to the bodhisattvabhūmis and consists of the path of preparation for entering the buddhabhūmi.[1168]

As mentioned above, Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on IV.15–20 teaches the boundary lines by way of referring to the twenty-two examples being matched with their inexhaustibilities in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra.*

As for the explicit statements in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and what is said in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,* just the fact of their speaking of "bodhisattvas" and "children of the victors" does not necessarily mean that they refer to bodhisattvas in terms of making a strict distinction beteween buddhas and bodhisattvas. For example, though Śvetaketu,[1169] Prince Siddhārtha, Maitreya, and so on are called "bodhisattvas," they are not necessarily bodhisattvas as opposed to buddhas because it is explained that they display activities such as dwelling in Tuṣita after having become buddhas already. Otherwise, since the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* describes the fourfold generation of bodhicitta in IV.2 as being the generations of bodhicitta of bodhisattvas, the last one among these—the bodhicitta that is the relinquishment of obscurations (which represents the buddhabhūmi)—would also be a generation of bodhicitta of bodhisattvas. Even if that is accepted, it is invalidated through the *Bhāṣya*'s own gloss of this fourth generation of bodhicitta as "the lack of obscurations on the buddhabhūmi."

Also, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*'s explanation of the single path to travel, the four epitomes of the dharma, and being cloudlike as respectively beginning on or pertaining to the eighth, ninth, and tenth bhūmis is a teaching on the boundary lines of the generations of bodhicitta on these bhūmis as being entities that arise as having the character of causes. However, this does not mean that, by virtue of these generations of bodhicitta existing on said bhūmis, they do not exist on the buddhabhūmi. For in his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on the twenty-second generation of bodhicitta, Vasubandhu explains that the cloudlike generation of bodhicitta exists on the buddhabhūmi. He says that the generation of bodhicitta that is associated with skill in means is like a cloud—just as all abundance of the outer world comes from rain clouds, the activities for the welfare of all sentient beings by way of manifestations such as dwelling in the heavenly realm of Tuṣita depend on this generation of bodhicitta. Also, if the single path to travel and the four epitomes of the dharma are explained as referring to the eighth and ninth bhūmis, respectively, there is the flaw of the order of these two bhūmis being mixed up because the single path to travel is the twenty-first example and the epitomes of the dharma pertain to the twentieth. In this way, the explanations in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* are just as with the other qualities that exist on the bodhisattvabhūmis in common (such as the knowledge of the path, the ten pāramitās, and the four foundations of mindfulness) not necessarily not existing on the buddhabhūmi. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* does

not explain that none of the twenty-two generations of bodhicitta exists on the buddhabhūmi because IV.2d explains the generation of bodhicitta that is the relinquishment of obscurations as being the buddhabhūmi.

Though Haribhadra says that the last three make up the buddhabhūmi, he says that the twentieth one represents its path of preparation, while the last two represent the buddhabhūmi in its fruitional character. In this way, though all the first nineteen generations of bodhicitta also exist on the buddhabhūmi with a fruitional character, the last three are said to make up the buddhabhūmi in its fruitional character because they do so in terms of their respective examples and their meanings being in accord. The *Ālokā* explains:

> What is to be generated are generations of bodhicitta that have the character of being focused on said causes and the fruition, respectively. Also, when they are divided, this should be done in this same way. Otherwise, through making just a division in terms of causes, the division would not be made in all aspects and therefore the division would be incomplete.[1170]

Thus, the twenty-two kinds of generating bodhicitta are divisions in terms of both causal and fruitional characters. If one did not present the division of the fruitional generation of bodhicitta, the division of the generation of bodhicitta would not be complete.

As for the explicit passage in the sūtras on the twenty-second generation of bodhicitta speaking of "bodhisattvas," this is in terms of teaching the manner in which bodhisattvas become buddhas in the form of nairmāṇikakāyas. For the sūtras say:

> Bodhisattvas who . . . being surrounded by all classes of gods and a great assembly of bodhisattvas, think, "I shall go to the heart of enlightenment."[1171]

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* has been quoted above and also the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā* say here, ". . . through displaying dwelling in the realm Tuṣita."[1172]

3b) Analysis of whether a generation of bodhicitta exists or does not exist on the buddhabhūmi

This has two parts:

a) Demonstrating that the systems of others are untenable

b) Presenting what is tenable

3ba) Some Tibetans say, "There is no generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi. For in this state, the support for generating bodhicitta—the disposition—has come to an end and buddhahood is beyond the time of the commitment to generate bodhicitta. Also, there is no mind of desiring to attain perfect buddhahood." Some assert that the generation of bodhicitta which is the relinquishment of obscurations represents a case of labeling the fruition as "generating bodhicitta." Others say, "The last three among the twenty-two generations of bodhicitta are not generations of bodhicitta because Haribhadra explains them as the fruitions of generating bodhicitta."

These statements are not tenable for the following reasons. If it were as the first one says, neither the generation of bodhicitta that is the relinquishment of obscurations and the cloudlike generation of bodhicitta nor the four immeasurables, great compassion, and so on would exist on the buddhabhūmi because it is claimed that the substantial continuum of the generation of bodhicitta does not exist on the buddhabhūmi. If that is accepted, the path of the knowledge of all aspects and so on as well as the pāramitās would be discontinued on the buddhabhūmi too. If it were the case that "the support for generating bodhicitta—the disposition—having come to an end" necessarily entails the nonexistence of the generation of bodhicitta, all the dharmas that are supported by this support (such as the bodhisattva vow and the pāramitās) would not exist either because their support has come to an end. Also, "being beyond the time of the commitment to generate bodhicitta" does not necessarily entail the nonexistence of the generation of bodhicitta, just as the commitment "I shall promote the welfare of others until I attain enlightenment" does not mean that one does not promote the welfare of others after one has attained enlightenment. Others, such as the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika śrāvakas, explain the time of dying and transiting as the cause for abandoning the prātimokṣa vows by virtue of being beyond the time of committing to them. However, it is nowhere explained that the attainment of buddhahood is the cause for abandoning the bodhisattva vow and the generation of bodhicitta. Therefore, to say that the bodhisattva vow and the generation of bodhicitta in the mahāyāna are abandoned after the attainment of buddhahood because buddhas are beyond the time of the commitment to generate bodhicitta is just the talk of fools who wrongly try to apply the system of the śrāvaka prātimokṣa vows in the same manner to the mahāyāna. Furthermore, "there being no mind of desiring to attain perfect buddhahood" does not necessarily entail the nonexistence of the generation of bodhicitta either. For though there is no mind of desiring the attainment of one's own perfect enlightenment within the generation of bodhicitta that has the character of the fruition, it is still a generation of bodhicitta (that is, the bodhicitta that is the relinquishment of obscurations).

As for the second assertion above, the generation of bodhicitta that is the relinquishment of obscurations does not represent a case of labeling the fruition as "generating bodhicitta." For if it did, the remaining three generations of bodhicitta in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.2 would also be just nominal labels, whereas this text and all its commentaries explain that all four are equal in being generations of bodhicitta, without ever making any distinction in terms of their being actual or nominal.

The third above statement of "the last three among the twenty-two generations of bodhicitta not being generations of bodhicitta because Haribhadra explains them as the fruitions of generating bodhicitta" is also not tenable. If it were true, the first nineteen would not be generations of bodhicitta either because Haribhadra explains them to be the causes of generating bodhicitta. It may be said, "The reason does not apply because Haribhadra does not explain them as the causes of generating bodhicitta, but uses the term 'causal generations of bodhicitta.'" In that case, however, the original reason in the above statement does not apply either because Haribhadra does not explain the last three generations of bodhicitta as the fruitions of bodhicitta, but uses the term "fruitional generations of bodhicitta." Some may wonder, "Still, do you assert that both the bodhicitta of aspiration and application exist on the buddhabhūmi? If they do, are they then the seeming or the ultimate generation of bodhicitta?" The two aspects of the seeming bodhicitta—aspiration and application as stated in the sūtras ("aspiration and setting out") and *Bodhicaryāvatāra* I.15–16 ("the desire to walk and walking")—do not exist on the buddhabhūmi because they refer to the initial generation of bodhicitta. However, their substantial continuum exists in an uninterrupted manner up through the buddhabhūmi as having the character of the fruition. Therefore, the four kinds of generating bodhicitta in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the twenty-two here are divided by presenting them as referring to distinct phases.

3bb) On the buddhabhūmi there exists the common substantial continuum of both the seeming and the ultimate generations of bodhicitta as having the character of the fruition. The seeming generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi is the final substantial continuum of the seeming generation of bodhicitta—the great compassion that performs effortless and spontaneously present enlightened activity. The ultimate generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi is the final substantial continuum of the type of realization that is nonconceptual wisdom—the wisdom that is ever immovable in that it is inseparable from suchness as the nature of phenomena. In brief, the ultimate generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi is omniscient wisdom and its seeming generation of bodhicitta is loving compassion. Some may say, "But then it follows that the generation of bodhicitta that arises from symbols exists on the buddhabhūmi." Though this kind of generating bodhicitta does

not exist on the buddhabhūmi as having the character of a cause, it is asserted here that its final substantial continuum does exist on the buddhabhūmi as having the character of the fruition. Therefore, though the pāramitās and so on of the bodhisattvabhūmis do not exist on the buddhabhūmi, it is not that the pāramitās and so on that make up the buddhabhūmi do not exist on it. Likewise, though the causal generations of bodhicitta on the bodhisattvabhūmis do not exist on the buddhabhūmi, the fruitional generations of bodhicitta do. This is why the explanation by Haribhadra and others that the generation of bodhicitta exists on the buddhabhūmi is given with the intention of referring to the generation of bodhicitta that has the character of the fruition. This is clear from Haribhadra's *Ālokā*, but he too does not assert any causal generations of bodhicitta to exist on the buddhabhūmi. The explanations of other masters about the generation of bodhicitta not existing on the buddhabhūmi also refer to the nonexistence of the causal generations of bodhicitta, but they do not explain that there is no fruitional generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi. To explain it in this way is excellent in that the Buddha's words and the treatises do not contradict each other.

To finally match the twenty-two generations of bodhicitta here with the four kinds that are explained in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.2, the former's first four (1)–(4) represent the latter's generation of bodhicitta that arises from aspiration; the next seven (5)–(11), the one of pure superior intention; the following nine (12)–(20), the one of maturation; and the last two (21)–(22), the one that is the relinquishment of obscurations.

JNS's Presentation[1173]

Śāntideva's definition of generating the bodhicitta of aspiration is "the mind with the desire for completely perfect enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings as its congruent factor, which is congruent with its aid, armor-like vigor." The definition of generating the bodhicitta of application is "the mind with the desire for perfect enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings as its congruent factor, which is congruent with its aid, the vigor of application." The difference between these two is like the distinction between the desire to go and actually going. Thus, the generation of the bodhicitta of application does not happen without having been adopted through a ceremony because a bodhicitta of application without appropriating it through vows is not adequate as the generation of the bodhicitta of application. The bodhicitta of aspiration is not definitely dependent on a ceremony because it is possible, through hearing something like the words that teach emptiness and compassion, that the disposition awakes within and the bodhicitta of

aspiration arises. Nevertheless, it is said in this system of Śāntideva that the bodhicitta of aspiration is also adopted by means of a ceremony in which both the bodhicitta of aspiration and application are adopted together. During that, the natures of these vows—which are of discordant type—are cast towards a single primary mind in the form of their respective mental aspects existing in the manner of congruently associated mental factors. In the second moment, they are established as vows with two different natures within consciousness. The vow of the bodhicitta of aspiration is taken for as long as it takes to become enlightened, which means that it exists uninterruptedly up through this point. This uninterrupted existence is due to the benefit of having adopted it simultaneously with the bodhicitta of application. Even if an ordinary aspiration were adopted by means of a ceremony, it would not turn into a vow. For it to turn into a vow, there is no other appropriate way than its having turned into the generation of the bodhicitta of application.

In general, the meaning of "mind-generation" (Skt. cittotpāda, Tib. sems bskyed) is to take something as one's object. Here, it is the generation of the mind that is to be focused on enlightenment through taking it as one's object. The following qualm might arise: "Haribhadra indeed asserts that any generation of bodhicitta is necessarily a generation of bodhicitta associated with desire as its congruent factor. But if this were the case, then there would be no generation of bodhicitta in the meditative equipoise that directly realizes identitylessness because there is no generation of bodhicitta with desire as its congruent factor in such a state."

The answer is that there are two types of generation of bodhicitta—(1) the generation of the mind (*citta*) of actual enlightenment (*bodhi*) and (2) the generation of the bodhicitta that is a natural outflow of enlightenment. The first one is the ultimate generation of bodhicitta, in which there is indeed not even the slightest flux of primary minds and mental factors. But it is not that, during the above meditative equipoise, the generation of bodhicitta that arises with naturally luminous mind as its congruent factor does not exist. The second one is the generation of bodhicitta that is developed as a primary mind associated with congruent virtuous mental factors. According to the approaches of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, "mind" means consciousness, which here refers to the mental consciousness because in it the capacity to focus on all pure dharmas is possible. Such a generation of bodhicitta, which has the nature of consisting of a primary mind and mental factors, exists neither on the buddhabhūmi nor in the meditative equipoise of realizing phenomenal and personal identitylessness. This twofold presentation of the generation of the mind of actual enlightenment and the generation of bodhicitta that is a natural outflow of enlightenment comes

from the *Yogācārabhūmi* and is also explained in this way in the special pith instructions of Lord Atiśa (the *Bodhipathapradīpa*).

In general, it is often asserted in both India and Tibet that whatever is mind is necessarily a primary mind that has the nature of some kind of consciousness. However, if this were the case, how could one explain that the presentation of natural luminosity being mind, which is found in all the great sūtras and tantras, just refers to ordinary consciousness? Therefore, the definition of the generation of bodhicitta in the commentaries by Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra is only presented in terms of the generation of bodhicitta on the level of seeming reality. The fact that they use the term "primary cognition" as a part of their definition of the generation of bodhicitta does not mean that they would use this term in the same way in the context of the generation of ultimate bodhicitta too. For then it would follow that they accept the wisdom free from reference points as consciousness, thus being very close to the position of the Vijñaptivādins. However, they are not close to this position since they only use this term in taking one kind of the generation of bodhicitta that is explicitly taught in the sūtras and treatises.

Furthermore, one can distinguish between the generation of bodhicitta of naturally luminous mind and the generation of bodhicitta that is characterized by the triad of mind (*citta*), mentation (*manas*),[1174] and consciousness (*vijñāna*). The first one is called "the great compassion of the buddhas" or "great compassion" or "the vajra of bodhicitta." The generation of bodhicitta that is approximately concordant with this and occurs in the meditative equipoise of the noble ones is explained as that which bears the name "generation of ultimate bodhicitta." Although the classification into the bodhicitta of aspiration and application does not exist in the AA, Haribhadra explains them as they exist in the sūtras. In general, the causal conditions for the generation of bodhicitta are the love and compassion of striving for the welfare of others, the two types of the disposition, and trusting confidence. The aid for generating bodhicitta is the desire or the aspiration of striving for perfect enlightenment, and to be endowed with this aid means to be endowed with the generation of bodhicitta.

B) The instructions

JG's presentation[1175]

The nature of the generation of bodhicitta (which is the basis of the division into its twenty-two types) is the primary topic of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA. If this topic is divided more extensively, the following topic of

the mahāyāna instructions is an ancillary elaboration and subdivision of it. These instructions consist of the ten objects as outlined in AA I.21–22. They are given to those who have first generated bodhicitta up through those who are endowed with the dhāraṇīs and self-confidence on the tenth bhūmi, that is, all bodhisattvas who have generated one or several of the causal generations of bodhicitta (1)–(19). The purpose of giving the instructions is twofold in terms of "instructions" and "directions."[1176] The purpose of "instructions" is to make the already attained qualities that consist of the respective causal and fruitional dharmas of the generation of bodhicitta and those that are impelled by these generations not deteriorate and increase further.[1177] The purpose of "directions" is to accomplish all the qualities that consist of all the not yet attained causal and fruitional dharmas of the generation of bodhicitta and those that are impelled by these generations.

The general explanation of this topic has six parts:

1) The objects from whom the instructions are received
2) The psychophysical supports in which they are received
3) The causes due to which they are received
4) The time when they are received
5) The purpose of receiving them
6) The nature of what is received

1) After having generated bodhicitta, from among those who are able to receive the mahāyāna instructions, those śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva spiritual friends who are themselves able to teach the mahāyāna instructions;[1178] the bodhisattvas who have entered the path; and śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas receive them from supreme nirmāṇakāyas (such as Buddha Śākayamuni), while noble bodhisattvas receive them from sambhogakāyas. However, there is no absolute certainty about the former because there are also cases of beings who have not entered the path (such as gods and nāgas) listening to supreme nirmāṇakāyas.

2) The psychophysical supports are twofold in terms of
   a) the instructions in general
   b) the mahāyāna instructions in particular

2a) Listening to the instructions and so on also exists in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and so on.

2b) The psychophysical supports for first listening to the mahāyāna instructions consist of the men and women in the three continents, except for Uttarakuru,[1179] as well as the gods in the desire and form realms who are suitable supports for the generation of bodhicitta and the mahāyāna path of

accumulation. The psychophysical supports for listening to these instructions in a vast manner are those who have attained the samādhi of the stream of dharma.

3) The causes due to which the mahāyāna instructions are first received are compassion, confidence, vigor, mindfulness, prajñā, and so on. The cause for receiving them in a vast manner later is the samādhi of the stream of dharma because *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.3 says:

> Then, within the stream of dharma,
> Vast instructions are received
> From the buddhas in order to attain
> Vast calm abiding and wisdom.

4) The time of first receiving the mahāyāna instructions starts after having generated bodhicitta. The time of listening to them in a vast manner starts with the great path of accumulation.[1180]

Here, some divide the mahāyāna instructions into ordinary and special ones and say that the ones in question here refer to the latter. In order to receive these, they say, one must have attained the great path of accumulation because one must have attained the samādhi of the stream of dharma. To this effect, they cite *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.17:

> Through having accomplished
> The supernatural knowledges in samādhi,
> They travel to [various] realms in the universe
> In order to pay homage and listen to buddhas beyond measure.[1181]

This explanation is not good. For, in general, one does not need to have attained the samādhi of the stream of dharma in order to listen to mahāyāna spiritual friends and so on. In particular, one does not even need this samādhi in order to directly listen to supreme nirmāṇakāyas because there are even cases of some who have not entered the path directly listening to their instructions. Also, the beginning passage in the sūtras on the knowledge of the path speaks about many gods receiving the instructions on prajñāpāramitā after having newly generated bodhicitta.[1182] Therefore, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.3 refers to the phase of having attained the four limbs of miraculous powers on the great path of accumulation, based on which XIV.17 is taught. Accordingly, bodhisattvas travel to various realms throughout the universe with their miraculous powers. There, based on the samādhi of the stream of dharma, they receive the vast mahāyāna instructions in order to attain,

from countless buddha nirmāṇakāyas, the calm abiding and wisdom that are vast by virtue of making up the mahāyāna. Thus, these two verses are given in terms of bodhisattvas on the great path of accumulation, through their miraculous powers, having traveled to various buddha realms and then, through the power of their samādhi of the stream of dharma, receiving vast instructions from the countless buddhas there. However, this does not mean that bodhisattvas must necessarily have attained the great path of accumulation and the samādhi of the stream of dharma in order to listen to the mahāyāna instructions in the context that is discussed in the AA here.

The samādhi of the stream of dharma is discussed in four parts:

a) Definition
b) Explanation of the term
c) Its causes
d) Its boundary lines

a) The definition of the samādhi of the stream of dharma is "the mindfulness and prajñā, which are congruently associated with samādhi, of being able to directly seize countless words and meanings of the dharma from the buddhas, which is based on resting in meditative equipoise in an actual dhyāna as its dominant condition."

b) The term "samādhi of the stream of dharma" refers to the ability to seize the words and meanings of the Buddha's dharma in an uninterrupted flow.

c) Through accomplishing supernatural knowledges by relying on an actual dhyāna, one gathers the accumulations, which comes from one's mind being supple and workable, just as *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.17 says.

d) Its boundary line is the great path of accumulation. As the *Ālokā* says:

> On this level of the path of accumulation, one attains the samādhi called "the stream of dharma," which is able to seize the words and meanings through having obtained the workability of mind.[1183]

5) The purpose of receiving the mahāyāna instructions is to attain the qualities that have not yet been attained and to have the ones that have already been attained not deteriorate, but increase them further.

6) The nature of the instructions to be received has two parts:

a) Nature
b) Division

6a) It is not good to describe these instructions as "the speech that is the direct instruction of the Buddha." For, in general, it is not definite that the mahāyāna instructions are only taught directly by the Buddha.[1184] The instructions do

not even have to be the words of the Buddha at all because the topics of these instructions are also complete in treatises such as the AA. Therefore, all sūtras and treatises that teach all parts of the mahāyāna path in a complete manner are instructions in the sense in question here.

The *Prasphuṭapadā* says:

> Alternatively, instructions are instructions [in the sense of] mainly consisting of the practice that accords with the instructions [received].[1185]

Thus, this text explains that both the instructions and the subsequent practice according to these instructions are instructions, with the latter one being primary. Following this, some claim that if the instructions were necessarily speech, there would be no giving of instructions by pratyekabuddhas because they do not teach the dharma by way of sounds. However, such claims and the explanation in the *Prasphuṭapadā* are not good for the following reasons. Jayānanda's *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* says:

> Instruction is teaching the dharma after having comprehended it.[1186]

Atiśa's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa* states:

> Its nature is the wheel of speech.[1187]

Both Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* and Bhadanta Vimuktisena's *Vārttika* explain that instruction appears as threefold:

> Teaching the instructions is teaching the tasks in order to attain the goal that one strives for. Instructions start with the nondeterioration of the qualities that have already been attained and show how to protect them. Directions start with attaining the qualities that have not yet been attained.[1188]

The same is said in the *Vivṛti*.[1189] Thus, they primarily explain the instructions as being speech as the means of expression. Also the *Śuddhamatī* says:

> The instructions are statements in order to comprehend.[1190]

Furthermore, the meaning of the term "instruction" does not apply to practicing or making something a living experience. Therefore, to call the

practice an instruction (as in the *Prasphuṭapadā*) is nothing but a case of labeling the result of the instructions (practice) with the name of its cause.

In this way, both the Tathāgata's teaching the dharma by way of physical expressions without sounds (such as the natural light of the Buddha eclipsing the karmically matured light of the gods, through which their mind streams become free from pride and realization arises in them)[1191] and the pratyekabuddhas teaching the dharma by way of physical expressions without sounds are referred to as "teaching the dharma" in terms of their function concording with giving instructions by way of speech. Therefore, teaching the dharma or giving instructions is fourfold—teaching by way of (a) physical expressions or what is visible, (b) speech, (c) sounds, and (d) the power of blessing or samādhi. (a) corresponds to cases such as the *Vinayavastu*[1192] explaining that a monkey who had watched pratyekabuddhas before taught five hundred seers[1193] the proper meditation posture with his body. This shows that the dharma can even be taught through the bodies of ordinary beings. (b) is easy to understand. (c) refers to the sound of the dharma coming from the drum of the gods or their instruments, trees, the sky, and so on. (d) refers to events such as attaining the qualities of relinquishment and realization by virtue of seeing the physical forms of holy beings and receiving their blessings; seeing true reality merely through seeing a painting of someone like Padmasambhava; and śrāvakas being able to realize the mahāyāna dharma and teach it to others through the power of the Buddha and his samādhi. Therefore, though teaching the dharma and instructions are not necessarily speech, to teach the dharma primarily by way of speech is the most frequent way to do so. Thus, the above statements quoted (such as Atiśa's stance that the instruction's "nature is the wheel of speech") were all made with the intention of speech being the primary element of the instructions and the most frequent way in which they are given.

6b) In terms of their function and so on, the instructions can be divided into two—"instructions" and "directions." These two are not different in terms of their nature and objects because instructions are what make already attained qualities not deteriorate and increase further, while directions make one attain those qualities that one has not yet attained. Thus, the difference in their functions is explained in the *Ālokā* as follows:

> Instructions are for the sake of not forgetting the meanings that were seized during the phase of reflection, while directions are for the sake of generating previously nonexistent realizations during the phase of meditation.[1194]

In terms of their objects, the instructions in general are tenfold (as in AA I.21–22), which can be summarized into four. (a) The three in terms of

practice are (1) the principal object or nature of practice, (2) the four realities, and (3) the three jewels. (b) The three in terms of the remedies that relinquish the causes for practice deteriorating are (4) the vigor of not clinging, (5) completely indefatigable vigor, and (6) the vigor of fully embracing the path. (c) The two in terms of the special qualities that are the causes for practice becoming special are (7) the five visions and (8) the six qualities of supernatural knowledge. (d) The two in terms of the paths that are the causes for practice reaching its final culmination are (9)–(10) the paths of seeing and familiarization.

JNS's Presentation[1195]

This has two parts:

1) Presenting the meanings of the sūtra passages that are to be explained
2) Matching these with the AA commenting on their meanings

1) The sūtra passage on the topic of the instructions begins by Śāriputra asking:

> "Bhagavan, how should bodhisattva mahāsattvas train in prajñāpāramitā?" "Here, when bodhisattva mahāsattvas engage in prajñāpāramitā, they do not see any bodhisattva mahāsattvas as if they were existing bodhisattvas, nor the word 'bodhisattva,' nor the engagement of a bodhisattva, nor prajñāpāramitā, . . . because bodhisattva mahāsattvas are actually empty of the nature of a bodhisattva and because prajñāpāramitā is empty of a nature of its own too. Why? This is their essential true nature, for it is not through emptiness that form and so on are empty, nor is emptiness other than form. Why? The very form and so on is emptiness and the very emptiness is form and so on. Why? Because 'bodhisattva,' 'prajñāpāramitā,' 'form,' and so on are mere words and because form and so on are illusionlike."[1196]

This passage teaches that the prajñā which is the mahāyāna practice's own nature is more eminent than the ones of the lower yānas. However, master Ratnākaraśānti comments on the meaning of this passage by linking it to prajñāpāramitā being the remedy for the ten conceptual distractions.[1197] As for the manner in which, by virtue of skillful means, the mahāyāna practice's own nature is more eminent than the ones of the lower yānas, the sūtras say:

> Śāriputra, bodhisattvas who engage in prajñāpāramitā and familiarize with it for a single day outshine the prajñās of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Why? Because the prajñā of bodhisattva mahāsattvas who engage in prajñāpāramitā is concerned with [accomplishing] nirvāṇa for all sentient beings . . . One should therefore understand that the prajñās of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are not comparable to the prajñā of bodhisattva mahāsattvas, even if the latter familiarize with it only for a single day.[1198]

Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*[1199] explains the manner in which the mahāyāna prajñā or practice is more eminent than those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas through matching the six examples (such as a thicket of reeds) that are contained in the above sūtra passage with the distinctive features that represent the six dharmas of realization[1200] of śrāvakas, saying that these do not even come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a hundred thousandth, or a billionth fraction of the means and the prajñā of bodhisattvas who have just generated bodhicitta—in fact, they are not at all comparable by way of numbers, fractions, counting, similarity, or example.

The passages in the sūtras that correspond to each one of the remaining nine topics of instruction start with, "Bodhisattva mahāsattvas who make efforts in the emptiness of form are called 'effortful.'"[1201]

2) As for matching the meanings of these passages with the comments in the AA, the instructions are taught in the latter in the same manner as they are found in the above sūtra passages. You may wonder, "What kind of persons are needed as the listeners to these instructions?" *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.1–2 says:

> Emerging in [one] incalculable eon
> And increasing their aspiration,
> They are as replete with virtuous dharmas
> As the ocean is with water.
>
> In this way, the primordially pure children
> Of the victors who have gathered the accumulations,
> With excellent insight and virtuous minds,
> Apply themselves to meditation.

Line XIV.1a means to emerge from saṃsāra (that is, reaching the path of seeing); "increasing their aspiration" refers to the great path of accumulation; "pure" means the pure bodhisattva vow; and "excellent insight" refers to having heard many teachings.[1202] Thus, the cause for hearing the mahāyāna

instructions here is that those who have attained the great path of accumulation obtain the mind of samādhi and thus listen to the buddhas through the power of the samādhi of the stream of dharma having arisen in them. As for the manner in which this is the case, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.3 says:

> Then, within the stream of dharma,
> Vast instructions are received
> From the buddhas in order to attain
> Vast calm abiding and wisdom.

The definition of the samādhi of the stream of dharma is "the mind dwelling one-pointedly on words and meanings by virtue of its ability to retain very profound and vast dharmas without forgetting them." For the *Ālokā* says:

> On this level of the path of accumulation, when the workability of the mind is attained, one attains the samādhi called "the stream of dharma," through the attainment of which one is able to seize the words and the meanings.[1203]

Thus, the meaning of "stream of dharma" is that this samādhi exists continuously—it lasts in an uninterrupted manner from the greater path of accumulation up through buddhahood.

Through relying on this samādhi of the stream of dharma, one listens to the dharmas that come from supreme nirmāṇakāyas. As *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.48 says:

> Those who dwell at the door of dharma
> Are always urged on by the tathāgatas,
> Pulled out of the abyss of flaws as if by their hair,
> And forcefully established in enlightenment.

For this reason, those who are worthy to listen to the mahāyāna instructions are identified in terms of the unmistaken progression of their relying on the unchanging bodhicitta in their mind streams, then gathering the accumulation of merit continuously, and thus engaging in the path of the mahāyāna. For the unmistaken order is to, immediately after having generated bodhicitta, listen to the corresponding instructions on the means that make one attain that for which one has generated bodhicitta.

Here, any speech that teaches the instructions must appear as cognizance in the form of speech, and the cause for it appearing in this way as speech must be the āyatana of sound. Though others say, "The speech that is taught

here is not necessarily sound," this is not tenable. For when bodhisattvas on the great path of accumulation who have attained the samādhi of the stream of dharma listen to the dharma, they must listen to it by relying on either an ordinary ear sense faculty or a divine sense faculty, which means that they must focus on nothing but specifically characterized sounds as the objects of the cognitions that are based on these two kinds of sense faculties.

C) The two realities

1) General presentation[1204]

The definition of the seeming is "the perceptions and cognitions that appear from the perspective of (referential) cognizance." The definition of the ultimate is "the special perceptions and cognitions free from all flux of such cognizance." As for the meaning of "seeming reality," all phenomena are said to be "real" because they are real as seeming deceptions, that is, as nonexistents. Since the actuality of the nature of phenomena is real as being real in the ultimate or definitive sense, it is called "ultimate reality." Some explain the seeming as seeming reality because it is real from the perspective of the seeming, while the ultimate is ultimate reality because it is real from the perspective of the ultimate. However, as far as the boundary lines of the two realities presented by Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga go, this is mistaken. Thus, the instances of seeming reality consist of all the cognitions that are produced by the cause which is the mistakenness of ignorance and all the factors that appear for these cognitions. The instances of ultimate reality consist of the appearances of the display of nonconceptual wisdom, which is free from the cause that is the mistakenness of innate ignorance. To distinguish the two realities as what is able or is not able to perform a function on the level of the seeming is just done in terms of childish beings.

If you wonder which one of the fully qualified two realities explained above is the one to be accepted temporarily, no matter which one of the two accumulations is gathered, what is real is definitely ultimate reality alone. When gathering the accumulation of merit, one engages in adopting and rejecting by accepting the ultimate reality that is asserted by childish beings. When gathering the accumulation of wisdom, from the perspective of meditative equipoise, there is indeed nothing whatsoever to accept. However, during subsequent attainment, by accepting the ultimate reality that is common consensus among the noble ones, one engages in cognitions and expressions in a way that is approximately concordant with meditative equipoise. In brief, seeming reality is never suitable to be accepted as real in any situation, no matter which one of the two accumulations is gathered. For in our own

system, seeming reality is not established through valid cognition. Thus, all kinds of ultimate reality that are temporarily explained as instances of ultimate reality do not go beyond seeming reality because they are the objects of terms and conceptions. Consequently, an instance of ultimate reality that is fully qualified as such is explained as not being an object of mental states. But we find in the oceanlike *Yogācārabhūmi* that, from the perspective of personally experienced wisdom, it is not the case that instances of ultimate reality do not exist. However, to think that it then follows that such instances of ultimate reality from the perspective of this wisdom are instances of seeming reality is a far cry from the Madhyamaka systems of Maitreya and Nāgārjuna. Both their systems explain nothing but that whatever is seeming reality does necessarily not exist by a nature of its own, while ultimate reality is the perfect (nature), which is necessarily not something that must be nonexistent. They unanimously explain that both existents and nonexistents—as divided in terms of existence and nonexistence from the perspective of the seeming—are equally nonexistent, while the existent that represents the nature of ultimate reality is definitely nothing but existent. Its synonyms—true reality, suchness, and the nature of phenomena—are also explained as nothing but existent. In authoritative systems there are no other explanations than that. Therefore, after having cut through reference points through the view, in the phase of making this a living experience through meditation, what is called "ultimate reality" is free from all assertions. As it is said:

> There is no dispute because it is the phase of analyzing the ultimate.

As for the meaning of the statement "What is without arising is without final deliverance" in AA I.31c, many Indians and Tibetans, by applying this to the ultimate, say that unarisen phenomena being delivered from arising represents the freedom from extremes. However, this is not the intention of the Buddha and his spiritual heirs—there is no entailment in teaching, "Since they are unarisen ultimately, arising forms and so on are without final deliverance and therefore free from extremes." This explains the meaning of "what is without arising is without final deliverance" in a mistaken manner. For, according to the above stance, there is then nothing else to teach but "What has arising lacks final deliverance."[1205] Some others say, "That seeming phenomena without arising are without final deliverance is the aspect of ultimate reality. The aspect of seeming reality is merely what entails arising and also entails final deliverance." But this just means that these people never heard of the system of the Great Mādhyamikas. In that system, the realization that what looks as if it entails arising on the level of the seeming is unarisen or without arising is just something that accords with how the basic nature of

seeming reality is. But the basic nature of ultimate reality is not suitable to exist in this way. Thus, seeming reality means to be unarisenness per se. For that reason, everything that has arisen is delusive and deceptive. Whatever is delusive is necessarily not real, and whatever is unreal does necessarily not exist in the way it is superimposed as existent. So whatever is existent in a way of not being suitable as existent is necessarily unarisen. On the other hand, ultimate reality cannot be ascertained through valid cognition as being known or realized to be either arisen or unarisen.

Nowadays, some people who boast about themselves being the crown jewels of those who propound the definitive meaning assert that, when taking the instance of a phenomenon that is not differentiated in terms of the two realities, the fact that the aspects of arising and ceasing exist in it represents seeming reality, while the aspect of realizing these aspects of arising and ceasing being discontinued represents ultimate reality. Forget about such being the distinction of the two realities by the Mādhyamikas, it does not even go beyond the distinction made by the Vaibhāṣikas. For Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas assert that if something is eliminated and the mind does not engage it anymore, this represents subject and object in terms of seeming reality. If one attempts to eliminate something, but the mind still engages it, this represents subject and object in terms of ultimate reality. This means that all generally characterized phenomena (what are similar in type) represent seeming reality, while the distinct consciousnesses and their referents that are specifically characterized phenomena are ultimate reality.[1206] Thus, if not even these two schools assert the above mistaken presentation of the two realities, it is impossible for any other Buddhists to accept it.

So how is our own system? The arising of the mere seeming lacks any arising as this mere seeming, which means that this kind of arising does not qualify as arising in the first place. If this unqualified arising existed as a reality that represents the nature of the seeming and what is consensus among the Mādhyamikas themselves, any reality other than that could not be found. However, ultimate reality is not like that—ultimate reality is the reality that is the opposite of everything delusive. Thus, it is undeceiving and indestructible—the indestructible vajra of the genuine reality of all buddhas and all great bodhisattvas like Mañjuśrī. This is the manner in which the two realities are distinguished in the Madhyamaka of definitive meaning of both Maitreya and Nāgārjuna. Though it is true that there are people who are habituated to their bad propensities toward something else that is supposedly profound, those who are fortunate do not even turn their ears toward it.

2) The way in which the two realities become the objects of the wrong ideas of apprehending them as mutually exclusive[1207]

This has three parts:

a) Explaining the flaws of not understanding the division into the two realities and the qualities of understanding it
b) Explaining their actual way of being by determining their natures
c) Explaining their hermeneutical etymology and teaching their enumeration

2a) If one understands the mode of being of the two realities, through understanding the true reality of the profound meaning of the teachings one gathers the accumulations without ignorance and thus becomes a perfect buddha. If one lacks such understanding, the flaws to the contrary of this accrue.

2b) Explaining their actual way of being by determining their natures has three parts:

a) The actual explanation
b) Relinquishing mistakenness about the two realities
c) Teaching through a summarized refutation that ultimate reality is undifferentiable

2ba) The definition of *saṃvṛti*[1208] (the seeming) is that which has never existed as a referent with a nature of its own and which consists of the aspect that is the other-dependent nature (consciousness as the subject together with its objects). The definition of *paramārtha* (the ultimate) is that which has never been nonexistent as true actuality's own nature and which consists of the aspect that is the perfect nature together with its object. The first one appears in the mind streams of those who just see this life, while the second one clearly appears in the minds of those who behold the supreme other because the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> What does not exist and what exists are to be known
> As what does not appear and appears, respectively.
> This change of state is liberation
> Because one acts as one pleases.[1209]

2bb) Relinquishing mistakenness about the two realities has three parts:

1) The way of relinquishing the mistakenness that the ultimate is empty of a nature
2) The way of relinquishing the mistakenness that the ultimate is not assessed by the cognitions of the great buddhas
3) The way of relinquishing the mistakenness that the two realities are different in nature

2bb1) Others may think, "It follows that the ultimate is empty of a nature because the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* says:

> Seemingly, everything exists.
> Ultimately, everything does not exist.[1210]

This was said with the intention of all that is explained as existent being the seeming and all that is explained as nonexistent being the ultimate." This is a mistaken statement which indicates that the meaning of this passage is not understood by these people. For the meaning of the above is that the Buddha had in mind the true nature of the seeming, saying that the seeming is what exists from the perspective of mistakenness, but does not exist from the perspective of unmistakenness. If he had not said it with this in mind, since the phrase "existing on the level of the seeming and not existing ultimately" does not mention any dharma that is the means to present existing on the level of the seeming, any presentation of the seeming would be extinguished for these people. That this is the case is also stated by Nāgārjuna in his autocommentary on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV.8:

> The dharma taught by the buddhas
> Is perfectly based on the two realities—
> Wordly seeming reality
> And ultimate reality.

> *The dharma taught by the buddha* bhagavāns came about *based on these two realities*. This so-called "*worldly seeming reality*" refers to seeing all phenomena as arising since the mistakenness of worldly beings does not realize that all phenomena are empty of nature. Seemingly, this is the very reality for just these [beings]. Hence, it is seeming reality. As for *ultimate reality*, since the unmistakenness of the noble ones realizes it, it is the seeing that all phenomena do not arise. Ultimately, this is the very reality for precisely these [noble ones]. Therefore, it is ultimate reality.[1211]

The gist of this is as follows. Mistakenness means that worldly beings do not understand the seeming as self-empty and thus conceive of it wrongly. Since seeming phenomena are ultimately empty, they do not exist. As for ultimate reality, having realized that the seeming (nonexistents that appear to be existent) is something misapprehended, the ultimate lack of arising is ultimate reality; therefore, it exists.[1212] Thus, in the context of presenting the two realities, if something is not real on the level of the seeming, this contradicts its being seeming reality. If something is not real ultimately, this contradicts its being ultimate reality. In the context of engaging in yoga, if

the seeming is not real, this contradicts its being real (at all). If ultimate reality is free from reference points, this also contradicts its being real. Therefore, it is not a conceivable object. Nevertheless, in the context of presenting the two realities, only the ultimate is real and the other one is delusive. As the *Ratnameghasūtra* says:

> O son of good family, if the ultimate were nonexistent, pure conduct would be meaningless. The coming of tathāgatas would also be meaningless. Because the ultimate exists, bodhisattvas are skilled in the ultimate.[1213]

2bb2) The way of relinquishing the mistakenness that the ultimate is not assessed by the cognitions of the great buddhas

Others may say, "Since it is said in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.2c that 'the ultimate is not the sphere of cognition,' it is neither an object of the Buddha's knowledge of all aspects nor of the nonconceptual wisdom of bodhisattvas." The meaning of this passage is that Śāntideva had in mind only the cognitions of ordinary sentient beings. Otherwise, the following and other statements would have to be wrong—many texts saying that ultimate reality is "the sphere of personally experienced wisdom";[1214] Maitreya speaking of "the perceptual sphere of the noble ones";[1215] and Asaṅga stating, "You may wonder, 'Why is it called the ultimate?' Because it is the sphere of the ultimate wisdom of the noble ones."[1216] Others may object that there is no term for mental states that singles out the mental state of a buddha, but this is pointless. For in both Sanskrit and Tibetan, there are many cases of a single term having many meanings and of many terms applying to a single meaning.

In brief, when the two realities (the objects) are respectively presented through said two kinds of cognition (their subjects), it is possible to speak about the two ways in which these two are real and the two ways in which they are empty or not empty of a nature of their own. As the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* says:

> Nirvāṇa is nonempty emptiness. What is other than this is empty emptiness.

Nāgārjuna says:

> That nirvāṇa is the sole reality . . .[1217]

And:

> Unarisen emptiness is the one
> And arisen emptiness is the other.

> Unarisen emptiness is supreme,
> Since arisen emptiness destroys.[1218]

And:

> It is not the nature of nonentities.
> It is asserted to be empty by nature.[1219]

Thus, the imaginary and the other-dependent represent the emptinesses of being empty of a nature of being established in the way they are imagined and appear, respectively. Since the perfect nature is empty in an independent manner, it is not that its fundamental character of being empty needs to be a reversal of the previous two emptinesses.

2bb3) The way of relinquishing the mistakenness that the two realities are different in nature

You may think, "According to this position, the two realities would be different in nature because the two are mutually exclusive." This is not the case. Seeming reality cannot be expressed as existing as something other than ultimate reality, so it is only different in the sense of negating that they are one in nature. However, since they are inexpressible as being other, their being different is negated. Since they are not one in nature either, their being one is negated. If they are distinguished in terms of not being one, it is not contradictory in terms of the power of entities to present them as different in the context of presenting them as the two realities. The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* says that there are four flaws if the two realities were one in nature—when childish beings see the seeming, they would also see the ultimate; just as contaminations increase within the seeming, they would do so in the ultimate too; just as there are no divisions in the ultimate, there would not be any in the seeming either; and, just as the ultimate cannot be sought by seeming consciousnesses in what is seen, heard, and so forth, the ultimate could not be sought as something else through hearing and reflecting. However, if the two realities were different, there would also be four flaws—even if the ultimate is seen, the clinging to the reality of the seeming would not be put to an end; the ultimate would not be the true nature of the seeming; the sheer suchness that the seeming is not established would not be the ultimate; and, in a single person, both afflicted and purified phenomena would be observed simultaneously.[1220]

As for the way in which the seeming and the ultimate are inexpressible as being the same or different, the nature of phenomena (ultimate reality) and the bearers of this nature (seeming reality) are not one because they have mutually exclusive features in that the ultimate nature of phenomena exists in an undeceiving manner, while the seeming bearers of this nature are deceiving

instances of nonvalid cognition, that is, they lack a nature. This excludes that the ultimate and the seeming are one. The nature of phenomena (ultimate reality) and the bearers of this nature (seeming reality) are not separate either for the following reasons. (a) The ultimately existing nature of phenomena cannot be determined through being any superior "existence" that is other than being characterized through the seeming being nonexistent. Therefore, from the perspective that any "seeming" which is other than the mere nonexistence of the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena is not established, the two realities are not separate. Or they are not separate because (b) a seeming that is other than the existence of the ultimate nature of phenomena is not established and thus there is no seeming that is different in nature from the nature of phenomena alone being really existent. Or (c) it is said that they are not separate by considering that the very fact of the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena not being established is the nature of phenomena, that is, ultimate reality. Since (a) and (b) accord in their meaning, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas explain them as the meaning of the two realities not being separate, while (c) is the explanation of this by those Mādhyamikas who follow common (worldly) consensus. No matter in which one of these two systems, seeming reality is not asserted as being existent.

Those who are trained in the latent tendencies of cognizance say, "As objects of superimposition, the bearers of the nature of phenomena and this nature exist as different, but there is no difference in terms of the basic nature itself. Therefore, since the ultimate nature of phenomena is undifferentiable from the seeming bearers of the nature of phenomena, the other-dependent seeming exists as mere appearance and its nature—the perfect nature—exists as the nature of cognizance." No matter where such is found, you should understand that it is nothing but the position of the Mere Mentalists. Here, in the context of Great Madhyamaka, the bearers of the nature of phenomena (consciousnesses together with their accompanying mental factors) are delusive and the nature of phenomena (wisdom together with its accompanying factors) is real.

2bc) Teaching through a summarized refutation that ultimate reality is undifferentiable

Neither of the two realities is established as a second (independent) phenomenon in the context of connected phenomena that entail a counterpart. In particular, ultimate reality is not established in this way. As *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XVIII.9 says:

> Not known from something other, peaceful,
> Not discursive through discursiveness,
> Without conceptions, and without distinctions—
> These are the characteristics of true reality.

Therefore, in the context of the reasonings that present both of the two realities, one follows conventions such as the mountain on this side depending on the mountain on the other side and the mountain on the other side depending on the mountain on this side. In this context of describing the two realities as entailing their counterparts, if one of these two is negated, the other one is negated too. Therefore, such presentations are just statements in order to guide childish beings, but are not made in terms of the definitive meaning. If something entails a counterpart, through negating one, the other one must also be negated, and if one is established, the other one must also be established as this other one. However, here, they are not established in this way because the ultimate is not negated through negating the seeming and the seeming is not established through the ultimate being established. In particular, ultimate reality is not established as a second phenomenon when one tries to assess this through counting away from its own nature because ultimate reality itself is apprehended first. Nor is it established as a second phenomenon when one tries to assess this through counting toward ultimate reality starting from some other nature because there is no phenomenon that has another nature. Thus, the two realities are definitely not existing as two. Since they are in union in that they are neither one nor different, they are a unity. In brief, they are referred to as being neither one nor different, and they are not affirmed as being one or different. Thus, since something like that (being one or different) contradicts the power of entities, it is not asserted by the victors and their children. Some may say, "What does contradicting the power of entities matter to you since the power of entities does not exist for you?" This is exactly the kind of qualm of mixing up the two realities that is the basis for explaining all this here and is taught by logicians as a flawed rebuttal.

2c) Explaining their hermeneutical etymology and teaching their enumeration

In the term *saṃvṛtisatya*,[1221] *saṃ* means "fully"; *vṛti* (or *āvaraṇa*), "covering" or "obscuring"; and *satya*, reality. Thus, since the nature of mistakenness fully obscures emptiness, it is the seeming. As the *Satyadvayavibhāga* says:

> The seeming is asserted as
> That which fully obscures.[1222]

Thus, "seeming" represents a translation of the meaning. One speaks of "reality" here by referring to what appears as real from the perspective of mistakenness. This seeming reality has both a correct and a false aspect. The correct seeming is asserted to be what exists as common worldly consensus on the level of the seeming. As the above text refutes (its total nonexistence):

Some who are known as bad disputants say
That, in actual fact, entities do not arise
And that they, just like the child of a barren woman and such,
Do not even arise on the level of the seeming.[1223]

In the term *paramārthasatya*, *parama* means "genuine" and "supreme" and *artha* refers to an object(ive). Since it is the object(ive) of engaging in the genuine nature of phenomena, it is the genuine object(ive). Since it is real as the object of the wisdom of the noble ones, it is real.[1224] Therefore, one must be learned in the distinction between the two realities. For it is said:

It is comparatively better to deviate from ethics,
But you should never deviate from the view.

3) The way in which the two realities are not mutually exclusive

It is neither said here that "the two realities are not mutually exclusive from the perspective of being one in self-isolate"[1225] nor is it said that "they are not mutually exclusive by asserting that something like a vase is an instance of seeming reality and that its aspect of being empty is ultimate reality." It is also not said that these two are not mutually exclusive by having in mind that a vase's being empty of a nature of its own and the vase that is the reverse of nonvase are not mutually exclusive. For if these statements are analyzed through reasoning, they are not seen to be not mutually exclusive. Rather, the meaning of the two realities not being mutually exclusive is stated here with the following in mind. For the two realities, which each have the power of bearing their own specific characteristics, it is not the case that one of them can obstruct the other and thus render it powerless. For example, it is not mutually exclusive that something like mere appearances (the focal objects of mahāyāna practice) and their being empty of a nature of their own do exist conventionally and do not exist ultimately. From the perspective of mistakenness, they do exist, and from the perspective of wisdom, they do not exist. Therefore, it is not the case here that two mutually exclusive phenomena come together within a single basis, just as the existence of strands of hair for someone with blurred vision and the nonexistence of such strands of hair in general are not mutually exclusive.

4) The qualms that are to be eliminated

The qualms consist of either taking the route of the ultimate and trying to invalidate the seeming through using the ultimate as a reason or those of trying to negate the ultimate through using the seeming as a reason. The first means to negate (proper) conduct through taking the view as the reason.

The second means to negate the view through taking conduct as the reason. Since the two realities are the distinct objects of view and conduct, the scopes of view and conduct are sufficiently gauged through either one of these two realities.[1226]

5) The reasoning that is the means for eliminating these qualms

In the context of presenting view or conduct just on their own, it is not claimed that the two realities are not mutually exclusive. For, through presenting the view, one does not cling to any characteristics of reference points, and at that point (according to *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.40d) it is said that "even thinking about actions and their results is put to an end." However, the two realities not being mutually exclusive means that one has to realize their not being mutually exclusive when one practices view and conduct in union, that is, engaging in yoga in the manner of seeing that phenomena appear but are without nature. Here, "appearing" means appearing to consciousness, but when it is realized that what appears is without nature, this is realized by wisdom. In other words, it is not that both of these two—appearing and being without nature—are perceived from the perspective of a single cognition. Therefore, in terms of the two aspects of appearing and being without nature, in the context of conduct appearance is primary, while being without nature is primary in the context of the view. You may wonder, "So which one of the two—view or conduct—is the primary one?" To manifest the dharmakāya is by virtue of the aspect of the view and to manifest the rūpakāyas is by virtue of the aspect of conduct.

6) The manner of eliminating said qualms

The wrong ideas that exist in one's own mind stream are eliminated through the prajñā in one's own mind stream that distinguishes the two realities. The clinging to these two being mutually exclusive that exists in the mind streams of others is eliminated through reasonings that negate the two extremes. As for the manner of elimination, some say, "Attempts to invalidate the seeming by taking the ultimate as a reason are eliminated through an answer that is based on the seeming. Attempts to invalidate the ultimate by taking the seeming as a reason are eliminated through an answer that is based on the ultimate." Others say, "All qualms that take the route of the ultimate are eliminated through answers in terms of the seeming. All qualms that take the route of the seeming are eliminated through answers in terms of the ultimate." To me, it is permissible to give answers to each of these qualms by using each of the two realities, respectively, because each one of the sixteen qualms that are put forth as such qualms (under the last point of the instan-

taneous clear realization) appear as ignorance about the presentation of the two realities.

D) The path of preparation

1) The four stages of the path of preparation[1227]

The definition of the path of preparation is "the path that provides the opportunity for liberation, has the nature of the five faculties and not the nature of the seven branches of enlightenment, and is (prior to the path of seeing) approximately concordant with the direct realization of reality in terms of its focal objects and aspects." The mahāyāna path of preparation includes the prajñās of studying, reflecting, and meditating that make up the nature of this path as well as the generation of bodhicitta and great compassion in the mind stream. The nature of the path of preparation is the mundane wisdom that arises from meditation (*Abhidharmakośa* VI.20ab).

The AA explains the four levels of the path of preparation—what is conducive to penetration—(such as heat) as the progressive stages during which the respective ones among the four manifest and potent conceptions about apprehender and apprehended are relinquished through the power of their remedies being produced. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.23–27 says:

> Then, having become such,
> Bodhisattvas in meditative equipoise,
> Except for mental discourse,
> Do not see any referents.
>
> In order to increase the illumination of phenomena,
> They make stable efforts.
> Through the increase of the illumination of phenomena,
> They abide in mere mind.
>
> Through this, they see all appearances
> Of referents as being mind.
> At this point, they relinquish
> The distraction of the apprehended.
>
> Then, solely the distraction
> Of the apprehender remains.
> At that point, they swiftly
> Touch upon the uninterrupted samādhi.

Thus, immediately upon that,
The distraction of the apprehender is relinquished.
In due order, these [phases]
Should be known as being heat and so on.

Accordingly, the four stages of the path of preparation are explained as follows. The first stage of the path of preparation is called (a) "heat" since it is a portent for the arising of the fire of supramundane wisdom. The second (b) represents the peak among the *flux* of mundane roots of virtue. The third (c) is called "poised readiness" since one is not afraid of the actuality of the profound nature of phenomena. The fourth (d) is the supreme one among all mundane dharmas. During (a), bodhisattvas attain the illumination of the aid that is the prajñā of realizing the nature of phenomena. Through this, their wisdom of heat sees that what appear as generally and specifically characterized phenomena are nothing but mental discourse, whereas there are no actual outer referents to be perceived. (b) During peak, in the manner of that illumination increasing, they familiarize with not dwelling upon apprehended referents. (c) In the manner of entering the sphere of true reality, they realize that mere appearances are mind and familiarize with that. However, they do not get stuck in the sole existence or remaining of conceptions about an apprehender either since they (d) realize that what appears as the referent of the samādhi of the imminence of the path of seeing does not exist as the nature of mere mind either and familiarize with that. In brief, (a)–(c) represent increasingly subtler degrees of relinquishing the distraction of something apprehended, while (d) performs the function of relinquishing only the distraction of an apprehender.

In the system of Maitreya, there are two reasonings here to relinquish conceptions about the apprehended. (1) Through proving with the reason of the "invariable co-observation" of appearances and mind that appearances are merely mind, one realizes that outer referents do not exist. (2) Through proving with the reason of being lucid and aware that mere appearances are mind, one also realizes that outer referents do not exist.[1228] In addition, there is one reasoning to relinquish conceptions about the apprehender—proving with the reason of the nonexistence of the apprehended that a mind to apprehend it does not exist either. After having proven this, it is then realized directly.[1229]

The point of directly realizing the freedom from all characteristics of apprehender and apprehended in this way is the path of seeing, whose character is yogic valid perception. As for the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation, they consist of unmistaken self-aware valid perceptions that are approximately concordant with the actual unmistaken wisdom that lacks the duality of apprehender and apprehended. This is just as what

Madhyāntavibhāga IV.12a teaches: "Approximately concordant yet mistaken."[1230] The meditative equipoises during the path of preparation are not something other than self-aware valid perception because both what is aware and what it is aware of arise as the nature of a single lucid and aware experience.[1231] As for the manner in which such wisdom without the duality of apprehender and apprehended is more eminent than the view of the pratyekabuddhas, the earlier Tibetan masters say, "It has to be explained that pratyekabuddhas merely realize that apprehender and apprehended are empty of being different in substance. However, they do not realize the true reality of being empty of any kind of duality of apprehender and apprehended."

Some people claim that Āryavimuktisena explains the four levels of the path of preparation as *being* the four kinds of conceptions, but this is not justified since it contradicts the intention of Maitreya. However, Āryavimuktisena just explains that these four conceptions are congruently associated with the four levels of the path of preparation.[1232] If these conceptions had to *be* the four levels of the path of preparation merely through being congruently associated with them, by the same token it would very absurdly follow that the factors to be relinquished through seeing *are* the path of seeing.

The meaning of the term "what is partially concordant with definite distinction" (the Tibetan version of "factors conducive to penetration") for the path of preparation is as follows. One speaks of "definite distinction" because, through the direct and definite certainty about the nature of phenomena on the path of seeing, the person's mind stream and the factors to be relinquished through seeing are distinguished from each other. Since the path of preparation serves as a part of this and concords with the path of seeing as the latter's cause, it is called "what is partially concordant with it."[1233] As for the reason for the fourfold division of the path of preparation, it is so divided by virtue of the certainty of there being four different degrees in terms of the distinctive feature of being more distant from or closer to realizing the actuality of the nature of phenomena.

Furthermore, in terms of the manner of the path of preparation "being associated with the four kinds of conceptions" (AA I.25cd), you may wonder whether the conceptions in this context here are conceptions in terms of being affirmed or negated. They exist as both parts—during the preparation for meditative equipoise and meditative equipoise itself, in a potent manner, these conceptions have the aspect of something to be negated. They are also presented as conceptions in terms of being affirmed because the subsequent attainment of such meditative equipoise is the phase during which no efforts are made to relinquish these conceptions about apprehender and apprehended.[1234] In the context of the path of preparation of the mahāyāna, the four conceptions (for details, see below) that have the nature of cognitive

obscurations are referred to as the primary factors to be relinquished, while the hīnayāna emphasizes the conceptions that have the nature of afflictive obscurations. This is the difference between the factors to be relinquished on the path of preparation in the mahāyāna and the hīnayāna.[1235]

2) The focal objects and aspects of the path of preparation[1236]

As for the focal objects and aspects in this text here, it is taught that, from among the twelve levels of the path of preparation, the focal objects on the levels of lesser and great heat as well as those on the lesser and medium supreme dharma pertain to seeming reality. On the other eight levels, they pertain to ultimate reality. As for the aspects, on the levels of great peak, medium poised readiness, and the lesser and great supreme dharma, they pertain to seeming reality. On the other eight levels, they relate to ultimate reality. According to the *Vivṛti*'s explicit explanation, the difference between focal object and aspect is one in terms of certain features and what possesses these features. In brief, the focal objects taught here refer to the main objects on which to focus. These must be explained as AA I.40a says:

> The focal object consists of all phenomena.

The aspects must be asserted as the distinct modes of apprehending these objects to be focused on, which must be explained as the aspects as they are described in AA IV.1ab:

> The specific instances of cognizing entities
> Represent the defining characteristic of "aspects."

Other Tibetans explain that all focal objects are seeming reality and all aspects are ultimate reality. This means to be mistaken about the meaning of the two realities and the meanings of focal objects and aspects in this context. By mistaking the latter two for just being the generalities and particulars that are known in dialectics, these people explain that the meaning of particulars refers to ultimate specifically characterized phenomena and that generalities that are imputed as conventional terms are seeming reality. But in this context here, the apprehended part of consciousness consists of both generally characterized and specifically characterized phenomena as two different objects. For each one of these there is a distinct focal object and aspect. Therefore, those people's matching of these two knowable objects with focal object and aspect, respectively, is not justified and they conflate "aspect" and "specifically characterized referent" as the same terminological category. Since such a claim is not even found in the system of dialectics, it is not suitable in that

system either. In the present context, anything that pertains to the ultimate, be it a focal object or an aspect, is something that exists during the actual meditative equipoise, whereas the focal objects and aspects that pertain to seeming reality exist during the preparatory stages of the actual meditative equipoise. This is the teaching transmission by Paṇḍita Trilakṣa that is found in the notes recorded by Ar Jangchub Yeshé, but it does not accord with the explanations that are well known in Tibet at present.

As for the question of which type of mind these meditative equipoises of the path of preparation, which are distinguished by the focal objects and aspects just explained, belong to, many earlier Tibetans assert them to be yogic valid perceptions. Others assert them to be realizations by way of object generalities and thus say that they represent inferential cognitions, repetitive cognitions,[1237] or correct assumptions.[1238] But some genuine beings have stated that these assertions are not tenable. As it is said:

> Yogic valid perception occurs in the mind streams of noble ones, but not in ordinary beings. [If the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation were] inferential valid cognitions, they would be mental states that newly realize something, but then it would also follow that they are nothing but consciousnesses [that result] from studying and reflecting. If one claims that they are subsequent cognitions, it follows that they are claimed to be conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents. If one claims that they are correct assumptions, they are nothing other than mental states of nonrealization. Therefore, these mental states on the path of preparation are not included within any of the two types of valid cognition or the three mental states that are nonvalid cognitions.[1239] Not only are they not included within these, but they are not nonconceptual consciousnesses either.

As for the mental states of the path of preparation not being conceptions, AA I.27c says:

> Their aspects are to refrain from clinging and so on.

AA I.33b declares:

> And the nonconceptuality of samādhi.

Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* on this says, "Since all conceptions are not tenable . . ."[1240] The meaning of what is taught in this way is that the meditative equipoises

of the path of preparation are not conceptual for the following reason. The path of seeing is devoid of the characteristics of all conceptions and the path of preparation must be approximately concordant with the former in terms of its focal objects and aspects. However, if the path of preparation entailed conceptions, it would not be suitable in this way.

As for those meditative equipoises not being nonconceptual consciousnesses either, AA I.25cd says that they are

> Based on being associated
> With the four conceptions in due order.

In their commentaries on this passage, Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra explain these meditative equipoises as being associated with the four conceptions that have the aspect of being to be negated. The gist of this explanation is that whatever is a nonconceptual consciousness must clearly realize a specifically characterized phenomenon. However, these meditative equipoises here lack the clear realization of the specifically characterized phenomenon of identitylessness. Therefore, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.31 says:

> False imagination; neither correct
> Nor false; nonimagination;
> And neither imagination nor nonimagination—
> This expresses all knowable objects.

"False imagination" refers to the conceptions that are not approximately concordant with supramundane wisdom. Those that are "neither correct nor false" are those that approximately concord with supramundane wisdom (up through the factors conducive to penetration). "Nonimagination" refers to suchness and supramundane wisdom. "Neither imagination nor nonimagination" represents mundane wisdom—the subsequent attainment of supramundane wisdom. "All knowable objects" are included in nothing but these. I do not elaborate on the disputes and their answers in this context for fear of becoming too verbose.

As for whether the bearers of the nature of phenomena appear or not during the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation, some Tibetan masters say, "During the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation bearers of the nature of phenomena that are nonentities appear in an unclear manner. Such an appearance cannot be anything but an appearance under the influence of conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents." In the system of those who assert that the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation consist of conceptions, it is indeed true that this

statement has to be made in such a way. However, a cognition that apprehends by conflating terms and their referents, for which bearers of the nature of phenomena that are nonentities appear in an unclear manner, and the type of conception that represents the nature of the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation are established to be mutually exclusive in terms of their focal objects and aspects for the following reasons. False imagination and the cognition that consists of the proper mental engagement which is not false are mutually exclusive in terms of their own natures. It is impossible for the nature of this proper mental engagement to take as its object a despicable mental state of nonvalid cognition to which nonentities appear in an unclear manner because there is absolutely no purpose for something like that.

3) The four conceptions in the context of the path of preparation[1241]

The conceptions in this context consist of the mind clinging to characteristics of its specific objects—the distractions of the apprehending conceptions that function as obstructions to omniscience. Since such cognitive obscurations, which have the nature of conceptions, exist in the mind streams of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the latter do not attain the nirvāṇa that actually fulfills this function. As the *Uttaratantra* says:

> Therefore, without attaining buddhahood,
> Nirvāṇa is not attained,
> Just as you cannot see the sun
> Once you take away its light and its rays.[1242]

When conception is identified in general, according to *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.8ab, the false imagination that consists of the minds and mental factors in the three realms is presented as conception. According to the *Abhidharmakośa* II.33a, that which takes coarse referents as its objects is conception, which does not contradict the reasonings of Dharmakīrti either. His *Pramāṇaviniścaya* says:

> Conception is the cognition to which what is suitable to be mixed with expressions appears.[1243]

In this context, the object of expression is an object generality and the means of expression is a term generality.[1244] Thus, there are two types of conceptions that represent obstructions to attaining omniscience—(a) the conceptions that obscure the direct seeing of true reality are the obstructions to analyzing suchness and (b) the conceptions that obscure karmic actions and their results are the obstructions to analyzing the variety of phenomena. Among these, the first are relinquished solely during meditative equipoise,

while the latter are the factors to be relinquished through the wisdom of subsequent attainment.

In this context, these conceptions can be further divided into
1) the conceptions that apprehend substantiality
2) the conceptions that apprehend imputations
The first are equivalent to the clinging to real existence and are twofold:
1a) the conceptions about the apprehended
1b) the conceptions about the apprehender
1a) The conceptions about the apprehended are twofold:
1aa) the conceptions about afflicted phenomena
1ab) the conceptions about purified phenomena

The conceptions about purified phenomena are classifed as two:
1ab1) those in terms of the mahāyāna (the conceptions about the apprehended that see their respective apprehended objects as flawed and put an end to the mental states that cling to these objects)
1ab2) those in terms of the hīnayāna (the conceptions about the apprehended that see their apprehended objects as possessing qualities and engage in the mental states that cling to them)

1b) The conceptions about the apprehender are also twofold:
1ba) the conceptions about phenomena (knowable objects and the cognitions that know them)
1bb) the conceptions about persons (the bases for imputing the person and the factor that is imputed as the person)
In this context, the conceptions about substantiality arise in dependence on (prior) conceptions about the cause of these conceptions being something substantially existent. Thus, the object taken by the mode of apprehension of these conceptions is the notion of some self-sufficient substance.

2) The conceptions that apprehend imputations are the mental states in which the superimpositions of clinging to the real existence of some referent have been severed, but which still cling to this referent in an imputational manner. As for the objects of such mental states, they cling to (a) apprehended and (b) apprehender as being mere imputations.

2a) The conceptions about the apprehended as an imputation are twofold:
2aa) the conceptions that apprehend the factors that are afflicted phenomena

2ab) the conceptions that apprehend the factors that are purified phenomena (again twofold in terms of mahāyāna and hīnayāna)
2b) The conceptions about the apprehender as an imputation are also twofold:
2ba) the conceptions about phenomena
2bb) the conceptions about the person
2ba) The conceptions about phenomena are again twofold:
2ba1) the conceptions about the bases for imputing ordinary beings (mind and mental factors)
2ba2) the conceptions about the bases for imputing noble ones (the wisdoms of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment)

That the just-explained division of the two conceptions about the apprehender also applies to the two conceptions about the apprehended is evident from what is written down in a clear manner in the progressive stages of meditation on the dharmas of Maitreya, which were transmitted from Dsen Kawoché. However, some later great Tibetans speak of "finding solely through the dexterity of insight (*blo gros*)"; say that "such finding is also the pith of what is explained in the Madhyamaka scriptural system and there is no way to explain it other than in this manner"; and claim that "there is no flaw of such a distinction not being explained in the AA and its commentaries." Through explaining this kind of distinction, they dispute about whether the modes of apprehension of the conceptions about apprehender and apprehended accord with the facts or not, but all such disputes just betray their flaws of not understanding the meaning as explained above.

As for the basis of mistakenness that triggered such disputes, the *Vṛtti* presents four possibilities in terms of the relationship between conceptions about the apprehender and conceptions about the apprehended (being the one but not the other, being both, and being neither). On this, some Tibetan masters say, "Here, these four possibilities are not counted on the basis of a single object, but in terms of different objects. If such is presented, it very absurdly follows that a third type of valid cognition is possible because then inferential valid cognition conceives of outer objects and, in its own nature, is perception." Such a flaw does not apply to Āryavimuktisena because his intention in presenting the above four possibilities is not in terms of whether there would or would not be very absurd consequences by virtue of analyzing these possibilities well through reasoning. Rather, he just adduced the merely general explanation on said four possibilities with regard to the conceptions about the apprehender and the apprehended that is given in the abhidharma. Furthermore, some people say that the author of the *Vṛtti* is not Āryavimuktisena, but this is completely out of the question because an unbroken lineage of disciples of Āryavimuktisena (such as Paṇḍita Vairocana) had

arrived in Tibet at the time of the kings of Samyé and they all agreed that this *Vṛtti* composed by Āryavimuktisena is as well known as the sun and the moon.

The above conceptions that apprehend substantiality (1) exist in the mind streams of ordinary beings and during the subsequent attainments of noble śrāvaka's and pratyekabuddhas for the following reasons. Ordinary beings conceive of every entity as solely something that is real by virtue of its own specific characteristics—they do not conceive of it as anything else. During the subsequent attainments of noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, mental states of clinging to real existence have not been put to an end. During both the meditative equipoise and the subsequent attainment of mahāyāna noble ones, conceptions that apprehend substantiality do not arise because they are endowed with the continuum of the uninterrupted direct realization of the lack of real existence.

As for the conceptions that apprehend imputations (2), during both the meditative equipoise and the subsequent attainment of the mahāyāna path of preparation, by virtue of mentally engaging in aspiring for true reality, they exist in a manifest way. During the subsequent attainments of the seven impure bhūmis, by virtue of mentally engaging in true reality, the manifestation of conceptions that apprehend imputations is possible. On the pure bhūmis, there are no manifest conceptions at all because one has gained mastery over nonconceptual wisdom. As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Due to the change of mentation, perception,
> And conception, there is fourfold command
> Over nonconceptuality . . .[1245]

In the noble ones of both mahāyāna and hīnayāna, manifest conceptions that apprehend imputations and focus on persons are possible. For during the subsequent attainment of noble ones there is the apprehension that "all these persons are illusionlike, dreamlike, and mere designations."

The practice on the stage of the path of preparation is as follows. From among the conceptions mentioned, first one needs to put an end to the conceptions that apprehend the substantiality which is taken as the object of the mode of apprehension of one's innate conceptions. Thereafter, through explaining the reasonings that negate the conceptions that apprehend imputations, in due order, one puts an end to the conceptions about apprehended and apprehender in terms of both substantiality and imputation. When practicing in this way on the path of preparation, one rests in meditative equipoise in such a way that one becomes familiar with and extends the clear illumination of prajñā about the following modes of lacking a nature. During the meditative equipoise of heat, this means seeing that the apprehended in

terms of afflicted phenomena is without nature. During the level of peak, it is seen that the apprehended in terms of purified phenomena is without nature. During the level of poised readiness, it is seen that substantial apprehending is without nature. During the level of the supreme dharma, it is seen that imputational apprehending is without nature. Thus, during the first level, three kinds of conceptions are relinquished; during the second, two kinds; during the third, one kind; and during the fourth, also one kind.[1246] Since all of these are relinquished during meditative equipoise, this is the manner in which the path of preparation is associated with conceptions.

This explanation of the manner of relinquishing those conceptions is the unmistaken explanation of the intention of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra.[1247] Nowadays, however, some people here give presentations such as the path of preparation "being associated with the conceptions in terms of affirmation as the factors to be relinquished and its being associated with the conceptions in terms of negation as its nature." Such mistaken statements without having critically analyzed the meaning explained above are then passed on from one to the other.

As for this topic, Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta assert the following. When the nine conceptions about the apprehended in terms of afflicted phenomena are thinned out, but not yet relinquished through the level of heat, the path of preparation is still associated with them. When the nine conceptions about the apprehended in terms of purified phenomena are thinned out, but not yet relinquished through peak, the path of preparation is still associated with them, whereas the former nine conceptions are relinquished. Likewise, when the two types of conceptions about the apprehender are thinned out, but not yet relinquished through the levels of poised readiness and supreme dharma, respectively, the path of preparation is still associated with both or one of these, whereas the conceptions about the apprehended in terms of purified phenomena are relinquished.

The four conceptions that are taught in the context of the path of preparation here contain portions of both the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization.[1248] However, some say that the conceptions in this context here represent the portion of the conceptions that are solely factors to be relinquished through seeing because the path of seeing arises right at the end of the path of preparation, whereas the conceptions on the path of familiarization are not referred to here.

E) The disposition

1) General explanation[1249]

In general, the meaning of "disposition" is as follows. In the hīnayāna, the disposition for enlightenment is presented as "having little desire and being content." But these are just indications that the disposition exists due to the signs of this disposition, whereas they are not clear teachings of the disposition that fully qualifies as such. Hence, the meaning of "disposition" that is taught here is that it is an adequate substantial cause for its result to come about. Such a cause is classified as twofold—the causes for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The cause that is taught here is the disposition which is the cause for nirvāṇa. According to the followers of the mahāyāna, it is asserted that this very causal disposition abides as a seminal aspect based on the ālaya. The causal disposition for nirvāṇa is founded on the ālaya-wisdom and the causal disposition for saṃsāra is founded on the ālaya-consciousness.[1250]

Thus, these two causal dispositions are founded separately on the pure and the impure ālaya, respectively. However, the assertion that does not clearly differentiate between pure and impure ālayas, but presents the causal dispositions for both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as based on a single ālaya as the bearer of such a property, is a mistaken understanding of the meaning of the abhidharma scriptures. *The Abhidharmasūtra* says:

> The dhātu of beginningless time
> Is the matrix of all phenomena.
> Since it exists, all beings
> And also nirvāṇa are obtained.

Thus, it is declared that both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are justified since all phenomena, by way of the three characteristics,[1251] are present within the ālaya that is the dhātu of beginningless time. Here, the meaning of the sūtra is that one needs to differentiate between these two factors of wisdom and consciousness with respect to the ālayadhātu that does not reach a limit of beginning in time. Those who do not know this represent the impure system of gaining but an understanding of limited letters with respect to this phrase, "The dhātu of beginningless time is the matrix of all phenomena." Therefore, the necessity of making this distinction between consciousness and wisdom within the dhātu of beginningless time has been stated by the invincible protector [Maitreya] in his *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*:

> The lack of a fundamental change of state
> Has four shortcomings—

> The flaw of lacking a support in which afflictions do not operate,
> The flaw of lacking a support for engaging in the path,
>
> The flaw of lacking a basis of designation
> For persons in nirvāṇa,
> And the flaw of lacking a basis of designation
> For the distinctive features of the three enlightenments.
>
> Their opposites are the benefits involved,
> Which are to be known as fourfold.[1252]

In [its] commentary [by Vasubandhu] the following appears:

> At this point, it is not justified that mind is this very [basis of designation for persons in nirvāṇa] because the arising of remedies and the ceasing of antagonistic factors are simultaneous, and because contrary phenomena are not justified in the same basis, just as a cold and a warm sensation are not justified in the same basis.[1253]

Therefore, it is clearly declared that there are four flaws if there is no such support that does not allow for any operation of the factors to be relinquished and [allows for] the operation of their remedies and so forth—the ālaya-wisdom as the basis of the fundamental change of state—and that there are four benefits if it exists. Hence, the distinction between consciousness and wisdom within the ālaya is the assertion of the Buddha Bhagavān.

If, according to the tradition of some people, the causal disposition for both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is presented as nothing but the ālaya-consciousness, the order of all principles of the dharma of the mahāyāna is mixed up from its very foundation. Since the ālaya-consciousness is canceled upon becoming a buddha, the ālaya-consciousness is no [longer] existent. But the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness into ālaya-wisdom (which is its opposite) must be presented as the wisdom of having changed state. So it follows that, according to those [who hold the above position], it is not suitable for the wisdom of having changed state to arise once the ālaya-consciousness is canceled. The reason for this is that the canceled ālaya-consciousness is something that is [already] canceled, while a shift from this ālaya-consciousness to wisdom (which has changed state by having cast away the ālaya-consciousness) is impossible within the sphere of knowable objects. A presentation that the mere factor of cancellation of the canceled ālaya-consciousness exists as the nature of the wisdom of having changed state contradicts reasoning—a phenomenon that has become nonexistent is in no case suitable as a cause for something existent.

Those present-day followers of [Mahā]mudrā whose confusion is even a hundred thousand times bigger than this exclaim, "Through refining the ālaya-consciousness into something pure, it turns into the result of mirrorlike wisdom." This is not justified for the following reasons. Something like this does not appear in any of the traditions of the mahāyāna, and what does not appear [there also] does not appear in the sense of something that is obtained through reasoning. A presentation of the ālaya-consciousness as the cause and mirrorlike wisdom as its result is not something that is obtained through reasoning. Rather, with respect to the mode of being of causes and results in terms of [such] causes and results in the abhidharma that actually fulfill these functions[1254] (that is, being what produces and what is produced), the ālaya-consciousness and mirrorlike wisdom are not adequate as a cause and a result that fully qualify as such. Also, since the very nature of the ālaya-consciousness is [nothing but] the adventitious stains, it is presented as impure. No matter how it may be refined by something else, it will not turn into something pure. It is not possible within the sphere of knowable objects that something impure turns into something pure, or that something pure turns into something impure.[1255]

Some assert that there is the mere factor of lucid and aware mind, and that this is what comprises all the seeds of saṃsāra as well as the seeds of nirvāṇa. This is not tenable. That just one single [phenomenon] should function as the seminal cause for all of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is not something that appears in the Buddhist tradition. That such does not appear [in this tradition is shown by the fact that] this is put forward as the assertion of non-Buddhists ("just one single awareness-consciousness, which is the cause or seed of both bondage and liberation") by the great guardians of the Buddha's teaching, glorious Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and then refuted.[1256]

Most Tibetans in this land of snow say, "The twofold distinction between ālaya-consciousness and [ālaya-]wisdom is the system of the Mere Mentalists" and also, "The twofold distinction between ālaya-wisdom and [ālaya]-consciousness does not appear in any system whatsoever." Their own words are self-contradictory because if [this distinction] appeared in the system of the Mere Mentalists, it contradicts not appearing in any system at all.

Therefore, in the manner of presenting the contaminated latent tendencies of saṃsāra as being within the ālaya-consciousness [as their] foundation, what cycles [in saṃsāra], what makes it cycle, and where it cycles are all not something beyond the ālaya-consciousness per se. Some may argue, "But in that case, a single such factor [—the ālaya-consciousness—] is not suitable as three factors (what cycles and so on)." As for this point, I accept that it is not suitable that way. Nevertheless, although a presentation of three [factors] through a single one and so on contradicts reasoning, whatever happens from

the perspective of mistakenness happens this way precisely through the issue of ignorance.

Such an ālaya-consciousness is classified as twofold: the seminal aspect and maturational aspect. The [contaminated] seeds are input newly under the influence of the force of conditions—they are not something previously existing that is intrinsic through the nature of phenomena.

As for the manner in which uncontaminated seeds are input based on the ālaya-wisdom, the actual ālaya-wisdom is "the sugata heart," "the vajra of mind," and "the naturally abiding disposition." These are synonyms for the emptiness that actually fulfills this function, which are taught briefly by Lord Maitreya in *Madhyāntavibhāga* [I.14].[1257] Uncontaminated seeds are not something that must be input newly under the influence of conditions, but they are declared in the mantrayāna to be "the seeds of all aspects that are intrinsic by virtue of the nature of phenomena." In particular, they appear in the great texts of Lord Maitreya under the names "the latent tendencies for listening," "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas,"[1258] and "uncontaminated seeds."

These latent tendencies for listening are associated with ālaya-wisdom. You may wonder, "What kind of activity do they perform?" The noble master Asaṅga, who is capable of differentiating between the expedient and the definitive [meaning], has declared the following in his *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*:

> [Supramundane wisdom] originates from the natural outflow of the completely pure dharmadhātu, that is, the seeds which are the latent tendencies for listening. One may wonder, "What are these latent tendencies for listening anyway? Are they of the nature of the ālaya-consciousness or are they not? If they were of the nature of the ālaya-consciousness, how should they be suitable as the seeds of its remedy? And if they are not of its nature, then [you have to] look at what the matrix of these seeds of latent tendencies for listening might be." What these latent tendencies for listening in dependence on the enlightenment of buddhas are, which matrix they enter, and that they enter the maturational consciousness[1259] in a manner of coexisting with it—all this is like [a mixture of] milk and water. They are not the ālaya-consciousness because they are the very seeds of its remedy.[1260]
>
> Small latent tendencies turn into medium latent tendencies, and these medium latent tendencies then turn into great latent tendencies, all this by virtue of being associated with listening, reflection, and meditation that are performed many times. The small, medium, and great latent tendencies for listening are to be

regarded as the seeds of the dharmakāya. Since they are the remedy for the ālaya-consciousness, they are not of the nature of the ālaya-consciousness. [In the sense of being a remedy,] they are something mundane, but since they are the natural outflow of the supramundane—the utterly completely pure dharmadhātu—they are the seeds of supramundane mind. Although this supramundane mind has not originated yet, they are the remedy for being entangled [in saṃsāra] through the afflictions, the remedy for migrating into the unpleasant realms, and the remedy that makes all wrongdoing vanish. They are what is in complete concordance with meeting buddhas and bodhisattvas.

Though beginner bodhisattvas are mundane, [these latent tendencies] should be regarded as being included in the dharmakāya and [those of] śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as being included in the vimuktikāya.[1261] They are not the ālaya-consciousness, but are included in the dharmakāya and vimuktikāya, respectively. To the extent that they gradually shine forth in a small, medium, and great way, to that same extent the consciousness of complete maturation wanes and changes state too. If it has changed state in all aspects, the consciousness becomes devoid of seeds and is also relinquished in all aspects.

You may wonder, "How is it that the ālaya-consciousness, which abides together with what is not the ālaya-consciousness like water and milk, can wane in all aspects?" It is stated, "This is like geese[1262] drinking milk from water. It is similar to the change of state when, being free from mundane desire, the latent tendencies of what is not meditative equipoise wane, while the latent tendencies of meditative equipoise increase."[1263]

Hence, what is called "the latent tendencies for listening" is what allows one to listen to all the twelve branches of a buddha's speech. It is the capacity of uncontaminated cognition that is active through the power of the nature of phenomena. The factor of this capacity is what bears the name "latent tendencies for listening that are sustained by enlightenment." It is what is not suitable to blend with the mind streams of sentient beings. Here, these latent tendencies are said to be "latent tendencies" in terms of allowing the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya, which is based on enlightenment, to engage the mind streams of sentient beings. But there are no latent tendencies whatsoever that fully qualify as such in the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya, which has the character of the twelve branches of a buddha's speech and is the natural outflow of the supramundane, completely pure dharmadhātu.

It is declared to be the natural outflow that is free from all characteristics of latent tendencies.

One may think, "The explanation of small latent tendencies turning into medium latent tendencies, and these medium latent tendencies then turning into great latent tendencies and so on is [a description of] such an increase in the sense that latent tendencies exist that fully qualify as such." This is not the case. What is called "latent tendencies for listening, which are the natural outflow of the completely pure dharmadhātu" does not represent an increase of latent tendencies. Rather, it is the power of the decline of the factors to be relinquished—the antagonistic factors—that appears as if the latent tendencies for listening, which are the natural outflow of the completely pure dharmadhātu, increase from small to medium and so on.

Here, the meaning of "Though being mundane . . ." [in the above quotation] is said to be as follows. Though [the latent tendencies for listening] are the remedy for what is mundane, they are not contained in mundane mind streams, but are the natural outflow of the supramundane dharmadhātu. The gist of "natural outflow" is that it addresses the definite need for some [factor] that is other than the completely pure dharmadhātu itself and [at the same time] outside of everything that exists within the class of impure phenomena whose nature is [the dharmadhātu]. So, from the perspective of this factor of the natural outflow being associated with a mind stream, it is both presented as a bodhisattva and yet this factor is also included in the dharmakāya. During this time there are two [modes of engagement] in a yogin's single body which appears as the other-dependent nature—the mode of engagement of the continuum of consciousness and the mode of engagement of the power of wisdom. Noble Nāgārjuna says [in his *Dharmadhātustava*]:

> Just as from a mix of milk and water
> That is present in a vessel,
> Geese just sip the milk, but not the water,
> Which remains just as it is.
>
> Just so, being covered by afflictions,
> Wisdom dwells within this body, one [with them].
> But yogins just extract the wisdom
> And leave the ignorance behind.[1264]

Now one may think, "Since the causal disposition is explained as the unconditioned dharmadhātu, an unconditioned phenomenon is not suitable as the disposition. Disposition has the meaning of cause, and the presentation of causes and results is given based on conditioned phenomena. Hence, [the

dharmadhātu] is not suitable as the causal disposition." Wishing to eliminate such a qualm, some say, "The mistake that an unconditioned phenomenon is not suitable as cause does not exist [here] because there is a twofold reason to present an unconditioned phenomenon as the causal disposition. It is presented in a twofold way through support and through focus. First, it is justified that an unconditioned phenomenon—which has the mode of supporting—functions as 'causal disposition.' Bodhisattvas are labeled due to their six āyatanas, and these are supported by the mental consciousness. Since in the end this is supported by the dharmadhātu, it is justified that the unconditioned dharmadhātu functions as 'causal disposition' from the perspective of presenting it as support. The *Uttaratantra* teaches such through the two verses [starting with]:

> Likewise, skandhas, dhātus, and faculties . . .[1265]

Secondly, the presentation as causal disposition through focus is [justified] because bodhisattvas meditate by focusing on the nature of mind—the dharmadhātu. Therefore, at the time of the final freedom from stains, the dharmadhātu of mind becomes suchness free from stains."[1266]

The explanation in the *Uttaratantra* that these rest on or are supported by the [following ones] is merely a presentation from a conventional perspective that, with the intention that all phenomena are emptiness, they are suitable to arise, suitable to appear, and [may relate as] support and supported. That the nature of the mind—or the unconditioned dhātu free from stains—could be supported by or resting on another phenomenon is primordially impossible. Therefore, it is neither justified that the very dharmadhātu supports something else nor that the dharmadhātu itself is supported by something else. Furthermore, [these two verses] speak explicitly only of a being supported by or resting on the purity of mind, but they do not explain a being supported by the nature of the mind, the dhātu without stains. To identify "the purity of mind" in this context as the dharmadhātu is not necessarily so. Since the mind that is improper mental engagement never existed in this way, it does not change into something other than just its pure mode of being. Hence, this is the meaning of "resting."

In general, in order for [some things] to function as cause [and result], they must be mutually connected as support and supported. Also, such a support and supported must come together, but it is impossible that the dharmadhātu and the mental consciousness come together or that [one] supports [the other]. Even if there were such a coming together, it would not be a proof that justifies an unconditioned phenomenon as the disposition. Rather, that would be a proof of justifying a compound of a conditioned and an

unconditioned phenomenon as the disposition. Furthermore, if something given supports a phenomenon, it is difficult to prove that it is the cause for that phenomenon, or even a cause at all. Neither is necessarily the case.

Moreover, it is justified to present the dharmadhātu as the Tathāgata once it has become free from stains through having meditated on the path by focusing on the nature of phenomena. However, a presentation of an unconditioned phenomenon as the disposition merely due to this is something uncertain. Rather, once the purpose of meditating by focusing on these[1267] has been fulfilled, it is certain in every respect that an unconditioned phenomenon cannot be presented as the disposition.

Also, in general, since an unconditioned phenomenon that is contained in the mind streams of sentient beings is not possible, there is also no focusing of bodhisattvas on it or their being supported by the actual dharmadhātu that fully qualifies as such because the dhātu that is the nature of phenomena is not suitable to support or to be focused on. Moreover, if the cause of the result of some phenomenon is not established as having the character of this specific [resultant] thing, then it contradicts reasoning that it could become the cause of that [result] by focusing on a cause other than this cause, or by [the result] being supported by [that other cause]. Hence, such is never the case.

You may say, "But what then is the presentation of an unconditioned phenomenon as the disposition in your own system?" This presentation of the unconditioned dharmadhātu as the cause for buddhahood is not to present it as a cause by way of the existence of a connection between a cause and a result that fully qualify as such. Rather, this unconditioned dharmadhātu is [presented as a cause] in terms of perfect buddhahood and the unconditioned dharmadhātu being one in nature, while separable as different isolates. When [presenting it] in this way, the nature of the cause for perfect buddhahood and the nature of the cause that is the dharmadhātu are not different. Hence, the cause for perfect buddhahood is not different from the nature of the cause that is the dharmadhātu, and therefore it is called "the cause for buddhahood." When it is associated with stains, the name "result" is not used for this kind of nonduality of dharmadhātu and perfect buddhahood, but instead it is labeled by the name "cause." Once it has become free from stains, perfect buddhahood is taught by the name "result."

According to the definitive meaning, both [notions] that are taught here—what is taught by the name "cause" and what is taught by the name "result"—are of the same nature. Therefore, these two do not exist as an actual cause and its specific result that are different from each other. For rather, their modes of being as described are inseparable in terms of the distinctive feature of true reality.

Nevertheless, according to the expedient meaning, the dharmadhātu is presented as the cause and perfect buddhahood as the result. This bears the intention that something pure does not originate from a completely impure cause, but that something pure originates or exists based on something pure only. Thus, the purpose in this sense is [established] in terms of it being easy for [such] an understanding to emerge within the perspective of those whose mind is trained in the presentation of causes and results. Otherwise, the mistake of the consequence that cause and result are the same would be accrued since the very cause that is the unconditioned dharmadhātu is explained as "original buddha" in the mantrayāna. Hence, it is an expedient meaning that the result of perfect buddhahood is produced by the unconditioned dharmadhātu.[1268] This kind of expedient meaning is indeed a teaching adapted to the mental perspective of those to be guided. However, since the single actuality of the unconditioned dharmadhātu is taught in many ways, such as being a cause in some contexts and being a result in other contexts, it is necessary to distinguish the expedient meaning and the definitive meaning without mixing them.[1269]

As for "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas of bodhisattvas," other Tibetans say, "Some distinctive features of the six āyatanas of bodhisattvas who are on the path have the potential to produce uncontaminated phenomena."[1270] But I assert that the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, that is, the cognition that is not shared by the six āyatanas of bodhisattvas, is something that is to be taken as something distinctive that is other than the six āyatanas.[1271] The meaning of this is clearly explained by the protector Maitreya. What is called "uncontaminated cognition" is the unconditioned naturally abiding disposition, which is definitely the cause for perfect buddhahood and exists in all beings without beginning, right from the start. Due to three ways in which such a single disposition becomes revealed when it meets with distinctive features of conditions, there are also three [types of] possessors of the disposition. The meeting with conditions is based on the distinctive feature of the unfolding disposition. The understanding of the unfolding disposition is as follows. The disposition which, through the power of the nature of phenomena, consists of the conditions for presenting the unconditioned disposition as the great enlightenment [of buddhas], the conditions for presenting it as the medium enlightenment [of pratyekabuddhas], and the conditions for presenting it as the lesser enlightenment [of śrāvakas] is labeled as the "unfolding disposition."

In brief, the natural disposition is the support that exists from the very start, while the unfolding disposition abides as the disposition that consists of the [thirteen] accomplishments,[1272] which are distinguished by the particular phenomena supported [by the naturally abiding disposition] and enable the

arising of the kāyas that [promote] the welfare of others or not. The gist of such an explanation is as follows. The naturally abiding disposition is the very nature of the mind associated with stains. The factor of the gradual process of all its stains becoming exhausted or the factor of already having relinquished them is presented as the unfolding disposition. This leads to presenting the display of the two kāyas—which are one's own and [the welfare] of others—as the results of these two dispositions.

Those who assert that there exist both an empty and a nonempty aspect in this dharmakāya—one's own welfare—and that it exists as conditioned as well as unconditioned[1273] may well claim to have trained their minds in distinguishing the two realities according to the system of Lord Maitreya. However, any assertions that the dharmakāya and the dharmadhātu are conditioned, or empty in the sense of a nonimplicative negation, and so on [are not tenable] for the following reasons. Let alone in the distinction between the two realities as asserted by Lord [Maitreya], even in any [other] system of any [master] who founded a [Buddhist] tradition, a dharmadhātu and a dharmakāya that are conditioned phenomena are not asserted. [In all of these traditions] it is impossible to present the dharmadhātu and the dharmakāya as the factor that is a nonimplicative negation, that is, as empty [in the sense] of never having existed primordially right from the start. Moreover, the dharmakāya and the dharmadhātu are never ever presented as seeming reality. Thus, this manner of exegesis is explained the same way in all authentic traditions of the mahāyāna.

Some people proclaim loudly, "The presentation of the disposition that is explained in [texts] such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is the system of the Mere Mentalists but not the system of the Mādhyamikas." If this were the case, as a consequence all scriptural traditions of the mahāyāna would be forcefully pushed into the camp of the Mere Mentalists alone, and thus the Mādhyamika camps would suffer tremendous losses. [Rather,] in the system of the Mere Mentalists as well, the naturally abiding disposition is accepted as the buddha heart. They say, "It is possible among beings—those who possess the buddha heart—that some do not reach nirvāṇa in the form of great enlightenment. Therefore, there are those who possess the disposition that is the 'extinct disposition.'" However, they declare that there is no sentient being whatsoever that does not have the buddha heart.

Basically, the Mere Mentalists assert this naturally abiding disposition here as lucid and aware experience, while the Mādhyamikas do not assert that. The Mere Mentalists assert that there are sentient beings who do not attain perfect enlightenment at all, while the others do not assert that. The Mere Mentalists assert that the disposition for great enlightenment does not exist in the mind

streams of arhats of the hīnayāna, while the others assert that it does exist. The Mere Mentalists assert that arhats of the hīnayāna lack the cause for rebirth in existence, while the others assert that they do not lack it. These [are their assertions] to be understood without confusing them.[1274]

In this context, in order to make one understand what the exact principle of the supreme yāna is, one must understand what true reality—the nature of phenomena—is. In the mantrayāna, this is explained as the principal of the divisions of all dispositions, the lord of the circle of the ultimate mandala, the unbroken continuum within all aspects of ground, path, and fruition, which is [always] devoid of the three poisons and whose nature is not impermanent. This actual way of being is declared to be "the tathāgata heart" by Lord Maitreya. His intention was that this Heart is the dharmakāya endowed with twofold purity and that, by labeling a part with the name of the whole, sentient beings have one dimension of this buddha heart endowed with twofold purity, that is, its "natural purity." It is in this way that he spoke of "sentient beings having the disposition of the buddhas."

In brief, no matter which reasoning you may put forward to prove that the buddha heart exists in the mind streams of sentient beings, it is impossible to establish an actual connection between the reason and the predicate [in such a reasoning]. Also, as far as the assertion by others that sentient beings possess the Heart is concerned, it is [only] suitable to assert that they possess [such a Heart] in the sense of the factors to be relinquished. However, in that case, the factors to be relinquished are nothing but mistakenness, which never existed from the start. The assertion that either a connection of identity or a causal connection is established[1275] between this Heart and sentient beings as well as the assertion that they are some kind of support and supported that actually fulfill these functions are not in accord with the Buddha and the successor to his throne, the protector Maitreya and so forth. Therefore, they should be discarded. Also the many different presentations of the disposition that are given in other scriptural traditions are [simply] pointing to a mere fraction of this actual disposition.

You may wonder, "Then what is such a Heart?" It is the very nature of true reality, which cannot be separated from what consists of the unsurpassable qualities. In terms of its own nature, it is [always] endowed with twofold purity. However, provisionally and from the perspective of dialecticians, the Heart that actually fulfills this function is presented as what is free from adventitious stains and its being free from adventitious stains is asserted as perfect buddhahood at the time of fruition. But it is stated, "As for where the imputed Heart exists, it exists in the basic element associated with its husks."[1276] During that time [of the buddha heart existing in ordinary sentient beings], since it exists in the basic element that is associated with

its husks, it does not necessarily exist in the basic element itself. [Here,] the "imputed Heart" is identified as the nature of phenomena (dharmatā) existing in what is the completely pure nature of the dhātu.

The Heart that fully qualifies as such is the dharmatākāya.[1277] Therefore, each of the bhūmis of the mahāyāna will be seized during the phases when this very [Heart] is coming free from each corresponding portion of stains. Those who see each of these portions [of freedom] are presented as the jewel of the ultimate saṃgha. Seeing this is not [in a way that] a bodhisattva's stream of consciousness sees the Heart. Rather, due to the fact that many facets of personally experienced wisdom exist in this very Heart, the various collections of consciousness that obscure it cease as the respective [obscurations on each of the bhūmis]. This is labeled with the name "seeing."

A Heart like this is not contained in the mind streams of any sentient being whatsoever nor is it blended with any mind streams. By focusing on this Heart of the mind streams of sentient beings, the obscurations are purified, and even when liberation is accomplished, they do not have any connection to this Heart. At this point, [it is said that] "sentient beings have accomplished the path and thus attained the dharmakāya." [However,] this too is [just] in terms of convenient conventional expressions because a fully qualified presentation of being endowed with the attainment of the [dharmakāya] through the [accomplishment of the path], as it is given in the abhidharma, cannot be applied to this.

Some fools say, "The Omniscient Karmapa Rangjung [Dorje] asserts the intention of the *Mahāyānottaratantra* to be that the tathāgata heart exists in the dharmadhātu of the mind of sentient beings in an inseparable manner." This wise being did not assert such. In his autocommentary on *The Profound Inner Reality* he makes a twofold classification [of mind as such], saying, "What is pure is expressed as mind, and what is impure is [also] expressed as mind."[1278] By explaining that those who possess impure mental impulses are sentient beings, he elucidates that the dharmadhātu does not exist in such sentient beings. He presents these very sentient beings as *being* the adventitious stains that are produced by false imagination, which mistakenly strays from the dharmadhātu. By giving the pure mind names such as "ordinary mind," "original protector," and "original buddha," he says that it is exactly this [mind] that possesses the mode of being inseparable from the buddha qualities.[1279] This kind of [pure mind] is also the [Buddha] heart that actually fulfills this function.

Now you may wonder, "What does this pure mind refer to?" It is "the luminous nature of the mind." The meaning of "luminous" is that mistaken mind is naturally pure. The teaching that such a naturally pure Heart exists in sentient beings is not meant literally. Rather, what is taught by "buddhahood

exists in sentient beings" is that, by taking the naturally luminous Heart as the basis, *impure sentient beings exist in it* as that which is to purified. However, it is again [only] under the influence of other-dependent mistakenness that sentient beings exist as that which is to be purified, whereas, according to the definitive meaning, that which is to be purified—the adventitious stains—do not exist right from the start.

As for the meaning of "adventitious stains," it is inadequate in all respects to explain that "adventitious" refers to the assertion that something previously nonexistent originates newly, or to the assertion that something previously existent is suitable to become separated off later. The meaning of "adventitious" is not having come from some time before, nor to cease at some later time, nor to arise as something that newly comes about. Nevertheless, due to various causes of mistakenness making their connections, these [stains] are adventitious in the sense of being transitory [appearances]. In other words, they are nullities that have the nature of being unreal, false, and nonexistent.

Also, "existing" in "[sentient beings] existing as that which is to be purified" does not refer to an existence as in the existence that is distinguished as the counterpart [of nonexistence] in the dichotomy of existence and nonexistence. Rather, the existence that is taught here has the meaning of existing or not existing as what performs a function. So, all these sentient beings are entities because they are able to perform a function.[1280] If they exist [in this way], they are necessarily impermanent, and if they are impermanent, there is no need for any causes that make them perish other than the causes that produced them. Therefore, they abide as something that definitely perishes. Since they abide as something that definitely perishes in this way, a sentient being will pass into nirvāṇa upon its individual form of saṃsāra having become exhausted. It is in this sense that it is declared, ultimately speaking, that there is not even a single sentient being that absolutely never passes into complete nirvāṇa within this great basic element of sentient beings. This is the definitive meaning.

Whatever is an impermanent entity is necessarily something that arises from causes and conditions, and what arises from causes and conditions does not arise through a nature of its own. If something does not arise through a nature of its own, it does not exist permanently, and something that does not exist permanently is also not produced by permanent causes and conditions that give rise to it. For this reason, results that are produced by impermanent [causes] are similar to these very impermanent causes, thus being of concordant type [in being impermanent]. All phenomena of this concordant type are not phenomena that actually qualify as existing in the manner of being established by a nature of their own in terms of their own essence. Consequently, they are all called "the seeming" since what does not exist by

a nature of its own is mistaken as existing [in that manner]. This mode is what obscures the basic state of natural emptiness. What is said here is the intention of the Karmapas, who successively arrive as noble Avalokiteśvara intends, through assuming human births.

Nowadays some people say, "The intention of the Omniscient Rangjung Dorje is that the tathāgata heart that is not empty of qualities, such as the [ten] powers, exists in sentient beings. This is clearly explained by the mighty victor [the Seventh Karmapa] Chötra Gyatso." This is [just] putting to melody what others say, but it is not our own [Kagyü] system.[1281] You may wonder, "Which other great ones assert such a system?" In Tibet, the land of snows, there are indeed also many others who assert something like that, but the one who explains it by excessively promoting it is Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen. He declares that "such a Heart, which is free of all flaws and endowed with all qualities, exists in sentient beings. Through its *existing* in sentient beings, sentient beings do not have to *be* it. Therefore, one must make a difference between existing and being [something], without mixing them."[1282]

I say that this statement, "Buddhahood exists in sentient beings," is flawed. In general, in a proof that a single subject [in question] either has a distinct property or is this very property, the establishment of a connection between the predicate of the probandum and the reason in such a way that they are inseparable in their own essence represents a "nature reason." Or, in a proof that something exists in the basis that is the subject [in question], the establishment of a causal connection between the predicate of the probandum and the reason is necessary.[1283]

However, [considering the above statement] in terms of the first [type of proof], if "sentient beings" are taken as the subject, and "are buddhas" is taken as the predicate of the probandum, then [the possibility] to connect these with a reason that is formulated with "exist" is generally excluded through valid cognition.[1284] In particular, this [type of proof] is also not justified in your own system because, according to you, it is neither asserted that buddhas are sentient beings, nor that sentient beings are buddhas.

Furthermore, in [your own] system, you cannot take "sentient beings" as the subject and "buddha" as the predicate of the probandum, and then connect them with a reason that is formulated with "exist." For to connect [two phenomena] in such a way that the one is or has the other, in general, one needs something that is not negating [what one tries to connect] through being contrary to it. But in your system, it is not proper to connect sentient beings and buddhas through a reason that is formulated with "exist" since you claim that they, just like light and darkness, are contrary in the sense of not coexisting [in a single locus]. That means you cannot connect them in this

way because it simply comes down to not finding any reason at all that could serve as such a [correct] subject property.[1285]

In brief, to be the probandum or to exist in it depends on a connection being established. However, for a connection to be established, the unmistaken positive and negative concomitances[1286] must be established. Consequently, this [statement], "Buddhahood exists in sentient beings," is uncertain since it does not rest upon any positive or negative concomitance whatsoever that is unmistaken through valid cognition.

[You may want to reformulate this by] saying, "In sentient beings who are endowed with buddhahood (the subject), buddhahood exists." Here, the nature of the subject is not established. That which is buddhahood or the Heart is unconditioned, and it is impossible that conditioned sentient beings are endowed with this unconditioned Heart. However, if we just assume that they were endowed with it, would they then be endowed with it in a contradictory manner or be endowed with it in a connected manner? [Obviously,] you do not assert that they are endowed with it in a contradictory manner. But if they were endowed with it in a connected manner, the Heart and sentient beings who obscure it would [again] not be beyond being connected either by identity or in a causal manner, while the Bhagavān has declared in the collection of sūtras of definitive meaning that these two cannot be expressed as being either the same or different. Hence, the above thesis is not tenable.

The gist of this—the meaning of the statement by the victors and their children that "buddhahood exists in sentient beings"—is declared to be as follows: "Buddhahood exists in sentient beings, without [the two] being connected, in the manner of a Heart [or core] within the cocoon of beginningless afflictive obscurations, and in such a way that this Heart is not something whose own nature is nonexistent." As for the meaning of this, it is tenable to say, "Its intention is that the Heart exists as [or in] the Heart."

Some later great ones [in Tibet] say, "As for the meaning that the buddha heart exists in sentient beings, it is declared that 'Buddhahood exists in sentient beings' with the following in mind: 'In different individual sentient beings, individual kinds of buddhahood that serve as the Hearts [of these beings] exist.'" Through being explained in this way, it indeed strikes the intelligence of some people as being tenable. However, the existence of individual kinds of buddhahood as the Hearts of individual sentient beings is also difficult to discriminate as being the definitive meaning. The buddhahood that serves as the Heart [of these beings] cannot be expressed as existing as many individual kinds that are either the same or different because the suchness of this Heart cannot be differentiated as being good or bad due to a difference in its support ([existing in] a buddha or a sentient being) and because this undifferentiable Heart is free from being one or many.

This is why some people put forth the following [proof]: "[Verse I.28 of the *Uttaratantra*] is taught as the means to prove the existence of the Heart that actually fulfills this function in sentient beings:

> Since the perfect buddhakāya radiates,
> Since suchness is undifferentiable,
> And because of the disposition,
> All beings always contain the buddha heart.[1287]

Therefore, the existence of the actual buddha heart is established through these three reasons according to their order. During the time of [sentient beings], in all beings (the subject) the buddha heart exists because the disposition exists at this time." [However,] in such a formulation, the criterion of positive concomitance (if the disposition exists, the Heart exists) is not established for the following reason. If the disposition is also presented as merely the latent tendencies for listening, the Heart refers to actual buddhahood. But while the latent tendencies for listening occur even on the level of [practicing the path due to just] having confidence,[1288] the dharmakāya and the buddha heart do not necessarily exist on that [level].

Furthermore, it may be said, "[In] these [sentient beings] (the subject) the [buddha heart] exists because the suchness of sentient beings and the buddha heart are undifferentiable." Here, a part of the reason does not apply to the subject since it is declared in this system of the *Mahāyānottaratantra* that suchness and the buddha heart are equivalent and just different names, but that suchness does not exist in sentient beings.

Also, even if [the reason] "since the perfect buddhakāya radiates" is given for the same subject and predicate of the probandum as before, it does not go beyond being a reason that does not apply [to the subject] because it is impossible that the perfect buddhakāya radiates from the continua of sentient beings.

This is why the statement that the [tathāgata heart] exists in [sentient beings] because of the [above] kinds of reasons must be understood through the triad of intention, purpose, and [logical] invalidation of the explicit [statement].[1289] This is said clearly in this text [—the *Uttaratantra*—] itself.[1290]

Some great ones say, "The intention behind [this statement] is that buddhahood exists in the continua of sentient beings as something suitable to come forth, just as in the example of butter existing in milk as something that is suitable to come forth [from it]." This example of those who put it that way is not justified either. That butter comes forth from milk is invalidated even by reasoning that is based on direct perception. So just as this example is [not] established, its meaning is not established either.

Thus, to explain the dharmadhātu [and nothing else] as the disposition as well as [the fact] that the fruitions of the three yānas emerge in dependence on just this [dharmadhātu] is what persists as the definitive meaning. Noble Asaṅga declared [in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya*]:

> You may wonder why [suchness] is called "dharmadhātu." Because it is the cause for all dharmas of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas.[1291]

Consequently, the threefold difference in terms of fully complete or not fully complete realization [of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas, respectively] occurs through the three different [ways of] engaging in this very dharmadhātu as a yāna. However, [Asaṅga] did not state that realization's own nature is anything other than this cause that is the dharmadhātu.

Here, some may say, "Then it follows that also the realization of realizing personal identitylessness does not go somewhere else beyond the cause that is the dharmadhātu." [To this, there is] the widely known answer, and the answer for those who [really] want to know. As for the first, if I [already] accept that there are no other phenomena apart from the dharmadhātu, why should I not accept [the above consequence]—I do accept it. As for the second, if this consequence refers to the existence of the factor of personal identitylessness in the dharmadhātu, I accept it. But if this consequence refers to the factor of realization through the prajñā that realizes the identitylessness of the continuum of the person that is connected to the continuum of a śrāvaka, it lacks the entailment [of the predicate by the reason].

Some Tibetans present the nature of the dharmadhātu as consciousness that is lucid and aware. They explain the assertion that, by focusing on nothing but this, it functions as the support for the [various] types of realization of the three yānas as being the system of the Yogācāras. They say, "If the dharmadhātu is realized, this is not necessarily the realization of phenomenal identitylessness," and "When the result of any of the yānas comes forth in dependence on the dharmadhātu, it is not certain that the dharmadhātu must be realized [for this to happen]." There are indeed [such statements], but [for now] I leave them as bases to be examined.

You may say, "The gist of [your] explanation in this way presents the disposition that actually fulfills this function as the [buddha] heart. Hence, in that case, since there are three [kinds of] possessors of the disposition, is this Heart itself presented as these three [kinds of] possessors of the disposition?" It is not. Though this Heart in itself does not go beyond just the single disposition of the tathāgatas, the classification as three [kinds of] possessors of the disposition is [made] due to the existence of three different [kinds of]

noble persons. However, it is not that there is something to be classified in the disposition of the tathāgatas itself. Then you may think, "In that case, different noble persons are impossible altogether." What is taken as the basis of designating noble persons are the qualities of awareness and liberation of these noble ones.

In brief, nowadays, those who boast about being the proclaimers of the definitive meaning say, "The disposition of the buddhas is what relinquishes the respective portions of the factors to be relinquished in individual beings to be guided who are the three [kinds of] possessors of the disposition. Through that, they respectively attain the realization of some aspects or of the entirety of all aspects of the buddha disposition of the buddhas. This is the justification for the three [kinds of] possessors of the disposition. Also, the attainments of these three types of enlightenment come forth due to the buddha disposition granting its power." In the first [parts] of such an explanation, there is nothing major that is untenable, but a phrase like "granting the power of the Heart" did not appear anywhere in India or Tibet before. If both the words and their meaning are examined, [this kind of] Heart does not exist. Since the Heart is unconditioned, it is impossible to involve the conditioned activity of granting its power.

Some people may think, "Because all radiating of the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya from this very Heart accomplishes activity, the above [statement] is not untenable. Thus, it is tenable." To say this [just exposes] your flaw of not having been trained [thoroughly]. In terms of its own nature, the activity of the Buddha's dharmakāya is not a conditioned activity. At the time of such activity engaging with sentient beings, the [actual] accomplishing of that activity is something that takes place in the continua of sentient beings with pure karma, meaning that it comes about through the power of entities. Since that activity is accomplished in the continua of these [beings] during that time, there is no need for the existence of efforts or conditioned activities within the actual enlightened activity of the dharmakāya itself.

All accomplishments in the thirteen accomplishments taught here [in the AA] are not just fruitless toils, but meaningful results. Through having performed the activity of accomplishing the purification of adventitious stains in the buddha heart, once the stains have become pure [it can be said that] "the result of buddhahood is attained." This result is what bears the names "disposition," "support," or "cause" during the phase [of being in the process] of accomplishing it. That in this case there is no cause or result that fully qualifies as such has already been explained above.

In terms of the definitive meaning, exactly this disposition of the Heart is actual buddhahood. From the point of view of what appears to the sentient beings who obscure this very [Heart] and other beings to be guided, it appears

as if they have become buddhas, which is just seeming buddhahood. At this point, once the adventitious stains have become pure, it appears as if this very buddhahood needed to become completely perfect omniscient buddhahood again. But in terms of the definitive meaning, this very buddha heart is buddhahood by its sheer presence. Therefore, it does not need to become buddhahood again and nothing else is able to make it become buddhahood either. Thus, if examined and analyzed, apart from this very buddhahood being buddhahood, it is impossible for even a single noble person to become a buddha anywhere else in any of the three times.

Precisely this actuality dawned in the minds of the Tagpo Kagyü gurus of yore and was put to song. As Lord Tüsum Kyenpa[1292] sang:

> If there is no change in buddhahood,
> There is no aspiration to attain all these fruitions.

Some later people in the land of snows say, "By presenting the thirteen accomplishments as something that arises as the nature of dharmadhātu wisdom, they are something supported in that manner. This is like, for example, presenting the six grounds of dhyāna as the supports for minds on the uncontaminated path." To this I say:

> However you differentiate "existing" and "being [something],"
> The continua of beings do not possess
> A connection to the buddha heart.
> However supreme sentient beings may be,
> They are what is to be purified for luminosity to become fully clear.[1293]
> However it may be covered by obscurations,
> The Heart does not move
> From buddhahood to anywhere else.

This much is for sure.

2) The disposition is not a nonimplicative negation[1294]

In this context, some scholars in both India and Tibet come up with many reasonings, saying, "Ultimately, this sheer lucid and aware mind of all sentient beings does neither arise nor cease because it neither arises from having ceased nor from not having ceased. Since this is established through this reason, mind is established as being without arising. Since it is established to be without arising, it is established that this lack of arising naturally abides in all sentient beings. Since this is established and since the nature of this

nonarising is the dharmadhātu, the dharmadhātu is established to pervade everything. Since it pervades all, it is established that all sentient beings are pervaded by the buddha disposition because the dharmadhātu is presented as this buddha disposition. If it is said that the original reason above does not apply, we ask, 'Does mind arise from its cause having ceased or does it arise from its cause not having ceased?' In the first case, it follows that mind is without a cause because it arises from something that has ceased, which is a nonentity. In the second case, it follows that mind's cause is permanent because the cause has not ceased, though its result has arisen."

All of this is untenable. I ask, "As for this disposition that is asserted here, is it presented as the disposition in the sense that it performs activity or is it so presented despite not performing any activity?" In the first case, how could a nonimplicative negation—the lack of any entity, which is the fact of being without arising—perform any activity because this very agent is empty of being able to perform a function? The reason applies because it is ruled out that the fact of nonarising is able to perform a function. The reason entails the predicate because activity without an agent is ruled out. In the second case, if one presents this nonimplicative negation as the disposition despite it being empty of activity, also the child of a barren woman would be the disposition because both are equal in being presented as the disposition despite being without activity. One may say, "The very unconditionedness that does not depend on either performing or not performing activity is established as the disposition by nature." If one asserts that unconditionedness is established as the disposition by nature, even if that is claimed to be the great essence of *Svātantrika- and *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, it is nothing but flawed. An unconditioned phenomenon called "disposition" that is established by nature is not found in the Madhyamaka systems of either *Svātantrikas or *Prāsaṅgikas. For their systems only ever assert the lack of a nature, but never claim that not being established by any nature is an unconditionedness that is established by nature, nor that the nature of this unconditionedness is a phenomenon that is established as a nature. Thus, the assertion of an unconditioned disposition that is established by nature is ruled out to be a correct system.

3) The single yāna and buddha nature in all beings

So, what are the boundary lines for presenting the disposition in our own system? I have stated most of it already above, but to elaborate a bit here, the following is found in the mighty victor Chötra Gyatso's presentation of the disposition.[1295]

Nowadays, people say that sūtras such as the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and treatises such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* represent teachings that all sentient beings are of three dispositions. However, these sūtras' and treatises' own

uncommon approach does not present three dispositions and so on. For example, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* itself says that the teaching on three dispositions is of expedient meaning:

> As long as mind operates,
> There is no limit for yānas.
> But once mind changes state fundamentally,
> There are no yānas and no one to travel [in them].
> There is no presentation of yānas,
> So I speak of a single yāna.
> But in order to guide childish beings,
> I speak of different yānas.[1296]

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* states:

> Though it is without difference in everything,
> Suchness having become pure
> Is the Tathāgata. Therefore,
> All beings possess its heart.[1297]

As for the intention of these sūtras and treatises, in the final picture it is nothing but Madhyamaka, whereas the assertions in India and Tibet that they are sūtras and treatises of Vijñaptivāda are not good. Still, others object, "Doesn't *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11d say, 'Some have inferior immaculate [dharmas] and [some] lack the cause' and the *Bhāṣya* on this, 'They are those who do not have the disposition for nirvāṇa'? Also, doesn't the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* say:

> As for those who have the disposition of śrāvakas and solely progress toward peace, even if all buddhas joined their efforts to establish them in the heart of enlightenment, they could not make them attain unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment."[1298]

These statements entail an intention. The basis of the intention behind them is that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas also have the buddha disposition, but, in their respective situations, do not meet the conditions for its awakening. For this reason it is said that the respective dispositions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are definite (for a certain period). The purpose of the above statements is as follows. In order to awaken the mahāyāna disposition, those persons who are not suitable right from the start for this disposition being awakened are first introduced to awakening the disposition in the form of

some inferior nirvāṇa. However, this is taught to be the path of the mahāyāna right away. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* says:

> That the great seer taught three yānas
> Represents the skill in means of the guides—
> There is only a single yāna, not two,
> But for the sake of guiding, he taught three.[1299]

The invalidation of the explicit statements above is that the inferior nirvāṇa without remainder is not the nirvāṇa that actually fulfills this function. For the cognitive obscurations have not been relinquished and therefore it is not omniscience. Also, the nirvāṇa that actually fulfills this function must necessarily be the state of not falling into either saṃsāra or personal peace, whereas this inferior nirvāṇa means to abide in the extreme of peace.

Having demonstrated this invalidation of the explicit statements, it is the case that the state of abiding in this inferior nirvāṇa will become buddhahood. For it is certain that this continuum of the inferior nirvāṇa (the support) will become awakened/purified and it is certain that the already primordially enlightened tathāgata heart, with which this support is endowed like a tree with its core or the earth with a treasure, seems to unfold[1300] through the power of the continuum of this support becoming terminated within this primordial enlightenment. Some may think, "This is not certain. Though śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have the disposition, it is not tenable that they enter the mahāyāna because they lack the causes for taking rebirth in saṃsāra and because they have already cast away their previous physical supports." These reasons are not established because Asaṅga's large commentary on the *Uttaratantra*, by taking the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra* as its source, says that, just as the three levels of existence arise from the causes of contaminated karma by virtue of the condition of grasping, the three kinds of bodies of arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have attained mastery (all of which are of a mental nature) arise from the causes of uncontaminated karma by virtue of the condition of the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance.[1301]

You may wonder, "At which point of the path of the mahāyāna do people who dwell in inferior nirvāṇas enter this path?" They must enter it starting on the path of accumulation of the mahāyāna for the following reasons. One must gather the accumulations that are necessary to manifest the nirvāṇa of great enlightenment for a minimum time of three incalculable eons, and the first of these eons needs to be spent gathering the accumulations on the level of engagement through aspiration. Furthermore, if one does not progress gradually through all five paths of the mahāyāna, it is not established as the mahāyāna. You may wonder, "Are such people then ordinary beings or noble

ones?" They are definitely nothing but noble ones because they are arhats that have attained the qualities of inferior noble ones and not fallen away from them. However, they are not noble ones of the mahāyāna because they have not manifested the path of seeing of the mahāyāna. Explained in this way, the three temporary yānas are established as a single ultimate yāna.

By virtue of this, it shall be proven that all sentient beings will become enlightened. As for those sentient beings with misguided craving, who are claimed by others to have the nature of never passing into nirvāṇa, it is certain that the continua of these sentient beings are suitable to become terminated and that their respective buddha wisdoms are suitable to appear as these wisdoms. For the collection of causes for both (a) the continua of these sentient beings becoming terminated and (b) their buddha wisdoms appearing as these wisdoms is complete in number and there are no obstructions to it. The first reason (a) applies because sentient beings are nothing other than the adventitious stains. Ultimately, these adventitious stains are not real entities because they are conditioned and, in being conditioned, perish right upon being established. If they perish right upon being established, they are not necessarily not becoming terminated and do not necessarily exist permanently. For this reason, the continua of such sentient beings are suitable to become terminated—just as with any other conditioned phenomena, their manifesting as sentient beings does not have a lasting continuum. To mistake them as being lasting continua happens under the sway of the sleep of ignorance. Since these other-dependent appearances of sentient beings are delusive, there is the certainty of becoming free from these delusive adventitious stains. It is also certain that this mistaken continuum of the large assembly of sentient beings becomes terminated, just as when persons not trained in terminology may cling to the horns of a rabbit as being really existent, while the certainty that these horns do not exist is undeceiving. Therefore, *Pramāṇavārttika* II.208cd says:

> Mind is naturally luminous,
> The stains are adventitious.

What is other than the vajra mind (the buddha heart or natural luminosity) and can be separated from it (sentient beings, stains, the seeming, mistakenness, and ignorance) is adventitious because it is not an established basis in the first place. Thus, on the temporary level, it is terminable and relinquishable. If it were an established base right from the start, it would not be terminable or relinquishable because it is established primordially. So who would be able to relinquish it and who would be able to terminate it? Therefore, since the continua of sentient beings become terminated, the mistakenness

of misconceiving them as continua can be relinquished. Thus, it is established through direct perception that also the efforts in applying the remedies that relinquish such mistakenness are meaningful. You may think, "Though the respective continua of such sentient beings are terminable and the stains are relinquishable, these continua arise again and the relinquishment of stains is reversed." This is not the case—there is no rearising of a terminated continuum because there is no re-arising of what has perished. Relinquishment is not reversed either, as *Pramāṇavārttika* II.141ab says:

> Since the seeds of the views about identity have been relinquished,
> This is irreversibility.[1302]

Accordingly, once the seeds and the supports that consist of the basis of mistakenness and the basis of delusion have been put to an end, they do not arise again, just as the result is put to an end once its cause are put to an end.

The second reason above (b) also applies. A sentient being, whose nature consists of the two obscurations and their latent tendencies, is the lucid awareness that consists of the factor of (ordinary) consciousness, in which all adventitious stains are fully complete. Once the wisdom of the buddha heart is free from this, it is suitable to appear as this wisdom because this wisdom as what is obscured clearly manifests once it is free from these factors that obscure it, just like the sky free from mist.

Some people may object, "If it is the case that the cessation of the lucid and aware mind that consists of the factor of consciousness assists in wisdom becoming suitable to appear, in the great systems,[1303] when the collection of causes being complete in number is put forward as the reason to prove that sentient beings are definitely buddhas, this depends on proving the existence of the buddha heart as the main element in this collection of causes being complete in number. This is in turn proved through the reason of the existence of luminous mind, and the latter is established through self-aware self-lucid mind. Therefore, it is explained that all sentient beings become enlightened because they are pervaded by this mind, which contradicts your system." Those who say this exhibit the flaw of not understanding the essential point of the great system exactly as it is. In the context of putting forth the reason of the collection of causes being complete in number in order to prove that sentient beings will be buddhas, the meaning of the phrase "Because the main cause—the buddha heart—exists" is as follows. This very buddha heart is a label for sentient beings in terms of its being the name of the cause for becoming a buddha. Its being with stains is called "the sugata heart that is the basic element of sentient beings." Once these adventitious stains have been purified, the buddha heart without stains (which is labeled now in terms of

the fruition) is called "buddha enlightenment" and "nonabiding wisdom." This Heart, which is labeled as a cause, exists right from the start when it has stains. By virtue of the reason of the buddha heart's existence at that time, once it becomes free from these stains later, it is established as existing without any change. The argument that proves this is a nature argument. As *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.269ab says:

> When a result is proven by virtue of its cause,
> This is included in nature [reasons].

By virtue of this being established, it is established that all sentient beings will become buddhas. For once sentient beings and adventitious stains, which are not different in nature, are purified, primordial buddha wisdom unfolds as this wisdom. Therefore, since sentient beings and adventitious stains are without a basis and lack any root, within the domain of knowable objects, it is impossible for them to not ever become purified and thus abide permanently. Consequently, it is certain that all sentient beings will become enlightened.

The gist of this is as follows. Sentient beings who have become fully and completely awakened/purified are labeled as buddhas because there is no other phenomenon than that which could be presented as a buddha. As it is said:

> Beyond having relinquished saṃsāra,
> There is no other nirvāṇa.

Being taught in this way, the instruction of all sentient beings "having" the buddha heart is a teaching about having/existing in a contradictory manner. However, this cannot be proven through what was asserted above, that the great system proves the existence of the buddha heart through the reason of the existence of vajra luminosity. For certainty about these two is not an easy matter, but very difficult. Likewise, the statement that "vajra luminous mind is proven through the self-lucid self-awareness of the Mere Mentalists" is not established either because one cannot be certain about this by virtue of the lucid awareness in Mere Mentalism that is connected with (ordinary) consciousness. Consequently, I do not subscribe to the above presentation of what the great system is supposed to be.

Therefore, the manner in which the earlier-mentioned cessation of the lucid awareness that consists of the factor of (ordinary) consciousness serves as the cause for wisdom being suitable to appear as wisdom is as follows. When this wisdom appears as such wisdom, it is by virtue of what is obscured needing to become pure of stains. The fact of wisdom appearing as wisdom by virtue of these stains having become pure is a result of freedom.[1304] Though

the continuum of the lucid and aware mind that consists of the factor of (ordinary) consciousness is terminated, the lucid awareness that consists of the factor of wisdom will greatly unfold. This is explained in the commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* together with the example of the sounds of the major strings among the many strings of a lute becoming more prominent to the same extent that the sounds of the minor strings fade away.

However, the Vijñaptivādins say, "In sentient beings, the continuum of buddhahood exists in a way of being suitable to manifest and the stains exist in a way of being suitable to be separated. Nevertheless, it is possible for the remedies that separate them to be incomplete, just as in persons with misguided craving and in the nirvāṇa without remainder." The statement "It is possible for the remedies to be incomplete" is not true. The power that gives rise to the remedies in the mind streams of these beings is produced through the force of the enlightened activity of the tathāgatas. For the tathāgatas attained mastery over enlightened activity and, for the welfare of others, remain in saṃsāra as long as it lasts, it thus being meaningful.

You may wonder, "But in that case, what is the cause for people who dwell in the nirvāṇa without remainder assuming rebirth?" They take rebirth by virtue of the existence of the latent tendencies of nonafflicted ignorance. "How are they born through this?" One is able to accumulate uncontaminated karma, just as one accumulates contaminated karma. This uncontaminated karma is able to function as a cause for taking birth, just as wisdom alone is able to display the manner of being born as a nirmāṇakāya. "However, must what is explained as a mental body be something that is free from the skandha of form?" Though such a body is beyond the phenomena of form, as an appearance for others, it does not appear as being free from the āyatana of form because it has a physical form that promotes the welfare of others, just like the body of a supreme nirmāṇakāya. Though it is the case that all sentient beings are suitable to become buddhas and are certain to become buddhas, through putting an end to saṃsāra as such, there is no end to it because a time when saṃsāra is empty is impossible. If this were possible, there would be the well-known flaw of it following that the continuum of the enlightened activity of the buddhas becomes terminated.

In my opinion, saṃsāra has no beginning. For if something has a beginning and an end ultimately, it needs to be something real, but saṃsāra does not exist as something real. Thus, a beginning of saṃsāra is only a mental imputation, but there is no beginning of saṃsāra that is established by nature. The reason for there being no such beginning is that the very saṃsāra that could serve as the foundation or basis for the existence or nonexistence of a beginning does not exist (the same applies for an end of saṃsāra). This is the definitive meaning. However, in terms of the expedient meaning, from

the perspective of the conceptions of the various latencies of the beings to be guided, saṃsāra both has and does not have an end. For it is suitable that object generalities appear to those beings that present nonexistence in dependence on existence and existence in dependence on nonexistence. Also, one cannot present any absolute existence or nonexistence that is established by nature. As for not being able to present anything in an absolute way, because the realms of all sentient beings and this wheel of saṃsāra are just mere dependent origination, dependent phenomena and what they depend on are not definite in a one-dimensional way. Rather, this dependent origination is something inconceivable for those who just see this life. Therefore, this reasoning of teaching that all of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is dependent origination is the means to overcome all biases, such as saṃsāra having or not having a beginning or an end, or its being empty or nonempty. With this meaning in mind, it is said that saṃsāra is without anything to be added or subtracted, just as dependent origination is without exhaustion and increase. This is the meaning of what the mighty victor Karma Pakshi[1305] says:

> Saṃsāra not becoming empty though all beings have become buddhas means that there are newly born sentient beings because saṃsāra is conditioned.

This is a very subtle point, which is difficult to realize.

4) Other commentaries on the disposition

LN[1306]

This has ten parts:

1) The nature of the disposition
2) Its proof
3) Its qualities
4) Flaws
5) Its signs
6) Hermeneutical etymology
7) Divisions
8) The point of whether the disposition can or cannot be cut off
9) Example
10) The distinctive features of its fruition

1) The śrāvakas assert the disposition as the disposition for liberation, which is the virtue of detachment. Based on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.4ac, the Mere Mentalists hold that the naturally abiding disposition is the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, which means being primordially endowed with the

fortune to become a buddha. When this disposition is accomplished through conditions, it is the unfolding disposition. The former is the entity that is the support and the latter is the one that is supported. Also, the former exists as a causal entity, but not as a resultant entity (buddhahood). This kind of disposition of the Mere Mentalists is only nominal. Therefore, it is the dharmadhātu that is the naturally abiding disposition. Thus, the *Avataṃsakasūtra* says:

> O children of the victor, this "disposition of bodhisattvas" is to be completely devoted to the dharmadhātu, which is as vast as the sky and naturally luminous.

The definition of the naturally abiding disposition is "the unconditioned virtue that will become the dharmatākāya."[1307] The definition of the unfolding disposition is "the conditioned virtue that serves as the cause for perfect enlightenment" (supported by *Uttaratantra* I.149–150).[1308] All sentient beings possess the buddha disposition because they become weary with the suffering of saṃsāra and wish and strive for peace (as in *Uttaratantra* I.40–41). Temporarily and conventionally, the dispositions for the three yānas are different because the basic elements of sentient beings (the cause) vary; they aspire for different yānas (the condition); they engage in different definite and indefinite practices; and their respective fruitions are three different kinds of enlightenment (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.2). The mahāyāna disposition is supreme because of having trained for a long time through superior virtue; possessing all the qualities such as the ten powers; representing the great welfare of others; and buddhahood being inexhaustible (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.3).

2) The proof that the disposition is emptiness is that the naturally abiding disposition is emptiness free from superimposition and denial. For though there are no afflictions to be removed and no purified phenomena to be added, it is empty of adventitious afflictions, but not empty of being naturally pure (as in *Uttaratantra* I.154ab and I.155). Also, nothing but this basic element or disposition is the inconceivable object of the knowledge of all aspects. For at the time of its being with stains, it is both pure and impure, while at the time of its being without stains, what have not been stains in it before have become pure later (as in *Uttaratantra* I.25ab).

3) The qualities of the disposition are that it is difficult to fall into the lower realms and, even if this happens, it is easy to be liberated and one does not experience great suffering there, but develops great weariness about saṃsāra and matures the sentient beings in these realms (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.8).

4) There are four flaws that, despite having the disposition, prevent one from attaining buddhahood and engaging in its qualities—habituation to afflictions, bad friends, deprivation of necessities for practicing virtue, and being dependent on others, such as being a servant (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.7).

5) The signs of the mahāyāna disposition are four—from the very outset of their practice, the beings who have it feel compassion for sentient beings, aspire for the mahāyāna dharma, tolerate hardships, and engage in the virtues of the six pāramitās (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.5).

6) In terms of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.4d and its *Bhāṣya* explaining *gotra* (disposition) as meaning *guṇottāraṇa*, it is called disposition because the qualities arise from it.[1309] From among the nine meanings of *go*, the ones relevant here are "direction" and "earth (*bhūmi*)," while *tra(yaṇa)* means "protecting." Thus, it is the disposition because it protects the sentient beings that are contained in the dharmas or bhūmis directed toward enlightenment. Or it refers to *kula* ("family" or "collection"), which means it is the disposition because it merges with the lower realms out of compassion or because it is the foundation of the collection of qualities. As for its synonyms, Abhayākaragupta says in his *Munimatālaṃkāra*:

> The dharmadhātu, which has solely the defining characteristic of all phenomena being without nature, is the cause for the dharmas of the noble ones. Therefore, it is expressed through the synonyms "naturally abiding disposition," "basis," "reliance," "cause," "foundation," "abode," "precursor," "matrix," "seed," "dhātu," and "nature."[1310]

7) As for the different types of disposition, according to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.6, there are four—certain by nature, uncertain, unalterable by conditions, and alterable. According to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, there are five—the three certain ones (as a śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, or bodhisattva), the uncertain one, and the "cut-off disposition." Those beings with the first three dispositions are certain to attain their respective types of enlightenment, while those with the fourth disposition can switch onto other paths. The disposition of rhinolike pratyekabuddhas is only certain from the level of heat of their path of preparation onward; the one of the greater group practitioners, from the level of peak; and the one of the lesser group practitioners, from their path of seeing or their path of familiarization. The disposition of bodhisattvas with the sharpest faculties is only certain from their path of preparation onward; the one of bodhisattvas with middling faculties, from their path of seeing; and the one of bodhisattvas with dullest faculties, from the eighth bhūmi.[1311]

8) As for whether a "cut-off" disposition is or is not possible, those who assert the disposition as the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas hold that a cut-off disposition exists. According to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11, there are four kinds of persons whose dispositions are inferior, while those who do not have the disposition are those who lack the causes for liberation. Here, in the AA, since the naturally abiding disposition is asserted to be the nature of phenomena, it is impossible for it to be cut off (supported by *Uttaratantra* I.28). The intention behind explaining a cut-off disposition is that it is very difficult for the beings who have it to be liberated. As Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* says:

> As for the statement that those who just follow their great desire possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa forever, it refers to having aversion toward the mahāyāna dharma as being the cause for not attaining parinirvāṇa. Therefore, this statement was made for the sake of turning such people away from their aversion, with the intention of referring to another time.[1312]

9) Since the disposition possesses many virtues, the luminosity of wisdom, and powers such as the supernatural knowledges; lacks the stains of the afflictions; and is pure and unchanging, it is like gold (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.9 and *Uttaratantra* I.148).

10) As for its fruition, the disposition is the root of attaining bliss, pacifying suffering, the tree of enlightenment, and the benefit and happiness of oneself and others (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.13).

STT and BT[1313]

STT defines the disposition as "the dharmadhātu that serves as the basis for practice," which refers to the naturally pure and reference-point-free mind streams of all persons in whom the yoga of the level of heat of the culminating training has arisen and of those beyond. BT's only general comment is to report on the Third Karmapa's position as both the naturally abiding disposition and the unfolding disposition being unconditioned and therefore "disposition," "basic element," and "dharmadhātu" being equivalents.[1314]

RT[1315]

On the Vaibhāṣika's and Sautrāntika's presentation of the disposition, RT agrees with NSML (see below). Among the Vijñaptivādins, Dignāga explains the disposition as having the nature of cognition. Lines 11cd of his *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* say:

> The disposition is asserted as having the nature of consciousness,
> Whose character is loving-kindness and prajñā.

Thus, he speaks of the bodhisattva disposition as being loving-kindness and prajñā at the time of the cause. Therefore, it is obvious that he also asserts the dispositions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as being their roots of virtue at the time of the cause. You may think, "In this statement, Dignāga intended only the unfolding disposition, whereas he asserts the naturally abiding disposition as being mere lucid and aware mind." This is not the case because he does not explain any disposition that is other than what he says above. Also, since all Vijñaptivādins assert three yānas ultimately, according to them it is not suitable for the buddha disposition to pervade all sentient beings, whereas what Dignāga describes above does exist in all beings. Therefore, they assert only the buddha disposition as being "the sugata heart," but it is not what they explain as "the disposition" in general. The disposition is also not explained as the unconditioned dharmadhātu because what cannot be made special through conditions is not suitable as a cause and therefore does not have the meaning of disposition. This appears to be equivalent to the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* saying that certain roots of virtue constitute the disposition of the śrāvakas, which also applies up through the bodhisattvas.

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu explain the disposition in terms of its (1) nature, (2) synonyms, and (3) divisions. (1) According to the sūtras, "the disposition of bodhisattvas is their distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, which has been obtained through the nature of phenomena since beginningless time and is continuing as such." Thus, the nature of the disposition is held by them to be the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas. If they do not present the ālaya-consciousness, the disposition is the potential that makes one attain enlightenment when the uncontaminated seeds that exist in the mental consciousness meet with certain conditions. If they present the ālaya-consciousness, the disposition consists of the uncontaminated seeds that dwell in this consciousness. The *Sāgarameghasūtra* says:

> The distinctive feature of the six āyatanas consists of the seeds that dwell in the ālaya-consciousness—the potential for producing the uncontaminated dharmas.

(2) The synonyms for the disposition are as follows. It is called "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas" because the persons of the three yānas, which are imputed onto the six āyatanas, are distinguished as the respective possessors of dispositions or because the potential is made special by virtue of being awakened through the conditions of the six āyatanas. It is called

"uncontaminated seed" because it is the cause that produces uncontaminated wisdom. It is also referred to as "what makes it suitable to relinquish the obscurations" because it abides as the potential that is suitable for the arising of wisdom through becoming free from stains when it meets the conditions of the path. It is called "the latent tendencies for listening" because it is to be revived through the condition of listening to the Buddha's teachings. As the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says, these latent tendencies are lesser, medium, and great:

> The small, medium, and great latent tendencies for listening are to be regarded as the seeds of the dharmakāya.[1316]

Here, the lesser latent tendencies for listening are revived through the condition of persons of dull faculties listening to the dharma that teaches merely personal identitylessness; the medium ones, through persons of medium faculties listening to personal identitylessness (the assertion by others that the medium ones are the causes for realizing one-and-a-half of the two kinds of identitylessness means to not distinguish according to philosophical systems); and the great ones, through listening to the very vast sūtra collection (the mahāyāna). Among these, it is the latter that are explained as the seeds of the dharmakāya.

(3) By virtue of the ways in which the disposition functions as the cause for enlightenment, it is divided into the certain ones and the uncertain one. The first ones are those that are primordially certain as the causes for the respective enlightenments of the three yānas and therefore do not turn into any other form of enlightenment through any conditions, just as there are solely gold, silver, or copper, respectively, in certain mountain areas. Sthiramati's *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* on I.19a says:

> Just as some [phenomena] in beginningless saṃsāra are sentient and some are insentient, here too some [sets of] the six āyatanas are called "the buddha disposition," some, "the śrāvaka disposition," and so on. Since the disposition has been continuing since beginningless time [up through the present], just like the distinction between what is sentient and insentient, it not something that has arisen adventitiously.[1317]

The uncertain disposition is suitable, under the influence of certain conditions, as the cause for the realizations of all three yānas, just as some mountains contain sometimes copper, sometimes silver, and sometimes gold.

Not being endowed with uncontaminated seeds by virtue of the obscurations being greatly predominant is called "the cut-off disposition." Therefore, it is not included in either the certain or uncertain dispositions. As the *Bhāṣya* on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11d explains, "lacking the cause" means to possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa forever. It is not reasonable for this to intend a cut-off disposition in terms of practicing because this would just be no different from "lacking the virtue conducive to liberation" (line III.11c) and thus accrue the flaw of repetition. Also the position of some that "the cut-off disposition" refers to being endowed with uncontaminated seeds, but that they are not suitable to be revived, is untenable because the above passage refers to not being endowed with uncontaminated seeds.

Some may think, "It is not justified for the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha dispositions to be certain because, ultimately, a single yāna is explained." This is not the case because the sūtras speak of sentient beings having various dispositions and one can first observe different interests in them, then different ways of practicing, and finally different fruitions in terms of their respective enlightenments.

The nature of the disposition is twofold—the naturally abiding disposition and the unfolding disposition. Their difference is not as in the assertion by some that the former is not revived by any other conditions, while the latter becomes special by way of being revived through conditions. Rather, as the already mentioned passage in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says, the naturally abiding disposition abides primordially by virtue of the nature of phenomena, while the other one is newly accomplished.

The manner in which the disposition is asserted by the Mādhyamikas has three parts:

1) Identifying its nature
2) The way in which it serves as the disposition
3) Rebutting an objection

1) The prajñāpāramitā sūtras say:

> Subhūti, the meaning of the word "bodhisattva" is without word meaning. Why? Enlightenment is without arising . . . What is meant by the word "bodhisattva" does not exist and is not observable.[1318]

Therefore, by virtue of it being justified that enlightenment (the supported) is not substantially existent, the disposition (its support) is not really established either. However, the disposition that is the true nature of the six āyatanas is the cause to which the term "bodhisattva" is applied (the foundation of practice), but it is not a really established meaning or referent of this term. The foundation of practice is twofold—the bodhisattva and the

disposition. The former refers to the thirteen levels of bodhisattvas as the bases of the dharma as explained in AA I.37–38. The latter is taught as nothing but the nature of the dharmadhātu. Here, what is asserted as the disposition is the dharmadhātu that is made special through the inner āyatanas, but not the dharmadhātu of the outer āyatanas because the latter are not suitable as the foundation of practice, thus lacking the meaning of "buddha disposition."

Some say, "Since the meaning of disposition is 'cause,' the sheer true nature of phenomena is not suitable as the disposition because it does not exist as an entity." But then the true nature of mind would not be suitable as the disposition either because it does not exist as an entity. Also, it is not suitable to assert the sheer true nature of phenomena as the disposition. For what should be asserted as the disposition is the mind with stains, which has the character of luminosity because it is the substantial cause of wisdom. Otherwise, since there is no further reason to assert the dharmadhātu as the disposition, it could equally be said to not be the disposition. "But the dharmadhātu is presented as the disposition because the dharmas of the noble ones will be realized when one focuses on and thus familiarizes with it." This is not the case because the same happens through familiarizing with the dharmadhātu of the outer āyatanas and it therefore would follow that the latter is the buddha disposition.

Others may say, "Since mind lacks the meaning of the term 'nature,' it is not suitable as the naturally abiding disposition." Just as the world says that the nature of fire is heat, mind is expressed as "nature" by virtue of its arising as nothing other than having the nature of luminosity, which cannot be changed into anything else through any conditions. For mind cannot be changed through any conditions into anything other than its own nature of luminosity. "But does it not arise as having stains through conditions such as desire? So how can it not be suitable to be changed through conditions?" Though stains may be associated with gold, from the perspective of the nature of gold it does not arise as the nature of the stains because it can be separated from the stains through certain methods. Likewise, at the time when mind possesses stains, though its nature is not manifest by virtue of stains such as attachment, from the perspective of its nature it has not changed into anything else. This is also stated in the scriptures—*Uttaratantra* I.103b says:

> Seeing this honeylike basic element of awareness . . .[1319]

and I.104c states:

> Likewise, the honeylike uncontaminated cognition[1320] that exists in beings . . .

Also Nāgārjuna's collection of praises says this—verse 1 of his *Cittavajrastava* states:

> I bow to my own mind
> That dispels mind's ignorance
> By eliminating the mind-sprung web
> Through this very mind itself.

And line 7d says:

> Buddhas spring from a sound mind at ease.[1321]

Lines 23cd of the *Dharmadhātustava* say:

> Just so, wisdom in afflictions
> Stays without a single stain.

The uncontaminated seeds asserted by the Mere Mentalists are not tenable as the naturally abiding disposition. For they do not operate in all sentient beings since there is the possibility of sentient beings not being endowed with them.

2) The way in which the disposition serves as the disposition is twofold by way of being
   a) a foundation
   b) a cause

a) The foundation of practice is the bodhisattva, who is imputed onto the six inner āyatanas. Among these āyatanas, the five sense faculties (such as the eyes) rely on the āyatana of mentation, while, ultimately, mentation abides as the nature that is the nature of phenomena. Therefore, with the intention of all āyatanas relying on the nature of phenomena, *Uttaratantra* I.56–57ab says:

> Likewise, skandhas, dhātus, and faculties
> Rest on karma and afflictions,
> Karma and afflictions always rest on
> Improper mental engagement,
>
> And improper mental engagement
> Rests on the purity of mind . . .

b) As for being the disposition by way of being a cause, from the mental consciousness focusing on and thus familiarizing with its own actual way

of being the practice that purifies the stains of the true nature of the mind arises. When such familiarization culminates, the mental consciousness and its true nature become free from stains and thus change state as buddha wisdom and stainless suchness. It is for this reason that the nature of phenomena is asserted as a cause. Though there is the focusing and thus familiarizing with the true nature of the outer āyatanas, since it is not suitable as a cause in this sense, the essential point of not presenting the true nature of the outer āyatanas as the disposition appears to be this. This also explains well the meaning of the statement that the dharmadhātu is labeled with the conventional term "disposition" by way of presenting it as having the nature of a cause so that bodhisattvas realize the dharmas of the noble ones, just like the focal object that is focused on through the progressive realizations of the śrāvakayāna and so on.

3) Some may say, "If all sentient beings have the buddha disposition, how can saṃsāra still be observed as being infinite, even if countless buddhas pass into nirvāṇa?" The reason is that, though beings have the disposition (the cause), they possess the four flaws that are adverse conditions. As *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.7 says:

> Habituation to afflictions, bad friends,
> Deprivation, and dependence on others
> Are, in brief, to be known
> As the four flaws with regard to the disposition.

LSSP[1322]

This has four parts:

1) The nature of the disposition
2) The manner in which it serves as the disposition
3) The divisions of the disposition
4) The hermeneutical etymology of "disposition"

1) The nature of the disposition

This has three parts:

a) The śrāvaka system
b) The Mere Mentalist system
c) The Madhyamaka system

1a) The śrāvaka system

In the vinaya, [the Buddha] speaks of [the disposition] being fourfold—the dispositions of the noble ones of being content with poor dharma robes, alms, and bedding as well as the disposition of the noble ones of delighting in relinquishment and meditation. The nature [of this disposition] is the mental

factor detachment. You may wonder, "What is taught by these four?" The [first] three dispositions of the noble ones teach the manner of practicing the path and the fourth one teaches the actual activity. Here, the teacher said to his disciples, "If you perform this activity in this manner, you will attain liberation before long." As for the purpose of discussing these four, the first three bring peace, when one craves for entities that [one considers to] be mine and the last one lastingly pacifies craving for both a self and what is mine. The *Abhidharmakośa* [says]:

> The dispositions of the noble ones are detachment.[1323]

And:

> Three teach the manner and the last one, the activity.[1324]

And:

> In order to temporarily or lastingly pacify
> The desires [based on] the clinging to a self and mine.[1325]

As for the manner in which these serve as the disposition, the autocommentary [on the *Abhidharmakośa* says]:

> They are the four dispositions of the noble ones since the noble ones arise from them.[1326]

Also, the difference between sharp and dull faculties is presented as the disposition. As the *Abhidharmakośa* [says]:

> Some are of this disposition from the beginning
> And some become [so] by virtue of purification.[1327]

Thus, though a mere disposition is known [among śrāvakas,] there is no presentation of the two dispositions [as in the mahāyāna].

As for the explanation that the Sautrāntikas assert [the disposition] as the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, which refers to the obscurations being suitable to be relinquished, I have not seen any corroboration.

1b) The Mere Mentalist system

The *[Vivṛta]gūḍhārtha[piṇḍavyākhyā* says]:

> The perfect [nature] is twofold—permanent and impermanent . . . The impermanent is twofold—what has the character of perfect wisdom and what has the character of seeds . . . What has the nature of seeds is also twofold—naturally abiding and accomplished.[1328]

Based on the natural disposition of purification, the *Śrīmālā[devī]-siṃhanādasūtra* labels it with the conventional term "ālaya-consciousness" and says that, based on the seed of purification, all sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart. Thus, [this sūtra] asserts the naturally abiding disposition as the potential within the ālaya for producing what is uncontaminated, which is something conditioned. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* [states]:

> The small, medium, and great latent tendencies for listening are to be regarded as the seeds of the dharmakāya. Since they are the remedy for the ālaya-consciousness, they are not of the nature of the ālaya-consciousness.[1329]

[The text] says [further] that these latent tendencies exist together with the ālaya, just like [a mixture of] milk and water, and that [the latter] changes state through its seeds becoming extinguished to the very extent to which these [tendencies] increase, just as geese drink [only] the milk within the water. Thus, this [text] also says that [the naturally abiding disposition] is impermanent.

Likewise, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Because of the differences in [beings'] dhātus,
> Aspirations, and accomplishments,
> And because of observing different results,
> The existence of the disposition is ascertained.[1330]

This also refers to [the naturally abiding disposition] being conditioned because the proofs for the different dispositions for the three yānas establish them through the existence of different dhātus [of sentient beings] (the causes), different aspirations for [one or another of] the three yānas (the conditions), differences in what is definitely accomplished or not accomplished, and three [different kinds of] enlightenment—supreme, middling, and small (the results). For if [the naturally abiding disposition] were suchness, different aspirations and so on could not establish [it as being different] since [suchness], apart from the divisions in terms of mere different bearers of the nature [of suchness], lacks any inherent differences. Furthermore, [the disposition in this text is not suchness] because it establishes [the mahāyāna

disposition] as the supreme disposition, which is for the reason that the hīnayāna disposition culminates in the [nirvāṇa] without remainder, whereas the one of the mahāyāna does not become exhausted at that time. For if [the disposition] were suchness, it would be impossible for its continuum to be interrupted [ever].

The *[Viniścaya]saṃgrahaṇī*[1331] explains that the mahāyāna [disposition], the hīnayāna [disposition], and the cut-off disposition, respectively, refer to mind streams that are suitable to relinquish both obscurations, [those that are suitable to relinquish] merely the afflictive obscurations, and those that are not suitable to relinquish [any of these]. This also intends seeds within the ālaya.[1332]

[In Yogācāra texts] that do not present the ālaya, the disposition is also twofold—the naturally abiding one and the accomplished one. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* [says]:

> "What is the disposition?" In brief, the disposition is twofold—the naturally abiding one and the accomplished one (*samudānīta*). The naturally abiding disposition is the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas of bodhisattvas, which has been obtained through the nature of phenomena since beginningless time and is continuing as such [up through the present]. The accomplished disposition is what is obtained through having cultivated roots of virtue in the past.[1333]

The *Śrāvakabhūmi* [states]:

> "So what is the nature of the disposition?" It is distinguished from the body, embraced by the six āyatanas, obtained through the nature of phenomena, and is continuing since beginningless time [up through the present].[1334]

You may wonder, "What is this 'distinctive feature of the six āyatanas'?" On this, Khu [Chenpo Lhadingpa] says that this refers to the sixth āyatana (the āyatana of mentation) because the five sense faculties are not tenable as being the disposition. Dré [Sherab Bar] explains that one may take [this term] as authoritative because, in the system of the Mere Mentalists, even the five sense faculties are merely mental appearances. Some say that it refers to suchness as a particular or subcategory of the sixth outer āyatana (the āyatana of phenomena) since it "is obtained through the nature of phenomena." The first two among these assert the six āyatanas [in this term] as the inner ones and thus are not mistaken about what the āyatanas [here] are, but they are

mistaken in asserting that the disposition is the sixth āyatana or [all] six, respectively. The third [position] is mistaken about both the āyatanas and the nature of the disposition. "How do you know that this refers to the inner āyatanas?" The *Śrāvakabhūmi* [says]:

> This seed has no characteristics outside of the six āyatanas. It is this state of the six āyatanas which are continuing since beginningless time [up through the present] and are obtained through the nature of phenomena that is simply labeled with the names and conventional terms "disposition," "seed," "dhātu," and "nature." Therefore, it is said to be contained within a single continuum.[1335]

Thus, in the context of analyzing whether the disposition is a single continuum or different ones, it explains that [the disposition] is a label for the state of the six āyatanas. Hence, how could the outer āyatanas be suitable as a basis for this label? Also the *Sāgaramegha[sūtra* says]:

> This seed, which is free from being expressible as either the same as, or something other than, being conditioned and cannot be grasped, is called "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas." The six āyatanas represent the substantial root of a sentient being. Therefore, they should be called "the distinctive feature of a sentient being." It is by virtue of being endowed with them that one speaks of "the distinctive feature of a sentient being, of the essence, of a single being,[1336] and of an individual." Alternatively, it is identified as the six āyatanas because what is taught as "the disposition" is what is undifferentiable from any of these āyatanas in the respective [states] that are obtained through meditative absorptions and birth.

Thus, since the possession of [all] six āyatanas or any of them is sufficient, [possessing the disposition refers to] possessing the basis of the distinctive feature, or the state, that is the disposition of the six āyatanas. The disposition is a label for the distinctive feature or state of these [āyatanas].

In brief, though one speaks of "the six āyatanas" [here], [the disposition] is asserted as the potential to attain enlightenment that operates based on [the six āyatanas] and is not interrupted by a sentient being's mind stream, its realms, birth places, and so on. Since it performs [this] function, it is substantially existent, but not a separately existent self-sufficient substance. Therefore, it is asserted as something that is inexpressible as being either identical with or other than its basis of imputation. Thus, the disposition is neither the six āyatanas nor is it something else. The *Sāgaramegha[sūtra* says]:

> It is obtained through the nature of phenomena because it is not formed by anybody.

Thus, it is not newly produced through the triad of study, reflection, and meditation, but abides primordially as a continuum. The same [text says]:

> As for naturally abiding, it should be understood as abiding in the disposition without having generated bodhicitta. For it is what arises from the natural outflow of the very pure dharmadhātu, which is not conditioned [or formed] by roots of virtue.

Otherwise, if, by virtue of [the phrase] "obtained by the nature of phenomena," [the disposition] were unconditioned, since the *Śrāvakabhūmi* explains the same for the six āyatanas and also explains the same for going for refuge and vows, they would [all] be unconditioned. Though there is the assertion that "the unfolding disposition consists of all paths," it is just the naturally abiding disposition, when it is caused to flourish through the triad of study, reflection, and meditation, that is merely labeled with this other name "unfolding." The *Sāgaramegha[sūtra* says]:

> You should understand that the generation of bodhicitta is "other" because what is called "accomplished [disposition]" is this very disposition representing another temporary feature, which is taught through another name.

In this [text], there are also explanations about naturally abiding and unfolding [types] for the following two [sets of disposition]—the dispositions that are certain and uncertain and the dispositions of those who have and have not previously gone through inferior paths.

It may be said, "However, the *[Mahāyānasūtr]ālaṃkāra* [says]:

> By nature, unfolding,
> Support, supported,
> Existent, and nonexistent . . .[1337]

Thus, the two dispositions are explained as (a) existing as the cause, but not existing as the result, and (b) as existing as the result. Therefore, the two are mutually exclusive." They are mutually exclusive in terms of their isolates, but they are not mutually exclusive in terms of substance. Hence, if one thinks of them in terms of substance, once the path is entered, [the disposition] is both. As the *Śrāvakabhūmi* [says]:

> When the seed has not produced the fruition and the fruition is not accomplished, [the disposition] is therefore called "subtle." Once it has produced the fruition and the fruition is accomplished, the seed and the fruition merge into one. Therefore, the disposition is taught as "coarse."[1338]

When taken in this way, also [the following passage] in the *Vṛtti*, which brings up the opposing thesis on the disposition by the Mere Mentalists, will be quoted well:

> Others say, "The disposition is the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas. This is twofold—the one that is accomplished through conditions and the naturally abiding one."[1339]

This represents the [Mere Mentalist] system of asserting something conditioned as the disposition. However, there are also [Mere Mentalists] who assert that the disposition is the nature of phenomena—such as the disposition that is taught as the nature of phenomena here in the *[Abhisamay]ālaṃkāra* being also explained by Ratnākaraśānti as the disposition.

The former presentation of the disposition is [given] by virtue of its producing what is uncontaminated, while the explanation of the nature of phenomena as the disposition [accords with] the *[Abhidharma]samuccaya*:

> Why is it called "dharmadhātu"? Because it is the cause of all qualities of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas.[1340]

Thus, it is the mere production of qualities through focusing on the [dharmadhātu] that is presented as the disposition. In this way, [the disposition] serves as the disposition in two ways by being the causal condition or the object condition,[1341] respectively, [for the production of the uncontaminated qualities].[1342]

1c) The Madhyamaka system

The *Daśadharmakasūtra* says:

> Just as [the existence of] fire is known due to smoke
> And [the existence of] water is known due to water birds,
> The disposition of intelligent bodhisattvas
> Is known due to its signs.

Accordingly, the *Madhyamakāvatāra* explains [the disposition] as the cause of the [following] physical signs:

Those who, even at the time of being ordinary beings, hear about emptiness,
Thus give rise to great joy on the inside again and again,
Whose eyes become moist through the tears arisen from that great joy,
And whose body hairs stand on end—
They possess the seed of the mind of a perfect buddha.[1343]

The *Ratnakūṭa* [says]:

That in which there is not even the slightest conditioning is unconditioned. That which is unconditioned is the disposition of the noble ones. By virtue of its being equal to space, this disposition is without distinctions. Since this disposition is the suchness of phenomena at all times, it is permanent by virtue of being the single taste of [all] phenomena.

The *Avataṃsaka[sūtra* says]:

O children of the victors, what is called "the disposition of bodhisattvas" is being completely devoted to the dharmadhātu, which is as vast as the sky and naturally luminous. The bodhisattvas who abide in this way are born with the disposition[1344] of the buddha bhagavāns of the past, are born with the disposition of the buddha bhagavāns of the future, and are born with the disposition of the buddha bhagavāns that live at present.

Accordingly, here in the *[Abhisamay]ālaṃkāra*, the disposition is said to be the dharmadhātu. The *Vṛtti*, after having refuted the position that the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas represents the two dispositions, says that the naturally abiding disposition is the nature of phenomena:

They must state the meaning of what is called "natural" in "naturally abiding disposition." If they say, "It is a synonym of 'cause,'" [the disposition] that is accomplished through conditions is also a [cause]. Therefore, what difference in meaning would there be? [However,] there is no such flaw in [the naturally abiding disposition] being a synonym of "the nature of phenomena." Alternatively, [one could say that] the disposition of these [people] is [only] nominal, while this is the fully qualified one. Therefore, this [position of ours] does not conform with the [position of theirs].[1345]

Thus, Āryavimuktisena says that there is no flaw if the meaning of the naturally abiding [disposition] is asserted as being the nature of phenomena. However, if it is asserted as merely being the cause of enlightenment, it follows that also the unfolding [disposition] is such a [cause]. Consequently, these two would not be different.

You may wonder, "So what kind of nature of phenomena do you assert as the disposition?" There is the explanation in the *Uttaratantra*, which says about the disposition in general:

> The disposition of the three jewels
> Is the object of the omniscient ones.
> It is fourfold— . . .[1346]

Thus, it explains all of the following four—the basic element, enlightenment, the qualities, and enlightened activity—as the disposition. In particular, it speaks of the disposition as being twofold:

> Like a treasure and a fruit tree,
> The disposition is to be known as twofold—
> Naturally abiding without beginning
> And the supreme of what is accomplished.[1347]

It clearly teaches the naturally abiding disposition, which is illustrated by the example of the treasure, as the nature of phenomena free from anything to be added or to be removed:

> Likewise, the precious treasure lodged within the mind
> Is the stainless nature of phenomena without anything to be
> added or to be removed.
> Through not realizing it, these beings continually
> Experience many forms of suffering from poverty.[1348]

2) The manner in which it serves as the disposition

In general, the positions of both Mādhyamikas and Mere Mentalists agree in presenting the disposition as being the mere cause of the qualities being suitable to arise and the obscurations being suitable to be relinquished within the mind streams of sentient beings. Also, that [the obscurations] are suitable to be relinquished is by virtue of the stains being adventitious. However, they disagree on the meaning of "adventitious." The Mādhyamikas present "stains" as adventitious because they are merely set up by mentally imputing them, but, ultimately, they are emptiness in that they are not substantially

established. The Mere Mentalists assert the stains as being adventitious for the following reason. Since they have the nature of other-dependent primary minds and mental factors, they are real as substances, but they are produced through the improper mental engagement of clinging to the skandhas as being pure, happiness, permanent, and a self, which deviates from their basic nature. Hence, one is able to put an end to this cause of the [adventitious stains] by way of eliminating its objects. Once it stops, also the desire and so on that are its results will naturally come to an end. Therefore, they are suitable to be removed.

Consequently, [according to] the Mādhyamikas, when the nature of the mind—emptiness that in its fundamental state is not established as anything whatsoever—is realized, conventionally, all illusionlike clinging will be at peace and all illusionlike remedies will arise. This is what they, from the perspective of the seeming, impute onto that very nature of the mind and present as "the naturally abiding disposition."

[According to] the Mere Mentalists, the luminous nature of the mind, in its fundamental state, is established through its own nature at all times, while the stains are suitable to be removed from it through remedies. To the very extent that it becomes free from these stains, to that extent all its qualities will arise. Therefore, since it functions as the basis for these two [(stains and qualities)], the nature of phenomena is asserted as the disposition. I see the former as the scope of the explanation [of the disposition] in this *[Abhisamay]-ālaṃkāra* and the latter as the one in the *Uttaratantra*.[1349]

Thus, though [Mere Mentalists and Mādhyamikas] agree in asserting the nature of phenomena as the disposition, they differ in respectively asserting or not asserting the basis of purification of the stains as being real. Hence, their reasons for presenting the nature of phenomena as the disposition are not the same.

Consequently, the statements in the context of Mere Mentalism that the stains are primordially extinct are explained as merely referring to their not operating in the basic nature since they are produced because of mistakenness. But, unlike by the Niḥsvabhāvavādins, they are not explained as mere names that are mentally imputed because that would mean to mix the [two positions]. That stains are without extinction and without arising is the distinctive feature of the latter system. Therefore, [Mādhyamikas] label the mere knowing that the factors to be relinquished are without nature with the conventional term "relinquishment," but do not assert that the factors to be relinquished and their remedies are real as different substances because they assert that [relinquishment] is just like an illusory elephant defeating another illusory elephant.

Without understanding that [the Mādhyamikas] present [the disposition as] this very profound dhātu by way of taking the seeming and superimposing [it onto this dhātu], but rather taking it as something that is independently established, many imaginary [notions about it] (such as some asserting them to be one and others, to be different) appear, [but] the result of that is only mental exhaustion.

3) The divisions of the disposition

The *Laṅkāvatāra[sūtra]* describes it as fivefold—the dispositions of the three yānas, the uncertain disposition, and the cut-off disposition. As for the last one, it merely intends being difficult to be liberated, whereas it is impossible for the disposition to be cut off completely. If the stains were not suitable to be relinquished, it would follow that they are the nature of the mind and, in that case, it would be impossible to transcend saṃsāra, just as fire and its heat are inseparable. Though it is well known that the Mere Mentalists assert [the possibility of] the disposition being cut off forever, they just present in this way what certain sūtras of expedient meaning explain, but do not accept this as the definitive meaning. If they asserted [the latter], they would have to accept that the obscurations are not suitable to be eliminated, [but] that is not tenable because they assert that all stains are adventitious.

4) The hermeneutical etymology of "disposition"

The *[Mahāyānasūtr]ālaṃkāra* [says]:

> . . .—it is to be understood
> In the sense of qualities being set free.[1350]

Accordingly, it is the disposition because the qualities arise and originate from it. As for its synonyms, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says:

> The disposition is also called "basis," "displayer," "cause," "foundation," "abode," "precursor," and "matrix."[1351]

Those who explain the presentations of the disposition in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* as their own system, while claiming that the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* represents the Mere Mentalist system and that the ways in which Mere Mentalists and Mādhyamikas assert the disposition discord, [just] ridicule themselves.[1352]

PK and SLG[1353]

As for explaining the dharmadhātu taught here in the AA as being the tathāgata heart, it is suchness with stains. In this vein, the tathāgatagarbha

sūtras and the *Uttaratantra* establish that all sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart. The reasons for this are explained in *Uttaratantra* I.28. Among the first three lines of this verse, "Since the perfect buddhakāya radiates" refers to the dharmakāya of the tathāgatas pervading the nonphysical basic elements of sentient beings because the text says further that, just as space is omnipresent in forms, the tathāgata heart is omnipresent in the hosts of sentient beings. "Since suchness is undifferentiable" indicates that, in all, suchness is not different, with tathāgatas having its pure nature too. "And because of the disposition" refers to the existence of the disposition that produces the three buddhakāyas. As for the disposition, it is a seed or a cause. As the *Abhidharmasūtra* says:

> The dhātu of beginningless time
> Is the matrix of all phenomena.
> Since it exists, all beings
> And also nirvāṇa are obtained.

Asaṅga states in his *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā*:

> Being as vast as the dharmakāya, the tathāgata heart, which has the nature of being the disposition that definitely has the characteristic of being inseparable from the Tathāgata, exists at all times in the manner of not being different in all.[1354]

To speak about the definite disposition here is done with the intention that all sentient beings are suitable to eventually become buddhas.

Uttaratantra I.29ff. continues to explain the tathāgata heart through the ten points of nature, cause, fruition, function, manifestation, phases, omnipresence, changelessness, and inseparability. As for its nature, the dharmakāya is the power to accomplish what one wishes for, suchness never changes into anything else, and the disposition means to be moistened through compassion. In this order, these three specific characteristics of the nature of the tathāgata heart accord with the examples of a jewel, gold, and water. In addition, its general characteristic of natural purity accords with the purity illustrated by those three examples.

In terms of the nine examples in *Uttaratantra* I.96ff., the first three (buddha statue, honey, and seed) teach the tathāgata heart as having the nature of the dharmakāya; the fourth one (gold), as having the nature of suchness; and the remaining (treasure and so on), as having the nature of the disposition.

Since the tathāgata heart is lasting, it is the basis, foundation, and matrix for everything unconditioned that is connected to and cannot be separated

from it as well as everything conditioned that is not connected to and can be separated from it. By virtue of this tathāgata heart existing, when it is not realized, it is suitable to be called "saṃsāra," and when it is realized as it is, to be called "nirvāṇa." Without it, neither would be possible. This is comparable to the existence of space, due to which it can appear as having clouds for some and as being without clouds for others. The adventitious stains, which do not withstand analysis on the level of the correct seeming, are like clouds, while the dharmadhātu, which withstands being analyzed, is like space. Therefore, if one properly engages in the adventitious stains, one will be liberated from them because it is nothing but completely understanding them that means being finally delivered from them. Hence, it is tenable to say that the dharmadhātu is naturally without afflictions, but will become pure later.

This tathāgata heart is not seen by ordinary beings, śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have newly entered the mahāyāna. Even the bodhisattvas on the bhūmis see it only a little bit, whereas the tathāgatas see it without mistakenness. What is so difficult to see is the dhātu of peace and utter peace.[1355] You may wonder, "If the dhātu of all phenomena is like that, isn't it contradictory to say that it exists in all sentient beings?" It is not, because, after having relinquished the five flaws such as being faint-hearted, one is made to understand that said statement is of expedient meaning with regard to the tathāgata heart. In this way, it is called "buddha heart," but not "śrāvaka heart" and so on. The object that is to be realized is this tathāgata heart alone, but the subject that realizes it just as it is is definitely solely the vision of buddhas. Therefore, it will be easily understood that there is only a single yāna ultimately.

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* presents the disposition in terms of the particulars of its existence, superiority, definition, signs, divisions, flaws, and benefit.[1356]

As for its existence, you may wonder, "If such a tathāgata heart exists in all without difference, all should be equally certain as either having the sharpest faculties (just as bodhisattvas) or as having the dullest facultuies (just as śrāvakas). So how come one sees this not being the case, that is, their respective differences?" In terms of their nature, all are certain as having the buddha disposition and therefore there is not a single sentient being that will not become a buddha eventually. However, temporarily, by virtue of being altered through certain conditions, it presents itself in various ways. This is just as in the case of water showing different colors when it is blemished by various types of earth, but if it is left without stirring it, it is always the same in being clear and transparent. Therefore, the different dispositions are presented by way of four factors that respectively differ—conditions, aspirations,

practices, and fruitions (as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.2). This is why the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* speaks of five kinds of dispositions and others of four.

The definition of the disposition is " the dhātu's capacity to produce the dharmas of the noble ones." According to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, it is twofold—the naturally abiding disposition (obtained through the nature of phenomena) and the unfolding disposition (made special through conditions). "The cut-off disposition" refers to not having the cause for parinirvāṇa, either temporarily or forever. Though *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11 explains the first case as being fourfold, the intention is that their difference lies in becoming enlightened slowly or extremely slowly.

SLG adds that the definition of the naturally abiding disposition is "that which is suitable to become the dharmakāya, once it has changed state," since śrāvaka arhats are also held to see the dharmakāya. Thus, it is fourfold—the dispositions of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, buddhas, and the uncertain disposition. The definition of the unfolding disposition is "that which is suitable to become the two rūpakāyas, once it has changed state." It is thirteenfold in terms of the practices for which it is the foundation. The certain dispositions of being a śrāvaka or a pratyekabuddha are also obtained by virtue of the nature of phenomena, while the unfolding disposition exists only in bodhisattvas. The latter's boundary line is the path of preparation because, from this path onward, it is impossible to be prevented from attaining great enlightenment and the power of accomplishing the higher qualities unfolds.

NSML[1357]

The Vaibhāṣikas assert having little desire and being content, which are of the nature of the mental factor detachment, as being the disposition. They call this "the disposition of the noble ones" and "the uncontaminated disposition" because the uncontaminated path of the noble ones arises from it. When divided, it is fourfold—being content with poor dharma robes, alms, and bedding as well as delight in relinquishment and meditation. However, these are not presented as the naturally abiding disposition because the meaning of "natural" is not fulfilled in them (they arise under the influence of conditions) and because this system does not have the conventional term "naturally abiding disposition." There is no certainty in presenting it as the buddha disposition either because it is impossible for what is certain to produce the path of noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas to become buddhahood.

According to the Sautrāntikas, the sūtras describe the "disposition" as a seed or potential of the mind—it is the seed that has the property of possibly deteriorating during the phases of ordinary beings and learners. Thus, it is the potential or seed of uncontaminated mind from which the fruition is suitable to arise. This is not the same as the disposition asserted by the Vijñaptivādins.

For the latter hold that it exists primordially and is not something that is newly planted under the influence of conditions, while what the Sautrāntikas call "disposition" is an uncontaminated seed that is planted through conditions, such as what was previously obtained during the phase of an ordinary being. Even if one regresses from the fruitions of once-returners and non-returners during the phase of the learners, the above seed still exists. Thus, the difference in meaning is very significant. For the same reasons as above, the disposition as held by the Sautrāntikas is also not asserted as the naturally abiding disposition or the buddha disposition.

As for the Mere Mentalists, according to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[1358] the disposition of bodhisattvas is their distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, which has been obtained through the nature of phenomena since beginningless time and is continuing as such up through the present. Its nature is asserted as the primordially existent potential that makes one attain enlightenment when the uncontaminated qualities that exist in the ālaya-consciousness meet with certain conditions. According to the Mere Mentalists, there are several reasons for calling it "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas." From among the six āyatanas, it refers distinctively to the āyatana of mind. From among the latter's eight kinds of consciousness, it refers to the ālaya-consciousness. From among the latter's maturational and seminal portions, it refers to the seeds. From among virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral seeds, it refers to virtuous ones. Virtuous seeds can again be contaminated or uncontaminated, but here the latter are referred to. In general, since the three features of the disposition as stated in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* are explained in the sūtras, also the Mādhyamikas must assert the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas. However, when doing so, one should not mix the Madhyamaka explanation with the above one, but follow the *Vṛtti* in explaining the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas as the true nature of the six āyatanas. The disposition explained by the Mere Mentalists is called "the naturally abiding disposition" because it has been obtained through the nature of phenomena since beginningless time. However, the uncertainty of presenting it as the buddha disposition is as above. In brief, those who assert that there are ultimately three yānas hold that the disposition is not necessarily the buddha disposition. This is taught to be an essential point of their philosophical system.

The Mādhyamikas explain the nature of the disposition in many ways, such as being the dharmakāya, the dharmadhātu, or mind. However, its own fully complete nature is stated in *Uttaratantra* I.28. Among the first three lines of this verse, "Since the perfect buddhakāya radiates" refers to what is suitable for the condition of the Buddha's enlightened activity engaging it. "Since suchness is undifferentiable" indicates what is suitable for relinquishing the adverse conditions of the obscurations. "And because of the disposition"

teaches what is suitable for the arising of all buddha qualities as the fruition. Thus, these three points are complete in both the sugata heart and the buddha disposition. However, in order to present it as the sugata heart, all three must be complete, while they need not be complete in order to present it as the disposition because the disposition itself represents one of these three points.

In brief, the definition of the sugata heart at the time of it being a cause is "the dharmadhātu that is suitable for (a) the condition of the Buddha's enlightened activity engaging it; (b) relinquishing the adverse conditions of the obscurations; and (c) all buddha qualities arising as its fruition. The definition of the buddha disposition is "the dhātu that is not liberated from the stains and whose own nature is suitable to become any one of the three kāyas, or the causal element that consists of any roots of virtue at the time of the disposition being awoken."

In the Mere Mentalist system, the naturally abiding disposition being conditioned, emptiness, suchness, the true end, signlessness, the ultimate, and the dharmadhātu are asserted to be synonyms for the emptiness of the other-dependent nature being empty of the imaginary nature, which is an emptiness that is established as withstanding analysis through reasoning, with all of the above being equivalents. However, in the Madhyamaka system, the sugata heart, the dharmadhātu, and the naturally abiding disposition are asserted as the unity of lucidity (the bearer of the nature of phenomena) and the cessation of all reference points of the four extremes within this very lucidity (the nature of phenomena) being inseparable. On the other hand, emptiness, suchness, and so on are presented from the point of view of the basic nature of the reference points of reality or the four extremes having ceased. Therefore, the difference between the former and the latter is very big because the latter are presented as solely the empty part of said unity. In brief, in the Mere Mentalist system, the naturally abiding disposition does not have to be the dharmadhātu because the former is conditioned and the latter is solely unconditioned. In the Madhyamaka system, the naturally abiding disposition must be the dharmadhātu because the naturally abiding disposition itself is presented as the dharmadhātu since it is the cause of the buddhadharmas, such as the ten powers; dharmadhātu, disposition, and cause are equivalents; the AA expresses the foundation of practice as "dharmadhātu" and its commentaries say precisely the same; and also Nāgārjuna says the exact same.

Nyalshig Jambel Dorje's commentary[1359]

This has eight parts:

1) The proof that the disposition exists
2) The proof that it is supreme
3) Its definition

4) [Its] signs
5) Its divisions
6) Its flaws
7) Its benefits
8) Its examples

These eight are stated in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*:

> Existence, supremacy, definition,
> Signs, divisions of the disposition,
> Flaws, benefits,
> And twofold example, [all] being fourfold.[1360]

1) The proof that the disposition exists
This has two parts:
a) The general proof that the disposition exists
b) The proof of different dispositions

1a) The general proof that the disposition exists

The naturally abiding disposition of the mahāyāna exists in sentient beings because they become weary through understanding that [saṃsāric] existence is suffering and, through the power of that, come to have the notion that nirvāṇa is happiness and thus possess the striving [for nirvāṇa]. Since matter and nonentities lack the disposition, the negative entailment of these reasons is established. As the *Uttaratantra* says:

> If the buddhadhātu did not exist,
> [Beings] would not be weary of suffering,
> Nor would they wish, strive,
> And aspire for nirvāṇa.
>
> This seeing of the flaws and qualities of suffering and happiness
> Of [saṃsāric] existence and nirvāṇa
> Is due to the existence of the disposition—
> It does not exist in those without the disposition.[1361]

1b) The proof of the existence of different dispositions

In sentient beings there exist three temporarily different [dispositions] (such as the one that is certain as the disposition of śrāvakas) because temporarily different constitutions of sentient beings and three [different aspirations] (such as the aspiration for the śrāvakayāna) are observed, because different accomplishments (such as the accomplishments of śrāvakas) are observed, and because the three enlightenments are observed to be different.

The different constitutions are as described in the sūtras. This is not uncertain because if temporarily different dispositions did not exist, ultimately different dispositions would exist even less and therefore different constitutions and so on would absolutely not arise.

It is not reasonable that the proponents of entities [attempt to] prove [three] ultimately different dispositions through these reasons. [Here, the question is] whether they set forth ultimately different constitutions and so on as the reasons or whether they set forth temporarily different ones as the reasons. In the first case, [the reasons] do not apply because ultimately all sentient beings are the same in terms of the basic element of a buddha, the ultimate aspiration is the aspiration for the mahāyāna, the ultimate accomplishment is the accomplishment of the mahāyāna, and the ultimate fruition is great enlightenment. The second case is uncertain because though sentient beings are different in their constitutions, aspirations, and so on, they are the same ultimately in terms of the disposition of the mahāyāna. As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Because of the differences in [beings'] dhātus,
> Aspirations, and accomplishments,
> And because of observing different results,
> The existence of the disposition is ascertained.[1362]

2) The proof that [the mahāyāna disposition] is supreme

The disposition of the mahāyāna is more supreme than the two dispositions of the hīnayāna because it functions as the support for attaining the eminent virtue of all obscurations having become pure, because it functions as the support for attaining all qualities such as the powers and fearlessnesses, because it functions as the support for the arising of the vast welfare of others, and because it functions as the cause for virtue never becoming exhausted. These reasons are not uncertain because if the true nature of the mind with stains, which is empty of any nature of its own, as well as the virtues of the mahāyāna that are based on it did not exist, it would be impossible for these reasons to apply to the stained true nature of merely the mind that lacks a permanent self and is empty of material apprehended [objects] as well as the accomplishments of the hīnayāna that are based on it. Therefore, the negative entailment of the reasons is established. [This is also the case] because there is no ever-inexhaustible virtue when one has passed into the nirvāṇa without any remainder of the skandhas through the hīnayāna. As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* states:

> Because it is the cause for eminence,
> Completeness, great welfare,
> And the inexhaustibility of virtue,
> The disposition is stated to be supreme.[1363]

As for proving that the disposition is supreme in terms of the fruition too, [the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*] says:

> By virtue of its producing the tree of enlightenment with its truly vast qualities,
> Due to its achieving complete happiness and the subsiding of suffering,
> And because of its fruition of providing benefit and happiness for oneself and others,
> This supreme disposition resembles an excellent root.[1364]

The meaning of the words [of this verse] is easy.

3) Its definition

The definition of the naturally abiding disposition is "the nature of phenomena that is the cause of freedom of the svābhāvikakāya." "The nature of phenomena" excludes the unfolding disposition, while "the cause of freedom of the svābhāvikakāya" excludes the svābhāvikakāya. As the *Sūtra of Explaining the Nature of No Going*[1365] says:

> Bhagavan, the suchness that represents a bodhisattva is the suchness of a Bhagavān having completely and perfectly awoken into unsurpassable fully perfect enlightenment. This is the suchness through which [great bodhisattvas] have completely and perfectly awoken into unsurpassable fully perfect enlightenment. Therefore, it is this suchness that receives the name "tathāgata."

The [prajñāpāramitā] sūtras say in this context:

> Subhūti, as for the meaning of the word "bodhisattva," there is no meaning of this word. You may wonder why. In enlightenment, there is not, or there cannot be observed, any arising, existence, or nonexistence. Therefore, Subhūti, there is no meaning of the word "bodhisattva."[1366]

The definition of the unfolding disposition is "the virtues that newly produce [all] types of buddha qualities, which did not exist before." The first [part of this definition] excludes the buddhabhūmi itself, while the second one excludes the naturally abiding disposition.[1367] As the *[Prajñāpāramitā]-saṃcayagāthā* states:

> This is the supreme treasure of dharma, the genuine vault of dharma,
> And the vault of happiness and well-being of beings who have the buddha disposition;
> The past and future protectors of the world in the ten directions
> Are born from this, and yet the dharmadhātu does not become exhausted.[1368]

Thus, it says that mother [prajñāpāramitā] up through the tenth bhūmi and her true nature are contained in these two.[1369] The naturally abiding disposition is the support and the unfolding disposition is the supported. Both exist as the causes of enlightenment, but they do not exist as the fruition.

Through this disposition, the instances of all qualities without exception are set free and all qualities without exception arise—this is the meaning of the term "disposition." As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* declares:

> By nature, unfolding,
> Support, supported,
> Existent, and nonexistent—it is to be understood
> In the sense of qualities being set free.[1370]

Its synonyms are "seed," "basic element (dhātu)," and "natural disposition."

4) Its signs

The awakening of the unfolding disposition exists in bodhisattvas because [even] at the very outset of all their practices they are endowed with all-pervasive compassion, because they are endowed with the vast aspiration for the mahāyāna, because they tolerate the suffering of infinite hardships, and because they perfectly engage in the virtues of the six pāramitās. As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* states:

> From the very outset of practice, compassion
> Aspiration, tolerance,
> And perfect engagement in virtue
> Are declared as the signs of the disposition.[1371]

5) The divisions of the disposition
This has three parts:
a) Division in terms of its own nature
b) Division in terms of conditions
c) Division in terms of what is founded [on it]

5a) Division in terms of its own nature

From among the three [points] that are the purpose of stating the divisions, their summary, and the meaning of the words, the meaning of the words has five parts:
a) The basis on which the division is made
b) The nature that is divided
c) The meaning of how it is divided
d) The reasons by virtue of which it is divided
e) The definite number of the divisions

5aa) The basis on which the division is made is the disposition of the mahāyāna.

5ab) The nature that is divided has two aspects—the natural disposition and the unfolding disposition.

5ac) The meaning of how it is divided is that these [two] are indivisible because they are the bearer of the nature of phenomena and the nature of phenomena that is empty of this very [bearer].

5ad) The reasons by virtue of which it is divided
This has two parts:
1) Division in terms of its own nature
2) Division in terms of the fruition

1) Division in terms of its own nature

The disposition of the mahāyāna is only twofold—the bearer of the nature of phenomena and the nature of phenomena that is empty of this [bearer]. The nature of phenomena is twofold—free and not free from all stains. From among these, it is [the nature of phenomena] with stains that is the disposition because [the nature of phenomena] free from stains is the fruition of the disposition. It will be explained below that the defining characteristics of the natural disposition are complete in the nature of phenomena with stains.

The bearer of the nature of phenomena (the mind) consists of only three—virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral. Since nonvirtuous and neutral [states of mind] are not the causes of enlightenment, it is the virtuous [mind]. Virtue is twofold—complete and incomplete. From among these, complete [virtue] is the fruition. Therefore, not fully complete virtue—all virtues up through the tenth bhūmi—represents the unfolding disposition because aspiration

prayers and so on become increasingly vast through the power of the conditions of other virtues until they finally become buddhahood.

2) Division in terms of the fruition
The fruition (enlightenment) is twofold—the nature of phenomena and the bearer of this nature. The first one is the nature of phenomena free from all stains. However, since this is not attained without any causes and without any conditions, the cause of its becoming free [from stains] is the true nature of the mind with stains up through the tenth bhūmi because it is merely through its having become free from stains that it is the fruition (enlightenment). As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Though it is without difference in everything,
> Suchness having become pure
> Is the Tathāgata. Therefore,
> All beings possess its heart.[1372]

The unfolding disposition is the condition of the svābhāvikakāya because it purifies the stains of the mind. If enlightenment (the subject) is omniscient wisdom, its cause consists of the virtues up through the tenth bhūmi because the positive and negative entailments are certain. As [the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*] says:

> Being close to enlightenment, swift . . .[1373]

5ae) The definite number of the divisions
In general, when taking phenomena that bear their own characteristics as the basis, they are definite as two—the bearers of the nature of phenomena and the nature of phenomena—because a third possibility is not observable. As for the nature of phenomena, the one with stains was already established above, and the defining characteristics of the naturally abiding disposition abide in it. Thus, the true nature of the mind, which is empty of any nature of its own, is the ultimate nature because this nature has not arisen from causes and conditions, does not depend on any other phenomenon that sets it up, and does not change into anything else. It was already proven that this is the cause of freedom of the svābhāvikakāya. Since this cause is the disposition, it is established as the naturally abiding disposition.

As for the bearers of the nature of phenomena, they are twofold—entities and nonentities. From among these, nonentities are not the causes of omniscience because they lack the function of cultivating the path. Entities are twofold—matter and awareness. From among these, that matter is not the cause of omniscience is analogous to the above. Awareness is threefold—virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral. Among these, the latter two are not the

causes of that [omniscience] because they are the causes of saṃsāra. As for the first one, it is twofold—complete and incomplete virtue. From among these, complete [virtue] is the fruition of the disposition, which was already explained above. It was [also] proven already that the incomplete virtues up through the tenth bhūmi are the unfolding disposition. The primary cause [of omniscience] is mother [prajñāpāramitā] during the paths of training. As the *[Prajñāpāramitā]saṃcayagāthā* says:

> However many approaches, doors, means, and roots of wisdom there are,[1374]
> They all have sprung from supreme prajñāpāramitā.
> With the conditions coming together, the magical wheel of enlightened activity spins,
> And yet prajñāpāramitā is without decrease and increase.[1375]

Therefore, when analyzing through scripture and reasoning, only these two [dispositions] are observed, so the number is definite. The summarized meaning is that [the division] into four dispositions that is made [below] is taught as the two [points] of number and nature. The purpose is to realize the subject matter of [both] the summarized meaning and the meaning of the words. With this meaning in mind, the *Uttaratantra* states:

> Like a treasure and a fruit tree,
> The disposition is to be known as twofold—
> Naturally abiding without beginning
> And the supreme of what is accomplished.
>
> It is held that the three kāyas are attained
> By virtue of these two dispositions—
> The first kāya, through the first one,
> And the latter two, through the second one.
>
> The purity of the svābhāvikakāya
> Should be known to be like a precious statue
> Because it is without artifice by nature
> And is the foundation of precious qualities.
>
> Since it is the emperor of the great dharma,
> The sambhoga[kāya] is like a cakravartin.
> Because it has the nature of a reflection,
> The nirmāṇa[kāya] is like a golden image.[1376]

5b) The division into four dispositions in terms of conditions
[This division] consists of the certain disposition, the uncertain disposition, the certain one being unalterable through conditions, and the uncertain one being alterable through conditions. As the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> The disposition is certain, uncertain,
> Unalterable, and alterable
> Through conditions. In brief,
> These are the four kinds of disposition.[1377]

5c) The division into thirteen in terms of what is founded [on it]
Since this is necessary for explaining the [relevant] passage [in the AA], it shall be explained there.

6) Its flaws
The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Habituation to the afflictions, bad companionship,
> Deprivation, and dependency on others—
> In brief, the flaws with regard to the disposition
> Should be known as fourfold.[1378]

These refer to the flaws of both dispositions.

7) Its benefits
The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> They [only] go to the lower realms [once] in a long time
> And are liberated [from them] quickly.
> While there, they experience little suffering
> And their weariness matures the sentient beings [there].[1379]

As for maturing [here], though [bodhisattvas] may be born in the lower realms, they mature others in the lower realms through their compassion, such as [when] the bodhisattva [Sūryagarbha was a] horse.

8) Its examples
The first one among three [examples for the disposition] is given in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*:

> It should be understood as being like a mine of gold,
> Being the foundation of immeasurable goodness,

Being endowed with wisdom and stainlessness,
And being the source of the powers.[1380]

Just as gold [in a big gold mine] is abundant, lucidly shining, stainless, and useful, [the disposition] is the foundation of the immeasurable goodness of the nature of phenomena without stains, the abode of the knowledge of all aspects, the primordial lack of the stains of the afflictions, and the source of the powers such as the supernatural knowledges.

The second example in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

It should be understood to be like a mine of supreme gems
Because it is the cause of great enlightenment
And the source of great wisdom, the samādhi of the noble ones,
And the great welfare of sentient beings.[1381]

[A big mine of gems contains] four kinds of gems—being of authentic type, excellent color, excellent shape, and excellent size or power. Likewise, [the disposition] is the authentic disposition for the nature of phenomena being at peace as the twofold purity of great enlightenment. Resembling the excellent color [of gems], it functions as the cause of omniscience. Resembling their excellent shape, it is the cause of the samādhi of the noble ones. Resembling their excellent power, it is the cause for the maturation of limitless sentient beings.

The third example is described in the *Uttaratantra*:

In the earth beneath a pauper's home
There may be an inexhaustible treasure,
But that person does not know of it,
And the treasure does not exclaim, "I am here!"

Likewise, with the stainless treasure lodged within the mind—
The dharma that is inconceivable and without decay—
Not being realized, the suffering of being destitute
Is continuously experienced by all beings in many ways.[1382]

[This illustrates] the naturally abiding disposition.

Just as seeds and sprouts that exist in fruits, such as mangos and palm fruits,
And have this indestructible property [of growing into a tree],
Through coming together with ploughed earth, water, and so on
Gradually become the entity of a majestic tree,

> Likewise, the pure dharmadhātu lodged within the peel
> Of the fruit of ignorance and so on in sentient beings,
> In dependence on such and such virtues
> Gradually becomes the king of sages.[1383]

[This illustrates] the unfolding disposition.

F) The focal object of practice[1384]

There might be some doubt, "Do the bodhisattvas who focus on the practices as being founded on the dharmadhātu thus focus on the dharmadhātu alone or on something else?" The answer is AA I.40a:

> The focal object is all phenomena.

The passage on these phenomena in the sūtras that is to be explained here is from *The Sūtra in Eighteen Thousand Lines*:

> Sūbhuti, "all phenomena" refers to virtuous, nonvirtuous, neutral, mundane, supramundane, contaminated, uncontaminated, conditioned, unconditioned, common, and uncommon ones. Subhūti, these are called "all phenomena." Great bodhisattvas should train in their nonexistence. They also represent all the phenomena to be fully penetrated by great bodhisattvas.[1385]

As for this focal object of practice, the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists say, "One focuses on the focal object of practice that is solely the dharmadhātu, which bears the name 'nondual wisdom.' During no phase of the path whatsoever is there any focusing on the appearances of mistakenness that are set up through the latent tendencies of ignorance." This is not justified because AA I.40–41 says:

> The focal object is all phenomena.
> They are virtuous and so on . . .

If it were as these Mere Mentalists say, this would entail the mistake of there being no progression of the focal objects in terms of apprehender and apprehended within the dharmadhātu becoming increasingly pure because one focuses on the nature of phenomena that is empty of duality right from the start. Furthermore, since they assert the dharmadhātu as

being really established, they do not cut through the stains of clinging to its reality. Therefore, this explanation of focusing solely on some really existent dharmadhātu right from the start does not even put an end to merely the reference points of clinging to real existence, let alone putting an end to the reference points of clinging to the lack of real existence. Therefore, Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra say:

> Based on that, the foundation refers primarily to the nature, while the focal object refers primarily to the alterations[1386] [related to this nature]. Since neither is negated through the other, it is justified that the definitions and divisions of the foundation and the focal object are different and that the focal object becomes increasingly pure.[1387]

Here, you may object, "It is claimed here that if one focuses solely on nondual wisdom right from the start, the focal object will not become increasingly pure. But in that case, the same mistake applies to your system too, which explains that one focuses on the lack of entity, as AA V.39a says:

> The lack of entity is asserted as the focal object of this.

Therefore, in the lack of entity, not even the sheer difference between being pure or impure is tenable, so forget about a focal object becoming increasingly pure." The meaning of AA V.39a is not like that. It is an instruction on focusing in the manner of eliminating the superimpositions of clinging to all phenomena of seeming reality as being real entities, but not an instruction on the focal object being the nonimplicative negation that is the sheer lack of entity.

In brief, in the section on the disposition, the dharmadhātu alone is primary because the dharmadhātu is the mother that gives rise to all noble ones. In this section on the focal object of the mahāyāna, one needs to focus on both the dharmadhātu (or the nature of phenomena) and the phenomena that bear this nature and obscure it because all bearers of this nature (the adventitious stains) that completely pervade the nature of phenomena in its entirety have to be eliminated in all their aspects. If one needs to eliminate them in such a way, one also needs to focus on them. For among phenomena and their nature (and among the seeming and the ultimate), the unblurred and stainless eye of dharma must directly see and realize that what exists does exist and that what does not exist does not exist. Once this is realized, there is no ignorance about the way of being of the two realities. Consequently, mastery over the two wisdoms that know suchness and variety is gained, which eventually turns into omniscience.

Some of those who assert that the focal object which is taught here is solely the dharmadhātu hold that, when mahāyāna yogins rest in the meditative equipoise of accomplishing perfect buddhahood, this equipoise lacks the appearance of the subjects and objects of seeming reality. This is how the Mere Mentalists and some particular Mādhyamikas think and express it, but this just shows their imperfect realization. Not only the noble ones of the mahāyāna, but also the noble ones of the hīnayāna relinquish mistaken superimpositions (such as permanence) through focusing on the general characteristics of the four realities during their preparation for meditative equipoise. The difference between them is that the noble ones of the mahāyāna cut through superimpositions by focusing on the unmixed specific characteristics of the actual way of being and the way of appearing of all phenomena. Otherwise, if one asserts that the object of meditative equipoise is nothing but the lack of appearance, this entails the following flaws. The mental state that takes the factor of the nonimplicative negation that is the lack of any object as its appearing object is a conceptual one. Therefore, it cannot but apprehend a generality that is the elimination-of-other which consists of the lack of any object.[1388] Therefore, this kind of focal object is not tenable as the object of meditative equipoise. On the other hand, if one thinks, "The very lack of appearance is directly seen," this contradicts the path of reasoning—the lack of appearance is a sheer nonexistence, but a nonexistence cannot be seen directly. Or if an emptiness that consists of the lack of appearance were verified through direct perception, it would necessarily be a conditioned or specifically characterized phenomenon because it is something that directly appears for perception.

Therefore, if the assertion that meditative equipoise lacks appearances accrues such flaws, you may wonder, "When resting in meditative equipoise with regard to the focal object of practice, is that meditative equipoise something with or without appearances?" The intention of the AA and its commentaries in this context is explained as follows. Although all other-dependent phenomena appear as mere illusions and dreams, there is no imagination that entails apprehender and apprehended. In terms of the inwardly looking aspect, one focuses solely on nondual wisdom. In this context, this amounts to the self-aware direct perception of nonconceptual wisdom (the subject) being aware of itself in the manner of being of one taste with its object (which is the appearance of the nature of phenomena and not a nonimplicative negation). From the perspective of this subject that is nonconceptual wisdom and with the implication that its focal objects—the entities of the correct seeming—do not exist by any nature of their own, these focal objects are nothing other than cognitive aspects. Therefore, in this

context, one practices by discriminating their actual way of being and their way of appearing without mixing these two.

You may wonder, "But wouldn't these very cognitive aspects be conceptions?" On the level of ordinary beings, to focus on a cognitive aspect as being this aspect is congruently associated with clinging conceptions. However, during the meditative equipoise of the noble ones, after nonconceptual wisdom has first focused on the illusionlike other-dependent, finally (as explained above) it becomes blended in an inseparable way with the dharmadhātu, which is like water free from silt. Being blended in this way refers to what is labeled here with the name "cognitive aspect."

You may still wonder, "Granted, it is justified to speak of this cognitive aspect as the appearing of a cognitive aspect from the perspective of consciousness. However, from the perspective of wisdom, it is not like that." If the *Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas as well as Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert that nonconceptual wisdom sees the entirety of the seeming, it is clear that there is no seeming that is established as outer referents—it cannot be anything but the appearance-portion of omniscient wisdom. Therefore, since it is perfectly suitable that the aspects of knowable objects appear to utterly lucid wisdom, they are justified as cognitive aspects. The wisdom during such a meditative equipoise does not apprehend by way of the object generalities of the phenomena of the seeming and the object generality of the ultimate—emptiness—appearing to it. Rather, it is that which cuts through superimpositions onto the perception that is undeceiving through clearly seeing the suchness of entities. You may still wonder whether such undeceiving perception accords or does not accord with the sense-based and mental valid perceptions of ordinary beings and then be concerned, thinking, "If it does not accord with these, it is reasonable to discard it." Do not entertain such qualms because the *Samādhirājasūtra* says:

> Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,
> Nor is the tongue, the body, or mental cognition valid cognition.
> If these sense faculties were valid cognition,
> Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?[1389]

Thus, the realization of yogins who are noble ones is inconceivable.

G) The equipment of wisdom

1) The nature of phenomena and wisdom in relation to being self-empty versus other-empty[1390]

Wisdom refers to the dharmadhātu (the nature of phenomena empty of all adventitious phenomena) and, by virtue of it also being aware of itself, to the pure subject called "personally experienced wisdom." Such emptiness and wisdom are referred to as unborn emptiness and wisdom. As [the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*] says:

> Unarisen emptiness is supreme,
> Since arisen emptiness destroys.[1391]

According to the victor Maitreya, there are three emptinesses—[the emptiness of] existence, [the emptiness of] nonexistence, and natural emptiness. He stated that, among these, not understanding the natural emptiness and wisdom of the perfect nature simply means to not understand its emptiness and wisdom. Some people say, "It is very much true and justified that venerable [Maitreya] said so and that also the mother sūtras declare the nature of phenomena—the perfect nature—to be emptiness. This means that it is taught to be self-empty and not taught to be other-empty." This is not the case. *The Sūtra [in Eight Thousand Lines]* teaches:

> The mind is no-mind. The nature of the mind is luminosity.[1392]

Therefore, since the adventitious mind is self-empty, it does not exist. Since natural luminosity is other-empty, it is not taught as empty, but as "luminosity." Maitreya's [*Uttaratantra* I.155c] says:

> It is not empty of unsurpassable dharmas . . .

This declares that the dharma that is the unsurpassable nature of phenomena is not empty of its own nature. The meaning of this is clearly stated by Mañjuśrī:

> The emptiness of analyzing the skandhas
> Is without a pith, just like a banana tree.
> The emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects
> Does not become like that.

Thus, when the own nature of all imaginary and other-dependent phenomena (such as the skandhas) is analyzed, their own nature is emptiness, just as in the example of a banana tree without pith. As for the perfect nature (the emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects), in general, it cannot be analyzed and, no matter how it may be analyzed, it does not become like that—empty of a nature of its own. For it never changes into anything else than this supreme kind of wisdom. Some people say, "The other-empty emptiness does not actually fulfill the function of emptiness since its own nature is not emptiness." This is not justified. As for being emptiness, the mahāyāna abhidharma explains that an emptiness without a presentation of (a) a basis of emptiness, (b) something that it is empty of, and (c) what is empty of what does not actually fulfill the function of emptiness. It is taught that an emptiness that actually fulfills this function is an emptiness in terms of that which is the basis of emptiness being empty of what it is empty of. This means being empty in a way that actually fulfills this function. However, if something is counted as an emptiness that actually fulfills this function by virtue of being empty in such a way that it is empty of its own nature, then something whose own nature does not abide in it is explained as being self-empty. Consequently, since it follows in this case that all emptinesses in the sense of extinction (such as the child of a barren woman) are emptinesses that actually fulfill this function, this is not tenable.[1393]

Furthermore, there is also not the flaw of the other-empty's own nature not being empty. Since the name "other-empty" is applied to emptiness [in the sense] of the other features within this basis [—the nature of phenomena—] being empty of their own respective natures, the other-empty's own nature does not become nonempty. The reason for this is that the name "other-empty" is [only] applied to the compound meaning of this basis [—the nature of phenomena—] being empty of said respective [features, but not to this basis in itself being other-empty].[1394] However, it is not asserted that this basis—the nature of phenomena—is empty of its own nature. [Likewise, as was just said,] this [basis itself] is not other-empty either. Therefore, if it is not other-empty, forget about it being self-empty. Nevertheless, it functions as the basis of emptiness in terms of being other-empty, whereas it is not suitable as the basis of emptiness in terms of being self-empty. The reason for this is that only what is concordant in type with an emptiness that embraces that of which it is empty—the bearers of this [empty] nature that are other—is suitable as the basis of emptiness of this [other-empty emptiness], whereas the other one [—the basis of emptiness in terms of being self-empty—] is not suitable as such. The meaning of being "concordant in type" is as follows. The emptiness that consists of the prajñā of knowing that what is other—the adventitious stains—is terminated and does not arise

[again] concords in terms of focal objects and aspects with the basis that is the nature of phenomena—the [sugata] heart.[1395] The reason for the other one [—the basis of emptiness in terms of being self-empty—] not being concordant in terms of focal objects and aspects with this [nature of phenomena] is that all adventitious phenomena are empty in such a way that, by virtue of being impermanent right upon their sheer presence, their own natures cease. Therefore, they do not concord in terms of focal objects and aspects with this basis that is the genuine nature of phenomena. Since this basis—the nature of phenomena—lacks any being impermanent, any perishing of its own nature right upon its sheer presence, any ceasing, and any arising whatsoever, it is not concordant in terms of focal objects and aspects with these [adventitious phenomena]. [On the other hand,] when the prajñā of knowing that what is other (the stains) is terminated and does not arise [again] focuses on the permanent and unchanging nature of phenomena (the nature of phenomena that is free from the triad of arising, abiding, and ceasing), it concords in terms of focal objects and aspects [with this nature].

There is also another reason for the other-empty's own nature being self-empty. The subject in question—the other-empty, which is all the while empty of what is other (the adventitious bearers of the nature [of phenomena])—is what entails the adventitious stains (which are other than this basis) being all the while empty in that their own nature does not remain for an instant because these bearers of the nature [of phenomena] are seeming reality. For this reason, one definitely needs to accept that what is other-empty is necessarily self-empty. But if one claims that the emptiness which is asserted to be self-empty is the emptiness that actually fulfills this function, it is not suitable to assert any other-empty that is other than self-empty.

Now, the reason that this basis—the nature of phenomena—is [actually] neither other-empty nor self-empty is that it is not even suitable as a sheer emptiness that is not specified as being empty or not being empty of itself or something other. For it has the essential character of being the utter peace of all reference points in terms of being empty or not being empty. Thus, from the perspective of the [actual] freedom from reference points, no characteristics whatsoever of being empty of itself or something other transpire within the basis that is the nature of phenomena. [However,] from the perspective of entertaining reference points, among the two emptinesses of being empty of itself or of something other, being other-empty is superior and being self-empty is inferior. The reason for this is that if one does not realize the actual way of being of being self-empty, just as it is, one does not realize or infer the actual way of being of being other-empty. As for understanding and inferring being self-empty, even if one does not understand the actual way of being of being other-empty, an inferential understanding of being self-empty is easily

accomplished. Since this is a valid cognition that is definite through experience, may the minds of those with the proper fortune rely on it. Here, I say:

> Those who utter the lion's roar of the emptiness of the supreme other
> Do know how to articulate the fox voice of self-emptiness,
> But how could those who emit the fox bark of bad self-emptiness
> Hear the lion's voice of profound other-emptiness?

2) The explanation of emptiness (the object) and the way in which it is observed by wisdom (its subject)[1396]

To begin, there are many different ways of identifying emptiness (the object).

a) The system that is in common with the Mere Mentalists who propound other-emptiness

The basis of emptiness consists of both the consciousness of dualistic appearances through the power of the other-dependent nature and the latent tendencies that are input through this consciousness. The object of negation based on this is the imaginary nature. This consists of the two factors of the dualistic appearance of apprehender and apprehended, with each one of these two factors entailing the two factors that are the superimpositions in terms of persons and phenomena. The emptiness of said basis of emptiness being empty of said object of negation is the entity that is empty of duality. In this context, something like the realization of personal identitylessness is a limited emptiness and something like the realization of phenomenal identitylessness is the all-encompassing emptiness. Thus, the emptiness, nature of phenomena, and suchness that are limited in this way are also focused on by noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. The *Vivṛti* says:

> Just as the yānas of the śravakas and so on focus [on the dharmadhātu] through their progressive realizations . . .[1397]

However, though noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas focus on the limited emptiness and so on that was just explained and realize its being the cause for the dharmas of the noble ones that they respectively attain, it is not asserted in this system that these noble ones realize phenomenal identitylessness. For this reason, in terms of the lower noble ones, this system explains that the emptiness of the internal means the eyes and so on (whose nature is internal) being empty of an inner agent. This refers to the bases of imputing a person, that is, the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas. If one were to explain that these are empty of a nature of their own, it would follow that this is the

meaning of phenomenal identitylessness. Therefore, the lower noble ones lack the eye of seeing that all phenomena are empty of a nature of their own.

b) The system that is in common with the Mādhyamikas who propound self-emptiness

Through presenting all phenomena of suchness and variety as the bases of emptiness, the objects of negation based on these are the mental states of clinging to these phenomena as existing in the form of being established through a nature of their own. In this context, this nature that is referred to as "phenomena's own nature" has to be divided into the two realities. Thus, in terms of the ultimate, one may say, "Since all phenomena do not have a nature, they are empty of nature, which is their nature or essence." However, such is only said in terms of conveniently concise conventions—there are many issues to be disputed and examined even with respect to just this statement. In terms of the seeming, when taking a pillar as an example, the fact that this very aspect of a pillar possesses the function of supporting a beam and so on is presented as its nature. But nowadays, many ignorant people claim that the aspect, the essence, and the nature of this seeming pillar are substantially different and apply this rationale to all phenomena, thus writing it down as some profound meaning in many instruction manuals for meditators. However, there is not the slightest pith in this. The nature of pillars, vases, and so on is what is directly observed, such as their performing a function. Apart from that, a substantially existent nature of pillars, vases, and so on that lies not within the sphere of the sense faculties or is not observable by them is not something that is suitable to appear. Therefore, it is like the vase of a flesh-eating demon, which may or may not exist.[1398]

However, to assert the fact of the above-mentioned nature of seeming phenomena being nonexistent or empty as being the nature of ultimate reality refers only to the context of accepting a presentation of ultimate reality. When such a presentation is not accepted either, one must state that the very nature of the ultimate (being empty of any essence of the seeming) is empty of this very nature. Nāgārjuna said again and again that if one does not state it in this way, the view of regarding emptiness as being emptiness is a view that leads to very great ruin. Therefore, that which is the emptiness of something does not exist as the nature of this something. For it is asserted that entities are empty of any nature in terms of both realities. Also, when it is asserted that pillars, vases, and so on lack a nature of their own, an ultimate reality or basic nature that serves as the nature or core of this lack of nature is not asserted either.

As for the emptiness of something being empty of that something,[1399] (1) the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas and (2) the Mādhyamikas who follow common consensus have their own individual positions.

1) As long as not reading a presentation of emptiness, the former assert that its nature is cognition,[1400] because they assert that the basis of emptiness of the fourth emptiness[1401] is cognition. As Haribhadra says:

> By virtue of all phenomena being empty, also the emptiness that is the nature of the cognitions that have the emptiness of the internal and so on as their focal objects is emptiness. Therefore, it is the emptiness of emptiness. The mere cognition that all phenomena are emptiness is the emptiness of all phenomena. By virtue of this, emptiness is also empty because it relinquishes the conceptions of clinging to this [emptiness].[1402]

2) The latter assert the nature of being empty of something to be a spacelike nonimplicative negation. Āryavimuktisena says that emptiness is the focal object of wisdom (the subject):

> You may wonder, "What is the focal object of nonconceptual wisdom?" It is said to be "the emptiness of all phenomena."[1403]

Here, the followers of the lower yānas say, "It follows that what is to be observed—emptiness—is not existent because it does not exist by virtue of not being observable by nature, just like the child of a barren woman. Therefore, whatever is not observable by nature is necessarily not an existent. For example, just as vases are not observable in an area without vases, also the emptiness that is to be observed does not exist as emptiness. Thus, because this is naturally understood as a double negation, it follows that all phenomena do exist." Furthermore, "It follows that this emptiness does not exist as emptiness because it is to be observed by wisdom. Whatever is to be observed is contradictory to being emptiness. If nonexistent entities (such as emptiness) were suitable to be observed, why should existent entities (such as the skandhas) not be suitable to be observed? Therefore, it follows that all phenomena are not empty, but existent."[1404]

Out of the wish to give an answer to these objections, the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists say, "From the perspective of nondual wisdom, what is to be observed (emptiness) and what observes it (wisdom) do not exist as two different factors. Rather, since this very wisdom is emptiness, the fact that this wisdom of emptiness observes this very wisdom of emptiness is referred to by the conventional expression 'observing emptiness.' However, since we do not assert any emptiness that is other than the wisdom empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended, our position is not affected by such flaws." As the *Vṛtti* says:

> Some say, "Since it is free from all focal objects, this is sheer nonconceptual wisdom. What is called 'emptiness' is not an existent at all."[1405]

The Real Aspectarians give the following answer to the above objections: "The emptiness of being empty of an apprehender and apprehended that are substantially different is a nonimplicative negation, which is observed as nothing but a nonimplicative negation. The apprehending aspect that assesses it is presented as nonconceptual wisdom. Through presenting it in this way, perception does not become being without an object." As the *Vṛtti* says:

> Some assert, "By virtue of pertaining to both of the two aspects of apprehender and apprehended, it is not that the focal object refers to one of these aspects alone."[1406]

The Yogacāra-Mādhyamikas teach that these two answers are not tenable.

1) The lack of justification of the first answer has two parts:
   a) The consequence of purity not developing further
   b) The consequence of wisdom being without an object

1a) As for nonconceptual wisdom, it follows that there is no further increase of purity after this wisdom has focused on suchness with the entirety of adventitious stains before and then focuses on suchness as it becomes progressively pure of stains later. For, from the very start, this wisdom focuses on the suchness that is pure from all stains of apprehender and apprehended. Out of the wish to remove the flaw that accrues through this consequence, the False Aspectarians may say, "Although suchness is pure by nature from the very start, the adventitious stains are relinquished in a progressive manner." But then it follows that the system of the False Aspectarians is not suitable to relinquish the clinging to the reality of nondual wisdom because their system lacks both the perceptions and the reasonings which assess that this nondual wisdom is not established by a nature of its own. If this is accepted, the purity in question would be a partial purity because it is suitable as the purity of those stains that consist of the clinging to duality, but the stains that consist of the clinging to this purity itself being real are not relinquished.

1b) As for the consequence of wisdom being without an object, Āryavimuktisena says:

> In the two theses of the opponents, it would follow that wisdom is something whose sphere is the lack of any entity . . .[1407]

The meaning of this is that it follows that nonconceptual wisdom is without any object because it neither focuses on the seeming nor is it suitable as its own object.[1408]

2) The lack of justification of the second answer is put forward by Āryavimuktisena as follows:

> . . . and that emptiness is a conditioned phenomenon.[1409]

The meaning of this is that it follows that emptiness is a conditioned phenomenon because it is observed through direct perception. The reason entails the predicate because it is certain that, among unconditioned phenomena, there are absolutely no focal objects of direct perception, while it is certain that such focal objects do exist among conditioned phenomena. Therefore, these two (focal objects of direct perception and conditioned phenomena) are definitely connected in such a way that there is none of them without the other. Out of the wish to remove the flaw accrued through this consequence, it may be said, "We do not assert this emptiness as a spacelike lack of any entity, but we present it as the apprehended aspect that consists of the aspect which is this emptiness." In this case, it follows even more than before that emptiness is a conditioned phenomenon because it is an apprehended aspect. Furthermore, since this emptiness is an apprehended aspect, it follows that it is not the kind of emptiness as claimed because it is a conception, that is, a consciousness that apprehends it. The reason applies because a consciousness that induces certainty about that apprehended aspect (which consists of the aspect that is said emptiness) being emptiness is impossible among direct perceptions. The reason entails the predicate because there is no inducing of certainty in direct perceptions. Therefore, it is impossible for this aspect to be anything other than a conception. Without inducing certainty, even if such an apprehended aspect were emptiness, it is impossible to be certain that it actually is emptiness. Therefore, through an emptiness about which there is no certainty that it actually is emptiness, one's necessary objectives (on the path to liberation) are not accomplished. Consequently, conditioned phenomena and conceptions are mutually exclusive with emptiness, the unchanging perfect nature, and so forth.

Now, you may wonder, "How is this asserted in Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's own system, who take the tradition of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas as their basis?" The meaning of "the emptiness of all phenomena" (as in the above quote from Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*)[1410] does not refer to the nonexistence of the appearances of the seeming, but to seeing the appearances of the seeming, which are specified through being empty of a nature of their own, as being illusionlike. Having put forward such a thesis, the proof for this is set

up as follows: "Any cognition that engages in the focal object under discussion here is necessarily one that focuses on illusionlike appearances, just like a dream consciousness. Also, the wisdoms as they are explained here (as the perceiving subjects of the twenty emptinesses) are cognitions that engage in such focal objects." This is a nature reason. Both its subject property and its positive entailment are established through direct perception (with the latter one being based on an example). The reasoning that negates the reason existing within the heterologous set is established through the very reasoning that negated the position of the Mere Mentalists above. Therefore, it is negated that illusionlike appearances have any real existence, but the lack of real existence is not affirmed. Consequently, just through saying that what is empty of reality and merely appearing is not existent, one does not end up with something really established. As the *Vṛtti* says:

> There is no flaw because Devadatta will not rearise if his killer has been killed.[1411]

It may be said, "However, does this not contradict the statement in the mother sūtras that the focal object of the knowledge of all aspects is the lack of entity?" The meaning of this statement is not that it was made with the intention of taking the nonimplicative negation that is the lack of entity as an object of wisdom. Rather, if it had been made with this intention, it would follow that the subject that takes such an object is a mental state that operates by way of an isolate, that is, an elimination-of-other. Therefore, this is not reasonable. So what is the meaning of this statement? It refers to the focal object of wisdom as what appears as the various manifestations of the dependent origination of the seeming, which are specified by having negated any real entities. Here, superimpositions are cut through by focusing on mere appearances through study, reflection, and meditation on the mundane level of the path. Once these superimpositions have been severed through that, there is certainty about nothing but sheer suchness. Consequently, all focusing through anything on anything as anything is nothing but emptiness of these respective factors. That this is the case in terms of the path of learning is stated by the *Vṛtti*:

> Much indeed remains to be said in terms of classifying it into mirrorlike wisdom and so on. However, this presentation of the equipment of wisdom is just a fraction.[1412]

Thus, the *Vṛtti* teaches that the above does not apply to the mahāyāna wisdom of nonlearning. You may wonder, "How about this wisdom then?"

Once all latent tendencies of dualistic appearance have been eradicated in this wisdom, there is no chance for any appearances of the seeming in it.

3) Various ways of asserting the definite number of emptinesses (including the wisdoms that correspond to the twenty emptinesses)

Some great Tibetans say, "In the mother of the victors, only eighteen emptinesses are mentioned—(1) the emptiness of the internal; (2) the emptiness of the external; (3) the emptiness of the internal and external; (4) the emptiness of emptiness; (5) the emptiness of the great; (6) the emptiness of the ultimate; (7) the emptiness of conditioned phenomena; (8) the emptiness of unconditioned phenomena; (9) the emptiness of what is beyond extremes; (10) the emptiness of what is without beginning and end; (11) the emptiness of what is not rejected; (12) the emptiness of the primordial nature; (13) the emptiness of all phenomena; (14) the emptiness of specifically characterized phenomena; (15) the emptiness of the unobservable; (16) the emptiness of nonentities; (17) the emptiness of self-entity; and (18) the emptiness of the nature of nonentities. In his *Madhyāntavibhāga*,[1413] Maitreya summarized the enumeration of these eighteen into fourteen, and the way he did so is as follows. The first four emptinesses of the experiencer and so on are classified by way of the object. The next two (the emptiness of emptiness and the emptiness of the ultimate) are classified by way of the subject. By adding the eight practices of bodhisattvas (from the emptiness of the conditioned up through the emptiness of all phenomena) to the first six, there are fourteen emptinesses altogether. The two emptinesses of the unobservable and of self-entity (from among the enumeration of eighteen emptinesses) are included in these fourteen. The seventeenth and eighteenth (the emptinesses of nonentities and the nature of nonentities) are then added at the end of these fourteen in order to eliminate superimpositions and denials with respect to emptiness. Since the former one of these last two emptinesses corresponds to the meaning of self-empty and the latter one to the meaning of other-empty, there is no need to mention these two (self-empty and other-empty) separately. In brief, the presentations of fourteen, sixteen, and eighteen emptinesses agree in all sūtras and tantras. But it is not appropriate, as the system of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra does, to divide the single emptiness of the nature of nonentities into four and so on."

It is true that the system of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra makes a classification into twenty emptinesses, but such a classification is the true intention of the mother. In the pertinent section of the large mother sūtra, a brief introduction to the eighteen emptinesses is given. Then, in the detailed explanation of these, the sūtra speaks about them by matching them with their respective bases of emptiness. In this section, the sūtra clearly explains

the four bases of emptiness of the four remaining emptinesses, which are also explicitly spelled out by their names, that is, the four emptinesses of entities, nonentities, self-entity, and other-entity. Therefore, masters such as Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra do not incur the slightest wrongdoing. Since this enumeration of twenty emptinesses is clearly explained in the mother sūtras, the reasons for why it is not a self-styled novel presentation by Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra are as follows.

1) Internal phenomena (the faculties of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind) are empty because they are not permanent (lacking any self-sufficient abiding) and not perishing. Since this is their nature, it is presented as the emptiness of the internal and the wisdom that realizes this is referred to as the wisdom that realizes the emptiness of the internal. The same applies to the remaining nineteen wisdoms, which have the following nineteen emptinesses as their objects. Thus, the equipment of wisdom consists of the twenty wisdoms that perceive these twenty emptinesses.[1414]

2) External phenomena (forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena) do not abide as collections, thus being empty of being form and so forth. This is presented as the emptiness of the external.

3) The fact that both the six inner āyatanas (which are conjoined with mind) and the six outer āyatanas (which are not) are emptiness is presented as the emptiness of the internal and the external.

4) That the emptiness of phenomena is empty of this very emptiness and that also the cognition of all phenomena as being emptiness is emptiness is presented as the emptiness of emptiness.[1415]

5) That everything in the ten directions (such as vast shapes) is empty of being such is presented as the emptiness of the great.

6) The emptiness of nirvāṇa (cessation and the path that leads to it) is presented as the emptiness of the ultimate.

7) That conditioned phenomena (all three realms), which arise from causes and conditions, are empty of being such is presented as the emptiness of conditioned phenomena.

8) Unconditioned phenomena neither arise from causes and conditions, nor abide, nor cease, and never change into anything else than what they are. Their emptiness is presented as the emptiness of unconditioned phenomena.

9) The emptiness of the nonobservation of extremes (freedom from permanence and extinction) is presented as the emptiness of what is beyond extremes. Another meaning of what is beyond extremes hinges on "extremes" referring to parts. Thus, by being beyond being broken down into any parts whatsoever, there is not even the slightest middle or end.

10) The emptiness of what is without beginning, end, coming, and going is presented as the emptiness of what is without beginning and end (saṃsāra).

11) The emptiness of that in which there is nothing to be rejected (the ultimate in terms of practice,[1416] such as the dharmas concordant with enlightenment) is presented as the emptiness of what is not rejected.

12) None of all phenomena (whether they are conditioned or unconditioned) in general and their basic nature in particular are produced by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, or tathāgatas. The emptiness of this is presented as the emptiness of the primordial nature.[1417]

13) All phenomena (the five skandhas, the twelve inner and outer āyatanas, the six consciousnesses, the six contacts, the six feelings, phenomena that have form, phenomena without form, conditioned phenomena, and unconditioned phenomena) are empty of being such. This is presented as the emptiness of all phenomena.

14) The emptiness of all phenomena that are specifically characterized through their defining characteristics (such as that which is suitable as form) and features (such as their arising) refers to the lack of all these specific characteristics in the skandhas, the āyatanas, the dhātus, the six pāramitās, the dhyānas, the immeasurables, the formless absorptions, the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment, the eight liberations, the buddha qualities (such as the powers), and what is other than these—the nature of all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena.

15) In general, since time and so on are just imputations, they are not observable. Also, the past, the present, and the future are such that once one of them exists at its own specific time, the others do not arise. Thus, the emptiness of the nonobservation of the three times is presented as the emptiness of the unobservable.

16) All phenomena are established merely from the perspective of collections and originate from being assembled. Their nature is that there are no permanent entities, no performing of functions, and no existence in them. In other words, dependent origination is empty of such entities and so on. This is presented as the emptiness of the nature of nonentities.

17) Entities such as the skandhas come together by having causes and conditions and, when examined, are just perishable phenomena. Their emptiness is presented as the emptiness of entities.

18) Other than as mere imputations, nonentities (unconditioned phenomena such as space) are not suitable to exist. Their being empty in this way is presented as the emptiness of nonentities.

19) Self-entity[1418] refers to the actuality that is seen and known by the noble ones in just the way that it abides primordially and that is not made into something other than that through this seeing. Thus, the emptiness of this self-entity or essence of all phenomena (which is called "emptiness") not

being produced through the knowing or seeing of the noble ones is presented as the emptiness of self-entity.

20) The matrix that is the nature of phenomena (and its synonyms) is emptiness primordially, but it is not produced or established as emptiness through any agent that is another entity. It is the nature of the sphere of the noble ones that is other than the phenomena within the mind streams of those who just see this life. The emptinesses of this basic nature and its synonyms (from "the matrix of phenomena" up through "the true end") are presented as other-empty, and the wisdom of realizing such emptiness is the wisdom of realizing the other-empty.[1419]

Therefore, the mother sūtras clearly speak of twenty emptinesses. I think that the emptiness of self-entity (17/19 in the above two lists of eighteen/twenty emptinesses) contains both the self-entitity (or nature) of the seeming and the self-entity (or nature) of the ultimate. Therefore, it is further classified as the two emptinesses of entities (17 in the list of twenty) and nonentities (16/18). The single emptiness of the nature of nonentities (18/16) contains two emptinesses in terms of its self-isolate and its instance-isolate.[1420] By virtue of this, it is classified as two—self-empty and other-empty (20). Thus, by virtue of the two emptinesses (17) and (18) in the list of eighteen emptinesses becoming four, the additional two (17 and 20 in the list of twenty) serve as supplements to these eighteen, so that the number of twenty is correct.

The statement by other Tibetans that Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra classify the emptiness of the nature of nonentities (18/16) alone as fourfold lacks any authentic source. It is an even greater case of lacking examination to say, "It contradicts the Buddha if one makes a classification of the remaining four emptinesses." For the Buddha himself clearly stated the following in the pertinent passage of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*:

> Entities are empty of entities. Nonentities are empty of nonentities. The self-entity is empty of self-entity. The other-entity is empty of this other-entity.[1421]

So what is the point of saying that what the Buddha doubtlessly said is contradictory to what the Buddha said? Some people say, "In the context of the division into twenty emptinesses, the earlier two emptinesses of conditioned and unconditioned phenomena and the later two emptinesses of entities and nonentities are repetitious." There is a difference between them because the former two are taught from the perspective of defining characteristics and the latter two are taught from the perspective of instances.

In this twentyfold division, all the bases of emptiness that bear the nature of emptiness are indeed nothing but emptiness. However, they were classified

into three types of bases of emptiness for the sake of negating (a) superimpositions of a real nature; (b) the thought that emptiness is newly produced by the wisdom of the noble ones; and (c) an agent as imagined by others.

The boundary lines of these twenty emptinesses are presented in the *Ālokā*. The first three are presented as pertaining to the level of engagement through aspiration in general; the fourth one, to the supreme dharma; the following seven, to the seven impure bhūmis; the next three sets of two (12)–(17), to the three pure bhūmis, respectively; and the following three (18)–(20), to the buddhabhūmi. When their boundary lines are presented in this way, during the level of engagement through aspiration, the corresponding emptinesses are realized through the valid cognition that is a reasoning consciousness or through a cognition that is approximately concordant with yogic valid perception. On the various bhūmis, they are focused on and realized through yogic perception. On the buddhabhūmi, none of these twenty bearers of emptiness of which it is empty is observable as anything whatsoever by the wisdom of omniscience. Nevertheless, they are presented as being realized by way of fully penetrating just this profound basic nature of the bases of emptiness in terms of a given such basis being empty of that basis.

4) The basis of emptiness

As explained above, the bases of the twenty emptinesses are the internal (such as the eyes) and so forth. What is called "basis of emptiness" here refers to the bearers of the nature of emptiness. This means that what such a basis is empty of is labeled with the name "basis of emptiness." However, in this context, the "basis of emptiness" is not identified as something like the unchanging perfect nature, which is the basis of emptiness that actually fulfills this function.[1422] The reason why something like this perfect nature is not identified as the basis of emptiness here is as follows. If such a basis of emptiness were explicitly taught in the middle turning of the wheel of dharma, one would not be able to relinquish the stains of clinging to it as being something real. In this context of the middle turning, if one has not even eliminated the stains of clinging to the reality of form and so on (which are not this profound basis of emptiness), forget about eliminating the stains of clinging to the perfect nature as being something real. Therefore, the latter is not taught in this turning. However, in the final turning of the wheel, when something like the Vajra heart—which is introduced subsequent to having eliminated all reference points—is taught as the basis of emptiness, it is not that one is not in a state of poised readiness for such a teaching. For at this point, all reference points and characteristics with regard to the entirety of phenomena and their true nature have already been cut through.

In this context, others say, "It is not the case that what something is empty of is labeled or imputed as 'basis of emptiness.' Here, when you explain other-emptiness, you teach 'the matrix of phenomena' (and its synonyms), which you assert as not being an imputed basis of emptiness, but the actual basis of emptiness that truly fulfills this function. Thus, it is not an imputed basis of emptiness." Granted, just this much is said here. However, in this context here, to speak about the matrix of phenomena and so on without commenting on them as being the actual basis of emptiness that truly fulfills this function is stated as a specification of emptiness in terms of what it is to be empty of. Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* says:

> This is the emptiness of other-entity because it means being empty of any other agent. For it is said that any activity of a person that is related to emptiness amounts to nothing but tiring oneself out.[1423]

Therefore, what he puts forth here is a mere being empty of a nature of another agent. But he neither puts forward the final actuality of the mother (the profound other-empty) nor the basis of emptiness that actually fulfills this function as it is found in the final turning of the wheel of dharma. The reason for this is that this context of the second turning is the proper occasion to negate assertions of existence in terms of being established through a nature of its own; existence in terms of arising through its own specific characteristics; and existence in terms of abiding through a nature. Therefore, what Āryavimuktisena does here primarily is to negate that the respective bearers of the nature of phenomena are not empty but existent. Nevertheless, to not ascertain any of the phenomena of the seeming, which are only established from the perspective of ordinary mental states, and yet not to speak about the basis of emptiness that is profound other-emptiness is done with the implication of buddhas and bodhisattvas being skilled in the progressive stages of teaching the dharma.

5) The manner of being empty

The twenty bases of emptiness that are the bearers of the nature of emptiness are empty of the respective own natures of what these bases of emptiness are. For if they were not empty of their respective own natures, also the other-empty would not actually fulfill the function of being empty of these respective natures of theirs. This is why they are asserted as the twenty emptinesses, but they are not divided in this way from the perspective of their *being* emptiness. Certain people do not accept that these bases of emptiness (such as the eyes) are empty, but search for something of which they are empty

that lies outside of these bases. Those people contradict all systems of the proponents of pure self-emptiness.

The fact that Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra commented on all the twenty bases of emptiness that are the bearers of the nature of emptiness as being self-empty does not mean that they did not teach or assert the profound other-empty. For they taught those bases to be self-empty with the intention of (a) this being the context of putting an end to any kind of identity and (b) all twenty emptinesses referring solely to the seeming that is suitable to appear to (ordinary) mental states. However, when these two masters discussed the ultimate in terms of its being beyond such mental states, they did not speak about it being self-empty. You may wonder, "How do you know that they speak about this in terms of the seeming?" All the twenty numbers in the list of twenty emptinesses and all twenty bases of emptiness that are the bearers of the nature of emptiness consist exclusively of what are suitable to be observed as objects of (ordinary) mental states. Therefore, it is not suitable for them to pertain to something other than the seeming—the ultimate. In the ultimate (the other-empty), numbers are not tenable. Although this actual basis of emptiness (the other-empty) exists if it is not even something that is suitable to be observed, how could it be suitable to appear as an object of (ordinary) mental states? Thus, this presentation is exclusively based on phenomena of the seeming.

Some people may say, "Therefore, it follows that also the profound other-empty (the sphere of those who see beyond), such as the flawless dharma,[1424] is the seeming because its twenty bases of emptiness are the ones mentioned." Also, the flawless dharma can be classified as the two aspects of self-empty and other-empty for the following reasons. The imputed other-empty, such as the flawless dharma that is presented as a conceptual object of those who just see this life, is self-empty. The other-empty that actually fulfills this function—what is clearly manifest for nonconceptual wisdom (such as the flawless dharma of those who see beyond)—is nothing but other-empty. In this system here, this subject is treated in terms of the former one of these two.[1425]

After having reflected well on this,
Without it being very absurd,
I explained Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's intention of this section
Just as it rests in Yogācāra.[1426]

6) Nondual wisdom[1427]

There is nothing to be removed in this
And not the slightest to be added.
Actual reality is to be seen as it really is—
Whoever sees actual reality is liberated.

In this dependent origination that is the basic nature of emptiness free from all reference points, the aspect of the ultimate (nonmistakenness) is not to be removed and not the slightest aspect of the seeming (mistakenness) is to be added. Therefore, through the prajñā of realizing phenomenal identitylessness in accordance with the actual way of being of objects, the basic nature of suchness (actual reality) is to be seen as it really is. Then, to actually see, realize, or penetrate the lack of any nature (such as some identity being established by a nature of its own) is what liberates from the clinging to phenomenal identity.

Here, the following is to be understood. Verse V.19 teaches that being really established on the level of the seeming is not the actual way of being of objects, while verse V.20 instructs that being empty of reality is the actual way of being of seeming objects. Verse V.21 shows that which makes one realize in an unmistaken manner whether one engages in the actual way of being of objects or not. As for these three verses evidently not relating to what is explicitly taught in the sūtras, some people say that, over time, the letters of the sūtras have been corrupted, while it also appears that some others provide reasons as to why this is not the case. However, by virtue of analysis, the following is crucial. As for the words "in this" in V.20a, according to Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, in the context of Madhyamaka, there are two kinds of nondual wisdom—nominal and nonnominal. Through their putting forth the first one of these wisdoms as not being really established because it is of the nature of dependent origination, all phenomena are nothing but emptiness. It is excluded that what is absolutely not affected by the mistakenness of consciousness and so on is really established. If nondual wisdom were something really established in this sense, it would follow that noble persons do not appear either. However, without entailing such a consequence, the intention behind Vimuktisena's and Haribhadra's statement is that it is true by virtue of all the various bearers of the nature of phenomena that are mere appearances being nothing but natural emptiness, but that this statement would not be suitable otherwise. For it is said, "As for this appearance of any phenomena that are mere appearances . . ."[1428] There is a purpose for saying it like that because the reason that the appearing aspect of all phenomena is dependent origination is what ascertains the aspect of their actual

way of being to be emptiness. To ascertain this also has an outcome. If one relies on the activity of purifying one's mind stream through the reasonings in the context of studying and reflecting that explain in this way that all phenomena are empty of phenomenal identity, finally the power of meditation reaches perfection because this activity is the supreme means to manifest the path of seeing that phenomena are empty of identity.

As for the meaning of *Uttaratantra* I.154 (virtually identical to AA V.21), it identifies the emptiness beyond dependent origination, which is the nonnominal nondual wisdom to be seen during the path of seeing. Here, the words "in this" identify the nonnominal nondual wisdom that is not suitable as a counterpart connected to the appearing aspect of the seeming or any phenomena that depend on it or are supported by it. As for the meaning of "there being nothing to be removed or added," the following is clearly taught. In the nature of this nondual wisdom, no obscurations are to be removed and no wisdom is to be added. Rather, it is the object to be beheld by personally experienced wisdom, but there is no chance ever of it being viewed by something else, that is, consciousness. Also, the nondual wisdom that is the object to be viewed is an entity.

You may wonder, "But according to what the Mādhyamikas assert, isn't it a flaw to propound an entity?" In general, starting with the Vaibhāṣikas, all the respective assertions of Buddhist philosophical systems as to what is the ultimate speak of it as an entity and an existent. When the Mādhyamikas analyze, since all the respective kinds of the ultimate in the assertions of lower yānas belong to the seeming, they do not engage in the actual way of being of objects. Therefore, since they propound as an entity what is not an entity, they are flawed. Likewise, if it is said that the aspect of being empty that consists of mere appearances—the bearers of the nature of phenomena—being self-empty is an entity, this is flawed because one clings to the lack of entity as being an entity. Therefore, both the Niḥsvabhāvavādins and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas agree in not asserting the empty aspect of all phenomena—mere appearances being empty of themselves—as constituting any kind of nature. However, the position of the Buddha's mantrayāna, Maitreya, Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and others who declare that the dharmadhātu, which is not suitable as a mere appearance, exists as an entity did not arrive in the minds of the Niḥsvabhāvavādin masters. Though Candrakīrti in particular has refuted this position well, the reason for it being unassailable by refutations is as follows. In general, all explanations that both those who propound entities and those who propound the lack of entity are flawed refer to them as being flawed by having in mind that they are deceiving with regard to the actual way of being of objects. However, to accept, just as it is, what exists or does not exist as an entity on the level of being engaged

in the actual way of being of objects is absolutely free of flaw. For this is the context of accepting the outcome of Madhyamaka with an impartial and straightforward mind after having relinquished all extremes of superimposition and denial.

In brief, the scope of considering the proponents of entities that are refuted by the Mādhyamikas is confined to the entities of the seeming, and the refutation goes, "All seeming phenomena are neither entities nor the lack of entity and so on because they are not established as anything such." However, the proponents of Great Madhyamaka say that the nondual wisdom beyond dependent origination exists as the ultimate entity because it engages in the actual way of being of objects. This statement does not entail the flaw of the proponents of entities because—different from what the latter hold to be entities—this wisdom actually *is* an entity. It is an entity because it is explained in the Buddha's sūtras and tantras of definitive meaning as an entity and because there is no philosophical system above this Great Madhyamaka, due to which there are no explanations of any reasonings that refute this wisdom being an entity.

You may think, "But if this nondual wisdom is an entity, then it must be able to perform a function, which contradicts this nondual wisdom asserted by you being explained as a permanent entity."[1429] This is not contradictory because this wisdom *is* able to perform a function—it is able to perform the function of existing at its own time, and it is explained in the texts on reasoning that if something exists at its own time, it is established as being permanent. In brief, as for nondual wisdom existing at its own time, Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* says:

> Thus, one clearly sees that when something does not exist somewhere, the latter is empty of the former. In accordance with true reality, one understands that what remains there exists as a real existent.[1430]

This clearly explains the following. With nondual wisdom (ultimate reality) not existing during any phase of nondual consciousness (seeming reality), one sees or realizes clearly or in a supreme way (that is, in the manner of according with the actual way of being through the prajñā of identitylessness that is a natural outflow of the dharmadhātu) that this wisdom is empty of nondual consciousness (seeming reality). In this nondual wisdom there always exists the remainder that remains primordially and is primordially empty of the adventitious stains of nondual consciousness—the nondual wisdom that is not enshrouded in these adventitious stains. Also, the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* on verse I.25 says:

> Within the hosts of sentient beings, there is no being whatsoever into which tathāgata wisdom has not entered in its entirety. However, by virtue of clinging through discriminating notions, tathāgata wisdom is not manifest.[1431]

The meaning of this is as follows. In sentient beings or adventitious stains[1432] (which are like darkness), the nondual all-accomplishing tathāgata wisdom in its entirety (which is like light) exists primordially. Within each one of all kinds or realms of sentient beings, there is no being whatsoever into which this wisdom has not always entered in its entirety because this all-accomplishing wisdom, through entering all sentient beings, eliminates the adventitious stains (these very sentient beings), just as light eliminates darkness. That this wisdom is able to eliminate sentient beings in this way is said in terms of not analyzing it through reasoning. But if one analyzes through reasoning, sentient beings or adventitious stains are not eliminated by buddhahood or nondual wisdom because what is to be eliminated (sentient beings or adventitious consciousness) does not exist from the very beginning. Thus, it is already eliminated in the first place and needs not to be eliminated again. Also, buddhahood or nondual wisdom does not enter beings again in order to eliminate stains because it has the nature of always having entered them as that which eliminates the stains right from the start. "So what is the point of the above statement about what is eliminated and what eliminates it—that there is no being whatsoever within the hosts of sentient beings into which tathāgata wisdom has not entered in its entirety?" This is just said in terms of loose conventional parlance. However, sentient beings are obscured by virtue of clinging through their discriminating notions—the adventitious stains of not realizing that, as explained above, sentient beings and nondual wisdom are not established as what is to be eliminated and what eliminates it. For the mistaken appearances of such sentient beings, adventitious stains and wisdom appear as if they were what is to be eliminated and what eliminates it. This is for the following reasons. Due to not realizing that sentient beings (or adventitious stains) do not exist from the very start, they think that what existed before is eliminated later. Due to not realizing that any factors to be eliminated have already ceased through the power of how entities are (that is, the factors to be eliminated being phenomena that are unarisen), beings think that these factors have been put to an end through the power of remedies. Due to not realizing that nondual wisdom exists primordially, beings think that this wisdom eliminated the adventitious stains newly through the power of its sudden arising.

In brief, in terms of the actual way of being, the manner in which buddha wisdom accomplishes the welfare of sentient beings is as follows. The

two mutually exclusive phenomena of real nondual buddha wisdom (whose existence at all times is by virtue of the power of how entities are) and unreal sentient beings (adventitious stains, whose nonexistence at all times is equally by virtue of the power of how entities are) are possible within the sphere of knowable objects. Thus, it is in this manner that one uses the designation of "buddhas accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings." For this reason, since all sentient beings are pure in themselves, it is impossible for any sentient being not to become a buddha. Because buddhahood and sentient beings are mutually exclusive in terms of being existent and nonexistent, respectively, when having become a buddha, tathāgatahood itself has become buddhahood. However, it is neither suitable for anything or anyone else to become buddhahood nor is it suitable for sentient beings and buddhahood to represent a substantial continuum of cause and result. Therefore, the impossibility of "sentient beings becoming buddhas" and "sentient beings attaining buddhahood" is well established.

As for the reality that is to be seen through the path of seeing, master Candrakīrti identified it as the nonimplicative negation of being free from all extremes of reference points. Temporarily, this may be called "actual reality," because it is presented as ultimate reality. However, in the final picture, this is not actual reality because it is delusive. Candrakīrti himself said in his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*:

> You may wonder, "Is nirvāṇa also seeming reality?" It is as follows. If there are conceptions about saṃsāra, one also conceives of nirvāṇa because both are just worldly conventions. Therefore, it is said in the Bhagavatī:
>
> > Venerable Subhūti, also nirvāṇa is like a dream and like an illusion.
>
> Or
>
> > He said, "Śāriputra, if there were any phenomenon superior to nirvāṇa, it would also be illusionlike."
>
> If it did not depend on conceptions about saṃsāra, it would not be illusionlike. Therefore, nirvāṇa is also conceived of as seeming reality. "If that is the case, why is it said then that nirvāṇa is ultimate reality?" In worldly terms, it is undeceiving as having that nature. Therefore, by virtue of worldly conventional terminology, it is said to be "ultimate reality." What is deceiving and conditioned is not ultimate reality.[1433]

As for the prajñā that sees what is to be seen, according to Candrakīrti, after the discriminating prajñā at the time of the path of preparation has been burned by the fire of wisdom, it is the prajñā whose nature is the lack of appearance—the sheer freedom from reference points in which nothing whatsoever is seen. This is how he identifies it in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.91:

> For those who dwell in worldly reality,
> All five skandhas, which are common worldly consensus, exist.
> Once they strive for the dawning of the wisdom of true reality,
> For yogins, these five will not arise.

The first two lines teach the mundane view and the last two lines explain the supramundane view. You may think, "But it is not reasonable that this nonimplicative negation that is to be seen is the apprehended object of the prajñā that sees it because direct perception does not take generally characterized phenomena as its assessed object." It is in a manner of experiencing itself that the seeing prajñā explained above directly perceives the cognitive aspect that consists of being devoid of reference points and characteristics. Therefore, there is no flaw of it following that this prajñā has a generally characterized phenomenon as its apprehended object.

Some say, "In Candrakīrti's system, there is no experience of such a cognitive aspect because he does not accept self-awareness. Without that, it follows that such an aspect does not exist either." This just signifies lack of understanding, while I assert the following. Having taught the manner in which the wisdom that sees reality exists in this system above, this wisdom must refer to a cognition whose nature is lucid and aware, but which is not an ordinary consciousness. In this context, if such a cognition is without an assessed object, this contradicts the notion of a cognition that assesses it. Therefore, the assessed object (emptiness) cannot be assessed directly because it is nothing but a nonimplicative negation. However, the very factor of not seeing anything to be assessed is revealed by virtue of these two—what is taken as an assessed object in the manner of it not being something like a generally characterized phenomenon and the cognition that assesses it—not being other. Some great ones say, "Emptiness is revealed by way of the aspect that is the freedom from reference points appearing for the looking prajñā that does not see any reference points or characteristics whatsoever." I do not see any justification in this either because the freedom from reference points has no nature of its own, due to which any aspect that depends on it is not tenable. If one speaks about "the appearing of the aspect that is the freedom from reference points" by having in mind that the very cognition that looks at it is the freedom from reference points, this makes no sense either. There is

nothing that could appear as a second "aspect that is the freedom from reference points" other than what is the freedom from reference points per se. For what is the nature of cognition does not appear to cognition as its nature, so that it is impossible for cognition's own nature to appear as a cognitive aspect for cognition.[1434]

H) The equipment of the ten bhūmis[1435]

What are "the ten bhūmis"? Since they must be explained by means of their purifications, one speaks of "the equipments of the bhūmis" in order to teach these [purifications].[1436] The meaning that is taught in this way has three parts:

1) The nature of the bhūmis, which are the remedies
2) The nature of the object of meditative equipoise
3) The nature of the obstacles to be relinquished

1) The nature of the bhūmis, which are the remedies

This has seven parts:

a) Nature
b) Division
c) Meaning of the term
d) The distinctive features of relinquishment and realization
e) The distinctive features of manifesting the qualities
f) The distinctive features of the signs
g) The distinctive features of assuming a body

1a) Nature

The nature of bhūmi as such is that which functions as the foundation of qualities. The *Ālokā* says:

> . . . bhūmis refer to the principle of being foundations for qualities.[1437]

The nature of the bhūmis of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is what function as the foundations of their respective qualities. The nature of the bodhisattvabhūmis is what function as the foundations of the qualities of bodhisattvas. Likewise, the nature of the buddhabhūmi is what functions as the foundation of the qualities of a buddha. The presentation of the buddhabhūmi as a bhūmi is explained in the *Ālokā*:

> . . . the eleventh, the bhūmi of All-Illumination.[1438]

The main bhūmis that are taught here are the bhūmis that are the bodhisattvabhūmis. Their nature consists of being suitable to function as the foundations of [their distinct] qualities—the realization of the unity of means and prajñā, which is devoid of the two [kinds of] identity.

1b) Division

[The equipment of the bhūmis] needs to be divided into two:

1) [the equipment of] the bhūmis that eliminates the obscurations during meditative equipoise
2) the equipment of the bhūmis that gathers the accumulation of merit during subsequent attainment

Since there are ten [sets of] stains to be purified and ten dharmas that are the means to purify them, the equipment of the bhūmis is also divided into ten. As [the *Ālokā*] says:

> Through dividing the paths of seeing and familiarization in terms of the purifications, they are presented as ten, such as the bhūmi Supreme Joy.[1439]

Thus, there is the twofold main division [in terms of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment], and each one of these is tenfold in terms of the bhūmis. Thus, the division [of the equipment of the bhūmis] is twentyfold.

The twofold main division can also be categorized as follows.

1) [The equipment of the bhūmis that eliminates the obscurations during meditative equipoise] is contained in the equipment of wisdom and the equipment of the remedies.[1440] Through their function, only those obscurations that prevent the seeing of suchness are eliminated.[1441] Suchness in this context is twofold:

a) personal [identitylessness]
b) phenomenal identitylessness

1a) What obscures the first one is afflicted ignorance, which is twofold:

a) the actual ignorance
b) the latent tendencies that are input by it

Since the first one consists of the afflictions that bind in saṃsāra, it is relinquished on the first bhūmi. Since the second consist of the impregnations of the negative tendencies[1442] that are input by these [afflictions], they are similar to them in that they [also] function as the causes for birth in [saṃsāric] existence. Thus, they are labeled with this name ["affliction"]. Through the progression of the ten bhūmis, these subtle afflictive obscurations are relinquished simultaneously with the cognitive obscurations that are the factors to be relinquished through familiarization.[1443]

1b) What obscures phenomenal identitylessness is nonafflicted ignorance, [which is twofold:]

a) [what obscures] the naturally pure nature of phenomena

b) what obscures the nature of phenomena that is pure of adventitious [stains]

The first one is relinquished on the first bhūmi. The second are the respective obscurations of each one of the ten bhūmis, which are relinquished progressively during the meditative equipoises [of these bhūmis].

2) The second main category [—the equipment of the bhūmis during subsequent attainment—] is what eliminates the obscurations that prevent [seeing] variety. It consists of the ten different ways of inducing certainty about the nature of phenomena that occur during the subsequent attainments of the ten bhūmis. By virtue of engaging in this way, to learn and train in the six pāramitās represents the equipment of the bhūmis that consists of gathering the accumulation of merit. The reason why [bodhisattvas] must engage in this is as follows. If they did not train in this manner during their subsequent attainments and [simply] cultivated the meditative equipoises of the ten bhūmis without interruption, they would fall into the extreme of the nirvāṇa of extinction.[1444]

To instantiate the purifications of the bhūmis, they are twofold:

1) the purifications during the process of attaining

2) the purifications in terms of what has been attained[1445]

1) The first one refers to the phase of the first bhūmi [proper]. As [the *Ālokā*] says:

> One should understand that, for as long as the dharmas that consist of the purifications of any one bhūmi have not been completed, it is [still this] bhūmi. Once they have been completed, this is another bhūmi.[1446]

2) [The very purifications of the first bhūmi] are also the purifications for the second bhūmi. As illustrated by this, the very purifications of the second bhūmi must also purify the stains of [attaining] the third bhūmi, and the same applies up through the tenth bhūmi. However, there is no need for the purifications of the tenth bhūmi to purify the stains of the buddhabhūmi because the buddhabhūmi does not have any stains. Therefore, with regard to the buddhabhūmi, there are neither purifications during the process of attaining nor purifications in terms of what has been attained. Sugataśrī asserts that, just as one clears the drains when one [intends to] drain water, there are also purifications of the first bhūmi that purify [already] during [the level of] the supreme dharma [of the path of preparation].

1c) Meaning of the term
This has two parts:
a) General meaning
b) Individual meanings

1ca) General meaning
Since they are the bases for progressing higher and higher, they are called "bhūmis." As [the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*] says:

> Since [bodhisattvas] apply themselves to ascend higher and higher
> On these immeasurable [abodes]
> For the sake of innumerable creatures becoming fearless,
> They are asserted as bhūmis.[1447]

Hence, it is said that these bhūmis, on which [bodhisattvas] ascend higher and higher from the previous to the following ones for the sake of making innumerable creatures (sentient beings) fearless, are asserted as bhūmis.

1cb) Individual meanings of the terms
The meanings of the terms for each one of the ten bhūmis are given in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*:

> Upon seeing that enlightenment is near
> And the welfare of sentient beings is accomplished,
> Utter joy will arise.
> Therefore it is called "Supreme Joy."
>
> Since it is free from the efforts of distorted ethics,
> It is called "The Stainless Bhūmi."
> Since it causes the great radiance of dharma,
> It is "The Illuminating One."
>
> Thus, the dharmas concordant with enlightenment
> Are like intensely burning light.
> Because it is endowed with these, this bhūmi
> Burns both [obscurations], thus being "The Radiating One."
>
> Since they fully mature sentient beings
> And guard their own minds,
> This is difficult to master [even] by the intelligent.
> Therefore, it is called "Difficult to Master."

Since saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
Are both faced here,
It is said to be "The Bhūmi of Facing,"
Which is based on the pāramitā of prajñā.

Due to being joined with the path of single progress,
It is held to be the bhūmi "Gone Afar."
Since it is unmoved by the two discriminations,
It is named "The Immovable One."

The supreme mind of perfectly discriminating awareness
Is the bhūmi that is "The Excellent One."
The two that are like clouds pervade the space[like] dharma.
Therefore, it is the "Dharma Cloud."[1448]

1d) The distinctive features of relinquishment and realization
This has two parts:
a) The distinctive features of relinquishment
b) The distinctive features of realization

1da) The distinctive features of relinquishment
On each one of the bhūmis, their respective obscurations are relinquished. [The *Madhyāntavibhāga*] states:

Ignorance about the dharmadhātu—
The ten nonafflictive obscurations—
Are the antagonistic factors of the ten bhūmis.
Their remedies are the bhūmis.[1449]

You may wonder, "What is the manner of relinquishing them?" The *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* explains the manner of relinquishing the factors to be relinquished through the first [bhūmi] and then says that the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished through the remaining [bhūmis]. Furthermore, these obscurations are tenfold since they obscure the ten fruitions of the ten pāramitās. The ten fruitions are as stated [in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*]:

The obscurations of wealth, pleasant realms,
Not giving up sentient beings,
Decrease of flaws
And increase of qualities, engaging,

Liberating, inexhaustibility,
An unbroken flow of virtue,
Securing, and enjoyment of the dharma
As well as maturing.[1450]

Thus, the antagonistic factors of these are the factors to be relinquished.

1db) The distinctive features of realization

The *Madhyānatavibhāga* says:

The actuality of omnipresence, the actuality that is supreme,
The natural outflow that is the supreme purpose,
The actuality of nonclinging,
The actuality of the mind streams not being different,

The actuality of neither affliction nor purity,
The actuality of no difference,
The actuality of neither decrease nor increase,
And the matrix of fourfold mastery.[1451]

The four masteries are as [the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*] says:

By virtue of the change of mentation, perception,
And conception, there is fourfold command
Over nonconceptuality, [pure] realms,
Wisdom, and activity.

It is held that there is fourfold mastery
On the three bhūmis, such as the Immovable—
Two masteries on one [bhūmi]
And one on each of the others.[1452]

[Here,] "mentation" is the afflicted mind. Since it has changed state on the eighth bhūmi, it becomes the mastery over very pure nonconceptual wisdom. "Perception" consists of the five sense consciousnesses including their objects. Since they have changed state on this [bhūmi too], they become the mastery over pure [buddha] realms. "Conception" refers to the mental consciousness, which changes state on the ninth and tenth bhūmis. By virtue of this, it becomes the mastery over the wisdom that consists of [fourfold] discriminating awareness and, since it promotes the welfare of sentient beings as one wishes, it becomes the mastery over enlightened activity. You may

wonder, "But if one gains mastery over full-fledged enlightened activity on the tenth bhūmi, there would be no difference from the enlightened activity of buddhas." In terms of the enlightened activity that exists for its recipients (its objects), there is no difference between someone on the tenth bhūmi and a buddha, but there is a difference in terms of the enlightened activity that exists for the agents [of this activity]. By virtue of this explanation that there is no difference in terms of the enlightened activity for the recipients (the objects), one should not think that there is no difference between buddhas and bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi in terms of the extent of the power of their qualities, such as promoting the welfare of sentient beings. Rather, it is explained that their difference is like the one between the [amounts of] water in the ocean and in the hoof print of an ox. Nevertheless, the intention behind the explanation that there is no difference between their enlightened activities in terms of the recipients (the objects) is to realize that, from the perspective of the objects of enlightened activity (that is, worldly beings), there is no difference between the enlightened activities of buddhas and bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi. It is in this sense that [the *Uttaratantra*] says:

> They are equal in the world.[1453]

The outcome of this statement is that merely appearing as equal in the world does not fulfill the function of actually being equal. Through this explanation, the distinctive features of realization of the eighth bhūmi and above were described first [here].

Next, the distinct realizations from the first to the seventh bhūmis will be explained in detail. On the first bhūmi, the nature of phenomena is realized in the manner of it being omnipresent in oneself and all others. This actuality of [the dharmadhātu's] omnipresence in oneself and all others generally pervades oneself and others like oneself, who each possess a stream of consciousness and are tainted by all fetters. It is omnipresent solely in what is contrary to the nature of the dharmadhātu. What is contrary [to it] is nothing but wrong engagement.[1454] Therefore, since both oneself and others are empty of being this ["self"] and this ["other"], they are nothing but identitylessness—the dharmadhātu. Thus, since there is no difference [between oneself and others] in terms of their general [actuality], this all-pervading omnipresence is nothing but true reality. With this point in mind, on the level of the seeming and from the perspective of mistakenness, since both oneself and others experience nothing but suffering, both are alike in being mistaken and suffering. Therefore, the bodhicitta on the level of the seeming is not [just] a state of mind [of being concerned] about one's own happiness and [thinking], "Wouldn't it be nice if others [were happy too]?" Rather, it

refers to a state of mind that is equal in terms of wishing for the happiness of others in exactly the same way as one wishes for one's own happiness. The ultimate bodhicitta is to fully realize the actuality that, ultimately, both oneself and others are equal in being empty of any nature of their own, that is, being identityless. The former of these two [can] also exist in ordinary beings, while the latter [exists only] from the path of seeing [onward].

On the second bhūmi, [bodhisattvas realize that] the nature of phenomena is not tainted by any obscurations and that these are suitable to be relinquished. Their relinquishment is [also] the supreme of all that can be realized. This [bhūmi] consists of swiftly making great efforts for the sake of manifesting this realization and eliminating the stains.

On the third bhūmi, [bodhisattvas realize that] listening to the scriptural collections of the mahāyāna represents a fruition that is a natural outflow of the dharmadhātu. Once they understand the actuality of this natural outflow in such a way, they listen to the genuine dharma even if this means to cross a trichiliocosm[1455] that has turned into a single conflagration.[1456]

On the fourth bhūmi, there is no being attached to any phenomena whatsoever since there is no clinging to the dharmadhātu, that is, no craving in terms of [misconceiving it as] "mine."

On the fifth bhūmi, through the ten equalities, [bodhisattvas] realize that, among bodhisattvas and among buddhas, the dharmadhātu is equality. Thus, their mind streams are not seen as different.

On the sixth bhūmi, [bodhisattvas] realize that the dharmadhātu is by nature unafflicted and that the afflictions are adventitious.

On the seventh bhūmi, all apprehending of characteristics is relinquished for the reason that the characteristics of the dharma (such as the sūtras) do not occur as different.

The three remaining [bhūmis] were already explained in detail above.

1e) The distinctive features of manifesting the qualities

Through the first bhūmi, the nature of phenomena is directly realized. On the second bhūmi, the training in superior ethics is completely manifested. On the third bhūmi, the training in superior mind[1457] is completely manifested. On the fourth, fifth, and sixth bhūmis, the training in superior prajñā is completely manifested. Here, three distinct types of prajñā are explained—the prajñā of expertise in the thirty-seven dharmas [concordant with enlightenment] on the fourth bhūmi; the prajñā of expertise in the four realities on the fifth bhūmi; and the prajñā of expertise in the twelve [links of] dependent origination on the sixth bhūmi. [Thus,] up through the sixth bhūmi, the three trainings are completed and [then], based on the familiarization with the nature of phenomena, four fruitions are attained. What are these four? On the seventh bhūmi, the qualities are manifested in a way that is without

characteristics, but involves effort. On the eighth bhūmi, the qualities are manifested in a way that is both without characteristics and without effort.[1458] On the ninth bhūmi, based on the wisdom of fourfold discriminating awareness, sentient beings are matured. On the tenth bhūmi, limitless samādhis and dhāraṇīs are manifested.

Furthermore, bodhisattvas who dwell on the first bhūmi attain twelve sets of one hundred qualities. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> In the change of state of the five sense faculties,
> Supreme mastery is attained
> Over the perception of all their objects
> And the arising of twelve hundred qualities in all of them.[1459]

It is not contradictory for twelve hundred activities to take place in each moment of the attainment of the first bhūmi. For since it is not contradictory [on this bhūmi] for each sense consciousness to engage all five [sense] objects, it is established that also the former is without contradiction. What are these twelve [sets of qualities]? In one single moment of time, (1) [such bodhisattvas] behold the faces of one hundred buddhas; (2) are blessed by them; (3) send forth one hundred emanations; (4) display them for one hundred eons; (5) their wisdom operates from the beginning to the end of one hundred [eons]; (6) are absorbed in and rise from one hundred samādhis; (7) mature one hundred sentient beings; (8) shake one hundred realms; (9) illuminate one hundred realms with light; (10) open one hundred doors of dharma; (11) display one hundred of their own bodies; and (12) display one hundred excellent retinues that surround each one of these bodies. These [twelve qualities] are multiplied one thousand times on the second bhūmi; one hundred thousand times on the third; one hundred billion times on the fourth; one hundred trillion times on the fifth; ten quadrillion times on the sixth; and one hundred sextillion times on the seventh. On the eighth, they are equal to the number of the minutest particles in twelve hundred trichiliocosms. On the ninth, they are as many as the particles in one million countless buddha realms. And on the tenth, they are as many as the particles in one hundred million inexpressible buddha realms.[1460]

Furthermore, [such bodhisattvas show other qualities], such as displaying countless buddhas from each of their pores in every moment, each surrounded by a retinue of countless bodhisattvas, or [presenting themselves] as the five kinds of beings (such as Śakra). In addition, they directly receive the prophecy [about their future enlightenment and so on] on the eighth bhūmi, turn the stainless wheel of dharma on the ninth one, and receive the empowerment of abundant light rays from the buddhas of the ten directions on the tenth one. How is this empowerment bestowed? The *Daśabhūmikasūtra* says:

> The bodhisattvas who abide on this bhūmi worship the buddhas of the ten directions. Right upon having done so, the buddhas know that the time has come to bestow the empowerment. An immense amount of light rays streams forth from the ūrṇa hairs of the buddhas, circles ten times through all the worlds of the ten directions, and dissolves into the crowns of the heads of these bodhisattvas. Right upon when it has dissolved [there], they attain ten thousand [qualities] that they had not attained before, such as the vajralike samādhi.[1461]

1f) The distinctive features of the signs

The *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra* describes the portents for attaining the first bhūmi and so on. The *Svapnanirdeśasūtra*[1462] declares:

> Once one has attained the bhūmis, dreams occur in the following way . . .

The position of dharma lord Sakya Paṇḍita on [passages] such as these is that the distinctive features of dream portents are a presentation with respect to the level of engagement through aspiration. Venerable glorious Rangjung [Dorje] states in his *Profound Inner Reality*:

> Mistaken dreams are saṃsāra—
> Unmistaken dreams are the remedy.
> Therefore, the dreams of the children of the victors on the ten bhūmis
> Are taught as stated in the sūtras.[1463]

Thus, he says that this is not a presentation with respect to the level of engagement through aspiration. On this, some people say, "Dreaming does not occur without sleep, and it is explained that [bodhisattvas] relinquish sleep from the level of engagement through aspiration onward. Hence, it is a difficult point that those who have attained the bhūmis should have dreams." However, though this is the case for ordinary beings, on the bhūmis of the noble ones of the mahāyāna it is not certain that sleep is necessarily needed for dreams to occur. "But if there are such dreams without sleep, they are not actual dreams that fulfill this function." We do not assert that dreams are necessarily specifically characterized dreams.[1464] Therefore, though [the ones in question] are not specifically characterized dreams, there is no contradiction in their just being mere dreams. At this point, others may say, "But then

it follows that also the [waking] time with its direct perceptions is a mere dream because it is alike in that sleep is not needed [for these perceptions]." We accept that because in the final pith instructions of this system, all phenomena are ascertained as the continuum of threefold dreaming. Still, others may think, "In that case, there is no need for an extra teaching on dreams occurring in the noble ones because it is explained that all perceptions are dreams." Ultimately, all seeming phenomena that appear for sentient beings as if they were perceptions do not actually fulfill the function of perceptions, so they are not different from dreams. Nevertheless, since mere perceptions and dreams occur on the bhūmis of the noble ones too, [the fact of] there being a difference [between them] is established in terms of their being mutually dependent. Thus, there is no contradiction. Such dreams are [true signs of the bhūmis only] in terms of having entered the mahāyāna and cultivated the path. But if they do not occur in this context, one should understand them to be other [types of] signs, [which are related to] mantras, medicine, or hindrances.

1g) The distinctive features of assuming a body

On the first bhūmi, [bodhisattvas] take birth as a cakravartin king who wields power over Jambudvīpa, and on the second bhūmi, as one [who rules over all] four continents. On the third bhūmi, [they take birth] as Śakra, the lord of gods.[1465] On the fourth, [they become a ruler over] the twin [gods];[1466] on the fifth, [a ruler over] Tuṣita; on the sixth, [a ruler over] Enjoying Emanations;[1467] on the seventh, [a ruler over] Power over Others' Emanations;[1468] on the eighth, the lord of a chiliocosm in Brahmakāyika; on the ninth, Mahābralımā, the lord of a dichiliocosm;[1469] and on the tenth, Maheśvara,[1470] the son of gods, the lord of the three realms. To take birth in these ways represents qualities of [karmic] maturation. In assuming a body like that, there are four ways in which bodhisattvas take birth. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> It is asserted that the intelligent
> Are born by virtue of the power of karma,
> And furthermore, by virtue of the power of aspiration prayers,
> Samādhi, and mastery.[1471]

Thus, the four [ways] to take birth are as follows. Bodisattvas [on the level] of engagement through aspiration are born in the desire [realm] by virtue of their karma. Those who have attained the bhūmis are born as animals and so on through the force of aspiration prayers. To be born in the desire realm by putting an end to [abiding in] the dhyānas [occurs] through the force of samādhi. To transit from the abode of Tuṣita to Jambudvīpa and so forth through an emanation [happens] through the force of mastery [over birth].

In brief, it is through the force of great compassion, which is the deep affection for suffering sentient beings, that bodhisattvas who have attained the bhūmis display [the features of] birth, death, sickness, aging, and so on in saṃsāra. However, [these features] do not represent births and so on that are specifically characterized phenomena.

2) The nature of the object of meditative equipoise

This has two parts:

a) An analysis of whether, on the path of familiarization, there is or is not a newly seen nature of phenomena that was not seen through the path of seeing
b) An analysis of whether there are or are not appearances in the meditative equipoise [of the noble ones of the mahāyāna]

2a) An analysis of whether, on the path of familiarization, there is or is not a newly seen nature of phenomena that was not seen through the path of seeing
This has two parts:

2aa) Presenting the special position of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra
2ab) Refuting what is not the position of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, but is claimed to be

2aa) Presenting the special position of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra
[Āryavimuktisena's] *Vṛtti* says:

> . . . because the entity that is seen, just as it is, is not different from the entity that faces it.[1472]

[Haribhadra's] *Ālokā* says:

> By virtue of the dharmadhātu being without parts, bodhisattvas realize it in its entire nature. However, in terms of giving rise to [particular aspects of] certainty [about it], it is discriminated as the actuality of omnipresence [on the first bhūmi and so on]. Through this, a very lucid cognition of directly perceiving all phenomena to be without nature arises. At that time, . . .[1473]

The meaning of the first quote is as follows. The entity that is the dharmadhātu as it is seen on the path of seeing is [also] what is faced through the path of familiarization.[1474] Not only is this [dharmadhātu] faced [in this way], but the dharmadhātu that is seen on the first path of familiarization is also faced through the second path of familiarization. In brief, through the power of the adventitious stains in the dharmadhātu becoming progressively

pure on each subsequent [bhūmi] compared to the respectively previous ones, there is a newly seen dharmadhātu [on each one of these bhūmis] that was not seen through previous seeing. Hence, it is established that there are degrees in terms of extent, clarity, and so on with regard to the dharmadhātu that is to be viewed. It is asserted that the dharmadhātu that was realized on the respective previous bhūmis is also directly realized on the following bhūmis. [However, these kinds of realization] do not become mental states of realizing [again] what has been realized already,[1475] because the presentation of such [mental states only] refers to ordinary beings, whereas the yogic cognitions of the noble ones are inconceivable.

The meaning of the second quote is as follows. Others may raise the following qualm: "Because the dharmadhātu does not have parts, there is nothing that is more superior in terms of natural purity than the dharmadhātu of the path of seeing, that is, no newly seen dharmadhātu on the path of familiarization." Master Haribhadra himself gives an answer by finely discriminating this. He accepts that, with regard to the dharmadhātu in terms of the aspect of natural purity, there is nothing newly seen on the remaining bhūmis beyond the path of seeing. Thus, he says [above]:

> By virtue of the dharmadhātu being without parts, bodhisattvas realize it in its entire nature.[1476]

In terms of the feature of the dharmadhātu being naturally pure, there is no difference between the dharmadhātu that is seen on the first bhūmi and the dharmadhātu that is seen on the second one, just as there is no difference between the crescent moon of the first day [of the lunar month] and the crescent moon of the second day from the perspective of [both] being the moon.

Furthermore, [it was claimed above] that there is necessarily no newly seen dharmadhātu other than the dharmadhātu of the path of seeing because it does not have parts. What is shown here is that the entailment [of the predicate by this reason] is mistaken both (1) in terms of natural purity and (2) in terms of being free from adventitious stains.

1) Though there is no difference in that the naturally pure and partless nature of phenomena is seen, by virtue of whether superimpositions are eliminated or not, there is a difference as to whether there is or is not a new seeing or a new realization. For within the clear familiarity with certain aspects [of the dharmadhātu], [certain corresponding] superimpositions are eliminated, while [the superimpositions] with regard to other [such aspects] are not [yet] eliminated. This corresponds to the following example. In a direct perception [of the color blue], there is no difference in terms of [distinct] parts [to be seen] in terms of [simultaneously] seeing [the aspect that is the color] blue

and the aspect that is the impermanence of the [color] blue. However, [such a perception only] induces the certainty that makes one think, "This is blue," whereas the certainty that makes one think, "This is impermanent" does not arise. It is with this point in mind that master [Haribhadra] said [above]:

> . . . in terms of giving rise to [particular aspects of] certainty [about it], it is discriminated . . .

Others may say, "This contradicts [*Pramāṇavārttika* III.107cd]:

> The great intelligent ones gain certainty
> About all aspects by virtue of the very seeing."

There is no such flaw. "The great intelligent ones" in the context of this quote indeed refer to the noble ones, but it is not taught here that the certainty referred to by "gaining certainty" is necessarily the arising of certainty about the actuality that is seen. Rather, the meaning of "gaining certainty about all aspects" derives from having in mind that it is impossible for superimpositions of apprehending an object in a mistaken way to arise if its actual way of being is seen. Others may say, "If this refers to a cognition that has the property of superimpositions not arising, then it must necessarily be certainty." This is not [necessarily so], but is rather like in the following example. During the phase of the dharma readiness of suffering on the mahāyāna path of seeing, the true nature of the other three [among the four] realities is seen directly. Through this, superimpositions of wrongly engaging in the origin of suffering, cessation, and the path do [simply] not arise, but this [seeing] does not necessarily directly induce [active] certainty about these [other three realities], as such certainty arises [only] later during the phase of the path of familiarization.

2) Though that which is obscured (the dharmadhātu) does not have parts, that which obscures it (the adventitious phenomena that bear its nature) have the character of consisting of [different] parts. Therefore, that which is obscured (the partless nature of phenomena) becomes progressively clearly manifest in exact correspondence with the parts of the adventitious phenomena that bear its nature becoming pure one by one. However, those who do not make such a distinction understand the dharmadhātu as something that consists of parts. There is also the example of the clear sky for this. When the partless sky is obscured by a mass of clouds and someone who wishes to see the sky is looking at it with the [eye] sense consciousness, upon the [respective] portions of this mass of clouds dissolving gradually, the partless sky is also seen gradually. However, during such seeing, it is not that the sky has parts.

2ab) Refuting what is not the position of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, but is claimed to be
This has two parts:
1) Stating the antitheses
2) Their refutation

2ab1) Stating the antitheses

> "Because the nature of phenomena is partless, the fully complete nature of phenomena is seen on the path of seeing. On the path of familiarization, there is nothing more superior than that to be seen." "Apart from seeing the actuality of the nature of phenomena as it was before, there is no progression toward a new seeing of any later actuality of the nature of phenomena."

2ab2) Their refutation
This has two parts:
a) Refutation through scripture
b) Refutation through reasoning

2ab2a) Refutation through scripture
[The *Dharmadhātustava*] says:

> Just as, on the fourteenth day of waning,
> Just a little bit of moon is seen,
> Those aspiring to the supreme yāna
> Will see a tiny bit of buddhakāya.
>
> Just as when the waxing moon
> Is seen more in every moment,
> Those who've entered on the bhūmis,
> See its increase step-by-step.
>
> On the fifteenth day of waxing,
> Eventually the moon is full.
> Just so, when the bhūmis' end is reached,
> The dharmakāya's full and clear.[1477]

The *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* states:

> Even bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi see the sugata heart in a way that is like looking at forms at nighttime, whereas the tathāgatas behold it like forms at daytime.

[In itself,] the moon is not something that has waxing and waning parts. Nevertheless, when it comes closer to the light of the sun, through the power of the shadow disappearing from [the moon], which has [its dark] parts [only] by virtue of its own shadow,[1478] the moon is [progressively] seen completely through [a process that seems to] entail the cessation of those [dark] parts. In the same way, there are also differences as to what is progressively to be seen with respect to the dharmadhātu, and in terms of these differences, the nature of phenomena [that is seen through the] respectively following [bhūmis] is more profound than the one that is seen through the previous ones. You may wonder why that is. What obscures the nature of phenomena [that was seen] previously is coarser and what obscures the nature of phenomena [that is seen] later is more subtle. Therefore, it is merely by virtue of what obscures [the nature of phenomena] being more subtle that also the nature of phenomena [itself] is [referred to as being] more subtle. "Subtle" means being difficult to realize—since it is profound, it is not something to be inferred.

2ab2b) Refutation through reasoning

If it is asserted that seeing a partless phenomenon necessarily means seeing this complete [phenomenon], then it follows that when a single portion of the partless sky is seen, the complete sky is seen because it is a partless phenomenon. The same applies here.

2b) An analysis of whether there are or are not appearances in the meditative equipoise of the noble ones of the mahāyāna

This has two parts:

a) Refuting the system of others
b) Presenting our own system

2ba) Refuting the system of others

This has two parts:

1) Stating the antithesis
2) Its refutation

2ba1) Stating the antithesis

Some people say, "In meditative equipoise, there are appearances of the seeming. Through looking, superimpositions of reference points with regard to appearances are cut through. Through familiarization, while focusing on appearances, one becomes familiar with [the fact] that they are without nature. Therefore, everything (such as pillars and vases) is seen distinctly, just like fine patterns on brocade. Exactly this is also the intention of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra."

2ba2) Its refutation

If this were the case, it would follow that the meditative equipoise of the noble ones is [a discursive mental state with] reference points because it is a mental state of cutting through superimpositions onto the appearances of the seeming. The reason is what is claimed, the entailment is established through valid cognition, and what is to be excluded is excluded through valid cognition.[1479] It would likewise follow that [the meditative equipoise of the noble ones] is [a discursive mental state with] reference points because it is a mental state of focusing on appearances and thus becoming familiar with [the fact] that they are without nature. The reason, the entailment, and what is to be excluded are as before.

2bb) Presenting our own system

This has two parts:

1) Showing that there is a profound essential point in Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's explanation that the meditative equipoise of the noble ones entails appearances

2) Showing that all meditative equipoises of the noble ones are predominantly without appearances and engage the ultimate

2bb1) Showing that there is a profound essential point in Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's explanation that the meditative equipoise of the noble ones entails appearances

[Āryavimuktisena's] *Vṛtti* states:

> Exactly this is reasonable: All phenomena being empty of a nature of their own is the focal object, like, for example, the consciousness in a dream that has the [dream] horses and so forth being empty of a nature of their own as its focal object . . .[1480]

This means that the noble ones who attained great mastery over inner yoga have an inconceivable sphere of experience. Therefore, their phases of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment are not contradictory and they are able to carry the realization of meditative equipoise over into subsequent attainment as well. Thus, they have attained mastery over this distinctive feature of realization, at which point both spacelike meditative equipoise and illusionlike subsequent attainment are one. As [the *Uttaratantra*] says, the one does not block the other:

> The mind [set] on accomplishing activity
> Perpetually blazes like fire,
> Always engaged in the meditative absorption
> Of the dhyāna of peace.[1481]

Therefore, it is stated that it is not contradictory to [simultaneously] accomplish activity for sentient beings and rest in inner meditative equipoise. In this context, the writings of the mighty victor Chötra Gyatso say the following. The noble *Ratnakūṭa* explains that the operation of the meditative equipoise of great bodhisattvas reaches out into subsequent attainment and that the operation of subsequent attainment also feeds back into meditative equipoise.[1482] It is on this ground that the masters Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra made [the above] kind of statement. Therefore, this is the true sphere of the great noble ones. In those who are not noble ones, the prajñā [of realizing] that the appearances of the seeming do not exist in the way they appear focuses on their emptiness and thus knows the aspects of such [seeming] appearances to be appearances of nonexistents, just like [the appearance of] two moons.[1483] Though [nonnoble ones] may have such a [prajñā], it should not be equated with the ultimate wisdom of the nature of phenomena that actually fulfills this function since these [beings] are [still] involved in the [dualistic] facets of apprehender and apprehended.

In brief, it is well known that "Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert meditative equipoise as entailing appearances" and the [corresponding] passages from the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, and so forth were established through scripture and reasoning above. However, this [wrong proposition above that the] wisdom of the meditative equipoise of the noble ones entails the appearances of the seeming as its object does not appear in any of the texts of the final definitive meaning by venerable Maitreya, the son of the victors [called] Asaṅga, supreme noble Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti, and so on.[1484] In our opinion, the appearances that this [meditative equipoise] entails are not appearances of the seeming, but must definitely be explained as appearances of the ultimate.

Some may object, "Appearances of the ultimate (such as the dharmakāya) are impossible." However, the assertion that, within final ultimate reality (such as the dharmakāya), there are no appearances that consist of it does not appear in any great Indian or Tibetan tradition whatsoever. Therefore, [appearances of the ultimate] are not impossible. Some other people may say, "Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra did not explain [the appearances in meditative equipoise] as appearances of ultimate reality. To give a [proper] example [that illustrates] there being appearances of ultimate reality, one would have to present an example that is the appearance of an existent with properties that concord with the [ultimate]. However, what they present here as examples [for such appearances] are the illusionlike appearances of nonexistents, which concord with seeming phenomena. Therefore, in this context, they do not explain [these appearances] as appearances of ultimate reality."

Such talk [only exhibits] the flaw of not knowing the scriptural system of dialectics, which states the following. In order to generate a realization of what is to be proven, there are the two [types of proof] statements that establish the subject property and either demonstrate the positive entailment based on a concordant example or demonstrate the negative entailment based on a discordant example. Stating either one of these brings the other one to mind. Therefore, in this case here, we deal with a probative argument in terms of the latter [type]. Though the manner of formulating [such a] probative argument is not explicitly stated in the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, and so on, one should understand this by virtue of what these masters say.

To expound this a little bit further, some Mādhyamikas [who assert that meditative equipoise] is without appearances claim that the wisdom of the meditative equipoise of the noble ones lacks any appearance of an ultimate object. Those who are skilled in invalidating [this assertion], by way of eliminating the wrong idea of claiming that the wisdom in this [meditative equipoise] is without object, formulate an autonomous probative argument that suits the present proof [of this wisdom entailing appearances]. They do so from the perspective of those who have doubts that [this wisdom] has an object and [already] understood the connection of the entailment in this probative argument. This [probative argument] runs, "Any meditative equipoise of the noble ones necessarily takes appearances of what exists by nature as its object; for example, the meditative equipoise of vajra relinquishment [with its] appearances.[1485] Likewise, also the meditative equipoise of the noble ones who have attained mastery [over inner yoga] takes appearances of what exists by nature as its object."[1486]

Also, some subdivisions of the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists claim that there are appearances of the seeming as the object of the wisdom of the meditative equipoise of the noble ones. Those who are skilled in invalidating [this assertion], by way of eliminating the wrong idea of claiming that there are appearances of the seeming, formulate an [absurd] consequential statement that suits the present refutation [of this wisdom entailing appearances of the seeming]. They do so from the perspective of those who have doubts that there are definitely no [such appearances] and [already] understood the connection of the entailment in this statement. This [absurd consequence] runs, "Any cognition that takes appearances of what is nonexistent by nature as its object is necessarily not of the nature of the meditative equipoise of noble ones; for example, a cognition for which an illusion appears. The opponents claim [the reason] that also the meditative equipoise of noble ones is [a cognition] for which nonexistents appear."[1487]

By virtue of these explanations, the intention of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra is as follows. From the perspective of those Mādhyamikas [who

assert that meditative equipoise is] without appearance, they prove that wisdom has an object. From the perspective of the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, they fling the consequence [back at the latter] that the subject that is the wisdom of the meditative equipoise of noble ones would be the cognition and seeing of ordinary beings, with the reverse meaning of this statement being the proof that ultimate appearances are the appearing objects of this [wisdom]. Thus, by virtue of the positive and negative concomitances of this single probative argument, the above bad philosophical systems of Mādhyamikas and Mentalists are invalidated. The ones who invalidate [these systems] are the False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas[1488] Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra. [Topics] such as the manner in which appearances of the ultimate dawn for ultimate wisdom clearly appear in the unsurpassable texts of the mantra[yāna] and in the twenty dharma works [connected to] venerable Maitreya.[1489] Therefore, these [appearances] are the experiential sphere of the unsurpassable mahāyāna.

2bb2) Showing that all meditative equipoises of the noble ones are predominantly without appearances and engage the ultimate

For noble yogins who rest inwardly within the nature of phenomena, those cognitions and their appearing objects that [together] represent all aspects of the seeming, which consist of apprehender and apprehended, subside naturally, whereas the cognitions and their appearing objects that represent all the aspects which consist of the ultimate, in which these two [—apprehender and apprehended—] are relinquished, dawn naturally. As [the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*] says:

> [Wisdom operates] by virtue of the lack of appearance
> Because duality, how it is designated,
> Sense objects, cognizance,
> And the world as the container do not appear.[1490]

Therefore, [Maitreya] asserts that the subjects and objects of the seeming cease. [The same text] also says:

> For in those in meditative equipoise,
> A reflection of the sphere
> Of this samādhi appears.[1491]

Thus, he explains that the ultimate subjects and objects are observed in this [meditative equipoise]. Some people may say, "It is not contradictory that, even without the subjects and objects of the seeming ceasing, these other [ultimate] subjects and objects exist as something suitable to appear."

Venerable [Maitreya] states clearly in his *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* that this is contradictory:

> By virtue of this appearing, the nature of phenomena does not appear.
> By virtue of this not appearing, the nature of phenomena appears.[1492]

Nothing but this is the definitive meaning.

3) The nature of the obstacles to be relinquished

This has two parts:

a) The factors to be relinquished through seeing
b) The factors to be relinquished through familiarization

3a) The factors to be relinquished through seeing

This has four parts:

a) Definitions of the factors to be relinquished through seeing
b) Instances
c) Classifications
d) The way in which the factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished

3aa) Definitions of the factors to be relinquished through seeing

The definition of the mere factors to be relinquished through seeing is "the imputed obscurations that are to be overcome through the path of seeing."

The definition of the afflictive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing is "the afflicted ignorance that is to be overcome through the path of seeing."

The definition of the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing is "the nonafflicted ignorance that is to be overcome through the path of seeing."

The *Tarkajvālā* says:

> Afflicted ignorance and nonafflicted ignorance . . .[1493]

[Sthiramati's] *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* says:

> Here, cognitive obscurations are explained as the obscurations of bodhisattvas—they are known as "nonafflicted ignorance."[1494]

Someone may say, "This contradicts the explanation in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> What is not afflicted is not a factor to be relinquished through seeing."[1495]

[This is a statement that] is made in terms of the śrāvakas not asserting cognitive obscurations in their system.

3ab) Instances

The [instances] are the ten imputational [wrong engagements]. In particular, it is explained that four [of them]—the last three views and doubt—are solely imputations and [thus] factors to be relinquished through seeing alone. The meaning of the imputational factors to be relinquished is that they are the ignorance that arises from studying bad philosophical systems. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> The imputational ones should be regarded as being those of the others, that is, the tīrthikas.[1496]

As for these [imputational factors to be relinquished], the ignorance that comes from having previously studied bad philosophical systems exists[1497] even in animals and so on.

The nature of all imputational factors of the desire realm to be relinquished through seeing is nonvirtuous. The same [text] says:

> What consists of clinging through conceptions is nonvirtuous.[1498]

The nature of the imputational factors of the two higher realms [to be relinquished through seeing] is neutral. Alternatively, the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> All higher [contaminants] are neutral,
> And so are the desire realm's views about a real personality,
> The clinging to extremes, and the ignorance associated [with them].
> The remaining ones there are nonvirtuous.[1499]

That [all] imputational [factors] of the higher realms [to be relinquished through seeing] and [some of] the lower [desire realm] are neutral accords with the above instruction [that those of the desire realm are all nonvirtuous]. The first two views as well as the aspects of ignorance that are congruently associated with these two views ([as indicated] by "the ignorance associated [with them]") are naturally included in being neutral.[1500] The remaining eight [among the ten imputational factors to be relinquished through seeing] are nonvirtuous.

3ac) Classifications
This has two parts:
1) The position of the mahāyāna
2) The position of the hīnayāna

3ac1) The position of the mahāyāna
This has two parts:
a) The actual classifications
b) Removing objections about these classifications

3ac1a) The actual classifications
This has two parts:
a) The classifications in terms of nature
b) The classifications in terms of focal object, realms, and modes of wrong engagement

3ac1aa) The classifications in terms of nature
When classified in terms of their nature, the factors to be relinquished through seeing are six. The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> The root of existence—the six contaminants—
> Are desire, anger,
> Pride, ignorance, view,
> And doubt. These six
>
> Are explained as seven through the subdivision of desire—
> What arises from the two [higher] realms is the desire for existence.[1501]

Thus, [desire] is classified as two—desire for the desire [realm] and desire for existence. An alternative [classification] is tenfold—the five that are not views and the five views. The five that are not views are desire, anger, pride, ignorance, and doubt. The five views are the views about a real personality, the views about extremes, wrong views, the views of holding a view as paramount, and the views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount.[1502]

3ac1ab) The classifications in terms of focal object, realms, and modes of wrong engagement
When the factors to be relinquished through seeing are classified in terms of their focal object—the four realities (1)–(4)—and the modes of wrongly engaging the three realms (A)–(C), there are 112. What are they?

A1) [In terms of the reality of suffering, there are] the ten wrong engagements through focusing on the reality of suffering of the desire realm. Which

are these ten? They are (a) the five direct wrong engagements and (b) the five wrong engagements [based on previous] wrong engagement.

a) As for the first five, through the views about a real personality, [the five skandhas that make up] the reality of suffering are apprehended as "I" and "mine." Through the views about extremes, this reality of suffering is apprehended as existent or nonexistent, permanent or extinct. Through wrong views, the reality of suffering is apprehended as nonexistent. Through ignorance, one engages in the reality of suffering while being ignorant about its defining characteristics. Through doubt, one engages in it while having doubts about whether the five skandhas are the reality of suffering or not.

b) As for the second five, desire makes one attached and cling to the five views. By way of the five views, pride makes one arrogant and conceited. Through the views of holding a view as paramount, one focuses on any of the sixty-two wrong views,[1503] and thus holds them to be paramount, primary, and excellent. Through the views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount, one clings to both ethics and spiritual disciplines as being pure, excellent, and the path that is conducive to deliverance [from saṃsāra].[1504] (These are [called] "snares," "latencies," "purity through relinquishing the five skandhas," and so on. Among these, the snares are the manifest ones.) Anger makes one upset when hearing the view of identitylessness and such, which is due to its discordance with the five views. Therefore, "the five [types of] anger that focus on the [five] views" are explained.

A2) Likewise, there are the ten wrong engagements through focusing on the reality of the origin of suffering of the desire realm. These are understood by applying the above modes of engaging in the reality of suffering to the reality of the origin of suffering.[1505]

A3) In the same way, the ten wrong engagements by focusing on the reality of cessation of the desire realm are (a) the five direct wrong engagements and (b) the five wrong engagements [based on previous] wrong engagement.

a) As for the first five, through the views about a real personality, the reality of cessation is apprehended as "I" and "mine." Through the views about extremes, the reality of cessation is apprehended as existent or nonexistent, permanent or extinct. Through wrong views, the reality of cessation is apprehended as nonexistent. Through ignorance, one engages in the reality of cessation while being ignorant about its defining characteristics. Through doubt, one engages in the reality of cessation while having doubts about whether it exists or not. It is explained that, through these five, one [only] focuses on the names of both the reality of cessation and the reality of the path, but one does not focus on what they actually are, which is due to the reason that [these actual two realities] are not suitable to be focused on [through these five wrong engagements].

b) The second five are explained in the same way as the above section [A1b)] that starts with "Desire makes one attached and cling to the five views." Some other people may say, "Doesn't [the statement] 'The cessation of a real personality through possessing the [proper] means is not included in any realms or levels whatsoever' explain that the reality of cessation is beyond the three realms? For this reason, it is not justified to speak of 'the reality of cessation of the desire realm.'" Though the reality of cessation is beyond the three realms, [it means to] directly see that the stains to be free from [in this case] consist of existing as someone in the desire realm. By virtue of that, the reality of cessation that consists of being free from these [stains] is labeled as "the reality of cessation of the desire realm," [thus using] the name of the [particular] stains from which it is to be free.

A4) In the same way, there are the ten wrong engagements through focusing on the reality of the path of the desire realm. These are understood by applying the above modes of engaging in the reality of cessation to the reality of the path.

This presentation here is formulated in the way that it appears in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. Up to this point, [in the enumeration of the factors to be relinquished through seeing], there are forty factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to the desire realm.

B)–C) In the two higher realms, there are neither manifest anger nor any seeds [for it] because the mind stream there is moistened by calm abiding and the nine foundations for a hostile mind do not exist. These nine appear in the *Ratnakūṭa*:

> The nine consist of the three thoughts, "This [person] harmed me before," "does so now," and "will do so also in the future"; the three thoughts, "This [person] harmed my friends before" and so on; and the three thoughts, "This [person] benefited my enemies before" and so on.

Thus, there are thirty-six wrong engagements in the form realm (that is, nine for each one of the four realities) and the modes of wrong engagement of the formless realm are just like those of the form realm. Thus, when [all these wrong engagements] are summed up like this, the wrong engagements in terms of all three realms are 112, that is, the 112 [afflictive] factors to be relinquished through seeing.[1506] All these wrong engagements are relinquished at the same time through the path of seeing [of the mahāyāna].

3ac1b) Removing objections about these classifications

Some people may say, "When [the factors to be relinquished through seeing] are asserted in this way, it follows that the cognitive obscurations are

not factors to be relinquished through seeing because they are none of the six primary afflictions." [The reason] does not apply—they are contained in ignorance.[1507] As an alternative way to answer this, [it may also be said that] each of the two obscurations exist in all six [afflictions]. Again, some people may say, "It follows that the secondary afflictions are not factors to be relinquished through seeing because they are none of the six primary afflictions." [The reason] does not apply—it is explained that all secondary afflictions are imputations onto the factors that are the primary afflictions. "However, this is contradictory to the explanation in the *Abhidharmakośa* that the secondary afflictions are not the primary afflictions:

> The afflicted mental factors other than the afflictions
> That are "the skandha of formation"
> Are the secondary afflictions,
> Which are not called "afflictions."[1508]

This is [a statement that is made with] the intention of the secondary afflictions not being the isolates of the primary afflictions.

3ac2) The position of the śrāvakas
This has two parts:

a) The classifications of the factors to be relinquished through seeing
b) Demonstrating a classification that is not justified

3ac2a) The classifications of the factors to be relinquished through seeing
The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> They are ten, seven, seven, and eight,
> Excluding three or two views, respectively.[1509]

This explains that, in the desire realm, there are ten wrong engagements in the reality of suffering. With regard to the two following realities, by subtracting three views (the first two and the last one) each, there are seven [wrong engagements] in each of these two [realities]. For the last reality, by subtracting the first two views, there are eight wrong engagements. Thus, the sum total after subtracting these five [—three or two views, respectively—] is thirty-two [wrong engagements] that exist in the desire realm. It is reasonable to apply exactly the same [procedure] to the form [realm] and the formless realm, saying, "They are nine, six, six, and seven, [respectively]." Thus, by subtracting anger, there are twenty-eight [wrong engagements] in each one of the higher realms. In general, when [the wrong engagements in] all three realms are summed up, there are eighty-eight.

According to the Sautrāntikas, there are ten wrong engagements through focusing on the reality of suffering of the desire realm and eight each by focusing on the remaining three realities, which sums up to thirty-four. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> The wrong engagements with respect to the reality of the origin of suffering are the eight afflictions, with the views about a real personality and the views about extremes being excluded. The same goes for cessation and the path too.[1510]

With respect to the two higher realms, there are nine [wrong engagements] for the reality of suffering and seven for each of the remaining three [realities],[1511] that is, thirty for each of these [realms]. Thus, [the Sautrāntikas] assert ninety-four factors to be relinquished through seeing.[1512]

3ac2b) Demonstrating a classification that is not justified

Some people say, "[On the path of seeing,] there are the sixty-two wrong views that focus on the remaining three realities." If this were the case, it would follow that there are afflictive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing that represent views about a real personality which focus on the three remaining realities.[1513] For (a) [according to these people,] there are the sixty-two wrong views that focus on the three remaining realities and (b) it is explained through the scriptures that if these are present, they represent the views about a real personality. [Reason] (a) is established by virtue of its being claimed [by these people themselves]. [Reason] (b) is established because the *[Prajñāpāramitā]saṃcayagāthā* states:

> Just as the sixty-two views are contained in the views about a real personality . . .[1514]

3ad) The way in which the factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished[1515]

This has two parts:

1) The position of the mahāyāna
2) The position of the śrāvakas

3ad1) The position of the mahāyāna

This has two parts:

a) The detailed presentation with reference points so that the teaching remains
b) The presentation of ultimate personally experienced awareness without reference points[1516]

3ad1a) The detailed presentation with reference points so that the teaching remains

In terms of the first presentation, the factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished through the sixteen moments of the path of seeing in a fourfold manner (1)–(4).[1517] How are they relinquished?

1) The twenty-eight wrong engagements of the reality of suffering of the three realms are actually relinquished through the readiness for the dharma cognition of the reality of suffering. On the explanation of the readiness for the dharma cognition of the reality of suffering in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, its commentary says:

> This completely relinquishes the suffering to be relinquished through seeing, that is, the twenty-eight latencies of the three realms.[1518]

They are relinquished through the "path concurrent with the arising [of the remedy]."[1519] How are they relinquished? First, the proximate cause of the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering and its corresponding potent factor to be relinquished meet. During the second stage, the direct cause of the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering and its corresponding powerless factor to be relinquished meet. During the third stage, [the latter] is relinquished in such a way that the arising of the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering and the ceasing of its corresponding powerless factor to be relinquished are synchronized. As it is said:

> Who sees actual reality is liberated.[1520]

2)–4) Then, these twenty-eight [factors to be relinquished] are relinquished through the dharma cognition, the subsequent readiness, and the subsequent cognition of suffering, respectively, in such a way that [one's mind] distances itself [from these factors] through these [three cognitions].[1521]

The way in which the [remaining] factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished through [the corresponding readinesses and cognitions with regard to] the three remaining realities should be understood in the same way. The *Uttaratantra* says:

> Just as a progressively growing sprout and such
> Break through the husks of the seed,
> Through seeing true reality
> The factors to be relinquished through seeing are put to an end.[1522]

[However,] all presentations that explain that bodhisattvas relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing in a gradual manner entail an intention.[1523]

3ad1b) The presentation of ultimate personally experienced awareness without reference points

In terms of the second presentation, all the factors of the four realities to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished in one single smallest moment.[1524] The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> . . . because all the afflictions to be relinquished through seeing (the wrong engagements in suffering and so on) are relinquished simultaneously. One should know that the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished in a progressive manner because they are to be relinquished through becoming familiar with the path.[1525]

Thus, this is the intention behind the presentation of explaining that all factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished simultaneously.[1526]

3ad2) The position of the śrāvakas

This has two parts:

a) The persons of the gradual path

b) The persons of the simultaneous path

3ad2a) The persons of the gradual path

The persons of the gradual path relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing through the fifteen moments[1527] of the path of seeing in an eightfold manner (1)–(8). How are they relinquished?

1) First, through the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering, the ten wrong engagements in the reality of suffering of the desire realm are actually relinquished. They are relinquished through the "path concurrent with the arising [of the remedy]," which is the same as above [in the presentation of the mahāyāna]. Through the dharma cognition of the reality of suffering, these ten are then relinquished in such a way that [one's mind] distances itself [from them].

2) Through the readiness for the subsequent cognition of suffering, the eighteen (two sets of nine) wrong engagements in the reality of suffering of the two higher realms are actually relinquished. Through the subsequent dharma cognition of suffering, these eighteen are relinquished in such a way that [one's mind] distances itself [from them]. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explains that those factors to be relinquished through seeing that are the wrong engagements in the respectively corresponding realities of the higher

realms are relinquished together. The reason for that is as follows. The factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to each one of the realities of the two higher realms are relinquished together because also the remedy that focuses on them—the readiness for subsequent cognition—arises at one single time.

3)–8) The way in which [the readinesses and cognitions of] the three remaining realities relinquish their factors to be relinquished through seeing should be understood in the same way.[1528] [The *Abhidharmakośa*] says:

> They are ten, seven, seven, and eight,
> Excluding three or two views, respectively.
> Through seeing suffering in the desire [realm] and so on,
> They are progressively relinquished.[1529]

To summarize the gist of this, [the first four times or ways of relinquishment mean that] the factors of the desire realm to be relinquished through seeing that focus on each one of the [four] realities are relinquished through the [respective] dharma readinesses and dharma cognitions [of these realities]. [The second four times mean that] the [factors] of the higher realms [to be relinquished] are relinquished through the [respective] subsequent readinesses and subsequent cognitions. Thus, through applying this principle [to all four realities], there are eight [times or ways of relinquishment] by multiplying the four [realities] with these two [ways of relinquishment].

3ad2b) The persons of the simultaneous path

In terms of persons of the simultaneous path, the fifteen moments of the path of seeing relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing in a fourfold manner. [However, note that] the presentation of the factors to be relinquished through seeing being relinquished in a fourfold manner that is asserted by the śrāvakas in this context here should not be mixed up with the above presentation of the mahāyāna system in which the factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished in a fourfold manner.[1530]

3b) The factors to be relinquished through familiarization

This has four parts:

a) Definitions

b) Instances

c) Classifications

d) The way in which the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished

3ba) Definitions of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization
The definition of the mere factors to be relinquished through familiarization is "what is to be overcome through the path of familiarization."

The definition of the afflictive obscurations to be relinquished through familiarization is "the afflicted ignorance that is to be overcome through the path of familiarization."

The definition of the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through familiarization is "the nonafflicted ignorance that is to be overcome through the path of familiarization."

3bb) Instances
The [instances] are the six innate [wrong engagements].[1531] The commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> The innate views about a real personality are the factors to be relinquished through familiarization.[1532]

The meaning of innate factors to be relinquished is that they represent the ignorance that does not arise from having studied philosophical systems. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> The innate [obscurations] are those of all childish ordinary beings, even of deer and birds . . .[1533]

And:

> Since the entities that are . . . the factors to be relinquished through familiarization . . . exist primordially, it is difficult to tear them apart.[1534]

As for the natures [of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization], both the views that are to be relinquished through familiarization are neutral. The same [text] says:

> What consists of the innate views about a real personality experienced in the desire [realm] is neutral . . .[1535]

It is explained that the same goes for the views about extremes. Most of the factors of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization that are not a view are nonvirtuous. The same [text] says:

> Because the afflictions that are experienced in the desire [realm] are the basic foundations for wrongdoing, they should be regarded as being nonvirtuous.[1536]

All afflictions of the higher realms are neutral.

3bc) Classifications
This has two parts:
1) The classification in terms of the dhātus
2) The classification in terms of the afflictions

3bc1) The classification in terms of the dhātus
[The dhātus] are the eighteen factors to be relinquished through familiarization. As [the *Abhidharmakośa*] says:

> Ten are factors to be relinquished through familiarization,
> Also the [next] five, and the last three are of three kinds.[1537]

The ten [dhātus] that have form are factors to be relinquished [through familiarization]. "Also the [next] five" refers to the five dhātus that are the [sense] consciousnesses. [Each one of] the last three dhātus [(the mental faculty, the mental consciousness, and phenomena) contains] three [portions]—what is a factor to be relinquished through familiarization, what is not [such a factor], and what is neither. Through counting the three [portions] from among these that are [factors to be relinquished through familiarization], there are [some] portions of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization in all eighteen dhātus.

3bc2) The classification in terms of the afflictions
This has two parts:
a) The position of the mahāyāna
b) The position of the śrāvakas

3bc2a) The position of the mahāyāna
This has four parts:
a) Nature
b) The classification in terms of the realms
c) The classification in terms of the levels [of saṃsāra]
d) The classification in terms of the degrees [of the afflictions] on these levels

3bc2aa) Nature
The *Pañca[skandhaprakaraṇa]* says:

> The last three views and doubt are nothing but imputational. The remaining ones are both imputational and innate.[1538]

Thus, it is explained that four [of the ten wrong engagements] (the last three views and doubt) are exclusively factors to be relinquished through seeing. Therefore, when the afflicted factors to be relinquished through familiarization are classified in terms of their nature, there are six—desire, anger, pride, ignorance, the views about a real personality, and the views about extremes. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> The six factors to be relinquished through familiarization are the innate [forms of the] views about a real personality, the views about extremes, desire, anger, pride, and ignorance.[1539]

It is explained that the natures and the seeds of all that is afflicted represent factors to be relinquished. Though the natures and the seeds of all that is nonafflicted are not factors to be relinquished, the afflictions that focus on these [nonafflicted factors] are to be relinquished. As it is said [in the sūtras]:

> O fully ordained monks, relinquish the desire of striving for the eyes. If you have relinquished this, the eyes will also be relinquished.

3bc2ab) The classification in terms of the realms
[In terms of the three realms,] there are sixteen [factors to be relinquished through familiarization]—six in the desire realm and five (except anger) in each one of the two higher realms.

3bc2ac) The classification in terms of the levels [of saṃsāra]
[In terms of the nine levels of saṃsāra,] there are forty-six [factors to be relinquished through familiarization]—six in the desire realm; twenty [in the form realm] (five in each of the four dhyānas); and twenty [in the formless realm] (five in each of the four formless [states]).

3bc2ad) The classification in terms of the degrees [of the afflictions] on these levels
The following appears in the higher abhidharma. In the desire realm, there are nine degrees [of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization] in terms of greater, medium, and lesser desire.[1540] In the four states of the first, second, third, and fourth dhyānas, there are nine [degrees of desire] in each of these four, thus thirty-six. In the four formless states, there are also

thirty-six (nine in each of the four). Grouping them in this way, there are eighty-one [degrees of desire in the three realms]. Likewise, there are eighty-one [degrees of] pride, eighty-one of ignorance, eighty-one of the views about a real personality, and eighty-one of the views about extremes, making 405. Through adding the nine [degrees of] great, medium, and lesser anger in the desire realm to these, there are 414 [factors to be relinquished through familiarization altogether].

3bc2b) The position of the śrāvakas

When classified in terms of their nature, there are four [factors to be relinquished through familiarization]—desire, anger, pride, and ignorance. The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Four are to be relinquished through familiarization.[1541]

When classified in terms of the realms, there are ten—[the above] four in the desire realm and three [(except anger)] in each one of the higher realms. When classified in terms of the levels [of saṃsāra], there are twenty-eight.[1542] When classified in terms of the degrees [of the afflictions] on these levels, there are 252.[1543] [The same text says:]

> Four are to be relinquished through familiarization.
> Except for anger, just these
> Are the same in the form realm and the formless one.[1544]

3bd) The way in which the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished

This has two parts:

1) The position of the mahāyāna
2) The position of the śrāvakas

3bd1) The position of the mahāyāna

According to the mahāyana, the factors of the three realms to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished simultaneously. How are they relinquished? When the greater of the great factors of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished, also the greater of the great factors of the two higher realms to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished (and so forth [for the others]). Though [the manner of relinquishment] is like this, the nine factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished progressively.[1545] This takes place through the "path concurrent with ceasing." As [the *Abhidharmakośa*] says:

> Upon the mind of nonlearning arising,
> It is liberated from obscurations.
> Through the path concurrent with ceasing,
> Its obscurations are relinquished.[1546]

In [the prajñāpāramitā sūtras of] the mahāyāna's own scriptural tradition, it is also said:

> A bodhisattva mahāsattva who dwells on the fifth bhūmi should relinquish ten dharmas . . .[1547]

Therefore, it is explained that [the factors to be relinquished] are relinquished in such a way that the fifth bhūmi and the factors of the fifth bhūmi to be relinquished associate and then their cessation is synchronized. How are they relinquished? They are relinquished in such a way that the cessation of the smaller of the small path of familiarization and the cessation of the powerless greater of the great factors to be relinquished through familiarization are synchronized. [This way of] relinquishment happens in the same way [up through] the synchronization of the cessation of the greater of the great path of familiarization and the cessation of the powerless smaller of the small factors to be relinquished through familiarization.

3bd2) The position of the śrāvakas

In terms of the persons of the gradual path, the nine [degrees of the] factors to be relinquished through familiarization that exist on each of the nine levels [of saṃsāra] are relinquished progressively.[1548] In terms of the persons of the simultaneous path, the manner in which the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished accords with [the manner of] the bodhisattvas.[1549]

2) The knowledge of the path

A) The five causes of the knowledge of the path[1550]

1) Being free from adverse conditions means that the natural, unconditioned, and permanent light of the Buddha's dharmakāya greatly outshines the light that comes from the bodies of the gods, which is a conditioned and impermanent result of their former karmic actions. Subduing the pride of these gods in this way illustrates and includes the vanishing of all other afflictions (such as desire and hatred) that are obstacles for the arising of the knowledge of the path. Some assert that this teaches the physical support for the arising of the

knowledge of the path, but this is not tenable in terms of either the words or the meaning. For the *Vivṛti*'s presenting a mind free from pride means nothing but a particular mental support, which, in itself, does not entail any particular physical support. In terms of the meaning, it is not taught here that the knowledge of the path arises only in gods whose light is eclipsed, but in all those to be guided whose physical and mental supports are suitable for its arising.[1551]

2) However, if the knowledge of the path were to arise directly merely through being free from pride, it would follow that it also arises in śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Anticipating such concerns, the specific mental support of bodhicitta is explicitly taught here too. As for the meaning of the sūtras saying that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas "lack the power to generate bodhicitta,"[1552] based on the *Ālokā* the causes for attaining buddhahood are twofold—the substantial cause (the disposition) and the cooperative cause, which is bodhicitta. Though the former exists in the mind streams of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas too, without the cooperative favorable condition of generating bodhicitta, they generate the mindsets of the hīnayāna, make efforts in them, and, once they obtain the fruition of arhathood, are not reborn in saṃsāra. However, in principle, it is possible for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas too to generate bodhicitta and attain buddhahood. With this in mind, the Buddha said in the sūtras, "I shall rejoice if they too give rise to the mindset for unsurpassable enlightenment." To take the phrase "lack the power to generate bodhicitta" literally is the approach of the Vijñaptivādins, but not that of others.

3) In the mahāyāna system, the presentation of three yānas bears an intention (thus being of expedient meaning), but is not the fully qualified presentation (thus not of definitive meaning). Therefore, all beings are endowed with the feature of being able to proceed to ultimate unsurpassable enlightenment.[1553] For this reason, learning and nonlearning yogins among śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as well as non-Buddhist yogins necessarily need to cultivate the knowledge of the path in order to attain buddhahood. For all sentient beings are pervaded by the buddha heart.[1554]

4) In order to promote the welfare of sentient beings as long as saṃsāra lasts, the noble ones who generated bodhicitta do not relinquish in all respects the latent tendencies that bear the name "afflictions." This is the nature of bodhisattvas who strive for perfect buddhahood.[1555] You may wonder, "What are these afflictions that are not to be relinquished through the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas, but to be kept deliberately?" This is explained in detail in the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra*:

> "What are the causes for saṃsāra of these [bodhisattvas]?" They are as follows—never having enough of searching for the accumulation

> of merit; assuming rebirths in [saṃsāric] existence just as they intend; striving to meet buddhas . . .

The *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchāsūtra* says that afflictions have four capacities—obstructing the arising of their remedies, attracting suffering, taking birth, and producing further afflictions of their own type. Among these, the latter two are not be relinquished on the path of bodhisattvas.

In brief, it is explained that the affliction that is not to be relinquished here is desire. However, the latent tendencies of ignorance and views are deliberately relinquished through the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas. Also, anger and pride are definitely nothing but factors to be relinquished since they are the adverse conditions of the path of bodhisattvas. As for the capacity of desire to agitate the mind, though bodhisattvas do not deliberately familiarize with personal identitylessness, they deliberately familiarize with the prajñā of realizing both kinds of identitylessness as the remedy for the cognitive obscurations. Through this, as a matter of course, they are able to relinquish also the afflictions that are able to agitate the mind because this prajñā eliminates the causes for the afflictions that make the mind intractable—the conceptions of improper mental engagement. However, bodhisattvas do not relinquish the aspect of the afflictions that represents the cause which enables them to assume birth in saṃsāra. For the prajñā of realizing emptiness and great compassion arise in such a way that they are congruently associated, and these two also arise by being congruently associated with the latent tendencies of desire that enable bodhisattvas to take birth in saṃsāra. Therefore, until they attain the buddhabhūmi or the eighth bhūmi, bodhisattvas do not relinquish the latent tendencies of desire, but their mind streams are still associated with them. This is unlike the noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in that the latter two deliberately relinquish also the last two among the above-mentioned four latent tendencies of the afflictions. On the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, their continua—taking rebirths in saṃsāra—must be relinquished deliberately, which means that such relinquishment depends on relinquishing the causes for further rebirths. Consequently, by virtue of this difference between the hīnayāna and the mahāyāna, what is the main factor to be relinquished on the path of the former is presented as an aid for the path of the latter.

Some may object, "But it is explained that whatever is an affliction that fulfills this definition is relinquished through the knowledge of the path. As *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIII.5 explains, it is all afflictions that are relinquished through the path of seeing, which contradicts the above explanation that there are fully qualified afflictions in the mind streams of bodhisattvas." This would be true if the above explanation were about fully qualified afflictions, but such is not claimed here. Rather, we speak of "afflictions" here

because the three criteria for labeling a definiendum are complete (being a definiendum, being instantiated, and not serving as a definiendum for anything else than its own definition); because the "afflictions" here represent the latent tendencies that were input through afflictions and lack the capacity to intensely agitate the mind stream; and because their function (in terms of enabling bodhisattvas to take rebirth) is similar to actual afflictions. The purpose for speaking about such "afflictions" here is to know that the noble ones of the mahāyāna have a cause for taking birth in saṃsāra. The invalidation of the explicit statement is that since such "afflictions" do not agitate the mind stream, they absolutely do not function as the causes for the results that consist of helplessly circling through the unpleasant realms or any other existences within the three realms.[1556]

You may wonder, "So what is the point of presenting these 'afflictions' as afflictive obscurations—they surely should belong to the presentation of cognitive obscurations." They do not—Āryavimuktisena holds that these obscurations are referred to as "latent afflictive obscurations," which is by virtue of the relinquishment of such latent tendencies for the desire realm and existence[1557] as well as the path that relinquishes them existing from the inferior paths onward. On the other hand, the Yogācāras hold that the latent tendencies for the desire realm and existence are afflictions and afflictive obscurations that fulfill these definitions. They also assert that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas relinquish such obscurations in the state of arhathood, while bodhisattvas do so at the end of the continuum of the ten bhūmis. However, it is not that bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi have not completed the relinquishment of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, just as one is not able to set forth that the relinquishment of the skandhas of suffering is not complete on the first bhūmi merely because of not being separated from these skandhas. According to Āryavimuktisena, in addition, all latent afflictions have already been relinquished by the arhats of the inferior paths, so the "afflictions" in question here are not the negative tendencies of those latencies. Rather, in bodhisattvas, these "afflictions" are comparable to the latent tendencies of ignorance (such as exist in arhats). Therefore, the latencies for the desire realm and existence are not presented as actual afflictions or afflictive obscurations.

"But how can these function as causes for taking birth in saṃsāra?" There are two types of causes here—the latencies of desire and the latent tendencies of ignorance. The first serve as the approximately concordant causes for completing a bodhisattva's birth in saṃsāra, with the resultant skandhas being the contaminated phenomena that approximately concord with these causes. The second function as the karma that represents the concordant causes of propelling a bodhisattva to be born in saṃsāra, with their results being the

uncontaminated phenomena that concord with these causes. "In the mind streams of what kinds of bodhisattvas do these two types of causes exist?" The first type of cause exists in noble bodhisattvas on the impure bhūmis who have not gone through inferior paths, and it is this cause that the system of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra presents as the nature of the knowledge of the path. In bodhisattvas on the three pure bhūmis and in those who have gone through the realizations of arhats on the inferior paths before, it is only the second type of cause that functions as the cause for their being born in saṃsāra.[1558]

Some great ones say, "The nature of the knowledge of the path is taught in AA IV.29, which also applies to this context here, from the level of engagement through aspiration up through the path of nonlearning. However, 'the nature of not relinquishing afflictions' put forth by others here is not the intention of Maitreya since it contradicts the sūtras." This is a biased statement since the nature of the knowledge of the path is the knowledge that is the union of prajñā and means. Thus, from the perspective of prajñā, it is true that the nature of the knowledge of the path is as taught in AA IV.29. However, from the perspective of means, the nature of bodhisattvas is represented by the aspiration to promote the welfare of others as long as saṃsāra exists and the actual engagement in such activity (which simply bear the name "the nature of affliction," though this is not asserted by the above people). Therefore, they are taught here in this way by master Haribhadra, so please do not be confused about him.

5) The activity of bodhisattvas whose knowledge of the path has the nature as described in (4) means to engage in the triad of the completion of aspiration prayers, the maturation of sentient beings, and the purification of buddha realms. Through prajñā and skill in means, they gather sentient beings as retinues, mature these retinues, liberate the matured ones (into arhathood), and establish them on the path to reach ultimate liberation (buddhahood). Points (4) and (5) show that the nature and the fruition of the path of bodhisattvas are superior to those of the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

Some people say, "The activity of the knowledge of the path in the second chapter must be identified as the activity of accomplishing the welfare of the world as defined in AA IV.27–28, whereas to identify it as the triad of completion, maturation, and purification is wrong." However, this triad is justified as the activity of the knowledge of the path because the accomplishment of the welfare of the world at the time of the fruition depends on its primary cause, which is the activity of the triad of completion, maturation, and purification at the time of the path. Also, there is no more superior activity than the triad of completion, maturation, and purification to accomplish the welfare of the world at the time of the path either. One should realize that,

by implication, the above claim of the activity in this context here not being justified as said triad, while it is still justified as the activity of accomplishing the welfare of the world is nothing but self-contradictory.

Elaborations on causes (4) and (5)[1559]

As for all clear realizations of bodhisattvas being included in the knowledge of the path, the *Vivṛti*[1560] quotes the sūtras as saying that bodhisattvas should give rise to and know all the paths of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas. "Should know" in this phrase means that bodhisattvas must directly know the clear realizations that exist in the respective mind streams of these other three noble ones, just as they are. As for the awareness that knows in this manner, some Tibetans assert it to be a direct perception that is aware of something other. It appears that some others hold it to be self-aware direct perception and illustrate this through the supposingly concordant example of the clairvoyance of knowing the minds of others. I agree with asserting this kind of knowing as self-aware direct perception, but this example is not tenable. It is not that such bodhisattvas know the clear realizations of the other three noble ones through realizing what is in the mind streams of these noble ones. Rather, it is within their own mind streams that these bodhisattvas fully give rise to and complete the three kinds of identitylessness,[1561] which represent the types of realization of the above three paths, and know these in the manner of self-aware perception through the stainless dharma eye.[1562]

As for what performing the activity of the path of bodhisattvas means, I agree with others that the need to perform the triad of completion, maturation, and purification is the meaning of performing the activity of the path of bodhisattvas. However, to say that to explain the activity of this path as the relinquishment of the obscurations contradicts the explanation of this path having the nature of not relinquishing certain afflictions is just a quibble about words. In fact, that bodhisattvas, through deliberately retaining the afflictions that enable them to assume births in saṃsāra in order to relinquish all obscurations, do not relinquish these afflictions serves as their primary activity of relinquishing obscurations, thus being the perfect conduct of bodhisattvas who are skilled in means. Therefore, the two explanations of the activity of the path of bodhisattvas as (a) relinquishing the obscurations and (b) having the nature of not relinquishing afflictions are not contradictory in their intention.

"So, if bodhisattvas realize the three kinds of identitylessness, must the realizations and relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas be asserted as being complete at that point?" Yes, because the prajñāpāramitā sūtras say:

> That which are the knowledges and relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas represent the great poised readiness of a bodhisattva attaining the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising.

Some say, "One is able to present the realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as being complete at that point, but it is highly absurd for the entire relinquishments of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats having been relinquished too." This stance obviously disagrees with the phrase "That which are the relinquishments . . ." in the above sūtra passage. Also, if you think that such bodhisattvas have not completed the relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas because they have not yet relinquished a tiny portion of the latencies for the desire realm and existence in order to take rebirth in saṃsāra, this is untenable for the following reasons. You would be right if such nonrelinquishment were by virtue of these bodhisattvas not being able to relinquish those latencies, or if the relinquishment of such latencies were dependent on any other number of additional causes. However, though there are no other obstacles to complete relinquishment at that point, bodhisattvas do not relinquish just this amount of latencies by deliberately retaining them. Merely due to the fact of their not relinquishing these latencies, one cannot explain that they have not completed the inferior relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas at that point. It is well known by all proponents of the dharma in general that even though bodhisattvas have relinquished the afflictions through their attainment of the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering on the path of seeing, this does not entail that they have to relinquish what bears the name "the latencies of desire for the desire realm and existence." Also, though these latencies represent the final form of desire, their capacity does not have the nature of afflictions. This is what genuine masters declare. According to Āryavimuktisena's text, such latencies are not fully qualified afflictions. Therefore, in my opinion, the explanation that the mind streams of those who see the reality of the mahāyāna have the nature of not having relinquished the afflictions is of expedient meaning. Consequently, the definitive meaning is that there are no afflictions in their mind streams.

Some people say, "Afflictions have two capacities—there are those that agitate the mind stream and those that bind in saṃsāra. Among these two, the arhats of the hīnayāna have relinquished the capacities of both, while the noble ones of the mahāyāna have not relinquished the latter." This is not tenable either. The capacity of those afflictions that bind in saṃsāra does not exist in the mind streams of bodhisattvas who see reality because they are bodhisattvas who do not dwell in saṃsāric existence. In addition,

if the capacity of those afflictions that bind in saṃsāra existed in these bodhisattvas, this capacity would have to belong to the category of afflictions among the categories of karma and afflictions (as the two possible causes of saṃsāra). But it is contradictory for such a capacity to be this kind of afflictions because it is completely impossible for mahāyāna noble ones to take rebirth in saṃsāric existence through such afflictions performing their typical functions of propelling one into a birth and then completing the particular features of such a birth. In general, though the latencies of the desire for existence (which are the causes for completing rebirth in saṃsāric existence) do exist in noble bodhisattvas, these latencies are not afflictions that bind these bodhisattvas in saṃsāric existence. If the capacity of the afflictions that bind in saṃsāra existed in someone merely by virtue of the fact of their taking rebirth in saṃsāra, then it would very absurdly follow that this capacity exists even in tathāgatas who display the twelve deeds. Thus, the gist of this explanation is to establish that the latencies for the desire realm and existence that exist in the mind streams of noble bodhisattvas are not afflictions.[1563]

Furthermore, some people say, "If the relinquishments and realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are complete in noble bodhisattvas, in terms of those bodhisattvas who have not gone through any inferior paths before, it follows (1) that they have relinquished the afflicted mind from the point of the dharma cognition of the path of seeing onward; (2) that they have relinquished the obscurations of meditative absorption; and (3) that they have attained the path of nonlearning and the nirvāṇa without remainder."

(1) The reason why the first consequence does not invalidate what was explained above is as follows. Since there is no presentation of seven or eight consciousnesses in the terminologies of the hīnayāna texts, it is not explained in them that the mentation that functions as the support for the afflictions (as what is supported) exists as something separate from them. Thus, this comes down to these texts explaining that if the afflictions (the supported) do not exist, the mentation that serves as their support does not exist either (in actual fact, however, I think that it is not the case that there is not even the slightest remainder of the mentation that functions as the support of the afflictions). In the conventional terminology of the mahāyāna, there exist both the afflictions and the mentation that serves as their support. However, for someone who trains on the mahāyāna path, it does not make any difference in this regard whether they have or have not gone through any inferior paths before. Therefore, once the dharma cognition of the mahāyāna is attained, though the afflictions (the supported) do not exist any more, the mentation that serves as their support has not yet been relinquished and thus exists.

(2) As for the reason for the second consequence being unable to invalidate what was explained above, if it is meant in the sense of said

bodhisattvas having relinquished the obscurations of meditative absorption of the hīnayāna, I accept. But if it is meant in the sense of these bodhisattvas having relinquished the obscurations of meditative absorption of the mahāyāna because they have relinquished the afflictive obscurations, the entailment is uncertain.

(3) As for the reason for the third consequence being unable to invalidate what was explained above, if those who are at the level of the dharma cognition of the mahāyāna path of seeing, through not completing the triad of completion, maturation, and purification, do not even manifest the path of nonlearning and the nirvāṇa of the mahāyāna, how could they possibly deliberately retain the path of nonlearning and the nirvāṇa of the hīnayāna? If they were to retain the latter ones, I would answer the above third consequence about bodhisattvas having attained these states by saying, "I accept." "So what are nirvāṇa and the true end referring to then?" They are identified as the dharmakāya of engaging the final level of twofold purity. It is nothing but this that represents the two nirvāṇas—the temporary one of arhats (which is characterized by the relinquishment of merely the afflictive obscurations) and the one of buddhas (which is characterized by the relinquishment of both obscurations). "But then it follows that arhats manifest the dharmakāya because the dharmakāya and nirvāṇa are one and these arhats have manifested nirvāṇa." There is no such flaw—the statement that nirvāṇa must be the nature of phenomena, suchness, the dharmakāya, and the true end is made in terms of the nonabiding nirvāṇa of the mahāyāna that actually fulfills this function. On the other hand, since the inferior nirvāṇas are limited nirvāṇas, it does not follow that the dharmakāya is manifested through having manifested those inferior nirvāṇas. As *Uttaratantra* I.84d says, this is the definitive meaning:

> Except for buddhahood, there is no other nirvāṇa.

If you wonder when the nonabiding nirvāṇa (or the true end) that actually fulfills this function is manifested, this happens once the triad of completion, maturation, and purification is completed. But if the true end is manifested in an untimely fashion without having completed the triad of completion, maturation, and purification, two flaws are accrued—one falls into a nirvāṇa that is extinction and the three kāyas of ultimate buddhahood are incomplete. Those to be guided who are the recipients for the instruction to not manifest the true end without having completed the triad of completion, maturation, and purification are those who see the reality of the mahāyāna. Those who are able to manifest the dharmakāya through relinquishing the cognitive obscurations even without having completed said triad are instructed by mentioning the

above two flaws. If you wonder whether it is possible for any beings to be guided to have the latter disposition, the sūtras say that this is not impossible:

> If one wishes to attain poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising, one is able to become a completely perfect buddha in seven days.

So what is this attainment of poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising? Āryavimuktisena explains it as the first dharma readiness of the mahāyāna. This means that, at this point, through one-pointedly familiarizing with the wisdom of realizing phenomenal identitylessness in such a manner that it is the combined remedy for the cognitive obscurations, one is able to become a completely perfect buddha in seven days. The true end that is manifested in this way in an untimely fashion is the one that actually fulfills its function as far as complete buddhahood in terms of the dharmadhātu goes. However, since the triad of completion, maturation, and purification has not been completed, the buddhahood of the rūpakāyas that are the natural outflow of the dharmadhātu does not exist in this true end that (otherwise) actually fulfills its function.

You may wonder, "What is the actual triad of (1) completion, (2) maturation, and (3) purification?" (1) As for the full extent of the completion of aspiration prayers, what bodhisattvas actually aspire for is the permanent uninterrupted welfare of others by virtue of the two rūpakāyas for as long as there is no rising from the nature of phenomena. However, this does not happen without having fully completed both accumulations. As for the reason for its happening once the two accumulations have been completed, the promotion of the welfare of those to be guided through the rūpakāyas without moving away from the dharmakāya takes place through the power of the fact of dwelling in the nature of phenomena. Thus, in a mind stream of having thoroughly cultivated the two accumulations, it is feasible for the remedies of the obscurations to be produced. For the full completion of the remedies, one needs the full completion of the two accumulations, and in that case, the full completion of the remedies relinquishes the obscurations in a fully complete manner. Therefore, through the full completion of the two accumulations and the full completion of the remedies, the obscurations are completely relinquished. In this way, the relinquishment of everything that obscures this (that is, the rūpakāyas benefiting those to be guided without moving away from the dharmakāya, and thus the corresponding aspiration) is the full extent of having completed aspiration prayers.

"If, once what obscures it is relinquished, the dharmakāya of engaging the nature of phenomena promotes the welfare of others through the rūpakāyas not moving away from it, why is it not also doing the same at the time of

the obscurations not having been relinquished?" Some say, "Through being obscured by the obscurations, any chance for the dharmakāya doing so is prevented." However, I do not think that the dharmakāya of engaging the nature of phenomena does not perform the activities of the rūpakāyas even if the obscurations have not been relinquished. Since the dharmakāya that is the nature of phenomena cannot be divided, no matter whether the obscurations have been relinquished or not, this principle is inconceivable. Others say, "But then it follows that sentient beings have completed the above aspiration prayers because the dharmakāya that is the nature of phenomena in sentient beings performs the activities of having completed these aspiration prayers." There is no entailment—through the reason of the dharmakāya that is the nature of phenomena performing the activities of having completed these aspiration prayers, one is not able to prove that sentient beings (the bearers of the nature of phenomena) perform the activities of having completed these aspiration prayers. Still, some may think, "In terms of those who complete these aspiration prayers that are taught here, completion refers to having been accomplished by some sentient beings because the accomplishment of these aspirations through the dharmakāya of engaging the nature of phenomena does not qualify as the actual completion of aspiration prayers by someone who practices the path." Within the mind streams of bodhisattvas as those who practice the path, it is impossible for the completion of aspiration prayers through the dharmakāya which is the omnipresent nature of phenomena to be completed through these bodhisattvas' own mind streams as something that is their own. Also, since bodhisattvas as the ones who practice the path cease after the end of the continuum of the ten bhūmis, how could it be possible for these bodhisattvas to complete these aspiration prayers? "But then it follows that the statement by others that bodhisattvas complete their aspiration prayers is nothing but words, while, ultimately, they are not able to complete their aspiration prayers." In terms of the definitive meaning, bodhisattvas themselves are not able to attain the completion of their aspiration prayers as something with which their own mind streams are endowed. However, as for those bodhisattvas who attained the power to eliminate all the many obscurations that obscure these very aspiration prayers which exist as being primordially complete through the dharmatākāya of those bodhisattvas, they are able to free this completion of aspiration prayers through the dharmakāya from its obscurations. At that point, the termination of the obscurations (that from which this completion of aspiration prayers through the dharmakāya is to be freed) and the cessation of the bodhisattva (the one who frees it from its obscurations) are simultaneous. This is similar to fire arising from rubbing two sticks, in which case the burning of the sticks and the ceasing of the fire are simultaneous.[1564] It is this kind of activity that is

referred to as "great bodhisattvas becoming truly complete buddhas through having completed their aspiration prayers," which is just stated in this way in terms of convenient worldly conventions. This approach here is the final position that is established through the fine examination of the definitive meaning, but for those with bad fortune, it remains an impenetrable secret.

(2) As for the full extent of having matured sentient beings, this refers only to the kind of maturation that occurs under the influence of those beings to be guided for whom rūpakāyas are suitable to appear looking at these kāyas in any higher or lower sambhogakāya or nirmāṇakāya forms. It is these beings who appear as the retinues of these two kāyas, while any other beings do not appear as their retinues.

(3) The full extent of having purified buddha realms refers to the buddha realms in which the three kāyas (the dharmatākāya and the two profound kāyas that are its natural outflow) dwell. These are not realms that consist of karma and afflictions, but represent the completely pure realms that are made of wisdom.[1565]

B) The knowledge of the path of śrāvakas[1566]

This has three parts:

1) What is to be known—the nature of the path of the śrāvakas
2) The phase of the path of the mahāyāna during which this [knowledge] is generated
3) The question of whether the path or the knowledge of the path is taught [here]

1) What is to be known—the nature of the path of the śrāvakas

The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Dwelling in [proper] conduct and being equipped with study and reflection,
> One then engages in meditation.[1567]

Thus, with one's mind stream being endowed with any one of the seven sets of prātimokṣa vows, one then studies and reflects on the scriptural collection of the śrāvakas. Through this, one becomes learned in the six topics of erudition (the skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, the twelve [links of] dependent origination, what is the case and what is not the case, and the faculties). After this, one cultivates the path, that is, one progressively cultivates the lesser, medium, and great path of accumulation; then, lesser, medium, and great heat; lesser, medium, and great peak; and lesser, medium, and great poised

readiness. Following these, the supreme dharma arises as a single moment. The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Great [poised readiness], whose object is the suffering contained
> in the desire [realm],
> Is a single moment, and the same
> Goes for the supreme dharma . . .[1568]

The meaning of this is that great poised readiness, which focuses on the object that is the reality of suffering contained in the desire realm, arises for just one single moment without having a continuum. The very same applies for the supreme dharma too. The manner in which the path after medium poised readiness arises is as it is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> From the [foundation of mindfulness], heat arises,
> Whose sphere are the four realities
> With sixteen aspects. From heat
> [Arises] peak, which is alike.
>
> Both imprint their aspects by virtue of [the mindfulness of]
> phenomena
> And the other [mindfulnesses] increase them.
> From this, poised readiness arises, with two of its aspects being as
> before.
> All of them increase through [the mindfulness of]
> phenomena.[1569]

From cultivating the [four] foundations of mindfulness, the lesser [level of] heat of the path of preparation arises. The lesser, medium, and great [levels of] heat have the four realities in general as their objects and consist of familiarizing with them in the form of their sixteen aspects (such as the aspect of impermanence). Based on this, [the stage of] heat is fully completed. Based on heat, [the phase of] peak arises, whose focal objects and aspects are like [those of] heat. Both heat and peak imprint their aspects [of the four realities] in the form of the nature of the foundation of mindfulness of phenomena. The other three [foundations of mindfulness] (such as the foundation of mindfulness of the body) increase and complete the path. The two [levels of] lesser and medium poised readiness arise from [the phase of] peak, and their focal objects and aspects are just as [the ones] before.

To summarize the gist of this, during the phase of lesser heat, [one focuses on] the four aspects of suffering with respect to the desire realm and the four

aspects of suffering with respect to the two higher realms, that is, eight altogether. Through applying the same to the other three realities, one meditates on thirty-two aspects. Through meditating on these thirty-two aspects in the same way on each one [of the seven levels] up through lesser poised readiness, there are 224 aspects altogether. During the phase of medium poised readiness, one [first] meditates [only] on twenty-eight aspects by leaving out the four aspects of [the reality of] the path with respect to the higher realms. Then, by leaving out the four aspects of [the reality of] the path with respect to the desire realm, one meditates on twenty-four aspects. By adding these to the twenty-eight before, there are fifty-two. Following that, by leaving out the four aspects of [the reality of] cessation with respect to the higher realms, one meditates on twenty aspects, which—when added to the fifty-two before—makes seventy-two. Then, by leaving out the four aspects of [the reality of] cessation with respect to the desire realm, one meditates on sixteen aspects. When added to the seventy-two above, this sums up to eighty-eight. Next, by leaving out the four aspects of [the reality of] origin with respect to the higher realms, one meditates on twelve aspects (together with the eighty-eight from before, we now have one hundred). Finally, by leaving out the four aspects of [the reality of] origin with respect to the desire realm, one meditates on eight aspects (the previous hundred plus these making 108). At this point then, as far as persons who engage in craving are concerned, by leaving out either one of the last two from among the four aspects of suffering, they must meditate on its other three aspects. Classified in terms of the higher and unpleasant realms, these other three aspects become six, which—together with the 108 above—makes 114. Next, by leaving out both of the last two aspects of the reality of suffering, [those persons who engage in craving] meditate on its first two [aspects]. Classified in terms of the [two] higher [realms] and the lower [desire] realm, these [aspects] become four, which—including the 114 before—sums up to 118. Here, the [second] aspect of [the reality of suffering]—suffering—is the remedy for pride, by thinking, "This [suffering] is me." The [first] aspect of impermanence is the remedy for laziness. In this context, since one has to meditate twice on the aspect of impermanence, through summing it all up in this way, [the level of] medium poised readiness is completed through [having progressed through] 119 aspects. The *Prajñapti* says:

> One hundred and nineteen moments . . .[1570]

As far as persons who engage in views are concerned, the focal objects and aspects of the meditations [that serve] as the remedies for those who engage in craving should be understood in the reverse manner. Since these two—craving and views—are the roots for appropriating [the five skandhas and

their suffering], the remedies in order to [relinquish] them need to be generated intensely. The way in which great poised readiness and the supreme dharma arise was already explained above.

Following the completion of the path of preparation, the sixteen moments of the clear realization of the [four] realities arise in due order. The first fifteen of these constitute the path of seeing. As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> The fifteen moments [arising] from that
> See what has not been seen—thus, they are the path of seeing.[1571]

The sixteenth [moment] is the remedy that distances the factors to be relinquished through seeing, but it is not a remedy for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization.

Next, the remedy for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization—the path of familiarization—arises. How does it arise? In persons of the gradual path, the nine times nine [levels of the] path of familiarization (the remedies that relinquish the nine factors to be relinquished through familiarization that exist on each one of the nine stages [of the path of familiarization]) arise in a progressive manner. As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> On each stage, [there are] nine kinds of flaws,
> And the same goes for the qualities
> Through distinguishing the lesser and so on
> Of the lesser, medium, and great.[1572]

As for the persons of the simultaneous type, the manner in which the path of familiarization (the remedies for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization) arises accords with [the manner of] bodhisattvas.

After the completion of the path of familiarization, the fruition—the twofold wisdom of knowing termination and knowing nonarising—is manifested. As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> The knowledge of termination and nonarising
> Is enlightenment . . .[1573]

You may wonder, "What are the two wisdoms that are taught in this way?" The wisdom that knows termination is the knowledge that entails the aspect of having done what had to be done through [having realized] that "suffering is what is to be understood" and so on.[1574] The *Abhidharmakośa* states:

> The knowledge of termination, with regard to the realities,
> Is the certainty of being known and so forth.[1575]

The wisdom that knows nonarising is the knowledge that entails the aspect that there is nothing more to be done, such as, "Suffering has been understood and there is nothing else to be understood." The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> That there is nothing [more] to be understood and so forth
> Is asserted as the mind [that knows] nonarising.[1576]

2) The phase of the path of the mahāyāna during which this knowledge is generated

This has two parts:

a) The thesis
b) Removing objections to it

2a) The thesis

[All] types of realization and all relinquishments of the śrāvakas are included in the first bodhisattvabhūmi in the manner of the lower being incorporated in the higher for the following reasons. The medium mother [sūtra] states:

> Those which are the knowledges and relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas represent the poised readiness of a bodhisattva mahāsattva attaining the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising.[1577]

In his commentary on this passage, master Āryavimuktisena declared the basic meaning of this to be that all realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are fully completed in the path of seeing of bodhisattvas.[1578]

2b) Removing objections to it

You may object, "Then it follows that, on the first bhūmi, the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are [already] relinquished because the relinquishment of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization exists in śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas." We accept that, on the first bhūmi, there exists the relinquishment of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization in terms of the śrāvakas' and pratyekabuddhas' own systems. For the relinquishment of the mahāyāna's factors to be relinquished through seeing is vaster than the relinquishment of the hīnayāna's factors to be relinquished through familiarization—the vastest kind of relinquishment necessarily includes the most narrow kind of relinquishment. You may say, "Then it follows that, on the first bhūmi, the relinquishment of the factors to be

relinquished through familiarization in the mahāyāna system exists because the relinquishment of the śrāvakas' factors to be relinquished through familiarization exists [on this bhūmi]." [However,] there is no entailment. Some other people may say, "Then it follows that, on the first bhūmi, there is the relinquishment of all afflictive obscurations without exception because the relinquishment of all afflictive obscurations without exception exists in śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats." If this is evaluated from the higher perspective of the mahāyāna, the reason—that the relinquishment of all afflictive obscurations without exception exists in śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats—does not apply [because] the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra* states:

> Because śrāvaka arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who attained mastery have not relinquished the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance that serves as the support for all secondary afflictions, they are [still] endowed with all foul-smelling stains of the afflictions. Therefore, they have not attained the pāramitā of purity.

3) The question of whether the path or the knowledge of the path is taught here

You may wonder, "Is it the path or the knowledge of the path that is taught [here]?" In this second chapter, both the path and the knowledge of the path are taught. [AA I.7bd and II.2d] says:

> The paths of disciples and rhinos,
> The path of seeing, which is of great benefit
> By virtue of the qualities in this [life] and others . . .

And:

> This path of the śrāvakas is to be understood.

To elaborate a bit on this, the primary path to be known [here] is [the special knowledge of the path] that exists in the own mind streams of the bodhisattvas who know the path of the śrāvakas. The reason for this is that the way of knowing this path is to know it in the manner of self-awareness. [The types of the knowledge of the path] that exist in the mind streams of others are presented as the ordinary paths to be known. The reason for this is as follows. If not analyzed, the knowledge of the path in the mind stream of a noble bodhisattva [is aware of the knowledges of the path] that exist in the mind streams of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in the manner of being aware of something other. If analyzed, it is aware of them in the manner of self-awareness. What

is to be known here [by bodhisattvas] (the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas) are not the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas that fully qualify as such, but it is the path of bodhisattvas that is labeled as these [paths]. The reason for labeling [it in this way] is that what contains something is labeled by the names of the phenomena that are contained within it.

In brief, the [actual] path to be known [here] is that which is to be known, generated, and completed in a bodhisattva's own mind stream. Here, "knowing" means an unmistaken awareness, that is, being free from the three conceptions that obstruct the direct seeing of identitylessness.[1579] "Generating" means that [bodhisattvas] need to generate all three types of realization [of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas] in their own mind stream because they are not able to teach them to others if they have not generated them [themselves]. "Completing" means that the completion of realization is sufficient [here], while the absolute completion of relinquishment is not necessary. The reason for this is that there can be [certain] features that obstruct the realizations on the levels of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, but are not able to obstruct the realizations on the bodhisattvabhūmis and are [instead] seized with [skill in] means, so that they are not relinquished by virtue of being required for the welfare of others.[1580] Or even if [such features] are not required, they [at least] do not obstruct the realizations of the mahāyāna. Therefore, complete relinquishment with regard to these [features] is not necessary. Through not completing the relinquishment [in this way], the flaw of the completion [of realization and relinquishment] being incomplete is not entailed either, which comes down to the following. What is to be strived for deliberately by great bodhisattvas is the completion of the realization for the welfare of others. This represents the primary object of their deliberate striving, whereas the completion of the relinquishment for their own welfare is not the primary object of their deliberate striving.

The knowledge of the path is not presented as such through merely knowing the three paths. If this were the case, it would be comparable to it being reasonable to present the knowledges of the path in the mind streams of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as the knowledge of the path since these [knowledges] also know the paths in their [respective] own mind streams, but [these two knowledges] are not presented [as the knowledge of the path]. You may wonder, "So what is the factor that makes [the knowledge of the path] being presented [as such]?" It is presented as the knowledge of the path from the perspective of realizing that all three paths are without any nature. You may wonder whether this [factor] alone is sufficient for presenting it as the knowledge of the path. It is not because the boundary lines for presenting the knowledge of the path consist of its being mainly presented from the perspective of the true end not being manifested without the triad of completion,

maturation, and purification having reached their culmination. [Thus,] the fully complete definition of the knowledge of the path is presented as resting in meditative equipoise within the profound prajñā of the mahāyāna while being engaged in the vast means of the mahāyāna.

C) The knowledge of the path of pratyekabuddhas[1581]

The distinctive features of the path of the pratyekabuddhas that are to be known [here] are explained in the collection of bhūmis[1582] through seven [points]—disposition, path, perfect accomplishment, accumulation, dwelling, wandering, and explanation of the term. The main one among these is the path, which is threefold. (1) After having gathered the accumulations and trained in being learned in the six topics [of erudition] for one hundred eons up through one's respective previous lifetime, one has matured one's mind stream as a pratyekabuddha. Then, in one's last existence, by relying on the actual fourth [dhyāna], one manifests [all stages of the path] from heat up through the knowledge of termination within a single session. (2) On the second path, [during the time] up to one's respective previous lifetime, one does the same as above and [also progresses through] the first two factors conducive to penetration and up through the medium [level of] poised readiness. After these preliminaries, [in one's last lifetime,] one manifests [all the remaining stages of the path] from [the great level of] poised readiness and the supreme dharma up through the knowledge of termination. (3) On the third path, the way to gather the accumulations is as before. Having generated merely [the fruitions of] stream-enterer and once-returner in one's previous lifetime, in one's last existence, one manifests the remaining [stages of the] path. It is explained that there is no certainty for [persons on] the latter two [paths to manifest all the respectively remaining stages of their paths] during a single session. The first path refers to the rhinolike [pratyekabuddhas] and the latter two refer to the greater and lesser group practitioners, respectively. The last path [means that] there are pratyekabuddhas in their last existence who have already traveled on [parts of] the path of the noble ones before. This is explained as follows:

> The prince who gave rise to a śrāvaka's fruition of stream-enterer and once-returner before his last existence will attain his own enlightenment without meeting the teachings of a buddha.

You may wonder, "Why are there no pratyekabuddhas who give rise to [the fruition of] nonreturner in their previous lifetimes?" It is definite that

the [psychophysical] support for manifesting the enlightenment of a pratyekabuddha can solely be a support within the desire realm because it is impossible to manifest the enlightenment of a pratyekabuddha based on a support of the higher realms. As for the manner of this being impossible, based on the [psychophysical] supports of the higher realms, there is no full examination of the dependent origination of afflicted phenomena in its progressive and reverse orders [as it is done by pratyekabuddhas]. That all three [types of persons who have the] disposition of pratyekabuddhas[1583] are equal in terms of the duration of their gathering the accumulations is what is found in the collection of bhūmis, but this does not accord with other systems.

Some may say, "How do you know that those who have gathered only a few accumulations are able to attain [the paths of] preparation and seeing through this before their last existences, whereas those who have gathered a lot of accumulations are not able to attain [these paths]?" Though the [latter two types of pratyekabuddhas above] are able to attain these [paths], the gathering of the accumulations by the [rhinolike] pratyekabuddhas of sharpest faculties is more powerful. Therefore, through accomplishing fruitional phenomena that are more distinguished than the ones of those pratyekabuddhas who practice in groups, in their last existence, [the rhinolike pratyekabuddhas] give rise to four paths during a single session. This is [said] in order to teach that the rhinolike pratyekabuddhas are superior to the other pratyekabuddhas.

The distinctive features of relinquishment [of pratyekabuddhas] are as follows. In the mind stream of a rhinolike [pratyekabuddha], in terms of the factors to be relinquished through seeing, the afflictive obscurations and those cognitive obscurations that are conceptions about the apprehended are relinquished. Furthermore, they relinquish the cognitive obscurations with regard to the three realms that are conceptions about the apprehended and the nine [degrees of] afflictive obscurations of the higher realms in a combined way. As for the afflictive obscurations of the desire realm, they have already relinquished these through the mundane path of familiarization before the path of seeing because they attained the fourth dhyāna and did not regress [from it]. Thus, they do not need to relinquish these [afflictions] through the supramundane path of familiarization. I think that there are others (those [pratyekabuddhas] in their last existence who have gone through earlier fruitions, such as [the one of] a stream-enterer, before) who, at the time of relinquishing the afflictive obscurations [among] the factors to be relinquished through seeing before [their last existence], relinquish them through the supramundane path.

The distinctive features of realization [of pratyekabuddhas] are as follows. As for the distinctive feature of realizing personal identitylessness, they are like the śrāvakas. Apart from that, they [also] realize the phenomenal

identitylessness with respect to the apprehended, that is, they realize the true reality empty of the appearance of the duality of apprehender and apprehended. This [realization] is twofold through dividing it, in terms of direct realization, into the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation. The first one is again twofold through dividing it into [the paths of] seeing and familiarization, while the second one is threefold (the paths of seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning).

Though [pratyekabuddhas relinquish the conceptions about the apprehended] in this way, they do not relinquish the conceptions about the apprehender. As for the meaning of this, the False Aspectarians say, "They have not relinquished the conceptions about the apprehender because they do not realize that the apprehended aspect, which bears the name 'false imagination,' is without reality." Or, as the Mādhyamikas say, "They have not relinquished the conceptions about the apprehender because they do not realize that nondual wisdom is without reality." Yet others say, "The pratyekabuddhas are not different from the śrāvakas in that they study and reflect on the [latter's] scriptural collection. But it is not reasonable that they do not relinquish the conceptions about the apprehender, while they have relinquished the conceptions about the apprehended." With regard to this, Dharmamitra explains that it is easy to realize that these [external] physical forms—the container [of the world] and its contents—lack reality since their arising and perishing are obvious. However, it is difficult to realize [the lack of reality of] internal consciousness since its continuum is stable. Some say, "This is not justified. Since the container (such as mountains) has a stable continuum, it is difficult to realize [its lack of reality]. But it is easy to realize [the lack of reality of] internal consciousness since it is established through our experience that it keeps changing in terms of varying focal objects and aspects. Therefore, even the Vātsīputrīyas assert that mind is momentary, but they do not assert that form and such are momentary."

[All] this is ignorant because internal consciousness operates so swiftly in a manner of not being something other than this very consciousness. Since ordinary beings of weak internal insight as well as noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have no certainty about this and thus do not recognize it, it is difficult for them to realize that the [swiftly operating moments of internal consciousnesses] lack reality. On the other hand, [the fact that] the continua of external [phenomena] (such as rivers and burning butter lamps) do not abide for a single moment can be observed and recognized, by way of the [perceptual] mode of other-awareness, even through the sense perceptions of ordinary beings of weak insight.[1584] Therefore, to relinquish the conceptions about the apprehended is easy. To say like the Vātsīputrīyas that "mountains and such have stable continua, while consciousness does not have a stable

continuum" is a bad system. For both [external phenomena and consciousness] are equal in being momentary, whereas [the Vātsīputrīyas] claim that there are [some phenomena] with stable continua and [some phenomena] with unstable continua among these two. You may object, "But this mistake applies to your master Dharmamitra as well because these two [—external phenomena and internal consciousnesses—] are equal in being momentary, whereas he asserts that the external container and its contents are not stable, while internal consciousness has a stable continuum." He does not assert this—all he says is that, from the perspective of the changes of external [phenomena] being coarser, it is easy to realize [that they lack reality]. From the perspective of the changes of the internal being more subtle, it appears to childish beings as if it were stable. Therefore, it is difficult [for them] to realize [that it lacks reality too]. However, [Dharmamitra] does not claim that there is any difference between the sets of external and internal entities in terms of having stable or unstable continua.

Furthermore, you may wonder, "How are the states of body, speech, and mind of pratyekabuddhas?" The state of their body is that rhinolike ones stay all by themselves, whereas the other two [types] wander around together in groups. The state of their speech is that all of them have stopped talking. However, this is not the case under all circumstances because it is just their primary [state of speech] as a reaction to [certain] beings to be guided, whereas the sūtras say that they [at other times] do have conversations, speak about the dharma, and so forth. [Their state] of mind is to dwell in the three doors to liberation. Their state of enlightened activity consists of physical expressions through which they teach the dharma and so on as well as of demonstrating miraculous powers. In brief, if you wonder which special qualities they have that make them more distinguished than the śrāvakas, the *Madhyamakahṛdaya* says:

> Thus, their minds do not engage
> In hustle and bustle,
> Sentient beings' welfare, or [worldly] activities.
> Therefore, it is asserted that they have no masters.
> . . .
> The first ones, who stay alone,
> Have the aspiration
> To realize the profound.
> The remaining two stay together in groups.
>
> With their bodies and so on being well-disciplined,
> They engage in going for alms.

> In order to take care of inferior [beings],
> They are endowed with utter peace alone.[1585]

You may wonder, "Which philosophical system do these persons who are pratyekabuddhas propound?" They are included in the category of Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists because they assert that, after having relinquished the conceptions about the apprehended, single awareness is real as the nonduality of object and subject.[1586]

D) The knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas[1587]

This has two parts:

1) The supports in which it arises
2) What is to be generated—the path of seeing

1) The supports in which it arises

This has three parts:

a) The physical supports in which it arises
b) The minds of the grounds from which it arises
c) The causes from which it arises

1a) The physical supports in which it arises

[The knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas] does not arise in beings in the unpleasant realms, [in beings in] Uttarakuru, and in those who have committed the five actions of immediate consequence because they are obscured by afflictive, maturational, and karmic obscurations, respectively. It does also not arise in the physical supports of the [two] higher realms because weariness [with saṃsāra] has vanished there due to not having any feelings of suffering. So if you wonder in which [physical supports this knowledge] arises, it arises in men and women in the three [other] continents as well as in the gods of the desire realm. The sūtras say:

> At the time of explaining this teaching of the mother, the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising arose in twelve trillions from among all gods and humans.

And:

> The eyes of dharma in five hundred fully ordained nuns became completely pure, unblemished, and stainless with regard to the dharmas.

1b) The minds of the grounds from which it arises

[The knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas] relies on the six grounds of dhyāna because [the *Abhidharmakośa*] says:

> Seeing, focus, and operation
> [Have] the same grounds as the supreme dharma.[1588]

Thus, the [mental] supports for the supreme dharma must be explained to be any of the six grounds of dhyāna. Therefore, also the path of seeing relies on any of these six because it does not arise from the formless [absorptions] or the preparatory stages of the [three] higher dhyānas for the following reasons. The path of seeing and what is supported by and follows it function as the remedies for the three realms, [whereas] the formless [absorptions] do not focus on the desire [realm] and their superior insight is weak. [The path of seeing] is not supported by the preparatory stages of the [three] higher [dhyānas either]. For if the actual higher [dhyānas] are attained, the preparatory stages of these higher [dhyānas] have [of course] been attained [already], but if the [convenient] actual higher [dhyānas] have been attained, one does not rely on the [more] difficult paths of the preparatory stages of these higher [dhyānas].

Alternatively, [it is explained that the path of seeing of bodhisattvas] relies on the actual fourth dhyāna. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Having arrived at the very pure fourth dhyāna,
> Nonconceptual wisdom is seized and . . .[1589]

1c) The causes from which it arises

The path of seeing arises from the four conditions. The causal condition consists of the four parts of the path of preparation [because the AA says:]

> The cause for attaining all three yānas.[1590]

The dominant condition is samādhi. [The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says]:

> Fully investigating knowable objects
> Is based on samādhi.[1591]

The object condition is the illusionlike appearance of the four realities. [The AA says]:

> Through four moments of readiness and cognition
> For each one of the realities . . .[1592]

The immediate condition is the supreme dharma [of the path of preparation. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says]:

> At that point, there is swift contact
> With the uninterrupted samādhi.
>
> Since right after it
> The distractions of the apprehender are relinquished . . .[1593]

2) What is to be generated—the path of seeing

This has five parts:

a) Definition
b) Detailed classification of the instances
c) Explanation of the terms of the definienda
d) The manner in which [this path] relinquishes the factors to be relinquished
e) Considering whether there is or is not a subsequent attainment that is [part of] the path of seeing

2a) Definition

This has two parts:

a) Refuting the systems of others
b) Presenting our own system

2aa) Refuting the systems of others

[Some] say that the definition of the [mahāyāna path of seeing] is "the revelation of the previously unseen [fact] of all phenomena being without nature through newly seeing it." In this case, according to the system that asserts śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas having the realization of phenomenal identitylessness, the following invalidation applies. It follows that the second and all following moments of the śrāvaka path of seeing are not the path of seeing because the definition that is asserted here does not include them. Furthermore, it follows that the path of seeing of someone on the śrāvaka path of seeing who has entered the path of the mahāyāna is not the path of seeing because it lacks directly seeing the previously unseen [fact] of all phenomena being without nature.

Others may say, "Also noble śrāvakas realize that all phenomena are without nature. [Thus,] for arhats who have previously gone through the śrāvaka path of seeing and then entered the mahāyāna, apart from this śrāvaka path of seeing there is no need for a mahāyāna path of seeing arising [in them] again." But then it follows that it is impossible for such [arhats] who have entered the [mahāyāna] to become buddhas because it is impossible for them to attain

the first generation of bodhicitta. If it is said that [the reason] does not apply, [the question is] whether it is a mundane first generation of bodhicitta that arises in them or whether it is a supramundane first generation of bodhicitta that arises. In the first case, it would follow that it is possible for such noble śrāvakas to fall down into [the states of] ordinary beings because there is an arising of a mundane first generation of bodhicitta in these noble śrāvakas. If this is accepted, [it contradicts] the explanation [in the *Abhidharmakośa*] that it is impossible to regress from the fruition of a stream-enterer:

> But one does not regress from the first [fruition].[1594]

Some may say, "But since you accept that noble śrāvakas enter the mahāyāna from its path of accumulation, on this mahāyāna path of accumulation they [must then generate] either the mundane or the supramundane generation of bodhicitta of the mahāyāna. They have to generate the first one because they must enter the path of the mahāyāna in a progressive manner. [But] if they have to do this, this equals [your above] consequence that noble śrāvakas fall down into [the states of] ordinary beings." This does not follow. By virtue of asserting a mere entering into the mahāyāna path of accumulation, without making any distinction into mundane or supramundane, noble śrāvakas do not have to become ordinary beings because it is impossible that a change of the distinctive features of the path to the better leads to the distinctive features of its support (the person) becoming worse.

In the second case [of a supramundane generation of bodhicitta in said arhats], this ruins [the above claim that] the mahāyāna path of seeing does not [need to] arise in noble śrāvakas who have entered the path of the mahāyāna. If it is still asserted that it is not necessary for the mahāyāna path of seeing to arise in noble ones of the hīnayāna once they have entered the mahāyāna path, there are also other flaws. It follows then that it is impossible for those on the śrāvaka path of seeing who have not entered other yānas before and enter the mahāyāna path to relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing that are cognitive obscurations because the mahāyāna path of seeing as the remedy [for these cognitive obscurations] does not arise [in them], just as in those with misguided craving. If this is accepted, it follows that it is impossible [for them] to become buddhas.

Wishing to relinquish these flaws, it may be claimed that all aspects of the path of seeing are one single moment. However, in this case, it follows that its division into sixteen [moments] is meaningless. Wanting to get rid of the flaw that lies in this consequence, even if it is claimed that these sixteen [moments] are one in nature, there only follows the impossibility of [there being] a path of liberation [after the uninterrupted path] on which one is

liberated from the factors to be relinquished through seeing. And if this [path of liberation] is asserted as being the path of familiarization, it only follows that [the path of] seeing is not separated from [the path of] familiarization through a [phase of] subsequent attainment. If this is accepted, it follows that the correct result reason that a bodhisattva with medium faculties on the path of seeing accomplishes irreversibility is impossible;[1595] and if this is accepted, it follows that the presentations of approaching and abiding bodhisattvas are not reasonable.

2ab) Presenting our own system

The definition of the mere path of seeing is "that which provides the opportunity for liberation, has the nature of the [seven] branches of enlightenment, and does not have the nature of the path of familiarization." The definition of the path of seeing of bodhisattvas is "the mahāyāna clear realization of the [four] realities that has the nature of the [seven] branches of enlightenment and does not have the nature of the path of familiarization."

Here, others may say, "As for a path of seeing with this definition, if you do not assert that its second and all following moments are a new seeing, are you still able to claim that these following moments are this very path of seeing?" We are very much able [to do so] because if they were not the path of seeing, they would have to be presented as the path of familiarization, but none of the dharmas for presenting them as the path of familiarization are complete in them. [The reason] does apply because in order for [said moments] to be the path of familiarization, they definitely would have to be subsequent clear realizations, but they are [immediate] clear realizations of the realities. It may be said, "They *are* subsequent clear realizations." They are not because, in order for them to be such [subsequent realizations], they would have to be mental states that clearly realize the nature of phenomena and arise subsequent to having risen from the [preceding] single session of meditative equipoise [of the path of seeing] during which the nature of phenomena is seen newly. However, the second up through the sixteenth moment of the path of seeing are not such [mental states].

2b) Detailed classification of the instances[1596]

This has two parts:

a) The system of the mahāyāna
b) The system of the hīnayāna

2ba) The system of the mahāyāna

This has three parts:

1) Refuting [the systems of others]
2) Presenting [our own system]
3) Removing [objections]

2ba1) Refuting the systems of others
This has two parts:

a) [Refuting the assertion that the mahāyāna path of seeing arises] solely as having a single nature
b) Refuting the assertion that [this path] arises solely as something that entails different stages

2ba1a) Refuting the assertion that the mahāyāna path of seeing arises solely as having a single nature

1) Stating the claim

Some say categorically, "The path of seeing arises as having the character of one nature with sixteen isolates." They list the number of these sixteen isolates as follows. "Not being afraid of directly seeing the true nature of the four realities is one in nature with the readiness for dharma cognition. In dependence on each one of the realities, this is divided through different isolates, such as the readiness for the dharma cognition of the reality of suffering. From the point of view that this very readiness for dharma cognition arises in a way that resembles the readiness for dharma cognition of previous bodhisattvas, it is the readiness for subsequent cognition. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> One is similar to other children of the victor.[1597]

Again, in dependence on each one of the realities, this is fourfold, such as the readiness for the subsequent cognition of the reality of suffering. The direct seeing of the final object to be realized (the true nature of the four realities) through the final realizer (nonconceptual wisdom) is one in nature with dharma cognition. Again, in dependence on each one of the realities, it is the dharma cognition of the reality of suffering and so on. From the point of view that this very dharma cognition arises in a way that resembles the dharma cognition of previous bodhisattvas, it is the subsequent cognition. Again, in dependence on each one of the realities, it is fourfold, such as the subsequent cognition of the reality of suffering."

2) Its refutation

From this, it follows that such bodhisattvas would not have to cultivate the four immeasurables during the eighth moment of the path of seeing in order to prevent them from falling into cessation during the ninth moment because when the eighth moment (during which they have not [yet] fallen into cessation) arises, the ninth moment during which they do not fall into cessation [any more] has already arisen [too]. If it is said that [the reason] does not apply, [the above claim that] the path of seeing arises at one single time is ruined. If it is said that there is no entailment, it is necessarily the case for

the already arisen ninth moment (during which [these bodhisattvas] do not fall into cessation [any more]) that they do not have to cultivate the four immeasurables during the eighth [moment] in order to prevent them from falling into cessation during the ninth one—[the eighth one] is just like the time when the ninth [moment] during which they do not fall into cessation [any more] has arisen. If this is accepted, it contradicts the explanation in the *Vṛtti* that [bodhisattvas] have to cultivate [the immeasurables]:

> During the eighth moment of the path of seeing, bodhisattvas have to cultivate the immeasurables. Otherwise, during the ninth moment, without considering the realms of sentient beings, they would fall into cessation.[1598]

Furthermore, it follows that the culmination of the path of seeing during which [bodhisattvas] cultivate the lion's sport and the culmination of the path of seeing during which they familiarize with the twelve [links of] dependent origination are not meditations that [happen] at an earlier and a later time, respectively, because they arise at the same time. If this is accepted, [it contradicts AA V.23]:

> Then, after having been absorbed
> In the samādhi of the lion's sport,
> Dependent origination is examined
> In its progressive and reverse orders.

Furthermore, it follows that bodhisattvas relinquish all factors to be relinquished through seeing at a single time because the path of seeing arises at a single time. If this is accepted, it follows that those factors to be relinquished through seeing that are the conceptions about the apprehender as an imputed individual do not exist in the mind streams of [such] noble ones because they do not have factors to be relinquished through seeing that are the conceptions about the apprehender as a substantial person. The reason is established through the explanation that [the conceptions about the apprehender as a substantial person] exist only in ordinary sentient beings. If it is said that there is no entailment, the claim that all factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished at one time is ruined. If this is accepted, it contradicts the explanation [in AA V.6ac] that the conceptions about the apprehender as an imputed individual that are to be relinquished through seeing *do* exist in the mind streams of noble ones:

The two conceptions about substantially and imputedly existent
sentient beings
Are asserted as the ones about the apprehender.
Divided by ordinary beings and noble ones . . .

[Someone] may try, "The conceptions about the apprehender as an imputed individual that are explained to exist in the mind streams of noble ones are factors to be relinquished through familiarization." The conceptions about the apprehender as an imputed individual that are explained in this [verse] are not factors to be relinquished through familiarization because it belongs to the section that explains solely [the culmination of] the path of seeing.

2ba1b) Refuting the assertion that this path arises solely as something that entails different stages

1) Stating the claims

Some say, "[The path of seeing] arises as having four natures—the two paths of seeing when the nature of phenomena is seen and the two paths of seeing when wisdom is seen. Therefore, the nature of phenomena is seen through both readiness for cognition and dharma cognition, while wisdom is seen through both subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition." Some others say categorically, "The path of seeing arises progressively in sixteen moments."

2) Their refutation

It follows that bodhisattvas relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing progressively because the path of seeing arises progressively. The [reason] entails the [predicate], just as in the case of the śrāvaka path of seeing. If this is accepted, [it contradicts] the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*:

> . . . because all the afflictions to be relinquished through seeing (the wrong engagements in suffering and so on) are relinquished simultaneously. One should know that the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished in a progressive manner because they are to be relinquished through becoming familiar with the path.[1599]

Furthermore, the sūtras state:

> Immediately upon connecting with this vision,
> The views about a real personality, holding ethics and spiritual
> disciplines as paramount,

And doubt (these three afflictions)
Are relinquished simultaneously and the realities of the noble ones are seen.

2ba2) Presenting our own system
This has two parts:
a) The presentation of the path of seeing in general
b) The detailed explanation of the intention of the text of the *[Abhisamay]-ālaṃkāra* and its commentaries in particular

2ba2a) The presentation of the path of seeing in general

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* explains:

> The presentation of the path of seeing is twofold—the detailed presentation with reference points so that the teachings remain and the presentation of ultimate personally experienced awareness without reference points.[1600]

Thus, the path of seeing of bodhisattvas [is presented] in two [ways]:
1) The detailed presentation with reference points so that the teachings remain
2) The presentation of ultimate personally experienced awareness without reference points[1601]

The first represents the scope of explaining [this path] and the latter is the scope of its arising in the mind stream. The *Ālokā* says:

> . . . through the power of reasoning, the path of seeing is one single moment of clear realization, but it is explained as sixteen moments of clear realization [in terms of eliminating various kinds of mistakenness].[1602]

1) The detailed presentation with reference points so that the teachings remain has two parts:
a) The thesis
b) Presenting the proof for this [thesis]

1a) The sixteen moments of the path of seeing arise progressively and these moments must refer to [the time it takes to] complete a [specific] activity. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> A moment of mind should be understood as the complete arising of a cognition with regard to what is to be cognized [by it].[1603]

You may wonder, "How do these sixteen [moments] arise in a progressive manner?" (1) Not being afraid of directly seeing the impure true nature of the reality of suffering of the three realms is the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering, which is its uninterrupted path. "Uninterrupted path" refers to the remedy that actually relinquishes the factors to be relinquished. (2) The dharma cognition of suffering that directly sees the pure true nature of the reality of suffering of the three realms is the path of liberation. "Path of liberation" refers to the remedy that distances the factors to be relinquished (for the presentation of "impure" and "pure" [in this context], see section 2bb below that discusses the system of the bhūmis of śrāvakas). (3) Not being afraid of directly seeing that the first two wisdoms [just mentioned] are the causes for the qualities of the noble ones is the readiness for the subsequent cognition of suffering. (4) The wisdom that takes this very readiness for the subsequent cognition of suffering as its object is the subsequent cognition of suffering. Both of these also represent the path of liberation. (5)–(16) The same [pattern] as in the case of [the reality of] suffering applies to the remaining three realities.

You may wonder, "What are the objects of the two [latter] wisdoms?" The commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> The object of the supramundane path is twofold—suchness and perfect wisdom.[1604]

The progressive arising [of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing] is known through the explanation in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* itself, which says:

> (1) What is readiness? It is the uncontaminated prajñā in which the reality of suffering becomes revealed as one's own personal experience by virtue of prior analysis [on the path of preparation]. Through this [prajñā] of seeing suffering, the [respective] afflictions to be relinquished are relinquished. This is called "the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering." (2) What is the dharma cognition of suffering? It is the cognition that manifests liberation [from the respective afflictions] right after the end of the readiness [for the dharma cognition of suffering]. (3) What is the readiness for the subsequently realizing cognition of suffering? It is the uncontaminated prajñā right after the end of the dharma cognition of suffering in which it becomes revealed as one's own personal experience that the two [cognitions that consist] of the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering and the dharma

> cognition of suffering are the causes for the qualities of the noble ones. (4) What is the subsequently realizing cognition of suffering? It is the cognition that definitely seizes the readiness for the subsequently realizing cognition. The readinesses and cognitions that correspond to the remaining three realities should be understood in the same way. Here, through the readinesses for dharma cognition and the [dharma] cognitions, the apprehended is realized [to be empty]. Through the subsequently realizing readinesses and the [subsequent] cognitions, the apprehender is realized [to be empty]. It should be understood that all readinesses and cognitions entail the yoga of dwelling in signlessness. These sixteen moments of mind constitute the path of seeing.[1605]

[Thus,] presenting it in such a way is a presentation that is based on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

Alternatively, by taking the [four] aspects of the reality of suffering of the three realms as the bearers of their true nature, they are progressively related to [the two readinesses and the two cognitions] from the point of view of realizing the true nature of these [four aspects]—dharma readiness [is related] to "impermanence," dharma cognition to "suffering," subsequent readiness to "identitylessness," and subsequent cognition to "emptiness." The same manner of relating [the respective four aspects of each reality to the readinesses and cognitions] applies to the remaining three realities too.

1b) Presenting the proof for this thesis

This corresponds to [what the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says]:

> There are the four minds that accord with the factor of dharma cognition, the four minds that accord with the factor of subsequently realizing cognition, and . . . at their end, a single engagement in the meditating mind that is mere calm abiding. Through all these nine minds together, the path of seeing is fully completed.[1606]

Here, the first eight [minds] are divided into two [each] (the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation), thus making sixteen. The ninth one is the nominal path of seeing. Moreover, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> [The path of seeing] is also the dharma cognition that focuses on the removal of conventional designations of sentient beings, the removal of the conventional designations of phenomena, and the removal of the conventional designations of both of these in all respects.[1607]

Thus, it explains the progressive arising of the path of seeing through the threefold removal of conventional designations. [In this passage,] "sentient being" refers to a personal identity; "phenomena" refers to a phenomenal identity; "conventional designations" stands for the conceptions that are formed subsequent to such designations; "removal" means relinquishment; and "in all respects" refers to [both] sentient beings and phenomena. Here, all three [(removing designations of sentient beings, phenomena, and both)] are explained as "dharma cognition." In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, we also find the following:

> The first two should be regarded as the dharma cognition associated with its congruent factors and the third one, as the subsequent cognition associated with its congruent factors.[1608]

This progressive arising of the path of seeing is also stated in the *Uttaratantra*:

> Just as a progressively growing sprout and such
> Break through the husks of the seed,
> Through seeing true reality
> The factors to be relinquished through seeing are put to an end.[1609]

The *Vṛtti* says:

> During the eighth moment of the path of seeing, bodhisattvas have to cultivate the immeasurables. Otherwise, during the ninth moment, without considering the realms of sentient beings, they would fall into cessation.[1610]

Therefore, in accordance with the intention of these quotes, the first [more] comprehensive [presentation] is definite as the path of seeing.

2) The presentation of ultimate personally experienced awareness without reference points has two parts:

a) The thesis
b) Presenting the proof for this [thesis]

2a) The path of seeing arises as having a single nature and at a single time—it has no divisions in terms of isolates. In this context then, the first moment of the first bhūmi is the path of seeing, while the second and all following moments belong to the path of familiarization.[1611] Thus, here, the path of seeing is solely an uninterrupted path because it is the remedy that actually relinquishes the factors to be relinquished. Some may object, "There is no

certainty about this because [AA V.21d] explains a path of liberation as the path of seeing:

> Who sees actual reality is liberated."

Then it follows that the first moment of the śrāvaka path of seeing is a path of liberation because it is liberated from its respective factors to be relinquished. The entailment is what is claimed. If this [consequence] is accepted, [it contradicts] the explanation [in the *Abhidharmakośa*] of [the first moment of the path of seeing] being an uninterrupted path:

> Readiness and cognition, in due order,
> Are the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation.[1612]

2b) Presenting the proof for this thesis
The *Viniścāyasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> In terms of the second presentation, starting with the nature of the single mind that is congruently associated with cognizing suchness, the path of seeing is fully completed. Here, the path of calm abiding is to be regarded just as before.[1613]

Furthermore, the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* explains that the path of seeing does not have any divisions after dharma readiness:

> Right upon dharma cognition,
> If there were a distinction in it,
>
> Then those unlearned people
> Who think that even very subtle entities
> Arise through something
> Would not see the actuality of origination through conditions.[1614]

In accordance with this, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* declares that the basic nature of the four realities arises at a single time:

> Whoever sees dependent origination
> Sees suffering,
> Its origin, cessation,
> And the path.[1615]

The *Ālokā* states:

> The first moment of the first bhūmi is the path of seeing. Then, [bodhisattvas] attain the other moments—the second one and so on [of this bhūmi]—up through the "vajra" uninterrupted path, which immediately afterwards brings forth the buddhabhūmi of perfect enlightenment. Since all the [latter] realize the dharmadhātu as being the actuality that is supreme and so on,[1616] they are presented as the path of familiarization.[1617]

Furthermore, in the mantrayāna, there are limitless scriptural passages such as the illustrating example [wisdom] and the actual wisdom that is illustrated [by it] being definitely just a single moment. However, out of fear of being too verbose, I do not present [these passages here].

In brief, in the moment when the remedy has arisen, the factors to be relinquished have already ceased. Also, immediately upon the moment of the remedy having ceased, a moment of wisdom appears. With this point in mind, such is labeled as "wisdom arising momentarily." However, wisdom does not exist as having the character of being momentary because it is the basic nature that is empty of arising and ceasing. Other Tibetans who assert wisdom to be momentary, the nature of phenomena as the bearer of this nature, and the dharmakāya as ordinary thoughts are incurably mistaken—those who are endowed with analysis should reject [such assertions] as if they were poisoned food.[1618]

2ba2b) The detailed explanation of the intention of the text of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and its commentaries that is elucidated here in particular

The eight readinesses and the eight cognitions make sixteen. [The way they are presented here] represents only their progressive stages as they are asserted by Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra. For they present the four dharma readinesses as the [four] uninterrupted paths in relation to the factors to be relinquished through seeing; the four dharma cognitions, as the [four] paths of liberation; and the eight readinesses and cognitions of subsequent realization, as the special paths. Having done so, they [further] present someone who abides in the fifteenth [moment of the path of seeing] as an approaching bodhisattva and someone who abides in the sixteenth [moment], as a bodhisattva who abides in the fruition.

Furthermore, in the first and fourth chapters [of the AA], [the path of seeing] is taught from the perspective of subsequent attainment, and in the second, third, and fifth chapters, it is taught from the perspective of meditative equipoise. Here, the topic at hand is the explanation of the [path of seeing] in the second chapter. The single session of meditative equipoise

during which the naturally pure nature of phenomena becomes revealed is divided into sixteen parts because it is explained that these sixteen are not interrupted by anything else and because there is a purpose of dividing [this single session] into sixteen. [The purpose] is that [the path of seeing] is not divided through just the manner of seeing the nature of phenomena, but that it is divided into these [sixteen parts] by virtue of the manner of inducing certainty about the nature of phenomena as it is related to the individual bearers of this nature. In this way, seeing has one moment and realization has sixteen [moments].

You may wonder, "What is the difference between these two?" Seeing is [to be understood] in terms of the appearing object, which is the aspect that appears to the wisdom of the nature of phenomena. Realization is [to be understood] in terms of the object of engagement—the object with regard to which superimpositions are eliminated through inducing certainty about it. This object, as it is related to the individual bearers of the nature of phenomena, is emptiness.[1619] For example, as far as the seeing of the sheer naturally pure nature of phenomena through all these sixteen [moments] is concerned, there is no difference. However, since the first moment of this mode of seeing, through its own power, induces certainty about the nature of phenomena, it is a direct perception that [induces] certainty by virtue of itself.[1620] As for the second and all following moments, [in general,] something is a repetitive cognition if it is an added apprehension of a referent object ([in this case] the aspect that is a nonimplicative negation) with regard to which superimpositions have already been eliminated by the preceding [moment of apprehending this object].[1621] However, [the second and all following moments of the path of seeing] are not repetitive cognitions because, unlike ordinary beings, such bodhisattvas [on the path of seeing] do not have added apprehensions of the referent object that is the aspect of a nonimplicative negation, and because [these moments] represent direct perceptions of their appearing objects. Nor are [these moments] repetitive cognitions with respect to their specifically characterized objects of engagement because they are cognitions of something that is undeceiving when one engages in it for the purpose of using or rejecting it.[1622] Furthermore, [said moments] are also not repetitive cognitions with respect to the nature of phenomena as it is related to distinct bearers of this nature, with regard to which superimpositions have not yet been eliminated by any preceding wisdom [and about] which certainty must be induced through the own power [of these moments of cognition]. For it is definite that [these cognitions] are nothing but direct valid perceptions that [induce] certainty by virtue of themselves. As [the *Pramāṇavārttika*] says:

By virtue of itself, its own nature is realized.[1623]

As for the way in which certainty is induced about the nature of phenomena as it is related to different bearers of this nature, this is exemplified here by the manner in which [certainty] is induced about the true nature of the reality of suffering (which is something that bears the nature [of phenomena]). (1) To induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of the inseparability of suchness (the object) and buddhahood (the subject) represents the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering (the bearer of this true nature). This is the uninterrupted path that relinquishes those cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through seeing with respect to [the reality of] suffering. (2) To induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of greatness (such as the ultimate forms and so on of the dharmadhātu) represents the cognition that is the dharma cognition of suffering (the bearer of this true nature). For it is the path of actually being liberated from those cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through seeing with respect to suffering. (3) To induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of being empty of any valid cognition that actually assesses seeming forms and so on represents the readiness for the subsequent cognition of suffering (the bearer of this true nature). For it is the special path of the relinquishment of those cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through seeing with respect to suffering. (4) Just as seeming forms cannot be assessed through valid cognition, seeming forms and so on do not exist as valid cognitions either. To induce certainty about the true nature of this, by virtue of its own power, represents the subsequent cognition of suffering (the bearer of this nature). For it too is the special path of the relinquishment of those cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through seeing with respect to suffering. Through applying [this pattern] in the same way to the remaining three realities, [there] are sixteen [moments of realization].[1624]

2ba3) Removing objections

This has two parts:

a) [Removing objections to] the presentation of the mahāyāna path of seeing in general
b) Removing objections to the intention of the text of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and its commentaries in particular

2ba3a) Removing objections to the presentation of the mahāyāna path of seeing in general

Others may say, "It follows that one does not have to meditate on the four immeasurables during the eighth [moment of the path of seeing] in order to prevent one from falling into cessation at the ninth moment because the ninth

moment during which one does not fall into cessation has already arisen at the time of the arising of the eighth moment during which one does not fall into cessation."[1625] [I answer that the reason does not apply.] If they continue, "It follows that it does apply in terms of the [*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*'s] former presentation [so that the teachings remain (see 2ba2a)] because [this presentation] is like this," [I answer that] the reason does not apply. If they say, "It follows that it does apply in terms of the latter presentation because [this presentation] is like this," I accept.

2ba3b) Removing objections to the intention of the text of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and its commentaries in particular

Some people may say, "At the eighth [moment], one must rise [from meditative equipoise] into subsequent attainment because [the *Vṛtti*] says:

> . . . bodhisattvas have to cultivate the immeasurables."[1626]

This is not the case. It is certain that the love and so forth within the direct realization of the lack of any nature are necessarily the wisdom of the meditative equipoise of realizing emptiness, just as in the example of great nonreferential compassion.

2bb) The system of the hīnayāna

(1) First, not to be afraid of directly seeing the impure true nature of the reality of suffering of the desire realm is the arising of the uninterrupted path that is the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering. "Impure" refers to the object condition—the reality of suffering—being impure by virtue of the ten wrong engagements. (2) After that, to directly see the pure true nature of the reality of suffering of the desire realm is the arising of the path of liberation that is the dharma cognition of suffering. "Pure" refers to the object condition—the reality of suffering—being pure of the ten wrong engagements. (3) Following that, not to be afraid of directly seeing the impure true nature of the reality of suffering of the two higher realms is the arising of the uninterrupted path that is the readiness for the subsequent cognition of suffering. "Impure" refers to the object condition—the reality of suffering—being impure through the eighteen wrong engagements [(one set of nine for each realm)]. (4) Then, to directly see the pure actual nature of the reality of suffering with respect to the two higher realms is the arising of the path of liberation that is the subsequent cognition of suffering. "Pure" refers to the object condition—the reality of suffering—being pure of the eighteen wrong engagements. After these [four wisdom moments], the four wisdoms about the reality of the origin [of suffering] arise progressively, which are followed

by the arising of the four [wisdoms] about the reality of cessation and the four about the reality of the path. The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> The spheres of "dharma cognition"
> Are the desire realm's suffering and so on.
> The spheres of subsequent cognition are the suffering and so on
> of the higher [realms].[1627]

And:

> Readinesses and cognitions, in due order,
> Are the uninterrupted paths and the paths of liberation.[1628]

Therefore, these sixteen moments of mind according to the śrāvakas are said to be like lifting something onto a bridge.

2c) Explanation of the terms of the definienda
This has two parts:

a) The general [meaning of the path of seeing]
b) The particular meanings of terms

2ca) The general meaning of the path of seeing
Since it is directly seen that all phenomena are without nature, it is a seeing. Because it is the location of proceeding to this [seeing], it is a path. As [the *Abhidharmakośa*] says:

> Because its fifteen moments
> See the unseen, it is the path of seeing.[1629]

2cb) The particular meanings of terms
By virtue of directly cognizing the [sixteen] dharmas of the four realities (such as impermanence), [the path of seeing] is dharma cognition. By virtue of not being afraid of this, it is readiness. By virtue of its subsequently cognizing the defining characteristics of the four realities through signs, it is subsequent cognition. By virtue of not being afraid of this, it is [subsequent] readiness. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> Through the two—dharma cognition and subsequently realizing cognition—all manifest and hidden formations are clearly realized.[1630]

As for the meaning of this, "all formations" are the four realities. With regard to the desire realm, these four are directly [realized], and [with regard

to the higher realms,] they are realized through the inference of "the four [realities] of the higher realms being like the four of the desire realm."

2d) The manner in which this path relinquishes the factors to be relinquished
This has two parts:

a) The actual [manner of relinquishment]

b) The ancillary topic of the manner in which the afflictive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished

2da) The actual manner of relinquishment
In terms of those [bodhisattvas] who have not gone through an inferior path before [entering the mahāyāna], the first dharma readiness is able to eradicate the entirety of the afflictions that agitate the mind stream, every single one of the factors that are based on these [afflictions] and propel one into further existences, and all cognitive obscurations that obstruct the direct seeing of the true nature of the reality of suffering. For through directly and newly seeing the nature of phenomena, this first dharma readiness is able to induce certainty about [this nature] by virtue of [this dharma readiness'] own power. Though this first dharma readiness has the ability to vanquish all latencies of the afflictions without exception, it does not do so because the remedy for all latencies of the afflictions without exception is not cultivated in a deliberate way. You may wonder, "What is the remedy for these [latencies] that is to be cultivated in a deliberate way?" It is definitely [a mind] that entails either the aspect of personal identitylessness or [the aspect of discriminating] coarse [lower levels from] peaceful [higher ones]. Since these two are the remedies for the causes that propel one into existence and complete [what one is propelled into], at this point [of the first dharma readiness], noble śrāvakas relinquish the causes that propel them into and complete further existences through those remedies. However, as far as bodhisattvas are concerned, since their prajñā of realizing emptiness definitely operates in conjunction with compassion (which means being attached to sentient beings), they do not relinquish all latencies of the afflictions without exception at this point.

Thus, the following is to be kept [in mind]. It is definite that bodhisattvas who have not gone through an inferior path before [entering the mahāyāna] relinquish the latencies of the afflictions that are factors to be relinquished through seeing through nothing but the mahāyāna path of seeing. However, they are able to relinquish the causes for taking rebirth in [saṃsāric] existence, which are based on these [afflictions] and are factors to be relinquished through familiarization, even through the mundane path [of familiarization]. For noble śrāvakas, there is no relinquishment of the causes for taking rebirth in existence through the mundane path. But for noble bodhisattvas, there is [the possibility of] relinquishing the causes for taking rebirth in [saṃsāric] existence, which are factors to be relinquished through familiarization,

through the mundane path. An example for this would be the situation of a bodhisattva who has not attained the uncontaminated path of familiarization of the mahāyāna (which serves as the remedy for desire within the desire realm) and yet takes rebirth in the form realm after having relinquished taking an existence in the desire realm through the mundane path.

[Next,] the subsequent readiness [for cognizing the reality] of suffering is the ability to induce certainty about the two previous wisdoms of dharma readiness and [dharma] cognition being the causes for the qualities of the noble ones through eliminating superimpositions to the effect that [these two wisdoms] are not [such causes]. However, this subsequent readiness is not presented as an uninterrupted path in relation to the factors to be relinquished through seeing because the superimpositions that are the factors to be relinquished through it are not factors that obstruct the direct seeing of the nature of phenomena.

In general, there are very many cases in which those on the path of seeing and the path of familiarization relinquish factors to be relinquished that are neither of the two respective [sets of] factors to be relinquished [through these paths], such as the manner of relinquishing those obscurations that obstruct the entire range of knowable objects, the obscurations of meditative absorption, the obscurations of accomplishing special qualities, and the obscurations of the time when the faculties shift.

2db) The ancillary topic of the manner in which the afflictive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished

Bodhisattvas do not cultivate the remedy for the latencies of the afflictions in a deliberate way because they do not strive for the peace of having relinquished these [latencies]. You may wonder, "What do they relinquish then?" They only relinquish the conceptions that represent cognitive obscurations. For this reason, it is said that the vinaya of bodhisattvas is what tames nothing but conceptions. You may ask, "Do they not relinquish the latencies of the afflictions at all?" This is not the case. For when they deliberately relinquish the antagonistic factors of the bodhisattva path [of familiarization] (the 108 conceptions that are cognitive obscurations), they simultaneously relinquish the 108 latencies of the afflictions [too]. Thus, at this time, they do not have to cultivate an uncontaminated remedy for the latencies of the afflictions apart from [their path of familiarization]. For, in terms of general isolates, conceptions are cognitive obscurations, but they also represent the afflictive obscurations of bodhisattvas. Therefore, through primarily relinquishing conceptions, as a matter of course, [bodhisattvas] also relinquish the afflictive obscurations. With this in mind, venerable Vasubandhu declared [in his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on I.5]:

> The afflictions of bodhisattvas are conceptions.[1631]

If explained like this, there is no flaw in the way that master Haribhadra presents approachers and abiders for those [bodhisattvas] who are previously not free from attachment.[1632] Thus, since "bodhisattvas who are approaching arhats" are in the process of making efforts in relinquishing the impregnations of the negative tendencies of the two obscurations through the vajralike samādhi, they are presented as such ["bodhisattvas who are approaching arhats"]. However, it is not suitable to present them as such from [the point of view of] their making efforts to relinquish the latencies that are the causes for taking rebirth on the Peak of Existence because noble bodhisattvas relinquish the nine [degrees of the] latencies of the desire realm and the [higher] existences simultaneously. In brief, the latencies of the afflictions are twofold—(1) the "afflictive obscurations" that bear the name of these latent tendencies and are the latencies that represent the causes for taking rebirth in [saṃsāric] existence and (2) those that bear the name of these latent tendencies but represent cognitive obscurations. As the causes for [bodhisattvas] taking rebirth in saṃsāra for the welfare of others, the first are not relinquished [by bodhisattvas], while the second are the ones to be relinquished simultaneously with the conceptions that are the cognitive obscurations.

2e) Considering whether there is or is not a subsequent attainment that is part of the path of seeing

In the abhidharma, there is no explanation of a common locus between subsequent attainment and the path of seeing. As for the meaning of this, the lower and the higher abhidharmas agree in their explanations that, at this stage [of the path of seeing], cognitions in terms of seeming [reality] have been rendered into something that has the property of not arising [again]. Ar Jangchub Yeshé and others say that, by considering the signs of an irreversible person on the path of seeing and the way in which dependent origination is realized during subsequent attainment, there is such a common locus. However, this is not justified. Other than the sixteen [moments] of the readinesses and cognitions of the path of seeing that are taught here, nothing more is explained [as this path]. The readinesses and cognitions of subsequent attainments that bear these names are [just] nominal. Whatever is an actual readiness or cognition is necessarily a [state of mind in] meditative equipoise. As it is said:

> If this were not the case, how could the moments of personally experienced awareness of yogins have the defining characteristic of others trusting them?

Thus, someone who is endowed with the special conduct subsequent to [meditative equipoise] (which is explained as the signs of irreversibility) is someone on the path of familiarization of the mahāyāna. For, through inference with such a result reason, its cause—the realization on the preceding path of seeing—[is proven]. Or, through inferring its specific causes—special means and prajñā—with this reason, it is proven that a bodhisattva who abides in these causes is an irreversible person on the path of seeing (which is [a proof] in terms of a nature reason). As for the way of realizing dependent origination during subsequent attainment, this happens during [the interval] between the path of liberation of the path of seeing having been completed and the arising of the preparatory stage that serves as the remedy for the conceptions that are factors to be relinquished through familiarization. This is the position of the master of the *Vivṛti*.

This general topic of the path of seeing was written by adopting the intention as it is found in Trolungba Lodrö Jungné's supplementary explanation on the path of seeing. Therefore, the mahāyāna that is taught [here] is also established as the intention of the ṭranslator Ngog.

If the progression of the clear realization of the realities
Is not understood according to this way of explaining it,
Even if some who loudly proclaim to be erudite
And some who claim to have realization
Discuss this hundreds of times
Through many seemingly so pure discourses empty of reality,[1633]
These are nothing but deceptions.
Therefore, do not rely on them,
But trust what I explained here.

E) The path of familiarization

1) The path of familiarization and its function in general[1634]

This has four parts:

a) The definition
b) The detailed divisions of its instances
c) The bodies and minds of the grounds it relies on
d) The difference between the contaminated and the uncontaminated path of familiarization in this chapter

1a) The definition
[The path of familiarization] is that which provides the opportunity for liberation, has the nature of the path of the noble ones who are learners, and does not have the nature of the path of seeing.

1b) The detailed divisions of its instances
a) The mundane [path of familiarization]
b) The supramundane path of familiarization

The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> The path of familiarization is twofold . . .[1635]

Thus, [this text] explains it as the contaminated mundane path of familiarization and the uncontaminated supramundane path of familiarization. Also the higher abhidharma [in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*] says:

> [It consists of] the mundane path prior to the path of seeing and the supramundane path.[1636]

As for "prior to" [in this sentence], the intention is that there are mundane paths of familiarization before the path of seeing. Among the [two] paths of familiarization that are explained like this, the first one is the nominal one and the second one is the fully qualified one.

1ba) The mundane path of familiarization
This has two parts:
1) Divisions
2) Function

1ba1) Divisions
The higher abhidharma starts its explanation with the words, "What is the mundane path? It is the mundane first dhyāna . . ." and [continues] up through the Peak of Existence.[1637] Therefore, there are seventeen [levels of the mundane path of familiarization]—the actual stages of each of the four dhyānas and the four formless [absorptions]; the preparatory stages of each of these (making sixteen altogether); and the special actual first dhyāna.

1ba2) Function
According to noble Asaṅga, the mundane path of familiarization relinquishes solely the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> As for those who are free from desire in terms of the desire realms, their desirous attachment, their intentions to harm, their pride in relation to phenomena that accord with their [attachment and their intention to harm], and their ignorance that is congruently associated with the [first three] are relinquished in such a way that they do not arise [anymore] at all. However, the factors to be relinquished through seeing (such as the views about a real personality) are not like this.[1638]

This explains that the mundane path of familiarization relinquishes solely the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. As for the manner of relinquishment, the higher abhidharma says:

> It is the cessation by virtue of the seeds having been weakened through the mundane path.[1639]

Thus, the mundane path of familiarization weakens the seeds of the afflictions that are the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. You may wonder, "But the *Abhidharmakośa* explains that the mundane path of familiarization relinquishes both the portion of the factors to be relinquished through seeing and [the portion of] the factors to be relinquished through familiarization because it states:

> Those that are overcome through the readiness that arises from the Peak of Existence
> Are the factors to be relinquished through seeing.
> Those that arise from the remaining [levels] are [overcome] through both seeing and familiarization.[1640]

Thus, the factors to be relinquished through seeing that are overcome through the subsequent readiness that arises from the Peak of Existence are definitely the factors to be relinquished through seeing. However, the mundane path of familiarization that arises from the remaining eight levels[1641] relinquishes both the portion of the factors to be relinquished through seeing and the portion of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. This explanation contradicts [the above one]." It is true that [the two explanations] are contradictory, but there is no flaw in that because the higher yāna cannot be invalidated through being in contradiction to lower ones.

1bb) The supramundane path of familiarization
This has two parts:
1) Divisions
2) Function

1bb1) Divisions
The remedial path of familiarization has nine divisions, that is, each of its three [levels of] lesser, medium, and great [are further divided into] three—the first one has a lesser, medium, and great [level], and the medium and the great [levels] have the same three [subdivisions].

1bb2) Function
[The supramundane path of familiarization] consists of the familiarization on the nine remaining [bhūmis after] the first bhūmi. The *Vṛtti* starts its explanation with the words, "On the second bhūmi, through the lesser of the lesser path relinquishing the greater of the great conceptions . . ." and [continues by saying] that, on each of the nine bhūmis, their respective factors to be relinquished are relinquished. [1642]

1c) The bodies and minds of the grounds it relies on
The physical support in which the previously nonexistent [path of familiarization] newly arises is definitely solely [a body within] the desire realm because [this path] must arise in the [same] support in which the path of seeing has arisen. As for the physical supports for sustaining a path of familiarization that has already arisen [in one's last life], śrāvakas can rely on [any supports within] all three realms, while pratyekabuddhas must rely on solely [a body within] the desire realm. For bodhisattvas, in general, it is explained that they can rely on [any supports within] all three realms. However, when this is examined in detail, they do not rely on [any supports within] the formless realm because this is not a place where the welfare of others [is promoted]. You may wonder, "So what is the intention behind there being bodhisattvas who progress to the formless realm?" Such [bodhisattvas] are presented as such either from the point of view of having already relinquished the causes for rebirth in the form realm or the intention behind this is that they have the power to be born in the formless realm. However, though they have the power to be born [there], it does not mean that they have to *be* born there. For, directly pertaining to progressing to the formless realm, the sūtras explain that [such bodhisattvas] become enlightened in various realms through emanations, but it is not explained that they have to be born in the formless realm.

It may also be said, "The commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* explains that those bodhisattvas who have not attained the distinctive feature of power are reborn in the formless realm. Those bodhisattvas who are reborn in the formless realm do not have the power to be reborn in the desire or form

realms without rising from the mental state of the actual formless [absorptions]. For they have relinquished the causes for being reborn in the desire or form realms since they have previously become free from attachment to these [realms]." Though it is possible for such bodhisattvas who have not attained the distinctive feature of power to have said property, in general this is not reasonable. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* explains:

> Since the others are endowed with nonreturning,
> They practice through emanations.[1643]

This explains that, although bodhisattvas have relinquished the afflictions that are the causes for taking rebirth in the pleasant and unpleasant realms and grounds, without giving up their actual own physical support (wherever this physical support may exist) they display the ways of rebirth in the desire realm and so on through emanations and thus gather the accumulations.

As for the mental support, the mundane path of familiarization [can] rely on any mental supports among the seventeen levels [of saṃsāra]. The supramundane path of familiarization does not rely on [mental supports within] the desire realm and the Peak of Existence. As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Except for the branches of enlightenment and the path,
> In the desire realm and on the Peak of Existence . . .[1644]

Thus, since the state of mind of the Peak of Existence is not clear, it is not suitable as a mental support for the [supramundane path of familiarization]. Since [the minds of] the desire [realm] are not in meditative equipoise, they are not suitable as mental supports for the [path of familiarization either]. You may wonder, "On which [grounds] does this [path] rely then?" It relies on the six grounds of dhyāna and the first three formless [absorptions] because these are the ones that are named "the nine uncontaminated grounds."

To this system others may object, "Why does [the path of familiarization] rely on the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna and not on the preparatory stages of the remaining three?" The path of familiarization that exists in the mind streams of those who have not attained the mental states of the actual dhyānas has to rely on the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna because they have not yet attained the mental states of the actual dhyānas, which are very supple mental supports. [The path of familiarization] does not have to rely on the preparatory stages of the remaining three dhyānas other than the first one because it is sufficient to rely on just these actual [dhyānas]. Thus, master [Haribhadra] said that this explanation in the *[Abhisamay]ālaṃkāra* here that the uncontaminated path of familiarization relies on the desire realm and

the Peak of Existence is not something that does not fall under the intention of the mother because this is [explained] in terms of bodhisattvas who are skilled in means. The meaning of their being skilled in means is as follows. Within a single mind stream, the causes for rebirth in the desire realm (which bear the name "latencies of craving for the desire [realm]") and the prajñā that clearly realizes emptiness are not the factors to be canceled out and what cancels them out, respectively. Therefore, they are suitable to occur simultaneously. In this situation, bodhisattvas who are skilled in means do not deliberately relinquish the causes to be reborn in the [desire realm], by virtue of which they then take birth in the desire realm and on the Peak of Existence. Such an explanation is justified because it accords with the explanation that the nine actual meditative absorptions of crossing in one leap[1645] and the conceptions that are the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are the remedies and the factors to be relinquished [here, respectively].

1d) The difference between the contaminated and the uncontaminated path of familiarization in this chapter

That which entails false imagination is the contaminated path of familiarization and that which is free from this imagination is the uncontaminated path of familiarization. Some people refer to this imagination that is taught here as the conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents. However, this is not suitable for the following reasons. There is no common locus between the path of familiarization of the mahāyāna and the conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents. It is impossible that these two could be congruent through the five factors of congruence [between primary minds and mental factors]. Also, bodhisattvas on the pure bhūmis do not have such conceptions during their subsequent attainments. For this reason, any apprehended object that could be identified as a contaminated path of familiarization on the pure bhūmis as asserted by the above people is obsolete. They may say, "Since it is possible for [these conceptions and the path of familiarization] to occur simultaneously in a single mind stream, the conceptions that present the path of familiarization as being contaminated are presented by all means as the conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents." But then it follows that even the uncontaminated paths of familiarization of the impure bhūmis are conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents because they operate in the same mind stream as false imagination. Thus, the original thesis [above] is not tenable.

As for our own system, all consciousnesses in which the duality of apprehender and apprehended appears under the sway of latent tendencies represent false imagination. Exactly these are the conceptions [in terms of the path of familiarization that are referred to] in this [second] chapter. The meaning of

being or not being free from these [conceptions] is as follows. Since [the path of familiarization that] operates simultaneously with these conceptions in the same mind stream is contaminated [by them], it is not free [from them]. Since [the path of familiarization that] does not operate simultaneously with them is not contaminated [by them], it is free [from them]. Therefore, the wisdom of the subsequent attainment of the path of familiarization is called "contaminated." For in a bodhisattva whose mind stream is endowed with this wisdom of subsequent attainment, [this mind stream] consists of the [kind of] cognition in which, under the sway of the latent tendencies of ignorance, the duality of apprehender and apprehended keeps appearing within the consciousnesses of the five [sense] gates [of this bodhisattva].

Thus, this is presented as the path of familiarization because it is the mahāyāna path of familiarization's knowledge of directly realizing these appearances to be dreamlike. The path of familiarization is not presented as such from the point of view of what appears during its [subsequent attainment]. For it is certain that [everything] from the point of view of appearance represents false imagination and therefore consists of nothing but factors to be relinquished. You may wonder, "What is it then that is to be presented as the path [of familiarization]?" It is the above-mentioned realization of directly realizing [these appearances] to be dreamlike. Therefore, from the point of view of the self-isolate of the wisdom of subsequent attainment, [the path of familiarization] is not asserted as the dualistic appearances of apprehender and apprehended because any cognition that appears as duality is necessarily contradictory to being wisdom. It is established that these [two] are contradictory because, in general, any cognition that appears as the duality of apprehender and apprehended under the sway of latent tendencies must be an (ordinary) consciousness and, as such, is contradictory to being wisdom. This essential point is even much more profound than what is very profound.

[Still,] others say, "Since Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert that meditative equipoise entails appearances too, does it not follow that it is contaminated? If this follows, also the self-isolate of the wisdom of meditative equipoise would be contaminated, and then it is pointless to analyze whether the self-isolate of the wisdom of subsequent attainment is or is not contaminated." Those who say this do not understand the reason why Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert that meditative equipoise entails appearances. In terms of the manner of identifying the focal object of practice, first, the cognition that appears as the duality of apprehender and apprehended and arises as all kinds of dependent originations is taken as the basis of analysis at the time of preparing [for the actual meditative equipoise]. This is what they labeled as "the meditative equipoise that entails appearances." However, this is not an explanation of the actual meditative equipoise entailing appearances. For

during that time it is impossible that the appearances of the duality of apprehender and apprehended arise in the cognition that is present within the same mind stream as the wisdom [of this equipoise]. [The reason] applies [because AA V.21d says:]

> Who sees actual reality is liberated.

Thus, it is explained that, [in meditative equipoise,] nothing but wisdom appears, whereas anything else does not appear. Furthermore, it is said:

> When the power of familiarization is perfected, all characteristics of mistakenness are relinquished.[1646]

This explains that appearances of mistakenness absolutely do not arise [in meditative equipoise]. You may wonder, "So what is the purpose of distinguishing [the meditative equipoise that entails appearances from] the other 'meditative equipoises without appearances'?" The difference [only pertains to the stage of preparing for meditative equipoise. In the former case,] during the preparation [for meditative equipoise] taught above, initially what is taken as the basis of analysis is the cognition that appears as the duality of apprehender and apprehended. On the other hand, to assert meditative equipoise as being without appearances refers to nondual wisdom being taken as the basis of analysis during the preparation [for meditative equipoise] right from the start. Some say, "Just as Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra analyze by taking the cognition that appears as the duality [of apprehender and apprehended] as their basis of analysis during the preparation [for meditative equipoise], they analyze in the same way during the actual meditative equipoise." This is not the case because, during meditative equipoise, even discriminating prajñā itself is consumed by the fire of wisdom. Through explaining such reasons, one is liberated from the futile disputes about whether the self-isolate of the wisdom of meditative equipoise is contaminated or not.

2) The path of familiarization as aspiration[1647]

[This has three parts:]

a) Definition
b) Division
c) Boundary lines

2a) Definition

[The definition of the path of familiarization as aspiration] is "the clear realization of subsequent attainment [that is associated with] the confidence of trusting that prajñāpāramitā is the source of the three welfares." From the

perspective of entailing dualistic appearances, this [path of familiarization as aspiration] is presented as conceptual. However, it is not so presented from the perspective of conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents because this kind of path of familiarization is a nonconceptual unmistaken cognition, [that is, a perceptual valid cognition]. As for presenting the nature of aspiration as confidence, Ratnākaraśānti says [in his *Śuddhamatī*]:

> Aspiration is confidence, pure openness, and striving, that is, [it has] the characteristics of trust and wishing.[1648]

Therefore, it is the wish to attain the state of prajñāpāramitā through trusting it and thus realizing its being undeceiving. Since the object [of this aspiration] (the state [of prajñāpāramitā]) is pure, the subject (confidence) also arises as having the aspect of [a state of mind of] pure openness. Since the object (this state [of mind]) is what is be strived for, the subject (pure openness) also arises as having the aspect of striving. Therefore, it represents the aspiration for the true reality that operates through the power of entities. For Dharmamitra says [in his *Prasphuṭapadā*]:

> Its nature is to apprehend entities that were ascertained precisely as [they were ascertained].[1649]

2b) Division

[Aspiration] is threefold—aspiration in order to attain the final welfare of oneself (the svābhāvikakāya); aspiration in order to attain the [final] welfare of both [oneself and others] (the dharmakāya); and aspiration in order to attain the [final] welfare of others (the rūpakāyas). The reasons for dividing [aspiration] into three are as follows. Through the path of familiarization of aspiring for the mother as the source of one's own welfare, one primarily emphasizes the accumulation of wisdom that relinquishes the cognitive obscurations (the phrase "that relinquishes the cognitive obscurations" applies to the following two [types of aspiration] too). Through the path of familiarization of aspiring for the mother as the source of both welfares, one primarily emphasizes the union of the two accumulations. Through the path of familiarization of aspiring for the mother as the source of the welfare of others, one primarily emphasizes the accumulation of merit. There is also another purpose of this enumeration [of aspiration] being definitely threefold because it puts an end to the [notion of] having to manifest the true end through aspiring for the mother as being the source for the dharmakāya alone. During this phase of threefold aspiration of the mind, the [bodhisattva's] cognizance that [manifests as] body and speech also performs praises,

eulogies, and laudations, but some say that it is the tathāgatas who perform these praises, eulogies, and laudations for the bodhisattvas who are endowed with said threefold aspiration.[1650]

In brief, aspiration, dedication, and so on are mental engagements in the qualities of prajñāpāramitā from the perspective of dualistic appearances, while the nonreferential wisdom that operates simultaneously with them is the [actual] path of familiarization. In terms of the former (these mental engagements), [the path of familiarization] is presented as the aspect of means (the conduct on the level of the seeming, which is the welfare of others). In terms of the latter (nonreferential wisdom), it is presented as the aspect of prajñā (one's own welfare through the view of the ultimate). Therefore, by virtue of these two—prajñā and means—not being separated, [bodhisattvas] gather the two accumulations and thus manifest the two kāyas.

2c) Boundary lines

In the system of some, such as Mokṣākaragupta,[1651] the boundary line for [the path of familiarization as] aspiration is presented as [it being present] from [the level of] engagement through aspiration onward, but this is not suitable to be presented as the starting line for the aspiration taught here. For its starting line must be presented as the path of familiarization immediately after the path of seeing has been completed because this is the context of explaining the aspiration of this very path of familiarization.

Therefore, [from among the three kinds of aspiration here,] (1) the aspiration for one's own welfare is included in the subsequent attainments of the impure bhūmis. For, by virtue of not having relinquished the afflicted mind [yet], [in bodhisattvas on these bhūmis there still] arises some subtle pride of focusing on themselves.

(2) The aspiration for both welfares is contained in the first two pure bhūmis because, by virtue of the change of state of the afflicted mind, [bodhisattvas] realize the equality of themselves and others. Some say, "It is not suitable to speak of the afflicted mind having changed state on the eighth bhūmi because its basis is the ālaya[-consciousness] and the change of state of the [latter] has not yet been attained [on this bhūmi]." [The suggestion here] that the lack of the change of state of the ālaya[-consciousness] necessarily entails that it is not suitable for the afflicted mind to have changed state is deluded for the following reasons. [The statement about] the change of state of the afflicted mind on the eighth bhūmi despite the ālaya not having changed state [yet] is pure by virtue of the threefold analysis[1652] because venerable [Maitreya] has said [so himself]. Also, though there are three distinct ways of understanding the meaning of the way in which a change of state takes place, with regard to the change of state in this context, there are two [such ways]—the change of state of what is supported and the change of state

of the support. But the above idea that if the support has not changed state, also the change of state of the supported is not a change of state that actually fulfills this function just means to not understand the presentation of change of state. Both the change of state of the ālaya (the support) and the change of state of the afflicted mind (the supported) are well known by the name "change of state" because the explanation of the term "change of state" can be applied in concordance with the facts to both [cases] and they are well known in the treatises in this way. Therefore, [the change of state of the afflicted mind in question here] is not a change of state of the support, in which the state of the supported (the afflicted mind) depends on the state of the support (the ālaya). Rather, what is presented as the conventional term "change of state" [here] is the change in terms of the self-isolate of the state of the supported (the afflicted mind) that does not depend on the [support of the ālaya]. For, at the point [of the eighth bhūmi], the afflicted mind [per se] is without [any further] transcendence or change. As for it being established that this reason entails [the predicate], *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* [XI.45ac says]:

> Due to the change of mentation, perception,
> And conception, there is fourfold command
> Over nonconceptuality . . .

The *Bhāṣya* on this by Vasubandhu, the second omniscient one, [glosses this as] "no change."[1653]

(3) The aspiration for the welfare of others is contained in the last pure bhūmi because the manner in which the welfare of others [is accomplished] is equal to [the one of] buddhas.

[These points (1)–(3)] represent the meanings of the passages in the *Ālokā* that respectively end with "[Maitreya] first taught the nine subdivisions of aspiration for one's own welfare because the seeds of pride about oneself are not extinguished [in bodhisattvas on these levels]"; "He explained the nine subdivisions of the aspiration for the welfares of oneself and others because, [for bodhisattvas on these levels,] oneself and others are equal"; and ". . . because the aspiration for the welfare of others arises for the sake of boundless realms of sentient beings."[1654]

3) The path of familiarization as dedication[1655]

[This has four parts:]

a) The manner of gathering the merit to be dedicated through threefold genuineness
b) The manner in which this [merit] increases greatly through the means of vast dedication
c) The manner in which the dedication must be embraced by prajñā

d) In consequence, the manner of sealing [merit] through unified dedication

3a) The manner of gathering the merit to be dedicated through threefold genuineness

(1) To take the case of the entities that consist of the roots of virtue of something like generosity being dedicated for enlightenment as an example, the genuine objects of generosity are fivefold—the three jewels; those who proclaim the dharma; and sick persons and one's parents. Furthermore, the sūtras speak about guests; nurses; those who turn against a kingdom and are then tortured by kings; and those without protection. As for the degree of superiority of these objects, the *Mañjuśrīmūlatantra* says:

> One hundred thousand ordinary persons
> Match a single pure brahman.
> One hundred thousand pure brahmans
> Match a single person with pure ethics.
> One hundred thousand persons with pure ethics
> Match a single person who has attained wisdom.

(2) The genuine entities [to be gathered] are right actions, that is, roots of virtue (such as generosity) that are not mixed with any wrongdoing. As for the degree of superiority of these entities of virtue, the mother [sūtras] say that [one may] offer to the buddhas for eons wordly realms that are filled with stūpas made of the seven precious substances, with [each one] being one yojanā in height and a half one in width, and [in number] as many as there are sand grains in the Ganges. [However,] compared to that, [everything] from writing down prajñāpāramitā up through meditating on it is superior. This teaches the difference in terms of superiority of entities of virtue (such as practicing generosity and erecting stūpas) versus studying, reflecting, and meditating on the mahāyāna sūtras.

(3) The genuine motivation [for gathering merit] is to gather roots of virtue in order to attain buddhahood for the welfare of others and to dedicate them to that [end].

3b) The manner in which this merit increases greatly through the means of vast dedication

This refers to mentally bringing together and combining all the roots of virtue of oneself and others as a single [object to be dedicated] and then making one's dedication of these [virtues] for the sake of [all] sentient beings within the entire extent of space. [Furthermore,] one rejoices in the dedications of others and also dedicates the roots of virtue of this rejoicing for perfect enlightenment.

3c) The manner in which the dedication must be embraced by prajñā
This means to understand that, on the level of the seeming, such dedications are just dependent originations. Ultimately, however, dedication itself is empty of dedication.

3d) The manner of sealing merit through unified dedication
[This has six parts:]

a) What is to be dedicated
b) That for which it is dedicated
c) The aim of dedication
d) The [cognitive] aspect of dedication
e) The definition of dedication
f) The manner of accomplishing dedication

3da) What is to be dedicated
This consists of the two accumulations, or, as the *Madhyāntavibhāga* says:

> In order to attain the two virtues . . .[1656]

Its commentary [by Vasubandhu] states:

> Virtue is conditioned and unconditioned.[1657]

Such conditioned virtues are the roots of virtues that are gathered in the three times because it is said:

> All the many virtues of all beings that there are—
> Those that have been performed, will be performed, and are performed.
> Thus, these are volitional and volitioned virtuous actions.[1658]

As for unconditioned virtue, the mahāyāna abhidharma explains that "unconditioned virtue is suchness."[1659] Thus, unconditioned roots of virtue do exist. To this some say, "Then it follows that suchness is a karmic action because it is a virtue to be dedicated." These people set up such a consequence through their clinging to any virtue necessarily being a [karmic] action. However, everything that is virtue does not need to be some [karmic] action of body, speech, or mind of sentient beings for the following reasons. [First,] this is just as in the case of everything that is karma not needing to be virtue. In general, what is presented as virtue is characterized by being a cause that has the nature of being free from wrongdoing and precedes its result that consists of the state of the cessation of suffering. As for cause and result in terms of this kind of presentation and what presents it, it is suitable from the perspective

of mental states to present it with regard to the nature of phenomena (unconditioned suchness). In brief, the karmic actions of body, speech, and mind of sentient beings produce conditioned roots of virtue, whereas the enlightened activities of the vajras of body, speech, and mind of buddhas produce unconditioned roots of virtue.

To this, some say, "Then it follows that one needs to explain that buddhas accumulate karmic actions and attain fruitions of unconditioned virtue. Therefore, your [position] is just self-made." The actions of the three vajras of buddhas do not need to accumulate actions again—the nature of such actions is established merely through buddhahood itself being established. The manner in which this is established is that, for example, the presence of [accomplishing] the welfare [of all beings] is established from the perspective of the actions of enlightened activity, and being a buddha [is established] from the perspective of its very nature. Nor do buddhas need to again attain any fruitions of conditioned virtue because these are attained merely through their being buddhas being established and because these two [—those fruitions and being a buddha—] are inseparable, just as being impermanent is attained merely through being established as a vase.

Some say here, "An unconditioned virtue that is produced as the actions of the three vajras is [self-]contradictory because this virtue being unconditioned and [at the same time] being suitable to be performed as the actions of the three vajras are contradictory." The actions that are called "the actions of the three vajras" do not need to depend on being performed by persons, being produced through causes and conditions, or the coming together [of certain conditioned circumstances]. Therefore, the actions of the three vajras are unconditioned too. Thus, there is no contradiction as adduced above. Again, some people say, "The own nature of what is unconditioned is just unconditioned, but it is not suitable for what is just unconditioned itself to produce unconditioned roots of virtue that are other than itself. For there is no connection between these two (what is unconditioned itself and something other [that is unconditioned]), nor is it possible within the sphere of knowable objects for something unconditioned to produce conditioned roots of virtue." That something unconditioned does not produce conditioned roots of virtue and that it is not suitable for what is just unconditioned itself to produce unconditioned roots of virtue that are other are in accord with [the positions] of these people. However, I present the virtue of buddhahood and the dharmadhātu as this sheer being unconditioned, which discords with these people's position that [these two] are not suitable as virtue because they are unconditioned.

In brief, since the dharmadhātu is not conditioned by sentient beings, its being presented as the supreme of all virtues in my system comes down to

being unconditioned virtue; being unfabricated virtue; being natural virtue; and being the virtue of the fundamental state. To combine the meanings of these, in the dharmadhātu ultimate virtue (the cause) *exists* because the unconditioned dharmakāya (the result produced by it) *exists* [in it]. Or the dharmadhātu *is* ultimate virtue because this *is* its nature or fundamental state. In continuation of this initial probative argument, [I say that] the dharmadhātu is of the nature of ultimate virtue because it is unconditioned in terms of the ultimate. Therefore, in the latter probative argument, being unconditioned (the subject property) applies to the dharmadhātu ([the subject]). The positive concomitance is that whatever is unconditioned in terms of the ultimate is necessarily of the nature of ultimate virtue—just like the [sugata] heart, in true actuality the nature of the dharmadhātu also is virtue. The negative concomitance is established as follows. Whatever is not of the nature of ultimate virtue is necessarily not unconditioned in terms of the ultimate—just as for phenomena that are other than the dharmadhātu, the other [party] claims that the nature of the dharmadhātu is not virtue. Therefore, in terms of the definitive meaning, ultimate virtue and being unconditioned are of the same nature. Since both the meanings and the conventional terms of these probative arguments need to be established, the manner of establishing them is [to be] understood from the oral tradition.

Again, some people say, "It follows that the unconditioned dharmadhātu does not increase, even if it is dedicated because it is the dharmadhātu." If they fling this consequence [at me] by having in mind that the dharmadhātu's own nature does not change, even if it is dedicated, I accept it in my system [too]. However, though the unconditioned virtue that is the dharmadhātu cannot actually be rededicated by sentient beings, through dedicating it by pretending that it is something to be dedicated, it becomes the cause for attaining perfect enlightenment. Since the dharmadhātu becoming a cause [in this way] is included in [the category of] virtuous mental actions, it is not that taking it as something to be dedicated is without result.

In general, in terms of taking something to be dedicated, the arising of some actual entity that is to be taken as what is to be dedicated is either necessary or not necessary. From among these two [possibilities], since contaminated and uncontaminated virtues (which are conditioned phenomena) are other than the unconditioned dharmadhātu, the entities of such virtues are not the actual enlightenment. Thus, [in this case,] enlightenment must be manifested [indirectly] by way of these virtues increasing or from their continuum. But since the unconditioned virtue that is the dharmadhātu is nothing other than enlightenment, it does not have to function as the cause for enlightenment by way of any change in this virtue to be dedicated. Though there are these two cases of sentient beings actually being able or not being

able [to take] the virtue to be dedicated as something to be dedicated, within their minds they are able [to take] both as something to be dedicated. For there is no difference in dedicating both [conditioned and] unconditioned virtue in the [same] manner of [mentally] eliminating other [things] with regard to what appears as a mental object [to be dedicated].

Here, it may be said, "If the dharmadhātu is both enlightenment and virtue, there is no need to dedicate it for enlightenment." In terms of the definitive meaning, there is indeed no such need. However, during the time when the adventitious stains of sentient beings [seem to] function as the antagonistic factors of the dharmadhātu, these sentient beings [dedicating the dharmadhātu as ultimate virtue] is a dedication within the scope of their mental pretense, which is done for the sake of overcoming these [seemingly] antagonistic stains through the virtue that is the completely pure dharmadhātu. You may wonder, "Isn't it the case that dedicating within the scope of pretense lacks a fruition?" This is not the case. It is just as with the virtues that were performed by other sentient beings, though these are not virtuous actions that were actually performed by oneself. Fruitions arise from dedicating [the actions of others] within the scope of [one's] pretense through bringing them together and combining them with the virtuous actions that were performed by oneself, and doing so in such a way that [the former] are not different from [the latter]. Explained in this way, only buddhas have the ability to actually dedicate and "transform" unconditioned virtue into enlightenment, but sentient beings do not. The unconditioned virtue of buddhas, through great compassion, is dedicated in order to actually purify sentient beings and adventitious stains in a thorough way. This is displayed as if the [sugata] heart endowed with twofold purity in the mind streams of these sentient beings is, from a temporary perspective, transformed into enlightenment. However, it is not the case that sentient beings do not dedicate unconditioned virtue as well—the manner in which they have to dedicate it was already explained above. I say:

Since the dharmadhātu is enlightened virtue,
It is not in order for it to change
Into enlightenment that it is dedicated.
However, since the capacity to purify
The obscurations that obscure it
Exists in unconditioned virtue,
For the sake of engaging in that, unconditioned purity
Is taught as something to be dedicated by venerable [Maitreya].

Again, some people say, "[Above, you claim that] virtue *exists* in the dharmadhātu or that it *is* virtue. [However,] then it would be equally possible that nonvirtue *exists* in the dharmadhātu or that it *is* nonvirtue." This is not equally possible. The dharmadhātu is established as natural virtue, and this being established by nature is not shed in any situation whatsoever, so there is no opportunity for it to be nonvirtue, just as the nature of the virtuous action of having relinquished killing is not any other action.

Some others may think, "Since sentient beings cannot actually gather unconditioned actions, their being dedicated by the minds of sentient beings lacks a fruition." This is not the case—it is just like a fruition arising from the accumulation of wisdom being dedicated by the minds of sentient beings, though ordinary beings cannot actually gather the accumulation of wisdom. Some may say, "Then it follows that a mind stream in which the roots of virtue are extinct is endowed with roots of virtue to be dedicated because the dharmadhātu is something to be dedicated." If this is said [in the sense of], "It follows that that [mind stream] is endowed with conditioned virtue because of the [above reason]," the entailment is not definite. If it is said [in the sense of], "It follows that that [mind stream] is endowed with unconditioned [virtue] because of the [above reason]," I accept. For [when the texts speak of] "a mind stream in which the roots of virtue are extinct," this entails the intention of the conditioned roots of virtue being extinct temporarily, whereas a mind stream in which the unconditioned roots of virtue are extinct is impossible.[1660]

Some may say, "As for virtuous actions, it follows that the performed virtues that are performed in any of the three times are unnecessary because the nature of phenomena is what is to be dedicated." This [consequence] does not go anywhere beyond either a contradictory or an uncertain entailment.[1661] As for the manner of it not going beyond being contradictory, if this [consequence] is put forth by having in mind the reason of the dharmadhātu not being suitable as something to be performed through being performed in the three times, the ultimate dharmadhātu gathers performed roots of virtue through performing them at all times. Therefore, it is eliminated through valid cognition that [the dharmadhātu] is not suitable to gather performed roots of virtue that are performed through it. Therefore, when the virtuous dharmadhātu is taken as the subject [of this consequence], in terms of its abiding in this way [(performing virtue at all times)] in the noble ones, [the reason in this consequence] represents a contradictory reason. On the other hand, according to the position of the people [who put it forth], it represents an uncertain [reason]. Or if [this consequence] is flung [at me] as [it reads above] by taking conditioned virtue as the subject, there is no positive concomitance between the reason and the predicate to be proven. If the

unconditioned dharmadhātu is something to be dedicated, this does not mean that it is unnecessary to dedicate conditioned virtuous actions as something to be dedicated [as well]. Thus, [said positive concomitance] is uncertain in terms of both the position of these people and how things actually are.

3db) That for which it is dedicated
All conditioned and unconditioned virtues are dedicated in order to eliminate the adventitious stains (the factors to be purified) within the [sugata] heart (the basis of purification) and to clearly manifest this basis of purification (the result of purification).

3dc) The aim of dedication
You may wonder, "As for the need for dedication, for whose sake is it?" It is not for one's own welfare, but solely for the sake of the welfare of others because it is as [the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*] says:

> Through this merit, may all beings
> Gather the accumulations of merit and wisdom,
> And then attain the two supreme [kāyas]
> That arise from merit and wisdom.[1662]

3dd) The cognitive aspect of dedication
On the level of seeming [reality], [to dedicate with] intense striving is crucial, thinking, "Based on this virtue, may I and all others attain buddhahood for the welfare of all sentient beings." As for praising such striving, the *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūhasūtra* says:

> Whichever aspiration payers are made by someone
> Who abides in the play of striving
> In accordance with the conditions of all phenomena,
> Their fruitions will exactly match them.

This [striving] should be embraced by the certainty that, ultimately, neither anything for which one dedicates, nor a dedicator, nor anything to be dedicated ever existed. As it is said:

> All victors arriving in the three times . . .

And:

> Just as the omniscient hero Mañjuśrī . . .[1663]

The meaning of [these verses] is that, for the noble ones of the mahāyāna, through the mere [fact of] making a dedication, it is established as the nature of nonreferential dedication. But ordinary beings should first make the dedication on the level of the seeming (the [above-mentioned] intense striving) and thereafter aspire for this [dedication] having the nature of the ultimate nonreferential [dedication]. Thus, they should mentally engage in these two [ways of dedicating] in an alternating way.

3de) The definition of dedication

With virtues being dedicated in order to attain enlightenment for the welfare of others, they do not become lost until enlightenment is attained and entail inexhaustible fruitions after enlightenment has been attained. To explain the term of the definiendum, it comes [from the Sanskrit] *pariṇāma* and therefore refers to transformation. So its meaning is "dedication" because all virtues are transformed into causes for perfect enlightenment. As the *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchāsūtra* says:

> Just as a drop of water fallen into the great ocean
> Is not exhausted until the ocean dries up,
> Through dedicating virtue as a cause for enlightenment,
> It is not exhausted until enlightenment is attained.

3df) The manner of accomplishing dedication

If one makes a dedication from the depth of one's heart, it will be accomplished [accordingly]. This is said to be a powerful dedication that expresses the truth through words that entail a pledge and [are motivated by] correct awareness. As for the difference between dedication and aspiration prayer, [the former means the following]. Through specifically selecting any conditioned or unconditioned roots of virtue and then making them into the common roots of virtue of all sentient beings, these virtues are dedicated as the causes for oneself and [all] others attaining great enlightenment. In the case of aspiration prayers, without specifically selecting any particular roots of virtue, one aspires from the depth of one's heart that all sentient beings will become buddhas and also expresses the power of this truth verbally, making prayers accordingly.

4) The uncontaminated path of familiarization[1664]

You may wonder, "In general, as what is the uncontaminated path of familiarization proper presented?" Taking the clear realizations during the subsequent attainments of the mahāyāna as the bases here, [the uncontaminated path of familiarization] consists of [those of these clear realizations] that are free from false imagination. Without being embraced by this uncontaminated

path of familiarization, perfect enlightenment is not attained through the contaminated path of familiarization alone. This is just as with the example of not attaining perfect enlightenment through conduct (such as generosity) if it is not embraced by the pāramitā of the prajñā of realizing the lack of nature. This path of familiarization is twofold:

1) the path of familiarization as accomplishment, which perfects the qualities of the dharmakāya

2) the pure path of familiarization, which purifies the obscurations in order to be liberated from antagonistic factors

Therefore, the traces [that are left by] these two paths of familiarization are the dharmakāya and the vimuktikāya, respectively. [In general,] these two [kāyas] depend primarily on the functions of both meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. In particular, since the vimuktikāya is characterized by mere relinquishment, it is the fruition that depends on the function of the uninterrupted path of the meditative equipoise that preceded it. Since the dharmakāya is characterized solely by the attainment of realization after having finished relinquishing [everything] to be relinquished, it is the fruition of the path of liberation that preceded it. For, from the perspective of the activity of making a presentation of having finished relinquishing [everything] to be relinquished and the realization of [everything to be] realized as mental objects, [relinquishment and] realization are mutually dependent. [However,] in actual fact, there is no earlier or later with regard to these two because once one has finished relinquishing [everything to be] relinquished in this context, one has finished realizing [everything to be] realized; and once one has finished realizing [everything to be] realized, one has finished relinquishing [everything to be] relinquished. This is just like the simultaneity of having finished defeating one's opponents and having won the battle. Some earlier Tibetans who do not understand this point say that the path of familiarization as accomplishment is the uninterrupted path and that the pure path of familiarization is not the path of liberation. Some [others] declare the opposite of this, and thus they dispute.

5) The utterly pure path of familiarization[1665]

[This path] refers to the meaning of the following passage in the sūtras:

> Subhūti, what is the purity of form is nothing but the purity of the fruition . . . What is the purity of the fruition is nothing but the purity of the mother. What is the purity of the mother is nothing but the purity of form. It is thus that the purity of form . . . the purity of the fruition, and the purity of the mother do not exist as two, cannot be made two, are not different, and are not divisible.[1666]

You may wonder, "What is the nature of purity?" It is Mahāmudrā, the ultimate entity of the unchanging perfect [nature], because the two-part [*Hevajratantra*] teaches:

> Actually, the purity of all entities
> Is stated to be suchness.[1667]

The meaning of this is clearly expressed by omniscient Vasubandhu [in his *Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā*]:

> There is no separately existing "purity that represents the fruition" which consists of purified phenomena, such as the pāramitās and the dharmas concordant with enlightenment. Rather, the very purity of the ever-present form of the nature of phenomena—the perfect [nature]—is equivalent in meaning to "the purity that represents the fruition" . . . Here, in the context of the form of the nature of phenomena, [the sūtras] speak of "pure form." In the context of the true end called "nirvāṇa," they speak of "the pure fruition." In the context of the dharmakāya, they speak of "pure prajñāpāramitā." Here, what is the suchness of pure form is the pure fruition, that is, liberation. What is liberation is pure prajñāpāramitā, that is, the dharmakāya. What is the dharmakāya is pure form, that is, equivalent in meaning to suchness. Therefore, ultimately, suchness, liberation, and dharmakāya are not different—they are one.[1668]

The meaning of these [passages] is as follows. The fruitions that arise from the power of progressing on the path are the four fruitions of the śrāvakas (stream-enterers and so on); the two fruitions of learning and nonlearning of the pratyekabuddhas; the ten bodhisattvabhūmis; and the buddhabhūmi. Each one of all of these seventeen fruitions indeed has its own level of purity in terms of its respective obscurations having been cleansed, but the level of purity that is taught here is as follows. Other than the very liberations that consist of the fruition of the buddhabhūmi itself and the fruitions of the ten bodhisattvabhūmis that are approximately concordant [with buddhahood], there is no other perfect [nature], [sugata] heart, and ever-present actuality. In actual fact, the pure nature of phenomena, such as ultimate form, and the ultimate protector are of the nature of nirvāṇa—true reality. Since this is the true end, it is pure. As for the purity of everything such as dharmakāya, prajñāpāramitā, liberation, and suchness, the nature of purity is undifferentiable. Therefore, as far as the [sugata] heart is concerned, the distinctions

that are made in terms of the phases of ground, path, and fruition are of expedient meaning. In terms of the definitive meaning, in the sense of this [sugata] heart [itself] being free from the phase that is the time of the ground, [it is called] "purity from the primordial beginning." In the sense of its being free from the phase that is the time of the path, [it is called] "perfect purity." Since it is free from the phase that is the time of the fruition, it is called "utter purity." The reasons are as follows. The phenomena of ground, path, and fruition are presented from the perspective of [ordinary] mental states. However, as for the purity of the unchanging [sugata] heart, in terms of its own nature, it is impossible to function as the ground at a certain time, as the path at another time, and as the fruition at yet another time because what has the defining characteristic of being unchanging is of the single nature of negating being one or different. As it is said [in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*]:

> Purity is asserted to be like the purity
> Of the element of water, gold, and space.[1669]

Explained in this way, it is said that there is no difference in terms of purity between (a) the purity of the nonimplicative negation that is the primordial nonexistence, like the child of a barren woman, of the factors to be relinquished (the obscurations of the adventitious stains and all seeming phenomena) and (b) the purity of the implicative negation that is the primordial existence, like a permanent entity, of the [sugata] heart (ultimate reality) that abides as the actual way of being. However, there is a very big difference [between them] in terms of what is to be purified and the way of being pure. This is the explanation according to the final definitive meaning. If this is explained in accordance with the expedient meaning, Dharmaśrī's *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* says:

> Form and such are what are to be purified. Prajñāpāramitā is what purifies. The fruition refers to stream-enterers and so on. Not existing as two refers to the nature. That it cannot be made into two [refers to this being impossible] through mental states. Not being different is the general characteristic. In brief, complete purity is liberation from the general and specific characteristics of all phenomena. Complete purity means that there is nothing to be excluded that is to be negated. Perfect purity means that there is nothing to be delimited that is to be affirmed. Within the actuality of the nature of phenomena, there is nothing to be negated or to be affirmed.[1670]

In brief, as exemplified by something like the path of liberation of the meditative equipoise of the second bhūmi, the meaning of negation that is taught in this context here is as follows. Once the stains have become pure through the power of the uninterrupted path (the specific cause of the fruition that is the path of liberation), the stains (all imaginary and conceived consciousnesses including their objects, such as form) are pure. For to present a pure fruition depends on its being pure of the factors to be relinquished (such as form), and it is by virtue of the factors to be relinquished (such as form) having become pure that the fruition—the path of liberation—is presented as pure. Thus, the purity in relation to both the fruition and form is the same, just like the dying of an only child in relation to both father and mother.

Alternatively, it is also suitable to explain this in the following way. That the ultimate is specifically characterized and real, while the seeming is generally characterized and unreal—that much is equally accepted by all four proponents of [Buddhist] philosophical systems in terms of the boundary lines of their respective presentations of the two realities. Therefore, the purity of ultimate reality is the fact of the ultimate [sugata] heart (the fruition that is the dharmakāya) not moving away from its nature of being endowed with twofold purity since the primordial beginning.[1671] The purity of seeming reality consists of the moving [away from this nature] because the own nature of the seeming (the cocoon that is the very embodiment of conceptions including their latent tendencies) is to be nonexistent since the primordial beginning, not to be endowed with twofold purity, and to lack any nature.

As for the meaning of purity, it is taught that, since it applies to being empty, free, and void, one is not able to distinguish the emptiness of [these] different purities of the two realities as being [two] different [emptinesses or purities].[1672] The outcome of all these explanations is that one is able to present the stains (such as the form of seeming [reality]) as purity by virtue of the very fact of their never having entered the actual way of being. However, if the form and such of seeming [reality] had entered the actual way of being, one would not be able through anything whatsoever to present them as purity.

6) Removing qualms about the manner in which the stains are relinquished[1673]

Having in mind that the manner in which the factors to be relinquished on this path of familiarization are relinquished is a difficult point, master Haribhadra spoke about it through the example of someone doing laundry. The meaning of this is related to

1) the manner of canceling out seeds versus the manifest factors to be relinquished

2) the factors to be relinquished and their remedies

1) The manifest factors to be relinquished are not directly canceled out through their remedies because these two are not suitable to abide simultaneously within a single mind stream. You may wonder, "So what is it that is directly canceled out?" It is the impregnations of negative tendencies or the seeds that are canceled out by directly encountering them because these two (seeds and remedies) are suitable to operate simultaneously within a single mind stream. At such a time, the seeds to be relinquished abide within the ālaya-consciousness and therefore are suitable to abide together with their remedies within the mind stream of a single person. On the other hand, the manifest factors to be relinquished arise as the nature of the mental consciousness. Therefore, it is not suitable for something that is in the process of arising as the nature of the mental consciousness to occur simultaneously with remedial wisdom.

Furthermore, you may wonder, "As it is explained, 'The arising of the aspect of the remedy and the ceasing of the aspect of the impregnations of negative tendencies occur together. Thus, they are simultaneous, just like the appearing of light and the ceasing of darkness.'[1674] So how do you comment on the meaning of this?" The intention behind this is the simultaneity of the present remedy having arisen and the future factors to be relinquished having ceased because the factors to be relinquished are relinquished in the sense of "the future factors to be relinquished, through the present remedy, having been rendered into something that has the property of not arising anymore." Also the above example for this meaning is solely to be understood as follows. The present light must eliminate future darkness, but there is no need to eliminate past darkness because an infinite regress would follow if what has already been eliminated needed to be eliminated again. In general, also in the system of dialectics, the cessation of what is to be canceled out must be accepted as the result that is the absence of what is to be canceled out and of canceling it out. Therefore, the cessation of darkness and the appearing of light are not simultaneous. Rather, it is the present light having arisen and the future darkness not arising that are simultaneous because the intention here is simultaneity in terms of the time of cessation. Thus, this must be applied in the same way to the factors to be relinquished and their remedies. In brief, that which cancels out associates with the causes for the future factors to be canceled out and thus obstructs the arising of these future factors to be canceled out. In this way, that which cancels out renders those factors to be canceled out into something that has the property of not arising anymore.[1675]

2) From the second up through the seventh bhūmis, the three degrees of the lesser and the three degrees of the medium path of familiarization progressively relinquish the three degrees of the great and the three degrees of the medium cognitive obscurations, respectively. Simultaneoulsy with this, the three degrees of the great and the three degrees of the medium latencies

of the afflictive obscurations are relinquished too because if these were not relinquished, they would surface in a manifest way during the subsequent attainments of the impure bhūmis (which they do not). On the three pure bhūmis, the three degrees of the great remedy relinquish the three degrees of the factors to be relinquished that are the lesser latent tendencies of ignorance. There is a twofold classification of this ignorance into (a) the latent tendencies of afflicted ignorance and (b) the latent tendencies of nonafflicted ignorance. Both of these function as causes for bodhisattvas on the pure bhūmis taking rebirth in saṃsāric existence. At the end of a bodhisattva's continuum on the tenth bhūmi, both of these most subtle causes that represent impregnations of negative tendencies have to be relinquished. For if they are not relinquished, the dharmakāya cannot be manifested.

In this context, some say, "What is explained here is as follows: 'The most subtle stains that are the impregnations of negative tendencies are not relinquished through the greater of the great path of familiarization, but are relinquished through the buddhabhūmi. The impregnations of negative tendencies on the bodhisattvabhūmis that concord with the class of the cognitive obscurations should be understood as threefold—those which are like something existing within the surface layer of the skin; those which are like something existing in the subcutaneous tissue; and those which are like something existing in one's very core. The first are relinquished on the level of Supreme Joy; the second, on the level of being without characteristics and spontaneously present; and the third, on the level of a tathāgata.'" This is not the case—the meaning of this quote is that the name of the relinquishing remedy is given to the relinquishment. On the buddhabhūmi, there are no stains since the most subtle stains that are impregnations of negative tendencies are the factors to be relinquished that are related to the pure bhūmis alone.

3) The all-knowledge

A) The presentation of the objects of knowledge (skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas)[1676]

This has three parts:

1) The explanation of the five skandhas
2) The way in which they correspond to the dhātus and the āyatanas
3) The way in which they correspond to the four realities, the five bases, and so on

1) The explanation of the five skandhas

This has four parts:

a) Definition
b) Classifications

c) Definite number
d) Definite order

1a) Definition
[A skandha] is a conditioned phenomenon that is an assembly of many parts. The form skandha has parts in terms of spatial dimensions and the four name [skandhas] have parts in terms of time. Both also have many parts in terms of isolates.

1b) Classifications
This has two parts:
a) The actual classifications
b) Removing objections

1ba) The actual classifications
1) The definition of the form skandha is "that which is a collection of many parts and, through discrimination of tangible objects or objects, is suitable as form, that is, material entities." Its classifications are given in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> Form consists of the five sense faculties,
> Their five objects, and what is imperceptible.[1677]

Imperceptible form is something imagined by the Vaibhāṣikas, and the totalities of the phenomena āyatana as well as the appearance of skeletons and such are imaginary too. Therefore, the forms that actually fulfill this function are just ten—the sense faculties and their objects.

A) The five sense faculties are of subtle form and function as the actual supports for the respective sense consciousnesses. Respectively, they look like a flax flower in the eyeball; like a birch gnarl in the inner ear; like copper spoons in the cavity of the nose; like two half-moons in the middle of the tongue, which are just the width of a hair apart; and like the down feathers of a bird pervading the whole body.[1678]

B) The five objects are as described in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> [Visible] form is twofold and twentyfold.
> Sound is eightfold,
> Taste is sixfold, smell is fourfold,
> And tangible objects are elevenfold.[1679]

Thus, (a) visible form is twofold—colors and shapes; or, twentyfold (same as in CE). Although some assert the unicolored sky as the twenty-first type, it is not counted as something separate from blue here. The blue of the sky is the

visible form that is the color of Mount Meru,[1680] but the sky does not have any color or shape whatsoever. (b)–(d) Sounds and so on are as in CE.

The skandhas of the four names are as described in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> Feeling is experience. Discrimination
> Has the character of apprehending characteristics.
> Formation is other than the [remaining] four skandhas.
> . . .
> Consciousness—awareness of its respective [objects]—[1681]

2)–4) The skandhas of feelings and so on are as in CE. As for the mental factors, the fifty-one in the mahāyāna abhidharma are as in CE, while the forty-six in the hīnayāna are as presented in the *Abhidharmakośa* as follows. The ten omnipresent mental factors that occur as the retinue of all minds are:

> Feeling, impulse, discrimination,
> Striving, contact, insight, recollection,
> Mental engagement, conviction,
> And samādhi are [present] in all minds.[1682]

The ten that occur as the retinue of virtuous states of mind:

> Confidence, heedfulness, suppleness,
> Equanimity, shame, embarrassment,
> The two roots, nonviolence,
> And vigor always arise in virtuous [minds].[1683]

The six that occur as the retinue of the great afflictions:

> Ignorance, heedlessness, laziness,
> Lack of confidence, lethargy, and agitation
> Always occur in afflicted [minds]; . . .[1684]

The two that are the retinue of nonvirtuous states of mind:

> . . . in nonvirtuous [minds],
> Lack of embarrassment and lack of shame.[1685]

The ten that occur as the retinue of the small afflictions:

Wrath, resentment, hypocrisy,
Envy, spite, concealment, avarice,
Deceit, self-satisfaction, and violence
Are the factors that are small afflictions.[1686]

The eight that are not definite as any of the above:

Examination, analysis, contrition,
Sleep, anger, desire,
Pride, and doubt—
These eight are explained as not definite.[1687]

All of these forty-six mental factors can occur as the retinue of the mental consciousness, but only certain appropriate ones can occur as the retinue of the sense consciousnesses. Among these, since suppleness is the basic factor of meditative equipoise, it does not occur in the desire realm. Nonvirtuous contrition and sleep do not occur in the two higher realms.

5) Consciousness is as stated in CE. In the Yogācāra tradition, the ālaya-consciousness is called "mind"; the afflicted mind, "mentation"; and the six others, "consciousness." The seven consciousnesses other than the ālaya arise in the ālaya like waves from water, or reflections in a mirror, but they are not the same as the ālaya because during the two meditative absorptions,[1688] deep sleep, and so on, the others do not exist, whereas the ālaya still does.

1bb) Removing objections

Some people may say, "Consciousness is just a single one—when it meets with the conditions for operating via the respective sensory gates, it is referred to by the conventional terms of different consciousnesses." In this case, it would follow that the mental consciousness and the five sense consciousnesses arise and cease together because there is only one single consciousness. It would also follow that either the mental consciousness does not infer generally characterized phenomena and hidden objects or that the five sense consciousnesses do not cognize specifically characterized phenomena because there is only one single consciousness, which therefore must be definite as either only externally oriented observation or only internal mental consciousness. It would further follow that, just as the mental consciousness does not depend on being close to objects, the sense consciousnesses do not depend on being close to objects because just as they are not different in being one single consciousness, they also must have the very same features. It would also follow that the sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness have a single object because it is not possible for a single consciousness to have more than one single object. And it would follow that a situation in which the six

consciousnesses arise simultaneously is not possible because there is only one single consciousness, and when this solitary consciousness arises via any one of the sensory gates by meeting the conditions for that, it cannot arise via any other sensory gates. It may be said, "But the scriptures say, 'Sentient beings have one stream of consciousness each.'" This entails the intention that consciousnesses of concordant kind, such as eye consciousnesses, arise as being one in substance. The *Pramāṇavārttika* says:

> These definitely have the capacity
> For ones of concordant type.
>
> Thus, it is realized
> That conceptions arise progressively.[1689]

The *Sūtra That Teaches the Twelve Āyatanas*[1690] states:

> The six consciousnesses are contained in the āyatana of mentation.[1691]

This indicates in which one of the twelve āyatanas all six consciousnesses are included. Some may say, "Since minds and mental factors are different in substance, also the four name skandhas are different in substance." The *Madhyāntavibhāga* and its *Bhāṣya* by Vasubandhu say:

> Here, what sees an object is consciousness,
> And [what sees] its features is a mental factor.[1692]
>
> Thus, what sees the mere object is consciousness. What sees the features of this object is a mental factor.[1693]

This is their difference, but it is not suitable for them to be different in substance. For the display of mind as such is labeled as "feeling" from the perspective of arising as the three experiences (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral); as "discrimination" from the perspective of being aware and discerning phenomena as different; as "impulse" from the perspective of mind moving towards objects; as "mental engagement" from the perspective of holding the mind on a focal object; as "contact" from the perspective of assessing objects; as "striving" from the perspective of running after sense pleasures; as "hypocrisy" from the perspective of hiding one's own faults; as "deceit" from the perspective of gaining one's livelihood by misleading others; as "sleep" from the perspective of the mind withdrawing inside, and so on. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> Mind is what appears as twofold:
> It appears as desire and such, and likewise,
> It appears as confidence and so on.
> There is no other phenomenon that is affliction and virtue.[1694]

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says:

> Mental engagement is engagement of the mind . . . Pride is the arrogance of the mind.[1695]

The *Pramāṇaviniścaya* states:

> The mind's being upset is hatred.

And:

> Because these are seen as being of a single nature, also the experiences in other mental states are nothing other.[1696]

The *Pramāṇavārttika* says:

> What arises from corresponding causes,
> Why should that be different from mind?[1697]

Hence, the four name skandhas are not established as different in substance. Here, some may say, "They are established as different in substance because the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* says:

> Because five are not justified,
> Because their states are mistaken,
> Because there are no distinct enabling causes,
> And because it would be contradictory to scripture."[1698]

This passage does not teach that the four name skandhas are different in substance because it is a passage which negates that mental factors are not substantially established for the following reasons. The four name skandhas are not different in substance, but are still classified as four through isolates. The states of these skandhas are not different in substance from mind, but just represent the conditions of appearing as if they were different, just like the arising of bubbles from water. Still, even then one must precisely distinguish the many different forms in which water and bubbles—which are not

different—may appear. Since they are not distinct in that they depend on the same four enabling causes and conditions, this is a proof that the four name skandhas are one in substance. If this were not the case, it would also contradict the scriptures since these declare:

> Mind is made afflicted through desire. It is purified through confidence and such.

Thus, the arising of mind in such and such forms is conventionally spoken of as "afflicted phenomena" and "purified phenomena," respectively, but it is not taught that these exist as being different in substance.[1699]

1c) Definite number

The skandhas exist among entities as two kinds—form and mind. As for mind, both feelings and discriminations are explained after the explanation of form with the purport that they are to be understood as the roots of dispute and as the causes of saṃsāra, and also in terms of being less and less coarse. Lay people dispute for the sake of feelings, and proponents of philosophical systems dispute about different discriminations in terms of philosophical systems. Those who cling to feelings and have mistaken discriminations circle in saṃsāra. As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Because they are the roots of dispute
> And the causes of saṃsāra, and by virtue of the causes of their order,
> From among mental factors, feelings
> And discriminations are presented as separate skandhas.[1700]

Since the other mental factors are equal in terms of their coarseness, they are referred to as the distinct skandha of formation. Consciousness exists among entities as the eight collections of consciousness.

1d) Definite order

The skandhas are arranged according to being less and less coarse because form is obstructive and such. Feelings are presented next because sentient beings first delight in forms and savor them through feelings. Then comes discrimination because clinging to forms and such arises from mistaken discriminations. There follow formations since this mistakenness is made afflicted by them. In this way, mind is afflicted by these four. Thus, they are arranged in this order so that one understands this.

2) The way in which they correspond to the dhātus and the āyatanas

An āyatana is a gate for the arising of primary minds and mental factors. Dhātu means "existing as a distinct type" or "seed." As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus
> Have the meanings of collection, gate for arising, and disposition.[1701]

As for their instances, the ten phenomena within the form skandha are the corresponding ten āyatanas and ten dhātus. As the *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> The very sense faculties and their objects
> Are asserted as the ten āyatanas and dhātus.[1702]

The skandha of consciousness corresponds to the āyatana of mentation and the seven mental dhātus.

> Consciousness—awareness of its respective [objects]—
> Is also the āyatana of mentation.
> It is asserted as seven dhātus too—
> The six consciousnesses and mentation.[1703]

The difference between mentation[1704] and mental consciousness[1705] refers to past and present mentation, respectively. The sense faculties are the supports for the other consciousnesses and mentation is taught to be the support for the mental consciousness.[1706] Therefore, the dhātus are taught as eighteen.

> Mentation is the consciousness
> Immediately after [any of] the six [consciousnesses] have passed.
> In order to establish the support of the sixth one,
> The dhātus are asserted to be eighteen.[1707]

Both the āyatana of phenomena and the dhātu of phenomena consist of the three remaining skandhas, such as feeling, and the eight unconditioned phenomena—the three suchnesses of virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral phenomena; space; the unmoving; analytical and nonanalytical cessation; and the cessation of discrimination and feeling. Thus, the *Abhidharmakośa* states:

> These three, imperceptible [form],
> And unconditioned phenomena
> Are called "the āyatana or dhātu of phenomena."[1708]

As said above, "imperceptible form" is just something posited by philosophical systems.[1709] Some may say,"Since there are pairs of some sense faculties, such as the eyes, the āyatanas and dhātus would be more than those listed." Although these faculties exist in pairs, they are respectively presented as one since they are similar.

> Though eyes and so on are two,
> They are one dhātu because they are similar
> In type, sphere, and consciousness.
> Pairs grew for the sake of beauty.[1710]

As for unconditioned phenomena, they are none of the five skandhas from form up through consciousness, and they are not suitable as a sixth skandha either because they do not exist as what "skandha" means—a collection of many parts. However, there is nothing contradictory in presenting them in an āyatana and a dhātu. The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> Unconditioned phenomena are not explained as skandhas
> Because they are not suitable as what this means.[1711]

In the form skandha, the āyatana of mentation, and the dhātu of phenomena, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are included.

> In one skandha, one āyatana,
> And one dhātu, everything is included.[1712]

Furthermore, it should be understood that all explanations of the terms "skandhas," "āyatanas," and "dhātus"—such as the five pure skandhas (ethics and so on), the āyatanas of the totalities and overpowering,[1713] the four types of formless āyatanas, the six dhātus (such as earth)—are included here.

> Likewise, as appropriate, also the other
> Skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus
> Should be included in what was explained here
> By analyzing their specific characteristics well.[1714]

It should also be understood that the Bhagavān explained phenomena by summarizing them as the five skandhas for those of sharpest faculties, as the twelve āyatanas for those with medium faculties, and as the eighteen dhātus for those of dull faculties.[1715]

3) The way in which they correspond to the four realities, the five bases, and so on

The relationship of the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus with the five bases of knowable objects is as follows. (1) The skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus that have form are the basis of mind. (2) The skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus that are included in the six collections of consciousness are the basis of mind. (3) The skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus that are included in the mental factors are the basis of mental factors. (4) As for the basis of nonassociated formations, the Vaibhāṣikas assert it to be fourteenfold (1. attainment, 2. nonattainment, 3. equal status, 4. the state without discrimination, 5. the meditative absorption without discrimination, 6. the meditative absorption of cessation, 7. the life faculty, 8.–11. the four defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena,[1716] 12. groups of words, 13. groups of phrases, and 14. groups of letters).[1717] However, to state them as something that is other in substance than form, mind, or mental factors is not suitable because they are not observable as something other than these. (5) The basis of unconditioned phenomena consists of (a) space (the absence of obstructive tangible objects); (b) analytical cessation (cessation by having exhausted the factors to be relinquished through the remedies); (c) nonanalytical cessation (simply having ceased by virtue of temporary incompleteness of necessary causes and conditions); and (d) suchness.

According to the mahāyāna, it is also suitable to summarize all knowable objects that are explained in this way as the five dharmas. The *Madhyāntavibhāga* says:

> Causal features, conceptions,
> And names are contained in two aspects.
> Perfect wisdom and true reality
> Are contained in just a single one.[1718]

Furthermore, the five bases of knowable objects are included in the pairs of conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, or contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena. The *Abhidharmakośa* says:

> As for contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena,
> Conditioned phenomena except for the path
> Are contaminated because
> The contaminations adhere to them.
>
> Uncontaminated phenomena are the reality of the path
> And also the three kinds of unconditioned phenomena—
> Space and the two cessations.[1719]

As for the purpose of teaching all knowable objects explained in this way in the context of prajñāpāramitā here, they are taught because there is the intention that bodhisattvas must know the topics of the three yānas in detail and because the mahāyāna entails the lower yānas preceding it. The *Daśacakrakṣitigarbhasūtra* says:

> Childish beings who have weak faculties, are lazy,
> Do not seriously engage in the two yānas,
> And are not endowed with the wheel of the mahāyāna
> Are not vessels for the vast dharma.

Thus, terms such as "the five bases of knowable objects" represent the specific dharma terminologies of the inferior yānas. Terms such as "the three natures," "the five dharmas," "the eight collections of consciousness," and "the two identitylessnesses" represent the specific dharma terminologies of the mahāyāna. Terms such as "the skandhas," "the āyatanas," "the dhātus," "the four realities," and "the two realities" are used by all followers of the common vehicle.

The explanation of this general topic of knowable objects has been set forth just as it appears in the *Prajñāpāramitāṭīkā "Supeme Essence"* by the mighty siddha called the Great Nyalshig.[1720] Thus, there is nothing bad in it.

B) Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not realize phenomenal identitylessness[1721]

That the knowledge of entities that is taught in the third chapter of the AA must be explained as the inferior knowledge of entities is from the point of view of the general layout of the AA because the third chapter is the one that teaches the knowledge of entities within the division of the AA's eight topics. However, it is not the case that there is no knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas. For the prajñāpāramitā taught in the second chapter of the AA is identified through its mode of not abiding in either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, which is exactly what is taught as the nature of the knowledge of entities in this third chapter too. You may think, "But then, when the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas is identified, apart from identifying the knowledge of the path (the cause of this knowledge of entities), there is no need to teach the knowledge of entities separately here." The purpose of teaching the knowledge of entities separately is to demonstrate the means to engage in the knowledge of all aspects, which was taught in the first chapter, and to easily realize the divisions of the antagonistic factors of this knowledge as well as the difference between being close to and being distant from this knowledge of all aspects (the fruitional mother).

The reasons for having to teach the knowledge of entities in these ways are as follows. You may wonder, "When noble śrāvakas enter the mahāyāna path after having given rise to bodhicitta, is the particular type of prajñā that already exists in their mind streams due to their former realization sufficient for the mahāyāna path?" It is not only not sufficient, but is distant from the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas and in fact constitutes an antagonistic factor for engaging in the latter. That śrāvakas lack the special prajñā of bodhisattvas is the intention of Maitreya because Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, who comprehended this intention, commented on it in this way. However, when they explain that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack the realization of phenomenal identitylessness, by virtue of the reason that there is nothing tobe apprehended that is an outer object, they identify the phenomenal identitylessness in terms of the apprehended that is to be realized by pratyekabuddhas as being empty of something apprehended that is other than the apprehender in terms of being another substance. However, this does not refer to the true reality of being empty of apprehender and apprehended altogether. For the explanations of the texts by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu do not identify any phenomenal identitylessness in terms of the apprehender that is beyond or superior to being empty of apprehender and apprehended.

Some ignorant people say, "Haribhadra says in both of his commentaries on the intention of the AA that the realization of phenomenal identitylessness exists in śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. For when he explains the dharmadhātu as the disposition of all three yānas, he thereby explains all noble persons to be characterized by being unconditioned. The meaning of this explanation is that all noble persons must be explained as being characterized by realizing phenomenal identitylessness. Also, in the section just before his comments on AA I.39c ("But by virtue of the divisions of the phenomena founded on it . . ."), he explains that śrāvakas focus on the dharmadhātu. But if they focus on it, they necessarily realize the dharmadhātu or phenomenal identitylessness." This is untenable, since the passage quoted teaches the reason for presenting the dharmadhātu (mind with stains) as the disposition by way of its being a cause. This reason is that all qualities of the noble ones of the three yānas must arise based on the dharmadhātu. This is readily known by merely seeing the context of the passage in question.

This may also be explained as follows. Even if śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas were to realize the dharmadhātu, it is thereby not certain that they necessarily realize phenomenal identitylessness. For the *Madhyāntavibhāga* gives explanations about the dharmadhātu and the divisions of the sixteen emptinesses even with regard to personal identitylessness. The above position also entails the flaw of the dharmadhātu not being tenable as the disposition for inferior yānas. For the dharmadhātu is definite as the buddha disposition;

the unfolding dispositions of inferior yānas are not the dharmadhātu; and the conventional term "naturally abiding disposition of inferior yānas" does not appear in the commentaries. Furthermore, according to this position, even the systems of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* would hold that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize phenomenal identitylessness because they hold that all noble persons are characterized by being unconditioned. The reason does apply because *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.14–15 explicitly states that the dharmadhātu is the cause of the qualities of noble ones and because the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says in the context of suchness as one of the eight unconditioned phenomena, "Why is it called dharmadhātu? Because it is the cause of all qualities of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas."[1722]

In brief, as a reason for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realizing phenomenal identitylessness, it is completely unrelated to adduce that all dispositions for perfect buddhahood are characterized by being unconditioned. As for the meaning of the passages adduced above, the reason "Because the dharmadhātu is characterized by being unconditioned" in Haribhadra's commentaries is put forward to prove that the dharmadhātu is the buddha disposition, which is done with the intention of perfect buddhahood having the nature of "being unconditioned and spontaneously present" (*Uttaratantra* I.5c) and so on. The outcome of putting forth this reason is that all dispositions for perfect buddhahood are established to be characterized by being unconditioned. By virtue of this being established, no earlier learned ones were able to doubt that the intention of the *Uttaratantra* is to explain that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack the realization of phenomenal identitylessness. Rather, if the three texts by Maitreya other than the AA and the *Uttaratantra* say that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas even lack the realization of suchness empty of duality, how could it be possible for them to realize all phenomena to be naturally empty? These reasons eliminate the position of Maitreya and his followers holding that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas directly realize phenomenal identitylessness.

As for the intention of Śāntideva, it is also held to be that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack the realization of phenomenal identitylessness. *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.45ab says:

> If liberation came from relinquishment of the afflictions,
> It should happen immediately after this.

Thus, he says that if the liberation of perfect buddhahood were attained merely through realizing personal identitylessness, it would follow that śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats also attain it. The reversed meaning of this consequence shows that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not attain the liberation

of perfect buddhahood because they lack the realization of phenomenal identitylessness. Thus, it is clear here too that they do not have this realization.

This point is also Nāgārjuna's intention, which is explained by the great scholar Bhāvaviveka through linking the view explained in the former's collection of reasoning with the conduct taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Thus, Bhāvaviveka explained that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack the bodhisattvas' special prajñā of realizing phenomenal identitylessness. When Candrakīrti taught on this through linking the view of the collection of reasoning with the aspect of means as taught in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, his statement that the special prajñā of realizing phenomenal identitylessness exists in śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas was made for the sake of praising phenomenal identitylessness, but this is not his final intention. The manner in which he praised phenomenal identitylessness by way of saying that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize phenomenal identitylessness is as follows. If one needs to realize phenomenal identitylessness even for merely attaining the states of noble śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas, there is no need to mention the need for realizing phenomenal identitylessness in order to attain the state of a noble one in the mahāyāna.[1723]

In brief, it is taught that the attainment of the bhūmis of the noble ones and the state of complete liberation depend on the realization of phenomenal identitylessness. Thus, this realization alone is supreme. In terms of the third chapter of the AA, what is explicitly taught in both the sūtras and the AA is only the prajñāpāramitā of not abiding in either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa. However, implicitly, the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, who do abide in nirvāṇa, is taught too.

C) The three natures[1724]

This has two parts:

1) How they are taught in the sūtras
2) Explanation according to the scriptural system of Yogācāra

1) How they are taught in the sūtras

The mother sūtras explain all phenomena, from form up through the knowledge of all aspects, by dividing them into the three characteristics.

a) The aspects (from form up through the knowledge of all aspects) that appear from the perspective of false imagination are superimposed as being such and such [aspects]. It is from this point of view that [the sūtras speak of] imaginary form and so on. These are also called "what is incomplete." The reason for calling them so is that they are incomplete because the referents that consist of these [superimposed aspects] are not suitable to be realized

by wisdom. Therefore, what is incomplete is not suitable as a foundation for [enlightened] qualities either.

b) [The other-dependent nature] is what, from the perspective of false imagination, appears as these various phenomena from form up through the knowledge of all aspects. This is expressed as being both complete and incomplete because it refers to the meaning of the compound that is presented as being incomplete from the point of view of dualistic appearance and as being complete from the point of view of lucid awareness.

c) [The perfect nature] refers to the form and so on of the nature of phenomena, which are empty of superimpositions onto false imagination's aspect of appearance as being such and such [aspects]. This is called "what is complete," which refers to realization being complete as the [perceiving] subject that is wisdom. It is classified [as twofold]—the unchanging perfect [nature] and the unmistaken perfect [nature]. Both of these are [further] divided into two each—the aspect of dharmadhātu wisdom and the aspect of the qualities that bear this nature.

As for these boundary lines of presenting the three characteristics, both Mādhyamikas and Mere Mentalists agree in their assertions about the other [two characteristics], but when presenting the perfect [nature], they differ as follows. The Mādhyamikas present it as the other-dependent being empty of its own nature and the Mere Mentalists present it as the imaginary being empty of its own nature.

2) Explanation according to the scriptural system of Yogācāra

This has two parts:

a) Presenting each one of the three [characteristics]

b) Matching them with the two realities

2a) Presenting each one of the three characteristics

a) [The imaginary characteristic] refers to any imputed aspects that, under the influence of the latent tendencies of ignorance, are superimposed onto the aspect that consists of dualistic appearances. It is classified as fourfold—each one of [the basic divisions into] the twofold imaginary [nature] in terms of apprehender and apprehended [entails] [two] further aspects of imputing the two identities. An alternative fourfold [division] is that each one of the two identities [entails] the two aspects of apprehender and apprehended. [Thus, the imaginary nature is classified into] eight in terms of the four ways of [apprehender and apprehended each] being associated [with the two identities] and the four ways of the reverse [of that]. To exemplify the latter (the reverse way of being associated), to apprehend a personal identity as [being either one of] the twelve [types of] persons who are agents[1725] represents the apprehender, while what is superimposed by this as "mine" represents the

apprehended. What is external and apprehended as a phenomenal identity is the apprehended that consists of [outer] referents, while the [internal] consciousness that appears as these [outer referents] is the apprehender.

In brief, the two identities represent the imaginary that fully qualifies as such and knowable objects are the nominal [imaginary nature], but they are not claimed to be existent. However, the isolates of the two identities that are eliminations-of-others are mere eliminations-of-others, but they are not the imaginary that fully qualifies as such because they are not imputed as either apprehender or apprehended. Nevertheless, these isolates that are eliminations-of-others exist in a conventional sense because they function as supports for terms and mental states.

b) The other-dependent characteristic is that which, under the influence of latent tendencies of ignorance, appears as the aspects of apprehender and apprehended. When classified, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* describes it to be sixfold—the three [aspects] that appear as if they were external (places, referents, and bodies) and the three that appear as if they were internal (mentation, perception, and conception). The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explains it as twofold—latent tendencies and the false imagination that is produced by them. Since these two function as aids for each other and thus depend on something other, they are called "other-dependent." The *Madhyāntavibhāga* explains it as fourfold:

> Consciousness arises as the appearance of referents,
> Sentient beings, a self, and cognizance . . .[1726]

Here, one has to understand the following distinctions. Though the other-dependent is necessarily false imagination, all portions of the ālaya-consciousness are not necessarily false imagination. For the ālaya-consciousness is not something that possesses the aspects of the third realm [of saṃsāra]; it is the collective basis for all three characteristics being associated together; and it needs to be presented as the location of [all] knowable objects. You may wonder, "Since cognizance is explained as the other-dependent, isn't it that the ālaya-consciousness is explained as the other-dependent?" It is taught that labeling the ālaya as a consciousness that is cognizance [refers to] the nominal [ālaya] and not to the [ālaya] that fully qualifies as such. In terms of the teaching that one portion of the ālaya (the aspect of cognizance) is the other-dependent, [this portion of the ālaya] is necessarily false imagination. However, the entire ālaya is not necessarily the other-dependent and false imagination. The aspect of the latent tendencies of dualistic appearances within the ālaya represents the imaginary, its matured aspect is the other-dependent, and from the point of view of its being lucid

awareness, it is the perfect [nature]. Those latent tendencies are presented as the imaginary because this imaginary [nature] arises due to the power of being habituated to latent tendencies. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says:

> The causal features of referents
> As designated, their latent tendencies,
> And the appearance of referents through them
> Are the defining characteristics of the imaginary.[1727]

c) The perfect characteristic is the actuality of the basic nature—being empty of the imaginary (the object of negation) within the other-dependent (the bearer of this [perfect] nature). It is classified [as twofold]—the unchanging perfect [nature] and the unmistaken perfect [nature]. The first one consists of the two kinds of identitylessness and the second is the wisdom that directly realizes these.

2b) Matching the three characteristics with the two realities

The first two characteristics are presented as the seeming reality because they are afflicted focal objects. The imaginary is that which, from the perspective of being affected by ignorance, appears as the aspect of being real because it is seemingly real. However, the imaginary is not even conventionally real because it is delusive and empty of a nature of its own even conventionally. Therefore, this fact that the imaginary lacks a nature is the general system of everyone from the Mere Mentalists upward.

The other-dependent is the conventional reality that actually fulfills this function because the essence and nature of the other-dependent are established conventionally, due to which it is not empty of its own nature. Although the nature of the other-dependent is really established, the other-dependent itself is not really established because it is not established in the way it appears, just as illusory horses and oxen appear as such [horses and oxen], but are not established as such. You may wonder, "What is the difference between the other-dependent and the nature of the other-dependent?" Though the other-dependent is of the nature of the other-dependent, the nature of the other-dependent is not the other-dependent. "Nature" in this context has two aspects—the conventional one and the ultimate one. The first one is the aspect of the seeds within the ālaya and the latter one is the nondual wisdom within it.[1728] Among these, the first nature is conventionally real because, when giving a presentation in terms of conventions, one gives a presentation of real and delusive by straightforwardly referring [to these notions]. However, [this conventional nature of the other-dependent] is not ultimately real. For when the conventional reality of dualistic appearance is realized to be empty, the aspect of the dualistic appearance of apprehender

and apprehended together with their seeds must be explained as the imaginary. The latter nature [of the other-dependent] is ultimately real because it is nothing but the unchanging perfect [nature].

You may say, "But if the other-dependent is not empty of a conventional and an ultimate nature, it follows that it is not empty of reality either; and in that case, it is really established." This is not the case. Since the followers of this system explain that the boundary lines of presenting emptiness are primarily [stated] in terms of being other-empty, they are able to present [emptiness] as merely being empty of another nature. Therefore, though [emptiness] is not empty of its own nature, it is not presented as not being emptiness. The profound dharmadhātu's own nature is empty[1729] of dependent origination, but it is not really established because this nature of its own cannot be said to be exclusively real or delusive and is free from being real and delusive.

The outcome of this explanation is as follows. The boundary lines of presenting the other-dependent are that it is presented as the collection of both the imaginary and the perfect [natures], just like space with clouds. The part that is dualistic appearance (the stains) is the imaginary, which is like clouds. The part that is the nature of the [other-dependent] (lucid awareness) is the perfect [nature], which is like space. Therefore, one of the two parts [of the other-dependent] is represented by the imaginary and the other part is the perfect [nature]. In this way, it is called "the other-dependent" because its arising as having stains (the consciousness of dualistic appearance—the imaginary) is produced under the influence of something other, that is, ignorance. In this way, the imaginary characteristic is false seeming reality and the other-dependent characteristic is correct seeming reality. The last characteristic [(the perfect nature)] is definitely nothing but ultimate reality because it serves as the focal object of the wisdom of the meditative equipoise of noble ones that completely purifies stains.[1730]

Some people may say, "Since the unmistaken perfect [nature] is the wisdom that focuses on the [unchanging perfect nature], it is not suitable as the focal object." However, for the buddha bhagavāns, the very wisdom that focuses is not unsuitable as the focal object because they have obtained the inconceivable state. [The perfect nature] is the ultimate because this ultimate is the supreme object to be striven for by buddhas and bodhisattvas. It is also real because it is real as nothing but nondual wisdom.



Appendix II: Charts

Chart 1: The three realms of saṃsāra and their subdivisions

1. FORMLESS REALM

Neither Discrimination nor Nondiscrimination (*naivasaṃjñāsaṃjñā*) ***a.k.a. Peak of Existence*** (*bhavāgra*)

Nothing Whatsoever (*ākiṃcanya*)

Infinite Consciousness (*vijñānānantya*)

Infinite Space (*ākāśānantya*)

2. FORM REALM

5 pure abodes (only noble beings)

- Not Low (*akaniṣṭha*)
- Excellent Outlook (*sudarśana*)
- Excellent View (*sudṛśa*)
- Without Heat (*atapas*)
- Not Great (*avṛha*)

4th dhyāna

- Great Fruition (*vṛhatphala*)
- Merit-Born (*puṇyaprasava*)
- Cloudless (*anabhraka*)

3rd dhyāna

- Consummate Virtue (*śubhakṛtsna*)
- Immeasurable Virtue (*apramāṇaśubha*)
- Limited Virtue (*parīttaśubha*)

2nd dhyāna

- Brilliant Light (*ābhāśvara*)
- Immeasurable Light (*apramāṇābhā*)
- Limited Light (*parīttābhā*)

1st dhyāna

- Great Brahmā (*mahābrahmāṇa*)
- In Front of Brahmā (*brahmapurohita*)
- Belonging to Brahmā's Assembly (*brahmakāyika*)

3. DESIRE REALM

Gods

- Power over Others' Emanations (*paranirmitavaśvartin*)
- Enjoying Emanations (*nirmāṇarati*)
- Being Pleased (*tuṣita*)
- Free from Combat (*yāma*)
- The Thirty-three (*trayastriṃśa*)
- Belonging to the Assembly of the Four Great Kings (*caturmahārājakāyika*)

Asuras

Humans

Animals

Hungry Ghosts (*preta*)

Hell Beings

Chart 2: The 108 repetitive phrases of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras

THE FIFTY-THREE AFFLICTED PHENOMENA:

1–5) the five skandhas
6–11) the six sense faculties
12–17) the six consciousnesses
18–23) the six objects
24–29) the six contacts (between the respective object, sense faculty, and consciousness)
30–35) the six feelings (resulting from the six contacts)
36–41) the six elements (earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness)
42–53) the twelve links of dependent origination

THE FIFTY-FIVE PURIFIED PHENOMENA:

- the *paths of conduct*:
  1–6) the six pāramitās
- the *paths of view*:
  7–24) the eighteen emptinesses
- the *yogic paths*:
  25–31) the seven groups of the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment
- the *paths of calm abiding*:
  32) the four realities of the noble ones
  33) the four dhyānas
  34) the four immeasurables
  35) the four formless absorptions
  36) the eight liberations
  37) the nine absorptions of progressive abiding
- the *paths of superior insight*:
  38) the three doors to liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness)
- the *paths of special qualities*:
  39) the five (or six) supernatural knowledges
  40) the four (special) samādhis ("heroic stride," "sky treasure," "the stainless one," and "the lion's sport")
  41) the four doors of dhāraṇī (in terms of poised readiness, mantra, words, and meaning)
- the *paths of fruition*:
  42) the ten powers
  43) the four fearlessnesses
  44) the four discriminating awarenesses
  45) great love
  46) great compassion
  47) the eighteen unique qualities
  48–52) the five beings who manifest the paths (the four fruitions of the śrāvakas plus the one of the pratyekabuddhas)
  53–55) the three final results (the three knowledges of all aspects, the path, and entities)[1731]

Chart 3: The five paths

ACCORDING TO THE *ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA*[1732]

The path of accumulation: It consists of the delight in the ethics of ordinary beings, controlling the sense gates, moderation in food, not sleeping during the first and last parts of the night, but making effort in yoga, and dwelling in alertness. It also consists of other virtues that serve as causes for liberation as well as the prajñās that arise from study, reflection, and meditation. Through cultivating these, one becomes a vessel for clear realization and liberation.

The path of preparation: It consists of the roots of virtue that are the factors conducive to penetration (heat, peak, poised readiness, and the supreme dharma) and are based on gathering the accumulations. Heat is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of attaining the illumination of the four realities through personal experience. Peak is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of the increase of the illumination of the four realities through personal experience. Poised readiness is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of partially entering and following the four realities through personal experience. The supreme dharma is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of the state of mind immediately before directly seeing the four realities through personal experience.

The path of seeing: It consists of the nonreferential samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) immediately after the supreme dharma. It is also what makes one realize, by virtue of the equality of what is to be observed and what observes it, that these two are equal. It is also the dharma cognition of focusing on the elimination of the designations of sentient beings and phenomena for these individually as well as the elimination of both designations for everything.

The path of familiarization: It consists of the mundane paths, the supramundane paths, the lesser paths, the medium paths, the great paths, the paths of preparation, the uninterrupted paths, the paths of liberation, and the special paths that are higher than the path of seeing. Among these, the supramundane path consists of the realizations (on the path of familiarization) of suffering, its origin, cessation, and the path. It consists of the dharma cognitions and the cognitions of subsequent realization that are congruently associated with samādhi and extends from the first dhyāna up through the āyatana of Nothing Whatsoever (the āyatana of Neither Discrimination nor Nondiscrimination belongs to the mundane path since its flux of discrimination is very unclear). The meditative absorption of cessation is also supramundane.

The path of nonlearning: Through the vajralike samādhi, the continuum of all impregnations of negative tendencies is severed, the continuum of the factors that are attained through encountering (that is, the obscurations) is severed, and the attainments of being free from them are attained. Therefore, based on this samādhi, immediately after it there is a total and comprehensive change of state, which consists of (1) the change of state of the mind of having attained nonlearning, (2) the change of state of the path, and (3) the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies.[1733] This change of state is the knowledge of the termination of the obscurations and the knowledge of their nonarising. The path of nonlearning also consists of the ten dharmas of nonlearning—the eight from the correct view on the level of nonlearning up through the correct samādhi on this level, the liberation of nonlearning, and the perfect wisdom of nonlearning (equivalent to the five uncontaminated skandhas; see Chart 12).

ACCORDING TO JNS

The path of accumulation: The special prajñā that opens the gate to merging with the levels of liberation and omniscience and does not have the nature of the [five] faculties of the path of preparation.

The path of preparation: The path that provides the opportunity for liberation, has the nature of the [five] faculties and not the nature of the [seven] branches of enlightenment, and is (prior to the path of seeing) approximately concordant with the direct realization of reality in terms of its focal objects and aspects.

The path of seeing: That which provides the opportunity for liberation, is the clear realization of the [four] realities, has the nature of the [seven] branches of enlightenment, and does not have the nature of the path of familiarization.

The path of familiarization: That which provides the opportunity for liberation, has the nature of the path of the noble ones who are learners, and does not have the nature of the path of seeing.

The path of nonlearning: The infinite relinquishment and realization of omniscience.

ACCORDING TO CE

The path of accumulation: The study and reflection on the piṭakas [of the respective yānas] and the cultivation of the four foundations of mindfulness, [the four correct efforts, and the four limbs of miraculous powers,] all by relying on the ethics [of the respective yānas].

The path of preparation: The clear realization of reality that arises from [mundane] meditation before the path of seeing arises.

The path of seeing: The clear realization of the [four] realities, which has the nature of the [seven] branches of enlightenment.

The path of familiarization: [The path] that has the nature of the [eightfold] path of the noble ones, on which one further enhances and familiarizes with clear realization.

The (mahāyāna) path of nonlearning: The final deliverance in terms of the knowledge of all aspects in which dhātu and wisdom have become of one taste.

ACCORDING TO *BOD RGYA TSHIG MDZOD CHEN MO*[1734]

The path of accumulation: The path that is the basis for progressing toward nirvāṇa, on which one gathers the vast accumulation that consists of the virtues conducive to liberation; realizes identitylessness in the manner of term generalities and object generalities through study and reflection; and cultivates the four foundations of mindfulness, the four correct efforts, and the four limbs of miraculous powers. Through this, the very coarse factors to be relinquished that produce suffering in saṃsāra are relinquished in the manner of invalidating them and one attains the qualities of the visions, supernatural knowledges, and the samādhi of the stream of dharma.

The path of preparation: The path that is a stepping stone to liberation, on which one attains the roots of virtue that are conducive to penetration; prepares for [and eventually joins with] the clear realization of reality; through the prajñā that arises from meditation, realizes the lack of nature of the apprehended; and cultivates the five faculties and powers. Through this, the imputational factors to be relinquished are relinquished in the manner

of suppressing them and one attains the qualities of samādhis, dhāraṇīs, supernatural knowledges, and so on.

The path of seeing: The path that is a stepping stone to liberation, on which one newly sees true reality, which was not seen before; proceeds to the levels of the noble ones; directly realizes the nature of phenomena, just as it is (identitylessness); realizes the variety of the bearers of this nature, as is appropriate; and cultivates the seven branches of enlightenment. Through this, the afflictions that are the factors to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished in the manner of eradicating them at the root; one becomes free from the five fears;[1735] and attains the twelve sets of one hundred qualities, and so on.

The path of familiarization: The path that is a stepping stone to liberation, on which one becomes acquainted with what was seen on the path of seeing and cultivates the eightfold path of the noble ones. Through this, the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished in the manner of eradicating them at the root and uncontaminated qualities are increased.

The path of nonlearning: The ultimate qualities of realization and relinquishment of each one of the three yānas, respectively, that is, the attainments of śrāvaka arhathood, pratyekabuddha arhathood, and buddhahood.

ACCORDING TO TOK[1736]

The path of accumulation: That which is a basis for progressing towards nirvāṇa and consists of the virtuous actions that are conducive to liberation.

The path of preparation: That which is a stepping-stone for liberation and consists of the phase of clearly realizing the ultimate.

The path of seeing: That which is a basis for progressing towards nirvāṇa and consists of the phase of newly and clearly realizing true reality.

The path of familiarization: That which is a stepping-stone for liberation and consists of the phase of having to become familiar with special samādhis.

The path of nonlearning (or completion): That which is the basis for actualizing nirvāṇa and consists of the phase of clearly realizing the final object of familiarization.

Chart 4: The sixteen aspects of the four realities of noble ones according to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, *TOK, and the* Abhidharmasamuccaya

ABHIDHARMAKOŚABHĀṢYA AND TOK[1737]

The reality of suffering

It is *impermanent* by virtue of depending on conditions; being unstable; or entailing arising and ceasing. It is *suffering* by virtue of its character of causing harm; being like a burden; or being an antagonistic factor. It is *empty* by virtue of being contrary to views about "mine"; being free from an internal person; or being free from a self. It is *identityless* by virtue of being contrary to views about a self; not doing what one desires; or itself not being a self. Or, in due order, these four are the remedies for those who entertain views about permanence, happiness, what is mine, and a self.

1) Whatever is conditioned has the defining characteristic of *impermanence.*
2) Whatever is impermanent has the defining characteristic of *suffering.*
3) Whatever is suffering has the defining characteristic of being *empty.*
4) Whatever is empty has the defining characteristic of being *identityless.*

The reality of origin

It is the *cause* of suffering by virtue of the principle of having the property of a seed; the principle of coming; or being its first cause, such as a seed is for a fruit. It is the *origin* by virtue of the principle of producing; arising; or being its proximate cause, such as a sprout is for a fruit. It is *arising* by virtue of the principle of connecting; increasing; or specific arising (such as the final fruition of a flower having arisen from its specific causes). It is the *conditions* by virtue of the principle of manifest production; meeting (for example, the coming together of the conditions of a lump of clay, water, a wheel, a rope, a stick, and so on producing a pot); or progression, such as a field, water, manure, and so on giving rise to the taste, color, and so on of a fruit. Or, in due order, these four are the remedies for those who entertain views about there being no cause, only a single cause, changes in the specificity of causes, and entities being produced through premeditation.

5) It is a *cause,* since karma and afflictions are the effective causes that plant the seeds of the latent tendencies which establish further births in saṃsāra.

6) It is the *origin* of suffering, since the latent karmic tendencies of sentient beings are the effective causes for being born as one of the six types of beings.

7) It is *arising,* since such individual specific causes are the effective causes for different outcomes, different beings and birthplaces, and even for being born as the highest of sentient beings on the Peak of Existence.

8) It represents *conditions,* because it represents the effective causes for obtaining various bodies that have not been obtained before and for the transition of already obtained bodies into others.

The reality of cessation

It is *cessation* by virtue of the skandhas having disintegrated; or the connection to suffering and its causes having disintegrated; or by virtue of no more engagement in suffering. It is *peace* by virtue of the three fires (desire, anger, and ignorance) having subsided; being free from the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena (arising, abiding, and ceasing); or being without suffering. It is *excellence* by virtue of being without harm; being (ultimate) virtue; and nothing being higher. It is *final deliverance* by virtue of being free from all flaws; being the supreme of what is reliable; or being irreversible. Or, in due order, these

four are the remedies for those who entertain views about there being no liberation, suffering being liberation, the bliss of samādhi being excellent, and liberation being unstable by virtue of regressing from it again and again.

9) *Cessation* is the freedom from the causes for the origination of suffering, that is, the afflictions.

10) *Peace* is the freedom from what causes nonpeace—the five appropriating skandhas, which are the all-pervasive suffering.

11) *Excellence* refers to being pure, since it is free from afflictions, and blissful, since it is free from suffering.

12) *Final deliverance* means being permanent, since it is irreversible, and the basis for benefiting others, since it is ultimate virtue.

The reality of the path

It is the *path* in the sense of being that on which one proceeds; being contrary to false paths; or serving as something like a path. It is *appropriate* by virtue of entailing what is appropriate; being contrary to what is not appropriate; or engaging in true reality as it is. It is *accomplishment* in the sense of perfectly accomplishing the goal; not being contrary to the city of nirvāṇa; or being certainty. It is *conducive to deliverance* by virtue of making one utterly and perfectly go beyond; being the remedy for all of saṃsāric existence; or definitely leading to deliverance. Or, in due order, these four are the remedies for those who entertain views in terms of thinking that there is no path, that mistaken paths are the path, that other paths too are the path, and that other paths are superior.

13) The *path* makes one search for and realize the dharmadhātu—suchness.

14) It is *appropriate*, since it functions as the remedy for what is not appropriate—the afflictions.

15) It is *accomplishment*, since it, through counteracting mistaken notions (such as apprehending conditioned phenomena as permanent), places one within the realization of suchness and accomplishes an unmistaken mind.

16) It is *conducive to deliverance*, since it makes one proceed toward the place of unconditioned, permanent, and everlasting nirvāṇa.

ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA[1738]

The reality of suffering

It consists of the births and the birth places of sentient beings (the six types of beings and their realms).

1) It is *impermanent* in terms of having the twelve characteristics of (a) nonexistence (in the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, there is never a self nor anything that is mine), (b) perishing (the perishing of what arises as conditioned formations), (c) change (conditioned formations keeping changing into something else), (d) separation (control over conditioned formations fading and their being taken as what is theirs by others), (e) closeness (being overpowered by impermanence), (f) nature (the arising of what is impermanent being connected through causes), (g) momentariness (conditioned formations not lasting more than an instant), (h) continuity (the uninterrupted continuity of the arising of conditioned formations since beginningless time), (i) sickness and so on (the changes of the body's elements, its age, and its life-force), (j) the arising of various states of mind (the mind arising sometimes as being full of desire and sometimes as being free from desire, with the same applying to hatred, ignorance, collection, distraction, dullness, exaltation, agitation, peace, meditative equipoise, and so on), (k) losing acquired possessions (the end of all acquiring is losing), and (l) the dissolution and formation of the world as

the container (its being destroyed through fire, water, and wind; dissolving during twenty minor eons, remaining dissolved during twenty minor eons, being formed during twenty minor eons, and remaining during twenty minor eons; together, these eighty minor eons make up one great eon of the universe).

2) It is *suffering* in terms of the eight kinds of suffering—(a) birth, (b) aging, (c) sickness, (d) death, (e) association with what is unpleasant, (f) separation from what is pleasant, (g) not obtaining what is desired, and, (h) in brief, the five appropriating skandhas (the first seven sufferings are suffering in terms of seeming reality and the last one is suffering in terms of ultimate reality). Or suffering is sixfold—(a) the suffering of anxiety, (b) the suffering of change, (c) the suffering of association, (d) the suffering of separation, (e) the suffering of not obtaining a result that one hoped for, and (f) the suffering of the impregnations of negative tendencies. Or it is threefold—(a) the suffering of pain, (b) the suffering of change, and (c) the all-pervasive suffering.

3) It is *empty* in the following sense. One clearly sees that when something does not exist somewhere, the latter is empty of the former. In accordance with true reality, one understands that what remains there exists as a real existent. This is the correct view of engaging in emptiness, which is called "unmistakenness." What does not exist in what? In the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, there is nothing that is permanent, enduring, self-sufficient, or unchanging, nor is there a self or anything that is mine. Therefore, the former are empty of the latter. What remains there as a real existent? That which is identitylessness. Thus, emptiness is to be understood in the sense of an identity not existing, while identitylessness exists. With this in mind, the Buddha said, "In accordance with true reality, what exists is understood as existent and what does not exist, as nonexistent." Emptiness is threefold—the emptiness of a nature, the emptiness of what does not exist as it appears, and natural emptiness, which correspond to the imaginary, the other-dependent, and the perfect natures, respectively.

4) It is *identityless* in that the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas lack the characteristics of a self as imputed by those who assert a self. With this in mind, the Buddha said that all phenomena are identityless.

The reality of origin

It consists of the afflictions and the actions that occur under the influence of the afflictions. The Buddha taught that the reality of origin is primarily craving—the desire of liking to be reborn and delighting in that rebirth. The meaning of "primary" is being omnipresent, which means that this craving is present in all things, all situations, all times, all realms, all feelings, and all aspects. The afflictions consist of desire, anger, ignorance, pride, doubt, and the five views. Actions consist of volitional karma and volitioned karma. Volitional karma is the mental karma of the mind forming something in it, which can be meritorious, nonmeritorious, or unmoving karma. Volitioned karma consists of mental, verbal, and physical karmas, which can be virtuous or unvirtuous.

5) It is a *cause*, because it represents the effective causes that plant the latent tendencies for rebirth.

6) It is the *origin* of suffering, because it represents the effective causes for the accumulated latent tendencies for certain sentient beings originating as certain classes of sentient beings.

7) It is *arising*, because it represents the effective causes for individual rebirths and their respective aspects and superiority.

8) It represents *conditions*, because it represents the effective causes for obtaining and passing away from different existences.

The reality of cessation

It consists of suchness and the nonarising of the path and the afflictions, which are where the latter cease, through what they cease, and what ceases, respectively. Thus, it is being focused on suchness, in which contaminated entites have ceased. Ultimate cessation is the one that is attained through the complete eradication of the seeds of affliction through the prajñā of the noble ones. Its supreme form is the cessation that consists of the nonabiding nirvāṇa of bodhisattvas and buddhas because it is the basis of benefit and happiness for all sentient beings. It is called cessation because suffering as the result of the afflictions does not arise anymore in the future.

9) It is *cessation*, because it is the freedom from the afflictions.

10) It is *peace*, because it is the freedom from suffering.

11) It is *excellence*, because it is the entity of bliss and purity.

12) It is *final deliverance*, because it is the basis of being permanent and blissful.

The reality of the path

It is that through which one understands suffering, relinquishes its origin, manifests cessation, and cultivates the path. It consists of the five paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning (on these, see Chart 3).

13) It is the *path*, because of searching for the actuality of true reality.

14) It is *appropriate*, because of being the remedy for the afflictions.

15) It is *accomplishment*, because of accomplishing an unmistaken mind.

16) It is *conducive to deliverance*, because of proceeding toward the permanent abode.

Chart 5: The aspects of the four realities of the noble ones in the abhidharma and the prajñāpāramitā sūtras

	sixteen aspects in the abhidharma	**thirty-three aspects in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in general**
reality of suffering	1) impermanence 2) suffering 3) emptiness 4) identitylessness	1) impermanence 2) suffering 3) identitylessness 4) peace
reality of the origin of suffering	5) cause 6) origin 7) arising 8) condition	5) disease 6) abscess 7) thorn/spear 8) evil
seven aspects common to the realities of suffering and origin	9/16) like an adversary 10/17) destructiveness 11/18) unsteadiness 12/19) disintegrating 13/20) frightening 14/21) like a plague 15/22) calamity	
reality of cessation	9) cessation 10) peace 11) excellence 12) final deliverance	23) identitylessness 24) peace 25) freedom 26) emptiness 27) signlessness 28) wishlessness 29) nonformation
reality of the path	13) path 14) appropriateness 15) accomplishment 16) conducive to deliverance	30) path 31) appropriateness 32) accomplishment 33) conducive to deliverance

The twenty-seven aspects in the knowledge of entities	
reality of suffering	1) not existing 2) not arising 3) free 4) not crushed
reality of the origin of suffering	5) without abiding 6) space 7) inexpressible 8) without name
reality of cessation	9) not going anywhere 10) nothing being removed 11) inexhaustible 12) without arising
reality of the path	*a) the aspects of focusing on the remedies for the afflictive obscurations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in common* 13) no agent 14) no cognizer 15) no transition 16) no subduing[1739] *b) the aspects of focusing on the remedies for the conceptions about the apprehended in accord with the pratyekabuddhas* *ba) the aspects of focusing during contaminated subsequent attainment* 17) like a dream 18) like an echo 19) like an optical illusion 20) like a mirage 21) like an illusion *bb) the aspects of focusing during uncontaminated meditative equipoise* 22) no afflicted phenomena 23) no purified phenomena 24) without being tainted 25) no reference points 26) no conceit 27) immovable

The thirty-six aspects in the knowledge of the path		
		The sixteen aspects in the abhidharma
reality of the origin of suffering	1) free from desire 2) not abiding 3) peace	cause
	4) lack of greed 5) lack of hatred 6) lack of dullness	origin
	7) subsiding of the afflictions	arising
	8) lack of sentient beings	condition
reality of the path	9) immeasurable 10) disconnected from the two extremes	path
	11) not different 12) no clinging to superiority	appropriate
	13) nonconceptuality 14) unassessable	accomplishment
	15) lacking attachment	[conducive to deliverance]
reality of suffering	16) impermanence 17) suffering 18) empty 19) identityless 20) no characteristics (its general characteristic)	impermanence sufering empty identityless

reality of cessation	the sixteen emptinesses of	
	21) the internal 22) the external 23) both internal and external	cessation
	24) emptiness 25) the great 26) the ultimate 27) conditioned phenomena 28) unconditioned phenomena 29) what is beyond extremes 30) what is without beginning and end 31) what is not rejected	peace
	32) the primordial nature	excellence
	33) all phenomena 34) specifically characterized phenomena 35) the unobservable	the manner of final deliverance
	36) the nature of nonentities	final deliverance

Chart 6: The kinds of saṃgha according to the Abhidharmakośa

A) THOSE WHO HAVE PREVIOUSLY BECOME FREE FROM ATTACHMENT (ONLY ONCE-RETURNERS AND NONRETURNERS)

once-returners

approachers

• abide in any one of the first fifteen moments of the path of seeing and have previously relinquished six to eight of the nine degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization

1) "pursuers by means of confidence" (duller faculties)
2) "pursuers by means of the dharma" (sharper faculties)

abiders

• same relinquishment, but abide in the sixteenth moment

1) "those who are convinced through confidence" (duller faculties)
2) "those who attain through seeing" (sharper faculties)

nonreturners

approachers

• abide in any one of the first fifteen moments of the path of seeing and have previously relinquished any number of afflictions from the ninth degree of the desire realm up through those of Nothing Whatsoever

abiders

• same relinquishment, but abide in the sixteenth moment

B) THOSE WHO RELINQUISH SIMULTANEOUSLY (ONLY ABIDING STREAM-ENTERERS)[1740]

Abiding stream-enterers who at this very level progressively relinquish all nine degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm as well as all nine degrees of the afflictions of the two higher realms simultaneously, thus becoming abiding arhats immediately thereafter without going through the levels of once-returners and nonreturners

C) THOSE WHO ATTAIN THE FRUITIONS GRADUALLY

stream-enterers

approachers

• abide in any one of the first fifteen moments of the path of seeing and have either not relinquished any factors to be relinquished through familiarization before the path of seeing, or less than five of the nine degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm

1) "pursuers by means of confidence" (duller faculties)
2) "pursuers by means of the dharma" (sharper faculties)

abiders

• same relinquishment, but abide in the sixteenth moment

1) "those who take seven rebirths" in the desire realm (not relinquished any factors to be relinquished through familiarization)
2) "those who are born from family to family" (relinquished the third and fourth degrees of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization and will take two or three rebirths of the same type)

once-returners

approachers

• those who relinquish the fifth degree of the afflictions of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization and make efforts in relinquishing the sixth one

abiders

1) mere abiders (relinquished the sixth degree of these afflictions)
2) special abiders "only separated by a single interval of one lifetime" (relinquished both the seventh and eighth degrees of said afflictions)

nonreturners

approachers

• same as abiding once-returners 2)

abiders

1) mere abiders (relinquished the ninth degree of the afflictions of the desire realm)
2) special abiders (those who make efforts to become free from the afflictions from the first dhyāna up through the eighth degree of the afflictions of the Peak of Existence)
    a) "those who progress to the form realm"
        1) "those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state"
        2) "those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born"
        3) "those who pass into nirvāṇa through application"
        4) "those who pass into nirvāṇa without application"
        5) "those who progress higher"
            a) "those who progress to Akaniṣṭha"
                1) "leapers"
                2) "half-leapers"
                3) "those who die in, and transit through, all abodes"
            b) "those who progress to the Peak of Existence"
    b) "those who progress to the formless realm"
        1) "those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born"
        2) "those who pass into nirvāṇa through application"
        3) "those who pass into nirvāṇa without application"
        4) "those who progress higher"
    c) "those who pass into nirvāṇa amidst visible phenomena"
    d) "those who terminate their life in the desire realm"
    e) "those who witness with the body"

arhats

approachers

• those who are anywhere in the process of relinquishing the afflictions of the first dhyāna up through the ninth degree of those of the Peak of Existence.

abiders

• those who attain the analytical cessation of having relinquished the ninth degree of the afflictions of the Peak of Existence

pratyekabuddhas

Chart 7: The twenty-five kinds of bodhisattva saṃgha in the revised edition of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines *and the twenty kinds of saṃgha in AA I.23–24*

TWENTY-FIVE KINDS OF BODHISATTVA SAṂGHA IN THE SŪTRA

stream-enterers

- approachers
  - (1) *the eighth one*[1741] [classificatory basis for (2)]
  - (2) *those of duller and sharper faculties*
- abiders
  - (3) mere abiders
  - (4) *those who take seven rebirths*
  - (5)–(6) *those who are born from family to family among gods and humans*

once-returners

- (7) approachers
- abiders
  - (8) mere abiders
  - (9) *those who are only separated by a single interval of one lifetime*

nonreturners

- (10) approachers
- abiders
  - (11) mere abiders
  - (12) *those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state*
  - (13) *those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born*
  - (14) *those who pass into nirvāṇa through application*
  - (15) *those who pass into nirvāṇa without application*
  - (16) *leapers*
  - (17) *half-leapers*
  - (18) *those who die in all abodes*
  - (19) *those who proceed to the Peak of Existence*
  - (20) *those who progress to the formless realm*
  - (21) *those who pass into nirvāṇa amidst visible phenomena*
  - (22) *those who are a bodily witness*
  - (23) *those who change state after being born*

arhats

- (24) *approachers*

(25) *pratyekabuddhas*

TWENTY KINDS OF BODHISATTVA SAṂGHA IN AA I.23–24

stream-enterers

- approachers
  - (1)–(2) *those with duller and sharper faculties*
  - (3)–(4) *attainers of confidence and the view*
- abiders
  - (5)–(6) *those who are born from family to family* (gods or humans)

once-returners

- (7) *those with a single interval*

nonreturners

- those who pass into nirvāṇa
  - (8) *in the intermediate state*
  - (9) *after being born*
  - (10) *with effort*
  - (11) *without effort*
  - (12) *by progressing to Akaniṣṭha*
  - (13)–(15) *the three leapers*
  - (16) *those who progress to the Peak of Existence*
  - (17) *those who overcame attachment to form*
  - (18) *those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena*
  - (19) *those who are a bodily witness*

(20) *rhinos*[1742]

Chart 8: The twenty kinds of saṃgha according to the Vṛtti, *the* Ālokā, *the* Vivṛti, JNS, *and* CE

VṚTTI[1743]

stream-enterers

approachers

(1) *the eighth one* (the classificatory basis for those of duller and sharper faculties)

abiders

(6) *those who are born from family to family among humans*

(7) *those who are born from family to family among gods*

once-returners

(8) *approachers*

(2) *those of dull faculties* (who are convinced through confidence)

(3) *those of sharp faculties* (who attain through seeing)

abiders

(4) *those of dull faculties*

(5) *those of sharp faculties*

(9) *those who are only separated by a single interval of one lifetime*

nonreturners

approachers

(2) *those of dull faculties* (who are convinced through confidence)

(3) *those of sharp faculties* (who attain through seeing)

(10) *abiders*

(4) *those of dull faculties*

(5) *those of sharp faculties*

(11) *those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state*

(12) *those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born*

(13) *those who pass into nirvāṇa through application*

(14) *those who pass into nirvāṇa without application*

(15) *those who progress higher*

(16) *those who overcame attachment to form*

(17) *those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena*

(18) *those who are a bodily witness*

arhats

(19) *approaching arhats*

(20) ***pratyekabuddhas***

ĀLOKĀ AND *VIVṚTI*[1744]

stream-enterers
approachers
(1) *those of duller faculties* who pursue by means of faith
(2) *those of sharper faculties* who pursue by means of the dharma
abiders
(3) *mere abiders*
(4)–(5) *those who are born from family to family* among gods or humans

once-returners
approachers
(6) *those of duller faculties* who are convinced through confidence or *those of sharper faculties* who attain through seeing
abiders
(7) *abiders*
(8) *those who are only separated by a single interval of one lifetime*

nonreturners
approachers
(9) *those of duller faculties* who are convinced through confidence or *those of sharper faculties* who attain through seeing
abiders
(10) *those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state*
(11) *those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born*
(12) *those who pass into nirvāṇa through application*
(13) *those who pass into nirvāṇa without application*
those who progress to Akaniṣṭha
(14) *leapers*
(15) *half-leapers*
(16) *those who die in all abodes*
those who progress to the Peak of Existence (those who overcame attachment to form)
(17) *those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena*
(18) *those who are a bodily witness*

arhats
(19) *approachers*

(20) ***pratyekabuddhas***

CE

stream-enterers
approachers
(1) *those of duller faculties* who pursue by means of faith
(2) *those of sharper faculties* who pursue by means of the dharma
abiders
(3) *mere abiders*
special abiders—(4) *those who are born from family to family*

once-returners
approachers
(5) *those of duller faculties* who are convinced through confidence or *those of sharper faculties* who attain through seeing
abiders
(6) *mere abiders*
special abiders—(7) *those who are only separated by a single interval of one lifetime*

nonreturners
approachers
(8) *those of duller and sharper faculties*
abiders
(9) *those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state*
(10) *those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born*
(11) *those who pass into nirvāṇa through application*
(12) *those who pass into nirvāṇa without application*
those who progress to Akaniṣṭha
(13) *leapers*
(14) *half-leapers*
(15) *those who die in all abodes*
(16) *those who progress to the Peak of Existence (those who overcame attachment to form)*
(17) *those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena*
(18) *those who are a bodily witness*

arhats
(19) *approachers*

(20) ***pratyekabuddhas***

JNS[1745]

According to the AA

stream-enterers

approachers

(1) *those of duller faculties*

(2) *those of sharper faculties*

(3) *those who attain confidence*

(4) *those who attain the view*

abiders

(5)–(6) *those who are born from family to family* (gods and humans)

once-returners

(7) *those with a single interval*

nonreturners

(8) *those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state*

(9) *those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born*

(10) *those who pass into nirvāṇa through application*

(11) *those who pass into nirvāṇa without application*

(12) *those who pass into nirvāṇa by progressing to Akaniṣṭha*

(13)–(15) the three *leapers*

(16) *those who progress to the Peak of Existence*

(17) *those who overcame attachment to form*

(18) *those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena*

(19) *those who are a bodily witness*

(20) ***pratyekabuddhas***

According to the sūtras as per the system of Ngog Lotsāwa's disciples

stream-enterers

approachers

(1) *those of duller faculties*

(2) *those of sharper faculties*

once-returners

approachers

(3) *those who attain confidence*

(4) *those who attain the view*

(5)–(6) *those who are born from family to family* (gods and humans)

special abiders

(7) *those with a single interval*

nonreturners

approachers

(3) *those who attain confidence*

(4) *those who attain the view*

abiders

(8)–(19) as above

(20) ***pratyekabuddhas***

Chart 9: Comparison of the terminologies of the types of saṃgha in the revised edition of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines, *the AA, and the* Abhidharmakośa

Sūtra	AA	*Abhidharmakośa*
eighth bodhisattva (*bodhisattvāṣṭamaka*) those who pursue by means of confidence (*śraddhānusārin*)	those of duller faculties (*mṛdvindriya*)	those who pursue by means of confidence (those of duller faculties)
those who pursue by means of the dharma (*dharmānusārin*)	those of sharper faculties (*tīkṣnendriya*)	those who pursue by means of the dharma (those of sharper faculties)
those who are convinced through confidence (*śraddhādhimukta*)	those who attain through confidence (*śraddhaprāpta*)	those who are convinced through confidence
once-returners who attain through seeing (*dṛṣṭiprāpta sakṛdāgāmin*)	those who attain through seeing (*dṛṣṭiprāpta*)	those who attain through seeing those who pass through seven lifes (*saptakṛtvaparama*)
those who are born from family to family among humans (*manuṣyakulaṃkula*)	those who are born from family to family (*kulaṃkula*)	once-returners born from family to family (*kulaṃkula sakṛdāgāmin*)
those born from family to family among gods (*devatākulaṃkula*)		
nonreturners (*anāgāmin*)	those who attain through seeing (*dṛṣṭiprāpta*)	nonreturners (*anāgāmin*)
those with a single interval (*ekavīcika*)	those with a single interval (*ekavīcya*)	nonreturners with a single interval (*ekavīciko 'nāgāmin*)
those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state (*antarāparinirvāyin*)	intermediate state (*antara*)	those who pass into nirvāṇa in the intermediate state
those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born (*upadyaparinirvāyin*)	after being born (*utpadya*)	those who pass into nirvāṇa after being born
those who pass into nirvāṇa through application (*abhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin*)	with effort (*kāra*)	those who pass into nirvāṇa through application
those without application (*anabhisaṃskāra*)	without effort (*akāra*)	those who pass into nirvāṇa without application

Sūtra	AA	*Abhidharmakośa*
those who proceed to Akaniṣṭha (*akaniṣṭhaparama*)	those who progress to Akaniṣṭha (*akaniṣṭhaga*)	those who progress to Akaniṣṭha
leapers (*pluta*)	three leapers (*plutastraya*)	leapers
half-leapers (*ardhapluta*)		half-leapers
those who die in all abodes (*sarvasthānacyuta*)		those who die everywhere (*sarvacyuta*)
those who proceed to the Peak of Existence (*bhavāgraparama*)	those who proceed to the Peak of Existence (*bhavasyāgraparama*)	those who progress to the Peak of Existence (*bhavāgraga*)
those who overcame attachment to form (*rūpavītarāga*)	those who overcame attachment to form (*rūparāgahā*)	—
those who pass into nirvāṇa amidst visible phenomena (*dṛṣṭadharmaparinirvāyin*)	those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena (*dṛṣṭadharmaśrama*)	those who pass into nirvāṇa amidst visible phenomena
those who are a bodily witness (*kāyasākṣin*)	those who are a bodily witness	those who are a bodily witness
approaching arhats (*arhatvapratipannaka*)	—	approaching arhats
pratyekabuddhas	rhinos (*khaḍga*)	pratyekabuddhas (rhinos)

Chart 10: The nine stages of settling the mind (calm abiding), the four flaws, and the eight remedies

The nine stages

(1) settling the mind
(2) continuous settling
(3) repeated settling
(4) close settling
(5) taming
(6) pacifying
(7) completely pacifying
(8) making one-pointed
(9) even settling

The four flaws and the eight remedies

Flaws	Remedies
laziness	• confidence • striving • vigor • suppleness
forgetting the instructions	• mindfulness (or recollection)
not applying the remedies for dullness and agitation	• applying them
overapplying these remedies	• equanimity

Chart 11: General sets of samādhis

The six grounds of dhyāna (Tib. bsam gtan sa drug)
(1) the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna
(2) the ordinary first dhyāna
(3) the special first dhyāna
(4)–(6) the remaining three dhyānas

The nine grounds of dhyāna (Tib. bsam gtan sa dgu)
(1)–(4) the preparatory stages of the four dhyānas
(5)–(8) the four dhyānas
(9) the special first dhyāna

The nine uncontaminated grounds (Tib. zag med sa dgu)
(1)–(6) the six grounds of dhyāna
(7)–(9) the first three formless meditative absorptions

The eleven minds that serve as supports for the path (Tib. lam rten sems bcu gcig)
(1)–(9) the nine grounds of dhyāna
(10) the fourth actual meditative absorption of the formless realm
(11) a mind within the desire realm.

The nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding (Tib. mthar gnas dgu)
(1)–(4) the four dhyānas
(5)–(8) the four formless absorptions
(9) the meditative absorption of cessation

("Progressively abiding" means to alternate each of the first eight meditative absorptions with the ninth one.)

Chart 12: Specific sets of samādhis and qualities[1746]

The triad of completion, maturation, and purification (Tib. rdzogs smin sbyang)
This refers to (1) the completion of aspiration prayers, (2) the maturation of sentient beings, and (3) the purification of buddha realms that bodhisattvas have to accomplish on their path in order to attain the fruition of the infinite enlightened activity of a perfect buddha (versus the state of the individual nirvāṇa of arhats, in which no such activity for others happens). (1) The full extent of the completion of aspiration prayers is the complete perfection of the power of the virtues that are the causes for the ability to effortlessly and spontaneously promote the welfare of others while one-pointedly resting in meditative equipoise within the nature of phenomena. (2) The full extent of the maturation of sentient beings is the complete perfection of the power of the virtues that are the causes for the ability to display millions of physical manifestations in millions of buddha realms and to establish the retinue in front of each such manifestation—countless sentient beings—on the path of the noble ones by virtue of teaching them just a single verse of dharma. (3) The full extent of the purification of buddha realms is the complete perfection of the power of the virtues that are the causes for accomplishing the particular buddha realm in which one will become enlightened, just as the full extent of the ripening of fruits is their being ready to be enjoyed.[1747]

The four discriminating awarenesses (Skt. pratisaṃvid/-vedanā, Tib. so so yang dag par rig pa bzhi)
(1) of dharmas (fully knowing the individual characteristics of all phenomena; or teaching the eighty-four thousand doors of dharma as various remedial means in accordance with the different ways of thinking of sentient beings)
(2) meanings (fully knowing the divisions and classifications of all phenomena, that is, knowing the meanings that are expressed by the words and statements about the general characteristics of phenomena—impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and identitylessness—and their ultimate characteristic—the lack of arising and ceasing)
(3) semantics (knowing the languages, symbols, and terms of all the various kinds of sentient beings and being able to please them through this; being able to teach many meanings through a single word; and being free from words that are mistaken, rushed, or repetitive)
(4) self-confidence (being able to hear the dharma from others and eliminate one's own doubts, explain the dharma to others and thus eliminate their doubts, and speak meaningfully, swiftly, without interruptions, and unimpededly)

The four fearlessnesses (Skt. caturvaiśāradya, Tib. mi 'jigs pa bzhi)
These consist of the two statements of (1) realization and (2) relinquishment (one's own welfare), proclaiming in the middle of those who surround one, "I am a buddha" and "I have terminated all contaminations," and the two statements about (3) the factors to be relinquished and (4) the path (the welfare of others), proclaiming, "The two obscurations obstruct liberation and omniscience" and "Through the all-knowledge and the knowledge of the path, respectively, the path is the final deliverance in the form of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha [arhats] and perfect enlightenment." These are "fearlessnesses" because [they are proclaimed as fearless as a lion roars among other animals and] there is not even a little bit of dispute in accordance with the dharma about them.

The four special samādhis (Tib. khyad par gyi ting nge 'dzin bzhi)

(1) Heroic stride—bodhisattvas experiencing and mastering the entire range of mundane and supramundane samādhis[1748]

(2) Sky treasure—being able to spontaneously manifest all desired and necessary things for all beings to be guided

(3) The stainless—removing the stains from all samādhis, making them lucid and bright[1749]

(4) The lion's sport—progressing through many different samādhis in various ways of entering and rising from them[1750]

The five certainties of the sāmbhogikakāya

(1) The certainty of place—the pure buddha realm of Richly Adorned Akaniṣṭha

(2) The certainty of retinue—solely bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis

(3) The certainty of body—being adorned with the major and minor marks

(4) The certainty of dharma—teaching only the mahāyāna

(5) The certainty of time—remaining until saṃsāra is emptied

The five visions (Skt. pañcacakṣu, Tib. spyan lnga)

(1) fleshly vision—seeing everything within eight thousand yojanās

(2) divine vision—seeing the manner of dying, transition, and rebirth of all sentient beings

(3) prajñā vision—seeing the nature of phenomena, just as it is

(4) dharma vision—seeing the scopes of the minds of those who are inferior and equal to oneself in terms of relinquishment and realization

(5) buddha vision—directly realizing the actual way of being and the ways of appearance of all phenomena

The five uncontaminated skandhas (Skt. pañcānāsravaskandha, Tib. zag med kyi phung po lnga)

These are related to the eightfold path of the noble ones in its ultimate fruitional aspect:

(1) the skandha of ethics: correct speech, aims of action, and livelihood at the level of the path of nonlearning

(2) the skandha of samādhi: correct samādhi and mindfulness at this level

(3) the skandha of prajñā: correct view, thought, and vigor

(4) the skandha of liberation: the mind that is utterly and completely liberated

(5) the skandha of the vision of the wisdom of liberation: the prajñā that is utterly and completely liberated

The six qualities of awareness and liberation (Tib. rig grol gyi yon tan drug)

The three qualities of awareness

(1) the wisdom that knows suchness

(2) the wisdom that knows variety

(3) internal personally experienced wisdom

The three qualities of liberation

(1) freedom from afflictive obscurations

(2) freedom from cognitive obscurations

(3) being unsurpassable in terms of irreversible realization[1751]

The six supernatural knowledges (Skt. ṣaḍabhijñā, Tib. mngon shes drug)

(1) miraculous powers
(2) the divine ear
(3) knowing the minds of others
(4) recollecting former states of existence of oneself and others
(5) the divine eye
(6) knowing the termination of contamination

The eight āyatanas of overpowering (Skt. aṣṭābhibhavāyatana, Tib. zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched brgyad)

Through focusing on four different shapes (small, large, good, and bad) and four different colors, respectively, in one's samādhi, one is able to transform all shapes and colors accordingly, overpower all others, and one's mind is not carried away from that.

The eight liberations (Skt. aṣṭavimokṣa, Tib. rnam thar brgyad)

(1) One looks at outer forms with the notion that inner consciousness possesses form, and then (2) one looks at outer forms with the notion that inner consciousness does not possess form. These two are called "the two liberations of what does not possess form looking at form" and serve as the remedies for the obscurations of emanating various forms. (3) The liberation of notions of beauty means to perfectly abide by having manifested the nature of pleasure through the body, which remedies the afflictions of liking to emanate beautiful forms or not liking to emanate ugly forms. (4)–(7) The next four liberations are the four formless absorptions and (8) the last one is the meditative absorption of cessation.

The ten āyatanas of totality (Skt. daśakṛtsnāyatana, Tib. zad par kyi skye mched bcu)

By virtue of the power of mastering samādhi, through focusing on earth the whole universe appears as earth. The same goes for water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, infinite space, and infinite consciousness.

The ten masteries (Skt. daśavaśitā, Tib. dbang ba bcu)

These are attained by bodhisattvas as the antidotes for ten kinds of harm that ordinary beings have to live with, representing mastery over:

(1) lifespan (being able to live for infinite eons)
(2) mind (engaging in firmly dwelling in samādhi through infinite wisdom)
(3) necessities (displaying all worldly realms by blessing them with many embellishments)
(4) karma (displaying karmic maturations just at the time when they can be blessed)
(5) birth (displaying births everywhere in the worldly realms)
(6) creative willpower (displaying all worldly realms as being completely filled with buddhas)
(7) aspiration prayers (displaying enlightenment in any buddha realm and at any time one pleases)
(8) miraculous powers (displaying all kinds of miraculous feats, such as going to all buddha realms)
(9) dharma (displaying the light of the dharma doors without center and periphery)
(10) wisdom (displaying a buddha's powers, fearlessnesses, unique qualities, major and minor marks, and becoming completely perfectly enlightened).

The ten pāramitās

In general, all pāramitās are virtuous states of mind together with their seeds that possess the four distinctive features of overcoming their respective antagonistic factors, operating through nonconceptual wisdom, fulfilling all desires, and maturing sentient beings with the three types of disposition (śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and mahāyāna).

(1) generosity—the mindset of giving away

(2) ethics—the mindset of relinquishment (wishing to abandon flaws)

(3) patience—the mindset of not being disturbed

(4) vigor—the mindset of delighting in the dharma

(5) dhyāna—the mind being one-pointedly focused on its object

(6) prajñā—wisdom from the perspective of its element of thoroughly analyzing phenomena

(7) skill in means—the prajñā of rendering all virtue inexhaustible through being skilled in the manner of internally accomplishing the dharma and externally maturing sentient beings

(8) aspiration prayers—aspiring that one, in all lifetimes, may never be separated from bodhicitta and that one's engagement in the pāramitās for the welfare of all sentient beings may be uninterrupted

(9) power—the special prajñā that is very vast in nature and cannot be overcome by any antagonistic factors

(10) wisdom—realizing the characteristics of phenomena to be empty and maturing sentient beings through the wisdoms of knowing suchness and variety

The ten powers (Skt. daśabala, Tib. stobs bcu)

These are the ten kinds of wisdom that know:

(1) what is the case (such as possessions arising from generosity) and what is not the case (their arising from avarice)

(2) the maturational results of the contaminated actions of all sentient beings without exception

(3) the various distinct inclinations of sentient beings

(4) the different mental constitutions of sentient beings that enable them to travel different spiritual paths

(5) the faculties of beings, such as confidence, to be superior (sharp) or nonsuperior (dull and medium)

(6) the paths on which to proceed to all three kinds of enlightenment

(7) afflicted phenomena (such as tasting the obscurations of meditative absorption) and purified phenomena (the lack of characteristics connected to these meditative absorptions and rising from them at the right time)

(8) the recollection of the past states of innumerable lifetimes of oneself and others

(9) the manner of the deaths, transitions, and rebirths of all sentient beings

(10) the termination of the contaminations of the two obscurations

The twelve deeds of a supreme nairmāṇikakāya[1752]

(1) descending from Tuṣita

(2) entering a womb

(3) birth

(4) engaging in the games and arts of a youth

(5) enjoying a retinue of queens

(6) renunciation

(7) practice of austerities

(8) sitting under the bodhi tree in Bodhgayā
(9) taming the hordes of māra
(10) attaining perfect buddhahood
(11) turning the wheel of dharma
(12) passing into nirvāṇa

The twelve qualities of abstinence (Skt. dvadaśadhūtaguṇa, Tib. sbyangs pa'i yon tan bcu gnyis)

(1) wearing the dress of a dung sweeper (that is, only clothes that other people have thrown away)
(2) owning only three robes
(3) only wearing clothes made out of one kind of material, such as wool
(4) begging for alms
(5) eating only while sitting at one's eating place (that is, not getting up and returning to eat)
(6) not eating food after noon
(7) living in isolated places
(8) living under trees
(9) living in places without a roof
(10) living in charnel grounds
(11) sleeping in a sitting position
(12) being content to stay anywhere (that is, without manipulating the ground in any way to make it more comfortable)

The twelve sets of qualities of bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis

On the first bhūmi, in one single instant, bodhisattvas:

(1) behold the faces of one hundred buddhas
(2) are blessed by them
(3) send forth one hundred emanations
(4) display them for one hundred eons
(5) their wisdom operates from the beginning to the end of one hundred eons
(6) are absorbed in and rise from one hundred samādhis
(7) mature one hundred sentient beings
(8) shake one hundred realms
(9) illuminate one hundred realms
(10) open one hundred doors of dharma
(11) display one hundred of their own bodies
(12) display one hundred excellent retinues that surround each of these bodies

From the second to the seventh bhūmis, this set of twelve is respectively multiplied one thousand times; one hundred thousand times; one hundred billion times; one hundred trillion times; ten quadrillion times; and one hundred sextillion times. On the last three bhūmis, respectively, the number of each of these qualities equals the number of the particles in twelve hundred trichiliocosms; one million countless buddha realms; and one hundred million inexpressible buddha realms.[1753]

The eighteen unique qualities of a buddha (Skt. aṣṭadaśāveṇikadharma, Tib. ma 'dres pa'i chos bco brgyad)
The six aspects of unique conduct of never being involved in any:
(1) mistakenness in terms of the body; (2) chatter; (3) deterioration of mindfulness; (4) mind that is not settled in meditative equipoise; (5) discriminations in terms of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa being different; and (6) indifference to forsaking those to be guided through lacking examination.

The six aspects of unique realization of there never being any deterioration of:
(7) the striving to teach the dharma; (8) the vigor to accomplish what is to be done for those to be guided; (9) the mindfulness of teaching the dharma without having to think; (10) the samādhi of the nature of phenomena; (11) the prajñā of immeasurable wisdom; (12) the liberation of all factors to be relinquished.

The three aspects of unique enlightened activity:
Wisdom preceding and following the enlightened activities of (13) body, (14) speech, and (15) mind.

The three aspects of unique wisdom:
(16)–(18) the vision of wisdom knowing all knowable objects in the past, present, and future without attachment (by virtue of knowing the suchness of all phenomena in the three times) and without obstruction (by virtue of knowing their variety).

Chart 13: The thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment and the five paths according to the Vaibhāṣikas

A) path of accumulation

1–4) **the four foundations of mindfulness** of
- body
- feelings
- mind
- phenomena

B) path of preparation

heat

5–8) **the four correct efforts** in
- relinquishing nonvirtue that has arisen
- not accumulating nonvirtue that has not yet arisen
- cultivating the virtue that has not yet arisen
- expanding the virtue that has already arisen

peak

9–12) **the four limbs of miraculous powers**—samādhis resulting in these powers, relinquishing
- striving
- intention
- effort
- analysis

poised readiness

13–17) **the five faculties** of
- confidence
- vigor
- mindfulness
- samādhi
- prajñā

supreme dharma

18–22) **the five powers**
- same five (not to be overpowered by their opposites)

C) path of seeing

23–30) **the eightfold path of the noble ones**
- correct view
- thought
- speech
- aims of actions
- livelihood
- effort
- mindfulness
- samādhi

D) path of familiarization

31–37) **the seven branches of enlightenment**

- confidence
- prajñā
- vigor
- joy
- suppleness
- equanimity
- samādhi

Chart 14: The common order of the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment and their matching with the five paths (according to non-Vaibhāṣikas and the mahāyāna)

A) path of accumulation

lesser
1–4) **the four foundations of mindfulness** of
- body
- feelings
- mind
- phenomena

medium
5–8) **the four correct efforts** in
- relinquishing nonvirtue that has arisen
- not accumulating nonvirtue that has not yet arisen
- cultivating the virtue that has not yet arisen
- expanding the virtue that has already arisen

greater
9–12) **the four limbs of miraculous powers**—samādhis resulting in these powers, relinquishing
- striving
- intention
- effort
- analysis

B) path of preparation

heat and peak
13–17) **the five faculties** of
- confidence
- vigor
- mindfulness
- samādhi
- prajñā

poised readiness and supreme dharma
18–22) **the five powers**
- same five (not to be overpowered by their opposites)

C) path of seeing
23–29) **the seven branches of enlightenment**
- confidence
- prajñā
- vigor
- joy
- suppleness
- equanimity
- samādhi

D) path of familiarization

30–37) **the eightfold path of the noble ones**

- correct view
- thought
- speech
- aims of actions
- livelihood
- effort
- mindfulness
- samādhi

Chart 15: The factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization according to the śrāvakas

A) THE FACTORS TO BE RELINQUISHED THROUGH SEEING (IMPUTATIONAL)

Vaibhāṣikas (*Abhidharmakośa*)

88

desire realm: 32 wrong engagements

a) reality of suffering: *5 nonviews, 5 views*

b) reality of origin: *5 nonviews, 2 views* (wrong views and the views of holding a view as paramount)

c) reality of cessation: *5 nonviews, 2 views* (same as b)

d) reality of the path: *5 nonviews, 3 views* (wrong views, the views of holding a view as paramount, and the views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount)

form realm: 28 wrong engagements

same as desire realm (except anger)

formless realm: 28 wrong engagements

same as form realm

Sautrāntikas (*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*)

94

desire realm: 34

a) reality of suffering: *5 nonviews, 5 views*

b) reality of origin: *5 nonviews, 3 views* (wrong views, the views of holding a view as paramount, and the views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount)

c) reality of cessation: same as b)

d) reality of the path: same as b)

form realm: 30 wrong engagements

same as desire realm (except anger)

formless realm: 30 wrong engagements

same as form realm

B) THE FACTORS TO BE RELINQUISHED THROUGH FAMILIARIZATION (INNATE)

252

desire realm: 36

4 nonviews (except doubt) with nine degrees each

form realm: 108

3 nonviews (except anger) with nine degrees each for each of the four meditative states

formless realm: 108

same as form realm for each of the four formless states

Chart 16: The way of relinquishment of the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization on the eight levels of the śrāvakas

level	path	afflictions[1754] already relinquished	afflictions being relinquished
imputational			
approaching stream-enterer	path of seeing (uninterrupted path)		88
abiding stream-enterer	path of seeing (path of liberation)	88	
innate			
approaching once-returner	path of familiarization		1–6 (24)
abiding once-returner	path of familiarization	1–6 (24)	
approaching nonreturner	path of familiarization	1–6 (24)	7–9 (12)
abiding nonreturner	path of familiarization	1–9 (36)	
approaching arhat	path of familiarization	1–9 (36)	10–81 (216)
abiding arhat	path of nonlearning	1–81 (252)	

*Chart 17: The factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization according to the mahāyāna (*Abhidharmasamuccaya *and* Abhisamayālaṃkāra*)*[1755]

A) THE FACTORS TO BE RELINQUISHED THROUGH SEEING (IMPUTATIONAL)	
afflictive obscurations	**cognitive obscurations**
112 **desire realm:** 40 wrong engagements, each of the 4 realities: *5 nonviews*, *5 views* **form realm:** 36 wrong engagements, each of the 4 realities: *4 nonviews* (except anger), *5 views* **formless realm:** 36 wrong engagements, same as form realm	108 **desire realm:** 36 conceptions, four sets of nine *conceptions of apprehended* (engagement; withdrawal) *and apprehender* (substantial persons; imputed individuals) **form realm:** same 36 **formless realm:** same 36

B) THE FACTORS TO BE RELINQUISHED THROUGH FAMILIARIZATION	
afflictive obscurations (innate)	**cognitive obscurations** (innate and imputational)[1756]
414 **desire realm:** 54, *4 nonviews* (except doubt), *2 views* (about a real personality and extremes) with nine degrees each **form realm:** 180, same as desire realm (except anger) in each of the four meditative states **formless realm:** 180, same as form realm in each of the four formless states	108 **desire realm:** 36 conceptions, 4 sets of nine *conceptions* of *apprehended* (JNS: mere entities; purified phenomena; others: engagement; withdrawal) *and apprehender* (JNS: merely imputed persons/imputed causes for imputing persons; others: substantially existent persons; imputedly existent persons)[1757] **form realm:** same 36 **formless realm:** same 36

Chart 18: Afflictive obscurations, cognitive obscurations, and obscurations of meditative absorption according to JNS

AFFLICTIVE OBSCURATIONS
(obscuring the attainment of the nirvāṇas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas)

1) the afflictive obscurations that obscure the attainment of the nirvāṇa with remainder
- a) the afflictive obscurations that agitate the mind stream
- b) the afflictive obscurations that are latencies (causes for taking birth in saṃsāra)

2) the afflictive obscurations that obscure the attainment of the nirvāṇa without remainder
- a) karmic afflictive obscurations (actions motivated by afflictions)
- b) maturational afflictive obscurations (skandhas)

COGNITIVE OBSCURATIONS
(obscuring the attainment of omniscience)

1) the cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished on the path of pratyekabuddhas
- imputational conceptions about the apprehended, that is, apprehender and apprehended being different in substance

2) the cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished solely on the path of the mahāyāna

A) the conceptions on the path of preparation
- 1) the conceptions that apprehend substantiality (equivalent to the clinging to real existence)
  - 1a) the conceptions about the apprehended
    - 1aa) conceptions about afflicted phenomena
    - 1ab) conceptions about purified phenomena
      - 1ab1) in terms of the mahāyāna
      - 1ab2) in terms of the hīnayāna
  - 1b) the conceptions about the apprehender
    - 1ba) conceptions about phenomena (knowable objects and the cognitions that know them)
    - 1bb) conceptions about persons (the bases for imputing the person and the factor that is imputed as the person)
- 2) the conceptions that apprehend imputations
  - 2a) the conceptions about the apprehended
    - 2aa) conceptions about afflicted phenomena
    - 2ab) conceptions about purified phenomena
      - 2ab1) in terms of the mahāyāna
      - 2ab2) in terms of the hīnayāna
  - 2b) the conceptions about the apprehender
    - 2ba) conceptions about phenomena
      - 2ba1) conceptions about the bases for imputing ordinary beings (mind and mental factors)
      - 2ba2) conceptions about the bases for imputing noble ones (the wisdoms of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment)
    - 2bb) conceptions about the person

B) the conceptions plus their seeds that cling to characteristics and obstruct the thorough analysis of what is to be known

1) those that are factors to be relinquished through the mahāyāna path of seeing
2) those that are the factors to be relinquished through the final culminating training ("ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance"—the latent tendencies of both afflicted and nonafflicted ignorance, divided into those that obscure attaining the wisdom of knowing suchness and those that obscure attaining the wisdom that knows variety)

C) the impregnations of the negative tendencies of the varieties of the two obscurations (the ālaya-consciousness)[1758]

OBSCURATIONS OF MEDITATIVE ABSORPTION

(obscuring the manifesting of the calm abiding and the qualities of the buddhabhūmi)

1) the obscurations that obstruct mundane calm abiding

2) the obscurations that obstruct supramundane calm abiding

BOUNDARY LINES OF RELINQUISHMENT

afflictive obscurations

hīnayāna

a) afflictive obscurations that agitate the mind stream and those that are latencies—the nirvāṇa with remainder

b) same plus karmic and maturational afflictive obscurations—the nirvāṇa without remainder

mahāyāna

a) the afflictive obscurations that agitate the mind stream—first bhūmi (dharma readiness of suffering of the path of seeing)

b) the afflictive obscurations that are latencies (causes for taking birth in saṃsāra)

- those that are factors to be relinquished through seeing—simultaneously with the 108 conceptions that are the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished on the path of seeing
- those that are factors to be relinquished through familiarization—simultaneously with the 108 conceptions that are the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished on the path of familiarization

cognitive obscurations

pratyekabuddhas

the conceptions about the apprehended being substantially other than the apprehender—arhathood (starting from the path of familiarization onward)

mahāyāna

A) the conceptions on the path of preparation (in the manner of suppressing them)

- seeing that the apprehended in terms of afflicted phenomena is without nature—heat
- seeing that the apprehended in terms of purified phenomena is without nature—peak
- seeing that substantial apprehending is without nature—poised readiness
- seeing that imputational apprehending is without nature—supreme dharma

B) the conceptions about apprehender and apprehended (the conceptions plus their seeds that cling to characteristics and obstruct the thorough analysis of what is to be known)

a) the conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and referents and cling to the duality of apprehender and apprehended—the dharma cognition of

suffering on the path of seeing (starting with the dharma readiness of suffering)

b) the false imagination of dualistic appearances

- the latent tendencies that produce the false imagination of dualistic appearance and are factors to be relinquished through seeing—simultaneously with the obscurations to be relinquished on the path of seeing
- the latent tendencies that produce the false imagination of dualistic appearance and are factors to be relinquished through familiarization—simultaneously with the obscurations to be relinquished on the path of familiarization

C) the impregnations of negative tendencies (the ālaya-consciousness or the latent tendencies of duality)—vajralike samādhi

In other words:[1759]

- the imputational clinging to real existence: bhūmi 1
- the innate clinging to real existence: bhūmis 2–10
- the imputational clinging to characteristics:
  - manifest: bhūmis 2–7
  - retaining a certain potency: bhūmis 8–10

THREE MAIN MODELS OF THE RELINQUISHMENT OF AFFLICTIVE AND COGNITIVE OBSCURATIONS

(1) Sequential model

- afflictive obscurations: bhūmi 1
- cognitive obscurations: gradually (and only) on bhūmis 1–10
  clinging to real existence: bhūmi 1
  - clinging to characteristics: bhūmis 2–7
  - clinging to duality: bhūmis 8–10[1760]

(2) Overlapping model

- afflictive obscurations
  - manifest (or imputational): impure bhūmi 1
  - latent tendencies (or innate): impure bhūmis 2–7
- cognitive obscurations
  - coarse
    - imputational: impure bhūmi 1
    - innate: impure bhūmis 2–7 (together with the latent tendencies of the afflictive obscurations)
  - subtle (innate) pure bhūmis 8–10[1761]

(3) Simultaneous model

Both afflictive and cognitive obscurations are gradually relinquished together in their increasingly more subtle forms (imputational and innate) throughout the entire path:

- in the manner of suppressing the obscurations: path of preparation
- actually eradicating them in a progressive manner:
  - imputational: bhūmi 1
  - innate: bhūmis 2–10[1762]

Chart 19: The sixteen moments of the wisdoms of readiness and cognition on the path of seeing according to the Abhidharmakośa, *the* Abhidharmasamuccaya, *and Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra as per JNS*

ABHIDHARMAKOŚA[1763]

For each one of the four realities:

Dharma readiness: the uninterrupted path of relinquishing the respective factors of the desire realm to be relinquished through seeing

Dharma cognition: the path of liberation of having relinquished these factors

Subsequent readiness: the uninterrupted path of relinquishing the respective factors of the two higher realms to be relinquished through seeing

Subsequent cognition: the path of liberation of having relinquished these factors

The path of seeing consists of only the first fifteen moments (the sixteenth—the subsequent cognition of the reality of the path—is the beginning of the path of familiarization).

ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA[1764]

For each one of the four realities:

Dharma readiness: the uninterrupted path of relinquishing the respective factors of all three realms to be relinquished through seeing

Dharma cognition: the path of liberation of having relinquished these factors

Subsequent readiness: the path of liberation of focusing on both dharma readiness and dharma cognition and apprehending them as the causes for the qualities of the noble ones

Subsequent cognition: the path of liberation of focusing on subsequent readiness and apprehending it as the cause for the qualities of the noble ones

Dharma readiness and dharma cognition focus on the true nature of the four realities (the object), thus being the subjects that realize the emptiness of the apprehended
Subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition focus on the wisdom that realizes this nature (the subject), thus being the subjects that realize the emptiness of the apprehender

The path of seeing consists of all sixteen moments (generally, here, a "moment" refers to the time it takes these readinesses and cognitions to fully realize their respective specific objects).[1765]

ĀRYAVIMUKTISENA AND HARIBHADRA AS PER JNS[1766]

Dharma readiness of suffering (as the specific bearer of the nature of phenomena): to induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of the inseparability of suchness (the object) and buddhahood (the subject) (the uninterrupted path that relinquishes those cognitive obscurations that are factors to be relinquished through seeing with respect to the reality of suffering)

Dharma cognition of suffering (as the specific bearer of the nature of phenomena): to induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of greatness (such as the ultimate forms and so on of the dharmadhātu) (the path of being liberated from said cognitive obscurations)

Subsequent readiness of suffering (as the specific bearer of the nature of phenomena): to induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of being empty of

any valid cognition that actually assesses seeming forms and so on (the special path of the relinquishment of said cognitive obscurations)

Subsequent cognition of suffering (as the specific bearer of the nature of phenomena): to induce certainty, by virtue of its own power, about the true nature of the fact that, just as seeming forms cannot be assessed through valid cognition, seeming forms and so on do not exist as valid cognitions either (also the special path of the relinquishment of said cognitive obscurations)

The same pattern applies to the remaining three realities.[1767]

Chart 20: The four remedies

Being in the process of eradicating the respective factors to be relinquished on a given path

(1) The **invalidating remedy**: the path of preparation of a given path—focusing on the four realities of the noble ones and invalidating the obscurations in terms of their sixteen aspects (for example, the supreme dharma of the path of preparation)

(2) The **relinquishing remedy**: the uninterrupted path—actually eradicating even the seeds of the respective factors to be relinquished (for example, the dharma readiness of suffering on the path of seeing)

Having already eradicated these factors to be relinquished

(3) The **sustaining remedy**: the path of liberation—experiencing and sustaining the attained freedom from the factors that have been relinquished through the preceding uninterrupted path (for example, the dharma cognition of suffering on the path of seeing)

(4) The **distancing remedy**: the special path—enhancing the realizations attained through the preceding path of liberation (for example, the samādhi of the lion's sport)

Chart 21: The correspondences of skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus

skandha	āyatana	dhātu
1) form	1) visible form 2) sound 3) smell 4) taste 5) tangible objects 7) eye sense faculty 8) ear sense faculty 9) nose sense faculty 10) tongue sense faculty 11) body sense faculty	identical with āyatanas
2) feeling 3) discrimination 4) formation	6) phenomena – skandhas 2–4 – eight unconditioned phenomena (five imperceptible forms)	identical with āyatanas
5) consciousness	12) mental faculty	12) mental faculty 13) eye consciousness 14) ear consciousness 15) nose consciousness 16) tongue consciousness 17) body consciousness 18) mental consciousness



Notes

1 Like CE, Tibetan commentaries usually have very detailed outlines with many subheadings. Though all of these numbered headings are retained in the translation, for the reader's convenience, the Table of Contents of CE is simplified and organized according to the eight topics and the seventy points of the AA. I am also breaking with the tradition of presenting the entire outline of a Tibetan text as an appendix. The outline of CE is unfortunately more confusing than helpful, since the main headings of the outline do not correspond to the actual topics of the AA, which are buried somewhere in a plethora of subheadings.

2 The image here alludes to this river being considered as very holy by Hindus—even its mere sight is said to wash away all one's negative deeds (it rises on the summit of Mount Amarakaṇṭaka in Madhya Pradesh in Central India and, after a westerly course of about eight hundred miles, ends in the Gulf of Cambay below the city of Bharuch).

3 The metaphor of a wheel is used in several ways here. The teachings of the Buddha are considered to be similar to certain properties of a wheel, in particular, the precious wheel of a cakravartin king who flies on it throughout the universe. Such a wheel travels swiftly, enters certain areas by leaving others behind, subdues those who have not been subdued, makes those who have been subdued feel at ease, and is able to fly up to high places and descend to those that are low. Just like such a wheel, through using the dharma, one travels on certain paths while leaving others behind, is able to do so swiftly, can cut through obstructions on the path, and is able to ascend to the form realm and the formless realms as well as descend to the desire realm. Furthermore, the dharma of realization is said to be like the spinning action of a wheel since it is transmitted to suitable recipients, while the dharma of scriptures is like the round shape of a wheel in that it consists of a collection of many teachings. Another explanation is that the wheel symbolizes the eightfold path of the noble ones and the three trainings. Here, the hub that gives stability to the rest of the wheel symbolizes the training of ethics (right speech, aims of actions, and livelihood) as the basis for the other two trainings. The spokes stand for the training in prajñā (right view, thought, and effort), which cuts through ignorance. The rim that holds the spokes together is like the training in samādhi (right mindfulness and samādhi), which means to hold the mind one-pointedly without any distraction (according to Bhandanta Ghoṣaka, mindfulness belongs to the spokes). JG (pp. 6–7) presents the definition of a dharma wheel as "that which has the character of consisting of the scriptures and realizations of the genuine dharma of the great sage and makes one overcome adverse factors." Just as the precious wheel of a cakravartin king makes him overcome adverse factors and conveys him to other countries and places, the dharma of scriptures and realization makes one overcome the adverse factors that consist of the two obscurations, including their latent tendencies, and is sequentially conveyed to the mind streams of those to be guided. The latter means that, by virtue of the Buddha having turned the wheel of dharma, the dharma of realization transits further and further to the disciples with the three dispositions of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. Through

these disciples teaching others in the same way, the dharma of realization is conveyed from one person to another in a similar and uninterrupted manner.

4 The reasons for my generally translating *satya* (Tib. bden pa) as "reality" and not as "truth"—as in the pervasive and unquestioned, but nonsensical, renderings "the two truths" or "the four noble truths" in Western Buddhist literature—are as follows. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (D4038, fol. 68b.1–3) says, "What is the meaning of reality [here]? The meaning of reality is the actuality that has the characteristic of not being in discord with the teachings and the actuality that, when seen, serves as the cause for purity. What is the meaning of the reality of suffering? It is the actuality of the formations that arise from the afflictions. What is the meaning of the reality of the origin [of suffering]? It is the actuality that produces the reality of suffering. What is the meaning of the reality of cessation? It is the actuality of both of the [former two] being at peace. What is the meaning of the reality of the path? It is the actuality of accomplishing the three aims." The *Śrāvakabhūmi* (D4036, fol. 94b.3–5; partly quoted in LSSP, fols. 117b.6–118a.2) explains, "In the sense of suffering being suffering up through the path being the path, they accord with what is real (*yathābhūta*), accord with what is unerring, are unmistaken, and are unimpaired. Therefore, they are called 'realities.' They are also called 'realities' because they are undeceiving by virtue of their own specific characteristics and [because] unmistaken mental states arise when they are seen. You may wonder, 'Why are they the realities of the noble ones alone?' They are called 'the realities of the noble ones' because the noble ones, by virtue of these realities being real in that they precisely accord with true reality, realize and see them in accordance with what is real, whereas childish beings do not realize or see them in accordance with what is real. By virtue of the nature of phenomena, these [realities] are indeed real for childish beings too, but not by virtue of their being realized by them. For noble persons, however, they are realities by virtue of both [being realities and being fully realized as such]." LSSP elaborates (fol. 118a.2–3) that the four realities are real for the noble ones in terms of both the facts and their minds. Though they are real in terms of the facts for childish beings too, since these beings do not realize these realities, they are not presented as the realities of these beings. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.2 (D4090, vol. khu, fols. 2b.6–3a.2) agrees: "What is the meaning of 'the four realities of the noble ones' that are found in the sūtras? Since they are real for noble persons, they are explained as 'the realities of the noble ones' in the sūtras. 'Does this mean that they are delusive for others?' Not being mistaken, they are real for everyone, but the noble ones see them exactly as they are, [that is, in their sixteen aspects], while others do not. Therefore, these [realities] are called 'the realities of the noble ones.' But they are not those of nonnoble ones because they see in mistaken ways. As a stanza [in *Saṃyutta Nikāya* IV.127] says:

> What the noble ones speak of as happiness
> Is perceived as suffering by others.
> What others speak of as happiness
> Is perceived as suffering by the noble ones."

JNS (p. 104) explains the meaning of the four realities as follows: "The reality of suffering is what arises as the nature of suffering in accordance with the noble ones seeing that the entirety of all-pervasive conditioned existence is suffering. The reality of the origin of suffering is what is present and established in accordance with the noble ones seeing that all sufferings in the three realms originate from karma and afflictions. The reality of the path is the actuality of identitylessness being seen as the reality of the path by the noble ones and its actually being just as it is seen by them. The reality of cessation is the ultimate's own essence being seen as the actuality of nonorigination since this is how it is seen by the noble ones." The same explanations are also found in TOK, vol. 3, p. 481; Krang dbyi sun 1985, pp. 1371 and 1777; and Samtani 2002, p. 107. Thus, the translation "the four noble truths" is misleading in at least two ways. In general, the Sanskrit word *satya* can indeed mean both "truth" and "reality," but in the context of the two or four realities, this term does not signify any abstract or semantic truth

(such as "one and one equals two," "all apples are fruits," or "everything is suffering"). As the above descriptions of the four realities as perceivable entities that perform specific functions (such as the five skandhas and afflictions, which can hardly be said to be abstract truths) make clear, "reality" is understood here in the sense of the individually experienced reality of life of certain persons. As Broido 1988 (p. 54) rightly says, "Truth is a property of sentences (relativized to contexts) or, philosophically, a property of propositions, but in any case not a property of cognitions or cognitive states or appearances or experiences or 'things.' It is only with a very great sense of strain that an English-speaker can say of a visual object or experience that it is true or false. . . . Given this strain and the resulting confusion it is not surprising that many Western accounts of the satyas are unintelligible." It is an often overlooked fact that, in general, Buddhism does not speak about abstract or philosophical statements or "truths," but its main thrust is soteriological in nature—identifying the deluded and undeluded ways in which we experience ourselves and the world and how we may arrive at the latter from the former. Thus, the Buddha did not say that we suffer because suffering is some kind of universal truth or law, but because suffering constitutes our basic experienced reality. Likewise, suffering is not caused by just another "truth" (its origin—karma and afflictions), but by very tangible physical, verbal, and mental actions and emotions. As for the reality of the cessation of suffering, a mere truth does not constitute the cessation of anything, let alone of all our problems and pain, but it has to be a radical transformation of our entire outlook on and experience of our world. The path that leads there is not just a "truth" either because the noticeable changes in one's body, speech, and mind that come about through practicing the methods of the Buddhist path do not represent a "truth." In sum, the point of the four realities is neither some mere truth nor something that is noble in itself—specifically, one wonders what should be noble about suffering or its origin as such (note that, according to the *Mahāvibhāṣā* [TD, p. 27, p. 401c27], the last two realities can be said to be good, whereas the first two contain good, bad, and neutral elements. Likewise, the last two realities are uncontaminated, but the first two are contaminated). Therefore, what we deal with here are the fundamental facts of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path as these are directly seen or experienced from the perspective of the noble ones. "Noble" are all those on the path of seeing and onward who realize these four facts in a direct and immediate manner. In other words, these four realities, or the knowledge about them, represent the deeply internalized reality of these noble ones. On the other hand, from the perspective of ordinary ignorant beings, these four are neither taken to be true nor are they the reality that they experience (with the possible exception of the first two of the three kinds of suffering, that is, manifest suffering and the suffering of change). Even if ordinary beings on the Buddhist path accept these four facts as true and attain more or less thorough insights into them, they still do not represent the experiential reality of their everyday lives, just as someone may understand the laws of aerodynamics but still cannot actually fly. That is, ordinary beings never experience or realize the full extent of these four fundamental facts as long as they have not attained the path of seeing. For more details, see CE on the two and four realities below (see also Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 73–74).

5 The reasons for using the term "path of familiarization" instead of the more familiar "path of meditation" (at least in popular Western Buddhist literature) are as follows. In a Buddhist context, both the Sanskrit *bhāvanā* and the Tibetan *sgom pa* mostly mean "familiarizing with," "mentally cultivating," or "enhancing" something, either some certainty gained through prior reflection or a direct insight into true reality (which is also clearly stated in the definition of the path of familiarization in the second chapter on the knowledge of the path below). Thus, this process can either be conceptual or nonconceptual. However, it should be noted that the original meaning of "meditation" is just "reflection" (Lat. meditatio, meditare), which is clearly conceptual, while the original meaning of the term "contemplation" (Lat. contemplatio, contemplare) is "viewing" or "looking" at something in a settled state of mind (possibly being either conceptual or nonconceptual). As for compassion and other virtuous mental states, the point is not really to meditate on them as some more or less abstract object or in a conceptual way,

but to cultivate and familiarize with them as integral constituents of one's mind. Of course, this is even more obvious in the case of mind's ultimate true nature (of which it is invariably said that it cannot be meditated on anyway, but one can definitely familiarize oneself with it). Likewise, the texts often speak about cultivating (or familiarizing with) a path, śamatha, and vipaśyanā, while it obviously makes no sense to say "meditating on a path," and even less to say "meditating on śamatha or vipaśyanā." In terms of the factors to be relinquished on the path, the coarser and more superficial ones can be relinquished merely through seeing the nature of all phenomena (on the path of seeing), while the more subtle and deeply ingrained ones can only be relinquished through repeated familiarization with the full scope of this nature (on the path of familiarization). Especially on the path of familiarization, the point is not to "meditate on" the nature of phenomena (or anything else, for that matter), but simply to become used to how things actually are. As for the Sanskrit term *bhāvanā*, it generally refers to an act of producing, manifesting, or promoting. Specifically, it means imagining, forming in the mind, occupying one's imagination with or directing one's thoughts to something. In this sense, the word can also refer to reflection, meditation, or contemplation (thus, depending on the context and to follow common consensus, I sometimes use "meditation" too). The term can also mean the application of perfumes and the like, or saturating or steeping any powder with fluid. Thus, similar to the process of a scent fully pervading a cloth or the like and actually becoming inseparable from it, "cultivation" or "familiarization" in this sense may be seen as "perfuming" the mind stream with virtuous imprints and liberating insights.

6 JNS, p. 31. This means that words or scriptures are not regarded as outer matter, but as nothing but mental appearances, that is, the aspects of mind that appear—under the influence of a buddha's dharmakāya—as the objects of the cognitive aspect of that mind. This notion is also found in Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J 70; P5526, fol. 114a.1–3): "The dharmakāya of buddhas is to be understood as twofold. (a) The perfectly pure dharmadhātu is the object that is the sphere of nonconceptual wisdom. This is to be understood in terms of the dharma that is personally experienced by the tathāgatas. (b) The cause for attaining this [personally experienced dharma] is the natural outflow of the perfectly pure dharmadhātu, which arises as cognizance in other sentient beings in accordance with how they are to be guided. This is to be understood in terms of the dharma that is the teaching." Sthiramati's *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* (Pandeya ed., p. 4.7–10; D4032, fol. 190a.4–5) defines "treatise" (Skt. śāstra) as follows: "A treatise consists of the cognizances that appear as the collections of names, words, and letters. Or a treatise consists of the cognizances that appear as the special sounds (or terms) that cause one to attain supramundane wisdom. How does cognizance act or express something? From the cognizance of the agent and explainer, the cognizances of the listeners arise." Also the *Ālokā* (p. 7) says, "This teaching [of prajñāpāramitā], on the level of the seeming, has the character of cognition appearing as words and letters." See also the concordant definition of scriptural prajñāpāramitā below.

7 Somewhat ironically, following Haribhadra's *Ālokā*, this position on the wheel of dharma is even held in Tsongkhapa's LSSP (fol. 55a.2–6), but categorically rejected by all subsequent Gelugpa commentators, who say that the Buddha's speech is sound as an external object and thus matter.

8 XXV.24cd.

9 Verse 7.

10 IV.94–96.

11 In Chapter Seven, The Questions of Paramārthasamudgata (D106, fols. 38a.7–39a.1).

12 Pp. 31–32.

13 Ibid., fols. 25b.6–26b.1.

14 As quoted in TOK, vol. 3, pp. 19–20.

15 P814, pp. 300.5.4ff. This passage is also quoted in Asaṅga's *Ratnāgotravibhāgavyākhyā* (P5526, fol. 77a.5–77b.6) and Nāgārjuna's *Sūtrasamuccaya* (D3934, fols. 189b.6–190a.6).

16 The Sanskrit term *śrāvaka* literally means "hearer" or "listener," and thus also "student" or "disciple" in general. In its more specific use, it refers to disciples of either the Buddha or of the Jaina tradition. Within Buddhism, originally, the term referred to those who had heard the teachings directly from Buddha Śākyamuni, while, particularly in the mahāyāna, it came to distinguish those who strive for the personal liberation of arhathood through realizing the four realities of the noble ones from those who follow the approaches of pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas (for an explanation of the term "bodhisattva," see the comments below on the line, "I pay homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas" at the beginning of the Tibetan translation of the AA). Sometimes, "śrāvakas" are also explained as "those who proclaim to others what they have heard themselves." Gampopa's *Jewel Ornament of Liberation* (trans. Guenther, p. 4) characterizes śrāvakas as being afraid of saṃsāra, yearning for nirvāṇa, and having little compassion.

17 Lit. "solitary or single buddhas" or "buddhas by themselves," which refers to both attaining pratyekabuddhahood without a teacher and usually staying in solitude. After having studied and gathered the accumulations for one hundred eons, in their last life, by virtue of their previous aspiration prayers, pratyekabuddhas are reborn in a realm without buddhas and śrāvakas. Without a teacher, but merely through the condition of seeing bones in a charnel ground, they remember the entire reverse order of the twelve links of dependent origination and use them as their main object of meditation in order to attain pratyekabuddha arhathood. The *Jewel Ornament of Liberation* (ibid., p. 4) describes pratyekabuddhas through six main features: the three of the śrāvakas mentioned above, being very proud, keeping silent about their teacher, and fond of living in solitude. Note that, with a very similar meaning as in Buddhism, the term "pratyekabuddha" is also found frequently in the Jaina scriptures (for details on a possible common Indian source extrinsic to both traditions, see Fujita 1975, pp. 100–104). For more details, see CE on AA II.6–10 and Appendix I2C.

18 As for the three yānas, contrary to common belief, they are not an exclusive mahāyāna template. Though not used in the Pāli tradition, they are found in the *Ekottarāgama*, the *Mahāvastu* (a Lokottaravāda-Mahāsāṃghika text), and, very frequently, in the giant *Mahāvibhāṣā* (a Sarvāstivāda text; for the exact references, see Fujita 1975, pp. 122–23). Also, Buddhaghoṣa's *Visuddhimagga* (Warren ed., p. 94) mentions a threefold enlightenment (*tisso bodhiyo*). However, the scriptures of the early Buddhist schools never speak of a "bodhisattvayāna" or "mahāyāna," but always of a "buddhayāna" (equivalent to the bodhisattvayāna), which is due to their strictly reserving the term "bodhisattva" for a future buddha during his time of being on the path to buddhahood. Originally, "bodhisattva" meant "a person seeking enlightenment (buddhahood)" or "a person destined to attain enlightenment." Thus, the early Buddhist texts always speak about "the bodhisattva," referring to Buddha Śākyamuni before his *saṃbodhi* or in his previous incarnations. Unlike in the mahāyāna, in which all its practitioners are called "bodhisattvas," the early schools hold that buddhahood (and thus being a bodhisattva) is only possible for a few exceptional beings, such as Buddha Śākaymuni, whereas everyone else can only hope for arhathood as a śrāvaka or a pratyekabuddha.

19 II.57–59. JG (pp. 74–84) compares the three turnings in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and the three stages in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*, concluding that the respective first and second ones perfectly match in terms of both their topics and recipients. As for the third ones, JG explains that the wheel of irreversibility in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* corresponds to the third phase in the Uttaratantra and to the teachings on buddha nature in general. Thus, the wheel of irreversibility is not the same as the third turning in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*.

20 VIII.15.

21 D9, vol. kha, fol. 289a.7–289b.2 and D12, fol. 113b.4–5.

22 It is also said that the last wheel mainly teaches buddha nature (see JG, p. 29) or nonreferential wisdom.

23 JG (pp. 10–17, 21, 27–31) says that different sūtras contain explanations on there being a single, two, or three turnings of the wheel of dharma. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, within a single turning of the wheel, the Buddha taught the four realities of the noble ones three times in terms of their natures, functions, and completions, which correspond to the paths of seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning, respectively. Also the *Lalitavistarasūtra* gives only a presentation of a single turning of the wheel in terms of the four realities (though differing from the above). The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* and others present two turnings (which do not correspond to the first two in the presentation of three turnings). The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* speaks of three turnings in terms of three types of beings to be guided and in terms of expedient and definitive meaning. Though the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* does not explicitly use the term "wheel of dharma," in terms of the meaning, it can be considered a sūtra that teaches three turnings. In any case, the second turning in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* and the middle one among the three turnings belong to "the wheel of the lack of characteristics" (the prajñāpāramitā sūtras). Note here that the three dharma wheels are often presented as an actual temporal sequence or as exclusive topics, but there is clearly conflicting information in the Pāli canon (that is, the Buddha teaching nothing but what this canon includes for forty-five years) and other sources. JG (pp. 18–25) gives Saṃyaksena as an example for presenting a temporal sequence (saying that the first turning happened during the first year after Buddha's enlightenment; the second one, thereafter until seven years after enlightenment; and the third one, thereafter until thirty-seven years after enlightenment). On the other hand, the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* explains that the Buddha taught on all sentient beings being endowed with buddha nature in Rājagṛha for ten or sixteen years before he even came to Vārāṇasī to teach on the four realities. Also, while different commentators give widely different durations for each one of the three turnings, JG says that authentic sources do not present any clearly defined durations of the three turnings. Thus, they represent a classification in terms of their main topics. In other words, it is hard to imagine that the Buddha first taught on the four realities only, then solely on emptiness, and finally on the distinction between the expedient and definitive meaning alone (thus teaching the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas only during the first rather brief period). More likely, as is usually the case in living teaching traditions, depending on individual needs, the Buddha gave a vast array of different teachings at different times to different students, which may be roughly grouped into these three cycles (which are moreover described in various ways in different mahāyāna sūtras).

24 Skt. manuja, Tib. shed las skyes.

25 Skt. mānava, Tib. shed bu. These latter two terms are names for sentient beings in general and human beings in particular. They stem from the Vedic myths about the creation of the world, in which it is said that Manu was the first human, out of whom the universe arose.

26 P842, fols. 155b.5–156a.7. The same manner of distinguishing sūtras of expedient and definitive meaning is also found in the *Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatārajñānālokālaṃkārasūtra*; Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava* (verses 56–57); Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (D3860, fols. 13a–14a) and *Madhyamakāvatāra* (VI.97); Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (ACIP TD3859-1@07B); Jayānanda's *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* (ACIP TD3870-1@211A–216B); and Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakālokā*. Note, however, that all the sources that present this distinction do so only in general without relating it to the three turnings of the wheel of dharma.

27 Fols. 6b–7a. For more details on the three dharma wheels and the different ways of distinguishing what is of expedient and definitive meaning, see the discussion of the dharma of scriptures in CE (fols. 4b–7a; supplemented by JG and JNS) and Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 527–49.

28 Skt. gṛdhrakūṭa, Tib. bya rgod phung po'i ri (usually translated as "vulture peak"). Though the Sanskrit *kūṭa* can mean both "peak" and "flock" (or "heap"), it is usually explained to mean the latter (which corresponds to the Tibetan *phung po* instead of *rtse mo* or the like). According to the *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* (D3802, fols. 3b.7–4a.1), Praśāstrasena's commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* (P5220, p. 292.3.7–8), and other sources, the mountain received its name from the shape of its rock formations that resemble a flock of vultures huddling together. Jñānamitra's commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* (P5217, p. 285.5.1–2) says that the name comes from flocks of vultures gathering on its top. Ngag dbang bstan dar lha ram pa's (1759–1831) commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* (trans. in Lopez 1988a, p. 141) lists five ways of explaining this name by referring to Sde srid sangs rgyas rgya mtsho's (1653–1705) *Bai durya g.ya' sel*—(1) the mountain being shaped like a vulture; (2) being shaped like a flock of vultures; (3) vultures protecting the mountain on which many such birds feed on corpses; (4) being a heap/flock due to the brilliance of the birds that are beings who understand emptiness; and (5) the Buddha's robe being snatched by a demon in the form of a vulture and dropped on the mountain (which is shaped like a vulture's head), where it turned to stone in four layers, which are known as "the great vulture heap."

29 These two words are cognate with the Sanskrit root *jñā* in both *prajñā* and *jñāna*.

30 D24, fol. 152b.3–4.

31 Verse 48.

32 Linguistically, *arhat* derives from the verb *arh* ("to deserve," "to be worthy"), but the hermeneutical etymology (*nirukta*) refers to having killed (*hata*) the enemies (*ari*) that are the afflictions. The Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary *Nighaṇṭu* (D4347) as well as the *Ālokā* (pp. 9–10) give both explanations. As in this case, the Tibetan translations of Buddhist technical terms frequently follow the hermeneutical type of etymology over the linguistic one.

33 *Pāramitā* means "perfection," "mastery," "supremacy," or "excellence," usually in something. Thus, *prajñāpāramitā* means the perfection of prajñā in the sense of both being the most supreme form of prajñā and bodhisattvas excelling in it or fully mastering it. As for the etymology "gone beyond or to the other shore," there is a range of opinions as to what goes beyond and what the other shore is. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on IV.112b explains that the pāramitās have gone beyond to their respective accomplishments (*sampad*). Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (P5549, fol. 32a.6–7) says that the pāramitās are so called because they go beyond all the roots of virtue (such as generosity) of worldly beings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas. Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (La Vallée Poussin ed., pp. 30–31) glosses "beyond" as the other shore of the ocean of saṃsāra, which is equivalent to buddhahood as the relinquishment of both afflictive and cognitive obscurations. The six pāramitās are called "gone beyond" because, when they are performed through being dedicated to enlightenment, it is certain that one will go beyond to buddhahood. The *Ālokā* (p. 23) explains prajñāpāramitā as the attainment of the knowledge of all aspects through the progressive arising of insight through study, reflection, and meditation and the state of having gone to the true end. It is defined as "that which fully discriminates phenomena." A commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* by Vajrapāṇi (P5219, p. 288.3.5) glosses prajñāpāramitā as having gone beyond being an object of mind (which corresponds to Śāntideva's famous definition of ultimate reality in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.2). Another commentary on the same sūtra by Praśāstrasena (P5220, pp. 292.2.7–292.3.2) says that *jña* is the most noble realization, through which one is far away from sorrow and suffering, while pra refers to this wisdom being the supreme among all that is mundane and supramundane. As for "gone beyond," the sufferings of birth and death are this shore, while nirvāṇa is the other shore, with sentient beings driven by the desires of saṃsāra being in the middle. Thus, this prajñā functions as a raft or ship that delivers them to the shore of nirvāṇa. Jñānamitra's commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* (P5218, pp. 285.2–3) explains that reality is known, just as it is, through the three

prajñās of study, reflection, and meditation. Since this wisdom does not see any phenomena whatsoever, it has gone beyond signs, the two extremes, and birth and death. JG (p. 225) states that *jñā* means just cognition, mind, awareness, experience, and lucidity. *Pra* marks this cognition as supreme in that it is the perceiving subject of the object that is the ultimate. Since the seeming consists of nothing but ordinary objects, any cognitions of it are not supreme. In terms of the path, pāram refers to reaching the supreme end and *ita* means "going" or "that which makes one proceed." In terms of the fruition, *pāram* means the same as above because there is nothing more superior to be searched for, while *ita* refers to having arrived there, which means having attained it or having gone a long way to it.

34 A more correct translation of "path of accumulation" would be "path of equipment/provisions" (Skt. sambhāramārga) since it refers to gathering the virtues that serve as the provisions for the following paths (however, "path of accumulation" seems to be the common consensus in most of Western Buddhist literature). As for "path of preparation," the Sanskrit *prayoga* and the Tibetan *sbyor ba* can mean "preparation," "joining," "application," "training," and "effort." In this context, mainly the first two meanings are explained to apply, in the sense that the path of preparation prepares for and eventually joins one with the direct realization of the path of seeing. The five paths may be compared to a journey to a nice scenic holiday place. First, one gathers the equipment necessary for the trip, such as food and gas for the car. Next, one drives on the road to that place, coming closer to it all the time, imagining vividly what it looks like based on one's guide book, and so on. Eventually, one arrives at the location and sees the wonderful scenery directly. During one's stay there, one becomes more and more familiar with the environment and all its details, exploring the surroundings. Finally, one knows the place inside out, feels completely at home, and is able to get around as one pleases. For the definitions of the five paths, see Chart 3.

35 This is usually translated as "postmeditation," which at best seems to be too neutral a word or just has the connotation of taking a break. Actually, the term refers to the level of realization of emptiness that is attained when emerging from meditative equipoise. This realization is then actively applied to seeing the illusionlike nature of all appearances and experiences in one's practice of the six pāramitās during the time between the sessions of meditative equipoise. Thus, a synonym for "subsequent attainment" is "illusionlike samādhi."

36 As will be seen below too, there is a very close connection between prajñā and wisdom (jñāna). Often, these terms are simply used as synonyms, or it is said that wisdom is nothing but the culmination or perfection of prajñā, that is, prajñāpāramitā.

37 The male embodiment of prajñā, Mañjuśrī, also holds a wisdom sword in his right hand and usually a lotus flower with a text on it in his left. The book stands for the knowledge that comes from letters and instructions, while the lotus symbolizes the natural unfolding of our inner seed of prajñā. Instead of the flower and the book, sometimes he is depicted holding a vase containing the nectar of prajñā. Here, the sword indicates the active aspect and the sharpness of prajñā, while the nectar symbolizes its quality of intuitive insight into true reality.

38 D135.

39 D160.

40 D25/553 (several prajñāpāramitā sūtras also appear in the tantra section of the *Kangyur*, obviously mostly by virtue of containing a mantra or just mantric syllables).

41 Skt. mātṛ, Tib. yum. Also, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are called "the mother sūtras" since prajñāpāramitā is considered as the mother of all four kinds of noble ones (buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvaka arhats).

42 *Prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayam sa tathāgataḥ/ sādhyatādarthyayogena tācchābdyam granthamārgayoḥ.*

43 Pp. 2–3 (throughout, page number references to JNS without indicating the volume refer to Volume One).

44 As Makransky 1997 (pp. 4–5) points out, most Indian AA commentaries other than Haribhadra's and many Yogācāra commentaries give one or more of three basic etymologies for "dharmakāya"—(a) the collection of the consummate uncontaminated qualities of a buddha (in certain pre-mahāyāna explanations, "dharma" is taken to refer to the Buddha's teachings); (b) the foundation or substratum of uncontaminated qualities, or the basis of mastery over all phenomena; and (c) the embodiment of the nature of phenomena, or the embodiment of the nature of phenomena as perceived by wisdom. The prajñāpāramitā sūtras never speak about the dharmakāya in the sense of (a) and almost always as (c), but AA VIII.2–6c presents it as a collection of uncontaminated qualities. In explaining the term "dharmakāya," JG (pp. 247–48) cites verse 41 of Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga*:

> Because it is the body of all dharmas,
> Because it is the foundation of inconceivable qualities,
> And because its nature is to follow the way things truly are (nyāya),
> It is the dharmakāya of the protectors.

Based on Jñānagarbha's own Vṛtti (D3882, fol. 14b.4–5), Śāntarakṣita's *Satyadvayavibhāgapañjikā* (D3883, fol. 50a.6–50b.4) comments, "Since the body is a collection [of parts], the dharmakāya is called 'the collection of dharmas' because the cause is metaphorically labeled as the result. You may wonder, 'Why is it a cause?' Because it is the foundation for all mundane and supramundane qualities. Or it is the dharmakāya because it proclaims and expresses all mundane and supramundane dharmas. For when the dharmadhātu is realized, all mundane and supramundane dharmas gather as if summoned. . . . This indicates that the term 'dharmakāya' is a term for an agent. 'But isn't the body something that is not an agent? [Otherwise,] how can it be the foundation for all inconceivable qualities?' [Jñānagarbha] replies, 'It is imputed as an entity that is a foundation.' If you wonder how, this is by virtue of whoever engages in it attaining [qualities]. That is, whoever engages in and realizes the dharmadhātu attains mundane and supramundane qualities. 'Why is it something whose nature is established as the way things truly are?' [Jñānagarbha] explains, 'It is of this nature because it possesses the way things truly are.' Therefore, the term 'dharma' [in dharmakāya] expresses the way things truly are and the term 'kāya' refers to nature."

45 CE (section 2.3.1.1.1.; fols. 11b–12a) does not mention natural prajñāpāramitā. (2) Scriptural prajñāpāramitā is the collection of the names and words that teach the means to attain the fruitional prajñāpāramitā. (3) The prajñāpāramitā of the path refers to the progression of the fruitional prajñāpāramitā becoming free from stains, which consists of the principal and the ordinary prajñāpāramitā. The first one consists of the above-mentioned contaminated and uncontaminated kinds of prajñāpāramitā. The ordinary prajñāpāramitā refers to the realizations of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats. (4) Fruitional prajñāpāramitā is explained as the suchness of phenomena that is free from all adventitious stains of apprehender and apprehended.

46 P. 23. The page numbers of Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and the first chapter of Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* refer to the Sanskrit editions by Wogihara and Pensa, respectively. These numbers are also indicated in [ ] in Sparham's (2006 and 2008a) English translations of the sections of these two commentaries that correspond to the first three chapters of the AA and thus can be conveniently located by the English reader. For the remaining chapters of the *Ālokā* and the *Vṛtti*, only the Derge *Tengyur* folio numbers are given. For the *Tengyur* is more widely accessible and read than Wogihara's Sanskrit edition and there is no published Sanskrit edition of the last seven

chapters of the *Vṛtti* (a working edition of the *Vṛtti* is available in pdf-form from Sparham and the IsMEO in Rome plans to publish a complete edition).

47 Rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab 1993a, fol. 3a.5–6.

48 Tib. chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506).

49 Pp. 3–4. This summarizes the gist of JG's (pp. 219–39) extensive discussion of the different forms of prajñāpāramitā and which of them are actual versus nominal (for details, see endnote 585).

50 The audience of the sūtras is regularly said to include famous śrāvaka disciples of the Buddha, such as Śāriputra, Ānanda, Subhūti, and Pūrṇa. The sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines declares that its audience consisted of 1250 monks who were arhats, five hundred nuns and lay people liberated in this life, and millions of bodhisattvas. The *Ālokā* (pp. 5–15) describes the audience of the sūtra in eight thousand lines and the manner in which the Buddha taught it in great detail, saying that the prajñāpāramitā sūtras were directly heard by Ānanda and, just like the sūtras of the hīnayāna canon, retained by him. Modern scholarship holds that the first of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras was the one in eight thousand lines (originating between 100 BC and 100 CE and first translated into Chinese by Lokakṣema in 179 CE). This was followed by the expansion of that text into several larger sūtras (c. 100–300 CE) and its condensation into shorter sūtras and versified summaries (c. 300–500 CE). Finally, there was the period of tantric influences in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (c. 600–1200 CE). For details, see Conze 1960a, 1973, and 1975a, Potter 1999, Rawlinson 1977, and Schmithausen 1977.

51 More precisely, "lines" are ślokas, indicating a unit of thirty-two syllables in Sanskrit, either in prose or in meter.

52 These are the celestial musicians of Indra who live in the air and the heavenly waters.

53 JG (p. 87) says that there are no authoritative sources for the existence of such sūtras.

54 JNS (p. 3) says that this classification stems from the Samyé catalogue of translated scriptures.

55 Skt. Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, Tib. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa (D8).

56 Skt. Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, Tib. nyi khri lnga stong pa (D9). Sanskrit edition by N. Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series 28, 1934.

57 Skt. Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā, Tib. khri brgyad stong pa (D10).

58 Skt. Daśasāhasrikā, Tib. khri pa (D11).

59 Skt. Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Tib. brgyad stong pa (D12). Sanskrit edition by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960 (glossary and critical notes by S. Bagchi, pp. 569–79). In the Tibetan tradition, the sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines are referred to as the large, medium, and brief prajñāpāramitā sūtras, respectively. Bu ston rin chen grub 1931 (vol. 2, p. 49) and others say that the first five of the six mother sūtras were taught simultaneously because the questioners and the prophecy for the Gaṅgā goddess are the same in all of them.

60 Tib. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa (abbr. mdo sdud pa, D13). This text consists of three hundred and two stanzas, two hundred and fifty of which represent a partial summary of the sūtra in eight thousand lines. As Conze 1973 (p. x) says, 240 out of 529 pages of this sūtra are not represented in the *Saṃcayagāthā*, while the latter's last fifty-two stanzas do not correspond to anything in said sūtra. According to LSSP (fol. 6b.4–5),

the *Saṃcayagāthā* is nothing but the eighty-fourth among the eighty-seven chapters of the prajñāpāramitā sūtra in eighteen thousand lines.

61 Tib. rab kyi rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pas zhus pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phin pa (D14); a.k.a. *The Sūtra in 2,500 Lines* (Sārddhadvisāhasrikā).

62 Skt. Saptaśatikā, Tib. bdun bgrya pa (D24).

63 Skt. Pañcaśatikā, Tib. lnga brgya pa (D15).

64 Skt. Triśatikā, Tib. sum brgya pa (D16). The full title of this sūtra is *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitāsūtra* (Tib. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcod pa), lit. *The Vajra Cutter Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, better known as *Diamond Sūtra* in the West.

65 Skt. Prajñāpāramitānayaśatapañcaśatika, Tib. tshul brgya lnga bcu pa (D17/489).

66 Skt. Ardhaśatikā, Tib. lnga bcu pa (D18).

67 Skt. Kauśikapāramitā, Tib. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa koo shi ka (D19/554). Kauśika is another epithet of the god Indra because he is the tutelary deity of the brahman clan Kuśika.

68 Skt. Pañcaviṃśatiprajñāpāramitāmukha, Tib. sher phyin sgo nyer lnga pa (D20/491).

69 Skt. Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra, Tib. shes rab snying po'i mdo (D21/531); commonly known as *Heart Sūtra* in the West.

70 Skt. Svalpākṣarā, Tib. yi ge nyung ngu (D22/530).

71 Skt. Ekākṣarā, Tib. yi ge gcig ma (D23). JNS (p. 3) says that the terms and the list of "six mothers and eleven children" are found in the early Samyé catalogue of translated Buddhist texts from India.

72 D26–30. Due to these additional prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the above-mentioned fact that the bulk of the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā* is just a partial summary of the sūtra in eight thousand lines, several Tibetan commentators declare the list of seventeen "mothers and their children" to be obsolete. It should also be noted that the last volume on prajñāpāramitā in the *Kangyur* contains thirteen additional sūtras (D31–43), but they have nothing to do with prajñāpāramitā. Rather, they are sūtras of those hīnayāna sects (such as the Sarvāstivādins) that had contact with Tibetans (these sūtras differ from the corresponding versions found in the Pāli canon). They include the *Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra* (about the Buddha's very first teaching on the four realities of the noble ones at Sarnath) and the *Jātakanidāna*. There are also a great number of other prajñāpāramitā-related texts not listed in the prajñāpāramitā section of the Tibetan canon, but throughout several of its other sections, many of them among the tantras. These texts include about twenty sādhanas of Prajñāpāramitā personified as a deity, several prajñāpāramitā dhāraṇīs, and some texts on ritual. The Chinese canon contains a number of further sūtras and other prajñāpāramitā-related texts not found in the *Kangyur*, foremost among them the **Maḥaprajñāpāramitāśāstra* attributed to Nāgārjuna (by modern academia considered to be a work by the Chinese translator Kumārajīva). For details on all of these texts, including their Indian and Chinese commentaries, see Conze 1960a, pp. 37–91. Finally, mention should be made of devotional supplications to and praises of prajñāpāramitā, such as Rāhulabhadra's *Prajñāpāramitāstotra* (D1127; attributed to Nāgārjuna) and Kambala's *Prajñāpāramitānavaślokī* (P5210), with the latter mainly instructing on a progressive meditation on emptiness that focuses on the six kinds of consciousness and their objects, culminating in spacelike wisdom free from any subject-object duality, which is just mind's natural luminosity. Note also that the variety of different Sanskrit manuscripts for several prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the different Chinese translations (second to eighth centuries) of these sūtras show that the early versions of these sūtras underwent considerable changes and that new versions kept appearing for centuries.

73 P. 11 (D3791, fols. 9b.6–10a.1).

74 LSSP (fol. 4b.2–5) relates the three approaches to the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines alone. The approach of the brief teaching for those who understand through concise statements teaches who trains, for what sake they train, in what they train, and how they train. It consists of nothing but a single sentence after the introduction in the above sūtra—"Śāriputra, here, a bodhisattva mahāsattva who desires to become completely and perfectly enlightened with regard to all phenomena in all aspects should make efforts in prajñāpāramitā" (CZ, p. 45). The second approach, of the intermediate teaching for those who understand through slight elaboration, adopts the knowledge of all aspects as its point of departure and, by referring to nonconceptual prajñāpāramitā, teaches the ultimate mode of being. It covers everything after the above sentence up through the end of the knowledge of all aspects (CZ, p. 202). The approach of the detailed explanation, for those who are very fond of words, takes the knowledge of the path as its point of departure and covers the rest of the sūtra. Through referring to conceptual and nonconceptual prajñāpāramitā, it explains the seeming and ultimate modes of being in detail.

75 This is an epithet of the Hindu god Indra.

76 The three approaches are found in the *Ālokā* (p. 11) and the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, which also mentions the eleven instructional specifications (though not enumerating them in one place as eleven).

77 These are emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness—the nature of phenomena is emptiness; causes lack any signs or defining characteristics; and the appearance of results is not bound to expectations or wishes.

78 This term, as referring to the subject matter of the AA, does not occur in any Indian commentary, but is commonly used in the Tibetan tradition. Gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me's (1762–1823) commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* (trans. in Lopez 1988a, p. 179) explains that implicit teachings and hidden meanings differ in that the former "can be found in any text and be understood through the power of reasoning that analyzes the meaning of the explicit teaching. A hidden meaning is something that cannot be understood with independent analysis without being indicated through the instructions of a guru."

79 Interestingly, Atiśa's commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* (P5222, pp. 297.3.6–297.4.2) says that all the topics of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are contained in two—the topic of the clear realizations that arise on the path and the topic of the essence (that is, emptiness). The former is presented primarily in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines, which teach the topic of the essence only implicitly. The latter is taught primarily in the shorter sūtras (such as the one in seven hundred lines), although these also imply the clear realizations on the path.

80 I use the term "hīnayāna" not in any pejorative sense, but only because it appears in the scriptures under discussion here, which regard themselves as "mahāyāna." Otherwise, the term "foundational yāna" seems to be more appropriate since most of its key elements are also studied and practiced in what is called "mahāyāna." Also, as becomes increasingly clear from recent studies, at least for many centuries followers of both approaches lived side by side in the same monasteries in India without any conflicts or perceived issues of inferiority, simply following a somewhat different road within the same overall Buddhist landscape. Furthermore, when considering the many different approaches between common mahāyāna and vajrāyāna both within and outside of India as well as the widely diverging traditions within "mahāyāna" Buddhism in China, Japan, Tibet, Vietnam, Korea, and so on, the sets of differences that are labeled "hīnayāna" and "mahāyāna" appear as just two such sets among many others.

81 Conze 1960a, pp. 14–15. The introduction of Āryavimuktisena's commentary explicitly says that the prajñāpāramitā sūtras neither add anything to the lists of dharmas found in the

abhidharma nor teach any remedial wisdom to counteract afflicted phenomena that is separated from these dharmas in seeing their essential lack of nature or identitylessness.

82 *Webster's New International Dictionary* defines this term as "the process or result of regarding as a thing; convert mentally into something concrete or objective; give definite form or content to; materialize." This corresponds very well to the Sanskrit *bhāvagraha* and the Tibetan *dngos 'dzin*. Thus, when I use the term "reification," it refers to the tendency to solidify our experiences and the world around us, to operate with the resulting "solid things," and to cling to them as being real.

83 The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (D4090, vol. khu, fol. 37b.4–6) explains these four paths as follows: "The path of preparation is that at whose end the uninterrupted path arises. The uninterrupted path is that which relinquishes the obscurations. The path of liberation is the first arising of the definite liberation from the obscurations that are to be relinquished through the [former path]. Special paths are the paths other than those." The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 95b.3–5) says: "What is the path of preparation? It is that which relinquishes the afflictions. What is the uninterrupted path? It is that after which the afflictions are relinquished without [any further] interruption. What is the path of liberation? It is that which manifests liberation after the afflictions have been relinquished. What are special paths? Special paths refer to the paths of preparation, the uninterrupted paths, and the paths of liberation with regard to certain afflictions other than the above [—those relinquished on various levels of the path of familiarization]. [The term] can also refer to the path of setting aside applying oneself to relinquishing the afflictions and being engaged in certain particular reflections on the dharma, applications of the dharma, or meditative absorptions. It may also refer to the path of accomplishing or dwelling in certain special qualities." The Seventh Karmapa (Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 1, p. 257) defines them as follows. The first one suppresses the factors to be relinquished and directly induces the uninterrupted path. The second one causes its own arising and the ceasing of the factors to be relinquished to be simultaneous. The third one is the path that arises immediately after the former and lasts for a single instant. The fourth one refers to all paths that arise thereafter. Note that the above path of preparation is not equivalent to the path of preparation in the progression of the five paths (the path of accumulation and so on), but applies to the four steps (a.k.a. the four remedies) in the process of relinquishing any given factor to be relinquished (for more details, see below).

84 Vol. 3, pp. 464–65.

85 P. 98.

86 XX.39.

87 XX.40.

88 According to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, upon attaining the first bhūmi, bodhisattvas are free from all fears in terms of (1) lack of livelihood; (2) death; (3) lack of praise; (4) the unpleasant realms; and (5) retinues.

89 In its more general sense, "the bhūmi or level of engagement through aspiration" refers to both the paths of accumulation and preparation. In its more narrow sense, as used here, it stands for the path of preparation alone.

90 Vol. 3, pp. 494–97. For a full translation of TOK's presentation of the paths, bhūmis, and fruitions of the causal yāna of characteristics, see Appendix VI in Volume Two of this trilogy.

91 Conze 1960a, p. 15.

92 Sparham 2006, p. xxvii.

93 For details on the two realities, see Appendix I1C.

94 Buswell and Gimello 1992, p. 28.

95 For details, see Conze 1960a, pp. 37–80.

96 Bu ston rin chen grub 1931, pp. 50–53.

97 In the Tibetan tradition, this collection is said to contain either five or six texts. Everybody seems to agree that the first five are the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, *Śūnyatāsaptati*, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, and *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. If six texts are counted as belonging to this collection, different masters add either the *Ratnāvalī* or the *Vyavahārasiddhi*. The Chinese canon furthermore contains the gigantic *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstra* (a commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* attributed to Nāgārjuna by the Chinese master Kumārajīva and his school).

98 The first explicit mention of Maitreya as the AA's author is found in Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and *Vivṛti* (late eighth/early ninth century).

99 As for the disputed authorship of the *Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā* (D3808; 292 fols.), the introductory verses of Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (*ācāryo vasubandhur arthakathane prāptādaraḥ paddhatau*) and also the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* (D3811) refer to a *Paddhati* (Tib. gzhung 'grel) authored by Vasubandhu. The *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* is a commentary on the prajñāpāramitā sūtra in eight thousand lines that, according to its colophon, follows Vasubandhu's *Paddhati*, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha*, and Asaṅga's "Determination of Questions about Suchness" (for the latter, see endnote 102). The *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī*'s specific term *nyi khri gzhung 'grel* for D3808 is also found in several other Indian and Tibetan commentaries. The oldest version of the Tibetan *Kangyur* (Narthang), which was edited by Butön himself, says that some claim D3808 to be by Daṃṣṭrāsena, but that it actually represents the *Paddhati* (Tib. gzhung 'grel) by Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's authorship is also confirmed in Butön's *History of Buddhism* (1931, vol. 2, p. 146), saying that the *Paddhati* comments on the middle turning of the wheel of dharma from the perspective of Mere Mentalism. His LN first (p. 5) only refers to Daṃṣṭrāsena's *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā* (D3807; 583 fols.; the early Tibetan *'phang thang ma* catalogue attributes this text to King Trisong Detsen). But later (pp. 25–27), LN praises Vasubandhu greatly and says that his manner of commenting on the prajñāpāramitā sūṭras in terms of the three natures does not contradict these sūtras and even explains this manner at length. RT (fol. 2b.4), JG (passim), CE (fol. 2), and MCG (fol. 4a.3–4) speak about a commentary on the sūtra in one hundred thousand lines by a certain Dpa' bo (**Śūra*) as representing the commentarial approach of the third system founder (it is unclear to whom this refers—obviously not the early master Āryaśūra—so it may be an alias of Daṃṣṭrāsena). MCG (fol. 4a.6–4b.1) also mentions what is known as the "*Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā* by Daṃṣṭrāsena" (MCG seems to consider these two texts to be different), denying the assertion by some scholars that the latter is by Vasubandhu since none of his or Asaṅga's commentaries on the AA were translated into Tibetan. In addition, MCG (fol. 5a.4) speaks of a *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā* by King Trisong Detsen. Śākya Chogden 1988h (p. 168) confirms the *'phang thang ma* catalogue's attribution of the *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā* to King Trisong Detsen, but says that both the *'ching phu* and the *ldan dkar ma* catalogues call it "Indian" and concludes that it is thus by Dpa' sde (*Śūrasena). PK (fol. 12b.2) says that Butön establishes the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (D3808) as being by Vasubandhu, but supports Daṃṣṭrāsena's authorship as stated in some of the earlier Tibetan catalogues. JG (pp. 104–5) follows the phang thang ma's attribution of D3807 to King Trisong Detsen and then presents a number of pros and cons with regard to Vasubandhu's authorship of D3808, concluding that it is difficult to decide whether the text is by Daṃṣṭrāsena or someone else. Representing the position of the Sakya tradition, Ngorchen Kunga Sangpo's (1382–1456) *Catalogue to the Tengyur* (Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum, vol. 10, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968, p. 359) accepts Vasubandhu as the author of

D3808. As for the table of contents of different editions of the *Tengyur*, those of the Derge, Narthang, and Lhasa editions agree on identifying Vasubandhu as the author of D3808 and Daṃṣṭrāsena as the one of D3807. However, as the above shows, these two texts were/are very frequently conflated. As Stearns 1999 (p. 220) points out, D3808 consistently uses the format of the three natures. If it were actually authored by Daṃṣṭrāsena, it would only seem reasonable to expect the same format in D3807 as well, but the three natures are never mentioned there. This clearly suggests that the texts were written by two different authors. Also, as Sparham 2001 (pp. 195–96) already showed, the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* and works by Abhayākaragupta quote several passages from a *nyi khri gzhung 'grel* that are all found in D3808, thus providing strong evidence that these two texts are identical (it is to be noted here that D3808 and the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* are the only known Indian commentaries on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that comment on these sūtras by consistently using the format of the three natures). In sum, the majority of Tibetan commentators in all schools except for the Gelugpa tradition accept Vasubandhu's authorship of D3808. The Gelugpa School follows Tsongkhapa, whose LSSP argues that D3807 and D3808 are by Trisong Detsen and probably Daṃṣṭrāsena, respectively. However, after having presented the pros and cons with regard to Vasubandhu's authorship of D3808, even Tsongkhapa concludes that this remains a matter to be analyzed by intelligent people (for details, see Sparham 2001, pp. 203–6, and LSSP, fols. 4b.2–5b.4). It is only later in his *Legs bshad snying po* that Tsongkhapa strongly denies Vasubandhu's authorship. Many commentators who accept Vasubandhu's authorship of D3808 say that he commented from the viewpoint of "Mere Mentalism" (*sems tsam*). PK (fols. 11b.5–12a.2) quotes Dharmaśrī's commentary as saying that Vasubandhu did not subscribe to the Madhyamaka and that Asaṅga therefore commented on the AA from the perspective of the philosophical system of Vijñaptivāda (implying that Asaṅga was a Mādhyamika, while Vasubandhu was not). PK says that Asaṅga's own position was not *cittamātra*, but that he wrote most of his works from that perspective in order to guide others. However, the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* (D3811, fols. 316b.4–317b.6) explicitly affirms Vasubandhu's authorship of D3808 and rejects all explanations that are in discord with it. Following Maitreya, both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu teach nothing but the definitive meaning in terms of emptiness. This includes the rejection of the ultimate existence of consciousness and thus does not represent Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra, which only teaches the expedient meaning. Thus, the statement in the second opening verse of Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* that Vasubandhu commented on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras "based on internal knowable objects" (that is, from the perspective of Vijñānavāda) is refuted. What Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu teach is moreover not in contradiction to Nāgārjuna's position. When reading this in connection with another passage (D3811, fol. 113a.1–114b.5) that explains Yogācāra (the position of the ultimately real existence of other-dependent consciousness) to be the path and Madhyamaka (emptiness free from existence and nonexistence) to be the fruition, with the latter depending on the former, the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* seems to regard Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as Mādhyamikas. Note here that even according to LSSP (fol. 37b.1–5) masters such as Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga are not to be included in the group of those whom Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* criticizes as not having grasped the meaning of profound emptiness and dependent origination. Rather, it is well known to most Indian and Tibetan scholars that those masters explain their own comments in terms of mere cognizance as being the meaning of Madhyamaka. This also appears, for example, in Ratnākaraśānti's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and its autocommentary, which say that, based on mere cognizance being explained as Madhyamaka, the intentions of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are the same. These texts explain that the very experience of mind's lucidity is established in the basic ground of being and that the lack of apprehender and apprehended within that is Madhyamaka. Since this is something like a pith instruction on prajñāpāramitā, LSSP says, have a look at those texts. Also Dölpopa and CE (fol. 2a–b) reject the position of Vasubandhu being a Mere Mentalist, saying that both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu commented from the perspective of "Great Madhyamaka" or *Shentong* Madhyamaka (note that, throughout, I speak of *Rangtong* and

Shentong [Tib. rang stong/gzhan stong] if these terms refer to a philosophical system, a school, or the followers of that school; otherwise, I use *rangtong* and *shentong* or, in particular when these refer to the manner of being empty, "self-empty" and "other-empty"). Dölpopa's works speak of "Great Madhyamaka" as a fifth Buddhist philosophical system superior to (and not a subschool of) Madhyamaka. In particular, Dölpopa supports Vasubandhu's authorship of D3808 (often saying that he is a "master of Great Madhyamaka" who presents this system very clearly) and specifically points to this text as one of the major sources for his own explanations of *shentong*. These explanations frequently incorporate literal extensive passages from D3808, often followed by the remark, "Thus the Madhyamaka teaches." JNS (pp. 8–9) explains that the claims by certain people that Vasubandhu did not comment on the intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as being Madhyamaka just represent their being engaged in some partial and biased form of Madhyamaka. Furthermore, the Madhyamaka view held by Asaṅga is the final intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA, and Haribhadra follows this Madhyamaka asserted by Asaṅga. Also, there is no way that Vasubandhu would comment on the intention of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as being Mere Mentalism as included in the four Buddhist philosophical systems. Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* does not say that Vasubandhu commented on the meaning of prajñāpāramitā as being *cittamātra*, but only says that he commented on it based on the fact that knowable objects are internal. However, merely commenting based on this fact does not entail that Vasubandhu commented that this is the prajñāpāramitā's final intended meaning. Moreover, even the Buddha himself taught many passages in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that accord with *cittamātra*, but this can obviously not be explained as an inappropriate understanding on the side of the Buddha. Also, if someone commented on the intention of sūtras that teach Madhyamaka from among the four philosophical systems as the meaning of these sūtras being nothing but Mere Mentalism, they would waste the teachings. However, Vasubandhu never wastes the teachings, but is a unique ornament of the teachings. YT (p. 52–53) and JG (pp. 135–36) basically agree, saying that Vasubandhu did not comment on the meaning of prajñāpāramitā as being mere mind because it is justified as mere mind, but just due to the priority of his own interest in mere mind. JG adds that he thus commented on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as being taught with the intention of the threefold lack of nature and so on.

100 D3809. As Conze 1960a (pp. 97–100) points out, the bulk of the fifty-eight verses of the *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* is based on the large prajñāpāramitā sūtras with no parallels in the one in eight thousand lines. The four largest sūtras list twenty emptinesses, while the sixteen given by Dignāga (verses 8–18) never occur in the sūtra in eight thousand lines, but correspond exactly to the contents of the sixteen in *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.17–20. Almost the entire remainder of Dignāga's text (verses 19–54) discusses the ten conceptual distractions (in terms of nonentities or entities, superimposition or denial, being one or different, a phenomenon's nature or its features, and taking a referent to be just as its name or vice versa) and their remedies. Note that these ten distractions are not found in any known prajñāpāramitā text either, but in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.77 and in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.20–22 (P5549, fols. 19b.6–20b.5), which correlates their remedies to passages in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. In this context, Dignāga's verses 27ff. also discuss the three natures.

101 For example, this is stated in RT (fol. 2b.4–5) and MCG (fol. 4a.4–5). However, JG (pp. 102–3) says that it is not the case that Nāgārjuna's collection of reasonings and so on do not also teach the progression of clear realization, nor is it that the AA does not teach the prajñāpāramitā sūtras' core topic (emptiness). However, through compassionately beholding those whose eyes of insight are blinded through the inner darkness of the ignorance of being mistaken about true reality, Nāgārjuna clearly explained the prajñāpāramitā sūtras by particularly emphasizing emptiness (the object that is taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras) through scripture and reasoning. On the other hand, Maitreya saw that the entirety of what is explained in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras is not realized in a complete manner if the progression of clear

realization (the hidden meaning that is implicit in the explicit teachings on emptiness) is not realized, and that realizing this progression of clear realization is difficult through merely teaching emptiness. By virtue of this, in the AA he clearly explained the prajñāpāramitā sūtras by emphasizing the progression of clear realization. Thus, apart from the difference of each one of them emphasizing the above respective topics taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, one cannot distinguish them on the grounds that they, in general, exclusively teach emptiness and the progression of clear realization, respectively. Both LSSP (fols. 5b.5–6a.3) and PSD (p. 4) elaborate that Dignāga's text, in its commenting by way of the ten conceptual distractions and the three natures, accords with the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, thus not representing a tradition outside the one of Maitreya's five works. The *Paddhati* (for which PSD provides no author) is said to not be separate from Nāgārjuna's exegetical approach since it quotes his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in the context of the sixteen emptinesses and when speaking about the nonexistence of arising, ceasing, afflicted phenomena, and purified phenomena, thus explaining them according to Nāgārjuna's reasonings (this position on the *Paddhati* is originally stated in the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī*). JG (pp. 95–97) refutes these arguments as not compelling. Rather, the reason for there being only the two distinct traditions of Nāgārjuna and Maitreya is as follows. Though Maitreya and Nāgārjuna agree in asserting the prajñāpāramitā sūtras as Madhyamaka, they differ in explaining the intention of these sūtras in terms of their explicit teaching and their hidden meaning, respectively. On the other hand, both Dignāga's text and the *Paddhati* were not composed for either of these purposes, but just explain or summarize the meaning of the explicit words of the sūtras. Other Kagyü and Nyingma masters (such as Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé) as well as the Jonang tradition would take both Dignāga's text and Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* as agreeing with Maitreya's works in general and the *Shentong* tradition in particular.

102 According to the Tibetan tradition, the other four are the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, and *Ratnagotravibhāga* (in the Tibetan tradition better known as *Uttaratantraśāstra*). Note that the designation "five Maitreya texts" is unknown in the first catalogue of Tibetan translations from Sanskrit (Tib. ldan dkar ma; compiled in 824). Davidson 1985 (p. 134) says "that the original 'five works of Maitreya' also included a *Yogavibhāga*, which no language has preserved."

103 P. 75. A lost commentary on the AA by Asaṅga is referred to in a few Indian and most Tibetan commentaries. Based on the introductory verses of Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (*bhāṣyaṃ tattvaviniścaye racitavān prajñāvatām agranī āryāsaṅga iti prabhāsvara yaśās*), Tibetan authors often refer to this commentary as *de nyid rnam nges* (the equivalent of *Tattvaviniścaya*). However, the above Sanskrit makes it rather unlikely that this was the text's actual title, meaning that "noble Asaṅga composed a commentary in order to determine true reality." Neverthless, the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* (D3811, fols. 209a.4–7, 231b.7–232a.1, 241a.5, and 319a.5)—also refers several times to and quotes from a treatise by Asaṅga called "Compendium of Determining True Reality" or "Determination of Questions about Suchness" (*de kho na nyid rnam par nges pa bsdus pa/de bzhin nyid la dri ba rnam par nges pa*), which discusses the three natures. According to Asaṅga's text, the imaginary exists conventionally and the other-dependent exists substantially, but both exist only on the level of seeming reality. The perfect nature—suchness as the object of supreme wisdom—exists ultimately and is inconceivable through any characteristics of substance, conventionality, and seeming reality. The opening verses of Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* and Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism in India* (1980, p. 161) also mention such a commentary by Asaṅga, without giving its name. Butön's *History of Buddhism* (1931, vol. 2, p. 140) and LN (pp. 5 and 24), JG (p. 134), JNS (p. 7), YT (p. 52), BT (p. 291), PK (fol. 11a ff.), and TOK (vol. 1, p. 449) mention Asaṅga's commentary with the title *de nyid rnam nges*, while JNS (p. 7) says that it was called *nyi khri rnam nges* (JG gives this as an alternative title). Following the *Prasphuṭapadā*, LN (pp. 24–25) and PK (fols. 11b.5–12a.1) explain that

Asaṅga's commentary was written in terms of the *cittamātra* view in order to guide his half-brother, Vasubandhu, though his own view was superior, that is, Madhyamaka (as mentioned above, JNS and CE deny this). Ngog Lotsāwa's brief commentary on the AA (Rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab 1993a, fol. 3b.2–4) says that the opening verses found in both Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and *Vivṛti* mean that he expounds the AA by having studied Asaṅga's explanation and furthermore by following Vasubandhu's, Āryavimuktisena's, and Bhadanta Vimuktisena's explanations on what does not clearly appear in the one by Asaṅga. Therefore, since Haribhadra expresses the meaning that he found by way of relying on this lineage of gurus, one should not distrust it. RT (fol. 2b.5) says that, though it is mostly claimed that the above two commentaries by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were neither correlated to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras nor the AA, they were on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras proper, and it is good to assert them as being correlated to both these sūtras and the AA. Both JG (pp. 134–35) and JNS (pp. 9–10) agree with this. As for Asaṅga and Vasubandhu commenting on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras themselves, apart from the *Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā*, the Chinese (Taishō 1510, 1511, 1513, 1514) and Tibetan canons (Tōhoku 3816) contain a verse summary of the *Vajracchedikāsūtra* with a prose commentary, attributed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, respectively. Both are clearly not related to the AA and just summarize this sūtra, with only one typical Yogācāra term ("ālaya-consciousness") appearing once in the commentary on verse 76. According to Tucci 1986 (p. 30), "occasional analogies with *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* are also noticeable, but no allusion is made to . . . theories so peculiar to the Yogācāras . . . But of course no conclusion can be drawn from this fact because the booklet is only concerned with the path, not with speculations of dogmatics."

104 Tib. rlangs khams pa go cha.

105 Tib. khri srong lde btsan.

106 Tib. ye shes sde.

107 Tib. sbas mañjuśrī (other texts give dbas mañjuśrī).

108 Tib. nyang indravaro.

109 The prajñāpāramitā sūtras often contain very extensive repetitional phrases in which a certain single principle is applied to a long list of things—such as, "There is no form, no feeling . . ."

110 Tib. mchims phu.

111 Tib. khri ral pa can.

112 Tib. ska ba dpal brtsegs.

113 Tib. cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan.

114 JG (p. 88) speaks of six early translations of the sūtra in one hundred thousand lines by Lang Kamba Kocha; Bé Mañjuśrī and Nyang Indravaro; Vairocana; Gawa Baldseg and Jogro Lui Gyaltsen; Jo Kyingdrug (Tib. lco khying 'brug); and Shang Yeshé (Tib. zhang ye shes).

115 Tib. rin chen bzang po.

116 Tib. shar phyogs pa zla ba bzang po.

117 Tib. bstan skyong 'bum phrag gsum pa (a namesake of the Indian paṇḍita Sthirapāla, who also lived in the eleventh century and whose alias was Trilakṣa—"the one who had memorized three hundred thousand ślokas"). In the quotes and references in relation with this name in later Tibetan commentaries, it is often not clear which one of the two scholars is meant, but probably it is the Tibetan one (there are no records of a commentary by the Indian paṇḍita). Also,

note that this eleventh-century Tibetan master (whose seat was Bodong Monastery) is not to be confused with the later Sakya master (1432–1504) with the same name.

118 Tib. rngog blo ldan shes rab.

119 Tib. khu chen po lha ldings pa (also known as khu brtson 'grus g.yung drung).

120 Tib. 'brom ston rgyal ba'i 'byung gnas.

121 Tib. khams pa phyag dar ston pa (also written phyva dar).

122 Tib. khams lugs.

123 Tib. 'bre shes rab 'bar.

124 In the Tibetan tradition, these are known as *ṭik chung* (a.k.a. *lo tsā ba chen po'i bsdus don*; republished 1993, see Bibliography) and *ṭik chen* (not preserved). A recently published collection of works by early Kadampa masters (*Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang*; for details, see www.tbrc.org) lists another brief commentary (39 fols.) on the AA by Ngog Lotsāwa called *Rin chen sgron me* (which is also quoted in JNS, p. 18).

125 For a slightly differing account of these events, see Lopez 1988a, p. 145. More details are also provided in Tarthang Tulku 1977, pp. 157–60.

126 Tib. ar byang chub ye shes.

127 Tib. rin chen rnam rgyal.

128 Tib. g.yag ston sangs rgyas dpal.

129 Tib. rong ston shes bya kun gzigs. For detailed charts of Rongtön's lineages coming through Ngog, Atiśa, and Kuchen, see Jackson and Onoda 1988, pp. XXI–XXII.

130 Tib. shā kya mchog ldan.

131 Tib. 'phan po na len dra.

132 Tib. mthong ba don ldan.

133 Tib. phya pa chos kyi seng ge.

134 Tib. gro lung pa blo gros 'byung gnas.

135 Tib. gnyal zhig 'jam dpal rdo rje.

136 Tib. gsang phu sne'u thog. This monastery and its college were founded by Ngog Loden Sherab's uncle, Ngog Legpé Sherab (Tib. rngog legs pa'i shes rab), who was one of the three main disciples of Atiśa in Central Tibet and also a student of Rinchen Sangpo and Trolungpa.

137 Tib. theg pa chen po la 'jug pa.

138 Tib. nya dbon kun dga' dpal.

139 Tib. legs bshad gser phreng.

140 Tib. don grub rin chen.

141 Tib. red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros. Rendawa (1348–1412) was one of the most famous Sakya masters and also the early Madhyamaka teacher of Tsongkhapa, before the latter developed his own differing approach.

142 Tib. snye thang bde ba can.

143 Tib. 'jam skya nam mkha' dpal.

144 For more details on Tsongkhapa's prajñāpāramitā studies, see Sparham 2008b, p. 545. As Sparham (ibid., p. xx) says, the LSSP is "looking through the Butön and Nyaön commentaries, as

it were, at the earlier Tibetan and Indian commentarial tradition." However, at least parts of the Nyingma tradition (such as the khenpos at the Dzogchen and Namdröl Ling Monasteries) hold that Tsongkhapa's commentary was actually authored by Longchen Rabjampa (1308–1363), the Nyingma School's most towering figure. For those familiar with Tsongkhapa's fierce rejection of Dölpopa's views, it may be very surprising that he received teachings from Nyaön as one of the latter's main students and that his LSSP relies so much on Nyaön's commentary (interestingly, unlike for all other fields, Tsongkhapa's own record of received teachings (*gsan yig*) in its present form does not mention any prajñāpāramitā lineage). For one, this reliance highlights the by now well-established fact that the later entrenched sectarian biases did not exist at this time and that it was the norm for most masters to study with and teach scholars from other schools. As for Nyaön's commentary, unlike Dölpopa, who vehemently rejects Haribhadra's explanations, its actual explanations on the AA strictly follow Haribhadra, and he only sometimes makes excurses into Dölpopa's presentations in terms of "Great Madhyamaka" (a.k.a. *Shentong*). Dölpopa was one of the first Tibetans to vehemently deny that the lineage of vast activity (consisting of Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and their true followers) is equivalent to what Tibetan doxographies usually present as "Mere Mentalists," often calling these two streams "ultimate Cittamātra" and "seeming Cittamātra," respectively. He greatly stressed the unity of the lineages of profound view (consisting of Nāgārjuna and his followers) and vast activity and disclaimed that the latter is inferior to Madhyamaka. On the contrary, he asserted that Indian masters such as Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Candrakīrti (the latter mainly because of his tantric works)—but not Haribhadra—all belong to this unified Madhyamaka-Yogācāra tradition that he calls "Great Madhyamaka." Dölpopa also elaborated on the correct understanding of the framework of the three natures, largely following Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. Consequently, like many other later Tibetans, he criticized the position that all scriptures in which the three natures appear are just Mere Mentalism.

145 Sparham 1996, p. 26.

146 See also Samten 1997, pp. 832ff. JNS explicitly quotes and/or refers to Nyalshig's commentary several times. Whether Nyalshig in turn relied on earlier commentarial standards (which is quite likely) can only be decided after detailed studies of and comparisons with the Tibetan commentarial literature on the AA before him, in particular the commentaries by Ngog Lotsāwa (which seems to strictly follow Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*) and Ar Jangchub Yeshé (the latter as well as a great number of other early Tibetan AA commentaries are found in the above-mentioned recently published collection of works by early Kadampa masters). Interestingly, later Gelugpa scholars did not accept Tsongkhapa's LSSP on precisely those points in which he followed earlier Tibetan masters. In fact, the Gelugpa tradition considers LSSP (as well as a few other texts by Tsongkhapa) as his not yet mature works before he perfected his view through his revelatory dialogues with Mañjuśrī via the medium Lama Umapa (Tib. bla ma dbu ma pa). In particular, it is held that LSSP represents a commentary from the perspective of *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika in common, while the orthodox Gelugpa position on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra is that it specifically represents the *Yogācāra-Svātantrika view. By contrast, LSSP seems to enjoy a much better reputation in other Tibetan Buddhist schools than within the Gelugpa tradition itself. In particular, PSD and PBG consist almost entirely of literal or slightly paraphrased excerpts from LSSP and also some of Patrul Rinpoche's other AA-related texts accord greatly with LSSP.

147 Samten 1997, p. 837.

148 Tib. ma cig lab sgron.

149 Vol. 1, p. 543.

150 Tib. snyems rtog. In the terminology of Machig's "Cutting Through," this refers to the "main demon," that is, the clinging to a real, permanent, and independent self, which is the principal source of all inner and outer demons.

151 P. 75.

152 *Bodha* can also mean "awakening," "comprehension," "knowing," "realization."

153 D4090, vol. khu, fol. 2b.4–5.

154 D4035, fol. 120a.7–120b.1.

155 D4038, fol. 276a.6–276b.4.

156 The same text (ibid., fol. 187b2.–6) explains "presentable reality" as the four realities of the noble ones since they are presented by way of the seeming reality in terms of worldly consensus (speaking of sentient beings, houses, and so on), reasoning (speaking of skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, and so on), and realization (speaking of stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, arhats, and their states). "Unpresentable reality" is the suchness of all phenomena, which is the sphere of personally experienced wisdom and thus cannot be presented in the above ways.

157 This refers to the final realization that and how one's own karma and afflictions have been utterly exhausted and will never arise again.

158 D4049, fols. 110b.2–111b.2.

159 III.15 (D4048, fols. 25b.6–26a.4).

160 Prologue, verse 3.

161 The sūtras in twenty-five thousand and eighteen thousand lines are for the most part just abbreviated forms of the sūtra in one hundred thousand lines. LSSP (fol. 7a.3–4) says that, as can be seen from the twelve Indian commentaries that correlate the eight topics of the AA to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (for these, see below), the sūtras on which the AA is based are the ones in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, eighteen thousand, and eight thousand lines, and (if counted separately) the *Saṃcayagāthā*.

162 Atiśa's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa* (D3804, fol. 230b.3–4) says that, according to Dharmakīrtiśrī and Ratnākāraśānti, there are only seven clear realizations, while the dharmakāya is their result. According to Haribhadra and Buddhaśrījñāna, all eight are held to be clear realizations. As for the difference between the eight clear realizations and the eight topics of the AA, JG (p. 218) quotes Atiśa's text (ibid., fol. 230b.4) to the effect that the former are the progressive development in a bodhisattva's mind stream, while the latter represent what is to be expressed (with the eight chapters of the AA being the means to express them).

163 This could also be understood as "the knowledge of the paths" since this knowledge refers to a bodhisattva's knowledge of not only the bodhisattva path, but also of the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

164 Note that these are the terms which are used in the AA itself. In the Tibetan tradition, (4)–(7) are usually referred to as "trainings" instead of "clear realizations"—thus, they are called "the complete training in all aspects" (*rnam rdzogs sbyor ba*); "the culminating training" (*rtse mo'i sbyor ba*); "the serial training" (*mthar gyis pa'i sbyor ba*); and "the instantaneous training" (*skad cig ma'i sbyor ba*). This is also what is followed here throughout.

165 LN quotes Ngog Lotsāwa on the difference between "training" (Skt. prayoga, Tib. sbyor ba) and "practice" (Skt. pratipatti, Tib. sgrub pa), saying that the former is the nature of yoga, while the latter refers primarily to the conduct that is founded on the yoga of ultimate reality.

166 CE and JNS supplement these two points with extensive discussions of the two and four realities (see Appendix I1C).

167 As for the AA's essential term "conception" as the main obscuration to be relinquished, the related Sanskrit terms *vikalpa (rnam rtog), kalpana (rtog pa), parikalpa (kun rtog)*, and their cognates all have the basic sense of "constructing," "forming," "manufacturing," or "inventing." Thus, in terms of mind, they mean "creating in the mind," "forming in the imagination," and even "assuming to be real," "feigning," and "fiction." This shows that their usual translation as "thought" or "concept" is not wrong, but often far too narrow. Fundamentally (and this is to be kept in mind throughout Buddhist texts), these terms refer to the continuous constructive yet deluded activity of the mind that never tires of producing all kinds of dualistic appearances and experiences, thus literally building its own world. Obviously, what is usually understood by "conception" or "conceptual thinking" is just a small part of this dynamic since, from a Buddhist point of view, it also includes nonconceptual imagination and even what appear as outer objects and sense consciousnesses—literally everything that goes on in a dualistic mind, be it an object or a subject, conscious or not. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* says that "concept" comes from Latin *conceptus* (collection, gathering, fetus) and is "something conceived in the mind : THOUGHT, IDEA, NOTION: as a *philos* : a general or abstract idea : a universal notion: (1) : the resultant of a generalizing mental operation : a generic mental image abstracted from percepts; *also* : a directly intuited object of thought (2) : a theoretical construct . . ." About "conceive," Webster's says, "to take into one's mind . . . to form in the mind . . . evolve mentally . . . IMAGINE, VISUALIZE . . ." Thus, somewhat differing from "concept," when "conceive" is understood in these latter senses in a very general way, it comes closer to the above meanings of *kalpana* and its related terms. This meaning of deluded mental activity is particularly highlighted by the classical Yogācāra terms "false imagination" (lit. "imagination of what is unreal") and "the imaginary," with the latter being everything that appears as the division into subject and object that is produced by false imagination (these terms appear throughout CE and JNS; for more details, see below). In this more general sense, "imagination" and "conception" are equivalent, which is also what Nāgārjuna's *Cittavajrastava* (verse 5) means:

> [For] the mind that has given up imagination,
> Saṃsāra impregnated by imagination
> Is nothing but an imagination—
> The lack of imagination is liberation.

Obviously, this does not mean that saṃsāra is nothing but conceptual thinking or that the mere lack of such thinking is nirvāṇa. Rather, as RT (fol. 40b.3–5) says, "All the many kinds of conceptions that are mentioned in the scriptures are included in false imagination because they have the aspects of the three realms appearing as the duality of apprehender and apprehended under the sway of latent tendencies. False imagination is threefold—the conceptions that are the mere appearance as the duality of apprehender and apprehended; those that have the aspect of coarse states of mind; and those that have the aspect of the appearance of terms and their referents. The first consist of the mere appearance, under the sway of latent tendencies, of apprehender and apprehended being different. The second are what the abhidharma explains as the confused mental discourse that is included in the portions of [the mental factors of] intention and prajñā. The third is the clinging to referents through following names." In the particular context of the AA, the four sets of conceptions about apprehender and apprehended in all their coarse and subtle degrees represent the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished throughout the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization (for the specific descriptions of these conceptions, see CE's general topic on I.34–35; verses I.34–35, V.5–16, and V.26–34; and Appendices I1D as well as I4B and I5A in Volume Two).

168 CE and JNS equate the disposition with buddha nature and nonconceptual wisdom. JNS offers one of the most comprehensive, insightful, and subtle discussions of the dharmadhātu as the "disposition" and the tathāgata heart—mainly from the ultimate perspective. It not only covers the understanding of buddha nature in both the sūtrayāna and the vajrayāna, but also eliminates many misconceptions about it. The presentation culminates in a penetrating analysis of the *Uttaratantra's* famous verse I.28, which is usually presented as a threefold proof for all sentient beings possessing buddha nature (see Appendix I1E1).

169 CE and JNS present detailed discussions of the four dhyānas, the four formless absorptions, and the four immeasurables.

170 Usually, the commentaries discuss the three equipments of wisdom, the bhūmis, and the remedies in greater detail. In particular, under the equipment of wisdom, JNS discusses the relationship between emptiness and the wisdom that realizes it; the twenty emptinesses and their corresponding wisdoms; and the notions of *rangtong* and *shentong* (see below and Appendix I1G). The topic of the ten bhūmis includes explanations of their nature; their classifications; and their distinctive features of relinquishment, realization, and qualities. It also discusses the nature of the object of meditative equipoise in the mahāyāna; whether there is a newly seen such object on the path of familiarization that was not seen on the path of seeing; whether meditative equipoise entails appearances or not; and the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization, including the manner in which they are respectively relinquished (see Appendix I1H).

171 JNS greatly elaborates on the knowledges of the paths of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, with further detailed explanations of the paths of seeing and familiarization of bodhisattvas.

172 Note that both the AA and its Indian commentaries refer to this third knowledge almost exclusively as "all-knowledge" (*sarvajñatā*). Though the term *vastujñāna* is found once (in the compound *vastujñānaprakārāṇām*) in the AA (IV.1a), it does not refer to the all-knowledge. In some Indian commentaries, *vastujñāna* is used a rare few times for the all-knowledge. However, the term *vastujñatā*, which would correspond to the terms for the knowledge of all aspects and the knowledge of the path (*sarvākārajñatā* and *mārgajñatā*), is not found in any of these texts. The Tibetan commentaries on the AA present the reverse approach, predominantly using "the knowledge of entities" (lit. "the knowledge of the bases"). Since the present volumes deal primarily with Tibetan commentaries, I also mostly use "the knowledge of entities" instead of "all-knowledge."

173 For overviews and definitions of all eight topics and seventy points of the AA, see Chart 26 and Appendix V in Volume Two.

174 This is already expressed in Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 79a.7).

175 For example, in Chapter Four, the preliminary topics follow after the actual aspects of the training. Also, the nature of the training is only identified subsequent to lengthy discussions of the qualities, flaws, and characteristics of this training. The commentaries often provide reasons for the order of the chapters of the AA and certain of its topics, but these reasons often seem somewhat arbitrary, obviously attempting to forge a coherent overall structure where it is hard to find one.

176 Fol. 14a/vol. 1, p. 454.

177 See Conze 1954 (pp. 7–8), 1960a (pp. 47–50), and 1975 (pp. xiii–xvi). Note however, that especially with regard to the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines, the order and the division of its chapters differ according to its various Sanskrit versions and its revised and unrevised editions in the Tibetan canon (for the latter, see below). According to Conze, in the sūtra in

one hundred thousand lines, the eight topics of the AA are taught in Chapters Two–Thirteen; Fourteen–Twenty-six; Twenty-seven–Twenty-eight; Twenty-nine–Forty-four; Forty-five–Fifty-nine; Sixty; Sixty-one–Sixty-two; and Sixty-three–Seventy-two, respectively.

178 JNS vol. 2, pp. 138–39.

179 The translation of CE provides references to each of the corresponding sections in the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines in Conze's translation (1975a).

180 The most concise form of mapping paths and bhūmis onto the contents of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras is certainly the explanation in several Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the *Heart Sūtra* that, in due order, the words GATE GATE PĀRAGATE PĀRASAṂGATE BODHI in the mantra of prajñāpāramitā represent the five paths.

181 It is interesting to note that, contrary to the great significance of the AA in India and its even more prominent status in Tibet, the text was obviously never translated into Chinese and basically remained unknown there.

182 JG (p. 122) says that this means that the former commentaries primarily comment on the sūtras and only provide minor correlations to the AA by way of treatises such as the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā*, with the reverse applying to the latter commentaries.

183 D3789 (61 fols). Smṛtijñānakīrti was instrumental in many translations in the Tibetan canon and also authored a number of commentaries, such as on Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, the *Guhyasamājatantra*, and texts related to the *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti*. Both Butön and JG (p. 119) say that old manuscripts refer to *byams pa* as the author of D3789 and that it should be examined whether Maitrīpa might thus have been mistaken for Smṛtijñānakīrti later. Tsongkhapa doubts Smṛtijñānakīrti's authorship of this text due to its overall weakness and certain inconsistencies in terms of relating the AA to the sūtras.

184 D3802 (65 fols.). Nothing is known about this author except that he is said to have been from Kashmir. Again, due to frequent Tibetanisms, Tsongkhapa doubts the Indian origin of this work altogether (the same goes for Dharmaśrī's *Prajñāpāramitākośatāla*; D3806).

185 D3787 (198 fols.), in Tibetan usually called *Illumination of the Twenty[-five] Thousand [Lines] (nyi khri snang ba)*. Traditionally, it is often said that Āryavimuktisena was one of the main disciples of either Vasubandhu or Dignāga (which seems to be problematic from a chronological point of view) and a contemporary of Bhāvaviveka. Also, as stated in the *Vivṛti's* opening verses, he is usually classified as a Mādhyamika. However, his commentary greatly relies on the *Abhidharmakośa* and freely uses typical Yogācāra formats in terms of nondual nonconceptual wisdom as well as the three natures and the eight consciousnesses, without ever explicitly identifying himself as a Mādhyamika. In the colophon to the *Vṛtti*, Āryavimuktisena describes himself as a follower of the mahāyāna, belonging to the Kaurukulla branch of the Saṃmitīya order (one of the eighteen subsects of early Buddhism), and being a nephew of a certain Buddhadāsa, a master overseeing many great monasteries. Āryavimuktisena's commentary is the first one to establish the textual framework of the correlations between certain passages in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* and the seventy points of the AA, which is basically followed by all later commentators to the present day.

186 D3788 (181 fols.). Other than having been a student of Āryavimuktisena, no information about Bhadanta Vimuktisena is available. His commentary, for the most part, just repeats or rephrases the former's correlations and explanations.

187 In the colophon of the *Ālokā*, Haribhadra says that he lives in a monastery called Trikaṭuka under the patronage of King Dharmapāla (770–815).

188 D3790. This is not a commentary on the AA, but a different version of the sūtra, into which the corresponding names of the AA's chapters, seventy points, and their subpoints are inserted as headings (without any additional commentary). The unrevised sūtra and this edition are close in content, but there are a number of passages in the latter that were added, omitted, or transposed so as to better conform to the AA's outline (for details, see Lethcoe 1976, Watanabe 1994, and Zacchetti 2005). Thus, remarkably, the usual process of what are considered the Buddha's words shaping their commentaries was partly reversed. The Sanskit manuscripts of the revised edition do not mention the name of the redactor, but the colophon of the Tibetan says that it was Haribhadra. In any case, it is not certain that it existed before Haribhadra's time and the commentaries before him clearly do not refer to it. However, at least from the early eleventh century onward (Ratnākaraśānti), despite the alterations mentioned, almost all Indian and Tibetan commentaries employed it—and not the original sūtra—as the sole (since most convenient) authoritative scriptural source to establish the correlations between this sūtra and the AA (which naturally gave rise to some exegetical problems). A notable exception is Dölpopa's meticulous comparison of the two versions. As for the relationship between the revised edition and the sūtra in eight thousand lines, Conze 1955 (p. 13) says, "The first third expands the first chapter of the version in eight thousand lines *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*. The second part reproduces, with some additions and omissions, the chapters two to twenty-eight of the same text. The third part is an independent treatise, which is throughout concerned with the obvious conflict between the doctrine of universal emptiness, and the practical needs of the struggle for enlightenment."

189 D3801 (229 fols.). Ratnākaraśānti is reported to have been a teacher of Nāropa, Maitrīpa, and Atiśa at Vikramaśīla University. The *Tengyur* says that both of his AA commentaries—the other being D3803—explain the prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the perspective of *cittamātra*, but his texts typically exhibit a synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, emphasizing mind's natural luminosity (for an overview of his writings, see Ruegg 1981, pp. 122–24, and Katsura 1976). His two commentaries here mainly employ the framework of the three natures, and also speak about the dharmadhātu as mind's natural luminosity, which is just obscured by adventitious stains and revealed upon their relinquishment. In his *Śuddhamatī*, he figures among Haribhadra's sharpest Indian critics, particularly with regard to the latter's novel interpretation of Chapter Eight.

190 D3791 (341 fols.). This is Haribhadra's largest commentary, the first one ever to relate the AA to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Eight Thousand Lines*. In the Tibetan commentarial tradition, it is usually just called "the large commentary" ('grel chen), but for the sake of clarity and consistency, I always use *Ālokā*.

191 D3803 (230 fols.). Unlike the *Ālokā*, this text gives word-for-word explanations of both the AA and the relevant passages of the sūtra in eight thousand lines, even occasionally modifying the verses of the former so as to fit the latter. It also explains difficult and unusual terms.

192 D3805 (228 fols.). This author was among the last great Buddhist masters in India, a prolific polymath living at the famous university of Vikramaśīla. His commentary is mainly from a Madhyamaka point of view, but he also identifies the naturally abiding disposition with the *tathāgatagarbha*, which pervades all sentient beings, is naturally pure, and is just obscured by adventitious stains. Like Ratnākaraśānti, he also criticizes parts of Haribhadra's commentaries.

193 D3792 (78 fols.).

194 D3798 (74 fols.). According to Butön and Gö Lotsāwa, this Buddhaśrījñāna was a direct disciple of Haribhadra and an important vajrayāna master, being the founder of the Jñānapāda lineage of the *Guhyasamājatantra*. However, unlike Haribhadra's *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikāsubodhinīnāma* (which comments only on the sūtra), Buddhaśrījñāna's commentary comments on the AA by correlating it to the *Saṃcayagāthā*. Moreover, Buddhaśrījñāna did not follow Haribhadra's commentaries on the AA in all respects, such as discussing the last chapter of the

AA in terms of three kāyas instead of four and explaining the fundamental change of state of the eight consciousnesses into the five wisdoms, which is a typical vajrayāna template based on the Yogācāra presentation of this topic.

195 D3806 (8 fols.).

196 D3793 (62 fols.). Though not explicitly related to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines, this commentary is held to be based on them in a general way. As for the still common Sanskrit reconstruction **Sphuṭārtha* (initially suggested by Tripāṭhī in 1977) of the usual Tibetan "title" *Clear Meaning* (don gsal), as the now available Sanskrit version (Amano 2000) shows, it is mistaken and obsolete (for details, see Sparham 2001, pp. 206–7). The Tibetan *don gsal* may be based on the last two lines of the fourth of the *Vivṛti's* concluding verses (*tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel gsal ba/ 'di ni seng ge bzang pos byas*), which Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā* glosses as *'grel pa don gsal ba*. The text is basically a very condensed version of the *Ālokā* (without, however, any of its numerous references to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Eight Thousand Lines*), and the Tibetan tradition often just calls it "the small commentary" (*'grel chung*; JNS sometimes refers to it as *ṭīk chung*) or "the commentary."

197 D3794 (115 fols.). Dharmakīrtiśrī was a Yogācāra master from Sumatra and one of Atiśa's two main teachers. LN (p. 5) and CE (fol. 2b) give Kulānta/Kulandatta as the author's name (probably an alias/epithet of Dharmakīrtiśrī).

198 D3796 (110 fols.). Dharmamitra seems to have been an immediate successor of Haribhadra and a Mādhyamika, but his commentary also refers to the three natures, extensively quotes the other four works by Maitreya, and was the first to introduce the notion of *tathāgatagarbha* into the discussion of the naturally abiding disposition, which was then continued by many later authors, such as Abhayākaragupta. Also in other issues, he is not as fully in line with Haribhadra (or not at all) as one would expect a subcommentator to be.

199 D3799 (73 fols.). Like his teacher Dharmakīrtiśrī, Ratnakīrti was a Yogācāra master.

200 D3800 (76 fols.). This Buddhaśrījñāna was invited to Tibet in 1200 by Tropu Lotsāwa (Tib. khro phu lo tsā ba byams pa'i dpal) and is reported to have taught Mahāmudrā there (thus he is not to be confused with Haribhadra's above disciple of the same name). Both Buddhaśrījñāna's and Ratnakīrti's commentaries closely follow Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*.

201 D3797 (6 fols.). Nothing is known about this author except JNS saying that he was from Kashmir, but his very brief work closely follows Haribhadra.

202 D3795 (22 fols.). Prajñākaramati was a Mādhyamika and primarily known for his large commentary on Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. His commentary basically follows Haribhadra.

203 D3804 (10 fols.). This text is a versified summary of the AA, with frequent references to the positions of almost all previous commentators, including Asaṅga. For a number of them, among them Haribhadra, both honorific and nonhonorific Tibetan verb forms are used, which usually signifies agreement or disagreement, respectively (though if the text really was translated from Sanskrit, these Tibetan forms do not necessarily mean much). On the other hand, Haribhadra is once called "great master"—as is Asaṅga twice—and a few times is said to have a "clear explanation" on specific points. In any case, it is hard to speak of a clear and/or consistent preference for Haribhadra's positions throughout the text. Atiśa's authorship is denied by both Padma Karpo and Tsongkhapa, the latter considering the text to be of Tibetan origin (possibly by one of Atiśa's Tibetan disciples).

204 D3903 (220 fols.). This text is not a commentary on the AA, but an independent encyclopedic work on the Buddhist scriptures in general. However, since its last three chapters discuss AA-related topics (with the first one of these treating the eight clear realizations), it is counted by many Tibetan scholars among the commentaries on the AA. In the commentaries by

different Tibetan masters, one finds various other ways to classify the above twenty-one Indian commentaries in terms of their correlating the AA to certain sūtras or just being commentaries on the AA itself. PSD, LSSP (which, however, doubts the authorships of some of these commentaries), and Sera Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen (Tib. se ra rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) follow the above division into twelve commentaries that correlate the AA to the sūtras and nine that do not correlate it. MCG (fol. 4b.1–6) also lists twenty-one commentaries and follows the above correlations of the individual texts with different sūtras and the AA (the first twenty commentaries are the same as above, while the twenty-first one is called *sdud pa'i gdams ngag*, which may refer to the *Munimatālaṃkāra*). JG (pp. 119–22) speaks of only twenty commentaries (not counting Abhayākaragupta's *Munimatālaṃkāra*). Among these, thirteen commentaries directly correlate the AA to the sūtras (JG adds Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* to the above list since it is said to be linked to the sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines). For the same reason, the *Vivṛti's* subcommentaries and summaries (not counting the very brief Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha) indirectly correlate the AA to the sūtras as well. Thus, in actual fact, there are only two among these twenty commentaries (*Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* and *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa*) that can be said to not be correlated to the sūtras (obviously, the *Munimatālaṃkāra* is not either). In his commentaries on the AA, Śākya Chogden also speaks about thirteen commentaries that correlate the AA to the sūtras. However, differing from both the above list and JG, he takes both of Ratnākaraśānti's commentaries to refer to the sūtra in eight thousand lines, and groups Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* as well as the *Aṣṭasamānārthaśasana* and *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* as the three that correlate the AA to the sūtra in one hundred thousand lines. All the remaining commentaries under II are then said to not correlate the AA to any sūtra and to follow Haribhadra's *Vivṛti*. PK (fol. 11a.3–11b.1) lists twenty-two Indian commentaries, including the two by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, while leaving out the *Munimatālaṃkāra*, and giving King Jagaddala as the author of the *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* (in the *Tengyur*, King Jagaddalanivāsin ("the one who dwells at Jagaddala") is given as the author of the abovementioned *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī*; for the complex relation between this text and the two *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*s attributed to Daṃṣṭrāsena and Vasubandhu, see endnote 98 and Sparham 2001). In general, it seems that there were more known (and unknown) Indian commentaries on the AA than just these twenty-one texts, such as the commentary by Asaṅga and possibly one by Paṇḍita Sthirapāla (eleventh century), who, according to Tāranātha 1980 (p. 311) taught prajñāpāramitā extensively at the famous Indian Buddhist university of Vikramaśīla. However, the citations/references with regard to Sthirapāla (or his alias Trilakṣa) in later Tibetan commentaries most probably refer to his Tibetan namesake (see below).

205 Tibetan authors usually summarily speak of "the tradition of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra" (*'phags seng gi lugs*) as if this were a unified system. However, as a closer study of their commentaries shows (as pointed out in modern studies and also exemplified in several cases below), their commentarial approaches exhibit a significant number of differences, many of them substantial.

206 Tib. dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan.

207 Tāranātha 1980 (p. 277) says that Haribhadra studied Madhyamaka with Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and prajñāpāramitā with upādhyāya Vairocanabhadra, thus clearly taking them to be two different persons, while at least parts of the Gelugpa tradition claim them to be a single person.

208 Tib. go rams pa bsod nams seng ge.

209 There are several reasons for this, such as Śākya Chogden being perceived to have criticized Sakya Paṇḍita, the Sakya tradition's most towering figure; his affiliation with the *Shentong* view; and his entire work consequently being banned by the Tibetan government. In the Kagyü tradition, it is often said that Śākya Chogden's *Shentong* view is informed by and elaborates

on the Seventh Karmapa's *Shentong* view (which basically means treating Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on an equal footing). Śākya Chogden indeed composed a number of his works upon the explicit request of the Karmapa and his several works on the AA also comment in the manner of combining Yogācāra and Madhyamaka.

210 Tib. smin grol pad ma 'gyur med rgya mtsho.

211 Tib. rdza dpal sprul o rgyan 'jigs med chos kyi dbang po.

212 Tib. gzhan dga'. His actual name is Shenpen Chökyi Nangwa (Tib. gzhan phan chos kyi snang ba) and he was the first main teacher at the famous monastic college of Dzongsar, founded by Dzongsar Khyentse Jamyang Chökyi Lodrö (Tib. rdzong gsar mkhyen brtse 'jam dbyangs chos kyi blo gros; 1893–1959). Khenpo Shenga also greatly revived the Nyingma academic curriculum.

213 Tib. bod pa sprul sku mdo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma.

214 For more details about, translations of, and/or excerpts from these texts, see Volume Three of this trilogy.

215 Tib. rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen.

216 Tib. mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang po.

217 Tib. 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa.

218 Tib. chos grags rgya mtsho.

219 Tib. dkon mchog yan lag.

220 Tib. ka rma phrin las pa mchog las rnam rgyal. Being a prolific writer, he was one of the main teachers of the Eighth Karmapa.

221 Tib. 'ba' mda' thub bstan dge legs rgya mtsho. The first of these commentaries covers six volumes with a total of 2,839 folios (!), thus probably being the largest one in history (the second modestly consists of just one volume). For details, see Kapstein 1997.

222 For another list of forty-five early commentaries on the AA (based on A khu ching shes rab rgya mtsho's *dpe tho* in Lokesh Chandra's *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature*, ch. 4, pp. 528ff.; TBRC no. W12845), see the foreword by D. Jackson in Rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab 1993a. The TBRC database lists eighty-four works on the AA (though some are identical), among them several contemporary ones that are not found in the other sources mentioned. See also a recently published collection of works by early Kadampa masters (*Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang*; www.tbrc.org), which contains numerous texts on the AA.

223 For brief descriptions of the Kagyü and Nyingma commentaries on the AA as well as the others used in the present study, see below and Volume Three.

224 Its colophon (p. 504) says that it was begun at the end of the author's twenty-second year and finished at the beginning of his twenty-fourth.

225 For example, pp. 103 and 182.

226 For example, p. 20 and vol. 2, p. 441.

227 For example, pp. 219 and 321ff.

228 Pp. 22ff. (for details, see below).

229 CE (fol. 2a) and SLG (fol. 13b.4) briefly mention the term shentong once without further explanations.

230 Pp. 488 (once) and 573 (two times).

231 Pp. 311–14 and 320–35.

232 P. 573 (two times) and vol. 2, p. 152 (three times).

233 Tib. 'jam dbyangs chos kyi rgyal mtshan. He was a student of the Fifteenth Karmapa and a teacher of the second Jamgön Kongtrul.

234 JNS, vol. 2, p. 515.

235 Tib. skyo brag dam chos zla ba.

236 Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang 2001, p. 2.

237 MPZL, pp. 2–3 (for details, see below).

238 Vol. 2, p. 517.

239 For more details on this distinction and the Eighth Karmapa's approach to *rangtong* and *shentong*, see below under "Some remarks on the distinct commentarial approaches of JNS and CE."

240 Tib. dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba.

241 Pp. 1108–9.

242 Pp. 96–97 and 123.

243 Tib. pad ma dkar po.

244 Vol. 1, pp. 362–63 and 449–53 (some of these passages are included in the above section on the transmission of the prajñāpāramitā literature from India to Tibet).

245 Tib. 'jam mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas.

246 As is well known, this author belongs to both the Kagyü and Nyingma lineages. That his presentation is included in my two volumes on the Kagyü commentaries on the AA is due to reasons of space.

247 Tib. 'jam dbyangs chos kyi blo gros.

248 Jackson and Onoda 1988, p. I.

249 Hopkins 1992 (p. 256) mentions that there is at least one Gelugpa text on grounds and paths—by the Mongolian Geshé Blo bzang rta mgrin (1867–1937)—written from a *Prāsaṅgika perspective. There is also a short text by Mkhas grub rje dge legs dpal bzang (1385–1438) on how to comment on the final view of the AA as being *Prāsaṅgika (Tōhoku 5460).

250 The three natures appear in the *Ālokā* (for example, p. 594; and D3791, fols. 207a.6–207b.1; 208b.6–7; 220a.5–220b.2; 300a.2–3). The term "(fundamental) change of state" appears in both the *Ālokā* and the *Vivṛti* (for example: D3791, fols. 317b.1 and 317b.7–318a.1; D3793, fols. 131a.1 and 132a.4). The four wisdoms appear in the *Ālokā* (for example, p. 82; D3791, fol. 50b.1). Also, the *Ālokā* (p. 84) describes the four practices of armor, engagement, equipments, and final deliverance (the last four of the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects) explicitly as presented by Asaṅga. The *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 124a.6) quotes *Madhyāntavibhāga* V.19ab on what the nature of enlightenment is. In addition, as Inagaki 1977 points out, the *Ālokā* also uses lengthy passages (almost literally) from Jñānagarbha's *Anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇīṭīkā* (D2696) in explaining important terms. However, as per Gelugpa and certain other Tibetan doxographies, Jñānagarbha is not considered as a *Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, but, just as Bhāvaviveka, as a *Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. However, as far as Jñānagarbha's writings go, it is hard to find support for classifying him as the latter, while there is clear evidence to identify him as a *Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (if one wants to use these categories at all, that is). For example, his *Satyadvayavibhāga* distinguishes and defines the

correct and false seeming in precisely the same way as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla—even identifying the correct seeming with the classical Yogācāra term "false imagination"—and his *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtrabhāṣya* explicitly presents the provisional existence of the phenomena of seeming reality as being based on the ālaya-consciousness.

251 In the *Ālokā*, this verse from the *Vyākhyāyukti* (D4061, fol. 30b.3) appears on p. 15.23. For the verse in full and how it relates to the AA, see CE below (2.2. The purpose and the connection).

252 D3791, fols. 177b.2–3, 220a.2, 310a.7–310b.1, and 312a.3–4.

253 D3792, fols. 66b.7–67a.1.

254 Ed. Vaidya, p. 3.18 (D12, fol. 3a.3).

255 Pp. 38–39.

256 D3791, fol. 204b.3–5.

257 Pp. 96–97 and 123.

258 JNS, vol. 1, p. 8.

259 Tib. dbu ma rnam brdzun pa (p. 354). See Appendix I1H2bb1.

260 Ibid., p. 180.

261 Tib. mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa. This is usually rendered by Western scholars into Sanskrit as *Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, but a more literal retrotranslation is the above (the same goes for the term *Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika). Thus, unlike the later Tibetan, and now commonly used, specific subdivision of the *Svātantrika-Mādhyamika subschool into *Sautrāntika-Svātantrika and Yogācāra-Svātantrika, which are strictly associated with the tenets of certain Indian schools, the earlier general Madhyamaka division into *Sūtrāntācāra-Madhyamaka (or *Sūtra-Madhyamaka) versus *Yogācāra-Madhyamaka is not necessarily or exclusively so associated. For an overview of the ways in which Madhyamaka is divided by different Indian and Tibetan authors, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 333–41. Being one-sidedly focused on the later and more narrow Tibetan doxographical subdivision of the *Svātantrika School, both the more literal retrotranslation of *mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma* and the broader scope of the above earlier and more general distinction seem to be neglected by many modern scholars.

262 In this respect, it is noteworthy that these two texts (and others) present the topic of paths and bhūmis in a much more linear and systematic way than the AA.

263 Moreover, the commentaries by Haribhadra and the two Vimuktisenas give the same hermeneutical etymology for *gotra* as the *Bhāṣya* on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.4—it being that from which (virtuous) qualities arise and increase. Also, Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's statements about the unconditioned dharmadhātu or dharmatā only being a "cause" in terms of its serving as the focal object of the practices that result in the supramundane qualities of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas correspond closely to certain passages in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (for details, see the notes in CE on the disposition).

264 Pp. 98–99 and 169–70.

265 For example, verse VIII.8 is almost identical to *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.13 (which is a quote of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.46), and VIII.7 closely resembles *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.12 (which corresponds to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.45 and its commentary by Vasubandhu; ed. Levi, p. 184). Also Asvabhāva's commentary on *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.12 (D4051, fol. 282b.1–5) suggests a common ground with VIII.7. Verses VIII.9–10 have parallels in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.16 and IX.34 as well as in *Uttaratantra* IV.42–52.

Verse VIII.11 compares with *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.15,17, 20, and 60, as well as with *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.3.4. Furthermore, verse I.17 closely matches *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.59–60. The list of the twenty-one sets of uncontaminated qualities of the dharmakāya is found in virtually the same way in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.43–61 and its commentaries, Chapter Ten of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the Pratiṣṭhā Chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the seventh chapter of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

266 There are Mādhyamikas who sometimes speak of three kāyas, such as Bhāvaviveka in his *Tarkajvālā* and Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*. The latter is interestingly based on Candrakīrti's reading of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, which in itself is a central text for the detailed Yogācāra presentations of buddhahood and the three kāyās. However, since Mādhyamikas simply do not have (or bother about) any "buddhology" of their own, this just means that they—somewhat ironically in light of their critiques of Yogācāra otherwise—resort to the typical Yogācāra explanations on this topic.

267 D3787, fol. 199b.1–6.

268 P5552, fol. 345a.3–7. Since both Āryavimuktisena and Asvabhāva lived around the same time, it is hard to determine who copied whom, but it is also possible that they both relied on some earlier common Yogācāra source.

269 These are found in both the Pāli canon and the *Abhidharmakośa*.

270 Also, many Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the AA (such as Haribhadra's *Ālokā*) frequently quote Vasubhandu's *Abhidharmakośa* in these and other respects. For details and references to the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, see the pertinent notes in CE and JNS.

271 The prajñāpāramitā sūtras only speak of the dharmakāya and the rūpakāya. Note that the Sanskrit grammatical forms svābhāvikakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya (as opposed to svabhāvakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya) are quite standard. They are not only used in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and its commentaries, but also in many sūtras and most Yogācāra texts, such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Uttaratantra*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, their commentaries, and so on. These grammatical forms indicate that the other kāyas are related to the dharmakāya as its features or aspects and are not three separate entities on their own. Thus, in terms of its nature, the dharmakāya is referred to as svābhāvikakāya (this is why these two are usually said to be equivalent); in terms of its bringing the enjoyment of the mahāyāna dharma to bodhisattvas, it is the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting in all kinds of forms for all kinds of beings, it is the nairmāṇikakāya. See also Makransky 1997 (esp. pp. 54–60) as well as CE on AA I.17 and its chapter on the dharmakāya.

272 The only rather extensive Indian Madhyamaka text on meditation is Kamalaśīla's three-volume *Bhāvanākrama*, but it is well-known that he greatly relied on Yogācāra ideas too.

273 Śākya mchog ldan 1988c, pp. 40ff.

274 Lit. "proponents of the lack of a nature." This is another term for the Mādhyamikas.

275 Tib. ldog pa gzhan sel gyi cha. An "elimination-of-other" is a conceptual phenomenon arrived at through excluding everything it is not.

276 This accords with Śākya Chogden's repeated statements that the *Rangtong* view is the best for cutting through all reference points, while the *Shentong* view is more helpful for describing and facilitating meditative experience and realization.

277 Śākya mchog ldan 1988b, pp. 13–15.

278 Śākya mchog ldan 1975, pp. 225–27.

279 In Śākya Chogden's system, "Mere Mentalists" specifically refer to the Real Aspectarians alone, while he considers the False Aspectarians (such as Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and almost all other Yogācāra masters) as fully qualified Mādhyamikas on an equal footing with Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka. Śākya Chogden does not identify any particular persons as Real Aspectarians, but says that, for the sake of different disciples and as a progressive approach, both the positions of Real Aspectarians and False Aspectarians are taught in the texts of the above Yogācāra masters. However, the latter position is their definitive meaning.

280 Śākya mchog ldan 1975, p. 223. Śākya Chogden adds here that, according to Ngog Lotsāwa, Śāntarakṣita and his followers explain the intention of Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika* as follows. The manner of cutting through superimpositions consists of *Rangtong* reasonings (such as being free from unity and multiplicity), while what is to be made a living experience is explained in the manner of *Shentong*.

281 *Nges don rgya mtsho sprin gyi 'brug sgra zab mo'i rgyas 'grel bdud rtsi'i char 'bebs* (Śākya mchog ldan 1988a, vol. kha, pp. 399–400).

282 Fols. 38b.6–39a.5. The "lineages of profound view and vast activity" represents one of the standard Tibetan subdivisions of the entire sūtra teachings of the mahāyāna—the former starting with Mañjuśrī (continued by Nāgārjuna and his followers) and the latter starting with Maitreya (continued by Asaṅga and his followers). In India and in Western scholarship, these are simply known as the traditions of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, respectively. Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā* (P5194, pp. 65.2.8–66.3.2) also speaks of "profound" and "vast," but only with respect to the contents of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, saying, "Their core topic, which is taught in the profound sūtras or in a clear way, is explained by noble Nāgārjuna in his *Mūlamadhyamaka[kārikā]prajñā[nāma]* and so on . . . [The passages of these sūtras] in which the topic of clear realization is taught are endowed with great vastness and profundity . . . this topic was explained by noble Maitreya . . ."

283 Tib. sangs rgyas mnyan pa bkra shis dpal 'byor. The Sangyé Nyenpa tulkus are regarded as great siddhas and incarnations of the Indian paṇḍita Smṛtijñānakīrti (eleventh century), who stayed in Tibet for many years as a teacher and translator, being instrumental in initiating the later spread of the dharma there.

284 Literally, the Tibetan says *sems tsam* ("Mere Mentalism"), which is ever so often used in Tibetan texts to refer to the Yogācāra School in general or a specific part of it. What is meant in this context is clearly the classical Yogācāra system as presented by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, and not "Mere Mentalism" in its somewhat pejorative sense as what is refuted and subordinated to Madhyamaka in the default Tibetan doxographical hierarchies.

285 Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, p. 40.

286 As will be seen right below, the *Svātantrikas are not presented as in other, mainly Gelugpa, doxograpies as being by default inferior to the *Prāsaṅgikas in many respects.

287 XIII.7. As CE and JNS explain later, in terms of the three turnings of the wheel of dharma (as well as in terms of progressive full realization), Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva (*Catuḥśataka* VIII.15) speak of "(a) first teaching identity, (b) teaching identitylessness in the middle, and (c) finally putting an end to all views." Thus, the above first and second stages correspond to (b) and (c). According to most Tibetan doxographies, only the *Prāsaṅgikas accomplish (c), while the *Svātantrikas only accomplish (b). However, as the above shows, the Eighth Karmapa obviously regards also (c) as a *Svātantrika domain (his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* elaborates at length on *Prāsaṅgikas and *Svātantrikas sharing the same realization and only differing in the methods to convey this realization to others).

288 Lines 9cd. Verses 9–11 in full are very clear on this:

Since the negation of arising and so on
Concords with actuality, we accept it.
Since there is nothing to be negated,
It is clear that, actually, there is no negation.
How should the negation of an imputation's
Own nature not be an imputation?
Hence, seemingly, this is
The meaning of actuality, but not actuality [itself].
In actuality, neither exists.
This is the lack of reference points—
Mañjuśrī asked about actuality,
And [Vimalakīrti,] the son of the victors, remained silent.

Again, in standard Tibetan doxographies, this stance would be considered as a feature of the *Prāsaṅgika approach.

289 JNS, pp. 22–26.

290 For more details on the Eighth Karmapa's approach to *rangtong* and *shentong*, see below under "Some remarks on the distinct commentarial approaches of JNS and CE."

291 Gzhan phan chos kyi snang ba 1987, pp. 71.6–74.6.

292 MPZL, pp. 2–3.

293 Interestingly, Ngog Lotsāwa's commentary on the *Uttaratantra* (Rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab 1993b, fols. 1b.2–2a.1) says that only the *Uttaratantra* explains the true reality of the meaning of the mahāyāna—the intention of the sūtras of definitive meaning (the irreversible dharma wheel), which teach the dharmadhātu as the single principle. The other four Maitreya works, through explaining the meanings of the sūtras of expedient meaning, make beings into suitable vessels for this perfect dharma because they present seeming reality as well as the ultimate that is based on the thinking of others.

294 Buswell 1997, p. 608.

295 Lopez 1992, pp. 153–55.

296 'Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal 1996, p. 1074.

297 Hopkins 1992, pp. 228–29.

298 R. Sharf, "Buddhist Modernism and the Rhethoric of Meditative Experience," *Numen* 42 (1995): 238.

299 This seems to be a bit of an overstatement because the only verses among the sixty-three of this fourth chapter that actually speak about practice are IV.35–37 and IV.62–63. All others just include lists of the 173 aspects of the three knowledges, various defining characteristics, various sets of the signs of irreversibility on different paths, and so on.

300 Note that, in pre-Christian Greek etymology, *soter* means "healer"—which matches well with the frequent description of the Buddha as the great physician for mental afflictions.

301 K. Burke, *A Rhethoric of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), 22–23.

302 Discrepancies exist both within a single tradition and between competing traditions. For example, the descriptions of the attainments of absorptions as given by Asaṅga, whose views are adopted by Tibetans, and those given by Buddhaghoṣa differ greatly, so that one cannot help but wonder sometimes whether they are speaking about the same topic at all. Also, there are long-running controversies within Buddhist schools concerning the identification of actual realizations.

303 Dreyfus 2003, pp. 174–82.

304 Dreyfus 1997, p. 58.

305 Verses 1–2 (here, my translation exclusively follows the Sanskrit).

306 Pp. 3–4.

307 Also Potter 1999 (p. 478) agrees: "The purpose of this work is to explain the way to the knowledge of all aspects."

308 Pp. 4–5.

309 Gzhan phan chos kyi snang ba 1987, p. 74.5–6.

310 Klein 1992, p. 298.

311 Ibid., p. 298.

312 Forman 1989, p. 393.

313 Ibid., p. 412.

314 Paramārtha (499–569) was among the foremost Indian Yogācāra masters who were active in China, translating and teaching extensively.

315 Ibid. pp. 412–14.

316 Mano's (1972) study of the *Abhisamayālaṃkārā* is in Japanese. Lopez (1988a) translated several commentaries on the *Heart Sūtra*. Naughton (1989) offered a translation of the first seven chapters of the *Vivṛti* (which, in his own words, is "tentative at best, and inconsistent at times," with "some passages that are wildly inaccurate"). Sparham (2006, 2008a–c, 2009, and 2010) has so far translated the chapters of Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti*, Haribhadra's *Ālokā*, and LSSP that discuss the first four topics of the AA. Zacchetti (2005) did a study on the different versions of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*. Prior to the present two volumes, the only published translation of an entire word-commentary on the AA consisted of the sections of JNS that directly explain the verses of the AA (Brunnhölzl 2001). Sparham 1987 (p. 156) also informs us about two unpublished manuscripts by J. Hopkins—the one being called "The Seventy Topics" (a translation of *Mi pham bla ma'i zhal lung* with a transcription of an oral explanation; together with Denma Lochö Rinpoche and L. Zahler) and the other being called "Achieving Through Armor" (a translation of the section on armorlike practice in Bsod nams grags pa's *Phar phyin spyi don*; together with Guy Newland). Furthermore, there is a draft translation of the *Vivṛti* by Geshe Jampa Gyatso, Acharya Thubten Jampa, and Thubten Tsultrim (Istituto Lama Tzong Khapa, Pomaia, Italy, 1998–1999).

317 CZ, p. x.

318 As quoted in Suzuki 1968, p. 9.

319 "The Modern West in the History of Religion," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52, no. 1 (1983), p. 9.

320 Suzuki 1968, p. 16.

321 Ibid., p. 55.

322 In addition, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche has stated repeatedly that, usually, only the first three chapters of the text are studied in great detail since they contain the main points, many of which are more or less repeated in the following chapters.

323 Hopkins 1992, pp. 255–56.

324 Cited in Fann 1969, p. 103, n. 4.

325 Lopez 1992, p. 181.

326 Buswell and Gimello 1992, p. 29.

327 V.21.

328 Hopkins 1992, pp. 251 and 253.

329 Conze 1960a, pp. 14–15 and 105–6.

330 Makransky 1997, pp. 277–78.

331 There are attempts in the commentarial and supplementary literature on the AA to present the paths and bhūmis as linear progressions. However, though not necessarily from a more theoretical pedagogic point of view, from the practical point of view as described above, such attempts seem to somehow miss the point.

332 The example refers to the famous French painter Monet having mispainted the church Notre Dame in Paris—because he expected them to be so, he substituted Gothic (pointed) arches for the rounded ones that Notre Dame actually has.

333 Forman 1989, pp. 410–12.

334 Conze 1973, p. xix.

335 Brunnhölzl 2007b, pp. 173–85.

336 P. 490.

337 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, pp. 1236–37.

338 Zilung Paṇchen is another name of Śākya Chogden.

339 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, p. 1240.

340 Brunnhölzl 2004. In addition there is a translation by T. Dewar (2008; see Bibliography) of the Ninth Karmapa, Wangchug Dorje's (Tib. dbang phyug rdo rje; 1556–1603) commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, which largely consists of excerpts from Mikyö Dorje's commentary on this text.

341 Four further examples of Western scholars making unfounded statements about Mikyö Dorje (which betray their obviously not having read his relevant texts and/or just making untenable generalizations) include (1) the statement on A. Berzin's website under "The Five Pathway Minds (Five Paths): Advanced Presentation" that "the Eighth Karmapa's commentaries agree with Gelug that Maitreya's explanation of the paths, particularly concerning the sets of obscuration and when they are removed, refers only to Svātantrika, and not to Prāsaṅgika." Not only is such nowhere to be found in JNS or elsewhere in Mikyö Dorje's writings, but, as can be seen in Appendices I1D and I1H3, as well as I4B and I5A in Volume Two, JNS's presentation of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations is obviously quite different from those of Tsongkhapa and other Gelugpas. (2) In an oral communication, G. Dreyfus held that, in Tibet, there are only three types of Madhyamaka besides Mipham Rinpoche's—*Shentong*, Gorampa, and Tsongkhapa. As is made clear by Brunnhölzl 2004 and Dewar 2008, Mikyö Dorje's Madhyamaka view does not fit into any of these categories. (3) Ruegg (1988, p. 1272) says that the Eighth Karmapa's *Lamp That Excellently Elucidates the System of the Proponents of Shentong Madhyamaka* (see Bibliography) "also quotes Candrakīrti (perhaps trying to bridge the *gžan stoṅ* and the *raṅ stoṅ* of Candrakīrti." However, the Karmapa's text never quotes Candrakīrti, nor makes any attempt to reconcile his view with *Shentong* or Great Madhyamaka, but, on the contrary, strongly and repeatedly rejects his approach (for details, see below). (4) Cabezón (in Cabezón and Dargyay 2007, p. 30) says that Sera Jetsün's polemical text *Kar lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan* is directed against Mikyö Dorje's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* instead of this text actually

attacking JNS. Though there is no room here to go into the highly complex details of the issues at stake, Sera Jetsün's text often misrepresents and/or oversimplifies JNS's explanations, while his "refutations" are limited only to default buzzwords and do not take into account the Karmapa's frequent and explicit emphasis that, at times, he moves to another level of discourse altogether (as described above in terms of distinguishing between a conceptual "philosophical system" and a wider outlook from the perspective of direct realization in meditative equipoise). Three examples of this shall suffice here. First, solely on the basis of quoting verses 30 and 43–44 of the *Dharmadhātustava*, Sera Jetsün concludes that all the texts in Nāgārjuna's collection of praises fully accord with his collection of reasoning and the Madhyamaka system in general, which means that the ultimate basic nature is nothing but all phenomena's lack of a nature and that consequently emptiness must be a nonimplicative negation. Also, nondual wisdom is therefore said to not exist ultimately. Let alone that such categorical statements about the above two collections of texts by Nāgārjuna and about emptiness being nothing but a nonimplicative negation are hardly justifiable from those texts, Sera Jetsün's approach simply disregards the *Dharmadhātustava's* many verses that explicitly suggest wisdom's ultimate existence and speak of several examples for the luminous nature of mind existing unaffected within the obscurations. Secondly, lines 1cd of the *Dharmadhātustava* are given as the only "scriptural proof" for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realizing emptiness. The same two lines moreover are claimed as teaching that nondual wisdom is not the ultimate basic nature. Thirdly, the same text's verses 20–21 are given as scriptural support for the existence of wisdom and luminosity on the buddhabhūmi (contrary to Sera Jetsün's claim and as is more than evident in many places in JNS, this is not something that the Karmapa denies in the first place, on the contrary). At the same time, as stated above, Sera Jetsün denies that nondual wisdom exists ultimately, which of course begs the question of how it may possibly exist then on the buddhabhūmi. Of course, the standard Gelugpa answer here is that wisdom is a part of seeming reality, the only ultimate existent being emptiness. However, this obviously entails a number of problems, such as how a part of seeming reality could exist on the buddhabhūmi (given that it is naturally equivalent to ultimate reality), or how a buddha's wisdom as a perceiving subject that belongs to seeming reality could ever realize any ultimate reality, such as emptiness.

342 According to Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, this text was probably written even before JNS (a publication of my translation of it is planned).

343 For details, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 445–57. On the question of whether Mikyö Dorje changed his view from his early approach in JNS to the one in his late commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche says that he did so a bit—the former represents mainly the position of the Seventh Karmapa (the systems of Nāgārjuna and Maitreya/Asaṅga sharing the same final intent), but still accords very much with Madhyamaka, while the latter is strictly and exclusively Madhyamaka as per Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti (as mentioned before, JNS also explains a lot of Yogācāra materials, while the latter commentary is pure classical Madhyamaka). Also, the Eighth Karmapa was always greatly fond of Madhyamaka and his final view is definitely the Madhyamaka as taught by Nāgārjuna and the mahāsiddha Saraha.

344 Kapstein 2000a, p. 122.

345 "Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?," in Dreyfus and McClintock 2003, p. 71.

346 Note, however, that the mainstream of the Tibetan scholastic tradition is not pluralistic in nature, but usually strongly oriented toward "*the* correct or highest view" (whichever politically correct position that may be in a given school) and tends to harmonize all other Buddhist views and philosophical systems with that view. Thus, there is often either passive silence about deviating or alternative opinions and writings or even active suppression (as evidenced by the centuries of, for example, banning the entire Jonang tradition and Śākya Chogden's writings, who came to be hardly studied even in his own Sakya School).

347 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, p. 1254.

348 All italics in this and the following excerpts from JNS are by me.

349 Ed. Vaidya, p. 3.18 (D12, fol. 3a.3).

350 Pp. 311–12 (Appendix I1G1).

351 Pp. 418–19 (Appendix I1E3).

352 See also below on the other-dependent nature being just the compound of the perfect nature (the actual basis of emptiness) and the imaginary nature (the illusory features within it), as illustrated by the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*'s example of gold ore.

353 Pp. 313–14 (Appendix I1G1).

354 JNS has *shes pa*, as does the Tibetan of the following quote from the *Ālokā*. The Sanskrit of this quote consistently has *jñāna* (which can mean knowledge, consciousness, or wisdom).

355 This refers to the emptiness of emptiness.

356 *Ālokā*, p. 95 (JNS has a greatly abbreviated/truncated version of this). Later, the *Ālokā* (p. 97) explicitly equates nonconceptual wisdom and emptiness, saying, "The nonconceptual mind discussed in this section of the sūtras through the discussion of emptiness is one in nature with the emptiness that it has as its focal object and realizes because emptiness—the nature of all phenomena—is its focal object."

357 *Vṛtti*, pp. 96–97; D3787, fol. 72b.6.

358 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.3–4. Note that the entire paragraph that precedes this quote is an extended paraphrase of a passage in the *Ālokā* (p. 97), which also uses this quote and elaborates on it as follows. Devadatta stands for the lack of any being or entity (*abhāva*), the extreme of denial. A real nature or own-being (*svabhāva*), the extreme of superimposition, is symbolized by Yajñadatta. When Yajñadatta—the killer of Devadatta—has been killed by his own emptiness, Devadatta will not reappear.

359 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.4.

360 Pp. 321–27 (Appendix I1G2).

361 Pp. 184–85 (Appendix I4F1).

362 Pp. 490–91.

363 Pp. 332–33 (Appendix I1G4).

364 This is another name of the first bhūmi or what is realized on it.

365 Pp. 334–35 (Appendix I1G5). The last line exhibits an intriguing ambiguity, matching the above remarks about the other-empty as a conceptual object versus what is directly realized. It means either that the Karmapa explained Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's position as it corresponds to the Yogācāra system or it could also be read as "While (I was) dwelling in the practice of yoga," thus suggesting that the Karmapa wrote this based on his direct experience and realization within meditative equipoise.

366 P. 573.

367 Vol. 2, pp. 300–301 (Appendix I5D3d).

368 Vol. 2, pp. 304–5 (Appendix I1G6).

369 Ruegg 2000, pp. 80–81.

370 Vol. 2, p. 294 (Appendix I5D2da).

371 P. 333 (Appendix I1G4).

372 Pp. 312–13 (Appendix I1G1).

373 P. 8. As mentioned above, CE says that Asaṅga/Vasubandhu and Haribhadra comment on the AA from the perspective of *Shentong* Madhyamaka and Great Madhyamaka, respectively.

374 Vol. 2, p. 307.

375 Note that this differs from Dölpopa's list of Great Mādhyamikas, which explicitly excludes Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, but includes other Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti (for details, see below). Mikyö Dorje's *Lamp That Excellently Elucidates the System of the Proponents of Shentong Madhyamaka* repeatedly calls Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu Great Mādhyamikas, while it states very clearly that Candrakīrti is not one. For example, the text says (pp. 22–23) that "Candrakīrti, Haribhadra, and so on assert the ultimate basic nature as being the nonfinding of the dharmadhātu by ordinary beings through examining with the [Madhyamaka] reasoning that negates an arising of existents and nonexistents." This is then contrasted with the position of the Great Mādhyamikas Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Also, this text (p. 24) states that "Candrakīrti and others identify the [fact that] the nature of phenomena is not seen by the ultimate nature of phenomena as 'seeing ultimate reality.' However, let alone speaking of this as the ultimate, they would have to accept many contradictions in their own systems even [in terms of] words [on the level] of seeming [reality]. Therefore, in order to eliminate this flaw, they say, 'We Mādhyamikas have no assertion whatsoever.'" In addition (pp. 43–44), the position of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realizing phenomenal identitylessness and emptiness, which is held by Candrakīrti and others, is strongly rejected.

376 In this context, Mikyö Dorje explicitly mentions Candrakīrti (vol. 2, p. 306) as such a Niḥsvabhāvavādin, but equally explicitly excludes Śāntideva (whom he calls a "Mādhyamika of the model texts") by quoting *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.35–37 in support of the dharmadhātu being a permanent functioning entity (vol. 2, pp. 194–95).

377 Vol. 2, p. 443.

378 For example, p. 325 and vol. 2, p. 300.

379 P. 354. Note that Mikyö Dorje refutes the notion of "False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas" at length in his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (for details, see Appendix I1H2bb1).

380 Vol. 2, pp. 291–92.

381 Vol. 2, p. 294.

382 For more details, see the endnote on this passage in Appendix I5D2d in Volume Two.

383 Vol. 2, pp. 294–97.

384 Vol. 2, p. 283 (Appendix I5D1).

385 Vol. 2, p. 298.

386 Vol. 2, pp. 206–7.

387 Vol. 2, pp. 395–96 (Appendix I1C2).

388 Vol. 2, pp. 306–7 (Appendix I1G6).

389 In the standard Tibetan doxographies, from among the last three sentences, the first two represent the position of the Vaibhāṣikas on the two realities, while the third one is said to be the position of the Sautrāntikas. As for the former, seeming reality means that if coarse phenomena (such as a cup or a mental continuum) are either destroyed physically or broken down mentally, due to the resultant lack of these phenomena the mental states that perceived them operate no

longer either. By contrast, ultimately real phenomena (minutest material particles and moments of mind) cannot be destroyed physically or broken down mentally, so the perceiving mind keeps engaging them.

390 Pp. 181–83 (Appendix I1C1).

391 This obviously refers to one of the standard Tibetan subdivisions of the sūtra teachings of the mahāyāna—the lineages of vast activity and the profound view.

392 Vol. 2, p. 443 (Appendix 8A3b).

393 Pp. 485–86 and 488–89.

394 Pp. 572–74.

395 Vol. 2, p. 235.

396 Vol. 2, p. 271.

397 Vol. 2, p. 423.

398 Verses 76 and 7.

399 P. 523 (Appendix I2E5).

400 Vol. 2, p. 193 (Appendix I4F2).

401 Vol. 2, pp. 415–16 (Appendix I7).

402 Conze 1973, p. 84.

403 P4532, fols. 43b.5–6; 45b.8–46a.3. The text has further similar passages (for example, fol. 47b.5–6) and repeats several times that another name of mother Prajñāpāramitā is Mahāmudrā (fols. 51a.8, 57b.3, 59b.4, and 65a.3). It also equates emptiness with Mahāmudrā.

404 For details on these, see the beginning of Appendix I1D.

405 P1350; as quoted in Khro ru mkhan po tshe rnam's *Dpal mnyam med mar pa bka' brgyud kyi grub pa'i mtha rnam par nges par byed pa mdor bsdus su brjod pa dvags brgyud grub pa'i me long* (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1989), p. 236.

406 Fol. 176a.5.

407 Maitrīpa's *Sekanirdeśa*, verse 36.

408 Fol. 190a.5–7.

409 This term indicates that emptiness is not just some blank state of nothingness, but entails many qualities. In the sūtra system, "the supreme aspects" are usually explained as the six pāramitās. In general, the term may also be explained as the inseparable union of appearance and emptiness. In the vajrayāna, in accordance with the four empowerments, it is said to be the union of appearance and emptiness, luminosity and emptiness, bliss and emptiness, and awareness and emptiness. Thus, emptiness is naturally endowed with the aspects of appearance, luminosity, bliss, and awareness.

410 Fol. 189a.2–4.

411 Fol. 192a.8–192b.1. There are several more passages in Sahajavajra's text that speak about the connections between prajñāpāramitā, emptiness, Madhyamaka, and Mahāmudrā (for a translation of the entire text, see Brunnhölzl 2007a, pp. 141–90).

412 Tib. lus kyis mchod sbyin gyi zin bris mdor bsdus kun dga'i skyed tshal, fol. 1b (a commentary on Karma Chagmé's *rgyun khyer gyi lus sbyin bsdus pa*).

413 Tib. sngags kyi rig pa brtul [zhugs] spyod pa.

414 For detailed accounts of Machig Labdrön's "Cutting Through," see Édou 1996 and Harding 2003.

415 Tib. 'gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal. He was a translator and scholar who studied with many different masters from all schools of Tibetan Buddhism. His *Blue Annals* (Tib. deb ther sngon po) is one of the standard historical works in Tibet.

416 'Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal 2003a, vol. 2, p. 847 (English transl. 1996, p. 725).

417 Ibid., pp. 847–48 (misrepresented as a quote in slightly different form on p. 725 in the English transl.); see also TOK, vol. 3, p. 381. The same author's commentary on the *Uttaratantra* repeats this very same statement several times, relating it to both Sahajavajra ('Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal 2003b, pp. 17.7–9 and 137.15–23) and the Indian siddha Padampa Sangyé's (d. 1117) instructions on "the Pacification of Suffering" (ibid., pp. 5.18–9 and 53.2–4).

418 'Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal 2003a, vol. 2, p. 848.

419 Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, pp. 7ff.

420 Tib. rgod tshang pa mgon po rdo rje; a major early Drugba Kagyü master.

421 For details, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 47–68.

422 Obviously, JNS alludes here to the Tibetan stereotype of the Ch'an master Hvashang Mahāyāna from Tun-huang, who is said to have advocated an exclusive cultivation of a thought-free mental state—as representing the realization of the ultimate—along with a complete rejection of the aspect of means, such as the accumulation of merit and proper ethical conduct. For more details, see the endnote on this in Appendix I6 in Volume Two.

423 Vol. 2, p. 412 (Appendix I6).

424 For more details on Maitrīpa's Mahāmudrā approach, see Brunnhölzl 2007a, pp. 125–41.

425 Vol. 3, p. 375.

426 Lines 48–51.

427 Vol. 3, pp. 376–78.

428 There is no text with this name by Atiśa, but the following quote of a passage of caution from Mikyö Dorje refers to Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* in this sense of Mahāmudrā in the pāramitā system primarily consisting of the Kadampa instructions.

429 Vol. 3, pp. 378–79. TOK has an abbreviated paraphrase of the passage by Mikyö Dorje, which is rendered here in full from his *Gdams khrid man ngag gi rim pa 'chi med bdud rtsi'i ljon bzang* (Delhi: Khetsun Sangpo, 1976, fol. 279a.2–5).

430 Ibid., p. 381. Similar to the above cautioning by the Eighth Karmapa, his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, pp. 38ff.) warns against a simplistic understanding of Gampopa's Mahāmudrā approach, stressing that it—according to the above three characteristics of Maitrīpa's and Sahajavajra's Mahāmudrā—does entail essential vajrayāna elements, such as pointing out instructions: "Some confused . . . later followers of the Tagpo Kagyü say, 'Even without relying on the mantra[yāna's approach], Lord Gampopa has nakedly pointed out to beginners the wisdom of Mahāmudrā in the nondual wisdom that is solely directed inward, thus manifesting ordinary or primordial mind.' There is no way that Lord Gampopa held such an approach even in his dreams."

431 Ibid., pp. 382–83.

432 For details, see H. H. Dalai Lama 1997 and R. Jackson 2001.

433 Tib. gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me.

434 Translation by Lopez (in Lopez 1988a, pp. 178–79).

435 Tib. nges shes sgron me.

436 The three natures are also often called "the three characteristics."

437 P. 577.

438 Vol. 2, p. 124.

439 Vol. 2, p. 462.

440 Vol. 2, p. 391. Elsewhere, JNS glosses "the supreme other" as "other-emptiness," thus being equivalent to ultimate reality, the sugata heart, and so on.

441 Vol. 2, p. 442.

442 P. 579.

443 As is made clear in Appendix I1E1 on the disposition by way of the example of milk and water being mixed, this does of course not mean that nondual wisdom is a part of the ālaya-consciousness.

444 JNS has "is not empty," but given the context and JNS's statements of "nondual wisdom being beyond dependent origination" (Appendix I1G6), the negative has been omitted here.

445 Pp. 579–80.

446 Note that this correlates well with the example of gold ore that *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.29 (P5549, fol. 22a.8–22b.6) gives for the three natures: "The existence of the imaginary nature in the other-dependent nature is that which is included in the set of what is afflicted. The existence of the perfect nature in the other-dependent nature is that which is included in the set of what is purified. The other-dependent nature is that which is included in both . . . In the case of a gold-bearing lump of soil, three [aspects] can be observed—the earth element, the lump of soil, and gold. [First, only] the lump of soil, which [actually] does not exist [as such] in the earth element, is seen, while the gold, which does exist, is not seen. Once [the lump of soil] is heated in a fire, it does not appear like that, but the gold appears. The earth element appearing as a lump of soil is a false appearance. When appearing as gold, it appears just as it is. Therefore, the earth element is included in both parts. Likewise, through cognizance being untouched by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, this cognizance appears as what is false (the imaginary nature), but not as true reality (the perfect nature). Once cognizance has been touched by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, this cognizance appears as true reality (the perfect nature), but does not appear as what is false (the imaginary nature). Thus, the cognizance that is false imagination—the other-dependent nature—is included in both aspects, just as the earth element is in a gold-bearing lump of soil." According to Asvabhāva's commentary (P5552, fol. 284a.2–4), the earth element refers to the elemental principle of earth (defined as the general qualities of being hard and solid), with both the lump of soil and gold containing this elemental principle of being hard and solid. For more details, see endnote 1729.

447 Pp. 580–81.

448 Pp. 235–36.

449 The classical description of the relationship between the three natures in Indian Yogācāra texts is that (1) the perfect nature consists of the other-dependent nature being empty of the imaginary nature, whereas the Tibetan followers of *Shentong* usually say that (2) the perfect nature is empty of both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. However, there are at least four Indian texts that explicitly and repeatedly state model (2) and also describe the perfect nature as the ultimately existent remainder of the equally nonexistent imaginary and other-dependent natures. These are Vasubandhu's *Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśa-*

sāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā (D3808, fols. 55a.1–2, 62b.6–63a.4, 92b.6–7, 98a.7–98b.5, and 286b.3–6), Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya* (D4064, fols. 168a.4–6), Vinītadeva's *Triṃśikāṭīkā* (D4070, fols. 53a.2, 53a.5–7, and 53b.1), and Jagaddalanivāsin's *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* (fols. 21b.4–5, 22a.6–7, 24a.7–24b.2, 28a.3–4, 30a.2–3, 47b.2–3, 56a.4–5, 140a.2, 147a.5, 156a.7–156b.2, 167b.1–3, 194b.1–2, 200b.1–2, 205a.3–4, 209a.5–7, 212b.5–213a.1, 214a.6–214b.7, 231b.7–232b.1, 254a.6–7, 284b.4–7, 301b.5–302a.1, and 307a.3–307b.2). The latter text (fol. 57a.1–3) also identifies the perfect nature with "the nature of the lack of entity" and says that "the term 'lack of entity' refers to the emptiness that is free from what is other (**pararahitaśūnyatā*), which refers to the nature of entities." Thus, there are clearly Indian precursors of model (2). As for both models (1) and (2) coming down to the same meaning due to the dual status of the other-dependent nature (as also highlighted just above by JNS, pp. 580–81), see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 485–86.

450 Pp. 332–33 (Appendix I1G4).

451 P. 185 (Appendix I4F1).

452 Vol. 2, p. 395 (Appendix I1C2bb2).

453 P. 387.

454 Fol. 76a–b.

455 Fol. 35a.

456 Pp. 185–86 (Appendix I4F1).

457 Note that the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J8.11–12) explicitly affirms activity arising from unconditioned buddhahood: "From tathāgatahood, even though it is unconditioned and has the characteristic of being inactive, all activities of the perfect buddhas operate without effort in an unimpeded and uninterrupted manner until the end of saṃsāra." The same text also equates the uncontaminated dhātu with *tathāgatagarbha* and the natural disposition (for example, J55.10). Yamabe 1997 (endnote 32) also mentions "the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (Taishō 31.581c5–8), which states that all the actions of the buddhas arise on the basis of the **asaṃskṛta-dharmakāya*."

458 Vol. 2, pp. 193–96 (Appendix I4F2).

459 Vol. 2, pp. 190–92 (Appendix I4F2). Note that this passage clearly betrays JNS considering Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as Great Mādhyamikas.

460 Vol.2, pp. 305–9 (Appendix I1G6).

461 J76 (P5526, fol. 118b.3–4).

462 J22 (P5526, fol. 88a.2–3).

463 Pp. 25–26.

464 Tib. kun gzhi'i rab tu dbye ba khyad par du 'phags pa. For details, see Stearns 1995.

465 Tib. sa bzang ma ti paṇ chen blo gros rgyal mtshan.

466 Sa bzang ma ti paṇ chen 1977, fols. 85b.6–86a.1 and 86a.6–86b.2.

467 Skt. lokottaracitta, Tib. 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems. For details, see the extensive quotes from this text in Appendix I1E1.

468 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fols. 13bff.

469 Kong sprul blo gros mtha yas 2005a, pp. 23–27.

470 Kong sprul blo gros mtha yas 1990a, pp. 101–2.

471 P. 145.

472 See, for example, his *Shing rta chen po'i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba.*

473 Ngag dbang yon tan bzang po 2000, pp. 113 and 230–33.

474 As mentioned before, the three characteristics are the same as the three natures.

475 The verse gives suchness, the true end, signlessness, the ultimate, and dharmadhātu as the synonyms of emptiness.

476 Pp. 208–15 (Appendix I1E1).

477 Vol. 2, pp. 447–48.

478 Pp. 578–79 (Appendix I3C2a).

479 Fols. 35a and 104b.

480 In *Uttaratantra* I.35–38, buddha nature is described through the four pāramitās of genuine self, purity, bliss, and permanence (see also Appendix I4F). "Genuine self" refers to all reference points of self and the lack of self being completely at peace.

481 Fol. 39a.

482 P. 449.

483 Vol. 2, pp. 503–5.

484 "The invincible one" (an epithet of Maitreya).

485 Vol. 2, p. 172.

486 Vol. 2, p. 487.

487 Vol. 2, p. 244.

488 Though there is no explicit division of the Mere Mentalists into Real and False Aspectarians here, as explained in Appendix I5D2d, JNS identifies those who only realize the lack of nature of the apprehended as the Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, while the False Aspectarians are said to realize the lack of nature of both apprehender and apprehended, while still taking sheer cognizance without the duality of apprehender and apprehended to be real.

489 "The sevenfold collection" refers to Dharmakīrti's texts on valid cognition (such as the *Pramāṇavārttika*) and "the sūtra" refers to Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya.*

490 These are the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, and the *Uttaratantra.*

491 This is quite a remarkable early analysis of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's approach since it already outlines the model called "ascending/sliding scales of analysis," with which the contemporary Western scholars Dreyfus and McClintock describe Dharmakīrti's system. I do not at all mean to diminish the merits of those two scholars in conducting excellent and detailed analyses of said approach (in fact, I greatly admire it), but—as the above passage shows—the principle obviously has been recognized before.

492 These obscurations are synonyms for the afflictive and cognitive obscurations, respectively.

493 Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 4, pp. 405–10.

494 Interestingly and unlike with other opponents, in his commentaries the Eighth Karmapa usually employs honorific terms when he quotes Dölpopa.

495 To be sure, all these terms come from several sūtras on buddha nature and some are also found in the *Uttaratantra.* Dölpopa also often qualifies his descriptions, such as by saying that,

in the context of giving explanations by making distinctions between permanence and impermanence, buddha nature, nondual wisdom, and so on are permanent, enduring etc., while also stating that all seeming phenomena are the opposite. However, within profound meditative equipoise, all reference points need to be let go of.

496 P. 223.

497 For example, see his *Fourth Council* (Tib. bka' bsdus bzhi pa) in *Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Paro, Bhutan, 1984), pp. 404–5.

498 For more details on Dölpopa's positions and the corresponding exact references, see Stearns 1999, Hopkins 2006 and 2007, and Mathes 2004.

499 Thus, each one of the first two volumes volumes contains four main layers of actual commentary on the AA—CE and JNS on the AA, JNS on the *Vivṛti*, and the *Vivṛti* itself. However, except for a few passages, I did not translate the *Vivṛti* in its entirety or on its own, but only as embedded in JNS's comments on it. Most obviously, this is for reasons of space, but also because the *Vivṛti* is an often very terse commentary.

500 Note that Appendices I and II in both volumes respectively form unities, with the numbering of their topics and charts in Volume One continuing in Volume Two for the sake of being able to refer to them in an unambiguous manner. The glossaries and the bibliography for both volumes are located at the end of Volume Two, but will be available online at www.snowlionpub.com as soon as the first volume appears.

501 Note also that, due to the elliptic structure of the AA and the commentaries that follow this structure discussing the same topics in more than one place, I generally either attempted to provide as many cross-references as possible or to put materials related to the same topic together in the same appendix or chart. However, often this structure of the AA and its commentaries with their many layers makes it impossible to treat a given topic exhaustively in just one place. Thus, the reader may still have to consult several related sections to collect all the available information on a given topic.

502 Numbers in { } indicate the folio numbers of the Tibetan *dbu med* manuscript of CE in continuous order. This disregards the fact that the Tibetan original has folio 28 two times (thus, compared to the original folio numbers, from folio 29 onward, the numbering here is always one number higher).

503 Tib. bcom ldan rig pa'i ral gri (1227–1305). He was a famous Kadampa master from Nartang Monastery (Tib. snar thang) and instrumental in the first edition of the *Kangyur* and *Tengyur*, which was finalized later by Butön. His collected works covered sixteen volumes.

504 For the same reason, LSSP (fol. 6b.3–4) also rejects this classification. Thub bstan brtson 'grus 1985? (pp. 253–57) presents a "quote" ascribed to the *Kauśikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* ("On the occasion of completing the seventeen mothers and children of prajñāpāramitā, the Bhagavān resided on Vulture Flock Mountain"). Thus, he says, to reject this classification is tantamount to opposing the Buddha himself (however, the above passage is not found in this or any other prajñāpāramitā sūtra in the *Kangyur*). In addition, Thub bstan brtson 'grus considers the objections of Rigpé Raltri and LSSP as invalid because to apply the expression "seventeen mothers and children" to summarize seventeen prajñāpāramitā sūtras taught together by the Buddha does not imply that he did not teach any other prajñāpāramitā sūtras, just as when one uses the commonly accepted expression "the large, medium, and brief prajñāpāramitā sūtras" for three of these sūtras. Moreover, though these seventeen do not include all prajñāpāramitā sūtras, it is not only the three large, medium, and brief sūtras, but all seventeen, that constitute the main sūtras explained in the AA since the opening verses of the *Vivṛti* speak of this text as being the ornament of all prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Among these, the principal sūtras on which the AA

comments are "the six mothers" because they are the sūtras that are suitable to be correlated to the order of the clear realizations as the topics of the AA. This is clear because there are the Indian commentaries that directly correlate the AA to the sūtras in one hundred thousand, twenty-five thousand, and eight thousand lines, and the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*. In addition, according to Patrul Rinpoche's PSD (p. 5), those that correlate it to the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā* thereby also implicitly correlate it to the sūtra in eighteen thousand lines and there are obviously some that correlate it to the sūtra in ten thousand lines too. "The eleven children" represent the ordinary sūtras explained by the AA.

505 JG (p. 87) says that there are no authoritative sources for such a division.

506 This collection is said to contain either five or six texts. The first five are (1) *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, (2) *Yuktiṣāṣṭikā*, (3) *Śūnyatāsaptati*, (4) *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, and (5) *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. If six texts are counted, either the *Ratnāvalī* or the *Vyavahārasiddhi* is added.

507 As mentioned in the Introduction, it is not clear who this author might be, but obviously the text referred to is the *Śatasāhasrikāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā*, otherwise held to be by Daṃṣṭrāsena.

508 Texts (1), (2), and (4) refer to Haribhadra's revised edition of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, the *Ālokā*, and the *Vivṛti*, respectively.

509 Tib. nub kyi sgo glegs. This is how the table of contents of the *Tengyur* refers to Prajñākaramati's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttipiṇḍārtha*.

510 This refers to JNS.

511 This is the Tibetan version of the Sanskrit term *lokacakṣu*, which means "the eye of the world." Originally, this is a term for the sun or the eyes of people, so translators are regarded as illuminating the dharma of the Buddha or being like the eyes through which other people can see it.

512 According to the Tibetan tradition, to present the title of a text both in the original Sanskrit and the language into which it is translated serves three purposes—creating trust in the genuine origin of the teachings at hand, planting the habitual tendencies of Sanskrit as a sacred language, and blessing one's mind stream.

513 As a set, the above make up the four kinds of languages used in classical Indian theater. In terms of being spoken in daily life, as is well known, Sanskrit was the language of educated people ("the divine language"). Prakrit generally refers to any provincial or vernacular dialect cognate with Sanskrit and is usually divided into four dialects—Śaurasenī, Mahārāṣṭrī, Apabhraṃśa, and Paiśācī. Apabhraṃśa is the most corrupt of the Prakrit dialects, while Paiśācī is just a jargon spoken by demons in plays.

514 Together, the Tibetan words *bstan* and *bcos* render *śāstra* (treatise), being thus explained as a text that sustains and restores the teachings. Based on a verse cited in the *Vyākhyāyukti* (P5562, fol. 143a.4), JG (pp. 129–30) explains *śāstra* as possessing the two qualities of restoring and protecting. The Sanskrit *śās* ("teaching," "correcting," "controlling") means to restore or heal (Tib. bcos) through turning body, speech, and mind of those to be guided away from nonvirtuous actions and make them engage in virtuous actions for the sake of their giving rise to the distinct features of ethics, samādhi, and prajñā (the three Buddhist trainings). Or, through familiarizing with the scriptures that one has been taught, the causal afflictions and karmas (including their latent tendencies) will be relinquished. The Sanskrit *tara* ("liberating") or *trā* ("protecting") refers to the fruition of this process of protecting in the sense of liberating one from all sufferings of the lower realms and saṃsāra in general. From a Buddhist point of view, as presented in Asaṅga's *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (D4038, fol. 205a.3–7), there are six types of specious and three kinds of proper treatises. The former include meaningless ones (on topics such as whether crows have teeth); those with wrong meanings (from a Buddhist perspective, such

as discussing an eternal soul); treatises on cheating others; heartless ones (such as on warfare or killing animals); and those that mainly focus on study or debate. Proper treatises are meaningful ones (in a Buddhist sense); those that lead to relinquishing suffering; and those that mainly focus on practice. In particular, among Buddhist treatises, the AA is one that collects topics which are scattered throughout the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (such as the progression of the clear realizations); restores what is in a wrong order; condenses these vast sūtras; and differentiates their profound hidden meaning. As for the title of the AA, JG glosses *clear realization* as "directly facing true reality and thereby definitely realizing it just as it is." In general, there are two types of *ornaments*—those that beautify and those that illuminate—and the AA represents both. For example, the beautiful body of a woman with all its natural qualities becomes even more beautiful through being adorned with ornaments such as bracelets. However, when she sees her beautiful and adorned body that she did not see before in this way in a mirror, which illuminates her body's features through clearly showing them, the mirror makes her joyful through enabling her to see her supreme beauty. Likewise, the wonderful body of the excellently phrased topics of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, which is ornamented with the qualities of natural peace, is always beautiful through being adorned with the ornaments of the eight topics and seventy points. However, by virtue of what was not clear appearing clearly in the illuminating ornament of the AA through its meaning being revealed, the AA produces supreme joy in the wise who are endowed with insight. JNS (p. 5) glosses *śāstra* as a teaching in the sense of curing the mind streams of those to be guided by way of their being endowed with the three trainings (in ethics, samādhi, and prajñā). A *pith instruction* is what teaches a vast meaning through few words and illuminates the hidden meaning. It is the means to gain *clear* or direct *realization*, which is the outcome of that means. The AA is an *ornament*, since it illuminates or beautifies both the words and their meanings.

515 Traditionally, in Tibetan Buddhist texts (translated from Sanskrit or indigenous), the opening homage indicates to which one among the three scriptural collections (Skt. piṭaka, Tib. sde snod) of the sūtrayāna—sūtra, vinaya, or abhidharma—a work belongs. Paying homage to the buddhas and bodhisattvas (as here) shows that a text belongs to the category of sūtra because this category is primarily related to the training in samādhi, with both buddhas and bodhisattvas knowing and engaging in it. Paying homage to the Buddha alone indicates the category of the vinaya, since it is related to the training in ethics, with only a buddha being able to fully understand all the implications and reasons for this code of discipline. Paying homage to Mañjuśrī refers to the category of the abhidharma, since it is related to the training in prajñā, which is embodied by Mañjuśrī.

516 The Sanskrit word *buddha* (meaning "awake," "expanded," "intelligent," "wise," and "realized") is explained here through the two syllables of its Tibetan rendering, *sangs rgyas*, with the former meaning "awakened," "eliminated," or "purified," and the latter meaning "unfolded" or "expanded."

517 As for the term bodhisattva, *bodhi* means "realization," "awakening," or "enlightenment," and *sattva* has many meanings (the most important ones in this context are "a being," "(disposition of) mind," "spiritual essence," "(strength of) character," "courage," "resolution," and "magnanimity"). In Tibetan, this is translated as *byang chub sems dpa'*, with *byang chub* meaning "purified and realized" and *sems dpa'*, "courageous mind." Thus, bodhisattvas are those who have given rise to bodhicitta, the mental disposition of having enough courage and magnanimity for the resolve of setting their mind solely on the goal of buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. The bravery in this lies in being afraid neither of the infinite number of sentient beings to be liberated nor the infinite time it takes to liberate them nor the great hardships one has to go through in order to accomplish this. By way of referring to the two objectives of bodhicitta (enlightenment and the welfare of other beings), the *Ālokā* (p. 31) explains the meaning of *bodhisattva* as follows. *Bodhi* refers to the power of prajñā taking enlightenment as one's

object and *sattva* refers to the force of compassion taking sentient beings as one's objects. Thus, literally, bodhisattvas are "those for whom enlightenment and sentient beings [serve as their objects]" (technically speaking, this represents a rather peculiar Sanskrit *bahuvrīhi* compound). Similarly, the *Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā* (D3808, fol. 39b.4–7) first equates "bodhisattva" with "bodhicitta," saying that the meaning of "bodhisattva" is twofold—seeming bodhisattva and ultimate bodhisattva. As for the first one, it is the state of mind that arises through focusing on completely perfect enlightenment (*bodhi*) and sentient beings (*sattva*) that is called "bodhisattva" because it focuses on these two objects. "Bodhisattva" also refers to those in whom said mental state exists since they, through focusing on enlightenment and sentient beings, are endowed with having generated the precious mind of both prajñā and compassion by way of dwelling in both the ultimate and seeming realities. "Ultimate bodhisattva" refers to the ten generations of bodhicitta on the ten bodhisattvabhūmis. In general, in accordance with the other meanings of *sattva* given above, bodhisattva may also be taken to mean "a being seeking enlightenment," "a being destined to become enlightened," "one whose mind is fixed on enlightenment," and "one whose essence is enlightenment." In Pāli sources, *bodhisatta* means "one who is devoted or attached to enlightenment" (this meaning is also known, but not favored, in mahāyāna sources, with *bodhisattva* deriving from Pāli *satta* being wrongly sanskritized as *sattva* instead of *sakta*). Among all these meanings of bodhisattva, the two primary ones in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are "one whose mind is fixed on enlightenment" and "a being seeking enlightenment." As the sūtra in eight thousand lines (Vaidya ed., p. 9.26.7; Conze 1973, p. 89) says, "They are called bodhisattva mahāsattvas by virtue of their purpose/aim being enlightenment." As for the term *mahāsattva* (which the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and others frequently use in combination with bodhisattva), it basically is understood as "one who is endowed with a great mind." The prajñāpāramitā sūtra in eight thousand lines (Vaidya ed., p. 9.28–29) says that bodhisattvas are called mahāsattvas because "they attain the highest state among a great mass of beings" (Conze 1973, p. 89 takes kārayiṣyati as a causative), with "beings" being glossed by the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines (CZ, pp. 123–25) as all beings from the beginning of the śrāvaka path up through irreversible bodhisattvas. The *Ālokā* (p. 80) comments on this as "one whose mind aims at becoming the highest among all beings . . . and then . . . causes them to accomplish this highest state. In the sense of bodhisattvas . . . having a great mind (sattva), they are called 'mahāsattvas'" (see also the comments on AA I.42c below). Also, in the sūtra in eight thousand lines (Vaidya ed., pp. 9.32–10.2 and 10.5–9; Conze 1973, p. 89), Śāriputra says that bodhisattvas are called mahāsattvas because they teach the dharma in order to relinquish great wrong views, such as clinging to a self, existence, nonexistence, extinction, and permanence, while Subhūti gives the reason as bodhisattvas being unattached to bodhicitta, the mind of omniscience, the uncontaminated mind, the unequalled mind, and the peerless mind, all of which are not shared with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. The *Ālokā* (p. 22) says, "Bodhisattvas are those whose minds (*sattva*), that is, intentions (*abhiprāya*), are directed toward the accomplishment of their own welfare, that is, enlightenment as not clinging to any phenomena. It may be said that śrāvakas can also be like that. [Therefore,] one speaks of 'mahāsattvas.' Those whose minds are directed toward the accomplishment of the welfare of others are mahāsattvas. It may be said that good people among the tīrthikas can also be such mahāsattvas. [That is why the word] 'bodhisattva' is used [too]." LSSP (fols. 225b.2–227b.5) and PSD (p. 123) say that the three reasons for presenting bodhisattvas as "mahāsattvas" consist of the means for accomplishing their aim of the three greatnesses (great mind, relinquishment, and realization)—the six types of mind that make bodhisattvas attain the highest state among all sentient beings, teaching the dharma to sentient beings in the manner of nonobservation in order to relinquish all views, and the attachment-free bodhicitta that is not in common with any śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and is not contained in the three realms (for details, see "the aim of practice" under the knowledge of all aspects). For more details on the terms *bodhisattva* and

mahāsattva, see Dayal 1970 and Kajiyama 1982. As for the term *māra* in general and the four māras in particular, see CE on IV.21, IV.44, and IV.62b, as well as Appendix I4H.

518 This is obviously based on the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 78b.6–7) saying that "Maitreya . . . through personally experienced wisdom identified the lucidity of prajñāpāramitā (the [perceiving] subject) as being the primary cause for attaining everything that is excellent" (note that the semantic range of Skt. *prasanna*—"lucidity"—also covers "clarity," "brightness," "purity," "tranquility," "serenity," and "graciousness").

519 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 13–15) says that what Maitreya's mind—nonconceptual personally experienced wisdom—identified as the primary cause for attaining everything that is truly excellent (nirvāṇa) is the lucidity of the special knowledge (the perceiving subject) which takes as its object the prajñāpāramitā of realizing all entities, paths, and aspects to be naturally unborn. This kind of subject and object represent the naturally abiding disposition, also called "prajñāpāramitā," which is the cause for all types of nirvāṇa and the source of all precious qualities of the dharmakāya and its enlightened activity. According to JNS, the above passage in the *Vivṛti* also teaches that the meaning of the buddha heart, which is explained in the *Uttaratantra* and taught to be the primary cause of great enlightenment, is the prajñāpāramitā that is explained in the mother sūtras. The above passage also implies that Maitreya, in terms of the definitive meaning, is a buddha. The purpose of Maitreya paying homage at the beginning of the AA is that others, upon hearing the qualities of prajñāpāramitā, give rise to openness and respect for her, which makes them engage in her, and eventually attain supreme excellence.

520 Note that my translation of the stanzas of the AA follows the Sanskrit, with the occasional significant differences in the Tibetan version being indicated in the endnotes.

521 JG (pp. 142–43) glosses "peace" as the nirvāṇa of the two realities of suffering and its origin (the causes and results in terms of saṃsāra) being at utter peace.

522 The prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA usually refer to the pratyekabuddhas in general as "rhinoceroses" (Skt. khaḍga, Tib. bse ru; the Sanskrit can also mean "rhinoceros horn" and the pratyekabuddhas are often referred to by the full expression for that—*khaḍgaviṣāṇa*—too). More precisely, only one type of pratyekabuddha resembles rhinoceroses in that they always stay by themselves in solitary retreat. The other two types practice together in groups (Skt. vargacārin, Tib. tshogs spyod pa), so they are also called those who are like (a flock of) parrots. They are also called group practitioners (those who become pratyekabuddhas after having gone through just the śrāvaka path of preparation) and abiders (those who become pratyekabuddhas after having attained the fruition of a śrāvaka stream-enterer).

523 The most common classification of "roots of virtue" (Skt. kuśalamūla, Tib. dge ba'i rtsa ba) throughout Buddhist literature is the threefold lack of greed, hatred, and ignorance—nothing but the reverses of the well-known three roots of nonvirtue (a.k.a. the three poisons). In Vaibhāṣika texts, this simple meaning of "roots of virtue" is developed further into three sets of roots of virtue (those that are conducive to merit, liberation, and penetration). This approach is eventually reflected in mahāyāna texts too (for details on these three sets, see below). As for the term "roots of virtue," according to Buddhaghoṣa's *Visuddhimagga* (XVII.70) those things that gain stability or virtue through given roots of virtue are said to be firm like trees and stable. However, those things without the causes that are such roots are like moss, sesame seeds, and so on, and thus unstable.

524 The nirvāṇa with remainder refers to the analytical cessation of the reality of suffering and its origin in an arhat's mind stream who is still alive, in other words, one who is still endowed with the five skandhas that are the remainder propelled by former karmas and afflictions (and thus can still cause some residue of suffering). Analytical cessation means that all karmas and afflictions as well as their root—the clinging to a personal self—that could serve as

causes for further rebirth have been eradicated through a thorough meditative analysis of all the aspects of the four realities of the noble ones. The nirvāṇa without remainder is then reached at death, that is, upon leaving the skandhas of one's last existence in saṃsāra behind. Thus, practitioners may attain arhathood while still being alive and then just shed their skandhas at death, passing from the nirvāṇa with remainder into the one without remainder. But there are also people who attain arhathood right at the moment of death, thus not going through the phase of the nirvāṇa with remainder. As for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas "desiring the temporary nirvāṇa," of course they do not really desire just a temporary state of freedom from suffering, but strive for and regard their attainment as being definitive and permanent. To speak about "the temporary nirvāṇa" is solely from the perspective of the mahāyāna, in which the nirvāṇas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are considered to be just temporary states of solitary peace, until they are roused by the buddhas from this state and exhorted onto the path of bodhisattvas in order to attain buddhahood too. JNS (p. 16) says that, according to the final assertions of both Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna, it is impossible that those who manifest a lesser nirvāṇa will not later attain buddhahood. Those arhats who have attained the nirvāṇa with remainder prolong their lifespans and accomplish enlightenment while still in their physical body. The arhats in the nirvāṇa without remainder become reborn from lotus buds in some pure worldly realms, and then are blessed by being incited through light rays from the bodies of the tathāgatas. In this way, they attain power over birth, complete the two accumulations of merit and wisdom, and achieve buddhahood.

525 D4049, fol. 116a.3–4.

526 JNS (p. 16) comments that the Vaibhāṣikas assert nirvāṇa—the reality of cessation—to be a permanent entity, while the Sautrāntikas say that it is a nonimplicative negation. The Mere Mentalists hold it to be consciousness empty of duality. There are Mādhyamikas in general who assert that it is the subsiding of a portion of the clinging to identity, thus being an emptiness in the sense of extinction. In any case, it is held that, in the state of nirvāṇa, the śrāvakas' mind streams that served as the supports for their roots of virtue and their path have terminated. This kind of termination is from the perspective of the lack of reference points, but such a lack of reference points is just one partial feature among the qualities of prajñāpāramitā.

527 These are the paths of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas.

528 In general, the term *cittotpāda* (Tib. sems bskyed)—literally "mind-generation"—refers to developing the specific mindset of a (Buddhist) spiritual path, be it the yānas of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, or bodhisattvas. In this text, the term specifically means "generation of bodhicitta" and thus is rendered that way throughout. The kinglike generation of bodhicitta means to strive and practice the path in order to first attain buddhahood oneself and then lead all beings to the same state; the ferrymanlike generation refers to striving to attain buddhahood together with all beings; and the shepherdlike generation represents the striving to lead all beings to enlightenment before oneself attains it, that is, not manifesting complete buddhahood for one's own welfare and promoting the welfare of sentient beings by taking rebirths in saṃsāra until there are no more such beings.

529 JNS (p. 78) says that "the aspiration of enlightening conduct" refers to striving for enlightenment, while "the aspiration of excellent conduct" means striving for the welfare of others. By virtue of these two kinds of aspirations, respectively, the two kinds of generating the bodhicitta of striving for enlightenment and the bodhicitta of striving for the welfare of others are brought to completion.

530 The Tibetan has "being endowed with her" (*gang dang yang dag ldan*).

531 These three are the contaminations of desire (the main affliction of the desire realm), existence (all afflictions of the form and formless realms that are other than ignorance and

afflicted views), and ignorance (the basis for the first two). Sometimes a fourth one, the contamination of afflicted views, is added.

532 This second occurrence of the words "endowed with" in the Tibetan line of verse has no explicit correspondence to the Sanskrit—*sarvākāraṃ* simply being a *bahuvrīhi* compound with *viśvaṃ*—though this compound may be rendered that way. However, CE obviously switches the subject of this being "endowed with" from "variety" to "the sages." To compare, JNS (p. 17) comments that, being united with her (the wisdom of the knowledge of all aspects), the sages (the buddhas) proclaim the wheel of dharma (this very variety of dharma collections that is endowed with the experience of all aspects of being free from attachment) as the remedy for engaging in the corresponding variety of afflictions.

533 Tib. khams. This Tibetan term can be understood as either referring to "the basic element" of beings (their buddha nature) or their various mental constitutions on the level of seeming reality (one of the ten powers of a buddha is to know these constitutions and teach beings accordingly). JNS (p. 30) comments that what buddhas desire is to turn the wheel of dharma in accordance with the faculties of those to be guided because buddhas have completely awoken from the sleep of ignorance and their insight is unattached and unimpeded with regard to all knowable objects. JNS (pp. 17–18) adds that, without having manifested the knowledge of all aspects, it is certain that the turning of the wheel of dharma does not happen either. Therefore, Maitreya pays homage here to the mother of both the buddhas and the genuine dharmas that exist in dependence on them.

534 As for "purified phenomena," and "afflicted phenomena" as their counterpart, these two sets are referred to again and again throughout the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, the AA, and its commentaries. In more detail, they consist of "the fifty-three repetitive phrases of the class of afflicted phenomena" (Tib. kun nas nyon mongs pa'i phyogs kyi 'gres rkang nga gsum) and "the fifty-five repetitive phrases of the class of purified phenomena" (Tib. rnam par byang ba'i phyogs kyi 'gres rkang nga lnga). These "108 repetitive phrases" represent an extensive layout of all phenomena in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and make up the extensive lists to which the explanations of emptiness and the path of its realization in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras are applied again and again (such as "form is empty, sound is empty, smell is empty . . .; the eye is empty, the ear is empty, the nose is empty . . ."). Due to a variation in the spelling of the Tibetan term, these two sets are sometimes also referred to as "commentarial bases" (Tib. 'grel rkang). For details, see Chart 2. As mentioned in the Introduction, "the mind that fully discriminates phenomena" is the definition of prajñā.

535 The first four of the five paths are the paths of learning and the last one is the path of no more learning. Any degrees of relinquishment of afflictions and obscurations on the first four paths are temporary cessations, to be superseded by the respectively higher realizations on the following paths. The definitive cessation of all afflictions is the nirvāṇa without remainder, and the definitive cessation of all obscurations in general is the dharmakāya.

536 The uncontaminated path is a synonym of the supramundane path, referring to the Buddhist path of noble ones on the paths of seeing and familiarization, as opposed to the contaminated mundane paths of Buddhists below the path of seeing and non-Buddhist (primarily Indian) spiritual traditions.

537 CE has *grangs* instead of *drang* (a rather common misspelling in this context). Obviously, the topic below is clearly the difference between the sūtras of expedient and definitive meaning.

538 The ten benefits are (1) teaching easily; (2) the listeners also learning easily; (3) out of respect for the dharma, they quickly gather the accumulations for enlightenment; (4) they quickly penetrate the dharma; (5)–(7) they obtain serene joy based on conviction about the Buddha, his teachings, and the saṃgha; (8) they experience supreme bliss in this very life; (9)

the Buddha pleases the minds of the learned by means of exegetical discussions; and (10) he is recognized to be learned.

539 The introduction to the three wheels of dharma in Chos kyi 'byung gnas 1988 (pp. 47–48) gives basically the same definition of the dharma of scriptures and adds that its instances consist of the consciousnesses of those to be guided appearing in the form of names, words, and letters, which occurs based on the wisdom of a buddha as the dominant condition and the pure mind streams of those to be guided as the causal condition. However, buddhas lack both the latent tendencies that motivate speech and the ignorance of clinging to internal cognitions as external sounds. Therefore, ultimately, the dharma is not something that is taught by buddhas out of their own wish to do so.

540 I.25cd. Most Vaibhāṣika abhidharma texts (such as the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*) accept that the dharma consists of both spoken words and the names/terms communicated by them, with some saying that the former are the nature of the dharma, while the latter represent the dharma's function of conveying its meaning. Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā* (D4092, fol. 47a.7–47b.6) says that those who interpret the dharma as spoken words (a subcategory of sound) and thus include it under the skandha of form are the Sautrāntikas. For those who take it to consist of names, it belongs to the category of nonassociated formations, while the Ābhidharmikas assert that both speech and names constitute the nature of the dharma. According to CE here, the Vaibhāṣikas' categorization of the dharma as spoken words subsumes it under the skandha of form, while the Sautrāntikas identify it as names, which fall under nonassociated formations. This accords with PSD (p. 25). According to Chos kyi 'byung gnas 1988 (p. 49) on I.25cd and TOK (vol. 2, pp. 471 and 473), the Vaibhāṣikas assert the spoken/scriptural dharma as chains of term generalities, that is, collections of names, words, and letters, thus classifying it under nonassociated formations. The Sautrāntikas hold it to consist of specifically characterized sounds, thus classifying it as belonging to the form skandha.

541 This seems to refer to the mythical mighty white elephant that is Indra's mount.

542 To my knowledge, none of Nāgārjuna's texts actually uses these terms, but they are found in Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* VIII.15. In the Tibetan tradition, this format is usually presented as the system of both these masters.

543 JNS (pp. 32–34) comments that, from among these four presentations, the explanation in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and the one that is found in the *Uttaratantra* concord in their first two modes of explanation, but not in their last ones. "The excellent complete distinction" in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is stated to be the wheel that completely distinguishes between what is expedient and what is definitive in the first and the middle wheels and so on. "The wheel of prophecy" in the *Uttaratantra* is the dharma wheel which teaches that all sentient beings are endowed with the tathāgata heart. It is obvious that Maitreya coined this conventional terminology as a comment on the presentation in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra*. The Seventh Karmapa said that the presentations of the three sets of teachings that are explained in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* and the three wheels that are explained in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* were definitely given by virtue of those to be guided, and represent different specific ways of turning the wheel of dharma (see JG below). Nāgārjuna and his followers said that (1) the wheel that first puts an end to what is nonmeritorious is taught in order to engage in an unmistaken way in what is to be adopted and discarded with respect to seeming reality, and thus to produce people with the karmic disposition for the arising of the prajñā about ultimate reality. (2) The middle wheel puts an end to a certain portion of reference points, and thus teaches the nominal ultimate. (3) The last wheel puts an end to all views of entertaining reference points. In brief, the progressive sequence of the ways of turning the wheel of dharma, which purify the progressive sequence of the respective constitutions, faculties, and latencies of those to be guided through

the mahāyāna, should be identified as being nothing more than what is presented here. In this context, some may wonder whether Maitreya's third "wheel of prophecy" and Nāgārjuna's third "wheel that puts an end to all views" come down to the same essential point. Karmapa Rangjung Dorje said that these two come down to the same essential point in a general way in the sense that whatever is the final wheel must necessarily be the wheel that teaches freedom from reference points. However, by virtue of a certain feature being complete or incomplete, they do not arrive at the same essential point. In "the wheel that puts an end to all views," nothing but sheer freedom from reference points is stated, while "the wheel of prophecy" explains that wisdom free from reference points is the distinctive feature of what is to be experienced by personally experienced wisdom. This is the only difference in terms of these two wheels not representing the same essential point. However, it is not that Nāgārjuna and his followers do not assert the wisdom free from reference points because this wisdom is taught extensively in Nāgārjuna's collection of praises and Āryadeva's *Bodhisattvayogacāryacatuḥśataka*.

544 This term refers to the first five human disciples of the Buddha—Ajñātakauṇḍinya, Aśvajit, Bhadrika, Daśabalakāśyapa, and Mahānāmakulika.

545 It should be noted that the three natures are also taught in the Maitreya Chapter of the prajñāpāramitā sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines and elsewhere (see below). In addition, the term for the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna*) also appears in the sūtra in one hundred thousand lines as an equivalent for emptiness, suchness, and so on.

546 Chos kyi 'byung gnas 1988 (pp. 51–64) presents the above four sets of three dharma wheels as follows. The rationale behind the division into three dharma wheels in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is that they were respectively taught to those to be guided whose hīnayāna disposition is certain, those whose mahāyāna disposition is certain, and those whose disposition is uncertain due to being changeable through certain conditions. Thus, the first wheel consists of teaching the four realities of the noble ones, the twelve links of dependent origination, and so on. The second wheel teaches the topic of very profound emptiness. In order to relinquish fear about this profound topic, the third wheel teaches that all phenomena are cognizance and that the perfect nature represents ultimate reality. The three wheels in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* are the one that speaks of revulsion toward saṃsāra, the one about the three doors to liberation, and the irreversible wheel, respectively. As for the rationale behind this division, according to the *Uttaratantra*, those to be guided enter the path of peace through first being exhorted by way of teaching on revulsion toward their attachment to saṃsāra. Then, through speaking about emptiness, they are matured in the mahāyāna. Finally, through the contents of the irreversible wheel, they engage in the object of all Tathāgatas and receive the great prophecy about their own enlightenment. The explanation of Nāgārjuna's three wheels agrees with the one by JNS above and is said to represent a division in terms of the respective means of guidance in dependence on those to be guided. In sum, the division and order of the three wheels as per the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is presented with the intention that the final wheel represents the ultimate definitive meaning, whereas Nāgārjuna's system teaches the second wheel of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* as being the final one because he asserts it to be the one that puts an end to all views. In general, the definition of the first dharma wheel is "the genuine dharma spoken by the Buddha that, with the intention of serving as a stepping stone for the mahāyāna, was taught primarily for those with the hīnayāna disposition." According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the teachings on the four realities were repeated three times. During the first time, the contents of each one of the four realities were described. During the second time, the reality of suffering was taught as what is to be understood; the reality of the origin, as what is to be relinquished; the reality of cessation, as what is to be manifested; and the reality of the path, as what is to be cultivated. During the third time, the Buddha taught that he had respectively understood, relinquished, manifested, and cultivated these four realities. Through the first repetition, by way of gaining certainty about the nature of each of the four realities,

he taught the path of seeing. Through the second one, by way of respectively rejecting and adopting these realities, he taught the path of familiarization. Through the third one, by way of having finished rejecting and adopting, he taught the path of nonlearning. With regard to each one of these three repetitions, there arise four factors of realization, thus making twelve. These factors also apply to each one of the four realities, thus totaling forty-eight. The four factors are called "eye" (uncontaminated prajñā), "knowledge" (lack of doubt), "awareness" (being aware of true reality), and "mind" (pure mind). In due order, they transcend the wrong views, the doubts, the ignorance, and the contaminated minds of the tīrthikas, who merely presume to see true reality. The Sautrāntikas reject this model and present the justified position that the four realities represent what is repeated and that the three repetitions refer to respectively focusing on the natures, the functions, and the results of each of these four realities. The direct purpose of the first dharma wheel was that the "group of five" attained arhathood and that eighty thousand gods attained the path of seeing. Its special purpose is that those to be tamed are established in the four fruitions of stream-enterers, once-returners, nonreturners, and arhats, as is appropriate. However, there are many additional elements that are contained in this first "dharma wheel of the four realities," whose time and place is uncertain (such as the vinaya and various discourses in the six great cities of Central India and so on). The definition of the second dharma wheel is "the genuine dharma spoken by the Buddha that, with the intention of showing the actual path of the mahāyāna, was taught primarily for bodhisattvas, starting with the principle of profound emptiness." The reason why it is called "the dharma wheel of the lack of characteristics" is that it teaches the true reality of all phenomena being utterly devoid of any specific characteristics of their own, which is beyond speech, thought, and expression. The direct purpose of this dharma wheel is that the definitive liberation of the mind streams of those to be guided who are its proper recipients depends on this teaching and that they thus engage in the object of the Tathāgatas. The indirect purpose is that, after the obscurations of the bad views of all sentient beings are eliminated and the basic nature of all phenomena is directly realized in an unmistaken manner, the great nirvāṇa of not abiding in any of the two extremes is attained. The definition of the third wheel of dharma is "the genuine dharma spoken by the Buddha that, in order to take care of those with uncertain disposition through the principles of the mahāyāna, was taught primarily as the discourses on being pure of the three spheres." This wheel is called "the wheel of excellent distinction" because it is taught by way of excellently distinguishing all phenomena as the three natures—the imaginary, the other-dependent, and the perfect natures. The instances of the third wheel include the sūtras that primarily teach on the tathāgata heart (such as the *Avataṃsakasūtra* and *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*) and also those that are vast in terms of both words and meanings (such as the *Ratnakūṭa*, *Ghanavyūhasūtra*, and *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*). The latter consist mainly of clearly teaching many topics that are taught in most other hīnayāna and mahāyāna sūtras in the form of bearing certain intentions.

547 JNS (p. 34) says that the former sūtras are those that teach the emptiness of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, while the latter represent the sūtras that teach the definitive meaning of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*.

548 JNS (p. 34) adds that the former sūtras correspond to the wheel of putting an end to any identity, while the latter represent the wheel of putting an end to all views.

549 JNS (pp. 34–35) gives basically the same definitions and classifications as CE. The definition of the sūtras of expedient meaning is "the sūtras that mainly teach the seeming reality that serves as the means for enabling the paths to nirvāṇa to arise in the mind streams of those with the dispositions of all three yānas." They are classified as two—the sūtras of the expedient meaning of the expedient meaning and the sūtras of the definitive meaning of the expedient meaning. The definition of the sūtras of definitive meaning is "the sūtras that, from the perspective of certain people to be guided who are not afraid of the profound, mainly teach the ultimate reality of the attainment of cessation by virtue of having cultivated the path to nirvāṇa" (their

classification is as above). These are the ways of distinguishing the expedient and the definitive meaning according to the two great traditions of the mahāyāna. Then, JNS lists three ways of distinguishing what is expedient and what is definitive in the wheels of dharma according to (1) the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, (2) the *Uttaratantra*, and (3) Nāgārjuna. (1) corresponds to the last two sentences in the above paragraph of CE except for replacing "what is most prominent in these respective wheels" by "in terms of the self-isolates of the three wheels." (2) is explained by the great Kashmiri paṇḍita Ratnavajra as follows: "The wheel that introduces to the path of peace is the expedient meaning. The wheel of maturation is the wheel that is predominantly of definitive meaning and contains some parts of expedient meaning. The wheel of prophecy is the wheel of nothing but the definitive meaning." [Ratnavajra was the teacher of the translator Rinchen Sangpo (Tib. rin chen bzang po; 958–1055), and the grandfather of Sajjana, through whom the two transmissions of the *Uttaratantra* reached Tibet via his disciples Ngog Lotsāwa, Dsen Kawoche (Tib. btsan kha bo che; b. 1021), and Su Gawé Dorje (Tib. gzu dga' ba'i rdo rje; eleventh century).] (3) The system of Nāgārjuna is that the first wheel is the expedient meaning of the expedient meaning. The second represents what is presumed to be the definitive meaning, but in terms of the actual meaning that it comes down to, it is the expedient meaning. The reason for this is that putting an end to identity through the meaning of identitylessness represents the definitive meaning. However, the conventional terms that put an end to identity do not go beyond nonimplicative negations, which are the objects of consciousness and expressions (the subjects of these objects). The definitive meaning lies solely in the third wheel because it is free from all reference points in terms of subjects and objects of speech, thought, and expression. There is neither a need nor a purpose to teach a wheel of dharma that puts an end to the reference point "freedom from reference points." For there are no persons who are concerned that being free from reference points is a reference point; this being free from all reference points is the main cause for attaining everything that is excellent; and, since being free from all reference points abides primordially as the ultimate way of being, one is also not able to put an end to it. According to JG (pp. 31–32, 51–52, 64–71, and 85–87), the fact of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* explaining the middle turning to be of expedient meaning is (according to the sūtra itself as well as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu) to be understood in terms of the "lack of nature" in the second turning actually referring to these three natures in the sense of the threefold lack of nature. Thus, what is considered to be of expedient meaning in the second turning is only to take the meaning of "lack of nature" literally—it is not that everything in the second turning is taken to be of expedient meaning. In other words, it is not said that the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in general are of expedient meaning, but only their literal meaning of "lack of nature." Likewise, what is of definitive meaning in the third turning only refers to the previously mentioned differentiation in terms of the threefold lack of nature and so on—it is not that everything in the third turning is of definitive meaning. In addition, not all sūtras that teach emptiness necessarily belong to the second turning because emptiness is also briefly taught in the *Kaccāyanagottasutta* (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* II.17ff.) and, more extensively, in the third turning (such as in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*). However, the manner in which emptiness is taught in each turning is quite different. Thus, in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, the distinction between what is of expedient and definitive meaning is made by way of what is to be taken literally or not within the three turnings, whereas the distinction in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* and so on (ultimate versus seeming reality) is made by way of the topic in general. However, in the final picture, these two ways of distinguishing are not contradictory. If the teachings of the second turning are taken literally, some mahāyāna followers may develop a nihilistic view, while śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas will become afraid of there being nothing whatsoever (such as the functioning of cause and effect). Thus, the third turning finely distinguishes between the three natures, existence and nonexistence, and what is expedient versus definitive in order to remedy the superimpositions and denials of such people in all yānas (that is, in order to eliminate both taking "lack of nature" literally and thinking that "lack of nature" contradicts what is directly perceived). Nevertheless, though the

Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra describes the second turning as being of expedient meaning, this is not contradictory to its being of definitive meaning ultimately because nonarising and so on do represent the definitive meaning. Furthermore, through teaching that the intention of "lack of nature" is the threefold lack of nature, the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* teaches the middle path free from the two extremes of superimposition and denial in terms of existence and nonexistence as being the definitive meaning. In general, the basis of making the distinction between what is of expedient versus definitive meaning in the Buddha's teachings consists of all phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, that is, the objects perceived through the mistaken seeing of ordinary beings under the sway of ignorance and the object of the wisdom of the noble ones, all of which are included in the two realities. It is with this in mind that the distinction in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* and so on (ultimate versus seeming reality) is made, which explains that what is taught to be existent (such as the skandhas) and what is taught through manifold terms, when distinguishing between existence and nonexistence (such as the three natures), represent the expedient meaning. In themselves, the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* and the *Uttaratantra* do not explicitly make a distinction in terms of expedient and definitive meaning. However, Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (P5526, fol. 118a.4–118b.5) states that *Uttaratantra* I.155, through saying that the buddha heart is empty of adventitious stains, but not empty of being the buddha heart, teaches the unmistaken emptiness by virtue of its being free from the extremes of superimposition and denial. Thus, implicitly, these texts hold that statements about the buddha heart being empty (of itself) are of expedient meaning. However, in the present context of explaining the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, the distinction between what is of expedient and definitive meaning should be understood by way of the distinction that is presented in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* and so on. Also, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (D107, fol. 136a.1–136b.6) presents the teachings on buddha nature as being of expedient meaning, with "buddha heart" being taught as just another name for emptiness, identitylessness, and so on in order to guide those who cling to an ātman as proclaimed by the tīrthikas. Here, (1) the basis of the intention behind the teachings on buddha nature is emptiness. (2) Their purpose is to guide those who are afraid of identitylessness. (3) The invalidation of the explicit statement is that, if taken literally, buddha nature would correspond to the ātman asserted by the tīrthikas (in general, these represent the three criteria to identify a teaching as being of expedient meaning).

550 PK (fols. 21a.5–22b.5) says that the followers of the lineage of profound view, in terms of just the sūtra system, divide the three turnings of the wheel into putting an end to what is nonmeritorious, identity, and all views, respectively. In this, they follow the *Kāśyapaparivarta* and others, with the first one teaching on the four realities; the second one, on the three doors to liberation; and the third one, on the middle path of all phenomena not abiding. Among these, they assert that the first one mainly refers to the worldly correct view. The second one mainly teaches the nominal ultimate, thus being the definitive meaning of the expedient meaning. The third one teaches on ultimate reality, thus being the definitive meaning. Those who follow the lineage of vast activity divide the three wheels into those of the four realities, signlessness, and excellent distinction, thus following the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*. Accordingly, they take the first wheel to be instantiated by the four realities; the second one, through the prajñāpāramitā sūtras; and the third one, through the tathāgatagarbha sūtras and so on. Among these, the first one is presented as being of expedient meaning; the second one, as entailing an intention; and the third one, as being of definitive meaning. However, this entails flaws because what can be invalidated through reasoning is presented as the definitive meaning, while what is established through scriptures and reasoning is said to entail an intention. My own position is that any internal contradiction within the Buddha's teachings is impossible. Therefore, the instances of the second wheel taught in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* are nothing but what is presented as the second one by the Mādhyamikas too. For this sūtra (D106, fol. 38b.2–4) says, "Starting with the lack of a nature of phenomena, he taught that they lack arising and lack ceasing, that

they are primordial peace and by nature perfect nirvāṇa. Thus, for those who correctly engage in the mahāyāna, in the form of speaking about emptiness, he turned the very wonderful and marvelous second wheel of dharma." Since this is asserted as a nonimplicative negation, the sūtra further says that it is of expedient meaning and a basis for debate. Likewise, the tathāgata sūtras say, "The Tathāgata does not confine himself to this amount of effort. Thereafter, through speaking on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness, he makes them realize the way of being of the tathāgatas" (*Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*). Also, what is identified as the instances of the third wheel in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is just what the Mādhyamikas (according to *Kāśyapaparivarta* §56ff.) take it to be—"It being taught first that there exists a self as the foundation for karma and its results represents the extreme of existence. It being taught later that there is no self and so on represents the extreme of nonexistence. What does not abide in these two extremes is called the middle path . . ." This means being endowed with excellent distinction and also represents the talks about being pure of the three spheres. Since there are no divisions in true reality, it is not reasonable that there are any divisions in the wisdom of sentient beings either. Therefore, since also the other two yānas must definitely engage in this middle path, it is taught that there is a single yāna ultimately. Hence, it is reasonable for the beings to be guided in this yāna to correctly engage in all yānas. Thus, the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (D106, fols. 38b.5–39a.1) says, "Starting with the lack of a nature of phenomena, he taught that they lack arising and lack ceasing, that they are primordial peace and by nature perfect nirvāṇa. Thus, for those who correctly engage in all yānas, he turned the exceedingly wonderful and marvelous third wheel of dharma that is endowed with excellent and thorough distinction." Also the *tathāgatagarbha* sūtras say, "The Tathāgata does not confine himself to this amount of effort either. Through speaking on the wheel of irreversibility and by speaking on the complete purity of the three spheres, he makes sentient beings with their causal potentials of various natures engage in the object of the tathāgatas. When they see the true nature of the Tathāgata through having engaged in it, they are called 'the unsurpassable ones worthy of offerings'" (*Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*). This is also called "the wheel of purity." Chos kyi 'byung gnas 1988 (pp. 68–74) says that, according to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, most sūtras of the final dharma wheel (such as the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra*) identify solely the final wheel as representing the ultimate definitive meaning because these sūtras say that the teachings in the second wheel about all phenomena being without any nature, arising, ceasing, and so on bear an intention. The reasonings for this system presenting the second wheel as being of expedient meaning are found in the sūtras and the treatises, but the main point is as follows. If the teachings on all phenomena lacking a nature were taken in a literal sense, it would follow that the other-dependent and the perfect natures do not exist either. In that case, it would follow that neither afflicted nor purified phenomena are observable. The reasons for this are as follows. The very ālaya-consciousness, which contains all seeds, represents the other-dependent nature that is characterized by being the cognizance which consists of false imagination, but this is not what karma and afflictions focus on through apprehending it as a referent. However, if the other-dependent were something nonexistent by nature, it would not be reasonable for it to exist even on the level of mere seeming reality, and, in that case, it would not be tenable for karma and afflictions, which focus on the other-dependent, to arise. Therefore, in a manner that resembles the eight examples of illusion, the other-dependent both exists and performs functions on the level of seeming reality, whereas the imaginary nature—the cognizance that consists of this very other-dependent nature appearing as referents—does definitely not exist even on the level of seeming reality. Suchness, which is the perfect nature empty of the other-dependent and the imaginary natures, is described as the wisdom without the duality of apprehender and apprehended, the tathāgata heart, or the disposition. If it did not exist, it would follow that the presentations of what appears on the basis of this perfect nature—the path and the result in terms of purified phenomena, such as the final attainment of enlightenment by virtue of having gathered the accumulations and having purified the obscurations—are pointless. Consequently,

it definitely exists as the really established ultimate. You may wonder why the Buddha then taught the lack of a nature. The reason is that he taught it with the intention that imaginary phenomena represent the lack of nature in terms of characteristics; other-dependent phenomena, the lack of nature in terms of arising; and perfect phenomena, the ultimate lack of nature. The purpose of speaking about the lack of nature is that it is primarily taught as the remedy for overcoming the bad views of clinging to any identity of phenomena. On the other hand, Nāgārjuna and his followers assert the second wheel of dharma as representing the ultimate definitive meaning because there are many scriptural sources (such as the prajñāpāramitā sūtras) that explain it as representing the ultimate definitive meaning and because the teachings on the principle of profound emptiness cannot be invalidated by any reasoning. They hold the final wheel of dharma to be of expedient meaning for the following reasons. If one asserts that the perfect nature exists by nature as ultimate reality, many flaws in terms of reasoning are accrued, such as *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XIII.7–8 saying:

> If there were the slightest [thing] that is not empty,
> There would also be a slightest [thing] that is empty.
> If there is not the slightest that is not empty,
> How could there be anything that is empty?
> The victors said that emptiness
> Is what delivers from all views.
> They said that there is nothing to be accomplished
> For those who have views about emptiness.

You may wonder then why the Buddha taught on the three natures. He did so in order to guide those who examine the teachings on profound emptiness in a wrong manner and thus fall into the extreme of extinction or those who do not aspire for the profound. Thus, all the sūtras that the Vijñaptivādins adduce when disputing this presentation here bear these two intentions. Also, it is established through many reasonings that there is no flaw here in terms of reasoning either, such as *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV.14 and 20 saying:

> For whom emptiness is feasible,
> Everything is feasible.
> For whom emptiness is not feasible,
> Nothing is feasible.
> If all of this were not empty,
> Nothing would arise or cease,
> And it would follow that, for you,
> The four realities of the noble ones do not exist.

In this way, Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas agree that the first wheel of dharma is of expedient meaning, but they have different positions on the second and third wheels. Here, mainly the latter system is accepted—one should understand that the second wheel represents the ultimate definitive meaning, while the third one contains elements of both expedient and definitive meaning, as is respectively appropriate. Thus, the division of the dharma into what is of expedient meaning and what is of definitive meaning is made according to the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*. That is, the sūtras that teach the principles of causes, paths, results, and so on by way of seeming reality are of expedient meaning because they guide one gradually toward ultimate true reality. Those that unmistakenly teach the basic nature of ground, path, fruition, and so on by way of ultimate reality are of definitive meaning because they definitively teach the actual true reality that is free from superimposition and denial. Here, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV.8 and 10 says:

> The teaching of the dharma by the Buddhas
> Is perfectly based on the two realities.
> These are the worldly seeming reality

And the ultimate reality.
Without relying on conventions,
The ultimate cannot be taught.
Without realizing the ultimate,
Nirvāṇa will not be attained.

On the mode of being of each one of the two realities, the *Akutobhayā* (D3829, fol. 89a.1–3) states, "This so-called 'worldly seeming reality' is the seeing that all phenomena arise since the mistakenness of worldly [beings] does not realize that all phenomena are empty of nature. Seemingly, this is the very reality for just these [beings]. Hence, it is seeming reality. As for ultimate reality, since the unmistakenness of the noble ones realizes it, it is the seeing that all phenomena do not arise. Ultimately, this is the very reality for precisely these [noble ones]. Therefore, it is ultimate reality. Those who do not understand the division of seeming reality and ultimate reality in this way are the ones who do not understand the profound true reality of the Buddha's teachings." For further details on the three turnings of the wheel of dharma, see, for example, Bu ston rin chen grub 1931 (vol. 2, pp. 45–56), PSD (pp. 16–19; see my forthcoming translation), and Brunnhölzl 2004 (pp. 527–49).

551 JNS (pp. 19–21) presents the reason for presenting prajñāpāramitā as "mother" as follows. Natural prajñāpāramitā is the fully qualified nature of phenomena, and this nature is inseparable from the dharmakāya of the buddhas. Therefore, once prajñāpāramitā is connected to the cause that is the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya (and is like a nanny) and the conditions of generating the mindsets for either one of the three enlightenments, she is free from any obstacles to giving rise to her own children—the four kinds of noble ones. Prajñāpāramitā clearly gives rise to bodhisattvas and buddhas, but as for whether she is also the mother who actually gives rise to the noble ones among śrāvakas, some earlier Tibetans say that she is the actual path and mother of the noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—through their realizing that all phenomena are without nature she is able to produce the nature of these noble ones and accomplish what they desire. However, this is obviously untenable. If the realization that all phenomena are without nature existed in the hīnayāna knowledge of entities, it would follow that the latter is no different from the knowledge of all aspects. "But the distinctive feature of realizing that the mind stream of a specific person lacks the nature of something like a personal identity *does* exist in these noble ones." True, but it would still follow that there is no difference in terms of profundity and vastness between the above knowledge of entities and the knowledge of all aspects. Still, some say, "We accept exactly this, since there is no difference between the realizations of phenomenal identitylessness by noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas on the one hand and by noble bodhisattvas on the other hand." Though Candrakīrti and others assert this, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu hold that this is not what Maitreya had in mind. Therefore, in this context of a text by Maitreya, one needs to follow the latter masters. Some people who have little idea about the mahāyāna claim that noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize phenomenal identitylessness by adducing Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* I.35ab as scriptural support:

As long as the clinging to the skandhas exists
For that long there is also [the clinging to] "me."
Through this identification with "me,"
Again, there is karma and thus, again, rebirth.

However, this is greatly mistaken, since this verse does not teach that there is clinging to "me" if one has not abandoned clinging to *phenomenal* identity. Rather, it means that as long as the clinging to the skandhas as a *personal* identity exists, for that long there is also the clinging to "me." Through this, one accumulates karma and will be reborn in saṃsāra. So if you ask whether the mother of the victors gives rise to noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas or not, we assert that she does since *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā* II.4ac says:

Those who intend to become śrāvakas gone to bliss
Or desire to become pratyekabuddhas, or, likewise, kings of dharma—
Without relying on this poised readiness, they are not able to attain [these goals].

[On the notion of "poised readiness," see CE on I.14.] "But if the mother of the victors gives rise to noble śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, this can only happen by way of the four realities with their sixteen aspects. However, if this is the only way in which these noble ones can realize the mother, since the prājñāpāramitā sūtras explain engaging in what is contrived—form and so on being impermanent—as the contrived mother and that such engagement is just a reflection of prajñāpāramitā, this is not the fully qualified mother." Sure, from the perspective of actually looking at the mother, this is not the fully qualified mother, but no matter whether one looks at it or not, the actual mother is never invalidated as not being this mother. Since the ultimate actuality of the mother is natural emptiness, that which is this natural emptiness is suitable to give rise to the four kinds of noble ones whose mind streams are endowed with the knowledges of entities, the paths, and all aspects, respectively. Later, JNS (p. 40) adds that the four kinds of noble beings are presented as mother prajñāpāramitā's children in terms of the progressive appearance and the ensuing clear realization of this mother in their mind streams.

552 CZ, p. 518. The *Vivṛti* and JNS (pp. 38–51) elaborate greatly on all possible realizations on all Buddhist paths being included in the AA, showing how all realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are included in the knowledge of entities; all realizations of bodhisattvas, in the knowledge of the path; and all realizations of buddhas, in the knowledge of all aspects. For JNS's (pp. 42–49) elaborations on the realizations and relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in turn being included in the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas, and on the triad of completion, maturation, and purification, see Appendix I2A4ff. and Chart 12.

553 The Lokāyatas are often also referred to as Cārvākas; (3) and (4) are the followers of Īśvara and Viṣṇu, respectively; and (5) are better known as Jainas. Note that this classification of non-Buddhist Indian schools is just one among many others. For details on this and the positions of the schools mentioned below, see Hiriyanna 1932, Frauwallner 1956, Brunnhölzl 2004 (pp. 794–99), and the numerous Tibetan doxographical texts translated into English. Note, however, that the presentations of the names, classifications, and philosophical systems of these schools (and several others) may vary considerably.

554 This is the southern continent in a four-continent world system of ancient Indian cosmology.

555 He is said to have rested in a kind of nonconceptual samādhi for twelve years, which is referred to in *Samādhirājasūtra* II.36 as an example of only a temporary achievement, since the grasping at a self and afflictions will arise again thereafter.

556 He was one of the six most famous non-Buddhist teachers at the time of Buddha Śākyamuni.

557 This means that the self is an "emerging quality" of matter and mind coming together. Usually, the Lokāyatas also claim that the ripening of the union of sperm and egg gives rise to the mind, just as when alcohol is produced through a mixture of barley and yeast.

558 This seems to refer to the two forms of liberation asserted by different Sāṃkhyas. Some say that liberation consists of the self or person (*puruṣa*) being left alone by virtue of the manifestations of the primal substance (*prakṛti*) melting back into it. Others say that liberation is the primal substance being released from the self. Besides the nontheistic followers of Kapila, the Sāṃkhya system was also adopted by Patañjali and his followers as the main philosophical foundation of the classic school of Yoga. In contrast to the former, however, the latter assert the existence of Īśvara and that the manifestation of the phenomenal world depends on his intent.

559 They are the founders of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, respectively, having written the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.

560 Tib. gsal byed pa.

561 Jaimini is the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (c. 200 CE) and Kumārila (early seventh century) wrote the most important and extensive commentary on it, the *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika*.

562 His actual name was Vardhamāna (b. 557 CE), and he was also called Nirgrantho Jñātaputra and Mahāvīra.

563 Note that, in Buddhism, "substance" (Skt. dravya, Tib. rdzas) includes matter, mind, and "nonassociated formations" (observable processes, such as impermanence or aging, that are in themselves neither matter nor mind).

564 Lines 4–5a. CE varies in lines 4c–5a: ". . . is never found as anything other than the skandhas. If it were the skandhas, it would be impermanent."

565 Vatsīputra (a disciple of Śāriputra) asserted an ultimately real person that is inexpressible as being either the same as or different from the five skandhas.

566 Both Pāli and Sanskrit sources agree on the Sautrāntikas being the last one of the eighteen subsects (*nikāya*), having branched off from the mainstream of the Sarvāstivādins mainly for the reason of denying that the seven works on abhidharma (see next endnote) were spoken by the Buddha himself. For details and various charts on all eighteen schools, see Hopkins 1996, pp. 340 and 713–19.

567 As transmitted by the Theravādins in the Pāli canon, these seven works are: (1) *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*; (2) *Vibhaṅga*; (3) *Dhātukathā*; (4) *Puggalapaññatti*; (5) *Kathāvattu*; (6) *Yamaka*; and (7) *Paṭṭhāna*. As transmitted by the Sarvāstivādins in Sanskrit, according to Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, the seven texts in chronological order are: (1) *Jñānaprasthāna* (attr. to Kātyāyanīputra); (2) *Prakaraṇapāda* (attr. to Vasumitra); (3) *Dharmaskandha* (attr. to Śāriputra; Taishō: Maudgalyāyana); (4) *Prajñaptibhāṣya/-śāstra* (attr. to Maudgalyāyana; Taishō: Kātyāyana); (5) *Dhātukāya* (attr. to Pūrṇa; Taishō: Vasumitra); (6) *Saṅgītiparyāya* (attr. to Mahākauṣṭhila; Taishō: Śāriputra); and (7) *Vijñānakāya* (attr. to Devaśarman). For details on these works, see Potter 1996, pp. 90–97; 100–110; and 137ff.

568 There are five kinds of "imperceptible form" (Skt. avijñaptirūpa, Tib. rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzugs), which are also called "the form of the āyatana of phenomena" (Skt. dharmāyatanarūpa, Tib. chos kyi skye mched kyi gzugs). They are phenomena that appear as aspects of form which are solely experienced by the mental consciousness, not demonstrable to the eye consciousness, and intangible. Among these five, "aggregational form" refers to the form of the minutest material particle. "Circumstantial form" includes, for example, the space in between things or reflections. "Form originating from correct commitment and symbols" refers to vows. "Imputed form" includes, for example, appearances in a dream, or skeletons appearing by virtue of the samādhi of repulsiveness. "Mastered form" appears through mastery over certain samādhis, for example, the entire universe appearing as earth or red due to the samādhi of the totality of earth or red and such.

569 As for the term "dhyāna," except for when designating the fifth pāramitā, it refers throughout to the four meditative states of the form realm.

570 Different from the more common classification of six kinds of beings, this means that the category of asuras is included in the category of gods.

571 Obviously, the meanings of the individual points in the above brief overviews of the concordant and discordant positions of Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas are clear only to those already familiar with the details and backgrounds of these points. Since there is no room here to

explain these, the reader is referred to the numerous English translations in the field of Tibetan doxographical literature (note though that certain points in the above overview differ from other such presentations).

572 Note that the standard, but rather late, Tibetan classification of the "Mere Mentalists" into "Real Aspectarians" and "False Aspectarians" with all their respective "subschools" is not attested in any Indian texts. Interestingly, CE does not at all mention the False Aspectarians here. As the following shows, CE obviously implies that those who are usually called False Aspectarians in Tibetan doxographies are Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, whom both CE and JNS consider to be Mādhyamikas, and thus not as asserting any really existing consciousness. JNS mentions and refutes positions ascribed to the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists several times, but also refers to Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra as False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas (see Appendix I1H2bb1).

573 This would follow because there are many different names for the god Indra.

574 In Indo-Tibetan dialectics, there are three criteria for a correct reason in a probative argument with subject, predicate, and reason (such as the above, "All outer and inner entities do not really exist, because they are mere dependent origination"). The subject property means that the reason must be present in all instances of the subject. The positive entailment means that the reason may be present only in the predicate and what is equivalent to or coextensive with it (the "homologous set"). The negative entailment means that the reason may never be present in any instance of the opposite of the predicate and what is equivalent to or coextensive with it (the "heterologous set"). For example, in the statement, "Dogs are animals, because they are mammals," the reason "being a mammal" applies to all dogs (the subject). Being a mammal necessarily entails being an animal (the predicate), and being a mammal never applies to anything that is not an animal (for more details on these three criteria, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 177ff.).

575 In reply to the question as to through which reasonings one comes to know the valid cognition of fully realizing the three knowledges to be unborn, JNS (pp. 22–26) says that this depends on three steps, which are based on the systems of the *Svātantrika and Yogācāra masters. First, through the reasonings that put an end to any real identity, the three knowledges that are seeming entities are determined to be unborn by proving their lack of real existence (primarily through the well-known Madhyamaka reasoning of being beyond unity or multiplicity). This is the stage of *rangtong*—establishing the three knowledges as lacking a nature of their own. Once they do not exist through a nature of their own, they are also established as lacking real existence. If a given phenomenon is really established, it must perform the function of this phenomenon. If it is able to do so, it must be undeceiving in that regard. If it is undeceiving, it must be really established. Here, due to not being established as certain real entities on their own, the three knowledges do not exist by any nature of their own. It is by virtue of this essential point that the Mādhyamikas explain what is accepted by the world to be real as being "the correct seeming," which is in fact a presentation of what is contrived und thus unreal due to lacking a nature of its own. Secondly, through the reasonings that put an end to all bases for a view, the three knowledges that are ultimate entities are determined to be unborn by proving that they do not only not exist as any real entities, but not even as any existent entities, which entails that they are unborn too (quoting *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XIII.7 on their being neither any being empty nor any being nonempty). Thirdly, as for fully realizing the three knowledges being unborn, based on the above two inferential valid cognitions of conventions, which consist of first refuting any real existence of the three knowledges and then understanding them to be unborn, in due order, the three knowledges are directly realized to be not really established and to be unborn. This is presented as the fully qualified view or outlook that is associated with the mind being immersed in yoga. At that point, there is no claim of any philosophical position, such as "being unborn," because the object of negation has ceased by itself and there is nothing

to be proved whatsoever either (according to *Satyadvayavibhāga* lines 9cd, there is actually no negation since there is nothing to be negated). Thus, what is unborn and explained as emptiness is established through its own valid cognition and not invalidated by any other valid cognitions. It is in this way that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti asserted the Buddha to be a true source of valid cognition since he realized that this kind of object (the mother of the victors) and this subject (the three knowledges as the wisdom of emptiness) are unborn. JNS finally refers to the explanations by the Seventh Karmapa. Unlike most Tibetan masters, he says that there is no such thing as the beings to be guided, who have the three dispositions of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, respectively, directly relying on the omniscience that has the nature of the three knowledges, nor is there any familiarizing with these three knowledges through these beings directly relying on them in their mind streams. For the intention of the words of the Buddha and the treatises on them is that the consciousnesses that represent the mind streams of those to be guided and the three knowledges are mutually exclusive. The consciousnesses, such as self-aware perception, of ordinary beings are not able to perform the function of familiarizing with the three knowledges by actually relying on them. Rather, all obscurations of these beings becoming relinquished is only justified because the process of becoming familiar with the realization of the three knowledges being unborn happens through the power of the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas within the consciousnesses of ordinary beings, which do not exist by any nature of their own. In other words, the relinquishment of obscurations in order to accomplish perfect buddhahood happens by virtue of becoming familiar with the operations of the compassion and enlightened activity of prajñāpāramitā, which is endowed with the qualities of the knowledge of all aspects. Having taught that this is justified, the Seventh Karmapa thus establishes that perfect buddhahood, in which the two obscurations are relinquished, is not impossible. Thus, according to the intention of the Seventh Karmapa and in my own opinion, Mikyö Dorje says, the self-aware perception that consists of the consciousness of those with impure minds, no matter how much it may be empty of the conceptions of apprehender and apprehended, and the self-aware perception of personally experienced wisdom are mutually exclusive in the sense of it being impossible for them to coexist. However, Dölpopa and Śākya Chogden—those present-day Tibetans who boast about themselves being Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas—claim that, except for respectively being or not being empty of both the imaginary and the conceived, the self-aware perception of the personally experienced wisdom that represents nondual wisdom is not different from the stream of the self-aware perception of those with impure minds. This does not accord with any scriptures that are authentic sources. For, otherwise, it would follow that ordinary sentient beings and buddhas have the same underlying mind stream.

576 JNS (pp. 10–11) explains in detail how the AA can be definitely correlated to everything in the sūtras in one hundred thousand and eight thousand lines too. According to the *Ālokā*, this implicitly includes the sūtras' settings, prophecies about certain persons, the chapters on the bodhisattva Sadāprarudita and his teacher Dharmodgata, and the Anupradatta Chapter. It also includes the Maitreya Chapter in the revised version of the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines since Dharmamitra comments that Āryavimuktisema explains it in connection with enlightened activity. In particular, JNS (pp. 18–19) quotes Ngog Lotsāwa's *Rin chen sgron me* as stating that the AA's verse of paying homage is the summary of the extensive presentation of the setting and, based on Vasubandhu's commentary, explains in more detail how these two match. JG (pp. 112ff.) says that Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta (and most Tibetans, such as Butön) hold that the AA does not include everything in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (such as the setting), whereas Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra assert the opposite. However, these two positions are not contradictory because Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta only say so in terms of certain passages being not included explicitly in the AA due to their being easy to understand, but it being possible to infer them implicitly by virtue of the more difficult passages that are explicitly included in the AA. That all subject matters of all prajñāpāramitā texts are included in the eight clear realizations is also stated in the concluding verses of the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 140a.2–3). This

not only includes the entire progression of clear realizations, but also the teachings on emptiness (the explicit meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras). For the eight clear realizations are included in the three knowledges (wisdom as the perceiving subject), and emptiness (the object to be perceived) is included in these knowledges in the manner of their ascertaining all entities, paths, and aspects to be without arising.

577 The beginning of the *Vṛtti* says that the AA's first verse of paying homage includes the commitment to compose this treatise about the clear realization of prajñāpāramitā. Traditionally, every Indo-Tibetan Buddhist treatise has to fulfill four criteria—proper subject matter, purpose, essential purpose, and connection (usually abbreviated by just the phrase "purpose and connection"). (1) Proper subject matters from a Buddhist point of view are the three kinds of proper treatises (meaningful in a Buddhist sense; leading to relinquishing suffering; and mainly focusing on practice) versus the six types of specious ones as described in Asaṅga's *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (D4038, fol. 205a.3–7; see endnote 513). (2) The proper purpose of a text means that it must serve as a convenient avenue for penetrating the intended meaning of the teachings. (3) The essential purpose is to engage in this meaning with enthusiasm and eventually attain a buddha's omniscience. (4) The proper connection refers to the one between the purpose and the essential purpose. Also, in terms of the subject matter, the earlier parts of the contents of the text must be properly connected with the following ones.

578 D4061, fol. 30b.3 (CE omits the first line). As mentioned in the Introduction, this verse is also quoted in Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (p. 15.23).

579 JNS (p. 52) identifies these lines as being by Kumāra(śrībhadra), but they are not found in his *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*. The *Vyākhyāyukti* (D4061, fol. 30b.4–6) says that (1) the purpose of a sūtra should be stated first since the audience will thus develop respect for it and make efforts in studying and retaining it. This purpose will be realized through (2) giving a topical summary of the sūtra; this summary, through explaining (3) the meaning of the words of the sūtra; the order of the meaning of these words not being contradictory, through (4) showing their coherence; and the reasonings and earlier and later passages not being contradictory, through (5) the rebuttal of objections.

580 The AA contains many very terse, ambiguous, and cryptic verses, with the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions moreover differing at times. In the above two verses, I attempted to mirror the order of the lines in Sanskrit, but since the commentary is based on the Tibetan, I largely adopted the meaning of the Tibetan. That these verses can be read in several ways is amply highlighted by the many different ways in which both Indian and Tibetan commentaries explain them. The main difference here lies in lines 2a–c, where the Sanskrit says, "Having committed to memory the meaning of the sūtras, may they easily progress in the tenfold practice of the dharma" (*smṛtau cādhāya sūtrārthaṃ dharmacaryāṃ daśātmikām/ sukhena pratipatsīrann iti*; for a complete translation of verses 1–2 purely from the Sanskrit, see the Introduction).

581 The *Vivṛti* and JNS (pp. 58–59) say that the knowledge of all aspects stands for all eight topics of clear realization. As for the meaning of "aspects" here, the prajñāpāramitā sūtras say that this refers to the aspects by means of which the teachings are uttered. The *Vṛtti* (D3787, fol. 199b.1–6) presents explanations by different scholars, such as the "knowledge of all aspects" referring to the wisdom that realizes all sixteen aspects of the four realities of the noble ones; the wisdom that realizes the ultimate aspects of phenomena (such as lack of nature, nonarising, and primordial peace); the capacity of buddha wisdom to fulfill all aspects of what sentient beings aspire for; and the wisdom that is the basis within which the obscurations in all their aspects are relinquished. Master Bhadrapāla explains that it is called "the knowledge of all aspects" because it is the very heart or essence of everything that is included in the ten aspects of knowable objects, such as the ālaya-consciousness. This, Vimuktisena says, is the very best commentary since this knowledge is what focuses on the perfect (nature; *pariniṣpanna*). It is not

clear who is meant by "Bhadrapāla," but it is highly noteworthy that the ten aspects of knowable objects, starting with the ālaya-consciousness, correspond to the ten chapters of Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. In addition, the entire above passage in the *Vṛtti* is found almost literally in Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana* (P552, fol. 345a.3–7) on the knowledge of all aspects in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.25 (corresponding to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.58, which says that it is the great enlightenment in all aspects that cuts through the doubts of all beings everywhere). As mentioned above, all of this is further evidence for the AA being very much based on the Yogācāra tradition and this obviously being noticed and accepted by many early and later Indian commentators. At the beginning of the chapter on the complete training in all aspects, both the *Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 176a.3–4) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 104b.3–4) define "aspects" in the general context of the AA as the specific instances of the wisdoms that focus on the nature of the remedial dharmas (such as impermanence) for the antagonistic factors (such as clinging to permanence). JNS (vol. 2, p. 12) says on this that "aspects" are the distinct features of the specific instances of consciousness that delimit their directly perceived objects among the entirety of knowable objects. According to the Third Karmapa's STT (p. 96), the aspects to be realized consist of the set of the sixteen aspects of the four realities and the set of the aspects that are the sixteen moments of wisdom in the mahāyāna's knowledge of the path, that is, on the mahāyāna path of seeing. These represent the aspects of the nature of the seeming, while the aspect of the ultimate fundamental nature refers to the fact that those two sets of sixteen aspects actually abide free from reference points (this fact is merely labeled as "aspect").

582 CE's gloss "accomplish the dharmakāya through that which has the character of the ten dharma practices" seems to retain the original meaning of lines 2bc of the Sanskrit ("progressing in the tenfold practice of the dharma"). Most Indian commentaries (including the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, and the *Vivṛti*) do not identify "the tenfold practice of the dharma." The *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 81a.4–5) only says that the entire meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras has the character of the eight clear realizations, which consist of the practices of accomplishing bodhicitta, generosity, and so on. Through committing to this (*Ālokā*: through study, reflection, and meditation on the prajñāpāramitā sūtras), one gradually progresses through the realizations of the ten bhūmis (such as the first one having the characteristic of realizing the dharmadhātu being omnipresent) and thus will manifest the knowledge of all aspects. Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā* (D3796, fol. 25a.1–25b.2; also partly paraphrased in JG, pp. 212–13) agrees with the *Vivṛti*, elaborating that the essential meaning of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras—the eight clear realizations—has the nature of the tenfold practice of the dharma (the ten pāramitās). This means the practice of bodhicitta, generosity, and so on. From the level of a beginner bodhisattva up through buddhahood, in terms of bodhicitta's causal and fruitional nature, respectively, the pāramitās are never separated from it. Therefore, even on the buddhabhūmi, generosity and so on are endowed with it. If generosity and so on are not blessed by bodhicitta (emptiness with a heart of compassion), they do not represent the practice of accomplishing. Therefore, bodhicitta is said to be the primary element in this practice. In general, in the mahāyāna, there are three sets of practice. (1) The bodhicitta of aspiration is the practice of entering. (2) The bodhicitta of application (the ten pāramitās) is the practice of accomplishing, which means to accomplish what one has aspired for or to excellently accomplish the fruition. (3) The practice of accomplishing of a buddha consists of the enlightened activities of the dharmakāya. Then, Dharmamitra explicitly denies the position of some that the tenfold practice of dharma refers to the more common set as found in *Madhyāntavibhāga* V.8cd–10ab—(1) writing the letters of the dharma; (2) venerating it and those who proclaim it; (3) practicing generosity for both of these; (4) listening to it; (5) reading it; (6) memorizing it; (7) explaining it to others; (8) reciting it; (9) reflecting on it; and (10) meditating on it. For they refer mainly to just the practice of accomplishing on the path of preparation and thus are not the supreme practice on all levels of bodhisattvas, nor are they ever mentioned in Haribhadra's commentaries (Prajñākaramati's *Vṛttipiṇḍārtha* [D3795, fol. 256a] follows this denial). Also, to assert the tenfold practice as the ten virtuous actions for the welfare of oneself

and others is said to not be tenable because Haribhadra's commentaries do not mention these either. Dharmakīrtiśrī's *Durbodhālokā* (D3794, fol. 147a.5) follows Dharmamitra's identification of the tenfold practice as bodhicitta and the ten pure pāramitās, and the *Kīrtikala* (D3799, fol 191b.5) also glosses it as the ten pāramitās. On the other hand, Ratnākaraśānti's *Śuddhamatī* (D3801, fol. 77b.2–3) and Buddhaśrījñāna's *Prajñāpradīpāvalī* (D3800, fol. 4b.5) identify the tenfold practice as the above-mentioned set in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. The *Marmakaumudī* (D3805, fol. 3a.6), explicitly explains it as referring to the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects. JG (pp. 213–16) explains that, though the *Ālokā* does not explicitly state that the tenfold practice refers to the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects, this is in fact its position. Moreover, JG explicitly denies that the tenfold practice corresponds to the ten pāramitās or the above set in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, saying that neither of these two sets pertains to what the sūtras or the AA and its commentaries say. Rather, JG says, the *Ālokā* glosses the tenfold practice through the phrase "accomplishing bodhicitta, generosity, and so on" (see the corresponding passage in the *Vivṛti* above), which illustrates the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects and thus implicitly stands for all seventy points of the AA. Among those ten points, "generosity and so on" may either signify the topics of the instructions on practice (the second point of the knowledge of all aspects) or the four sets of the actual mahāyāna practice (the last four points of the knowledge of all aspects—armorlike practice and the practices of engagement, the equipments, and final deliverance) because the six pāramitās are explained in all four of them. JNS's (pp. 59–60) own commentary is silent on this issue, while its commentary on the above passage in the *Vivṛti* follows JG in glossing "the practice of accomplishing bodhicitta, generosity, and so on" as "the topics of the instructions on practice—the tenfold practice of the dharma." As CE above, many Tibetan commentaries, such as PBG (p. 468), gloss the tenfold practice of dharma as the ten pāramitās.

583 Thus, according to the *Ālokā* (p. 4), the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 81a.1–6), CE, JG (p. 210), JNS (pp. 55–56), and all other commentaries that follow Haribhadra, (1) the subject matter of the AA is represented by lines I.1ab; (2) the purpose, by lines I.2cd; and (3) the essential purpose, by lines I.1cd–2ab. (4) The connection between (1)–(3) is to be understood by implication (the same is found in PBG, pp. 467–68). In other words, JNS says, (1) the subject matter of the AA consists of its eight topics; (2) its purpose is to realize these eight topics in an easy way by relying on the text; (3) its essential purpose is to attain the dharmakāya based on the realization under (2); and (4) the connection is that (3) arises from (2), and (2) from (1). By contrast, SC (pp. 2–3) says that line 1a is the subject matter; lines 1bc and 2ab, the connection; line 1d, the purpose; and lines 2cd, the essential purpose.

584 D27, fol. 177a.4–5.

585 D3807, fol. 26a.1–2.

586 P. 23. JG (pp. 219–39) defines actual prajñāpāramitā as "the prajñā (together with its congruently associated mental factors) of directly realizing emptiness on the three paths of the mahāyāna noble ones (the paths of seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning)." As for its fourfold classification, (1) natural prajñāpāramitā is explained by way of quoting the prajñāpāramitā sūtras; a famous verse in praise of prajñāpāramitā (attributed to Rāhulabhadra); Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*; and Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā*. These texts say that it is suchness, which cannot be taught or known; is beyond speech, thought, expression, unarisen and unceasing; is unarisen and unceasing dependent origination; and cannot be said to be the same as or different from phenomena. (2) The scriptural prajñāpāramitā is what teaches as its main topic the fruitional prajñāpāramitā and the prajñāpāramitā of the path, or, in other words, the ultimate culmination of the wisdom that directly realizes the nature of phenomena and is free from all obscurations, or, the path that transcends saṃsāra and nirvāṇa—the pāramitā that transcends the nine aspects of aspiration prayers, making effort, afflictions, karma, suffering,

saṃsāra, conceptions, qualities, and knowable objects. (3) On the prajñāpāramitā of the path, JG quotes the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* and the *Prajñāpāramitā-saṃcayagāthā*. The *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra Requested by Candragarbha* (D27, fol. 177a.4–5) speaks of the contaminated prajñāpāramitā during the level of engagement through aspiration and the uncontaminated prajñāpāramitā during the paths of seeing and familiarization. The actual prajñāpāramitā of the path is the nonconceptual wisdom of realizing all phenomena as lacking a nature on the paths of seeing and familiarization. Following *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.21–22 (P5549, fols. 19b.6–20b.5), Ratnākaraśānti says that prajñāpāramitā is the nonconceptual wisdom that is the remedy for the ten conceptual distractions (in terms of nonentities or entities, superimposition or denial, being one or different, a phenomenon's nature or its features, and taking a referent to be just as its name or vice versa). On (4) the fruitional prajñāpāramitā, JG quotes the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* ("It is called 'prajñāpāramitā' and it is also called 'vajralike samādhi'") and Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* as saying, "What is called 'prajñāpāramitā' ultimately transcends the nine aspects of aspiration prayers, . . . Therefore, the supramundane nonconceptual wisdom that consists of the vajralike samādhi is called 'prajñāpāramitā.' It is from this cause that the conceptual and nonconceptual wisdoms of subsequent attainment—mirrorlike wisdom, the wisdom of equality, discriminating wisdom, and all-accomplishing wisdom—arise. Thus, since the fruition is labeled as its cause, it is called 'prajñāpāramitā' . . . Among these [factors] that are thus called 'prajñāpāramitā,' the one here is referred to as 'the prajñāpāramitā belonging to the buddhabhūmi.'" Also Daṃṣṭrāsena's *Śatasāhasrikāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā* (D3806, vol. na, fols. 25b.5–7, 42b.2–3, and 50b.6–7) and Jagaddalanivāsin's *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* (D3811, fol. 17b.4–6) explain the same, from which it is clear that, here, Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* and these other two works (for details on the three, see the Introduction) do not refer to the vajralike samādhi as being the one at the end of the tenth bhūmi, but as being buddhahood. JG adduces further quotes from the *Prajñāpāramitāstotra*, the opening verse of Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* (with its commentary by Triratnadāsa), the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, the *Ālokā* (see right below), and Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, all of which identify prajñāpāramitā with buddhahood or nonconceptual wisdom. Next, JG distinguishes between an actual and a nominal aspect for each one of the four kinds of prajñāpāramitā explained above. As for natural prajñāpāramitā, according to the *Prajñāpāramitāstotra* (prajñāpāramitā being "the sphere of personally experienced wisdom"), the perceiving subject (prajñāpāramitā) is labeled with the name of its object. According to the meaning of the term "prajñāpāramitā" itself, the object is labeled with the name of its subject. As for fruitional prajñāpāramitā, the actual one is the wisdom that consists of the nonconceptual meditative equipoise of the buddhabhūmi—the vajralike samādhi. The nominal one consists of the four conceptual and nonconceptual wisdoms (mirrorlike wisdom and so on) that appear during the subsequent attainment of the meditative equipoise of the buddhabhūmi. Since they arise from this meditative equipoise as their cause, they represent a case of the result being labeled with the name of its cause. As for the prajñāpāramitā of the path, according to Ratnākaraśānti's *Śuddhamatī*, the path of preparation is called "prajñāpāramitā" because it is its cause. The dharmakāya with its enlightened activity is referred to as prajñāpāramitā because it is its fruition. The actual prajñāpāramitā of the path consists of the nonconceptual wisdom that serves as the remedy for the ten conceptual distractions, that is, the meditative equipoises of the ten bhūmis. Thus, the paths of accumulation and preparation as well as the buddhabhūmi are explained to be the nominal forms of the prajñāpāramitā of the path. As for scriptural prajñāpāramitā, in terms of its own nature, the actual scriptural prajñāpāramitā is what is expressed by scriptural prajñāpāramitā, while the nominal one consists of the means of expression being labeled with the name "prajñāpāramitā." When prajñāpāramitā is classified as threefold as in the opening stanza of Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha*, Triratnadāsa's commentary on it (D3810, fol. 295a.5–295b.7) explains the following. As for actual prajñāpāramitā (the actuality to be

accomplished) being "nondual wisdom," "dual" means apprehender and apprehended, which refers to the cognitions that are not without these two. The apprehended refers to what presents itself as form and so on, while the apprehender is the cognition that appears as the apprehended. Therefore, prajñāpāramitā is the cognition that is devoid of the pair of apprehender and apprehended. It is the very pure realization that represents the culmination of all the forms of the prajñās that arise from study, reflection, and meditation. As for the scriptures and the path, they are referred to as "prajñāpāramitā" with the intention of their being connected to that actuality to be accomplished in that they are the means to accomplish it. Therefore, the meaning of the term "prajñāpāramitā" is taught to be twofold—the principal one being nondual wisdom and the ordinary one consisting of the scriptures and the path. This corresponds to what the *Ālokā* explains (see the above quote). By taking the *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* and the *Ālokā* as their scriptural references, most Tibetans explain that fruitional prajñāpāramitā is the actual one, while the scriptural prajñāpāramitā and the one of the path are the nominal ones. The reasons for labeling the latter two as prajñāpāramitā are that they represent that which expresses fruitional prajñāpāramitā and the means or cause for attaining it, respectively. The purpose of doing so is that those who desire to attain this fruition know that the scriptures are what is to be engaged in through study and so on and that the path is what is to be cultivated. The invalidation of the explicit statement of labeling the scriptures and the path as prajñāpāramitā is that this statement contradicts the passages in the sūtras that speak of prajñāpāramitā as being the most consummate (which the scriptures and the path obviously are not). However, in our own system, following the intention of Dignāga and the *Ālokā*, the distinction between fully qualified and nominal prajñāpāramitās does not appear, but it appears that the one between actual (or principal) and ordinary is asserted. Following Dignāga, the above quote from the *Ālokā* explains the actual prajñāpāramitā as the dharmakāya or the Tathāgata. Since the scriptural prajñāpāramitā is merely cognizance appearing as names and words in the mind streams of those to be guided, it is not the fully qualified prajñāpāramitā. As for the path, though it is ordinary, this does not contradict its being the fully qualified prajñāpāramitā, just as an ordinary human is still a fully qualified human. Though the above-mentioned two *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*s and the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī* explain the vajralike samādhi of buddhas as the actual prajñāpāramitā and their wisdom of subsequent attainment as the nominal one, they give no substantial reasons for their making this kind of distinction. Furthermore, these commentaries explain the wisdoms of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddha arhats as fruitions of prajñāpāramitā and the scriptures as its cause, thus labeling causes with the name of their result. Also, though they explain all realizations of bodhisattvas up through the tenth bhūmi as just being prajñāpāramitā in a nominal way, they still say that the wisdoms of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddha arhats are fruitions of prajñāpāramitā. Such explanations are not good. On the other hand, by quoting the *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha*, Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā* makes the distinction between fully qualified and nominal prajñāpāramitās in accordance with this text and Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā*. This position is followed by most Tibetans. However, if one refers to the path as being merely nominal, all the many statements in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that one should train in prajñāpāramitā would become untenable because what is to be trained in (prajñāpāramitā) would not exist on any path of learning. Also, all other pāramitās would then become nothing but nominal and thus there would actually be no fully qualified six or ten pāramitās on the path of learning. Likewise, there would not be any fully qualified three trainings, two accumulations, prajñā and means, and so on of bodhisattvas on the path of learning. It may be said that the explanations on the need to train in prajñāpāramitā and on the pāramitās and trainings existing on the path of learning are given with the intention of all of these being nominal. But then what is to be trained in (the prajñāpāramitā of the path), training in it, the one who trains, and so on would likewise all be nominal. If that is accepted, the result of all this would also be just nominal. For it is not feasible for there to be an actual result if there is no actual cause. When searching for the intention of Dignāga and Haribhadra, the distinction

between fully qualified and nominal does not appear in their works. Rather, the *Ālokā* (p. 23) clearly says "actual" and "nominal." Thus, those who explain this latter distinction do so in terms of (a) the result being foremost as opposed to the cause and (b) cause and result being mutually dependent. Thus, when the principal basis to which the name prajñāpāramitā is applied is explained as the fruition, its two causes (scriptures and path) are explained and labeled with this name too, just as the above passage in the commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* does. As for the reason why the fruition is taken to be the principal one here, this commentary states that prajñāpāramitā is that which is to be accomplished by bodhisattvas because it is the fruition they desire. The scriptures and the path are taken to be ordinary because they are the causes for deliberately accomplishing this fruition. The same is expressed in Haribhadra's *Ālokā* and *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā* as well as in Dharmamitra's *Prasphuṭapadā*, all saying that illusionlike buddha wisdom is the principal prajñāpāramitā, while the scriptures and the path are not principal. Thus, fruitional prajñāpāramitā being taken to be the principal (or actual) one means that the wisdom of the knowledge of all aspects is realized through the progressive arising of the cognitions of the three prajñās and thus is most consummate. Therefore, it is given the name "prajñāpāramitā." Compared with this, what is not as powerful, but consists of (a) the cause for, or the path to, this principal prajñāpāramitā and (b) the scriptures, is thus suitable to be labeled with the name "prajñāpāramitā." For (a) is its cause and (b) is what expresses it. Though the path and the scriptures are labeled with the name of their result, they are not the actual prajñāpāramitā because they do not posses the unique characteristics of the actual fruitional prajñāpāramitā. However, the path and the scriptures cannot be invalidated as being prajñāpāramitā merely through saying that they, in general, do not bear the name "prajñāpāramitā" and do not represent the consummation of prajñā because the prajñāpāramitā of the path is endowed with the sheer consummation of prajñā and the characteristics of prajñāpāramitā. Therefore, it is in terms of being less or more prominent that the path is labeled with the name of its result, but this is not a general distinction in terms of the fully qualified prajñāpāramitā being or not being the actual prajñāpāramitā—as illustrated before, many scriptures identify the fully qualified prajñāpāramitā as the most consummate nonconceptual wisdom. Also, neither the AA nor the *Vṛtti* distinguish the eight realizations in terms of being actual and nominal. Vimalamitra says, "The ultimate prajñāpāramitā is the dharmakāya that is pure in all aspects. What has characteristics other than that (such as generating bodhicitta; the instructions; the armorlike practice; and the practices of engagement, the equipments, and final deliverance) is of a causal nature." He also holds both the causal and the fruitional prajñāpāramitās to be fully qualified prajñāpāramitās. Also Buddhaśrījñāna's *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā*, the *Ālokā*, and Kamalaśīla hold the prajñāpāramitā of the path to be the fully qualified one. Moreover, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, when explaining the ten pāramitās as being most prominent on the respectively corresponding ones among the ten bhūmis, does not say that prajñāpāramitā becoming pure and most prominent on the sixth bhūmi is merely something nominal. Rather, its *Bhāṣya* explains that, just as a seeing guide leading the blind to their desired destination, prajñāpāramitā seizes the qualities of the other pāramitās and thus establishes them on the buddhabhūmi because it has the nature of seeing what is and is not the perfect path. Also, both this text and the *Vṛtti* refer to the prajñāpāramitā of the path making the other pāramitās pure and supramundane through freeing them from the spheres of agent, object, and action. Therefore, since the mere term "prajñāpāramitā" does not have to refer to fruitional prajñāpāramitā alone, the prajñāpāramitā of the path is the fully qualified prajñāpāramitā from its own side and without being dependent on anything else. Furthermore, when the prajñāpāramitā of the path is referred to as the fully qualified path, it represents the nominal fruition in that it is a case of the result being labeled with the name of its cause (according to Ratnākaraśānti's explanation). In brief, as for all the subdivisions to which the name "prajñāpāramitā" is applied, there are none that are not included in the triad of scriptural, path, and fruitional prajñāpāramitās. That the scriptural and path prajñāpāramitās are not the actual

prajñāpāramitā only means that they are not the fruitional prajñāpāramitā, but it is not that they are not prajñāpāramitā at all because there are no other prajñāpāramitās that are not included in these three (or four) types of prajñāpāramitā. Therefore, their being classified as actual and nominal is in terms of comparison, just as, from their own sides, the inferior nirvāṇas and enlightenments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are asserted to be fully qualified, while, from the perspective of others, that is, in comparison with the nonabiding nirvāṇa and great enlightenment, they are just nominal. In this vein, the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* says that, on their own, the other five pāramitās are given the name "pāramitā" by virtue of their entailing the distinctive feature of dedication, thus being similar to prajñāpāramitā. However, it is only when they are embraced by the prajñāpāramitā of the path that they are all referred to as supramundane "prajñāpāramitā." As for the question whether the clear realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are actual or nominal prajñāpāramitās, the sūtras, the *Prajñāpāramitāstotra*, the *Vṛtti*, and the *Ālokā* explain all clear realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as being included in the knowledge of entities. Accordingly, all these realizations are included in prajñāpāramitā, but they are not prajñāpāramitā as such because prajñāpāramitā is primarily the special epitome of the mahāyāna that is not in common with others. According to the *Ālokā* and Buddhaśrījñāna's *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā*, compared to the uncommon prajñāpāramitā of the mahāyāna, the clear realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are contrived forms of prajñāpāramitā and therefore explained to be just reflections of prajñāpāramitā. Also, it is said that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not even possess the names of the six pāramitās as these are explained in the mahāyāna. As for generally classifying prajñāpāramitā as the eight topics of the AA without making any distinction between actual and nominal, all eight topics simply represent prajñāpāramitā without such a distinction.

587 CE does not include these six lines in full, but only renders the respective names under each topic below.

588 For the definitions of the eight topics as given by JNS, PSD, and STT, see Appendix V in Volume Two.

589 A "primary mind" is defined as "that which cognizes the nature of an object," while a "mental factor" is defined as "that which cognizes the distinctive features of this object." The six or eight consciousnesses are primary minds, while feeling, discrimination, and the forty-nine factors in the fourth skandha of formations are mental factors.

590 Each subheading (2)—explanation of the term—in the following descriptions of the eight topics uses their respective names as listed in AA I.3cd–4 above.

591 CE's presentation of the definitions, classifications, and boundary lines of the eight topics is obviously based on JG (pp. 239–48). The latter defines the knowledge of all aspects as "the wisdom that lacks the stains of all obscurations and directly realizes all aspects of suchness and variety in a momentary manner." It is twofold—(1) the knowledge of all aspects of suchness is "the wisdom of directly realizing the nature of phenomena, that is, all stains being at peace." (2) The knowledge of all aspects of variety consists of (a) "the wisdom of directly realizing all aspects of knowable objects (all natures, causes, and results of phenomena without exception)" and (b) "the final wisdom of directly realizing the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects in terms of its primary causes and results." The nature of the knowledge of all aspects is to focus on the nature of all phenomena (natural emptiness); rely on the dominant condition of the mindfulness of having cultivated many forms of mental engagement that entail the knowledge of all aspects; and its aspect being the ultimate wisdom of natural peace (and not the peace of previously existing entities having ceased later). The actual knowledge of all aspects exists only on the buddhabhūmi, while its merely approximately concordant forms exist on the four last paths of bodhisattvas and also in śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Thus, the knowledge of all

aspects that is taught in the first chapter of the AA is not the fully qualified one, because the sūtras say that it is not attained before the vajralike samādhi.

592 JNS (p. 65) explains that realizing something to be primordial peace is equivalent to realizing its lacking a nature.

593 JG (pp. 240–42) defines the knowledge of the path here as being "primarily the clear realization of noble bodhisattvas of the three paths being without nature ultimately, and, through being embraced by this realization, directly realizing the three paths and promoting the welfare of others on the level of the seeming without manifesting the true end through not completing the triad of completion, maturation, and purification" (on the latter, see Appendix I2A4ff. and Chart 12). It is twofold—(1) the knowledge of the path of the final deliverance of the three yānas and (2) the knowledge of the path of realizing the three paths as being unarisen. The first one, by way of not observing the three paths ultimately, directly knows and realizes them on the level of the seeming, thus promoting the welfare of those with the three dispositions of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas and not manifesting the true end as above. In terms of its focal objects (the three paths), this knowledge of the path is threefold. This is the supramundane clear realization of the cognitive seeing of bodhisattvas looking at the two paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, which is the clear realization of revealing all three paths. The second one has the character of being inseparable from the wisdom of the knowledge of all aspects that exists in the mind streams of buddhas. As for the boundary lines of the knowledge of the path, it primarily exists from the mahāyāna path of seeing up through the end of the continuum. Both the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā* negate that a cognition that merely cognizes by way of object generalities is the fully qualified knowledge of the path. Also, to say that the knowledge of the path exists on the buddhabhūmi may be done in the context of explaining each one of the clear realizations of the four kinds of noble ones separately, but it is not good to explain the boundary lines of the knowledge of the path as explained here as including the buddhabhūmi.

594 JG (pp. 242–43) defines the knowledge of entities as "the knowledge that directly realizes all entities as being primarily empty of a personal identity and is embraced by this realization." It is twofold—(1) the knowledges of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas that, from the perspective of bodhisattvas, are antagonistic factors and (2) the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas that is the remedy of the former. The first one consists of the two direct realizations of all entities being primarily empty of either a personal identity or the apprehended aspect of phenomenal identity and being embraced by these respective realizations. The second one is the direct realization of phenomenal identitylessness in a fully complete manner. Thus, it is only (1) that represents the clear realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, while (2) is inseparable from the knowledge of the path and the knowledge of all aspects, thus representing the clear realizations of bodhisattvas and buddhas. As for their cognitive aspects, (1) bears the sixteen aspects of the four realities and (2) has the aspect of the nature of all phenomena. However, the sheer types of realization of (1) exist in the mind streams of bodhisattvas and buddhas too. That (2) is presented as the knowledge of entities is by way of its objects or its factors to be relinquished. As for its boundary lines, the first fully qualified knowledge of entities exists from the paths of seeing of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas onward, while the latter fully qualified one exists from the mahāyāna path of seeing onward. The approximately concordant forms of (1) and (2) exist on the paths of accumulation and preparation of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, respectively, because there is the realization, by way of object generalities, that entities are without (personal) identity.

595 JG (pp. 243–44) defines the complete training in all aspects as "the yoga of bodhisattvas familiarizing with the aspects of the three knowledges in a combined manner in order to gain mastery over these aspects after having understood them through study and reflection." When divided in general, the complete training in all aspects contains 173 yogas of familiarizing with

the same number of all aspects of the three knowledges. In particular, it consists of the five natural trainings and the fifteen situational trainings. As for the boundary lines, in terms of the complete training in all aspects being the cause for the result of the culminating training, it exists from the lesser path of accumulation up through the last moment of the great path of accumulation. The complete training in all aspects as such exists from the lesser mahāyāna path of accumulation up through the end of the continuum.

596 An uninterrupted path refers to the process of a given factor to be relinquished being completely eliminated through its specific remedy, without anything being able to interrupt or stop this process. The result of this—the absence of the factor to be relinquished in question—is called a "path of liberation." For example, the sixteen moments of the path of seeing consist of eight uninterrupted paths alternating with eight paths of liberation (for more details, see below). In the context of the culminating training, the uninterrupted path refers to the vajralike samādhi during the very last moment of the tenth bhūmi.

597 JG (pp. 244–45) defines the culminating training as "the yoga of bodhisattvas that is the consummate familiarization with the three knowledges in a combined manner, which is based on the preceding complete training in all aspects on the great path of accumulation." It is classified as sevenfold—the four culminating trainings on the four levels of the path of preparation, and the culminating trainings on the paths of seeing, the path of familiarization, and the uninterrupted path. JG also speaks of an unspecified eightfold classification here (it may be that this refers to the culminating training of the path of seeing being counted as twofold in terms of its uninterrupted path and its path of liberation). As for its boundary lines, it exists from the level of heat of the mahāyāna path of preparation up through the end of the continuum.

598 In accordance with Āryavimuktisena, JG (pp. 245–46) defines the serial training as "the yoga of sequentially training in the thirteen dharmas as the object of training." According to Haribhadra, it is defined as "the yoga of bodhisattvas that is based on the culminating clear realization and consists of familiarizing with the aspects of the three knowledges by way of going through them in due order as they are realized individually and in combination in order to gain stability in them." The serial training is thirteenfold. As for the boundary lines, according to Āryavimuktisena, it exists from the path of accumulation up through the end of the continuum, which accords with the sūtras identifying it as taking place from one's first generation of bodhicitta onward. According to Haribhadra and Buddhaśrījñāna, it exists from right after the culminating training (on the path of preparation) up through the moment before the end of the continuum.

599 JG (p. 247) lists three ways in which an "instant" can be understood in Buddhism—(1) the 368th fraction of the time of a finger snap as known in the abhidharma; (2) the time it takes for a minutest material particle to shift its status as explained in the *Prajñapti* [JG only has *gdags pa* as the name of the text, which probably refers to one of the two texts in the *Tengyur* whose names include that word—the anonymous abhidharma works *Kāraṇaprajñapti* (Tib. rgyu gdags pa; D4087) and *Karmaprajñapti* (Tib. las gdags pa; D4088)]; and (3) the time it takes to complete a given action. Though the *Prasphuṭapadā* and the earlier Tibetans hold that the instant in question here refers to (3), it must refer to (1). For this accords with the *Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 316a.1–2) saying, "Through having familiarized with the perfect realization in a single instant, in the second instant there is the perfect realization of the dharmakāya." Also, the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 130b.3–4) on AA VII.2 compares the training in this single instant to the single proper step on a water wheel moving it in its entirey by virtue of having been well-crafted before by a skillful carpenter. Likewise, through the power of previous aspiration prayers and the dharmadhātu, in just a single instant, when focusing on the single uncontaminated wisdom, everything that accords in type (with this wisdom) is manifested. Furthermore, AA VIII.1c speaks of "the sage's realization in a single instant."

600 According to Āryavimuktisena, JG (pp. 246–47) defines the instantaneous training as "the final yoga of realization in the manner of realizing the two uncontaminated dharmas." According to Haribhadra, it is defined as "the final yoga of bodhisattvas that arises by virtue of the power of the serial training." Though this training is of a single nature, it is divided into four by way of the isolates of its four distinct characteristics. It exists solely at the end of the continuum.

601 JG (pp. 247–48) defines the dharmakāya as "the final fruition or maturation of the four trainings—the kāya that is endowed with many branches of uncontaminated dharmas." This accords with AA IX.1c and IX.2c. Also, as mentioned in the Introduction, based on verse 41 of Jñānagarbha's *Satyadyayavibhāga* and Śāntarakṣita's *Satyadvayavibhāgapañjikā* (D3883, fol. 50a.6–50b.4), JG explains that "dharma" in the term "dharmakāya" refers to the branches or limbs of the uncontaminated qualities of this "body," while "kāya" refers to their accumulation or collection, because it functions as the foundation of all qualities. The dharmakāya is classified as the three or four kāyas plus its enlightened activity. As for its boundary lines, the dharmakāya and its enlightened activity that are taught here exist solely on the buddhabhūmi. Some say that, among the two types of enlightened activity, the one that exists for the agent of this activity exists only on the buddhabhūmi, while the one that exists for the recipients (its objects) exists on the level of beginners. This is not tenable, because it is the enlightened activity of the agent (the Buddha) that is the actual functional activity, while what exists for its recipients is the outcome of this function or activity, but not the enlightened activity itself.

602 JG (pp. 248–54) says that the number of the eight topics is definite in terms of a single person becoming a buddha. First, the three knowledges are definite in number in terms of what is to be known, because one needs to know the result to be attained (the knowledge of all aspects); the cause that makes one attain it (the knowledge of the path); and the distinctions between the factors to be relinquished and their remedies (the knowledge of entities). Secondly, the four trainings are definite in number in terms of what is to be practiced, because they represent two pairs of cause and result. Since one is not able to relinquish the antagonistic factors merely through knowledge, one definitely needs the culminating training, in which one gains mastery over the remedies. This training needs to be preceded by the complete training in all aspects in order to make one gain such mastery. Thus, these are the two trainings that represent the pair of cause and result in terms of gaining mastery. In order to attain the dharmakāya—the fully perfect realization of all phenomena—in a single moment, one definitely needs the instantaneous training. In this training, when one manifests a single uncontaminated dharma in a single instant, one is able to manifest all other uncontaminated dharmas, which are concordant in type with it, without needing to make any efforts of manifesting them. This must in turn be preceded by the serial training that sequentially manifests the dharmas to be familiarized with in a combined manner through making efforts in familiarizing with them again and again without mixing up their proper order. Thus, these two trainings represent the pair of cause and result in terms of stability. This is the position of Haribhadra. According to Āryavimuktisena, the fruition of the dharmakāya consists of the relinquishment of all antagonistic obscurations and the completion of all qualities without exception. Therefore, the first two trainings are needed for relinquishing the antagonistic factors, while the latter two serve to manifest the qualities. As for the order of the eight topics being definite, the three knowledges are taught first, because one needs to ascertain the object to engage in through study and reflection. Among the three knowledges, the knowledge of all aspects is taught in order to give rise to enthusiasm since it teaches the fruition. The knowledge of the path is taught next, because, when searching for the cause of this fruition, one needs to know all paths of the three yānas. In this context, one must know the distinctions between the antagonistic factors and their remedies, which is why the knowledge of entities is taught thereafter. When explained in this order, this is easy to understand for the audience and thus represents "the progression in terms of explanation."

Then, to actually engage in the object of engagement that has been ascertained through study and reflection in this way, one needs to practice the four trainings. Among them, the pair of cause and result in terms of gaining mastery in order to relinquish the antagonistic factors is taught first. This is followed by the pair of cause and result in terms of stability in order to manifest the qualities. Finally, the text teaches the dharmakāya—the fruition of having engaged in this way. This entire sequence represents "the progression in terms of the arising of the actuality (that to which the explanations refer)," because the trainings arise by virtue of having ascertained the object of engagement. However, there is no progression in terms of that actuality in the three knowledges themselves, nor in the four trainings alone, because this progression in terms of the actuality is not definite for the culminating and the serial trainings either. As for the eight topics being the same or different, the three knowledges are different because the sūtras, the AA, and all commentaries speak of their being distinct in terms of their supports, objects, and functions. The four trainings and the dharmakāya are also different because the complete training in all aspects and the culminating training are a cause and its result; the serial training and the instantaneous training are also a cause and its result; the four trainings and the dharmakāya are causes and their result; and their respective boundary lines and definitions are different. However, they are not always different in any case—they may also be of a single nature, while just differing in terms of isolates. For example, from the end of the continuum onward, the complete training in all aspects, the culminating training, the serial training, and the instantaneous training are of a single nature that is identical to the nature of the wisdom of the end of the continuum. However, the complete training in all aspects and the culminating training at the end of the continuum differ from the complete training in all aspects and the culminating training that are taught in the fourth and fifth chapters, respectively. In addition, the four trainings are one in nature with the knowledge of the path, and the dharmakāya and the knowledge of all aspects are also one in nature. Still, they are all different in terms of isolates. The three knowledges of buddhas are one as the nature of the knowledge of all aspects because their knowledges of the path and entities represent the manifestations of the final realization at the time of the fruition through having familiarized with the aspects of the three knowledges (their objects) and because they are endowed with the final realization of entities and all three paths being without arising. Thus, on this level, the three knowledges are just labeled in terms of their distinct objects. However, the knowledges of the path and entities on the buddhabhūmi are different from these knowledges when they are primarily explained as two among the eight topics of the AA in the text's first two lines of homage and in its second and third chapters, respectively, because their supports, natures, and functions are explained as distinct there. As for the eight topics not being repetitive or redundant, JG says that (1) the three knowledges are not repetitive amongst each other; nor (2) is the complete training in all aspects a repetition of the three knowledges; nor (3) are the four trainings repetitive amongst each other; nor (4) is the dharmakāya a repetition of the knowledge of all aspects. (1) Someone may say, "The passages in the AA that teach on the knowledge of all aspects and the knowledge of the path are repetitive because the former's explanations on the paths of seeing and familiarization, such as the equipments of the bhūmis, are also explained under the knowledge of the path and because both knowledges teach the causes of the knowledge of all aspects." They are not repetitive because their purpose is different. For the explanations under the knowledge of all aspects mean to define all causal and resultant dharmas as the single knowledge that is the knowledge of all aspects (as the *Ālokā* says). The explanations under the knowledge of the path serve to eliminate doubts about whether the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas has been taught under the knowledge of all aspects. Also, the points that define the knowledge of all aspects just adduce the sheer causes, while the knowledge of the path teaches these causes separately as the knowledge of the three bodhisattva paths of seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning by way of defining them through their objects. Someone may say, "The passages in the AA that teach on the knowledge of the path and the knowledge of entities are repetitive because the paths of

śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are also taught in the second chapter." They are not repetitive because the teaching on all three as objects in the second chapter is for the sake of defining their cognizing subject—the knowledge of the path. The explanations in the third chapter, according to the *Ālokā*, through teaching the knowledge of entities as the remedy of being free from superimpositions (such as ignorance), constitute a separate teaching on knowing all entities for the sake of making one understand the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas as being the knowledges of entities that represent antagonistic factors (the opposite of the one of bodhisattvas). Furthermore, since the three knowledges are explained as having different focal objects, supports, and functions, there is no flaw of them being repetitive. (2) Some may say, "The passages in the AA that teach on the three knowledges and the complete training in all aspects are repetitive because, under the complete training in all aspects, its aspects, trainings, and defining characteristics are explained as being the three knowledges." According to Āryavimuktisena (whom Haribhadra follows here), they are not repetitive because the aspects of the knowledge of all aspects are cognizing subjects that are definitely distinct, while the complete training in all aspects represents the cognizing subject of all aspects without exception. From one point of view, the teachings under the three knowledges are the fully qualified ones, because they teach what is to be known by way of what defines and what is defined. What is taught under the complete training in all aspects represents the trainees since it is taught by way of practicing. From another point of view, what is taught under the three knowledges represents the objects of realization as being the aspects of natural peace and the threefold lack of arising of the three knowledges. What is taught under the complete training in all aspects is for the sake of the remedies through which antagonistic factors come to be at peace. (3) Someone may say, "The four trainings are repetitive because they teach the means to practice again and again." They are not repetitive because Āryavimuktisena asserts that they are causes and results in terms of familiarizing with all aspects and accomplishing conduct. According to Haribhadra, the complete training in all aspects and the culminating training represent the cause and its result in terms of gaining mastery, while the serial training and the instantaneous training are the cause and its result in terms of stability. (4) Someone may say, "The knowledge of all aspects and the dharmakāya are repetitive because both teach the fruition." They are not repetitive because, under the knowledge of all aspects, the object to be engaged in through the practice of the four trainings is taught by way of the knowledge of what is to be known, while the dharmakāya is explained by way of the foundation that is the fruition of having engaged in this knowledge. Buddhaśrījñāna says that the three knowledges are taught by way of being objects; the four trainings, by way of being causes; and the dharmakāya and its enlightened activity, by way of being the fruition. One may also say that the knowledge of all aspects is taught by way of what defines it, while the dharmakāya is taught by way of its nature.

603 The Sanskrit literally refers to "penetration" in the sense of a "breakthrough" experience, which refers to directly facing ultimate reality on the path of seeing. The branches or factors conducive to such a breakthrough are the four stages of the path of preparation, whose name derives from preparing one for or joining with this breakthrough.

604 Like warriors without any armor, when pierced by weapons, are unable to fight and win a battle, bodhisattvas will become frustrated or angry and worn-out by their tremenduous workload and responsibilities for all sentient beings if they fail to perform their many tasks without the underlying realization that they themselves, all their altruistic activities, sentient beings as the recipients of these activities, and the final "goal" of nirvāṇa all lack real existence. In this way, such a realization is the armor of bodhisattvas.

605 JNS (p. 66) adds that the first three of these ten dharmas of the knowledge of all aspects are presented as the sequence of cause and result. The four from penetration onward, (3)–(6), plus "practice's own nature" are presented as the sequence of explanation. The four practices (7)–(10) are the sequence of the actuality of the knowledge of all aspects.

606 JNS (p. 68) elaborates that the knowledge of entities of the śrāvakas represents the antagonistic factor of the path of the mahāyāna since it apprehends the four realities of the noble ones as merely consisting of the characteristics of their sixteen aspects (such as impermanence). The knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas functions as the remedy for apprehending any characteristics with regard to all entities, paths, and aspects.

607 JNS (p. 69) adds that (9)–(11) are presented from the perspective of the final path of nonlearning, with them respectively being the causes for the dharmakāya, the pure abodes of the rūpakāyas, and consummate enlightened activity.

608 According to sources such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.17–19, among the four levels of the path of preparation, "heat" bears this name since it is the first indication or anticipation of the path of the noble ones—the fire that can burn all the fuel of the afflictions. "Peak" indicates the summit of those roots of virtue that are unstable, just as from a mountain peak one can either regress to the side from which one came or progress to the other side—the rest of the path of preparation and so on. "Poised readiness" (Skt. kṣānti, Tib. bzod pa; lit. "patience," "endurance") refers to undeclining readiness or openness for the four realities. In a general mahāyāna sense, the term means to be mentally ready for the direct realization of emptiness, a.k.a. "the dharma of nonarising" (Skt. anutpattidharmakṣānti, Tib. mi skye ba'i chos la bzod pa). Thus, in this context, "poised or open readiness" does not mean passively enduring or bearing something, but rather indicates an active willingness and receptiveness to integrate the experience of emptiness into one's mind stream and to be able to live within its utter groundlessness. Verses 28–29 of Nāgārjuna's *Bodhisaṃbhāra* say:

> Neither arising nor ceasing,
> Neither nonarising nor unceasing,
> Neither both nor neither,
> Neither empty nor nonempty—
> When not straying from the view of the middle
> With regard to any phenomena whatsoever,
> There is poised readiness for nonarising,
> Because all conceptions are eliminated.

In a more specific sense, "poised readiness" refers to the third of the four levels of the path of preparation, on which the practitioner newly attains some degree of openness and calm in the sense of not being afraid of profound emptiness. Strictly speaking, the complete extent of this kind of poised readiness is only attained from the path of seeing onward, when the nature of phenomena is directly seen for the first time. For the most part, the path of familiarization then consists of increasing and stabilizing one's familiarity with this realization in all situations. "The supreme mundane dharma" is so called since it represents the highest spiritual achievement within saṃsāra and induces the path of seeing through its power, without however being a concordant cause (since the path of seeing is not of the same epistemological type as the path of preparation).

609 This is a technical term for a conceptual mental image of something that is arrived at by the exclusion of everything that it is not.

610 See Chart 12.

611 As Makransky 1997 shows in great detail, as it stands AA I.17 can be understood in at least two ways. Differing from the most straightforward reading of the Sanskrit—as followed by Āryavimuktisena and many others—Haribhadra reads it as the svābhāvikakāya and the dharmakāya being two different kāyas, thus speaking of four instead of three kāyas. As Kobayashi 1981 (p. 133) points out, in a number of Indian commentaries before and after Haribhadra (such as those by Bhadanta Vimuktisena, Ratnākaraśānti, Abhayākaragupta, and

Ratnakīrti), I.17b reads differently: "And also as nairmāṇika[kāya], thus being threefold" (Skt. in *Sārottamā*: *nairmāṇika iti tridhā*; Tib. *sprul pa zhes dang rnam gsum dang* and variants thereof). In both India and Tibet, this led to extensive debates and diverging ways of commenting (see Chapter Eight below). As mentioned above, the standard Sanskrit forms svābhāvikakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya indicate that these kāyas are related to the dharmakāya as its features, but not that they are three separate entities on their own. Thus, in terms of its nature, the dharmakāya is referred to as svābhāvikakāya (this is why these two are usually said to be equivalent); in terms of its bringing the enjoyment of the mahāyāna dharma to bodhisattvas, it is the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting or emanating all kinds of forms for different kinds of beings, it is the nairmāṇikakāya (note that *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.59–60 says literally the same, thus describing the kāyas as three; for details, see Makransky 1997, pp. 55–60). In addition, in AA I.17, the dharmakāya is described as having the fourth feature of enlightened activity. Obviously, this fourfold explanation is also followed by CE. The Eighth Karmapa says (JNS, p. 71) that, in his opinion, the dharmakāya and the svābhāvikakāya are not different in both being the dharmatākāya, but that this dharmatākāya has two aspects—the aspect of its own nature being natural luminosity and the aspect of never abandoning that which is its own nature. The former is taught as the dharmakāya and the latter, as the svābhāvikakāya. By virtue of this meaning, the dominant condition of primarily the svābhāvikakāya makes this dharmatākāya appear as the sambhogakāya within the stainless dharmadhātu, while the dominant condition of primarily the dharmakāya makes it appear as the nairmāṇikakāya, together with its enlightened activity, for those who are endowed with the pure appearances that are a natural outflow of the dharmadhātu. In brief, as explained in detail in Appendix I8A, JNS takes both the presentations of three and four kāyas to be noncontradictory since the svābhāvikakāya and the dharmakāya are one in nature (see also the comments on AA VIII.1–6). Note that, in general, the dharmakāya is often referred to as "dharmatākāya" or "svābhāvika-dharmatākāya," with dharmakāya being explained as an abbreviation of these two terms. For example, see Āryavimuktisena's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti* (D3787, fol. 192a.7–8), *Mahāyānasaṃgrāhabhāṣya* on X.1, *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* (Taishō 1530, 325c5–7), *Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna* (D3997, fol. 272b.5), and Jñānacandra's *Kāyatrayavṛtti* (D3891, fol. 8b.2).

612 JNS (p. 407) says that, from among the three approaches of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (concise, intermediate, and detailed), this chapter is presented by the intermediate one as taught in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*. From among the eleven instructional specifications, it represents the second (the explanations by Subhūti). For more details on the three approaches and the eleven specifications, see the Introduction. According to CZ (pp. 45–202), the knowledge of all aspects covers The Production of the Thought of Enlightenment (Chapter Two) up through The Second Subhūti Chapter (Chapter Twenty-one).

613 IV.1cd (CE quotes only the last line).

614 This hinges on the frequent hermeneutical—not linguistic—Sanskrit "etymology" (*nirukta*) of *citta* as being derived from the root *ci* (to accumulate, gather), which is, for example, also used in Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* 5, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* 31, and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* 7.

615 In general, "superior intention" is a term for the superior altruistic attitude of bodhisattvas, which means that they have solely the welfare of others in mind. They do so with the same spontaneous intensity with which ordinary beings usually strive for their own well-being. This attitude is said to be the immediate prerequisite or cause for the arising of uncontrived genuine bodhicitta even in ordinary beings (see the sevenfold pith instructions to develop bodhicitta in terms of cause and result as explained in Appendix I1A). Here, however, the term indicates the generation of the ultimate bodhicitta on the first seven bhūmis.

616 IV.8.

617 JNS (pp. 78 and 81) explains that the first one is the aspiration of striving for perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others, while the second one is the intention, including its seed, to keep the vow of bodhicitta that is taken. Though the terms "aspiration" and "application" are not used, implicitly the above two refer to aspiration and application, respectively. In this approach, it is not asserted that the bodhicitta of aspiration is assumed through a ceremony, or that there is a vow that has been obtained through this. Rather, the generation of bodhicitta is appropriated and then its vow is taken. As far as the actual nature of generating bodhicitta in one's mind stream goes, it does not have to be adopted by means of a ceremony, but the later taking of the bodhisattva vow that is connected to this bodhicitta is performed in order to accomplish the necessary purpose and to further enhance enlightenment and the welfare of others.

618 IV.7ab. According to the *Bhāṣya*, "a friend" means a spiritual friend; "cause" refers to the disposition; "roots" are the roots of virtue that unfold the disposition; "study" means studying the dharma that is recited; and "cultivation of virtue" refers to constant study, reflection, and meditation in this lifetime.

619 IV.7d. For further comments on bodhicitta in general and the above verses from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, see Appendix I1A. For more source materials on bodhicitta, see Dargyay 1981, Sparham 1987 and 1992, and Wangchuk 2007.

620 JNS (p. 85) explains this as the special state of mind that is associated with the congruent mental factor of desiring the attainment of completely perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others (this being presented in terms of bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation). JNS quotes the *Marmakaumudī* (D3805, fol. 10b.1) saying, "Here, mind, mental desire, resolve, aspiration, and striving are held to be synonyms." Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS says that the generation of bodhicitta means to aspire: "After I have accomplished buddhahood, for the sake of the welfare of others, I shall make efforts in the means to satisfy those with the three dispositions in accordance with their respective fortunes."

621 This and the following citations in the section on bodhicitta are found in CZ, pp. 45–46. Note that the frequent brief sūtra passages as quoted in CE are often greatly abbreviated and/or paraphrased (for example, "prajñāpāramitā" is usually replaced by "mother"), so I sometimes tacitly add a few words as found in the full quotes, without listing the variant readings/omissions in CE. For the contexts and the complete wordings of these passages, see CZ (who inserts the headings and subheadings of the AA and its commentaries into the text of the sūtras) as well as Sparham 2006 and 2008a. Note that in Conze's translation, pages 37–430 (corresponding to chapters I–IV of the AA) usually follow the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines (pp. 203–430 mostly rendering the revised edition of this sūtra), except for some passages from the sūtras in one hundred thousand and eighteen thousand lines. Pages 431–643 (chapters V–VIII of the AA) follow the Gilgit manuscript of the sūtra in eighteen thousand lines. For further details, see CZ, p. ix.

622 This refers back to the above presentation of the generation of bodhicitta. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1d uses the term "intention" (Skt. cetanā, Tib. sems pa), which is one of the five omnipresent mental factors. CE's above definition of the generation of bodhicitta says, "the mind (Skt. citta, Tib. sems) that focuses on perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others," which—at least in terms of the terminology—suggests bodhicitta being a primary mind (*citta*) and not a mental factor (Skt. caitta, Tib. sems byung). However, later, CE explicitly presents the nature of the generation of seeming bodhicitta as a mental factor (identified as aspiration/intention). In both India and Tibet, there occurred lengthy debates as to whether the generation of bodhicitta is a primary mind or a mental factor. As mentioned above, like most commentators, JNS (pp. 85–87) explains that seeming bodhicitta is a primary mind—a mental consciousness—associated with the mental factor of desiring enlightenment for the sake of

others. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS says that "the generation of bodhicitta being the desire for enlightenment" (in lines 18ab) is a case of labeling the result (bodhicitta) with the name of its cause (the desire for enlightenment), or labeling what is associated with its mental aid with the name of this aid (which is obviously what CE's explanation of seeming bodhicitta as a mental factor refers to). Just as the realization of emptiness is said to be a primary mind, though its main character is the mental factor of prajñā, the generation of seeming bodhicitta is a primary mind, though its main character is compassion. Thus, it is this primary mind of bodhicitta as the union of prajñā and means (the two facets of wisdom directly realizing emptiness and compassion for all beings) that eventually evolves into a buddha's knowledge of all aspects. However, JNS says, the description of bodhicitta being a primary mind with associated mental factors only applies to the seeming bodhicitta since the ultimate bodhicitta in the meditative equipoise of bodhisattvas and in buddhas does not involve any primary minds and mental factors in the first place (for more details on this discussion, see Appendix I1A, Sparham 1987 and 1992, and Wangchuk 2007).

623 In the Sanskrit of this line, the masculine pronoun *sa* (trans. here as "that") can only refer back to "welfare" (*artha*) in line I.18a. Merely grammatically speaking, the feminine pronoun *sā* (which precedes *sa* and thus is translated here as "this") could refer to either "enlightenment" (*bodhi*) or "desire" (*kamatā*) in line I.18b. However, in terms of the two focal objects of bodhicitta, "enlightenment" is the more likely referent. This is confirmed by virtually all commentaries saying that "this and that" refer back to "completely perfect enlightenment" and "the welfare of others," respectively.

624 JG (pp. 294–95) explains that, according to the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, "all aspects" in the first citation refers to the two aspects of the two realities; "become enlightened," to the fruition; "prajñāpāramitā," to its cause; and "make efforts," to the excellent training in order to achieve the fruition. Applied to the latter citation, "all aspects" refers to all the aspects of agent, recipient, and action with regard to the six pāramitās.

625 JG (pp. 295–96) explains that the last two citations teach on the welfare of others in brief and in detail, because the former speaks about it without giving a classification of the means to accomplish this welfare, while the latter provides such a classification in terms of the six pāramitās. Note that CE's explanation of the meaning of "completely perfect enlightenment" and "the welfare of others" through quoting the above four passages from the prajñāpāramitā sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines corresponds exactly to what the *Vṛtti* (pp. 15–16) and the *Ālokā* (pp. 24–25) do (in abbreviated form, this is also found in the *Vivṛti*, D3793, fol. 82b.4–6). This pattern is also followed by JG, JNS, and most other commentaries. Thus, in brief, enlightenment refers to "realizing all phenomena in all aspects" and, in detail, to perfecting the pāramitās through being free from the three spheres of agent, recipient, and action. "The welfare of others" is explained, in brief, as establishing all sentient beings in all universes in the nirvāṇa without remainder and, in detail, as establishing in the six pāramitās all beings who dwell in their opposites. Note, however, that the term "generation of bodhicitta" is absent in all these passages (it only appears later in a passage that, according to the AA, corresponds to the the treasurelike bodhicitta). Also, the two focal objects of bodhicitta—enlightenment and the welfare others—are mentioned only in the prajñāpāramitā sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines, while "the welfare of others" is absent in the sūtras in eight thousand and one hundred thousand lines.

626 As mentioned in the Introduction, this primarily refers to the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*, the greater part of which consists of connecting the twenty-two examples with the eighty kinds of inexhaustibility (this is also pointed out in Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on IV.15–20). In this regard, other sources also mention the *Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtra* (D503).

627 Note, however, that the order of these aids in the twenty-two generations of bodhicitta as found in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* differs from the one presented in the AA, which accords with the one in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.15–20.

628 This and the following passages in [ ] in this section on the twenty-two kinds of bodhicitta are inserted from JG (pp. 302–6) and JNS (pp. 91–92). The explanations of the twenty-two examples and their meanings in JG, JNS, and CE follow the comments in the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, the *Vivṛti*, and the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on IV.15–20, which are all very similar (see also Thrangu Rinpoche 2004, pp. 176–81).

629 JG (pp. 302–3) says that the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, Ratnākaraśānti, and Abhayākaragupta explain the similarity between fire and this training in terms of increasing, just as a fire increases due to firewood, while the *Kīrtikalā*, the *Prajñāpradīpāvalī*, and the *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa* explain this similarity in terms of burning. However, what is taugmt here is the nature of realization and therefore is not an actual remedy. Nevertheless, it may be said to function as a remedy, just like fire with regard to wood. Therefore, in terms of the training in the three knowledges on the path of preparation arising from meditation and thus acquiring the sheer capacity to burn the obscurations, it is suitable to match this training with both the features of burning and increasing.

630 Gandharvas (lit. "smell-eaters") are the celestial virtuosi musicians of Indian mythology. They live on smells and their cities are mere delusive appearances, just like mirages or optical illusions.

631 For details on these thirty-seven, see CE on IV.4–5, Appendix I4C, and Charts 13 and 14.

632 JG (pp. 304–5) says that this generation of bodhicitta, which is associated with one-pointed calm abiding and the superior insight of realizing phenomena to be without nature, is like a vehicle since it, through engaging in the union of means and prajñā, does not fall into the extremes of either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa and thus moves easily toward the nonabiding nirvāṇa.

633 Skt. dhāraṇī, Tib. gzungs.

634 These four are also known as "the four seals of the dharma." They are considered as the synopsis, hallmarks, or defining characteristics of the Buddha's teachings that distinguish them from others—(1) everything conditioned is impermanent; (2) everything contaminated is suffering; (3) all phenomena are empty and identityless; and (4) nirvāṇa alone is peace. It is said that they resound spontaneously and continuously from a special drum in Indra's god realm, thus reminding its inhabitants of the dharma.

635 JG (p. 305) explains that this generation of bodhicitta is like the stream of a river since the bodhisattvas on this level, which operates all by itself by virtue of having attained the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising, realize the equality of cognition and what is to be cognized. Therefore, through great compassion, means, and prajñā, they incessantly engage in activities for the welfare of others without making any differences.

636 JNS (p. 92) says that, according to some people's assertion, the first three types of generating bodhicitta represent the bodhicitta of aspiration, while the remaining nineteen constitute the bodhicitta of application. Also, some others claim that the first three represent the actual generation of bodhicitta, while the remaining are merely the aids for increasing it. However, even beginners can see that these positions are not justified. For if the generation of bodhicitta that is the mind which is congruently associated with resolve is usually given as the definition of the bodhicitta of application, how could it be the bodhicitta of aspiration here? As for the second claim, all the divisions of the generation of bodhicitta here are solely made by way of their differing in terms of their respective mental aids, but not by way of their differing in terms of whether they are or are not the actual generation of bodhicitta. Also, these divisions are

given primarily in terms of the bodhicitta of application. Thus, according to the *Ālokā* (p. 26), these twenty-two mental aids that are respectively congruently associated with the generation of bodhicitta include all generations of bodhicitta from the path of accumulation up through the buddhabhūmi, without there being any more or less divisions or any other order. When the respectively following aids arise from their respectively preceding ones, it is not that these preceding ones are abandoned, but the respectively following ones just represent the predominant congruently associated factors at the respective levels.

637 JNS agrees with these boundary lines, but JG (p. 308) says that (15)–(19) pertain to the special path of the tenth bhūmi alone. As for (20)–(22) being preparation, main part, and conclusion, JG explains these as respectively being the vajralike samādhi (the path of preparation for entering the buddhabhūmi), the meditative equipoise of the buddhabhūmi, and its subsequent attainment. JNS (pp. 95–96) presents the explanations by some that Haribhadra's way of matching the twenty-two types of generating bodhicitta accords neither with the sūtras nor with the intention of Āryavimuktisena since the latter did not draw any boundary lines for them. However, the first alleged flaw does not apply. For though the explicit teaching in the sūtras explains the generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi as the tenth generation of bodhicitta, what it teaches implicitly is the following sequence of the preparation for, the main part, and the conclusion of the generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi. In the realm of having become a buddha, the sounds of the three jewels resound incessantly and thus establish those to be guided in the perfect view (preparation). Through accomplishing nothing but the welfare of others, the welfare of sentient beings is unimpeded (main part). Through this being accomplished, the conduct of a tathāgata becomes manifest (conclusion). Thus, the explicit use of the term "bodhisattva mahāsattva" in the sūtras indicates that the unimpeded power of the direct causes for these three kinds of generating bodhicitta exists solely in the mind streams of bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi, while their direct results exist only in the mind streams of buddhas. The second flaw does not apply either because it was not the deliberate intention of Āryavimuktisena to not draw any boundary lines within the twenty-two bodhicittas. Rather, what his *Vṛtti* means is that the sheer generation of bodhicitta (the mindset of the mahāyāna) has the nature of just being the reverse of not having generated this mindset. Therefore, it is not established as a nature that can be divided into many kinds of generating bodhicitta.

638 Skt. dharmasrotas, Tib. chos rgyun. This samādhi is the final special fruition of the great path of accumulation. While not moving from this samādhi, one enters the ocean of buddha realms of the ten directions, comes to hear the genuine dharma from the mouths of an ocean of buddhas, and is able to retain them.

639 According to PVSD (fol. 13b.4–6), the ordinary instructions are those that teach merely a part of the mahāyāna path and the special instructions consist of all the words of the Buddha and the treatises on them that comprehensively and unmistakenly teach the mahāyāna path and its fruition.

640 JNS (p. 102) says that the nature of practice is the union of means and prajñā (the subject) being engaged in resting in meditative equipoise without going beyond the two realities (the object). Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 113–14) says that, in order to practically engage in the above-mentioned nature of bodhicitta in all its different kinds, to gather the two accumulations through properly engaging in what is to be adopted and rejected by not going beyond ascertaining each one of the two realities (which represent the profound and vast means and prajñā) is the objective that is not in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Therefore, the instruction here on the nature of practice is that the mahāyāna disciples should engage in this approach, through training in uncommon means and prajñā, for the sake of attaining liberation in the manner of not observing the two realities (or not observing the three spheres). In other words, as the *Ālokā* (pp. 32ff.) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fols. 84a.2ff.) explain at length, the

instruction on the practice of bodhisattvas is that their practice of the generation of bodhicitta in all its subdivisions does not transgress either ultimate or seeming reality and thus develops in a nonreferential manner without taking anything as a basis by virtue of not observing bodhisattvas, prajñāpāramitā, sentient beings, or anything else. Consequently, all the following nine subpoints of the instructions (such as the four realities and the three jewels) have to be realized as being empty, unborn, unceasing, lacking any nature of their own, and being free from purity, impurity, increase, decrease, and so on.

641 For more details on the topic of the instructions, see Appendix I1B.

642 D27, fol. 177b.5.

643 Lines 3cd. JNS (p. 102) defines the two realities from the perspective of the perceiving subject alone (see Appendix I1C1).

644 CZ, pp. 56–57.

645 Ibid., p. 58. As mentioned above, the presentation of the two realities as a standard mahāyāna template is experiential and soteriological in nature. It refers to realities in the sense that what is experienced in some way by someone is that person's individual reality, no matter how delusive this experience might be from the perspective of others, just as when we say that someone "lives in a different reality." By this, we do not mean that this person does not live on this planet, but that her or his view or perception of things is not the same as ours. This is even more obvious in people who go insane and live completely in their own world, not because they went to some actual place located elsewhere, but because the entire experiential framework of their minds has changed. In particular, in Madhyamaka, "reality" is understood in an epistemological or perceptual sense and not ontologically as some hard-and-fast "real existence" in any substantial, independent, or absolute manner. This means that seeming reality does not exist apart from the minds of the ordinary sentient beings whose experience it is. Likewise, ultimate reality is not some absolute or transcendent given. It does not exist anywhere other than in the minds of noble ones who rest in meditative equipoise within the nature of phenomena. The manifold expressions of seeming reality in different beings are usually compared to the various dream experiences of different sleepers. None of the episodes in their dreams has any correlate in any real outer reality, but at the time of dreaming, everything that is experienced is subjectively completely real. Ultimate reality is compared to waking up from the dream and realizing that none of the events in one's dream ever happened as anything other than a mere appearance in one's own mind. As *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.23 says:

> It is through the perfect and the false seeing of all entities
> That the entities that are thus found bear two natures.
> The object of perfect seeing is true reality,
> And false seeing is seeming reality.

Thus, since the two realities refer to experiences or perceptions, they are not just some abstract conceptual or formal truths. Also, when we see a table or hear a sound, we would not think of this as seeing or hearing a "truth," nor would we conceive the perceiving consciousness itself as a "truth." Rather, we refer to both the objects and the perceiving subject as some kind of reality that we perceive or experience. Moreover, in terms of the Buddhist path, mere "truths" (such as "all phenomena are empty" or "freedom from all reference points") do not have any liberating power per se, nor can they be the highest spiritual goal to be achieved. This is also highlighted in the soteriological thrust of the Sanskrit term *paramārthasatya* for ultimate reality, which literally means "the reality that is the supreme (spiritual) goal" and in the above-cited passage from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (D4038, fol. 68b.2) that explains the meaning of reality as "the actuality that, when seen, serves as the cause for purity." Thus, only realizations that have been fully integrated into one's mind as experiential realities have remedial power over our habitual

patterns of behavior and can serve as lasting existential transformations (otherwise, it is just as in the case of someone who accepts the fact of smoking being hazardous to one's health, but still is unable to quit). In sum, the two realities are not understood merely as general truths, but as the individual realities that are experienced by either the mistaken minds of sentient beings or the unmistaken wisdom minds of noble ones. These realities encompass both the objective and the subjective sides of these respective experiences. The objects that we see, hear, and so forth, including the various kinds of consciousness that perceive these objects, are our reality; and what the noble ones perceive is "their" reality. Therefore, we are not talking about two separate sets of reality that independently and objectively exist in two different realms called saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, respectively. Rather, the two realities refer to just what is experienced by two different types of beings with different types and scopes of perception. More important still, since the overall purport of the teachings of the Buddha is liberation from saṃsāric suffering, the presentation of the two realities and their relation is nothing but a means to this end. Since this presentation is used as a pedagogical tool for accomplishing liberation, the actual contrast between the two realities is soteriological in nature. The dividing line is drawn between what is delusive or seeming in the sense of being unreliable when seeking for liberation from saṃsāra and what is genuine or ultimate in the sense of being reliable as the appropriate basis for such liberation. The presentation of the difference between seeming and ultimate reality together with the ensuing activities on a seeming path to liberation are regarded as the means to achieve the direct realization of what is called ultimate reality. Thus, the presentation of the two realities is in itself an aspect of the bodhisattvas' skill in means, but within this educational approach, neither of these two realities is per se "better" or more real than the other. For all presentations and practical applications of these two realities can only happen within the framework of seeming reality itself since they only need to be taught to those who have an essentially dualistic state of mind. As such, these two cannot but be mutually dependent and dualistic since it is impossible to talk about, reflect on, or meditate on the one without the other. Likewise, there is no way to proceed on the path to "the ultimate" without first using and eventually letting go of seeming reality. On the other hand, within the meditative equipoise of those who directly perceive what is called ultimate reality, all reference points of a dualistic mind have completely subsided. Thus, any arguments about what is seeming, ultimate, real, or false are by definition simply irrelevant to this perceptual perspective. Consequently, from the perspective of the meditative equipoise of noble ones who realize the ultimate, experientially, there is only a single reality. However, it may be conceived or designated in various ways when these noble ones engage in their subsequent activities in order to teach and help others so that they too may realize this reality (see also Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 73–74).

646 The *Ālokā* (p. 32) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 84a.3–6) discuss the four realities by saying that their emptiness and prajñāpāramitā share the single nature of suchness. Thus, they are without arising, ceasing, being afflicted, or purified. There is no ignorance, no end of ignorance, no buddhahood, no making efforts in the pāramitās, and no one to make such efforts. JNS (pp. 103–4) says that, unlike the instruction on the sixteen aspects of the four realities in the śrāvaka system, the nature of this instruction in the mahāyāna is to teach the four realities in connection with the actuality of the profound emptiness of prajñāpāramitā Therefore, it is not just an instruction on personal identitylessness, but one that clearly teaches phenomenal identitylessness. By way of example, identifying and acknowledging the reality of suffering is said to resemble diagnosing a disease and accepting the fact that one is sick. Learning about the origin of suffering is like tracking the causes of one's disease. The reality of cessation is similar to one's health being fully restored through the sickness together with its causes being removed. The path resembles undergoing the treatments and taking the medicines that are necessary to eliminate the disease and become healthy. However, in this context, JNS says that, having understood the four realities like that, the instruction is to relinquish apprehending them in these ways and to abandon any clinging to them. The following presentation of the four realities in CE and

JNS (including the various factors to be relinquished on different stages of the path) may seem lengthy and overfraught with details, but it serves as the basic layout for all the many recurring references to these details throughout the text.

647 Originally, the Sanskrit term *duḥkha* referred to an axle not fitting properly into the hub of a wheel or that hub being off-center so that, in either case, the wheel would not roll smoothly (with *sukha* indicating the opposite). In this sense, *duḥkha* refers to saṃsāric existence as a fundamental "misfit" and always being "off-center," even if it subjectively seems to roll along smoothly (*sukha*) for a while. Thus, the term includes all manifest and latent kinds of uneasiness, unpleasantness, difficulties, problems, sorrows, and pain that sentient beings experience in the three realms of saṃsāra. Obviously, this goes way beyond and far deeper than the usual meaning of the word "suffering," so translations like "basic dissatisfactoriness" or the like seem to be more appropriate. This is especially true when one considers the three kinds of such dissatisfactoriness in the Buddhist teachings—(1) the all-pervasive dissatisfactoriness of saṃsāra, (2) the dissatisfactoriness of change, and (3) the dissatisfactoriness of pain or manifest suffering. (1) refers to the fact that any birth in saṃsāra, even in the highest god realms, inevitably and intrinsically bears the seed for manifest suffering and pain. For it was caused by mental afflictions and conditioned karmic actions, all of which are based on the fundamental delusion of clinging to a seemingly real identity of oneself and all other phenomena. (2) is what ordinary beings experience as happiness, the problem being that happiness will inevitably cease and turn into manifest suffering. (3) is what could be properly translated as "suffering"—all obvious and manifest troubles, conflicts, calamities, mental or physical pains, diseases, and so on. Obviously, (1) and (2) would never be called suffering in the usual sense, because the first one is not perceived at all by ordinary beings and the second one as the exact opposite of suffering. Nevertheless, since there seems to be a quite pervasive and strong habituation to the term "suffering" in Western Buddhist audiences and literature (though, ironically, nobody really wants to hear about suffering), I will follow that consensus. However, it may be helpful for the understanding of the topic of the four realities and their aspects (which is very pervasive throughout the AA and its commentaries) to keep the above more comprehensive meaning of the term in mind.

648 JNS (p. 105) says that, according to the Madhyamaka system, the four aspects of the reality of suffering are as follows. It is *impermanent* in the sense of not being established as the nature of its own momentary arising and thus not being dependent on other causes of disintegration. *Suffering* refers to all entities that are conceived of as "me" and "mine" as long as what is without identity is clung to as an identity (in brief, it is what has matured from the cause that is the origin of suffering). Empty means being empty of any nature. *Identityless* refers to being devoid of the two identities (personal and phenomenal). Also, the complete collection of the four aspects of the reality of suffering does not necessarily represent the reality of suffering, because these four are equally complete in karma, afflictions, and the contaminated path.

649 For details on propelling and completing causes and results, see below and Appendix I5E.

650 This the classical description of a four-continent world system in ancient Indian cosmology (for details, see Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośa* with its commentaries). For the different levels of gods in the desire and form realms, see also Chart 1.

651 This is an ancient Indian measure, about eight miles (according to other calculations, about four or sixteen miles).

652 JNS (p. 105) describes the first three of these four aspects as follows (the fourth one being the same). The reality of origin is a *cause*, since it is what appropriates the latent tendencies for further rebirths. It is the *origin* of suffering, since it produces suffering in accordance with these latent tendencies that were planted. It is *arising*, since it determines the particulars of suffering.

653 For definitions of these different causes, see Chart 24 in Volume Two.

654 These are the ten basic afflictive obscurations, most of them existing in both coarser (imputed) and subtler (innate) degrees, which are the factors to be gradually relinquished on the paths of seeing and familiarization, respectively. Numerous subdivisions of these ten are arrived at through relating them to the three realms of saṃsāra (desire, form, and formless realms) and the four realities of the noble ones (see also CE's general topic on the equipment of the bhūmis below, Appendix I1H, and Charts 15 and 17). As Frauwallner 1971 (pp. 73–81) and Cox 1992 (p. 74) point out, these ten basic afflictions in Sarvāstivāda texts derive from a basic set of seven contaminants in the early sūtras (such as the *Saṃyojanasutta* and the *Anusayasutta* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*), which consists of desire for sense pleasures, hatred, desire for existence, pride, ignorance, views, and doubt. Based on this list, ten afflictions are arrived at by combining the two varieties of desire and dividing views into five (all of this is also found in *Abhidharmakośa* V.1–3). Among the latter, "a real personality" refers to the notion of a really existent, independent, and lasting self that is somehow related to the five skandhas, which are in themselves momentarily impermanent and collections of many parts. "The views about it" may simply be classified as two—clinging to "me" and "mine." Usually, however, they are explained as twenty in number, which consist of four different possible ways of relating each one of the five skandhas to a personal self. To take form as an example, these four are the views that form is the self; that the self possesses form; that the self exists in form; and that form exists in the self. The same applies to the remaining four skandhas. The "views about extremes" are based on the self that is assumed through the views about a real personality and refer to clinging to this self as either being eternal or as something that becomes extinguished after death. "Wrong views" means to deny the existence of phenomena that—from a Buddhist point of view—exist, such as karma (causes and results), former and later lives, and the two or four realities.

655 Note that these represent the two standard ways of classifying the afflictions that are the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization. The first one is in terms of the ten types of primary afflictions (their imputed forms being the factors to be relinquished through seeing, and their innate forms being the factors to be relinquished through familiarization) and how many of them are present in the desire realm and the two higher realms in terms of the four realities, respectively. The second classification speaks about the nine degrees of each one of these afflictions in only their innate form (the factors to be relinquished through familiarization) as pertaining to each one of the nine levels of the three realms (counted as the desire realm and the four levels of the form and formless realms each). This sums up to eighty-one degrees for each affliction, with a corresponding number of respective paths of liberation for each (for details on the paths of liberation, see below). If one adds the eight levels of afflictions to be relinquished through seeing (as delimited through the eight paths of liberation during the path of seeing), for each affliction one arrives at a total of eighty-nine factors to be relinquished and their corresponding paths of liberation. For more details on the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization as well as on afflictive and cognitive obscurations, see Appendices I1H3 and I4B (Volume Two) as well as Charts 15–18.

656 This means that one becomes angry because someone either *has* harmed oneself, those close to one, or one's possessions; *will* harm any of these; or *helps* someone who has done any of these harms.

657 This list comes from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fols. 76a.6ff.), which also explains each one of the above names, all of which designate certain sets of afflictions (often the three main ones—ignorance, desire, and hatred) from certain distinct perspectives. Thus, these names are not exactly or always synonyms. Historically speaking (as also the Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* notes), the various terms for the afflictions as used in the sūtras entail differences in meaning, function, and circumstances. However, in the process of the numerous abhidharma schematizations, such differences became blurred or lost and the originally distinct terms gradually came to be regarded as synonyms. As Cox 1992 (pp. 68–69)

points out, the very early **Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra's* presentation of the afflictions even begins with a list of more than 530 individual afflictions or categories of roots of nonvirtue. The somewhat later *Jñānaprasthāna* (attr. to Kātyāyanīputra, end of first century BCE) lists sixteen categories (not synonyms) of afflictions, which partly correspond to the above twenty-four names. As for the above designation "accessories," ignorance, desire, and hatred are so called because based on them, their "accessories" of fear, spite, and distraction increase.

658 "Expand" (Tib. rgyas 'gyur) comes from the Tibetan rendering *phra rgyas* ("subtle-expanding") of Skt. *anuśaya*. The latter literally means being closely attached to something and refers to the afflictions adhering to their objects. The Tibetan rendering highlights the fact that these afflictions usually begin in a rather subtle or inconspicuous way and then develop and grow in their strength.

659 The last two paragraphs are based on *Abhidharmakośa* V.12–13ab and V.16–18, according to which there are eleven all-pervasive contaminants—(1)–(5) the five afflicted views that are relinquished through seeing the reality of suffering; (6)–(7) the wrong views and the views of holding a view as paramount that are relinquished through seeing the reality of origin; (8)–(9) the two kinds of doubt that are relinquished through seeing these two realities, respectively; and (10)–(11) the ignorance that is associated with these views and doubts as well as "isolated ignorance" (Skt. avidyāveṇikī, Tib. ma 'dres pa'i ma rig pa), both of which are also relinquished through seeing said two realities. As for these two kinds of ignorance, the first one is the aspect of ignorance that always operates in conjunction with other afflictions. The second one stands for the basic aspect of ignorance that lies at the root of all mistakenness and all mental functions in general. Therefore, this latter ignorance is not only the basis of nonvirtuous states of mind, but also of virtuous and neutral ones, thus referring to the activity of ignorance that is independent of any other afflictions (when ignorance is described as one of the twelve links of dependent origination, it refers to ignorance in this latter sense). The above eleven afflictions are called "all-pervasive" because they take all five categories of the factors to be relinquished with regard to their respective entire realms as their focal objects. These five categories are (1)–(4) the factors to be relinquished through seeing the four realities, respectively, and (5) the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. The nine contaminants within the desire realm that may also focus on levels of the two higher realms consist of the above eleven except for the two views about a real personality and views about extremes. The six contaminants that can also focus on uncontaminated phenomena (the realities of cessation and the path) consist of said eleven except for desire, hatred, pride, the views of holding a view as paramount, and the views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount.

660 Skt. prāpti, Tib. thob pa.

661 These two types of karma are usually referred to as "volitional karma" (Tib. sems pa'i las) and "volitioned karma" (Tib. bsam pa'i las), respectively. In its explanation of the link of karmic formations in Appendix I5E2, JNS says that, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the former refers to mental actions and the latter, to the physical and verbal actions motivated and triggered by the former. According to the other Buddhist schools, both consist of the mental factor intention, with the former referring to the intention that serves as the causal motivation and the latter, to the intention that serves as the motivation at the time of actually engaging in an action. See also Chart 4 on the origin of suffering in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

662 JNS (vol. 2, pp. 7–8) says that a karma whose results will definitely be experienced is to commit any of the five actions with immediate consequences and to not regret them. An example of an uncertain karma would be to kill one's parents and then to regret and confess this.

663 JNS (vol. 2, p. 6) says that propelling karma is the one through which merely a certain general type of birth is accomplished (such as merely being born as a human), while complet-

ing karma is what accomplishes a good or bad such birth (such as being born handicapped or healthy, in a slum or in a rich family).

664 What are called "white actions with white maturations" here refer to what is otherwise known as "immovable karmas." The karmic causes that consist of the dhyānas and formless absorptions, which are cultivated in order to be reborn on the corresponding levels of the form and formless realms, result only in rebirth within their specific corresponding god realm and cannot be changed by anything into resulting in any other level of rebirth. Another reason for them being called "immovable" is that these samādhis and their rebirths are not moved or stirred by the flaws of any levels below them. As for the difference between "immovable" and "movable" karmas (meritorious and nonmeritorious karmas), see the explanation of the link of "(karmic) formations" among the twelve links of dependent origination in Appendix I5E2ab1.

665 JNS (pp. 104–6) elaborates on the way in which the first two of the four realities are related as cause and result, saying that karma and afflictions produce suffering as either a karmically matured result (the five skandhas) or a dominated result (the environment). As for the origin of suffering, in its aspect of propelling rebirths, it consists of maturing causes. In its aspect of accomplishing these births, it consists of causes of similar outcome. Both aspects also represent the enabling causes of the world as the environment. However, the reality of suffering cannot be presented as a result that concords with the causes that are fully qualified karmas and afflictions. For example, when bodhisattvas take birth deliberately, a certain degree of willingly retained affliction (which is then called compassion) is needed as a cause to accomplish such a birth, but the skandhas that result from this are not held to be instances of the reality of suffering from the perspective of their being results that concord with the causes which are fully qualified karmas and afflictions. In brief, whatever belongs to the realities of suffering and its origin must be either an afflictive, a karmic, or a maturational obscuration.

666 JNS (p. 106) says that if the mind stream of someone is endowed with just one of these four aspects, it is necesssarily endowed with the other three as well.

667 The state of being free from something (in this case, karma, afflictions, and suffering) is not considered as a conditioned and impermanent result that is actually produced by a cause in the way that, for example, a sprout is produced by a seed. It is classified as a resultant absence of entities which is permanent and unconditioned. As JNS (p. 106) says, the reality of cessation represents the result of freedom through the power of the reality of the path. Though the defining characteristics of a result are complete in it, it has no cause that actually fulfills the function of producing it because it is unconditioned. However, the reality of cessation is not just presented from the aspect of sheer cessation. Rather, it is presented from the aspect of ultimate reality subsequent to the factors to be relinquished having ceased, which is the basis of their cessation. This ultimate reality is a special nondual cognition.

668 JNS (p. 106) elaborates that cessation is fourfold—(1) the cessation in the manner of suppressing the seeds to be relinquished on the paths of accumulation and preparation; (2) the cessation of the seeds to be relinquished through the uninterrupted path on the path of seeing having been eradicated; (3)–(4) the cessation of the seeds to be relinquished through the paths of familiarization and nonlearning, respectively, having been eradicated.

669 JNS (p. 106) says that the reality of the path is the means to manifest cessation. Whatever is presented as the reality of the path must be asserted as necessarily being the attainment of a given uninterrupted path. In the reality of the path that actually fulfills this function, all four of its defining characteristics must be complete. Among these, "conducive to deliverance" means being conducive to delivering from the lower paths onto the higher ones, and without the uninterrupted path (the remedy) one is not able to be so delivered. There is no room here to explain all the many further details of the four realities, so the reader is referred to the extensive discussions of these in the *Abhidharmakośa* (mainly Chapters 4–7) and its commentaries (for details

on the four aspects of each of the four realities, see also Chart 4). For further presentations of the various aspects of the four realities, see CE on AA IV.2–3.

670 According to JNS (pp. 106–7), the instructions on the three jewels are given in order to relinquish clinging to both the causal and fruitional three jewels that serve as the places of refuge. As for the jewel of the Buddha, on the level of seeming reality it consists of the two rūpakāyas. Ultimately, it is the dharmakāya with the eight qualities as above. Among these, (1) is the aspect of relinquishment and (2) is the aspect of realization—the final wisdom whose nature it is to be spontaneously present. (3) This wisdom is only realized by a buddha's own wisdom. (4)–(6) This wisdom is omniscient, has the nature of loving-kindness, and its power purifies the realms (or constitutions) of sentient beings. The two main categories that consist of one's own and others' welfare (which respectively include qualities (1)–(3) and (4)–(6)) are counted as qualities (7) and (8) of the Buddha. The same approach of counting applies to the realities of cessation and the path as the two main categories of the qualities of the dharma and the qualities of awareness and liberation as the two of the saṃgha (all these are described in *Uttaratantra* I.4–18), thus arriving at a total of eight qualities for each one of the three jewels.

671 JNS (p. 107) says that (2) refers to the dharma being endowed with the qualities of having relinquished the cause that is the reality of the origin of suffering. (5) is its lucidity by virtue of realizing true reality in a direct and self-aware manner. (6) is its power to cut through antagonistic factors.

672 JNS (p. 107) explains that what is presented as the jewel of the dharma has the nature of the two realities of cessation and the path and is not different from buddha wisdom. The ultimate jewel of the saṃgha is presented as the tathāgata heart during the phase of being both pure and impure, which has the above eight qualities. Therefore, the sole ultimate refuge is buddhahood (the enlightenment to be attained), which is the ultimate assembly of all genuine dharmas and noble saṃghas.

673 I.19. The jewel of the Buddha is primarily presented for those who, by virtue of seeing the Buddha's qualities, follow the mahāyāna in order to become buddhas themselves, thus being mainly interested in engaging the Buddha as the most supreme among all beings. The jewel of the dharma is primarily presented for those who, by virtue of seeing its qualities, follow the pratyekabuddhayāna in order to realize the profound dharma of dependent origination, thus being mainly interested in engaging the dharma as the most supreme among everything that is free from attachment. The jewel of the saṃgha is primarily presented for those who, by virtue of seeing its qualities, follow the śrāvakayāna in order to attain the state of an arhat as the highest embodiment of the saṃgha, thus being mainly interested in engaging the saṃgha as the most supreme among all assemblies.

674 These vigors refer to not clinging to one's own happiness, being completely indefatigable, and fully embracing the path in I.22 above. JNS (p. 108) explains that the instructions on the vigor of not clinging to one's body, speech, and mind dispel the laziness of clinging to bad activities; those on the vigor of accomplishing the power of the remedies in an indefatigable manner, the laziness of being disheartened; and those on the vigor of fully embracing the path to accomplish buddhahood, the laziness of self-contempt. Thus, bodhisattvas are endowed with nonclinging through turning away from clinging to what is bad; untiring perseverance through turning away from being timid; and the good fortune of embracing the supreme path through turning away from self-contempt. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 121–22) adds that the first vigor is the cause for making one's practice special; the second one, for one's practice becoming irreversible; and the third one, for not entering any yānas other than the mahāyāna.

675 As for the respective objects of these five visions, JNS (pp. 108–9) explains that fleshly vision sees material entities; divine vision, the awareness of afflicted mind streams; prajñā vision, the awareness of purified mind streams; dharma vision, the nature of phenomena that

is beyond matter and consciousness; and buddha vision, all four such objects together. As for their causes, according to the system of the common yāna they are accomplished only through the mental supports of the dhyānas, but here their primary causes are the six pāramitās. Their results—these five visions—are for the sake of great bodhisattvas swiftly becoming perfectly enlightened.

676 JNS (p. 109) comments that (e) is the direct realization of all the deaths, transitions, rebirths, beautiful and ugly complexions, good and bad actions, and their results, of all sentient beings. As for the difference between the divine eye and the divine vision above, in general the six supernatural knowledges know the nature of their respective perceptional causes, without ever depending on whether it is necessary or not for an object, which is suitable to appear, to appear as such by virtue of any object conditions. On the other hand, the five visions depend on the pure aspect of their objects, that is, on the elimination of what obscures the arising of a consciousness that is suitable to see an object that is suitable to appear. (f) refers to realizing that and how the karmas and afflictions of oneself and others have been exhausted and will never arise again. As for the enabling causes that produce these six supernatural knowledges, one rests temporarily in the dhyānas. Then, from within that state, (a) one mentally engages in one's body being light, supple, and so on, thus being able to display various miraculous powers. (b) Through intently directing the mind to collecting all kinds of sounds and languages, the divine ear operates. (c) One knows the minds of others through intently directing the mind to ascertaining particular states of their minds that precede particular ones of their physical and verbal expressions, just as one knows that equivalent states of one's own mind precede the same physical and verbal actions. In addition, one knows whether these others have or are free from afflictions. (d) Through remembering all one's actions in this life in their correct order one is able to recollect former states of existence too. (e) The divine eye operates through mentally engaging in the characteristic of lucidity, such as in a lamp. (f) Mental engagements such as "Through familiarizing with the mother, the supernatural knowledge of miraculous powers is attained" function as the causes that produce the knowledge of termination and nonarising.

677 JNS (pp. 111–13) explains that the path of seeing refers to meditating in such a manner that its sixteen moments are naturally unobservable. The path of familiarization means to meditate by way of seeing later distinctive features that are other than what was seen before through the path of seeing. One may object that there is no difference then between the paths of seeing and familiarization if one views and familiarizes with what was seen before. As an answer to this, some people say that, on the ten bhūmis, the way of seeing the nature of phenomena is that it is realized in an increasingly clear manner. However, this entails the flaw that it then follows that if the nature of phenomena on the first bhūmi is realized in a way that is unclear in comparison with the second bhūmi, the realization on the first bhūmi is conceptual because it is a mind that realizes its object in an unclear way. However, conceptions are not established as the nature of the remedy that is able to relinquish the seeds to be relinquished and represents the nature of the path. In our own system, on each bhūmi there is a difference in newly realizing distinctive features of the nature of phenomena that are other than what was seen before. In this sense, it is not that the respective realizations on the path of familiarization must realize nothing but the path that was already seen before. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the nature of phenomena that was already seen before is not seen later, because the purity of this very seeing has to progress further and further. Here, some say that a consciousness that sees later what has already been seen before is not a valid cognition, but this is no good. For it is only in terms of ordinary beings that a mind which sees what it already saw before is known as "repetitive cognition," which is presented as a type of nonvalid cognition (by the Gelugpas). However, within the framework of the cognitions of noble ones in meditative equipoise, even all the minds that ordinary beings may present as valid cognitions are not established as such through valid cognition. Therefore, it is equally untenable to apply any notions that correspond to the nonvalid cognitions of ordinary

beings to such meditative equipoises. Some say, "Though there is no difference in the meditative equipoises of all eleven bhūmis in directly realizing the mere dharmadhātu, they are divided through their differences in realizing particular bearers of the nature of phenomena as being empty of a nature of their own." However, the statement of "there being no difference in directly realizing the mere dharmadhātu" is untenable. For in the dharmadhātu's own nature there are no differences in terms of it being "mere" or "special." Also, if there were something to be seen that is more special than the "mere" dharmadhātu that is seen in all meditative equipoises of all eleven bhūmis, it would follow that it is never seen at all. One may think, "There is a difference between the mere dharmadhātu and the special one, because the special dharmadhātu that consists of said particular bearers of the nature of phenomena being empty of a nature of their own is realized." But that is not tenable either, because the sūtras of definitive meaning say that the negation which is the realization of particular bearers of the nature of phenomena being empty of a nature of their own is not the dharmadhātu. In brief, each one of all the meditative equipoises of the ten bhūmis on the paths of seeing and familiarization is a manifestation of a new and unmistaken realization of the nature of phenomena in which all manifest conceptions have been relinquished because these realizations are based on having newly relinquished their respective portions of obscuring mistakenness. This is supported by quoting *Madhyāntavibhāga* II.16–17 on the cognitive obscurations of the ten bhūmis being specific types of ignorance about the dharmadhātu and all obscurations being included in the pair of afflictive and cognitive obscurations, with their relinquishment representing liberation. In the texts of Maitreya, when excluding the obscurations of meditative absorption all other obscurations are included in that pair, but when the former are not excluded, the obscurations are three in number. Some people attempt to criticize the assertion that the obscurations of meditative absorption are included in the afflictive obscurations through the following absurd consequence: "It follows that the mind streams of arhats who are liberated through prajñā alone [on these, see below in the twenty types of saṃgha] have afflictive obscurations because the obscurations to meditative absorption are asserted as particular instances of the afflictive obscurations and because these arhats have not relinquished the obscurations of meditative absorption." These people further attempt to impose their rulership by claiming that one cannot but accept this absurd consequence. But this approach is very bad indeed, because it is impossible for arhats who are liberated through prajñā alone to attain arhathood in the first place without having overcome the māra of afflictions. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 119–22) says that the paths of seeing and familiarization are what make one's practice consummate. The insight during the sixteen moments of the path of seeing—that all phenomena are without nature—serves as the remedy for the imputed factors to be relinquished, just as illusionists are without attachment to their own illusory creations. Though what is to be revealed or realized on the path of seeing and the path of familiarization is not different in essence, through the power of the nature of dependent origination the levels of the path of familiarization serve as the remedies for the innate factors to be relinquished. In other words, what is strived for as the ultimate fruition by all five paths is the dharmakāya, whose essence is the nature of phenomena. In terms of this nature of phenomena being the object to be revealed, there is no difference between the paths of seeing and familiarization, but this does not mean that, with regard to this nature that is revealed through these two paths, there are no differences in terms of profundity, vastness, and being free or not free from certain factors to be relinquished. It is not tenable to present any of the five paths as being established through any characteristics of their own. However, these paths are explained as being sheer dependent origination, and thus as being established through the power of the nature of phenomena that consists of the two realities, such as factors to be relinquished being relinquished through their remedies within this framework of sheer dependent origination. Here, some unlearned people say, "Though there is no difference between the realization of the naturally pure dharmadhātu through the path of seeing and its realization through the path of familiarization, these two paths

are distinguished by virtue of their ways of seeing the dharmadhātu free from adventitious stains since a sūtra (quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* [J 77; P5526, fol. 119a5–6]) says:

> Just as the sun in a clouded sky with some gap, you are not seen fully here
> Even by the noble ones who have the pure eyes of insight, but still limited discernment."

However, all distinctive features of all paths in terms of what is to be realized and what is to be relinquished are presented solely from the perspective of becoming free from adventitious stains, whereas there exist no presentations of any path from the perspective of natural purity or in terms of primordial purity. This is to be understood from the meaning of the sūtra passage, "No matter whether buddhas have come to the world or not, the nature of phenomena is the same." Also, to adduce the above quote here is irrelevant since its meaning is that the noble ones do not see the dharmakāya in a fully complete manner. But it does not refer to their way of seeing in terms of seeing the naturally pure nature of phenomena, while not seeing the nature of phenomena free from adventitious stains. TOK (vol. 3, p. 485) explains the following on the path of seeing: "[Since the path of seeing] serves as the remedy for contaminated entities, it is called 'uncontaminated virtue.' Since it relinquishes the afflictions that are factors to be relinquished through seeing at their root, it is [called] 'relinquishing remedy.' Since it is the beginning of the dharmas of noble ones, it is also [called] 'the first generation of the supramundane mind.' Since it is the path of directly seeing the reality of the noble ones that was never seen before (the nature of phenomena free from reference points), it is called 'the path of seeing.'" On the path of familiarization, TOK (ibid., p. 489) says, "Since it is the path of making oneself familiar with familiarizing with the true reality that was realized on the path of seeing, it is called 'the path of familiarization.' Since it is uncontaminated, it is called 'uncontaminated roots of virtue.' Since it is the remedy that relinquishes through familiarization, it is also [called] 'relinquishing remedy.'" See also Appendix I2D2ba2b.

678 CZ, pp. 60–94.

679 The twenty kinds of saṃgha are a supplementary topic of the AA which did not receive very much attention in Indian commentaries (partly because these types of saṃgha were common knowledge in all Buddhist communities), but eventually became the subject matter of many Tibetan volumes discussing just this topic. The names, classifications, and characteristics of these twenty kinds of saṃgha stem from the śrāvaka tradition (in particular the Sarvāstivādin School) and are subdivisions of the "eight noble persons" (Skt. aṣṭāryapudgala), who include all śrāvakas from the path of seeing onward. These eight are stream-enterers (so called since they have entered the stream of the path that leads to nirvāṇa), once-returners, nonreturners, and arhats, with each one being divided into approachers to and abiders in these states (depending on how many afflictions are being relinquished or have already been relinquished). In brief, approaching stream-enterers are those during the first fifteen moments of the path of seeing, while abiders in that result have reached the sixteenth moment (thus having relinquished all imputed afflictions that are the factors to be relinquished through seeing). Approaching once-returners are those from the sixteenth moment (which, in the śrāvakayāna, is considered to be actually the beginning of the path of familiarization) onward, being in the process of relinquishing the first six of the nine innate degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm to be relinquished through the path of familiarization. Abiding once-returners are those who have relinquished all these six, thus only returning to the desire realm once. Approaching nonreturners (to the desire realm) are in the process of relinquishing the remaining three of the nine innate degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm. Abiding nonreturners have relinquished all nine, thus only being reborn in the form or formless realms. There, while working on relinquishing the remaining seventy-two degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to these two higher realms, they represent approaching arhats. Once all of these afflictions have been relinquished as well, they become abiders in the final fruition of an arhat (for all the ramifications and details,

see below and Charts 15–16). This overall framework is primarily found in the sixth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*, which actually contains many more than twenty varieties of noble saṃgha (most of the terms are also found in the beginning part of the *prāptiviniścaya* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*). Note also that this regular progression only applies to practitioners who have solely engaged in the Buddhist path and have not already previously relinquished certain afflictions to be relinquished through the Buddhist path of familiarization by virtue of having engaged in other non-Buddhist samādhis of the form and formless realms (summarily called the "mundane path of familiarization"), which obviates these afflictions having to be relinquished again on the Buddhist supramundane path of familiarization (see the presentation of the exemplary saṃgha below). In the AA, a selection of twenty out of all the categories found in the *Abhidharmakośa* is metaphorically mapped onto the saṃgha of noble irreversible bodhisattvas on the mahāyāna path as per the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (this latter presentation and the above one of the śrāvakas represent the actual and the exemplary saṃgha, respectively). The list of varieties of saṃgha does not discuss the path to enlightenment of any one individual person, but represents an exhaustive template of possible routes that beings with different previous spiritual careers may take on the Buddhist path once they have reached the path of seeing, mostly over numerous lifetimes and in various realms within saṃsāra.

680 Except for the presentation of those who relinquish instantaneously (which is based on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; P4049, fol. 110a.6–b.2), the explanation of the exemplary saṃgha follows the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.34–58.

681 These are practitioners who, already before the Buddhist path of seeing, have become free from certain degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm that are to be relinquished through the Buddhist path of familiarization, which is by virtue of their prior cultivation of samādhis of the form or formless realms on non-Buddhist paths.

682 These are practitioners who simultaneously relinquish all nine degrees of the innate afflictions of the desire, form, and formless realms to be relinquished through the Buddhist path of familiarization (simultaneous relinquishment is not possible on the mundane path of familiarization).

683 These are practitioners who gradually attain the four states of stream-enterer and so forth in a strictly progressive manner.

684 The three fetters consist of the views about a real personality, the views that hold ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount, and doubt. Through the first one, one is afraid of liberation and thus fettered by not wanting to proceed on the path. Through the second one, one takes what is not the path to be the path and thus is fettered by taking the wrong path. Through doubt about the path, one obstructs liberation too. There are also the sets of five fetters and nine fetters. The former consists of two sets—those in accordance with the desire realm (the above three fetters, striving desire, and malice) and those in accordance with the two higher realms (desire in the form realm and desire, agitation, dullness, and pride in the formless realm). The nine fetters are attachment, anger, pride, ignorance, view, holding something as paramount, doubt, envy, and miserliness.

685 This is the highest formless realm (a.k.a. "Neither Discrimination nor Nondiscrimination").

686 In general, there are two types of abiders—mere abiders (who do not make any efforts to progress to the next fruition) and special abiders (who make such efforts in varying degrees).

687 Skt. śraddhānusārin, Tib. dad pa'i rjes 'brang pa.

688 Skt. dharmānusārin, Tib. chos kyi rjes 'brang pa. The former term is often translated as "followers of faith" or the like, which suggests that it is possible to practice and realize the path of seeing out of mere (blind) faith. However, the scriptures make it very clear that a

solid understanding of the Buddhist teachings, especially of the four realities and how to meditate on them, is indispensable for both these types of practitioners in order to attain the advanced fruition of a stream-enterer (the path of seeing). Thus, both the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* explain that both types practice for the sake of clearly realizing reality as it is through recollecting the dharma, with the difference merely lying in having trust in the teachings as given by another person versus studying them by primarily relying on one's own prajñā.

689 Skt. śraddhādhimukta, Tib. dad mos.

690 Skt. dṛṣṭiprāpta, Tib. mthong thob.

691 This means that this classification and its names in terms of duller and sharper faculties are not restricted to those who have previously become free from attachment, but applies in general, thus also to the regular approaching stream-enterers, once-returners, and nonreturners in the category of those who attain the fruitions gradually. Note that, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the above two approaching once-returners as well as the regular (gradual) approaching stream-enterers during the first fifteen moments are still on the path of preparation since the path of seeing is only the sixteenth moment. Thus, the above abiding once-returners as well as the gradual abiding stream-enterers are on the path of seeing and not on the path of familiarization (which only starts after the sixteenth moment).

692 As mentioned before, to just abide in any one of the fifteen moments of the path of seeing means to be an approaching stream-enterer. However, the stream-enterers described here are practitioners who have already relinquished certain degrees of the innate afflictions to be relinquished through the Buddhist path of familiarization by virtue of having practiced the mundane path of familiarization before having entered the Buddhist path of seeing. Therefore, they do not have to relinquish them on the Buddhist path of familiarization. CE here strictly follows the presentation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.30–31, which adds that (a) those during the first fifteen moments of the path of seeing who, in addition, have previously relinquished any number of the first five degrees of the innate afflictions of the desire realm in this way are called "approaching the first fruition (of stream-enterer)." As explained above, (b) those who have previously relinquished any number ranging from six to eight degrees of these afflictions are called "approaching once-returners." (c) Those who have relinquished all nine degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm, or, these plus any of the sixty-two degrees of afflictions of the two higher realms up through the third formless realm (Nothing Whatsoever) are called "approaching nonreturners." As for (b) and (c), while they are technically—from the perspective of the Buddhist path alone—still in the process of becoming stream-enterers, in terms of their sum total of factors already relinquished they are at the same time already approaching once-returners and nonreturners, respectively. The *Bhāṣya* on VI.32 addresses the questions why, when realizing the sixteenth moment, persons (a) only become abiding stream-enterers and not approaching once-returners (since they have already relinquished some of the innate afflictions of the desire realm to be relinquished through the path of familiarization); persons (b) only become abiding once-returners and not approaching nonreturners; and persons (c) only become abiding nonreturners and not approaching arhats. The answer is that, upon attaining a given fruition, one does not attain any path that is higher than this fruition. Thus, as long as the abiders in any given fruition do not actively engage in the yogic practices that lead to the relinquishment of the factors not yet relinquished (which eventually yields the next higher fruition), they are simply abiders in the present fruition and not approachers to the next fruition.

693 Each one of the four dhyānas and the four formless absorptions has its own preparatory stages, during which the defilements of the respectively lower level of absorption are relinquished. This results in the experience of the actual respective state of samādhi as the fruition. The reason is that it is not possible to relinquish the defilements of a given realm if one is either still stuck in the mental scope of this realm or already simply experiences the bliss of

the next level. For example, the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna of the form realm is a threshold between a mind rooted in the desire realm and a mind just resting in the bliss of this first dhyāna, during which one is actually capable of relinquishing the defilements of the desire realm. This is why it is called "not ineffective" (Skt. anāgamya, Tib. mi lcogs med pa). For more details, see the general topic of the preparatory stages, dhyānas, and formless absorptions in the context of the practice of engagement below (I.44–45).

694 Skt. saptakṛtvaparama, Tib. srid lan bdun pa. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.34ab explains that this actually refers to a maximum of twenty-eight—four sets of seven—states of existence: seven times as a human with seven intermediate states and seven times as a god with seven intermediate states.

695 Type (b2) is called "those [who are born] from family to family" (Skt. kulaṃkula, Tib. rigs nas rigs), which means that they are reborn at least two and at most three more times in the same type of rebirth as the one during which they have attained the path of seeing, that is, as either a human or a god within the desire realm.

696 Skt. ekavīcika (lit. "one with one interval"), Tib. tshe gcig bar chad gcig pa. "One interval" is explained in two ways in the *Abhidharmakośa* on VI.36ac—being separated from nirvāṇa by only one lifetime and being separated from the fruition of a nonreturner by just one degree of the afflictions of the desire realm.

697 Skt. rūpopaga, Tib. gzugs su nyer 'gro.

698 Skt. ārūpyopaga, Tib. gzugs med nyer 'gro.

699 Skt. dṛṣṭadharmaparinirvāyin, Tib. mthong chos zhi.

700 Skt. parivṛttajanma, Tib. 'dod par tshe yongs gyur.

701 Skt. kāyasakṣin, Tib. lus mngon byed.

702 Skt. antarāparinirvāyin, Tib. bar 'da' ba.

703 Skt. upapadyaparinirvāyin, Tib. skyes 'da' ba.

704 Skt. sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, Tib. mngon par 'du byed pa dang bcas te 'da' ba.

705 Skt. anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, Tib. mngon par 'du byed med par 'da' ba.

706 Skt. ūrdhvaṃsrotas, Tib. gong 'pho ba.

707 The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* divides these again into three—those who pass into nirvāṇa during the intermediate state quickly, not quickly, and after a long time.

708 The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* says that, according to the sūtras (*Samyukta Nikāya* 27.23), the order of (a3) and (a4) is reversed in the sense of (a4) not *needing* to apply themselves with diligence and their accomplishment thus being more spontaneous. JNS (p. 129) follows this, saying that (a4) pass into nirvāṇa during the middle of said birth in the form realm through making just a little bit of effort on the path, while (a3) do so at the end of this lifetime through making great efforts (see also the comments on AA I.23d below).

709 Skt. akaniṣṭhaga, Tib. 'og min 'gro ba. This refers not to the ultimate Akaniṣṭha of buddhahood, but to the highest of the five pure abodes that make up the peak of the form realm (extensions of the fourth dhyāna level; see Chart 1). These five abodes are called "pure" because there are no ordinary gods of the form realm in them, but only noble beings in the Buddhist sense (that is, those above the path of seeing). In due order, the five progressive levels of alternating cultivation (see below) practiced by these nonreturners serve as the causes for their being reborn in these five abodes.

710 Skt. pluta, Tib. 'phar ba.

711 This is the lowest of the three heavens related to the god Brahmā, which together make up the first of the four levels of the form realm (see Chart 1).

712 Thus, they are "leapers," because they skip all the levels of the form realm between the lowest (Brahmakāyika) and the highest (Akaniṣṭha). All three nonreturners who progress to Akaniṣṭha have already practiced the alternating cultivation of the fourth dhyāna in their last existence in the desire realm, but then—by virtue of having savored the bliss of the first dhyāna—they regress from the three higher dhyānas, thus becoming reborn in Brahmakāyika. In this rebirth, they resume the practice of the supreme form of the alternating cultivation of the fourth dhyāna. By virtue of this, they are reborn in Akaniṣṭha and able to attain arhathood there. Note that between (1) and (2) above, the Tibetan of CE repeats the two phrases *skye ba phyi ma 'og min du skyes nas myang 'das thob pa'i 'phar ba dang/ des spel sgom dang po gsum po gang rung sor chud* ("They attain nirvāṇa after having been born in their next life in Akaniṣṭha. By virtue of this [support], they restore any one of the first three alternating cultivations."

713 Skt. ardhapluta, Tib. ched du 'phar ba.

714 Skt. sarvacyuta, Tib. gnas thams cad du 'chi 'pho ba.

715 According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the reason for these nonreturners not being born in Mahābrahmāṇa is that this god realm is restricted to tīrthikas, who regard the god Brahmā as the creator. Furthermore, there can be only one sovereign—Brahmā—in this heaven, but the noble nonreturners would outshine him. In general, nonreturners always progress upward, that is, they are neither born in an abode lower than their last one nor in the same one twice.

716 The fourth dhyāna is imperturbable and sharp by virtue of being free from all eight disturbances or flaws of dhyāna—examination, analysis, physical pleasure and suffering, mental pleasure and displeasure, inhalation, and exhalation (examination refers to the coarse investigation of phenomena, while analysis means their fine and detailed scrutiny). Moreover, this dhyāna represents a proper balance between calm abiding and superior insight, thus being most suitable among all types of samādhis in the form or formless realms for developing the superior insight of identitylessness. Once one is proficient in this dhyāna, one can practice alternating cultivation with the other three dhyānas as well.

717 The uncontaminated form of the fourth dhyāna means to be connected with meditating on the four realities and personal identitylessness, which serves to cut through the root of saṃsāra. As a purely mundane virtue within saṃsāra, the contaminated form of this dhyāna means to focus on comparing the peacefulness, purity, and bliss of higher abodes in the form realm with the coarseness of lower ones. Therefore, among the three phases of dhyāna during alternating cultivation, it is only the moments of contaminated dhyānas that can cause rebirths in the five pure abodes of the form realm.

718 As for counting six or nine alternations and so forth, this means to repeat the three-part process of the main practice as described here twice, thrice, and so on.

719 According to the *Abhidharmakośābhāṣya* on VI.42ab, in contrast to Vasubandhu's own opinion, the Vaibhāṣikas hold that both arhats and nonreturner are able to enter each dhyāna for just a single moment.

720 The *Abhidharmakośābhāṣya* on VI.42cd adds that arhats and nonreturners engage in such alternating cultivation out of fear of afflictions, that is, in order to, respectively, avoid retrogressing from their fruition and to keep away from engaging in mundane dhyānas that entail craving (called "the samādhi associated with enjoyment").

721 Skt. bhavāgraparamaga, Tib. srid rtser 'gro ba.

722 There is no intermediate state before any rebirths in the formless realm.

723 JNS (p. 134) adds that the nonreturners of the latter type need at least two more rebirths in the formless realm before attaining arhathood. They are of six types in terms of being reborn in (1)–(2) the first two or three lower formless realms, respectively; (3)–(4) the last two or three realms, respectively; (5)–(6) all four realms in ascending and descending order, respectively.

724 This means that these nonreturners attain all the fruitions of stream-enterer, once-returner, nonreturner, and arhat in a single lifetime in the desire realm. The supreme pair refers to the two foremost disciples of the Buddha, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, who accomplished this feat.

725 These persons have already attained the fruitions of a stream-enterer or a once-returner within a series of their previous rebirths (which may have been in the desire realm, form realm, or formless realm) and then attain the fruition of a nonreturner in their next birth, in which they also attain nirvāṇa (the latter is what "change of state" refers to here). Thus, JNS (pp. 134–35) explains them to be threefold. (1) Those who become nonreturners in a rebirth in the desire realm are the ones who have previously attained the realizations of either "those who will take seven rebirths" in the desire realm or "those who progress from family to family." (2) Those who become nonreturners in the form realm are those who have previously attained the realizations of any one among the three types of leaper. (3) Those who become nonreturners in the formless realm are a particular subtype of the fourth kind ("those who progress higher") of the nonreturners who progress to the formless realm—those who are certain to take a succession of rebirths in all four levels of this realm and then become "nonreturners who change state after being born" in the last one of these rebirths. According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.41ab, by virtue of the great disgust of nonreturners (1) with the suffering of the desire realm, they also become arhats in this very same life and are thus definitely not reborn in any other realms. Nonreturners (3) do not go to any other realms either, but nonreturners (2) sometimes proceed to the formless realm as "those who progress higher" up through the Peak of Existence.

726 The meditative absorption of cessation (a.k.a. "the meditative absorption in which discrimination and feeling cease") represents the cessation of all primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum as well as some with a stable continuum, that is, the first seven consciousnesses (except the ālaya-consciousness) and their mental factors. For details, see CE below on verses IV.4–5, as well as Appendices I4C2bc and I5F in Volume Two.

727 According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.43cd, the bodies in which consciousness has stopped are those of practitioners in the meditative absorption of cessation. During this meditative absorption, their bodies experience a hitherto unknown calmness. Once such practitioners rise from this meditative absorption, their consciousness returns, so that they also become mentally aware of this physical experience, which they then—in retrospect—know to have derived from their preceding meditative absorption. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 107b.4) says that these nonreturners are the ones who cultivate the samādhis of the eight liberations, the culmination of which is said meditative absorption (for details on these eight, see CE below and Chart 12). As extra bonus materials, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.43 and VI.63 alerts us that the above brief divisions are just the most superficial classifications of noble ones. When further classified in terms of place, disposition, detachment, and faculties, for example, just among the two categories of nonreturners who progress to the form and the formless realms, there are 12,960 types each, while the "pursuers by means of confidence" are of 147,825 types.

728 In other words, approaching arhats before this "vajralike samādhi" are simply the same as the special abiders in the fruition of a nonreturner described above.

729 According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.56–57, these six types of arhats are named (1) *parihāṇadharman*; (2) *cetanādharman* ("those who have the feature of [being capable] at will")—being able to intentionally put an end to their existence; (3) *anurakṣaṇādharman* ("those who have the feature of guarding themselves [from retrogressing]"; (4) *sthitākampya*—not regressing from their fruition even without guarding themselves, as long as strong causes of retrogressing are absent; (5) *prativedhanādharman* ("those who have the feature of [being capable of] penetrating")—being able to shift to the state of the immovable ones without effort; and (6) *akopyadharman* ("those who have the feature of being unshakable")—not being susceptible to retrogressing at all. Arhats (1)–(5) derive from "those who are convinced through confidence" (duller faculties), while (6) stem from "those who attain through seeing" (sharper faculties). The first five fruitions are dependent on certain situations—material goods, absence of illness, and place—and thus have to be constantly guarded, while the sixth is not so dependent. In sum, according to the *Bhāṣya* on VI.58, the Vaibhāṣikas claim that the first five arhats are susceptible to regressing from their fruition, which then results in them just being stream-enterers. This is followed by a lengthy argument by the Sautrāntikas who deny the possibility of any arhat regressing from their fruitional states (rather, they may only regress from abiding in the bliss of samādhi during their present life). The main reason is that, otherwise, liberation would not be final but reversible. Accordingly, from the general perspective of Buddhist philosophical systems from the Sautrāntikas upward, JNS (p. 136) gives the following definitions for these six types of arhat. Based on the gradualist type of arhats with duller faculties, it is possible for arhats (1) to regress from the state of abiding in bliss during one's present life that is irreversible through any conditions. (2) will not regress from this state if they swiftly leave the formations of the skandhas of this life behind, but will regress if they do not. (3) will not regress from said state if they protect their minds from sense pleasures, but will regress if they do not. It is impossible for (4) to regress from the state of bliss, but they cannot shift to being of sharp faculties. For (5), it is impossible to regress from the state of bliss and they are capable of shifting to being of sharp faculties. (6) are the gradualist arhats who are definitely of sharper faculties from the very beginning and thus are never susceptible to regress from the state of bliss in this life. The *Bhāṣya* on VI.64ab lists two more types of noble ones that specifically pertain to arhats and are classified in terms of the way they relinquish obscurations—those who are liberated through prajñā alone and those who are liberated through both prajñā and samādhi. The former are not able to enter the meditative absorption of cessation, but are liberated from all afflictive obscurations through the prajñā of realizing identitylessness. In addition, the latter are able to enter the meditative absorption of cessation since they are liberated from the obscurations of meditative absorption too.

730 JNS (pp. 130–31) says specifically that these six types also apply to leapers, half-leapers, and those who die in, and transit through, all abodes. In general, only abiding arhats are non-learners, while all other seven noble ones (approachers and abiders) are learners because they constantly have to train in the three trainings of ethics, samādhi, and prajñā. Ordinary beings (practitioners below the path of seeing) are not called learners in this sense because they do not fully realize the four realities of the noble ones and are still in danger of completely losing whatever training they have acquired. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.45 says that the number of noble beings being eight is only given in a nominal sense. In terms of the actual gradual progression of realization and relinquishment on the path, there are only five noble beings—approaching stream-enterers and the four abiders. As was explained above, in due order, the remaining three approachers are not different from the first three abiders.

731 The Sanskrit *śrāmaṇya* literally means "making efforts" and, in general, refers to the spiritual efforts of śrāmanas. The latter was originally a name for mendicants of nonbrahmanic origin who followed any spiritual path not founded on the Vedas. In Buddhist literature, this term is primarily used for Buddhist mendicants. Here, it specifically refers to the meditative

efforts of the above-mentioned eight types of noble beings to relinquish or "pacify the afflictions" (the latter is a traditional explanation of this term).

732 JNS (p. 142) states that "the approach of virtuous effort" is another name for the uninterrupted path. Thus, "the fruition of virtuous effort" is an uncontaminated path of liberation that is attained in dependence on its corresponding uninterrupted path. Fruition of virtuous effort, path of liberation, and reality of cessation are synonyms.

733 When an uninterrupted path is attained, it leads to a fruition of virtuous effort that has both a conditioned and an unconditioned aspect. The conditioned fruition is the path of liberation and the unconditioned fruition is an instance that is a reality of cessation. Technically speaking, a path of liberation is the result of a cause of similar outcome and is both a result that concords with its cause and a result through personal effort. In addition, any instance that is a reality of cessation is a result of freedom, which refers to the disconnection from the corresponding path of liberation and the irreversible complete relinquishment of all afflictions of the corresponding level, primarily through the prajñā of realizing identitylessness (in other words, this is what is called "analytical cessation"). The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.53cd adds that the two fruitions of once-returners and nonreturners (when they are combinations of the factors to be relinquished through seeing and certain factors already relinquished through mundane meditation) are furthermore supported by the pure obtainment of consistent freedom from their respective factors to be relinquished, such that these types of noble ones cannot die in a state of having regressed from their respective fruitions. During their lifetimes, it is possible that they temporarily regress from their status, but they invariably regain it before they die. In general, the fruition of a once-returner consists of the relinquishment of the three fetters (Skt. saṃyojana; the views about a real personality, the view of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount, and doubt) and the reduction of most of the desire, hatred, and ignorance pertaining to the desire realm. The fruition of a nonreturner consists of the relinquishment of "the five lower ties" (Skt. avarabhāgīya; the three fetters plus desire and hatred pertaining to the desire realm). The fruition of an arhat consists of the relinquishment of "the five higher ties" (Skt. ūrdhvabhāgīya; the two kinds of desire pertaining to the form and formless realms, respectively, as well as pride, agitation, and ignorance pertaining to both).

734 According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.52–53ab, the five causes that uniquely characterize the four fruitions of stream-enterer and so on are (1) relinquishing a previous path (the respective level of approacher); (2) attaining another path (the respective level of abider); (3) being endowed with a single state of attainment that consists of the termination of the respective factors to be relinquished in their entirety; (4) attaining a set of eight cognitions at once (the four dharma cognitions and the four subsequent cognitions; for details on these, see below and Appendix I1H3ad); and (5) attaining the sixteen aspects of the four realities.

735 These are the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna, the actual four dhyānas, the special first dhyāna, and the first three actual meditative absorptions of the formless realm. As for the distinction between the ordinary and the special first dhyāna, the first dhyāna entails five branches or accompanying mental factors, which are divided into three groups. The remedial branches are examination and analysis, the branches of benefit are exhilaration and bliss, and the branch that is the basis is samādhi. When the first dhyāna is free from examination (which is the coarsest of these five branches), it is called "special" (there is no such distinction for the remaining three dhyānas; for more details, see the explanation on the difficult points of I.44–45 below). For this and other frequently used sets of mental supports or samādhis for the path, see Chart 11. In principle, each one of them can be used as a mental support of mere calm abiding, based on which the liberating superior insights into identitylessness are developed. However, not all of them are equally suitable (as mentioned above, the fourth dhyāna is the most conducive one).

736 Though the formless gods have no material body, they still have a so-called "mental body." JNS (p. 144) says that the statement on the physical supports applies in general. In particular, the state of nonreturners who have previously become free from attachment can also be attained in a physical support within the higher realms. As for those who abide in their respective fruitions that have been fully attained, stream-enterers and once-returners can only abide in a physical support within the desire realm, while nonreturners and arhats can abide in physical supports within all three realms.

737 These are the bodhisattvas on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, for whom there are various signs of specific levels of irreversibility (for details on these levels and their signs, see verses IV.38–59). According to Haribhadra's commentaries, to go for refuge to them as the mahāyāna jewel of the saṃgha as explained in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras means to realize that they are unborn (as are all other phenomena).

738 It is commonly held that the term "cognitive obscuration" is only found in the mahāyāna, but not in the system of the śrāvakas (such as the Vaibhāṣikas). Indeed, the *Abhidharmakośa* and its commentaries do not mention it, but, as Cox points out, the terms "afflictive obscurations" and "cognitive obscurations" are found in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (Taishō 1545, 27.724b28; see Jaini 1992, pp. 139 and 144). The exact meaning of the latter term in that text is not clear, but obviously is not the same as in mahāyāna presentations.

739 Most Indian and Tibetan commentaries consider bodhisattvas being called "stream-enterers" and so on as only applying in a nominal sense due to certain similar properties. However, JNS (pp. 139–40) quotes the *Avaivartacakrasūtra* (D240, fols. 245a.4ff.), which is also referred to in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*. This sūtra teaches why the fully qualified stream-enterers, once-returners, and so on refer to bodhisattvas (by contrast, LSSP considers what the *Avaivartacakrasūtra* says to be only of expedient meaning). In other words, the real stream-enterers and so forth are the bodhisattvas and not the śrāvakas. The *Vṛtti* (D3787, fol. 38b.1–2; p. 46) and the *Ālokā* (p. 36) do not say this explicitly, but both also refer the reader to the detailed explanations in this sūtra. The fruitions of bodhisattvas as taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and summarized here in AA I.23–24 as well as the paths through which they are attained are not taught in the common scriptures available in the hīnayāna. Thus, this saṃgha of noble bodhisattvas represents the actual ultimate jewel of the saṃgha. The reason for using the same names as in the hīnayāna (stream-enterer and so on) are the above-mentioned similarities in certain respects. The purpose for giving these names to bodhisattvas is to make one understand that they are capable of establishing disciples of lower dispositions in the fruitions of stream-enterers up through pratyekabuddhas. They are definitely capable of doing so, because, from the path of seeing onward, bodhisattvas are endowed with all types of realization and relinquishment of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in a complete way. Also, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 116a.6) invalidates the presentation of the nominal stream-enterers and so on of the hīnayāna referring to the actual fully qualified approachers and abiders of bodhisattvas: "Why do bodhisattvas not become stream-enterers after they have entered the flawless [path, that is, the path of seeing]?" It is because entering the stream is not perfect. "Why do they not become once-returners?" This is because they assume limitless rebirths in [saṃsāric] existence as they wish. "Why do they not become nonreturners?" This is because they remain by virtue of dhyāna and thus are born in the desire realm.

740 CE does not present these verses in full here, but just their respective portions as they are explained below.

741 The classification into forty-five is found in the sūtras in one hundred thousand and twenty-five thousand lines, and the one into twenty-five appears in the revised version of the latter (see CZ, pp. 67–74).

742 Unlike in most other commentaries, the numbers inserted in ( ) to identify CE's counting of the twenty kinds of saṃgha are explicitly written out in the text.

743 This and all the following quotes in this section are found in CZ, pp. 67–74.

744 Obviously, this sūtra passage refers only to those who are convinced through confidence. JNS (p. 148) also provides the passage for those who attain through seeing: "Śāriputra, there are also those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who are skilled in means . . . Since they are not separated from the yoga of prajñāpāramitā, they will awaken in a completely perfect way to unsurpassable completely perfect enlightenment in this very Good Eon."

745 Note that, compared to the presentation of (11) and (12) according to the exemplary saṃgha above, both CE and JNS reverse their order in terms of when nirvāṇa is attained.

746 JNS (pp. 151–52) counts "those who progress to the highest peak of existence" and "those who overcame attachment to form" as two and also provides two different references from the sūtras (which accords with the *Vṛtti*), with the above one only referring to "those who overcame attachment to form." Those who progress to the highest peak of existence are referenced as follows (see CZ, p. 72): "Śāriputra, there are those bodhisattva mahāsattvas who, having practiced the dhyānas and the formless [absorptions], take birth from Brahmakāyika up through Śubhakṛtsna and then take birth from the āyatana of Infinite Space up through the Peak of Existence. Then, they are born in various buddha realms."

747 This is because "abiders in the fruition of arhathood," when applied to the path of bodhisattvas, are simply those who abide in the final fruition of buddhahood and thus are not a part of the jewel of the saṃgha.

748 For example, this is described in the *Śūraṃgamasamādhisūtra* in general and in particular, with Mañjuśrī manifesting in the form of a pratyekabuddha as a skillful means to liberate certain beings (Lamotte 1998, pp. 111 and 214–16).

749 In themselves, neither the Sanskrit nor the Tibetan of verses I.23–24 allows for a clear picture of what exactly the twenty kinds of saṃgha are, nor are these verses entirely consonant with the corresponding sections in the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines (also, the first nineteen above are obviously subdivisions of the categories of the eight noble persons of the śrāvakas, which are not even mentioned in these verses). This ambiguity is reflected in different Indian and Tibetan commentaries giving varying lists and numberings of the twenty kinds of saṃgha. The most literal reading of AA I.23–24 is given by Ratnākaraśānti, the later Buddhaśrījñāna, and JNS (p. 138), which says that approaching stream-enterers are those with (1) duller and (2) sharper faculties and the attainers of (3) confidence and (4) the view. Abiding stream-enterers are (5)–(6) those who are born from family to family (gods or humans). Once-returners are (7) those with a single interval. Nonreturners are those who pass into nirvāṇa (8) in the intermediate state, (9) after being born, (10) with preparation, (11) without preparation, (12) by progressing to Akaniṣṭha; (13)–(15) the three leapers; (16) those who progress to the Peak of Existence, (17) overcame attachment to form, (18) attain peace amidst visible phenomena, and (19) are a bodily witness. (20) Those noble bodhisattvas who resemble pratyekabuddhas are like a rhino. When compared to this list, both the *Vṛtti* (D3787, fols. 33a.5–38b.3; pp. 39–45) and Bhadanta Vimuktisena drop the five entries (12)–(16), count them as the single category of "those who progress higher," and add four other entries from the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (the "eighth bodhisattva" as the classificatory basis for (1) and (2) below; approaching once-returners; abiding nonreturners; and approaching arhats). Both Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (pp. 35–36) and *Vivṛti* (D3793, fols. 85b.3–86a.1) leave out four of the entries listed in I.23–24 and instead supplement four others from the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. (a) Under the approaching once-returners, Haribhadra counts "those who are convinced through confidence" and "those who attain through seeing" as one (but counts them again as one under the approaching nonreturners). (b) He does not count

"those who progress to Akaniṣṭha," but takes them as the general category that is then divided into the three leapers. (c)–(d) Nor does he count "those who progress to the Peak of Existence" and "those who progress to the formless realm" ("those who overcame attachment to form"). For he considers them as being the same in meaning and then takes them to be the general category that further divides into "those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena" and "those who are a bodily witness." Instead, Haribhadra adds the two mere abiders in the fruitions of stream-enterer and once-returner as well as the two approachers to the fruitions of nonreturner (in the form of repeating "those who are convinced through confidence" and "those who attain through seeing" as one) and arhat. Thus, according to Haribhadra, the twenty kinds of saṃgha consist of five stream-enterers, three once-returners, ten nonreturners, approaching arhats, and pratyekabuddhas (this classification is accepted as authoritative in almost all Tibetan commentaries). Abhayākaragupta drops "those who progress to Akaniṣṭha" and supplements the approaching arhats. Note that JNS's later comments on its own above list (pp. 147–53) differ, mainly matching the twenty entries of this list with the corresponding sūtra passages in the revised edition of the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines. Here, approaching stream-enterers are only said to be (1) and (2), while (3) and (4) apply to both approaching once-returners and nonreturners. (5)–(6) also belong to the approaching once-returners and (7) are the special abiding once-returners (thus, JNS's lists differ both times from both Haribhadra and CE). JNS says that its latter manner of commenting stems from the system of most of the disciples of Ngog Lotsāwa. In this system, Ar Jangchub Yeshé gives the following reasons for not counting the following five among the twenty-five kinds of bodhisattvas in the revised sūtra. "The eighth one" is not a separate category, but the classificatory basis of the categories of those of duller and sharper faculties. Since three kinds of special abiders (once-returners, nonreturners, and pratyekabuddha arhats) are explicitly mentioned here, the three corresponding mere abiders are understood implicitly. Since the special once-returners are explicitly mentioned, also the approaching arhats are covered implicitly. As for CE's list, it largely follows Haribhadra's, but differs in that it counts "those who progress to the Peak of Existence" and "those who overcame attachment to form" as entry (16) among the twenty, without, however, giving any indication that "those who attain peace amidst visible phenomena" and "those who are a bodily witness" are subcategories of the former. In addition, CE counts "those who are born from family to family" as only one entry (4), whereas Haribhadra explicitly counts them as two (gods and humans separately). In conclusion, both the *Vṛtti* (D3787, fol. 38b.1–2; p. 46) and the *Ālokā* (p. 36) recommend consulting the clear explanations on these twenty kinds of bodhisattva saṃgha in the *Avaivartikacakrasūtra*. Patrul Rinpoche's short text on the twenty kinds of saṃgha (Dpal sprul 'jigs med chos kyi dbang po 2003) agrees with the above descriptions of Āryavimuktisena's, Haribhadra's, Ratnākaraśānti's, and Buddhaśrījñāna's ways of listing. For details on the various lists of the twenty kinds of saṃgha in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*, AA I.23–24, the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, the *Vivṛti*, and JNS, see Charts 6–8. To compare the specific terminologies in terms of the twenty kinds of saṃgha as found in the revised edition of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*, the AA, and the *Abhidharmakośa*, see Chart 9 (for further comparisons with the Pāli canon, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Mahāvyutpatti*, see Apple 2003, pp. 516 and 518).

750 The above explanation is primarily found in his *Munimatālaṃkāra* (and partly in his *Marmakaumudī*), which does, however, not explicitly mention approaching arhats and pratyekabuddhas. As mentioned before, approaching arhats before the "vajralike samādhi" are simply the same as the special abiders in the fruition of a nonreturner described above.

751 As explained before, "penetration" is a synonym of the path of seeing, while "the branches of penetration" or "the factors conducive to penetration" are names of the path of preparation. The present section explains the latter.

752 For JNS's definition, see Appendix I1D and Chart 3.

753 As mentioned before, the Sanskrit *prayoga* can mean "preparation," "joining," and also "cause."

754 For details on this path, see IV.32–34.

755 The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 92b.5–7) says, "What is heat? It is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of attaining the illumination of the [four] realities through personal experience. What is peak? It is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of the increase of the illumination of the [four] realities through personal experience. What is poised readiness that concords with the realities? It is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of entering and following a part of the [four] realities through personal experience. What is the supreme mundane dharma? It is the samādhi (congruently associated with prajñā) of the state of mind immediately before [directly seeing] the [four] realities through personal experience." For the explanations on these four levels in the *Vṛtti*, the *Ālokā*, and JNS, see Appendix I1D.

756 As mentioned above, at the beginning of the chapter on the complete training in all aspects, both the *Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 176a.3–4) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 104b.3–4) define "aspects" in the general context of the AA as the specific instances of the wisdoms that focus on the nature of the remedial dharmas (such as impermanence) for the antagonistic factors (such as clinging to permanence). JNS (vol. 2, p. 12) says on this that "aspects" are the distinct features of the specific instances of consciousness that delimit their directly perceived objects among the entirety of knowable objects. Thus, throughout, in the pair of "focal object" and "aspect," the latter refers to the various and progressive cognitive facets (the subjects) of perceiving and focusing on the respective focal objects that consitute the various levels of the lack of both apprehender and apprehended (or, in general, the emptiness of all phenomena) in the mind of a bodhisattva during the four levels of the path of preparation (the same goes for the paths of seeing and familiarization). For more details, see the section on the triad of focal object, aspect, and cause below.

757 CE has *stong* (empty) instead of *gtong* in both the text and the quote.

758 VI.21cd–22a. This means that noble persons abandon the path of preparation by moving on to the next stage of the path, but they can never lose it through dying or even regressing from it. On the other hand, ordinary beings lose all four of its levels through dying, and also may lose the first two through regressing from them.

759 XI.31. According to the *Bhāṣya* and other commentaries, "false imagination" is identified as the minds and mental factors of the three realms of saṃsāra. The realizations on the mundane paths of accumulation and preparation are "not correct" because they are still mundane. However, they are "not false" either because they are approximately concordant with supramundane wisdom. Suchness itself and the wisdom of supramundane meditative equipoise are "nonimagination." Supramundane subsequent attainment is "neither imagination" (because it lacks any clinging to apprehender and apprehended) "nor nonimagination" (since there still are appearances of apprehender and apprehended in it). As for the relationship of false imagination with "conception," see the remarks on the latter term below and Appendix I1D. On the nature and scope of false imagination, *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.8ab agrees with the above identification, and Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* on I.1 glosses it as "the imagination of apprehender and apprehended." Sthiramati's *Ṭīkā* (Pandeya ed., pp. 11.30–12.3; D4032, fol. 135b.1–3) elaborates on this: "False imagination means that duality is unreal (or false) in it, or that [duality] is imagined by it. The word 'false' indicates that it does not exist as it imagines [itself] in the form of being apprehender and apprehended. The word 'imagination' indicates that referents are not found as they are imagined. Thus, being free from apprehender and apprehended is explained to be the characteristic of this [false imagination]. So, what is this [false imagination]? Without further differentiation, false imagination consists of the minds and mental factors of past, present, and future, which serve as causes and results, comprise the three realms, are

beginningless, terminated by nirvāṇa, and conform with saṃsāra. But when differentiated, it is the imagination of the apprehender and the apprehended. Here, the imagination of the apprehended is consciousness appearing as [outer] referents and sentient beings. The imagination of the apprehender is consciousness appearing as a self and cognition. 'Duality' refers to apprehender and apprehended, with the apprehended being forms and so on and the apprehender being the eye consciousness and so on." In sum, this means that such "imagination" includes all eight consciousnesses with their accompanying mental factors as well as their respective objects. As for all of this seemingly appearing, but actually being unreal as the mind's own confused play, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.15 states:

> False imagination is explained
> To be just like an illusion.
> Just as the aspect in which an illusion [appears],
> It is explained as the mistakenness of duality.

The *Bhāṣya* adds that false imagination should be known to be the other-dependent nature, which is also stated in XI.40cd. Furthermore, verse 5 of the *Triṃśikā* declares:

> What is the imagination of the nonexistent here?
> It is the mind that imagines in certain ways what [does not exist],
> [But its] referents, which it imagines like that,
> Are absolutely never found in these ways.

Sometimes, also the opposite of false imagination—correct imagination (or conception)—is presented. The latter refers to the mind being engaged in cultivating the antidotes for false imagination on the Buddhist path. "Correct imagination" refers to increasingly more refined—but still more or less dualistic—mental processes or creations that serve as the remedies for respectively coarser kinds of obscuring mental creations, perceptions, and misconceptions (false imagination). Initially, on the paths of accumulation and preparation, such remedial activities are conceptual in a rather obvious way, such as meditating on the repulsiveness of the body as an antidote to desire, or cultivating bodhicitta through contemplating the kindness of one's parents and so on. More subtle approaches would include familiarizing with momentary impermanence or personal and phenomenal identitylessness. From the path of seeing onward, all coarse conceptions of ordinary sentient beings (even the remedial ones) have ceased. However, during the first seven bhūmis there are still subtle concepts about true reality, and on the last three bhūmis, about attaining the final fruition of buddhahood. In other words, though phenomena are not taken as real anymore, on the first seven bhūmis there is still the apprehending of characteristics, and on the last three bhūmis there is still a subtle tendency of duality. In brief, since the remedial wisdom that consumes what is to be relinquished still depends on what it relinquishes and still entails subtle reference points with regard to the dharmadhātu, it must eventually and naturally subside too, once even its most subtle fuel (the apprehending of characteristics and duality) is burnt up. Compared to the example of washing a stained shirt, remedial wisdom would correspond to the detergent used to wash away the stains. Obviously, after the detergent performed its function, both it and the stains would be removed from the shirt in order for it to be considered clean—from the perspective of the clean shirt itself both stains and detergent are dirt. Thus, though correct imagination is the remedy for false imagination, both are still "imagination" in the sense that, from the perspective of the sole unmistaken cognition of a buddha, even the realizations on the bhūmis are not final and have to be transcended (this is repeatedly emphasized by JNS). Consequently, the "nonconceptual wisdom" of buddhahood is the mind's ultimate cognitive capacity that is not impaired by any imaginations or mental fictions—in it there is no delusional need or impulse to construct anything.

760 For more details, see Appendix I1D.

761 The last six lines in Tibetan are somewhat different:

A protecting bodhisattva's
Character of heat and so on accordingly
Is based on being associated with the four conceptions.
[Its] lesser, medium, and great [degrees]
Are more distinguished than
Those of śrāvakas and rhinolike ones.

762 These are focusing on (1) meanings, (2) entities, (3) characteristics, (4) directions, (5) time, and (6) what is reasonable (see, for example, the *Sacittikabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*; D4035, fol. 165b.1–2).

763 These are (1) investigation, (2) examination, (3) fine analysis, (4) calm abiding, (5) superior insight, (6) their union, (7) lucidity, (8) nonconceptuality, (9) equanimity, (10) uninterrupted continuity, and (11) nondistraction.

764 See Chart 10 and CE below under the practice of the equipment that is calm abiding.

765 JNS (p. 158) explains that the superiority of the mahāyāna path of preparation by virtue of these five features is what Haribhadra asserts (in both his *Ālokā* and *Vivṛti*), while Āryavimuktisena lists four or six such features (through either not counting (5), or adding the fact of the path of preparation being divided into twelve degrees). Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 163–66) says that this path of preparation is concordant with seeing the actuality of the four realities on the path of seeing and is subsequent to the path of accumulation of bodhisattvas. The latter represents a beginner's efforts in studying, reflecting, and meditating ("the roots of virtue that are conducive to liberation"; on these, see CE on IV.32), which have the nature of the five faculties (such as confidence). Among the above five features, (1) refers to focusing on the four realities by way of true reality. (2) means that one does not cling to any phenomena through such focusing functioning as the remedy for any views about phenomenal identity. In fact, in addition to the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas focusing merely on the sixteen aspects of the four realities, the mahāyāna path of preparation entails infinite ways of focusing on every detail of the four realities (as will be explained in detail below)—sometimes by way of (a) cause (realizing the five skandhas to be emptiness); sometimes by way of (b) result (samādhi); sometimes by way of (c) nature (there being no real entities); and sometimes by way of (d) the nature of phenomena. As for the glosses in ( ) in terms of ways (a)–(d) of the focusing on the mahāyāna path of preparation being superior, JNS says that Haribhadra's subcommentators give different explanations, but the ones given here accord with the *Prasphuṭapadā* by Dharmamitra, who is fond of Madhyamaka. Feature (4) refers to being mentored by spiritual friends who are skilled in means, and (5) pertains to the four conceptions about apprehender and apprehended that will be explained in detail in the contexts of the paths of seeing and familiarization. The path of preparation (as well as said other two paths) is based on these four conceptions in the manner of the latter being the factors to be relinquished and the former being their remedies. By contrast, on the paths of preparation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the focus is just on the four realities in their sixteen aspects, this being the remedy for clinging to the five skandhas as being entities that are established through their own specific characteristics. Through this serving as the remedy for the views about a personal identity, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas familiarize solely with the cognitive aspects that are the sixteen aspects of the four realities. Thus, they cultivate this path for the sake of only a limited type of realization, are devoid of mahāyāna mentoring, and do not relinquish the four conceptions about apprehender and apprehended. The intention of Haribhadra here is to teach that the paths of preparation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack the mahāyāna path of preparation's seizing the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization in the mahāyāna and meditating in the manner of suppressing these factors to be relinquished. By contrast, the claim by

other Tibetans that, in the system of Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, lines I.25cd explain the path of preparation to be conception is mistaken.

766 Note that this sense of aspect differs from how this term is used otherwise here. According to the Sautrāntikas, outer material objects are not perceptible by consciousness, but cast a likeness of themselves toward the mind. These "aspects" are then the actual perceived objects.

767 For more details on the focal objects and aspects of the path of preparation, see Appendix I1D.

768 This explanation on the path of preparation of the hīnayāna is based on *Abhidharmakośa* VI.17–19. The *Bhāṣya* says that the final stage of the level of medium poised readiness means to meditate only on a single aspect ("suffering") of the reality of suffering with regard to the desire realm through mentally engaging in it for two distinct moments. Great poised readiness and the supreme dharma each consist of only a single moment of mentally engaging in this aspect "suffering," thus lacking a continuum. For more details, see Appendix I2B.

769 JNS (pp. 171–72) explains that, in the context of the branches of penetration of the common approach of hīnayāna and mahāyāna in general, the manner of taking the four realities as focal objects and then eliminating superimpositions about their sixteen aspects is presented through the conventional term "aspect." In particular, in the presentation of the mahāyāna path of preparation in the AA, each one of the twelve levels of the path of preparation has a distinct focal object and a distinct aspect. This starts with the above focal objects (the four realities) and the aspects (impermanence and so on) of the entire path of preparation of the common yāna being presented as the specific ones of the level of lesser heat, while the specific focal objects and aspects of the remaining levels are not in common with the hīnayāna. However, Haribhadra also teaches here that this does not mean that the focal objects and aspects of the earlier ones among these twelve levels do not exist on the following. The phrase "to refrain from clinging and so on with regard to impermanence" refers to three aspects—refraining from clinging through mistaken views, abiding through a mistaken mind, and knowing through mistaken discriminations (according to Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, one refrains from these three on the great, medium, and lesser levels of heat, respectively). These points teach the focal objects and aspects of lesser heat, which must also be associated with the other levels of the mahāyāna path of preparation.

770 CZ, p. 95.

771 As JNS and other commentaries say, being the cause for the mahāyāna path of seeing (which encompasses the realizations of all three yānas) applies to all levels of the entire path of preparation.

772 CZ, p. 98.

773 JNS (p. 173) glosses "rising and falling" as increase and decrease; superimposition and denial; and arising and ceasing. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 174) says that any affirmations or negations in terms of form and so on are not observable through the mental engagement of aspiration. Through the mental engagement of true reality, even form itself is not seen, or, it is observed in the manner of no seeing.

774 This and the following three quotes are all on p. 99 in CZ.

775 Unlike CE and JNS, most other commentaries say that "abiding" belongs to the aspect of medium heat, meaning that phenomena seem to abide as something similar to the continua that their names suggest.

776 JNS (p. 173) adds that phenomena, conventional terms, and imputations do not abide, are free from abiding, and also are *not* free from abiding.

777 JNS (p. 175) explains the focal object of this level as follows. Here, all instances of the reality of suffering (such as the five skandhas) and, in general, all phenomena that make up the four realities do not abide as objects of mind in the form of referential characteristics. Rather, they abide solely as the nature of form and so on, that is, as not being established by any nature of their own.

778 CZ, p. 100.

779 JNS (pp. 175–76) says that form and such and the nature of phenomena are inseparable in being one as natural emptiness. Since emptiness is that which operates through the power of the nature of phenomena, even perfect form is not nonempty. When the nature of phenomena abides in the bearers of this nature, it is indeed emptiness, but there is no connection between the bearers of this nature (form and so on) and the nature of phenomena (emptiness). Rather, the abiding of the nature of phenomena in the bearers of this nature is an abiding in the manner of nonabiding. When explained in such a way, this refers to the sūtras saying, "Emptiness is form." The meaning of this lies in the intention that all imaginary forms and conceived forms do not exist by any nature of their own. Nowadays, there are assertions that, in terms of the definitive meaning, emptiness appears as form; that form dissolves into being empty; that karmic actions and their results arise from the cause that is emptiness as a nonimplicative negation; that karmic actions and their results must become emptiness through being annihilated into emptiness. Let alone such being the system of Madhyamaka, such claims are not made in any system of anybody who follows a Buddhist philosophical system. They are what the Tibetan Bön tradition propounds as the definitive meaning and thus are to be cast far away. All conceived and imaginary forms abide as the aspects that are the four epitomes or seals of the dharma (impermanence, suffering, identitylessness, and peace). Therefore, since the nature of the conceptions about apprehender and apprehended does not abide and is not established, the realization that they are not abiding is the aspect of lesser peak. Note that the terms "imaginary form," "conceived form," and "perfect form" (or "form in terms of the nature of phenomena") appear quite frequently in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, most prominently in the chapter of Maitreya in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines*. In due order, these terms can be equated with the three natures (see also Appendix I3C).

780 CZ, p. 100.

781 JNS (pp. 176–78) explains that conceived and imaginary forms lack any nature that is established as their being. Therefore, they are empty of being such forms. Being empty in terms of this aspect of being empty, they are not something other than natural emptiness. Hence, by virtue of their natural state of not being in contradiction to the nature of phenomena and through being the singleness that negates being different, they are of single taste as natural emptiness. This is the focal object of medium peak. The meaning of this is to understand the passage in the sūtras that emptiness does not exist apart from form, that form does not exist apart from emptiness, and that the two emptinesses explained in this way have the same nature (see CZ, p. 100). Since form does not exist by a nature of its own, apart from form, there is no emptiness as anything other than form that could be pinpointed by saying, "This is it." It is the emptiness of form not being established as existent that is taught as emptiness. To declare that, apart from emptiness, there is no form as anything other than emptiness is the meaning of the explanation that the phenomena of seeming reality (such as form) do not exist primordially. In brief, that there is no emptiness apart from form and no form apart from emptiness respectively refer to the following two explanations. Form is self-empty and, other than just this very being empty that is explained as self-empty in this way, there is no form that is left as any remainder of reference points and characteristics. Nowadays, the emptiness of most people who are renowned as having realized all the essential points of the definitive meaning is written down in many contexts of the dharma terminology of Madhyamaka as follows. (a) When speaking about

"There is no emptiness apart from form," it is asserted that form is not empty and also that the being empty that cannot exist apart from form is the nature or essence of form, which is not suitable to be seen by ordinary beings and is not different in substance from the entity that is form. (b) When speaking about "There is no form apart from emptiness," it is asserted that this very emptiness is suitable as form, appears as form, and is established as form. It is asserted that if this is realized by a person, such a bearer of the nature of phenomena becomes emptiness. If it is not realized, it is mistaken for being form and so on. It is also claimed that the difference between realizing and not realizing refers to recognizing or not recognizing; that recognizing or not recognizing refer to recognizing or not recognizing form and so on as emptiness; that the mind which recognizes this refers to the thinking mind; and that such thoughts have the nature of the dharmatākāya with all its qualities, such as the ten powers. No matter in whose traditions such claims appear, they do not accord with what the buddhas and bodhisattvas assert and are thus to be discarded. No matter whether we take the system of "the progressive stages of meditation of Maitreya's works" as handed down from Dsen Kawoché or the progression of the path of Maitreya's works as transmitted from Lord Atiśa down to the master from Tagpo (Gampopa), the certainty of realizing that the phenomena of seeming reality are empty can indeed arise in the mind streams of ordinary beings, but it has the nature of being conceptual and linked to terms. Therefore, as the master from Tagpo and his nephew explain that the emptiness of nonconceptual wisdom is not tenable as the perceiving subject in the meditative equipoise of the mundane path of preparation, it is certainly not their position to present the valid cognition that ascertains ultimate emptiness to be a conceptual mind. However, those who nevertheless loudly proclaim the opposite are people who flaw the master from Tagpo and his nephew. Since I stick to the side of this master, I consider these people to be frightening. The Karmapa's remarks under (a) seem to refer to certain positions within the Gelugpa School (such as form not being empty of form, but of being truly established, and this emptiness not being realizable by ordinary beings). His discussion under (b) obviously refers to people within his own tradition who misconceive the relationship between phenomena and emptiness and what it takes to realize the latter, particularly with regard to statements such as "The nature of thoughts is dharmakāya" in the Mahāmudrā tradition. As for the translation and transmission of the *Uttaratantra* and the other texts by Maitreya (particularly the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*), the lineage that started with the two Tibetan translators Dsen Kawoché and Su Gawé Dorje is called "the meditational system of the dharma works of Maitreya" (according to Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's introduction to his commentary on the *Uttaratantra*, each one of these translators composed a now lost commentary on this text). By contrast, the transmission of those texts by Ngog Lotsāwa (who also studied with Sajjana and Dsen Kawoché) is called "the system of study and reflection of the dharma works of Maitreya" (in particular, Ngog's interpretation of the *Uttaratantra* was later adopted in most points by the Gelugpa School).

782 CZ, p. 101.

783 CZ, p. 102.

784 The Tibetan version of I.30b includes a *phyir*.

785 D12, fol. 5b.1; Conze 1973, p. 85. According to the *Ālokā* (pp. 52–53), the object of great peak corresponds to the passage "This also should be known as a Bodhisattva's perfect wisdom, that he does not take hold of form, etc. . . . Therefore this too should be known as a Bodhisattva's perfect wisdom" (Conze 1973, pp. 85–86). The corresponding passage in the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines is the third paragraph on p. 102 in CZ. The *Vṛtti* (p. 61), however, includes this paragraph under the aspect of medium peak and has the focal object of great peak start with what CE identifies as the aspect of great peak (see next quote), while the aspect of great peak corresponds to the first paragraph on p. 103 in CZ. JNS (p. 178) provides no sūtra passage for the focal object of great peak and agrees with CE on the passage for the aspect of great peak.

Neither PSD nor PBG nor BT (pp. 353–54) provide any sūtra passages here, but the latter outlines Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's different ways of matching AA I.28cd–30 with the focal objects and aspects of lesser, medium, and great peak. According to the former, in terms of not differentiating the four realities, lines I.28cd correspond to the focal object, while I.29a indicates the aspect. In terms of differentiating the four realities, I.29bc and I.29d represent the focal object and the aspect, respectively, of the reality of suffering. The focal objects and aspects of the remaining three realities are taught in I.29b–I.30d, with I.30ab and I.30cd corresponding to medium and great peak, respectively. According to Haribhadra's *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 87a.4–87b.1), I.28cd and I.29ab represent the focal object and aspect, respectively, of lesser peak; I.29cd and I.30a, the focal object and aspect, respectively, of medium peak; and I.30b and I.30cd, the focal object and aspect, respectively, of great peak. Thus, CE follows the *Vivṛti*, as does JNS (pp. 175–79). LSSP (fols. 182a.6–185b.2) first presents Āryavimuktisena's explanation, supplemented by Ratnākaraśānti's differing position (lines I.28cd–29a and I.29bd representing the focal object and aspect, respectively, of lesser peak; I.30a and I.30b, the same of medium peak; and I.30c and I.30d, the same of great peak). Secondly, Haribhadra's explanation is said to be followed by Ratnakīrti and Buddhaśrījñāna's *Prajñāpradīpāvalī*. Like CE, LN (p. 347) quotes the above passage from the sūtra in eight thousand lines and comments according to Haribhadra. Like BT, YT (pp. 157–61) provides both Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's explanations. NSML (p. 165) follows Haribhadra.

786 CZ, p. 102. JNS (pp. 178–80) explains that the aspect of great peak is the realization, by virtue of investigating suchness through the prajñā that is not mixed with conceptions, that suchness is in all aspects unobservable. The investigation through prajñā means to answer the four questions in the above quote. The nature of prajñāpāramitā is emptiness. She is the pāramitā (perfection or transcendence) of all phenomena. The reason for calling her "prajñāpāramitā" is that she is the realization of the defining characteristic of suchness. The way in which prajñāpāramitā functions is to bring one to unsurpassable enlightenment. Thus, it is tenable to assert that this manner of investigating through prajñā is not a consciousness that is either conceptual or nonconceptual, but is approximately concordant with the manner of observing that lacks conceiving of the three spheres (agent, object, and action). JNS adds that its comments on the meaning of the words of the AA itself accord with the position of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and that also the meaning of the words of the *Vivṛti* must be expounded according to the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas. For when Haribhadra comments on the intended meaning of prajñāpāramitā, though he asserts the manner of cutting through reference points by way of the view according to the *Sūtrāntācāra-Mādhyamikas, when it comes to making this a living experience through meditation, his position accords with the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas. The nature, the focal objects, and the aspects of the path of preparation in this context here are solely something that is to be made a living experience through meditation, but not the kind of meditation in which one analyzes through the valid cognition of a reasoning consciousness and then clings to mere object generalities. You may wonder, "Isn't meditating on the nature of phenomena in the form of object generalities the path of preparation's manner to make it a living experience through meditation?" It is not—no matter which context of the focal objects or aspects on the twelve levels of the path of preparation you may consider, there is no explanation in any Indian tradition that the experiences in the contexts of these focal object and aspects are the experiences of their object generalities. Therefore, though it is well known like the wind in Tibet that the path of preparation means to meditate by way of object generalities, this is not something that you should put your trust in. According to JNS (Appendix I1D), the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation are unmistaken self-aware valid perceptions that are approximately concordant with the actual unmistaken wisdom without the duality of apprehender and apprehended on the path of seeing. Thus, implicitly, this means that meditating on true reality by way of object generalities occurs only on the path of accumulation (for more details, see Appendix I1D and the definitions of the paths of accumulation and preparation in Chart 3).

787 JNS (p. 180) explains the focal object of lesser poised readiness as phenomena, such as conceived form, being without any nature of existence. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 184) says that the nature of the characteristics of the seeming and the characteristic of the nature of the ultimate concord in being one as just emptiness. Therefore, it is said that form and so on are without nature. The explanation of some Tibetans who connect this passage in the *Vivṛti* with defining characteristics and what is defined by them is not tenable since it is not about ascertaining emptiness in this manner. Rather, the meaning here is to negate anything that is other than the aspects of form and so on as serving as their nature. Out of the concern that, in such a negation, there might be some remainder in terms of characteristics of entities, it is explained that characteristics are empty of a nature. It is merely this being empty that is referred to by the term "nature" here, and this "nature" is in turn explained to be empty of characteristics. Thus, what is intended here is merely the fact that both the nature of phenomena and its bearers are equal in being empty.

788 This and the following three quotes are all on p. 103 in CZ.

789 JNS (p. 180) says that the aspect of lesser poised readiness is that the nonbeing of a nature is the being of form and so on. For other than the nature of nonexistence, form and such are not suitable to have any nature of existence. For JNS's elaboration on the *Vivṛti* on the aspect of lesser poised readiness, see the beginning of Appendix I4F (the difference between *rangtong* and *shentong* and misconceptions about the latter).

790 JNS (p. 181) says that, since it is impossible for the phenomena that have the nature of consciousness and what appears to them to arise, there is no final deliverance either. For a further elaboration on this, see Appendix I1C1.

791 JNS (p. 183) comments that phenomena and the nature of phenomena are all completely pure by nature. Bodhisattvas who engage in the mother based on this purity are pure since the nature of body, speech, and mind lacks all adventitious flaws. This nature is unchanging like pure gold. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 187) says that one speaks here about being pure of evil deeds because, by virtue of realizing that a nature of all phenomena does not exist, one does not accumulate karma in any respect through body, speech, and mind by way of misconceiving what is nonexistent as existent.

792 According to JNS (p. 183), this focal object means that the instances of suchness, which are without characteristics in terms of the natures and the aspects of the two realities being identifiable as such and such, appear in this manner. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 187) says that all phenomena lack specific characteristics because any phenomenon is empty of being an entity or performing a function. Here, "performing a function" must happen either in an instantaneous or a gradual manner. However, if it happened in a single moment, there would be the flaw that functioning does not need a continuum of moments. If it happened gradually, the following flaws accrue. There is neither a continuum other than specifically characterized instants nor anything that changes momentarily; and in terms of a continuum of moments, there is nothing that connects them. Phenomena do not have general characteristics either. For generalities are nonentities and thus superimposed as objects of mind. Except for general characteristics that are fabricated, there is no performing of a function that can be ascertained as being characterized through any specific characteristics that are identifiable as such and such.

793 This and the following quote are on p. 104 in CZ.

794 JNS (p. 183) says that, through not dwelling on the characteristics of being ignorant about form and so on, there is no aspiration for any objects of one's beginningless mistaken views and no discrimination of the subjects and objects that consist of apprehender and apprehended. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 187–88) says that, when the nature of phenomena is analyzed through nothing but the nature of phenomena, it is realized in the following manner. By

virtue of the mental power that is induced through the reasoning of the characteristics of form and so on being free of mutual dependence, there is no aspiration for the mental engagement of aspiration, nor is there any knowing of true reality that is induced through the mental engagement of true reality.

795 JNS (pp. 183–84) adds that, once the level of poised readiness on the path of preparation is attained, by virtue of having relinquished all evil, one is not only not reborn in the unpleasant realms under the sway of one's karma, but there is also no more fear of such rebirth even in one's dreams. This is explained in many mahāyāna sūtras, so it is too limited to say that having attained this poised readiness means only not falling into the unpleasant realms.

796 The prajñāpāramitā sūtras contain varying lists of samādhis with different names (ranging from 108 to 121). See CZ, pp. 148–52 for a list of 112. The *Mahāvyutpatti* (section 21, entries 506–623) has 118.

797 This and the following three quotes are on p. 105 in CZ.

798 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 189–90) says that bodhisattvas on this level, through the powers of their pure aspiration prayers, excellent merit, wisdom, and the dharmadhātu, engage effortlessly and with great equanimity (free from being close and far or attachment and aversion) in all worldly realms, that is, in as many as the individual power of their samādhi allows them to.

799 JNS (p. 188) says that this prophecy is made by the past and present buddhas in the ten directions and is referred to as "the prophecy immediately after the generation of bodhicitta" in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 190) adds that it is due to the great power of the nature of phenomena that the buddhas praise and make prophecies about the yogins who are endowed with the samādhi of perfectly engaging in the yāna of suchness.

800 JNS (p. 189) explains that these bodhisattvas are neither conceited about having received the above prophecy nor about their samādhi experiences.

801 This and the next quote are on p. 106 of CZ.

802 JNS (p. 189) adds that this samādhi cannot be but nonconceptual since prajñāpāramitā, the meditative equipoise of resting in it, and the bodhisattvas who rest in it are seen to be one as suchness.

803 Interestingly, but without further comments, SLG (fol. 13b.3–4) says here that the supreme dharma is the completion of the illumination of wisdom, which lacks any appearance of the distractions of clinging to the actuality of true reality. Through this, the *Shentong* view is realized, whereas the philosophical system of the False Aspectarians is a disturbance.

804 That sentient beings are simply equated here with obscurations, the ālaya-consciousness, the impure other-dependent nature, nonafflicted ignorance, and false imagination may sound unusual and somewhat shocking, but it accords exactly with what is found in CE's and JNS's discussions of the dharmadhātu as the disposition for buddhahood (see below and Appendix I1E). Referring to the Third Karmapa, JNS (p. 221) says, "In his autocommentary on *The Profound Inner Reality*, he makes a twofold classification [of mind as such], saying, 'what is pure is expressed as mind, and what is impure is [also] expressed as mind.' By explaining that those who possess impure mental impulses are sentient beings, he elucidates that the dharmadhātu does not exist in such sentient beings. He presents these very sentient beings as *being* the adventitious stains that are produced by false imagination, which mistakenly strays from the dharmadhātu. By giving the pure mind names such as 'ordinary mind,' 'original protector,' and 'original buddha,' he says that it is exactly this [mind] that possesses the mode of being inseparable from the buddha qualities. This kind of [pure mind] is also the [buddha] heart that actually fulfills this function." As concluded below in CE, in being equivalent to adventitious stains, sentient

beings are nothing but the insubstantial clouds that float in and obscure the infinite sky of the dharmadhātu. Clinging to a personal self and the resultant notion of a sentient being is just like being stuck on the claustrophobic and gloomy outlook of fixating on the configuration of one of these clouds (which moreover keeps changing all the time) from within that cloud, while being aware of the cloud-free and sunlit expanse of the sky without any reference points resembles the nonconceptual wisdom of the dharmadhātu of a buddha.

805 Throughout, "mental state" renders the Tibetan *blo* (Skt. buddhi), which—in this sense—usually stands for any kind of dualistic mind as opposed to the nondual wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas on the bhūmis.

806 According to PBG (p. 544), mentally engaging in aspiring for true reality refers to mind arising as a mere likeness of what it familiarizes with, while mentally engaging in true reality means mind arising in exactly the way the defining characteristics of what it familiarizes with are. For details on the Buddhist notion of "conception" in general, see CE on I.14c above. For more details on the four sets of conceptions about apprehender and apprehended in all their coarse and subtle degrees, which are to be relinquished throughout the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, see verses I.34–35, V.5–16, and V.26–34 and Appendices I1D as well as I4B and I5A in Volume Two.

807 JNS (p. 203) answers the qualm that it is not justified to explain ignorance in the context of the conceptions about the apprehended because ignorance is an apprehender. It is true that ignorance is an apprehender in dependence on its respective own apprehended objects. However, in dependence on the apprehender that takes ignorance itself as an object, ignorance is something apprehended.

808 This and all the following quotes in the two sections on the conceptions about apprehended and apprehender are on pp. 107–12 in CZ.

809 "Name and form" is the fourth of the twelve links of dependent origination and indicates that the skandhas of feeling, discrimination, formation, and consciousness are mental in nature—being without form, they can only be named.

810 JNS (p. 202) comments that this refers to conceptions about the twelve persons who are agents—the four of self, sentient being, living soul (Skt. jīva, Tib. srog), and sustainer (Skt. poṣa, Tib. gso ba); the four of individual (Skt. puruṣa, Tib. skyes bu), person (Skt. pudgala, Tib. gang zag), Manu-bearer (Skt. mānuva, Tib. shed can), and Manu-born (Skt. manuja, Tib. shed las skyes); and the four of agent, feeler, knower, and seer. All of these terms are used in various non-Buddhist Indian traditions to indicate a really existing personal self, intrinsic soul, or spirit. Manu-bearer and Manu-born are names for sentient beings in general and human beings in particular. They stem from the Vedic myths about the creation of the world, which say that Manu had been the first human out of whom the universe arose.

811 As is clear from the following quote, in the sūtras this point refers to the eighteen dhātus and not to the (dharma)dhātu as the fundamental disposition for enlightenment. However, most commentaries interpret it as the latter.

812 JNS (p. 203) has "the wisdom that realizes emptiness."

813 For these, see Charts 11 and 12.

814 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 204) glosses this as "apprehending the five skandhas to be impermanent in a merely imputed sense."

815 The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 95b.4–5) says, "Special paths refer to the paths of preparation, the uninterrupted paths, and the paths of liberation with regard to certain afflictions other than the above [—those relinquished on various levels of the path of familiarization].

[The term] can also refer to the path of setting aside applying oneself to relinquishing the afflictions and being engaged in certain particular reflections on the dharma, applications of the dharma, or meditative absorptions. It may also refer to the path of accomplishing or dwelling in certain special qualities." The paths of special qualities (as in the list of the fifty-five purified phenomena; see Chart 2) are (a) the five supernatural knowledges; (b) the four (special) samādhis ("heroic stride," "sky treasure," "the stainless one," and "the lion's sport"); and (c) the four doors of dhāraṇī in terms of words, meaning, poised readiness, and mantra. On (a)–(c), see also Chart 12 and CE on I.47b.

816 For the manner and the order in which the above-mentioned four sets of nine conceptions are relinquished during the four levels of the path of preparation, see Appendix I1D. Note that there are two further sets of similar thirty-six conceptions about the apprehended and the apprehender, which pertain to the paths of seeing and familiarization, respectively. Compared to the conceptions on the path of preparation, the latter are progressively more subtle and constitute the imputed and innate cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through these two paths, respectively. They are discussed in detail in the context of the culminating training (V.5–34).

817 This and the next two quotes are found on p. 114 in CZ.

818 The sūtras say that the first of these features refers to bodhisattvas who train on the path; the second indicates what good mentors of these bodhisattvas do; and the third is treated as an extension or reverse of the second—bodhisattvas needing to abandon evil companions and mentors. Since AA I.36 is ambiguous enough, different commentaries provide varying descriptions as to exactly whose features the above three (particularly the first one) are—bodhisattvas as the ones being mentored; bodhisattvas as mentors; the mentors of bodhisattvas; or other beings who are guided by these bodhisattvas/mentors. JNS (pp. 206–7) comments as follows. It is taught that the mentors who are skilled in means are those whose minds are not intimidated and so on. According to Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, this refers to lesser, medium, and great degrees of fear. Such fear does not arise in the mentors, the spiritual friends. When they hear the dharma of profound emptiness, the minds of such mentors are not intimidated. Therefore, with skill in means, they teach others the lack of nature of all phenomena and so on (the six pāramitās). They encourage these others to abandon the antagonistic factors of profound means and prajñā that exist in their mind streams. These are the mentors of bodhisattvas in every way. Since the spiritual friends of the three yānas originate from the natural outflow of the dharmadhātu, they are nothing but the natural power of the profound mother of the victors herself. In general, the mentor in the mahāyāna as expressed by phrases such as "The spiritual friend is disciplined and peaceful" refers primarily to "the inner mentor of being skillful in means" among the supreme qualities of the spiritual friend. The *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* teaches four kinds of skill in means in terms of discriminating all phenomena, fully completing the six pāramitās, relying on the spiritual friend, and abandoning evil companions. Bodhisattvas who are mentored by a spiritual friend also are endowed with these qualities of skill in means. However, those who are not so mentored do not have these qualities and thus become intimidated and so on. Therefore, AA I.37 indicates the scope of such skillful bodhisattvas relying on a mentor, but it is also an explanation that this mentor must possess these qualities too. In brief, the sūtras explain the triad of the spiritual friend who is the mentor, the bodhisattvas who are to be mentored, and the scope of being mentored. Thus, since the one who possesses the qualities of mentoring described here is taught as the mentor, the bodhisattvas who are to rely on such a mentor will be mentored through these qualities. Hence, the mentor, the mentee, and the manner of mentoring should be understood without mixing them.

819 Among the fifty-one mental factors, "detachment" belongs to the group of the eleven virtuous mental factors.

820 The definition of a substantial (or proximate) cause is "that which is primary in producing the nature of a result," or "that which primarily produces the continuum of its own substance as its specific result." In general, in Buddhism, "substantial" is not limited to matter alone, but also applies to the mind as the basic "stuff" of which all cognitions and mental events are made. In particular, here, the "stuff" of which enlightenment or buddhahood is made is the unchanging nature of the mind (the sugata heart), which is an uninterrupted continuum throughout ground, path, and fruition. Thus, as explained repeatedly throughout CE and JNS, buddha nature is not really a cause in the usual sense in the first place since there are not two different entities that could be called "cause" and "result" (such as when fire produces smoke) and since nothing is newly produced ever in or by mind's true nature. Rather, the sugata heart is only referred to as a "cause" in terms of the perspective of beings on the path, for whom it first appears as if there is no enlightenment and then as if there is enlightenment (as a seemingly new fruition of the path). However, as JNS repeatedly explains, from the perspective of the sugata heart itself it is always the same throughout ground, path, and fruition. What appears as fruition is nothing but this sugata heart becoming revealed, once the adventitious stains (which were never a part of it) have been recognized for what they are—illusory obscurations.

821 Note that the notion of buddha nature appears only in a single prajñāpāramitā sūtra, the *Adhyardhaśatikā* (150 lines), which explicitly says that "all sentient beings contain/possess the tathāgata heart" (*sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ*; see Zimmermann 2002, p. 90 and Conze 2002, p. 230).

822 As mentioned above, *Uttaratantra* I.35–38 describes buddha nature through the four pāramitās of genuine self, purity, bliss, and permanence (see also Appendix I4F), with "genuine self" referring to all reference points of self and the lack of self having completely vanished.

823 P. 85; D3787, fol. 60a.3–4. The above is actually a quote from the *Ratnakūṭa* sūtra collection in the *Vṛtti* (CE has a greatly abbreviated and somewhat corrupted version of this quote). The *Vṛtti* also explains (pp. 76–77; fols. 59a.7–60a.4) that the corresponding passage in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras should be understood to say that bodhisattvas are without attachment because they do not conceive of or cling to real entities and their characteristics. The suchness of all phenomena is their not being existent. Thus, this passage teaches that, since nothing but the dharmadhātu is the cause of all qualities of the noble ones, the foundation of practice is the naturally abiding disposition. The text rejects the notion that the disposition is the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas, but takes it to be a synonym of the nature of phenomena (*dharmatā*). To the extent that one focuses on it (on the path), it serves as the cause of the qualities of the noble ones, and to that extent it may be called "disposition." The hermeneutical etymology of *gotra* lies in its meaning of qualities (*go* from *guṇa*) being set free (*tra* from *uttāraṇa*), which means that qualities arise or originate from it (this is literally what *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.4d and its *Bhāṣya* say). Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (p. 77) also quotes this etymology, but says that the notion of disposition only pertains to the level of seeming reality. The actual foundation of practice is nothing but the dharmadhātu, which may only conventionally be said to serve as the cause or bearer of the qualities (*guṇa-uttāraṇa*) of the noble ones by virtue of being taken as the object of their progressive practice in thirteen aspects. However, Haribhadra takes the sentence in the sūtras that "the meaning of the word 'bodhisattva' lacks a word meaning (*apadārtha*)" (CZ, p. 118) as referring to there being no disposition (*agotra*) ultimately. There is no realization for bodhisattvas unless they train in realizing the buddhadharmas like illusory persons by not clinging to anything as being real. On the level of seeming reality, the dharmadhātu is glossed as this illusory bodhisattva who is the foundation of the buddhadharmas being realized on the various stages of the path. Also, all distinctions of the disposition, such as naturally abiding, unfolding, certain, and uncertain dispositions, or the dispositions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, are not tenable ultimately. For it is nothing but the dharmadhātu being taken as the focal object by all practitioners in the three yānas that serves as the cause or foundation for realizing

and manifesting their respective qualities of the noble ones, all of which are expressions of this single ultimate dharmadhātu (see also CE and JNS on I.39). Note that Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's statements about the unconditioned dharmadhātu not being an actual productive cause, but only a "cause" in terms of serving as the focal object of the practices that result in the supramundane qualities of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, correspond closely to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, which also says that suchness is unconditioned; is not a cause; and only belongs to the category of "object condition" (D4038, vol. zi, fols. 5a.2, 5b.1, 5b.7, and 6b.5). Vasubandhu's *Mahyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (Pandeya ed., p. 39.9–10) also says that the dharmadhātu is the cause of the qualities of the noble ones because these qualities come forth by virtue of its serving as a focal object. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 238–39) adds that it is tenable to identify the *Vivṛti's* phrase "nothing but the nature of the dharmadhātu" as the buddha heart. For Āryavimuktisena's *Vṛtti* refutes the manner in which the Mere Mentalists and others assert the disposition and then teaches as its own system that nothing but the dharmadhātu is the disposition, which is also what is taught here by both the *Vivṛti* and the *Ālokā*. This instruction that the dharmadhātu and the buddha heart are without difference is the final intended meaning of the last three works of Maitreya (*Madhyāntavibhāga*, *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, and *Uttaratantra*).

824 Lines 34ab.

825 Lines 8cd.

826 In brief, sentient beings neither have the nature of a buddha nor are they buddhas. As mentioned before, since sentient beings are nothing but illusory adventitious stains that (other than as the delusions of a mistaken mind) never existed in the first place, how could such nonexistents possess anything, let alone buddha nature? Also, since the characteristics of such adventitious stains and buddha nature are contrary in every respect, the one possessing the other would be like darkness possessing light or hatred possessing love. Sentient beings cannot be said to be buddhas either because sentient beings—as adventitious stains—are impermanent and disintegrate, whereas buddhahood is unconditioned, thus absolutely changeless, and can never become nonexistent. Thus, they cannot be the same. In terms of buddha nature or the dharmadhātu, one speaks of it being endowed with twofold purity—natural purity and purity of adventitious stains. Conventionally speaking, in sentient beings only the first purity can be said to exist—in the sense of the true nature of adventitious stains, which is always unaffected by them. Once these stains are realized for what they are—nonexistent illusory appearances—their true nature (the dharmadhātu) is said to be endowed with both purities since it is not obscured any more by these adventitious stains (these topics as well as several others are elucidated at length in JNS's discussion of the disposition in Appendix I1E).

827 I.129 (CE only quotes line b).

828 Since Rangjung Dorje's text was written before the time of Tsongkhapa and his followers (who are well known to hold that buddha nature is nothing but sentient beings' emptiness in the sense of a nonimplicative negation), it must refer here to the position of Ngog Lotsāwa and some of his followers, as it explicitly appears in the former's *Theg pa chen po'i rgyud bla ma'i don bsdus pa* (Dharamsala 1993, fol. 4a.2–3).

829 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fol. 12a.4–5.

830 Skt. icchantika, Tib. rigs chad pa. The meaning of *icchantika* is not entirely clear, but is often taken to mean "those who just follow their great desire." The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* speaks of two types, with the first one being equivalent to the *agotraka* of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (see below). The Tibetan *rigs chad pa* is usually translated as "cut-off disposition," but especially in the light of the following explanations and what the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* says, this wrongly suggests that there are sentient beings whose disposition has been eliminated for good (which, when the term is used as an equivalent of buddha nature, is obviously ludicrous). It means

definitely not that there are beings who have no buddha nature, but refers to all conditioned virtue in a certain being's mind stream having become extinct temporarily (which means that, in principle, new virtue can be accumulated again, though some beings may never do so). For more details, see below and Appendix I1E.

831 D3787, fol. 59b.1–2; p. 76 (CE only quotes the phrase up to "noble ones").

832 Ibid., fol. 60a.4–5; p. 77. Note that the Sanskrit *prabhāvita* is ambiguous here, which is reflected in D3787 saying *'dus ma byas kyis rab tu phye ba*, while CE has *'dus ma byas'pa las byung ba* ("arise from the unconditioned").

833 Skt. pañcānantarya, Tib. mtshams med lnga. Often translated as the "five immeasurably negative or heinous actions"—killing one's father, one's mother, or an arhat; creating a schism in the saṃgha; and intentionally causing blood to flow from the body of a buddha. They are called "without interval" because their result is the unavoidable rebirth in a hell realm immediately after death, without the interval of an intermediate state (bardo) before the next rebirth.

834 These four states refer to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11:

> Some are solely devoted to wrongdoing,
> Some have completely destroyed the immaculate dharmas,
> Some lack the virtue conducive to liberation,
> Some have inferior immaculate [dharmas], and [some] lack the cause.

See Appendix I1E for further details on this verse, the disposition as buddha nature, and the questions whether the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* belong to what Tibetans call "Mere Mentalism"; whether these texts and the Yogācāra School teach that some beings have no disposition to attain enlightenment at all; and whether they assert three yānas ultimately.

835 This and the following quotes in the section on the disposition are found on pp. 118–20 in CZ.

836 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 234) glosses this as the level of practice on which both factors to be relinquished and remedies are realized to be unobservable. Thus, all conceptions about any factors to be relinquished and their remedies entailing arising and ceasing are relinquished—there is no chance for the arising of any conceptions that apprehend any characteristics of remedies and factors to be relinquished.

837 JNS (pp. 233–34) comments that the description here of the way in which the remedy arises and the factors to be relinquished cease on the eighth bhūmi applies to all other such descriptions too. The remedy that, once its unimpeded power has arisen, makes its factor to be relinquished cease in a defenseless way is called the "relinquishing remedy." On this manner of the remedy relinquishing its factor to be relinquished, some people say that the directly arisen remedy on the uninterrupted path and its factor to be relinquished cease simultaneously. There is not much wrong with this explanation, but some unlearned people add the words "Through canceling them out, future remedies relinquish the seeds of the factors to be relinquished that will arise." This is pointless since a future remedy, at its own time, is something in the present. Thus, since it relinquishes the seeds of its factors to be relinquished at that time by way of causing them to not arise, it relinquishes them at the very time of the relinquishing remedy having arisen, which—at any given time—is nothing but the present. This explanation is arrived at through both reasoning and scripture. [The following very brief quote in JNS somewhat resembles the beginning of a passage in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 85a.3–5) which says that relinquishment does not happen for anything in the past, the future, or the present. It simply means that the latent tendencies of afflictions are relinquished from where they exist. This means that the arising of the aspect of a remedy and the ceasing of the aspect of its factor to

be relinquished occur simultaneously, just like the arising of light and the ceasing of darkness. Since it has become free from the respective latent tendencies of afflictions, the mind stream remains as something in which these afflictions will not arise in the future. This is what is meant by relinquishment.] According to Haribhadra's explanation, from among the two kinds of factors to be relinquished—seeds and manifest ones—it is the power of the seeds that becomes extinguished. Since their respective remedies actually arise immediately before their ceasing, the extinction of these seeds to be relinquished and the full-fledged arising of their remedy happen simultaneously, just as when observing a very intense hot sensation at the location of a powerless cold sensation. However, there is no relinquishing of any manifest factors to be relinquished in terms of their being the factors to be canceled out and some factors that cancel them, which directly oppose each other. For,through the latter having become powerful, the former do not rise any more immediately upon that. The meaning of this corresponds to it not being suitable for the uncommon dharmas concordant with enlightenment to arise in one's mind stream until certain manifest factors to be relinquished, such as desire, have subsided. This means that, since any mental factors that accompany a single primary mind are congruent with it through the five factors of congruence [in terms of support (sense faculty); object; aspect; time; and substance], from the perspective of a single moment, it is not suitable that both a remedy and its factor to be relinquished (such as ignorance and prajñā) occur together. Also, without the cessation of the preceding moment in the continuum of similar moments of a primary mind that is either a remedy or a factor to be relinquished, the next moment of the respective other one does not arise. Thus, the statement that "the seeds are directly canceled out" is made in terms of it being easily applicable on the level of conventions and it conveniently inducing the appearance of an object generality about it. However, in terms of the definitive meaning, there is no relinquishing in such a way that remedies cancel out some real seeds of factors to be relinquished because the very factors to be relinquished are nothing but adventitious mistakenness. Once this is established through the yogic valid perception of realizing that the factors to be relinquished do not exist by any nature of their own, this is presented as the natural purity of the factors to be relinquished. On the other hand, the assertion "It is not suitable that the factors to be relinquished are relinquished without canceling them out" and the assertion "This is like in the example of a disease and medicine because the factors to be relinquished are discontinued through the power of the remedy having arisen" are only of expedient meaning.

838 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 235) says that, through the maturation of former aspiration prayers and the power of skillful means (such as generosity) on the eighth bhūmi, this bhūmi has the special quality of prajñā and means characterized by not abiding in the two extremes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

839 VIII.2bc.

840 XI.45ac. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.42–46 explains that, on the eighth bhūmi, mastery over nonconceptual wisdom and pure realms is attained through the change of state (for more details on this notion, see below) of the afflicted mind and perception, respectively. Likewise, by virtue of the conceptual consciousness having changed state on the eighth bhūmi (Appendix I1H says ninth and tenth bhūmis), on the ninth one, bodhisattvas gain mastery over the unattached and unimpeded operation of wisdom in all times, and on the tenth bhūmi, they gain mastery over all kinds of enlightened activities.

841 V.60b.

842 Skt. abhisaṃdhi/abhiprāya, Tib. dgongs pa/ldem dgongs (these are explained in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XII.16ff. and its commentaries). Just like the Sanskrit and Tibetan words, the English term "intention" can be understood in many ways (see Ruegg 1985), which has led to different (mis)interpretations. Also, the Tibetan terms are often used in different ways than the Sanskrit ones. As the examples for the different kinds of intention and indirect

intention below will show, there is no consistency in what they refer to—it is not always just another meaning (as the content of an intention) or an intention per se, and there also are overlaps. In a general sense, "having something particular in mind" when making a statement often seems more correct. For details, see Broido 1984 and Ruegg 1985.

843 JNS (pp. 235–36) adds that the imaginary nature lacks a nature in terms of characteristics because referents do not exist through their own specific characteristics. The other-dependent nature lacks a nature in terms of arising because it does not arise from itself. The perfect nature is the ultimate lack of nature because it is the ultimate and does not exist as the nature of the two kinds of identity. However, to present this threefold lack of nature as an example for the intention of another meaning is only tenable in the system of the Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, but not in any Buddhist philosophical system from the Nonaspectarian Mere Mentalists upward.

844 These eight flaws are listed in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XII.19—contempt for the Buddha or the dharma, laziness, complacency with little achievements, conduct out of passion or pride, regret, and separation of those of indefinite dispositions. The remedies are to teach specific points of the mahāyāna. JNS (p. 237) gives an example for the first one among these eight. Some may put down the Buddha by wondering, "Is Buddha Śākyamuni inferior in qualities to other buddhas?" In order to counteract such thoughts, the Buddha may say, "At that time, I was the Tathāgata Vipaśyī." Here, though the speaker says this by having the equality of the dharmakāya in mind (as in the above intention in terms of equality), the listener, through understanding this as referring to the equality of the rūpakāya, abandons contempt for the present Buddha.

845 D326, fol. 252b.7.

846 JNS (pp. 237–38) adds that any statement with an intention is not necessarily a statement with an indirect intention, while the latter is necessarily also of the former kind. A statement with an intention merely refers to something that the speaker has in mind, while a statement with an indirect intention serves to make another person understand the intention behind the explicit meaning of this statement. Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on the relevant verses in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (Dngul chu thogs med bzang po dpal 1979, fol. 133b.4–6) says that all four kinds of intention are included in the indirect intention of a remedy. The difference between intention and indirect intention is that the former primarily teaches the content that is intended and the latter its purpose. Some people say, "All intentions and indirect intentions are of expedient meaning." But this is not the case because *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.31 states that "the entirety of the Buddha's words has to be understood through the four intentions and the four indirect intentions" and that "the indirect intention of a remedy teaches the remedies in all the eighty-four thousand sections of the Buddha's words that are to be engaged in." This is also not contradicted by the passage in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 119b.5) that "quasi" equates indirect intention with expedient meaning by describing it as a semantic transformation of certain words and letters. For this passage only applies to the particular case of the indirect intention of transformation (this position is supported by the subsequent examples in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*).

847 JNS (p. 232) adds that practices (7)–(10) respectively refer to the eighth bhūmi's remedial uninterrupted path; the paths of liberation of having relinquished the two obscurations; and this bhūmi's special quality of emptiness and compassion in union. (11) On the ninth bhūmi, bodhisattvas practice and perfect the collection of qualities that are not in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. (12) On the tenth bhūmi, the welfare of others is accomplished without mixing up its progression. In this and the above explanations, the ways of identifying what the thirteen practices are and of matching them with the passages from the sūtras come from the unmistaken explanations in the commentaries by Nyalshig Jambel Dorje and others (the *Vṛtti* only provides references to the sūtras for the first six and the last one among the thirteen practices, while Haribhadra's commentaries provide no such references at all).

848 JNS (pp. 240–41) elaborates on the flawed absurd consequence of an opponent as presented in Haribhadra's commentaries as follows. "If the dharmadhātu is held to be the buddha disposition, then bodhisattvas are not the only ones who have the buddha disposition because the dharmadhātu is the general foundation of all three yānas and because all sentient beings would possess the buddha disposition. If that is accepted, it follows that three kinds of persons with three different dispositions are impossible because everybody possesses the buddha disposition." This consequence is flawed since Maitreya himself holds that if the buddha disposition did not exist even in śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, they would neither become weary of suffering nor aspire for nirvāṇa (as stated in *Uttaratantra* I.40). Also, the Buddha said that, in terms of the definitive meaning, all sentient beings are pervaded by the sugata heart. For this reason, ultimately, only a single yāna is presented. Therefore, as explained above, though all sentient beings have the buddha disposition and there is only a single yāna ultimately, it is not contradictory to temporarily present persons who have three different dispositions and three yānas.

849 According to JNS (p. 239), this example comes from the *Ratnakaraṇḍasūtra*. Starting with the *Vṛtti*, it is used (usually without source) as the default illustration in this context in all commentaries. The sūtra says that, from a single lump of clay, various vessels are made and burned in the same oven. Some of these may then be used as vessels for honey and ground sugar; others, for oil and butter; and yet others, for filthy matters. Likewise, the single dharmadhātu may serve as the vessel for bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, and ordinary beings. Note that the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (D107, fols. 136a.3–137a.3) uses the example of a potter making different vessels from a single lump of clay to illustrate that the Buddha teaches the same emptiness or identitylessness through different terms—sometimes through the teachings on identitylessness proper and sometimes through the notion of the buddha heart (for those who are afraid of identitylessness). The buddha heart is explicitly said to be understood and relied on as the *anātmatathāgatagarbha*, thus serving as a remedy for those who cling to an *ātman*.

850 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 241–42) says that the dharmadhātu is labeled with the conventional term "disposition" by way of its having the nature of being the cause of the three kinds of enlightenment in accordance with the respective realizations of identitylessness in the three yānas focusing on this dharmadhātu. In terms of these ways of focusing being close, intermediate, or distant, there are three different levels of realization, by virtue of which this very dharmadhātu is also labeled as three different dispositions. However, in terms of its own nature, the dharmadhātu cannot be labeled with any conventional terms of any dispositions other than the buddha disposition. With precisely this in mind, Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 54a.4) says, "Why is [suchness] called dharmadhātu? Because it is the cause for all qualities of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas." Some Tibetans say, "The meaning taught here is that the persons who have entered the three yānas necessarily focus on the dharmadhātu; must necessarily realize it, if they focus on it; and must necessarily reveal phenomenal identitylessness, when they realize it." However, not only is this not necessarily so, but such a statement just indicates not having arrived at the final meaning of this passage in the AA. What is taught here is as follows. As for the focus in the progressive realizations of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and so on, when they engage in their respective ultimate realities, their respective qualities of being superior to the level of ordinary beings arise. Since these arise from the causal condition that is the unconditioned dharmadhātu, it is presented as the disposition. However, merely presenting it in this way does not mean that śrāvakas and so on necessarily have to realize it or necessarily have to focus on it directly. For,this is similar to the example of all excellence in the world arising from the cause that is the Buddha's compassion. Though the compassion of the Buddha also comes from the unconditioned dharmadhātu, sentient beings do not have to focus on or realize either of these two in order to partake of worldly excellences. In conclusion, JNS (pp. 243–44) says:

> Since the disposition is a single one as the dharmadhātu alone,
> The differences of fully relinquishing the stains

Or relinquishing just a portion of them
Are presented as the dispositions of the three yānas.
Therefore, this very dharmadhātu
Is the disposition and also the cause.
Thus, with the basic element existing, the efforts
Through our activities are said to not be pointless.

To present a brief sketch of the position of the Sakya School on the disposition, NSML (pp. 197–200) says the following. The nature of the disposition is explained in many ways, such as dharmakāya, dharmadhātu, or mind, but the fully complete nature of the disposition is presented in *Uttaratantra* I.28:

Since the perfect buddhakāya radiates,
Since suchness is undifferentiable,
And because of the disposition,
All beings always contain the buddha heart.

In due order, the first three lines of this verse refer to that which is suitable for (1) the condition of a buddha's enlightened activity engaging it, (2) relinquishing the adverse conditions of the obscurations, and (3) the arising of all buddha qualities as the fruition. Thus, the definition of the sugata heart at the time of it being a cause for buddhahood is the dharmadhātu that is suitable in these three ways. The disposition for buddhahood is the causal aspect that consists of (a) its own nature being suitable to become any of the three kāyas and (b) any of the roots of virtue of the phase during which the dhātu or the disposition that is not free from stains awakens. The conditioned naturally abiding disposition as understood in the system of the Mere Mentalists is said to be a synonym for emptiness, suchness, the ultimate, the dharmadhātu, and so on. Though it is coextensive with all of these, in the Madhyamaka system it is asserted that sugata heart, dharmadhātu, and naturally abiding disposition refer to the inseparable unity of that which bears the true nature of phenomena (lucidity) and this nature itself (the reference points of the four extremes with regard to that lucidity having been put to an end). However, on their own, emptiness, suchness, and so on are presented from the perspective of the basic nature that consists of the reference points of real existence (or the four extremes) having been put to an end. Therefore, there is a very great difference because these latter terms only refer to the aspect of emptiness in that unity of lucidity and emptiness. In the Madhyamaka system, the naturally abiding disposition must necessarily be the dharmadhātu since it is the cause for the dharmas such as the ten powers of a buddha, and because "dharmadhātu," "disposition," and "cause" are equivalent. Also, AA I.38 calls the foundation of practice—which is equated with the dharmadhātu in I.5 and I.39—the "disposition." The same is found in its commentaries and also Nāgārjuna said nothing but this.

851 For details on this, see Appendix I1F.

852 JNS (p. 248) says that the focal object of mahāyāna practice consists of all phenomena because one must cut through superimpositions about them by way of ascertaining which ones among them are to be adopted and to be rejected.

853 The remaining ten are a sense of shame and embarrassment (refraining from nonvirtue), detachment, lack of hatred, lack of ignorance, vigor, suppleness, heedfulness, equanimity, and nonviolence (which, in the mahāyāna, includes compassion).

854 "Nonanalytical cessation" refers to something not happening due to its specific causes and conditions not being complete.

855 JNS (p. 249) glosses this as indifference.

856 JNS (pp. 249–50) explains that virtuous actions are those that are able to yield the results that are the higher realms in saṃsāra (humans, asuras, and gods) and liberation. What is nonvirtue by nature consists of the primary and secondary afflictions of the desire realm. What is neutral by nature consists of things like the sense faculties and their referents that possess form. Congruently associated neutral actions are the primary minds and mental factors that are congruently associated with the views about a real personality and extremes.

857 These three are space, analytical cessation, and nonanalytical cessation.

858 JNS (p. 252) explains that this refers to attractive objects turning into unattractive ones and pleasurable states of the sense faculties into unpleasurable ones.

859 See "The lesser [instruction on] the four realities" ("Manner of expanding") above. JNS (p. 252) explains that the *Abhidharmakośa* speaks about two doors that expand contaminations—their focal objects and the aids that are their congruently associated mental factors.

860 The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not explicitly speak of "six doors," but briefly lists (without their instances) the above six ways of being contaminated (D4049, fol. 58a.4-5). JNS (p. 252) summarizes that contaminated phenomena are those that have the natures of the realities of suffering and its origin, which together represent the factors to be relinquished through the path. Uncontaminated phenomena are those that are not included in these two realities and are not factors to be relinquished. In terms of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, contaminated phenomena are those that are connected with the above six doors, while uncontaminated phenomena are those that are not so connected.

861 JNS (p. 250) says that the first threefold division of phenomena (virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral) is their general division, while the remaining eight divisions are the particular ones of the general one. Both these general and particular focal objects have to be divided into mundane and supramundane. As for the eight particular ones, they can be summarized into four—the path (4)–(5); factors to be relinquished and their remedies (6)–(7); the two realities (8)–(9); and the fruition (10)–(11). Thus, (1)–(3) represent the classificatory basis for mundane and supramundane phenomena, while the remaining ones are their distinct divisions.

862 CZ, p. 120.

863 Note that, in itself, line I.42c can be read as (a) the mind that is the highest state (buddhahood) among all sentient beings; (b) the mindset that makes bodhisattvas achieve this highest state; or (c) their mindset of *establishing* all sentient beings in this highest state. The sūtras and most commentaries explain (c), while some commentaries (like CE, JNS, and PSD) differentiate between this great mind as the final fruition and its development on the path as the driving force to lead all beings to buddhahood. Obviously, CE first takes I.42c in the sense of (a) and then explains the three greatnesses in terms of the path as the means to achieve (a). PBG (p. 497) says that "great mind" refers to great compassion (including the mental factors associated with it) during the phases of both cause and fruition. This is the dharma that produces the highest state among sentient beings—buddhahood. For JNS's comments, see below.

864 According to the larger prajñāpāramitā sūtras and JNS (p. 254), (1) "the vajralike mind" is the motivation to never abandon a single sentient being, which cannot be affected by any adverse conditions. (2) "The vast mind" entertains neither any afflictions nor the limited mindsets of śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas. (3) "The unshakable mind" refers to the complete lack of conceit with regard to (2) or not mentally engaging even in the knowledge of all aspects. (4) "The mind directed toward the welfare and happiness of all beings" protects them from suffering and never gives up on them. (5) "Constant delight in the dharma" means striving for and liking it at all times. (6) "The mind of engaging in familiarization" familiarizes with the eighteen emptinesses, the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment, and so on. All of these are generated on the paths of learning and perfected on the path of nonlearning (for more details, see CZ, pp. 124–25). According to the sūtra in eight thousand lines, the six states of mind are (1) bodhicitta,

(2) the omniscient mind, (3) the uncontaminated mind, (4) the unequaled mind, (5) the mind that equals the unequaled, and (6) the mind that is not in common with any śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas. According to the *Ālokā* (p. 82; D3791, fol. 50a.4–50b.2), the latter group of six represents the third greatness of great realization. Among these six, (1) represents the bodhicitta of aspiration and application. (2) refers to the mind aspiring to merge with omniscience—the bodhicitta on the level of engagement through aspiration. (3) By virtue of nonconceptual supramundane discriminating wisdom, the mind is uncontaminated, which refers to the seven preparatory bhūmis—the bodhicitta of pure superior intention. (4) On the eighth bhūmi and so on, the mind is unequaled by virtue of its engaging in a manner that is effortless and signless—the bodhicitta of maturation. (5) The mind that equals the unequaled buddhas refers to the buddhabhūmi—the bodhicitta of the relinquishment of obscurations. Or (1) refers to the mind whose essence is nonarising and which represents the nature of enlightenment. (2)–(5) In terms of yogic seeming reality, this very mind is connected with mirrorlike wisdom and so on. Therefore, through certain isolates, it is explained as the four called "omniscient mind" and so on. (6) All of these states of mind are not in common with any śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas. JNS (p. 256) follows Sthirapāla in connecting the six states of mind in the sūtra in eight thousand lines with the first greatness in terms of mind, which is based on the intention that the minds which produce the highest state among all sentient beings are greatly connected with the states of mind in the order taught here. As for the above passage from the *Ālokā* in this context, JNS (p. 254) explains it as follows. On the paths of learning, (1) and (2) stand for the bodhicitta of aspiration and application, while (3)–(6), in due order, represent the above-mentioned kinds of bodhicitta of the level of engagement through aspiration and so on. On the path of nonlearning, (1) and (2) refer to the svābhāvikakāya and (3)–(6) to the four wisdoms (mirrorlike, equality, discriminating, and all-accomplishing wisdom).

865 CZ, p. 123.

866 JNS (p. 255) says that great relinquishment refers to teaching the dharma in the manner of nonobservation in order to gradually relinquish the thirty views about all kinds of personal and phenomenal identities that are listed in the sūtras (CZ, p. 126). These are (1)–(12) the views about the above-mentioned twelve kinds of persons who are agents (self, sentient being, and so on) as well as the views about (13)–(16) permanence, extinction, existence, and nonexistence; (17)–(23) skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, dependent origination, the pāramitās, the dharmas concordant with enlightenment, and the unique buddha qualities; (24)–(30) maturing sentient beings, purifying buddha realms, the three jewels, turning the wheel of dharma, and passing into parinirvāṇa. Among these views, (1)–(12) represent the views about a real personality or a personal identity. These and views (13–(16) are in common with ordinary beings; (17)–(23) are in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; and (24)–(30) are common among bodhisattvas.

867 CZ, p. 126.

868 Ibid., pp. 126–27.

869 JNS (pp. 256–59) explains the three greatnesses as the great mind to accomplish buddhahood as the most supreme state among all sentient beings and, founded on having generated such a mind, the relinquishment of what is to be relinquished and the realization of what is to be realized. By virtue of bodhisattvas taking these three greatnesses as their aims, they must equally use them as the means to accomplish these three. This means that the power of all three is progressively developed in a very great way, so that they finally become nondual wisdom, which has the nature of being self-arisen. This is great mind or a "mahāsattva." This very wisdom is also great relinquishment, since it is never affected by all the stains primordially. It is also great realization, since it is primordially realized and penetrated from the perspective of personally experienced wisdom. As for "great mind" on the paths of learning, it refers to the mind that,

in due order, has the nature of seeming and ultimate bodhicitta, which makes one the refuge, protector, and supreme of all sentient beings. On the path of nonlearning, it is nondual wisdom—the enlightened mind that is beyond the realms and experiential spheres of all sentient beings—that is labeled with the name "the mind that makes the highest of sentient beings." As for relinquishment and realization on the paths of learning, they refer to the respective levels of relinquishment and realization on these paths. On the level of nonlearning, they represent the infinite relinquishment and realization of omniscience. Thus, the practice that aims at these three greatnesses as both the temporary aims on the paths of learning and the ultimate aim on the level of nonlearning is what is present in the mind streams of bodhisattvas with profound insight who are called "mahāsattvas." Some people identify "the great mind that makes the highest of sentient beings" as the generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi, but this is only a fraction of it. In terms of the definitive meaning, this corresponds to the nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha being taught through the name "mind" in the tantras. The generation of bodhicitta that is taught in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* as "the generation of bodhicitta on the buddhabhūmi" is not an instruction on the existence of a generation of bodhicitta in some ordinary mind stream. Since everything that is needed has been accomplished in a complete way through such a generation of bodhicitta on the paths of training, it is this accomplishment that is taught through the name "generation of bodhicitta." According to Trolungba Lodrö Jungné, the syllables of the Tibetan word for bodhisattva represent the three greatnesses—"being purified" (*byang*) represents great relinquishment; "full comprehension" (*chub*) is great realization; and "mind" (*sems*) is great mind. TOK (vol. 3, p. 593) presents the three greatnesses as follows. Great relinquishment is the kāya that is completely pure of the two obscurations and their latent tendencies. Great realization is the wisdom that lucidly sees the entire sphere of knowable objects without exception. Great mind is the promotion of the welfare of all beings through the force of these two in a permanent, all-encompassing, and spontaneous manner.

870 JNS (pp. 259–61) identifies the above description of the nature of mahāyāna practice as being presented in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* V.1. (1) Armorlike practice refers to the cause of donning the great armor that primarily consists of the mental vigor to strive for the welfare of others through the motivation of the mahāyāna. (2) The practice of engagement is primarily the application of this vigor that is preceded by (1) as its cause. (3) The practice of the equipments means to unrelentingly embrace the activities that make one attain the fruition of great enlightenment. (4) The practice of final deliverance delivers one from bhūmi to bhūmi and has the nature of the union of means and prajñā. JNS elaborates that the AA clearly teaches these practices (1)–(4). However, Haribhadra gave his own presentation here of "the three knowledges being the practice in terms of the object" and "the four trainings being the practice in terms of the subject." When one considers the practice to accomplish the fruition of buddhahood for the welfare of others, it depends on the four trainings, which constitute the practice in the system of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA. Therefore, the four trainings have two parts. (1) The part of the view (the object) consists of meditating in order to realize the threefold lack of arising of the three knowledges, which is the general practice. (2) The part of conduct consists of meditating in order to realize the six pāramitās. Thus, the three knowledges are explained as "the general practice" and the four trainings as "the particular practices." By virtue of this explanation, the practice to accomplish buddhahood must necessarily consist of the four trainings through (1) taking the three knowledges as their objects and (2) making these trainings a living experience through the six pāramitās. However, among the earlier Tibetans there is consensus that the armorlike practice represents both the general and the particular practices, whereas the remaining three constitute mainly the general practice. Some also say that the practices of the first three chapters of the AA represent the general practice, while the practices of the following four are the particular practices.

871 As for the fourth one, both the *Ālokā* (p. 84) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 90b.3) just say "the special path." This obviously refers to some special path of the path of familiarization, which is, however, identified in different ways by the commentators (see below).

872 JNS (pp. 260–61) quotes the relevant passage from the *Ālokā* (p. 84), which starts by saying that the following presentation is by Asaṅga. (1) Armorlike practice and (2) the practice of engagement have the nature of training in an indirect and direct manner and thus consist of the path of accumulation and the level of engagement through aspiration (the path of preparation), respectively. As for (3) the practice of the seventeen equipments that has the nature of training in an immediate manner, its first fifteen parts (from loving-kindness up through dhāraṇī) make up the great supreme dharma of the path of preparation. The practice of the equipment that has the nature of the first bhūmi is the path of seeing, while the same practice that has the nature of the second bhūmi and so on is the path of familiarization. The practice of the equipment of the remedies is the sphere of both these latter paths (for the seventeen equipments, see I.47–71). (4) The practice of final deliverance is based on the path of familiarization. According to JNS, Trolungba Chökyi Jungné says that the intention of the *Ālokā* here is as follows. In terms of training in an indirect and direct manner, respectively, (1) armorlike practice exists from the path of accumulation onward, while (2) the practice of engagement exists from the path of preparation onward. (3) The practice of the equipments represents the sphere of both the mundane and the supramundane paths—in a general way, it exists from the great supreme dharma onward, while the particular equipments are the ones that represent the natures of the paths of seeing and familiarization, respectively, and the equipments of the remedies and wisdom. (4) The practice of final deliverance refers to the wisdom of the end of the path of familiarization right before the end of the continuum. Ngog Lotsāwa agrees with Trolungba on (1)–(3), while he says that (4) starts from the special path of the path of familiarization. From their respective starting points, (1)–(4) exist up through the end of the continuum. YT (pp. 210–11) agrees with Trolungba on (1)–(2) and most of (3). With regard to the latter, YT specifies that its first fifteen elements exist from the last moment of the great supreme dharma onward. The two practices of the equipments of the first bhūmi and of the remedies for the factors to be relinquished through seeing make up the path of seeing, while the path of familiarization consists of the two practices of the equipments of the remaining nine bhūmis and of the remedies for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. (4) consists of the special path of the path of familiarization, which exists on the three pure bhūmis. NSML (p. 211) agrees with YT except for identifying the beginning of (3) as the great supreme dharma per se. PBG (pp. 511–12) agrees with NSML on (1)–(3) except for identifying the beginning of (3) as the supreme dharma in general. However, (4) is said to consist of the special paths of all ten bhūmis. In brief, according to PBG, practices (2)–(4) exist from the first bhūmi up through the end of the continuum.

873 Note that the pāramitā of vigor is defined as a state of mind, while physical and verbal efforts represent just the natural outflow and the application of the attitude of being enthusiastic about engaging in virtue.

874 XVI.8.

875 As for the term *prātimokṣa* (or *pratimokṣa*), it should be noted that it literally means "rebinding" (*mokṣa* does not mean liberation here). The term refers to the code of regulations that, through being recited mainly during the biweekly monastic ceremony of confession (Skt. poṣadha, Tib. gso sbyong), purifies impairments of the monastic precepts and restores them. In Western translations that literally render the corresponding Tibetan *so sor thar pa* (and certain commentaries on it), the term is pervasively rendered wrongly as the vows of "individual liberation" or "self-liberation."

876 According to JNS (p. 267), the latter two are presented as vows with the intention that, once the mind rests in dhyāna or has seen true reality, all nonvirtuous actions cease of their own accord.

877 The three trainings are ethics, samādhi, and prajñā. When these are classified in terms of applying one's body and mind to them, there are six kinds of efforts. JNS's (p. 269) way of counting seven kinds of vigor is (1)–(6) to apply oneself respectfully and persistently to these six efforts plus (7) the armorlike practice.

878 In due order, these three types of dhyāna refer to the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna and the ordinary actual first dhyāna, the special actual first dhyāna, and the remaining three actual dhyānas.

879 JNS (pp. 263–64) explains the general definition of pāramitā as the special uncontrived prajñā of realizing that, primordially, a nature of all phenomena never existed. Thus, the definitions of all six pāramitās include the phrase "realizing that all phenomena are not established by any nature of their own" as their general part. In addition, the particular parts of their definitions are as follows. Generosity is defined as giving away all one's own possessions to others. Ethics refers to the continuous seeds of not relying on wrong conduct. Patience means one's mind being at peace within. Vigor is boundless delight for virtuous activities. Dhyāna refers to the mind being one-pointed without moving anywhere other than its object of focus. Prajñā means fully discriminating names and referents. In other words, it is prajñāpāramitā that is divided into six by virtue of there being six factors to be relinquished through the six pāramitās—attachment, corrupt ethics, impatience, laziness, not resting in meditative equipoise, and corrupt prajñā. That all six pāramitās are included in prajñāpāramitā works through the power of entities. However, generosity and so on that are not embraced by the special prajñā of realizing the emptiness of any personal or phenomenal identity are not presented as pāramitās. Therefore, it is certain that the prajñāpāramitā of generosity and so on does not exist in those who do not see reality. With this in mind, some former great masters said that the six pāramitās exist in the mind streams of bodhisattvas from the point onward when they engage in relinquishing the cognitive obscurations after they have already relinquished the afflictive obscurations in terms of the mahāyāna. In others, however, these pāramitās do not exist. Based on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVI.17–28, JNS (pp. 266–74) further explains the natures, causes, fruitions, functions, special qualities, and subdivisions of each pāramitā (their natures and subdivisions are mostly as above and in CE). (1) As for generosity, its cause is the virtuous mental factor of detachment, that is, the impulse to give. Its fruition consists of an excellent body and possessions. Its function is to take care of oneself and others and to perfect the accumulation of merit. Its special quality is to be without miserliness. (2) According to the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (D4036, fols. 18b.7–19a.3), the nature of ethics consists of six elements—training by way of (a) dwelling in ethics; (b) being disciplined through the prātimokṣa vows; (c) the excellent ritual of taking these vows; (d) the excellent sphere of engagement; (e) regarding even very subtle evil actions with fear; and (f) properly adopting the bases of training. The cause of this special nature of ethics is to be fully rooted in the motivation of wishing to attain the peace of nirvāṇa. The fruition of ethics is rebirth in the three higher realms. Its function is to serve as the foundation of all qualities, pacify the torment of the afflictions, and render oneself and others unafraid of evil actions. Its special quality is to be endowed with the accumulation of merit. (3) The cause of patience is great compassion. Its fruition consists of not harboring any grudge, not being divisive, being physically well and mentally happy, dying without regrets, and being reborn in the higher realms. Its special quality is to be endowed with the supreme ability to undergo hardships. (4) The cause of vigor is to rely on confidence and striving. Its fruition is the growth of mindfulness, samādhi, and so on. Its function is to serve as the remedy for afflicted phenomena. Its special quality is to be greatly endowed with detachment and so on. (5) The nature of dhyāna is the mind resting within. This means to rest within the mind having become aware of itself in a direct manner and to not delimit (in either an affirmative or a negative manner) any forms of subject and object other than that. The causes of dhyāna are mindfulness and vigor. Its fruition is the generation of special bliss. Its function consists of mastering the supernatural knowledges

and so on. Its special quality is to be endowed with the mental support in which the primary one among all phenomena—the special prajñā of realizing identitylessness—can arise. Its subdivisions are as above, or, according to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (D4037, fol. 111a.4), consist of the three kinds of dhyāna for the sake of blissfully abiding in this life, accomplishing all qualities of the samādhis of bodhisattvas, and promoting the welfare of sentient beings. (Usually, the path of blissfully abiding amidst visible phenomena consists of the last five among the eight liberations—the four formless absorptions and the meditative absorption of cessation—all of which cause one to dwell in physical and mental bliss in a saṃsāric lifetime; see CE below, fol. 84a–b). (6) The cause of prajñā is to rely on mundane dhyānas and supramundane samādhis. Its fruition is mind being liberated from the afflictions. Its function is to cut through doubts by way of displaying unsurpassable livelihood and explaining the dharma well. Its special quality is to be endowed with the supreme of all phenomena—prajñā. Its subdivisions are as above, or consist of the three prajñās arising from studying, reflecting, and meditating. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVI.36–42 explains the specific qualities of each one of the six pāramitās in terms of their magnificence, great purpose, lack of exploitiveness, and inexhaustibility.

880 Based on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVI.2, XVI.4, and XVI.7, respectively, JNS (pp. 264–65) gives three different explanations on the definite number of the pāramitās (the third one being the same as in CE). (1) In due order, the first four pāramitās accomplish all excellent qualities of the higher realms—possessions, one's body, one's company, and the excellent outcome of one's actions. Dhyāna frees one from being under the power of the afflictions and prajñā accomplishes all activities of the buddhabhūmi. (2) In terms of one's own welfare being accomplished through acting for the welfare of others, in due order, one removes the poverty of others; does not harm them; endures their harming oneself; makes them not feeling sad through serving as the companions they need; delights them through the display of various miraculous powers attained through dhyāna; and eliminates their doubts. As for (3), generosity is the cause for the superior training in ethics, while ethics and patience represent its nature. The *Śrāvakabhūmi* explains that the three superior trainings are called "superior" because non-Buddhists do not possess these three Buddhist trainings.

881 XVI.14.

882 V.38–39 (the last line in CE has "Omniscience, will be attained").

883 XVI.15.

884 JNS (pp. 274–75) says that, according to the previous learned ones, the armorlike practice as the subject that takes the six pāramitās as its objects consists of practicing them in such a way that all six are included in each one of them because they are not practiced in an isolated way on their own. However, since all the six pāramitās that are included in each one of these six pāramitās must accord with the latter, the armorlike practice's own nature consists of only six pāramitās. JNS also points out that the above division of armorlike practice into vast motivation and vast practice comes from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (D3808, fol. 116b.1–2), according to which vast practice means that all practices are accomplished through a single one (since all pāramitās are included in each one).

885 CZ, p. 128.

886 As mentioned above, this refers to the revised edition of the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines with the inserted headings of the AA.

887 In his general topics of the AA (Padmavajra 2001, fols. 18b–19a), Dzogchen Khenpo Padmavajra provides the following description. The generosity in each one of the six pāramitās is to abide within the respective pāramitā, to establish others in it, and to dedicate it to enlightenment by making it into something that is shared with all sentient beings. The ethics in each one is to be untainted by the intentions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who mentally engage in

just their own welfares. The patience in each one is that one's mind is not disturbed by one's own antagonistic factors and the wrong engagements of others. The vigor in each one is to greatly delight in practicing the six pāramitās for the welfare of others. The dhyāna in each one is to practice with a mind that is one-pointed with regard to the welfare of others and the knowledge of all aspects. The prajñā in each one is to be without conceit. In terms of seeming reality, the latter is accomplished by virtue of dedicating the practice of the six pāramitās to enlightenment. In terms of ultimate reality, this is accomplished by virtue of not entertaining any reference points in terms of the three spheres.

888 This and all the following quotes in the section on the practice of ninefold engagement are on pp. 131–36 in CZ.

889 According to JNS (p. 305), Haribhadra speaks here of "the path of nonlearning" because, on the eighth bhūmi, all characteristics of making efforts have subsided. Others, such as Abhayākaragupta, say that this is not tenable because "nonlearning" is impossible on the stage of being a bodhisattva. Thus, the practice of engaging in the path refers to familiarizing with everything from the four foundations of mindfulness (on the lesser path of accumulation) up through the eighteen unique qualities of a buḍdha.

890 JNS (pp. 305–6) explains that the first eight of these nine are explained to be the causal mahāyāna and the last one to be the fruitional mahāyāna. The first three represent one's own welfare; the middle three, the welfare of others; and the last three, both welfares. As for these nine being explained in only this order, Haribhadra (*Ālokā*, pp. 85–86) asserts the following. First, one stabilizes the mind, then one gathers the accumulations, and next one engages in the paths. On these paths, one cultivates love and so on for others and cuts through focal objects, which fetter these others. Based on that, one becomes pure of the three spheres. The pure conduct for others means to engage in one's own welfare, the three greatnesses. For this, one also needs to make efforts in knowing the minds of others and so on. Having done so, one then engages in omniscience because one is enthusiastic about becoming enlightened. This progression of realization sums up the entire mahāyāna. As for the meaning of "mounting the mahāyāna," JNS says that one should understand that the single avenue of all buddhas is nondual wisdom, which is given the name "yāna." To mount it means to progress through engaging in these nine practices.

891 In more detail, these seven are found in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIX.59–60. (1) Greatness of focus means that bodhisattvas focus on the vast collection of the mahāyāna scriptures. (2) Greatness of accomplishment is the benefit of both oneself and others. (3) Greatness of wisdom is as above. (4) Greatness of applying diligence is to make efforts on the path for three incalculable eons. (5) Greatness of skill in means refers to bodhisattvas from the first bhūmi onward being permitted to commit the seven negative actions of body and speech. For by virtue of their stainless bodhicitta, they never forsake any sentient being and are not subject to afflictions. (6) Greatness of perfect accomplishment means to attain the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya of a perfect buddha (the ten powers, four fearlessnesses, and eighteen unique qualities). (7) Greatness of enlightened activity refers to the effortless, spontaneous, and ceaseless activity for the sake of all beings.

892 The following explanations are supplemented by relevant excerpts from the corresponding general topics in JNS (pp. 278–304).

893 The causal dhyānas or formless absorptions are those that are cultivated in this lifetime, while the fruitional ones refer to the effects of such training in the next life—being reborn and experiencing the corresponding divine abodes of the form realm or the formless realm (which in themselves are lifelong uninterrupted states of meditative absorptions).

894 This means that each one of the meditative absorptions pertaining to the seventeen levels of the form realm and the four levels of the formless realms (see Chart 1) has its own preparatory and actual stages. These can only be cultivated and attained on the respective levels below them. For details on all these stages, see below, Zahler 1983 (pp. 92–143), the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

895 JNS (pp. 281–84) gives the reasons for why various kinds of practitioners attain certain meditative absorptions or not. The simultaneist śrāvakas before arhathood only attain the preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika because the attainment of the actual stage of this dhyāna means nothing but relinquishment of the ninth and final degree of the afflictions in the desire realm. As is the nature of simultaneists, they relinquish all afflictions of the three realms with the same degree at the same time, so such a person who has relinquished the final degree of afflictions of the desire realm would automatically have relinquished the final degrees of all afflictions of the two higher realms as well and thus be an arhat. As for the arhats who are liberated through prajñā alone, they do not attain the actual first dhyāna either since they have not relinquished the obscurations of meditative absorption that prevent such an attainment.

896 The reason for this is that these śrāvakas—before their level of the supreme dharma—must have attained the preparatory stages in which the sixth degree of the afflictions of the desire realm is relinquished. Before that level, they may or may not possess the fifth and sixth preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika because this particular type of śrāvaka may or may not have relinquished the seventh to the eighth degrees of said afflictions before this level (see above in the section on the twenty kinds of exemplary saṃgha).

897 The reason for these once-returners having attained the actual stage of Brahmakāyika is that, as was said above, such attainment equals the relinquishment of the ninth and final degree of the afflictions in the desire realm, which is the defining characteristic of a nonreturner. The reason that they, up through the supreme dharma, may or may not possess any number of further preapartory or actual stages from Brahmapurohita upward lies in the fact that nonreturners of this type range from being engaged in relinquishing the afflictions of Brahmapurohita up through the ninth degree of the afflictions of Nothing Whatsoever. On their path of familiarization, they either attain arhathood by way of attaining the respective higher meditative absorptions through their respective preparatory stages or they attain arhathood by way of relinquishing all remaining afflictions of the higher realms through relying on the uncontaminated actual dhyāna of Brahmakāyika.

898 The reason for these stream-enterers possessing or not possessing the middle three preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika is that the second and third of these are needed for relinquishing the first three degrees of the afflictions of the desire realm, while the fourth one is needed for relinquishing the fourth and fifth of these degrees (which is the range of relinquishment of these stream-enterers). That they do not attain the last two preparatory stages is because these are needed for the relinquishment of the sixth to the ninth of these degrees. If these gradualist stream-enterers had already relinquished the sixth degree, they would be once-returners who have previously become free from attachment. As for the abiding once-returners, if they have relinquished the seventh and eighth degree of the afflictions of the desire realm, they possess the last two preparatory stages, but if they are not even in the preparatory process of relinquishing the seventh degree, they do not possess either of these two stages. In no case can they possess the actual first dhyāna because they have to return once more to the desire realm.

899 Even in their second-before-last lifetime, these practitioners cannot possess the actual stage of the first dhyāna for the following reasons. By being such practitioners whose pratyekabuddha disposition is certain, in their last lifetime they must definitely assume a human birth under the sway of karma and afflictions. For the fruition of a pratyekabuddha arhat can only be achieved in a human body and not in any other realm. In their last lifetime, however, some

of them may possess the actual stage of the first dhyāna if they have already achieved the corresponding realizations on the four paths of śrāvakas in some previous life.

900 The reason is that these pratyekabuddhas progress through all stages from heat up through the knowledge of termination and nonarising in a single meditation session that is based on the final level of the fourth dhyāna.

901 The reason is that there are also pratyekabuddha arhats who are liberated through prajñā alone (see above under the simultaneists).

902 This refers to those bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation who have not yet relied on any mental support of meditative absorption, but simply obtained the bodhisattva vows based on the ritual for giving rise to bodhicitta.

903 The reason for this is that this dhyāna is the indispensable dominant condition for attaining the corresponding miraculous powers and so forth. Also, bodhisattvas on the great path of accumulation must have attained "the samādhi of the stream of dharma" (see CE on I.21).

904 The reasons are (1) that bodhisattvas must have attained the nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding during the stage of the subsequent cognition of the reality of suffering on the mahāyāna path of seeing and (2) that it is impossible to engage in any training to newly accomplish these nine during the three preceding stages of the path of seeing (dharma readiness, dharma cognition, and subsequent readiness of suffering). As for (1), AA IV.47d ("dissolution of the branches of the dhyānas") explains that bodhisattvas on this stage of the subsequent cognition of the reality of suffering attain a special realization because, despite having attained these nine meditative absorptions, they are not reborn in the form or formless realms as the maturational results of experiencing these absorptions. The reasons for (2) are as follows. (a) Bodhisattvas on the stage of the dharma readiness of suffering have relinquished both the afflictive obscurations and the obscurations of meditative absorption that prevent one from attaining the actual stages of the nine meditative absorption of progressive abiding because they have fully completed the type of realization and relinquishment of those śrāvaka arhats who are liberated through both prajñā and samādhi. (b) On the three stages of dharma readiness, dharma cognition, and subsequent readiness of suffering, any preparatory stages for the second dhyāna and beyond are impossible because the latter are necessarily not the uninterrupted paths and the path of liberation that represent the above three stages. (c) On the stage of the dharma readiness of suffering on the mahāyāna path of seeing, the actual first dhyāna must have been attained because being endowed with the miraculous powers of shaking one hundred worldly realms and so on (see the twelve sets of qualities of bodhisattvas in Chart 12) entails having attained their mental support, which is this first dhyāna. In particular, bodhisattvas on the path of seeing and those who possess the wisdom of the end of the continuum must possess the actual fourth dhyāna. For the fourth dhyāna is attained at the end of the supreme dharma of the mahāyāna path; the first attainment of the dharmakāya must happen by relying on the fourth dhyāna; and the actual fourth dhyāna is the supreme among all convenient paths (as mentioned before, this dhyāna entails a proper balance between calm abiding and superior insight, which—among all types of samādhi—makes it the most suitable for Buddhist insight meditation).

905 The mind streams of buddhas cannot be differentiated as to whether they possess or do not possess certain ones among the nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding. Being free from all obscurations with regard to all these meditative absorptions, their minds simply abide in sheer meditative equipoise.

906 According to JNS (p. 285), (1) means to have accumulated the extensive roots of virtue that are the respective causes for these meditative absorptions. (2) refers to the dispositions that are the respective causes for these meditative absorptions having awoken. (5) At the end of an

eon, those who have the psychophysical supports of gods or humans in the desire realm cannot but give rise to meditative absorptions and thus transit to higher realms.

907 In general, if these preparatory stages are not used as parts of an uncontaminated, that is, supramundane (Buddhist) path, but on the mundane paths of just achieving higher states within saṃsāra, "relinquishing" the afflictions means that only manifest ones do not appear any more, while their latent tendencies still remain. This makes it possible for them to arise again under the right circumstances, such as being reborn in the desire realm after one's life as a god in the form or formless realms has come to an end.

908 In terms of the general division of calm abiding and superior insight, these six stages belong to the latter, being kinds of mundane superior insight, which are based on a preceding training in calm abiding through the nine stages of settling the mind (see Chart 10).

909 The four paths are the path of preparation, the uninterrupted path, the path of liberation, and the special path.

910 This classification is one in terms of the nature of the preparatory stages (for the difference between pure and uncontaminated, see below under the actual stages of the dhyānas). Each one of the preparatory stages of the dhyānas can also be classified as fourfold in terms of whether they are practiced on the hīnayāna paths of accumulation, preparation, and seeing, and the mahāyāna path of accumulation. In terms of their function, they can either serve as the preparations for the actual dhyānas within saṃsāra or as the preparations for these dhyānas as they are used on the path to liberation from saṃsāra. JNS (p. 291) adds that the preparatory stages of the first dhyāna, when practiced by those who have not entered any Buddhist path, are presented as "the pure ones." For simultaneist arhats, these stages serve as the mental supports to simultaneously relinquish the afflictions of all nine levels of the three realms and, in that case, are presented as "the uncontaminated ones."

911 JNS (pp. 290 and 292) specifies that the "not ineffective" preparatory stages refer exclusively to the preparatory stages of Brahmakāyika (the first of the three levels of the first dhyāna). Thus, there are no such "not ineffective" preparatory stages for the other two levels of the first dhyāna (Brahmapurohita and Mahābrahmāṇa), the remaining three dhyānas, and the formless absorptions because their preparatory stages are necessarily not parts of the path to liberation from saṃsāra.

912 Usually, as mentioned above, the path of blissfully abiding amidst visible phenomena consists of the last five of the eight liberations (the four formless absorptions and the meditative absorption of cessation; see CE below, fol. 84a–b). CE here seems to refer to the above-mentioned passage in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that generally divides the pāramitā of dhyāna into three for the sake of blissfully abiding in this life, accomplishing the qualities of the samādhis of bodhisattvas, and promoting the welfare of sentient beings.

913 JNS (pp. 291–92) adds that, among the six preparatory stages (a)–(f), the preparatory stages of the four formless absorptions include (c) separation, (d) joy and withdrawal, and (f) final training, which—as explained above—are the ones that actually relinquish the respective nine degrees of afflictive obscurations and obscurations of meditative absorption. In terms of the feelings associated with the preparatory stages, those of the first three dhyānas are associated with physical and mental pleasure as well as equanimity, while those of the fourth dhyāna and the formless absorptions are only associated with equanimity.

914 In general, the dhyānas belong primarily to the category of analytical meditation, whereas the formless absorptions are resting meditations. Meditators pass from one dhyāna to the next by virtue of the presence or absence of certain branches or mental factors, whereas these are lacking in the formless states. The way in which one passes beyond the fourth dhyāna and from one formless absorption to the next one is through the four focal objects, such as infinite space,

and their cognitive aspects described below. Like the preparatory stages of the dhyānas, those of the formless absorptions initially also engage in analytical meditation as to the respectively lower states being more coarse and the higher ones being more peaceful, but their main emphasis is then on bringing said focal objects to mind and resting in them.

915 In addition, JNS (p. 295) says that the uncontaminated first dhyāna lacks both examination and analysis (thus only having the three branches of mental exhilaration, physical bliss, and samādhi). As mentioned above, there are no such distinctions for the remaining three dhyānas.

916 The difference between the formation of equanimity and the feeling of equanimity is that the former refers to simply resting in a state of meditative equipoise in which there is no need or impulse to remedy any flaws of meditation, while the latter refers to being in an emotionally neutral state of mind that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. As mentioned before, the eight flaws of dhyāna are examination, analysis, physical pleasure and suffering, mental pleasure and displeasure, inhalation, and exhalation. In terms of these eight, the main differences between the four dhyānas are as follows. In the first one, due to the presence of examination and/or analysis, the power of samādhi is incomplete. In the second one, samādhi is complete, but the branch of benefit is incomplete since there is still exhilaration. In the third one, due to the absence of exhilaration, the benefit of bliss is complete, but there are still three flaws of dhyāna (inhalation, exhalation, and bliss), which means it is slightly impure in the sense of lacking total equanimity. Since there are no such flaws in the fourth dhyāna, it is endowed with complete purity and equanimity.

917 JNS (pp. 294–95) explains that these branches are both the nature and the branches of the respective dhyānas because they necessarily arise as the associated mental factors of the mental consciousness that is the nature of the respective pure dhyāna. In particular, they are the branches of these dhyānas because they (a) function as remedies, benefit body and mind, and settle the mind; (b) make one attain previously unattained dhyānas; and (c) maintain the continuum of these dhyānas once they have been attained.

918 The four primary afflictions present in the dhyānas are (1) craving (being attached to the bliss of the dhyānas); (2) view (such as thinking that this state of dhyāna and the meditator is eternal, or seeing many past and future lifetimes by virtue of clairvoyance, thus thinking that the self is eternal); (3) pride (such as thinking, "I have attained dhyāna, but others have not"); and (4) ignorance (giving rise to doubts about whether this dhyāna is a path of liberation or not).

919 According to JNS (pp. 293–94), the first of these four divisions, a pure actual dhyāna that is approximately concordant with regressing from it, means that one is overpowered by the afflictions of its respective own level while resting in it and thus subject to regressing from it. A pure dhyāna that is approximately concordant with abiding means that it is followed by similar moments of this pure dhyāna. A pure dhyāna that is approximately concordant with being special means that it is followed by one of the respectively higher pure dhyānas. A pure dhyāna that is approximately concordant with penetration means that it is followed by the uncontaminated dhyāna of its own respective level.

920 JNS (p. 297) explains that both these notions and the afflictive obscurations of the respectively lower levels make up the antagonistic factors of the four formless absorptions.

921 The last sentence is missing in CE and is supplemented from JNS (p. 299).

922 JNS (pp. 300–303) quotes *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVII.22–23 and XVII.36 as the temporary benefits for oneself and others (such as fulfilling aspiration prayers, not regressing, and maturing sentient beings), while XVII.31 represents the ultimate benefit of being close to enlightenment. In due order, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVII.42, XVII.52, XVII.47, and XVII.32 explain the functions of the four immeasurables—detachment; not wishing for one's own happiness; outshining the happiness of others through even the suffering of a bodhisattva surpassing all mundane happiness; and not becoming weary of saṃsāra. As outlined in

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XVII.17b and XVII.43, the qualities that arise when bodhisattvas are endowed with the four immeasurables are nonconceptual wisdom, being supramundane, and being without any evil actions. In terms of their objects, according to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVII.17c, XVII.62, and XVII.29–30, respectively, they can be divided into three (in terms of sentient beings, the dharma, and being nonreferential); six (their being compassionately focused on those who are miserly, violent, disturbed, heedless, under the sway of sense pleasures, and clinging to what is wrong); or ten (those who are enflamed by attachment to pleasure; under the power of enemies; oppressed by suffering; obscured by mental darkness; traveling on paths that do not lead to liberation; tied down by wrong views; clinging to the bliss of meditative absorptions; straying from the path to liberation; straying into the hīnayāna when of uncertain disposition; and bodhisattvas with incomplete accumulations). *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XVII.24 and XVII.27, respectively, present the shortcomings of not cultivating the four immeasurables (being under the sway of their opposites—being malicious, violent, lacking rejoicing, and being attached to desire and malice) and the benefits of cultivating them (being free from the above flaws and remaining in saṃsāra, without attachment, for the sake of sentient beings).

923 CZ, p. 137.

924 CZ, p. 138.

925 CZ, p. 140.

926 CZ, p. 140.

927 CZ, p. 141.

928 CZ, p. 143.

929 CZ, p. 144. For details on the equipment of wisdom, see Appendix I1G.

930 CZ, p. 148.

931 (1) The cognition of suffering is to realize that suffering is unborn. (2) The cognition of the origin of suffering is to realize the relinquishment of suffering. (3) The cognition of cessation is to realize that suffering has stopped. (4) The cognition of the path is to realize the eightfold path of the noble ones. (5) The cognition of termination is to realize the termination of desire, hatred, and ignorance. (6) The cognition of nonarising is to realize that the places of rebirth and becoming do not arise again. (7) The dharma cognition is to realize that the five skandhas are mere illusions. (8) The subsequently realizing cognition is to realize that the sense faculties, the elements, and their derivatives are impermanent and so on. (9) The cognition of the seeming is to realize the mental characters of other beings. (10) The cognition of familiarity is to be familiar with the path. (11) The cognition of literalness is the Buddha's knowledge of all aspects.

932 These are the faculty that makes everything unknown known, the faculty of knowing everything, and the faculty of being endowed with knowing everything (see Appendix I4E).

933 As mentioned before, these three refer to one's meditative absorption entailing both examination and analysis, only analysis, or neither.

934 These are the recollections of the Buddha, the dharma, the saṃgha, ethics, giving, deities, birth, death, the body, and inhaling and exhaling.

935 For the sets not explained here, see the charts in Appendix II; "the explanation of the uncommon thirty-nine aspects of the knowledge of all aspects" under AA IV.4ac below; and the comments on AA VIII.2–6.

936 CZ, p. 153.

937 CZ, p. 160.

938 The forty-three letters and their order (beginning with "A") that the prajñāpāramitā sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines lists here (CZ, pp. 160–62) correspond to the early *Arapacana* alphabet of the Karoṣṭhi language of the northwestern Indian region of Gāndhāra, which was later widely used as a mnemonic device to symbolize Buddhist key terms (with each letter representing the first letter of a certain Sanskrit word). As in this case, these letters and the terms they stand for were often taken as the bases for contemplating their meanings. For example, with regard to all phenomena, the first five letters of the *Arapacana* alphabet symbolize the following: "A"—being unborn (*anutpannatva*); "RA"—being free from pollution (*rajas*, lit. "dust"); "PA"—the ultimate (*paramārtha*) being empty; "CA"—dying (*cyavana*) being unobservable; and "NA"—being without name (*nāma*).

939 Thus, most commonly, in terms of (a) and (b), dhāraṇī refers to the power of total recall. Its nature is special recollection and prajñā, and its function is the power to retain virtuous dharmas and to eliminate nonvirtue. As for (c) and (d) above, there are many varieties. Sometimes, "dhāraṇī" is even used as a name for texts, such as the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī*.

940 JNS (pp. 309–11 and 314–19) comments that (1) the pure motivation of bodhisattvas is their loving-kindness in order to pacify the sufferings of all unpleasant realms through their miraculous powers, even if they do not have a direct connection with the beings in these realms. (2)–(7) The special application of this motivation consists of bodhisattvas themselves abiding in all phenomena being illusionlike in that they do not exist as anything but mere appearances, and likewise their establishing others in the illusionlike six pāramitās. (8) Bodhisattvas accomplish the latter while always resting in the calm abiding of being endowed with the knowledge of all aspects, which serves as the foundation for the arising of perfect prajñā. (9) The superior insight of bodhisattvas who have entered the flawless (first) bhūmi is the wisdom whose pure focal object is the form and so on of the perfect nature (wisdom) being empty of the form of entities (the imaginary nature). In general, superior insight is identified as the prajñā of cutting through superimpositions onto the true mode of being, just as it is, which is induced through the power of stainless awareness. (10) The nature of phenomena, which is the perfect nature of the knowledge of all aspects of such bodhisattvas (the indestructible "form and so on with all aspects"), is the wisdom that is neither fettered nor liberated. Therefore, both vast means and profound prajñā are complete in this wisdom, by virtue of which it represents the path of their union in precise accordance with these two being complete. These ten equipments, which establish bodhisattvas in dwelling in the mahāyāna and then in familiarizing themselves with donning the great armor, seize these bodhisattvas so that they do not fall into either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa. The remaining seven equipments indicate the mahāyāna's own nature. Among these, the nature of the path that makes bodhisattvas progress is taught through the distinctive feature of skill in means, the cause that is wisdom, the nature of merit, and the functions of dhāraṇī. The causes for reaching the end of this path consist of the equipments of the bhūmis and the remedies. In particular, (11) the bodhisattvas' skill in the means of the six pāramitās without their observing any phenomena is what liberates all beings. (12) Wisdom refers to the dharmadhātu—the nature of phenomena empty of all adventitious phenomena—as well as, by virtue of it also being aware of itself, to the pure subject called "personally experienced wisdom." Such emptiness and wisdom are referred to as unborn emptiness and wisdom (for the full elaboration on wisdom in JNS here, see the beginning of Appendix I1G). (13) Merit is accumulated through resting in the meditative equipoise of numerous samādhis. The difference between the samādhis referred to in I.32c (under the supreme dharma of the path of preparation) and the samādhis taught here is as follows. The ultimate function of the samādhis explained above is to swiftly become a buddha. The purpose of explaining the function of samādhi here separately is to teach the samādhis in terms of their primary function of buddhas and bodhisattvas on the uncontaminated supramundane path not engaging in any thought activities of a distracted mind. (14) Bodhisattvas familiarize with all twenty-one sets of the path in a nonreferential way. The bodhisattvas who

are engaged in the first thirteen among these twenty-one are furthermore endowed with two sets of three qualities—the three greatnesses in terms of motivation, increase, and focus, and the three qualities of sameness and being free from inner and outer harm (the latter includes both harm through sentient beings and external conditional formations). (15) Dhāraṇī means to seize the excellent path in one's own and the mind streams of others. Upon realizing that the natures, the aspects, and the sounds of expressing all letters from A to HA are equal in being unborn, one can easily realize the dhārāṇīs of words and meaning. Based on those letters and these dhāraṇīs, one engages in realizing the nature of phenomena. Thus, once one examines the sound and the meaning of these forty-three letters and realizes them as being unborn, one meditates by sealing all phenomena in this manner. Through this as the cause, one is able to manifest the doors of dhāraṇī that can dispel ignorance. As for the meaning of "sealing," in some progressive stages of meditation, such as Madhyamaka, it is said that one meditates by first analyzing one phenomenon and then, upon not finding it, seals all other phenomena with this awareness of not finding. In the mantrayāna, with one ordinary phenomenon not appearing, one engages in the emptiness of great bliss and then seals all ordinary appearances with this. Among the four kinds of dhāraṇī, (b) means to recollect, for an infinite time, the infinite meanings of the dharmas that bodhisattvas hear or study (no matter how long they evaluate them, there is no end to their meanings). Dhāraṇī (c) is also called the one that makes one attain the state of a noble being. For through attaining the poised readiness of the path of preparation based on the letters "A" and so on, one further attains the great poised readiness of the supramundane path. (c) and (d) are called dhāraṇīs since (c) retains the poised readiness of knowing termination and nonarising in one's mind stream and (d) refers to retaining blessings as the fruition of mantra. Dhāraṇīs (a) and (b) refer to the two subjects that have the two objects of words and their meanings, respectively. Dhāraṇīs (c) and (d) represent the functions of one's own welfare and the welfare of others, respectively. The causes of these dhāraṇīs are threefold—they may arise from karmic maturation; study and familiarization; and samādhi. In the first case, they are matured results of past lives, while in the latter two cases, they are results of the present life. As for the dhāraṇīs arising from samādhi, their lesser degrees exist in mind streams below the bhūmis; their medium degrees, on the impure bhūmis; and their great degrees, on the pure bhūmis. Dhāraṇīs (a)–(c) exist from the level of poised readiness of the path of preparation up through buddhahood, while (d) exists from the first bhūmi onward. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says that, unlike the dhāraṇīs on the bhūmis, those on the paths of accumulation and preparation are unstable and not vast.

941 In the context of the AA, all phenomena (from form up through a buddha's omniscience) are taught to bear the nature of emptiness, which means they are empty of having any nature of their own (the object to be negated). For example, what appears as a book is empty of actually being a book because it is not established or findable as a book once it is subjected to reasonings that analyze for the ultimate (such as the reasoning of being free of unity and multiplicity). Thus, in technical terms, the basis of emptiness (Tib. stong gzhi), what it is empty of (Tib. stong bya), the object of negation (Tib. dgag bya), and the bearer of the nature of emptiness (Tib. chos can) are identical. This is the typical presentation of the way of being empty that is called "self-empty." The way of being "other-empty" means that the basis of emptiness and what it is empty of (the latter also being the object of negation) are different, with the most classical model being that the perfect nature is empty of both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. As mentioned before, according to CE and JNS, the ultimate true basis of emptiness—which is explicitly said to not be the subject under discussion in the context of the second turning of the wheel of dharma and the AA— is the unchanging perfect nature (or mind's natural luminosity), which is empty of all imaginary and other-dependent phenomena of seeming reality. However, unlike in other presentations of "other-emptiness," this ultimate basis of emptiness is not asserted as some absolute remainder that is an exception to being empty (for details, see Appendix I1G).

942 See the *Vṛtti* (D3787, fols. 71a.6–72b.4; pp. 94–96) and the *Ālokā* (pp. 95–96). Note that some scriptures mention eighteen emptinesses, which do not constitute a different set, but the same as above except for emptinesses (17) and (20).

943 In this context, the level of engagement through aspiration refers to the path of preparation alone. According to the *Ālokā* (p. 96), the last three emptinesses and wisdoms are associated with buddhahood because the first one is the foundation for relinquishing the afflictive obscurations including their latent tendencies; the second one is the foundation for relinquishing the cognitive obscurations including their latent tendencies; and the last one has the sense of being self-arisen. For more details on wisdom, emptiness, and their relationship, see Appendix I1G.

944 For elaborations on this concise presentation, see Appendix I1H. Note that the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (as seen in the AA below) speak of ten bodhisattvabhūmis by way of their respective practices of purification, but never mention any names. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* discusses seven bhūmis (without names) and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* speaks of seven bhūmis and thirteen abodes (*vihāra*). The most well-known, systematic, and by now standard presentation of the ten bhūmis (such as Supreme Joy), with each one corresponding to one of the ten pāramitās, follows the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (which adds the buddhabhūmi as consisting of "All-Illumination" and two more bhūmis, called "the Unequalled" and "Endowed with Wisdom," without discussing them in detail). The *Mahāvastu* also lists ten bodhisattvabhūmis, which however differ greatly in both names and contents from the above (for details, see Dayal 1970). Later texts also speak of thirteen (the beginner bhūmi, the bhūmi of engagement through aspiration, the ten bhūmis, and the buddhabhūmi) or even fourteen bhūmis (the bhūmi of engagement through aspiration, the ten bhūmis, "the Unequalled," "Endowed with Wisdom," and "All-Illumination"). In vajrayāna presentations, one finds further names and enumerations of bhūmis.

945 According to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the ten equalities are the equality of all phenomena in (1) their lack of characteristics; (2) their lack of defining characteristics; (3) their nonarising from the four extremes; (4) their nonorigination; (5) their being void; (6) their primordial peace or purity; (7) their lack of reference points; (8) their lack of being adopted or rejected; (9) phenomena being like illusions, dreams, optical illusions, echos, water moons, reflections, and magical emanations; and (10) their being entities or nonentities. The *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (D3808, fol. 12a.5–12b.7) explains these ten as follows. (1) The dharmadhātu without reference points and free from all aspects of the imaginary is not the sphere of any characteristics, fabrications, or conceptual consciousnesses, but is the sphere of nonconceptual wisdom. Therefore, all phenomena are called "without characteristics" and it is by virtue of the perfect nature that all phenomena are equal in being without characteristics. (2) Since imaginary phenomena—all phenomena of what is to be expressed, the means of expression, and the aspects of apprehender and apprehended—are utterly nonexistent it is by virtue of the imaginary characteristic that they are without defining characteristics. Therefore, they are called "equal in being without defining characteristics." (3) Since the ultimately perfect nature lacks both arising from itself and arising from causes and conditions it is the equality of nonarising. (4) Since the nature of suchness is free from the afflictedness of the afflictions and the afflictedness of birth it is the equality of nonorigination. (5) Since all phenomena are void of any nature they are equal in being void. (6) Since the perfect nature is without arising in the beginning and without ceasing in the end all phenomena are without arising and ceasing. Thus, they are equal in being primordial peace. (7) What apprehends the nature of the ultimate is perfect nonreferential wisdom because this nature is its apprehended object. Therefore, all phenomena are called "lacking reference points" and thus are equal in lacking reference points. (8) Since the nature of the ultimate lacks an agent, ultimately, it lacks adopting and letting go of other beings and other skandhas. Since there is no adopting and rejecting in this way ultimately, this is the equality of the lack of being adopted or rejected. (9) Since imaginary phenomena lack the nature of duality, they are equal in being like

illusions and so on. (10) The perfect nature exists neither as the nature of imaginary entities nor as the nature of nonentities such as horns of a rabbit. Therefore, since the perfect nature does not exist as these two, it is the equality of entities and nonentities. Through realizing these ten characteristics of equality, one attains the poised readiness for the equality of all phenomena. In his commentary on the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, Mipham Rinpoche ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990c, p. 695) gives another set of ten equalities specific to the fifth bhūmi by quoting from an unidentified sūtra. These are the ten equalities of completely pure mind and intention—(1)–(3) the equality of past, present, and future buddhas in their intentions with respect to the completely pure dharma; (4) the equality of intention with respect to completely pure ethics; (5) completely pure sentient beings; (6) completely pure elimination of views, doubts, and regrets; (7) completely pure knowledge of what is the path and what is not the path; (8) completely pure knowledge of the path; (9) completely pure increasing application of the dharmas concordant with enlightenment; and (10) completely pure maturation of sentient beings.There is yet another list of twelve equalities with regard to the fifth pāramitā in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*, which however only partly corresponds with the above (D175, fols. 112aff.).

946 As for the notion of "change of state," the corresponding Sanskrit term *āśrayaparivṛtti* (Tib. gnas yongs su gyur pa) is usually translated as "transformation." In general, there are a great number of scriptures (from the Pāli canon up through the tantras) in which this term is used with reference to a variety of different things or processes (see Davidson 1985), for some of which the word "transformation" may be appropriate. However, as CE's above example of the sky with or without clouds and the beginning of its comments on the eighth chapter of the AA state very clearly, the whole point in terms of the dharmadhātu, natural purity, buddha nature, or the luminous nature of the mind is that there is absolutely no transformation of anything into anything at any point. Rather, the revelation of mind's primordially pure nature as fruitional enlightenment only appears as a change of its state from the perspective of deluded mind—seeming to be obscured before and then unobscured later. Obviously, this does not refer to any change in nature, just as the sun first being covered by clouds and then being free from clouds would not be called a transformation of the clouds into the sun, or even any transformation of the sun itself. Thus, when this process of uncovering mind's fundamental nature is sometimes described in Buddhist texts as if there were a transformation of something impure (such as mental afflictions) into something pure (such as wisdom), this is just a conventional or expedient way of speaking. There is the more general classical Yogācāra format of how a change of state occurs in terms of the five skandhas of ordinary persons on the one side and the pure manifestations of the minds and the world of enlightened persons on the other (as, for example, described in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.41–48 and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.5 [P5549, fol. 44a.8–44b.5]). Within this format, pertaining to the fifth skandha of consciousness, there is also the more specific description of how a change of state occurs in terms of the eight consciousnesses on the one side and the dharmadhātu, the four wisdoms, and the three kāyas on the other side (as, for example, described in Sthiramati's commentary on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.12–17 [D4034, fol. 113b.1–5] and in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.61–76). However, in no case is it to be taken literally that the former are actually transformed into the latter. Rather, just as in the above example of the clouds and the sun, by virtue of the former vanishing, the latter become manifest. As for the above-mentioned four kinds of mastery by virtue of the changes of state of the afflicted mind, the sense consciousnesses, and the mental consciousness, they are described in detail in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.41–47 and XI.45–46 (note however, that several commentaries explain the second kind of mastery as a result of the change of state of the perceptual part of the mental consciousness and not of the sense consciousnesses, which makes sense since the latter are commonly described as having already changed state on the first bhūmi).

947 All these distinctive features are found in Appendix I1H.

948 As will be explained below, there are two sets of 108 such cognitive obscurations, which are to be relinquished on the path of seeing (the first bhūmi) and on the path of familiarization (the remaining nine bhūmis), respectively.

949 These kinds of ignorance are found (in sometimes varying formulations) at the beginning of the sūtra's ninth chapter (D106, fols. 61aff.).

950 CE has *thob pa* instead of *thos pa*.

951 For details on these ten afflictions or wrong engagements, see CE's above elaboration on AA I.21a (the reality of the origin of suffering under the four realities as the focal objective of practice) as well as Appendix I1H3a.

952 CE has the last two phrases in reverse order.

953 As mentioned above, according to the mahāyāna, these six are ignorance, desire, anger, pride, and the two views about a real personality and extremes.

954 Obviously, CE does not mention the three lesser degrees of afflictions to be relinquished through familiarization here. This may be only due to mistakenly omitting the word "afflictions" at the end of the above sentence and it seems natural to add it there (otherwise, this would beg the question of when these lesser afflictions are relinquished at all). For JNS and other commentaries repeatedly explain that the nine degrees of the afflictive obscurations to be relinquished through familiarization are progressively relinquished on the nine levels of the path of familiarization, which correspond to the second through tenth bhūmis (see Appendices I1H3bd1, I2E6, and I2F5, as well as I4B in Volume Two). There is, however, the explanation that the last three bhūmis are called pure because there are no more afflictive obscurations on them. This explanation is taken literally by some, while others (such as JNS) say that it only refers to manifest afflictive obscurations, whereas their subtle latent tendencies still have to be relinquished on the pure bhūmis. Thus, from among the three main models or opinions in terms of when which ones among the afflictive and cognitive obscurations are fully relinquished (see Chart 18), JNS and CE obviously explain model (3) (unless CE's above omission of the three lesser degrees of the afflictions to be relinquished through familiarization is on purpose, which would make it closer to model (2)). Though CE (fol. 61a–b) and JNS (Appendix I2A; vol. 1, p. 84) agree on the latent tendencies of desire only existing up through the seventh bhūmi, throughout, JNS seems to make a distinction between the latent tendencies (Tib. bag chags) and the latencies (Tib. bag nyal) of the obscurations, with the latter being the more subtle ones.

955 Cox 1992 (p. 99) says that, according to the abhidharma tradition, "dharma" in "dharma cognition" can either refer to the teachings of the Buddha (as illustrated in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*). Or it may specifically refer to the factors belonging to the realm of desire (as in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*), with "subsequent cognition" then indicating the cognition of the factors belonging to the two higher realms. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.28ab says, "'Why are there undoubtedly both readinesses and cognitions?' The readinesses and the cognitions represent the uninterrupted paths and the paths of liberation, respectively. Since the readinesses cannot be obstructed in their cutting through the obtainment (*prāpti*) of afflictions, they represent the uninterrupted paths. In those who are liberated from that obtainment of the afflictions, the cognitions arise simultaneously with the obtainment of being disconnected (*visaṃyoga*) [from the afflictions]. Therefore, they represent the paths of liberation. Thus, there are both [readinesses and cognitions], just like the two [steps] of expelling a thief and closing the door."

956 This is an explanation of the Tibetan term *yongs sbyong* (which can mean both purification and training) and renders Skt. *parikarmaṇa* (purification, preparation).

957 In the following lists of the purifications of the bhūmis, most of what is added in [ ] stems from JNS (pp. 369ff.).

958 JNS (p. 369) explains (8)–(9) as longing for, temporarily, seeing the rūpakāyas of buddhas and, ultimately, abiding as the dharmakāya, respectively. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 370) says that (1) is the intention that is directed toward all roots of virtue that are the bases of enlightenment and does not waver through mentally engaging in one's own welfare. (2) means to assist the purpose of accomplishing the enlightenment of oneself and others. (3) is an equal mind toward all sentient beings as if they were one's only child. (5) refers to the view and conduct that please one's spiritual friends. (7) means disliking to stay in the homes that are the three realms with all their levels. Quoting *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XX.32, the meaning of the name of the first bhūmi is explained as intense joy because bodhisattvas see that they are close to buddhahood and can accomplish the welfare of sentient beings in a vast manner.

959 JNS (pp. 369–70) elaborates that these ten are to be understood as purifications in terms of the view (not observing any nature) and in terms of conduct (the physical and verbal purifications that are informed by knowing that everything lacks a nature). In brief, through practicing these ten purifications, the first bhūmi is purified. Through having purified it, two benefits are attained—the proficiency of setting foot on this bhūmi in its entirety and beginning to progress higher.

960 This and the following quotes in the section on the first nine bhūmis are found on pp. 163–65 in CZ.

961 Note that this and the following explanations of the names of the second through ninth bhūmis in CE are based on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XX.33–37 and its *Bhāṣya* by Vasubandhu.

962 JNS (pp. 371–74) elaborates that the ethics of bodhisattvas is defined as consisting of the continuous seeds of having generated the bodhicitta of aspiration and the intention to actually apply themselves to the activities of bodhisattvas in terms of what is to be adopted and to be rejected, with the latter being attained in dependence on something else—the symbolic ritual of taking the bodhisattva vow. The bodhisattva vow is the aspiration that is one in nature with such application, but it is not just the mere aspiration that is not one in nature with this application. The three types of the ethics of a bodhisattva as the application of this vow are the vow itself (relinquishing nonvirtue in one's own mind stream); accumulating virtue; and accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings (making others abandon nonvirtue and accumulate virtue too). The way to properly practice these three is to aspire for and engage in them for the sake of attaining the perfect relinquishment, realization, and enlightened activity of a buddha for the welfare of all beings. Some people say, "The ethics of a bodhisattva must be based on the prātimokṣa vows. For in order to ultimately accomplish the benefit of others, one must necessarily temporarily relinquish harming others, and Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* affirms the bodhisattva vow being based on the prātimokṣa vows." However, there is no proof for that and even evidence to the contrary. In terms of reasoning, to ultimately accomplish the benefit of others does not entail temporarily relinquishing harming others, as is shown through counterexamples such as the Buddha in a former lifetime as a bodhisattva having killed a wicked captain before the latter could murder five hundred other bodhisattvas. In terms of scripture, the above statement by Atiśa was made with the indirect intention of gradually introducing certain beings who have the disposition of śrāvakas into the three yānas. Furthermore, if the bodhisattva vow needed the prātimokṣa vows as a basis, the question is whether they are needed as a basis for making bodhisattvas attain what they did not attain before, or as a basis for sustaining what they have attained already. In the first case, it would follow that the bodhisattva vow does not arise in gods and nāgas because they do not have the prātimokṣa vows. But then this contradicts the explanation about both gods and nāgas giving rise to bodhicitta. Also, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explains that the statements in certain sūtras about gods and

nāgas having *upoṣadha* vows (eight lay vows for twenty-four hours) do not refer to these actual vows, but just to the corresponding good conduct of these beings. In the case of needing the prātimokṣa vows as a basis for sustaining what has been attained already, it would follow that the bodhisattva vow is lost after death because the prātimokṣa vows are lost at that point. The causes for the arising of the bodhisattva vow are three—the foundation of a stable bodhicitta of aspiration; the wish to take the vow out of trusting confidence; and the symbolic ritual. The causes for breaking this vow are also three—losing its foundation (the bodhicitta of aspiration); arising of contrary conditions (the principal downfalls); and giving the vows back due to not being able to accomplish them. The fruitions of keeping this vow are three—being reborn in the company of spiritual friends with whom one is in harmony; being considered by all buddhas like their only child; and swiftly attaining enlightenment. The results when breaking this vow are also three—being reborn in the unpleasant realms through severe cases of the principal downfalls; falling away from the virtue of the mahāyāna; and being despised by genuine beings.

963 The Tibetan in both line I.52b and CE has "material things."

964 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 377) says that (1) and (2) are in order to mature oneself and satisfy others, respectively. (5) means to refrain from nonvirtue by considering oneself and others, respectively, in order to eliminate general and specific flaws. "Lack of conceit" refers to not entertaining any thoughts about these five purifications being established as any nature of their own, just as with the preceding sets of purifications.

965 This refers to the twelve qualities of abstinence (see Chart 12).

966 More literally, the Tibetan in both line I.53d and CE says "Taking the twelve qualities of purification as the perfect support for one's vows."

967 The Tibetan in both line I.54c and CE says "nirvāṇa."

968 The Tibetan in both line I.54c and CE says "giving away all material things."

969 More literally, the Tibetan in both line I.54d and CE says "no views."

970 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 378–79) says that (1) refers to dwelling in the hermitage of genuine liberation. (2) means having no desire because of lacking even any mental flux in terms of neither having attained any gain in the past nor attaining any in the present or the future. (6) refers to despising sense pleasures due to regarding them as shortcomings. (9) means that one's mind is uncowed with regard to accomplishing nonarising virtue (or the virtue of nonarising). (10) refers to not regarding anything that appears as the entities which have the natures of the imaginary and the other-dependent as being such entities.

971 The Tibetan in both line I.55a and CE says "attachment."

972 JNS (pp. 380–81) elaborates as follows. (1) Relinquishing intimacy with lay people consists of being born miraculously, shaving one's head, and wearing saffron-colored robes. Relinquishing intimacy with ordained people means for monks to not stay in the same place with nuns and vice versa for even a single moment as well as not being sad when they are not around. Since the accomplishment of the path is interrupted by virtue of intimacy with friends, this is taught in order to prevent such interrruptions. (2) Since bodhisattvas need to establish themselves as the basis of livelihood for all sentient beings, it is an occasion for their rejoicing when someone else offers alms to a third person. Thus, when others, such as monks, request and enjoy being sponsored by families that are devoted to these bodhisattvas themselves, miserliness and attachment toward these families does not arise in them. (3) Ordinary crowded places are towns and so on, but from the point of view of the supreme yāna, the minds of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are crowded places too. Since bodhisattvas are not fond of either places of hustle and bustle, they relinquish them. (4)–(5) Since bodhisattvas see neither any inner nor any outer phenomena, they relinquish any praise by singling out themselves and any disparaging by singling out others. (6)

They relinquish the ten nonvirtuous actions since these obstruct even the pleasant realms, let alone the path of the noble ones and enlightenment. (7) They do not see any phenomenon whatsoever by virtue of which a mind with conceit and arrogance could arise. (8) Since any entities or their opposites are not observable at all, they relinquish mistakenness about true reality. (9) They also relinquish bad mental states—doubts about true reality. (10) Since bodhisattvas have passed beyond the three mental poisons, they are liberated from karma and afflictions. Therefore, they relinquish any tolerance for these (the causes) and suffering (their result). Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 381 and 384) adds that (1) includes becoming ordained for the sake of gain and honor. (8) means the mistakenness through clinging by reversing virtue and nonvirtue, which has the nature of the two views about a real personality and extremes. (9) As for the doubt that is referred to here, it is classified into being an afflictive obscuration and a cognitive obscuration. The latter is not actual doubt, but is asserted as the impregnations of the negative tendencies that are planted by doubt. Thus, this does not contradict the explanation that the first three views and doubt are not afflictive factors to be relinquished through familiarization. (1)–(3) represent secondary afflictions; (4)–(6) are nonvirtuous actions; (7)–(9) are primary afflictions; and (10) includes all primary and secondary afflictions.

973 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 385–86) says that, through (1)–(6) the six pāramitās free from the three spheres being perfected, bodhisattvas are purified in terms of (7)–(8) not wishing for the states of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by virtue of seeing these as not being supreme and (9) not being afraid of all phenomena being unobservable by any nature of their own. (10)–(12) respectively represent being free from the obstacles to start engaging in generosity; keep engaging in it in the middle of it; and bring it to completion in the end.

974 Skt. *virodha* can also mean "negating, refuting, contradicting, being hostile." For example, referring to line I.65c, the *Ālokā* (p. 102) explains that bodhisattvas refrain from making any statements that refute or contradict emptiness because they display themselves everywhere in all kinds of suitable forms in order to liberate sentient beings, who take things to be real and cling to them. JNS (p. 387) explains (14) as clinging to being cowed with regard to the profound actuality of emptiness. (15)–(18) mean to not cling through regarding the three jewels and ethics as either any entities or nonentities. (19) Those of weak insight entertain the clinging by way of disputing emptiness, thinking that the statement of the defining characteristics of emptiness not being empty and the statement of all phenomena being emptiness are contradictory. (20) As for the two statements of the perfect nature—ultimate true reality—not being empty of a nature of its own and all other-dependent and imaginary phenomena being empty of any nature of their own, through not understanding the reasons in this scriptural approach here for the difference between these two explanations, one clings to the emptiness of the perfect nature and the other two emptinesses as opposing each other. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 387–88) has the same divisions as CE. In particular, (7) characteristics are identified as the afflictions; (8) the causes of the afflictions, as views; and (14) being cowed as thinking that one is not able to abandon saṃsāra. Other commentaries do not make the above divisions into eight afflictive obscurations, twelve cognitive obscurations, and so on, but just refer to twenty types of clinging. The *Vṛtti* does not comment on either the twenty factors to be relinquished or the twenty factors to be adopted. The *Ālokā* (pp. 101–2) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 93a.6–7) also just list the twenty factors to be relinquished, with the former one combining them with the twenty factors to be adopted as their remedies. YT (p. 242) says that the first eighteen factors to be relinquished are particular forms of clinging, while the last two are general. NSML (pp. 238–39) explains that (1)–(4) represent the views about a real personality; (5)–(6) are the views about extremes; (7)–(18) are the factors to be relinquished that are in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; and (19)–(20) are those in common with beginner bodhisattvas. Most commentaries explain (7) as the clinging to characteristics with regard to what is to be adopted and to be rejected; (8) as the clinging to different dispositions as the causes for the three yānas; (12) as clinging to

dwelling in false imagination as the three realms; (13) as being attached to what is to be adopted and to be rejected within these three realms; (14) as being cowed with regard to attaining the knowledge of all aspects; (19) as disputing about emptiness due to doubts; and (20) clinging to statements that are in opposition to natural emptiness.

975 JNS (p. 389) comments that emptiness as the supreme ultimate does not become emptiness through adding a second emptiness on top of it—it *is* emptiness, which does not become empty through emptiness. Signlessness is freedom from all characteristics of the seeming. Wishlessness is the lack of any wish for saṃsāra or nirvāṇa.

976 The Tibetan of I.63b and CE literally says "teaching/displaying [all] dharmas as the single aspect of . . ." As in other places, JNS (p. 389) glosses this single actuality of all dharmas—prajñāpāramitā or emptiness—as "profound Mahāmudrā."

977 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 390–91) says that (6) refers to not observing anything as an entity. (8) means to realize all yānas being one as the mahāyāna, which is proven through their being one in terms of both the causal and the fruitional yānas. All beings are one in terms of the causal yāna because they have the buddha disposition (as taught in *Uttaratantra* I.28cd). The final point of all three yānas is one in terms of the fruitional yāna because the final fruition of all three yānas is one—buddhahood (as *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti* IX.17cd says: "The final deliverance of the three yānas abides as the fruition of the single yāna"). (11) refers to teaching all knowable objects by way of the means of the mahāyāna. (15) means being skilled in prajñā and means. (19)–(20) refer to bodhisattvas cutting through superimpositions and doubts about emptiness through asking the buddhas and these bodhisattvas then teaching those to be guided who conceive of internal contradictions in emptiness how it is tenable that there are no such contradictions.

978 JNS (p. 392) explains that (1) means knowing the minds, mentations, and consciousnesses of all sentient beings (thus referring to the typical Yogācāra triad that stands for the ālaya-consciousness, the afflicted mind, and the six remaining consciousnesses, respectively). (3) means casting away the vast realm of a cakravartin (the sovereign over a trichiliocosm) and, for the welfare of others, manifesting a superb buddha realm instead. (5) refers to knowing the various superior and inferior faculties of sentient beings. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 392–93) says that (1) is done in order to mature sentient beings, while (2) represents such maturation. (3) In order to purify their buddha realm, bodhisattvas dedicate and transform their roots of virtue into constituting the nature of such a realm. (4) In order to not engage the buddhas in wrong ways, bodhisattvas please them after having realized their being undeceiving through scrutinizing in every respect what is and is not the dharma. (6) Purifying the contents of a buddha realm means to purify the stains in the mind streams of sentient beings.

979 The Sanskrit *śuddhamatī* is the female form of "what is endowed with excellence." Through mistaking *matī* ("endowed") for *mati* ("mind," "intelligence," "insight"), the term became mistranslated as *legs pa'i blo gros* ("Excellent Insight") in Tibetan. Thus, explanations of the name of the ninth bhūmi in Tibetan commentaries gloss the latter rendering.

980 The Tibetan omits "perfection."

981 Skt. *pratibhāṇa* can mean "eloquence, boldness, presence of mind, being quick-witted" and here primarily refers to the ability to teach the dharma in individually adapted ways to limitless beings, without ever becoming timid or making mistakes.

982 This is the name of Buddha Śākyamuni's clan.

983 In this section, CE primarily follows the *Vivṛti* and JNS's comments on the latter (pp. 394–95), which add that (1) aspiration prayers are made in order to attain everything that is excellent. (4) Birth through the womb of a precious mother who is praised by all people is taken

in order to obtain a body without any evil. (9) Bodhisattvas on the ninth bhūmi assume births in which they are praised, honored, and serviced by the gods, such as Indra and Brahmā. (10) Leaving one's home and becoming ordained is the unsurpassable conduct of great bodhisattvas. Fully qualified such ordination may take place either through taking a formal vow or through the nature of phenomena, as is the case with supreme nairmāṇikakāyas like Buddha Śākyamuni. (11) As the most excellent locations to teach the dharma, all kinds of precious trees, which are like wish-fulfilling jewels, appear with inconceivable scents and halos of light. JNS's own comments (p. 394) say that (2) is accomplished through the discriminating awareness of semantics and (3) through the discriminating awareness of self-confidence. (4) For the sake of guiding certain beings, bodhisattvas on the ninth bhūmi take birth through a womb. However, for the most part, they display only the miraculous manner of being born. (5) means the family of great enlightenment and (6) refers to taking birth in the lineage from which all great bodhisattvas of the past have been born. (7) refers to being born in the castes of kings and brahmans like a mighty Sal tree. (9) means a birth surrounded with special signs, such as filling the universe with light and shaking the ground in six ways right after being born. (10) refers to both these bodhisattvas and infinitely many other sentient beings. (11) Bodhi trees are made of all kinds of precious substances.

984 In other words, according to JNS (p. 398), the tenth bhūmi may be called "buddhabhūmi" because during its subsequent attainment, the bodhisattvas on it, by virtue of their previous aspiration prayers, appear to be equal to buddhas in that they are able to manifest the rūpakāyas and perform enlightened activity just as buddhas do (this seems to be the position of most Tibetan commentaries). However, as Appendix I1H explains, this is only true from the perspective of worldly sentient beings as the recipients of this enlightened activity, but not from the perspective of the bodhisattvas as the performers of this activity. In fact, the difference between buddhas and bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi in terms of the extent and the power of their qualities (such as promoting the welfare of sentient beings) is like the one between the amounts of water in the ocean and the hoof print of an ox. JNS (pp. 396–98) presents the opinions of some other Tibetan scholars on this (without refuting any of them). According to some, the statement in both the *Ālokā* (p. 104) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 94b.5–6) on the tenth bhūmi being "merely expressed as 'buddhahood,' but not being completely perfect buddhahood" means that those bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi who perform the deeds of a buddha are tathāgatas who manifest the dharmakāya. This statement was made with the intention of clarifying that these bodhisattvas are not the sambhogakāyas of a completely perfect buddha. Others say, "The prajñāpāramitā sūtras do not explain any purifications of the tenth bhūmi, but present it as the bhūmi of a tathāgata. This means that bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi are not able to actually become buddhas in the form of the dharmakāya because their two accumulations have not been fully completed. However, through the power of their aspiration prayers, they are able to become buddhas in the form of rūpakāyas. Through promoting the welfare of sentient beings through the twelve deeds of a buddha, the ultimate unsurpassable purification of the tenth bhūmi is accomplished. That the tenth bhūmi is presented as the buddhabhūmi is done from the perspective of bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi being able to manifest as the rūpakāyas of buddhas and in the sense of their promotion of the welfare of all beings equalling that of a buddha. For this is said in the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines (D9, vol. ka, fols. 91b.6f.) and *Uttaratantra* I.77." Ngog Lotsāwa says that, in general, the purifications of the bhūmis are presented in order to demonstrate that the respective bhūmis are different from the ones below them. Since the tenth bhūmi is taught as the fruition of all the bhūmis below it, it is established as being different from them. Therefore, though there is no explanation on any purifications of the tenth bhūmi, in terms of the primary point here no flaw of omission is accrued. YT (p. 250) explains that the tenth bhūmi is only explained through its characteristics with the intention that it includes all qualities of all preceding nine bhūmis. The reason why its purifications are not taught explicitly in the AA is that there are no purifications of the tenth bhūmi that are of

any type other than those of the lower nine bhūmis. LN (p. 481) agrees with this. NSML (pp. 253–54) says that the tenth bhūmi is described as the fruition of the other nine for the sake of generating enthusiasm in those beginner bodhisattvas who become faint-hearted through the descriptions of all the many purifications of the first nine bhūmis. Purifications of the tenth bhūmi do exist, but they should be known from those of the ninth bhūmi. In addition, the qualities of the tenth bhūmi are described in V.37–38 too.

985 The phrase on the cloud of dharma is also found in LN (p. 482; literally) and PSD (p. 182; abbreviated and reading *thob pa* instead of *thos pa*). It is based on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* on XX.38cd, which says, "It is called 'Cloud of Dharma' because the gate of samādhi and the gate of dhāraṇī pervade, like a cloud, the dharma that was heard—the skylike foundation in which they are deeply immersed" (*samādhimukhadhāraṇīmukhavyāpanān meghenevākāśasthālīyāśrayasaṃniviṣṭasya śrūtadharmasya dharmameghety ucyate*). Without considering the underlying Sanskrit, the above phrase in CE can be read in several ways. A rather literal rendering in accord with the meaning of the *Bhāṣya* would be "the cloud of dharma in which (a) the two gates of dhāraṇī and samādhi pervade the skylike abiding in the foundation of the dharma that was heard and (b) which showers down the rain of dharma."

986 CZ, p. 178.

987 In the above list, (1) pertains to the supreme dharma because the śrāvaka disposition is definite at this point. (2) bears its name because an approaching stream-enterer is the eighth fruition, when counted backward from arhathood as the highest fruition on the śrāvaka path. (3) is the level of seeing the first fruition of the approach of virtuous effort (fully seeing the sixteen aspects of the four realities). (4) has this name because most factors of the desire realm to be relinquished have been relinquished. (5) is so called because one is free from the attachment of the desire realm. (6) means that śrāvaka arhats are finally relieved from their burden—they realize that all factors to be relinquished have been relinquished and that everything to be realized has been realized (the same applies for pratyekabuddha arhats). Usually, the presentation of the levels of the hīnayāna is eightfold as follows (the numbers in ( ) correspond to those in the above list)—[1] the level of seeing what is pure (the path of accumulation); [2] the level of the disposition (1); [3] the eighth level (2); [4] the level of seeing (3); [5] the level of diminishing (4); [6] the level of freedom from desire (5); [7] the level of guarding what had to be done (pratyekabuddhas) (8); and [8] the level of having realized (or done) what had to be done (śrāvaka arhats) (6). This usual list (just reversing the order of [7] and [8]) is also the one given in the sūtras (CZ, p. 178) and followed by Bhadanta Vimuktisena's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravārttika* and the *Śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa*. To arrive at the above list as in CE, the *Vṛtti* (p. 107), the *Ālokā* (p. 104), and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 94b.3–5) drop level [1] and add the above level (7).

988 The Tibetan omits "eight."

989 Both here and in I.71a, the Tibetan has "are called . . ." (*ces bya* instead of *shes bya*).

990 CZ, pp. 179–81. For details, see CZ, the *Vṛtti* (pp. 108–11), and the *Ālokā* (pp. 104–6). In brief, as mentioned before, there are 108 cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing. These consist of the four sets of nine conceptions about (1) the apprehended (in terms of (a) engaging in the purified phenomena of bodhisattvas and (b) withdrawing from those of lower yānas) and about (2) the apprehender (as (a) a substantial person and (b) an imputed individual), each multiplied by the three realms. The 108 cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through familiarization also consist of four sets of nine conceptions about (1) the apprehended (in terms of (a) engagement and (b) withdrawal) and about (2) the apprehender (in terms of (a) mere persons and (b) the causes for imputing such persons), each again multiplied by the three realms. For details on these conceptions and how they are relinquished, see CE on V.5–34; Appendices I1D as well as I4B and I5A in Volume Two; and Charts 17–18.

991 On the path of nonlearning, TOK (vol. 3, p. 492) says, "Since [this path] is free from all contaminations, it is called 'uncontaminated roots of virtue.' Since it causes relinquished afflictions to not arise again, it is [called] 'the remedy for [saṃsāric] existence.' Since one has progressed to the point of completion at which the factors to be relinquished have been relinquished and what is to be known is known, it is [called] 'the path of completion.'"

992 This refers to the vajralike samādhi at the very end of the tenth bhūmi.

993 In both line I.73b and CE, *lam gyi yul can* for *mārgagocaraṃ* can also be understood as "the (perceiving) subject of the path."

994 JNS (pp. 404–5) explains that (4) means manifesting spontaneously present qualities in a manner that is without characteristics. (5) refers to giving rise to the nonabiding nirvāṇa. (8) represents the wisdom of not conceiving of the three spheres (agent, object, and action), whose function is to generate the ultimate knowledge of the path. According to Nyalshig's commentary, JNS says, in terms of the final paths of learning and nonlearning, respectively, (7) and (8) are the levels onto which one is finally delivered. The levels of how one is so delivered refer to relying on the dependent origination of purified phenomena being complete. Among these levels, since (1) the aim of attaining buddhahood is the primary task to be accomplished, it is taught first. It depends on (2) realizing equality, which in turn depends on (3) accumulating the merit of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings and so on. The latter depends on (4) the effortless accomplishment through the power of the marvelous accumulation of such merit. This depends on (5) realizing the freedom from extremes, which does not arise without (6) the attainment of the qualities of all yānas being fully complete. For such attainment, (7) the knowledge of all aspects is indispensable, which in turn depends on (8) the wisdom that has the path as its sphere. In a general sense, the practice of being finally delivered into enlightenment starts from the level of heat of the path of preparation. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 405–6) says that (2) all phenomena are as equal as space. (4) All activities of promoting the welfare of sentient beings are uncontrived, naturally happening, without characteristics, and effortless. (5) Such activities depend on the realization that is free from permanence and extinction and never changes into any other state. (6) Based on such realization, all purposes of the three yānas are attained. This gives rise to (7) the knowledge of all aspects, which also depends on (8) the subject that is the special path at the end of the continuum. There are no other dharmas superior to these eight, which means that (1)–(8) are all practiced in the manner of them being unobservable.

995 CZ, p. 182. For a detailed presentation of the eightfold practice of final deliverance, see CZ (pp. 182–202), the *Vṛtti* (pp. 111–26), and the *Ālokā* (pp. 106–28).

996 JNS (pp. 409–10) elaborates that some consider it pointless to teach a knowledge of the path as something separate from the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects (which already include everything). However, the knowledge of the path—the cause for the ten points of the knowledge of all aspects—was taught by the Buddha for a newly gathered audience. It is also explained that it was taught in order to remedy the wrong idea that the knowledge of all aspects cannot be realized by anybody else than a buddha. However, the knowledge of the path in the second chapter of the AA is only explained from the conceptual perspective of what is the cause for the knowledge of all aspects, but this chapter does not explain anything that was not already explained in the first one. Still, it is not repetitive because it is given with the purpose of teaching various paths and so on to a new audience. In brief, the learned declare that if a teaching contains a meaning to be fathomed by those to be guided that differs from some meaning presented before, it is not repetitive. However, in the absence of such a new meaning, even if the order of the words is not repeated, but something is said that is not different from some meaning presented before, it is repetitive (obviously, the same applies for the remaining chapters of the AA). As for matching the knowledge of the path with the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, JNS (p. 541) says that it refers to the Second Subhūti Chapter (Chapter Twenty-one), a.k.a. The Chapter of

the Purity of the Two Extremes. According to CZ (pp. 203–98), the knowledge of the path covers the First Śakra Chapter (Chapter Twenty-two) up through the first half of The Exposition of the Purity of All Dharmas (Chapter Thirty-six).

997 This and the following quotes in the section on the causes of the knowledge of the path are found on pp. 203–4 in CZ.

998 Note that most commentaries other than CE and JNS, in following the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 95b.2–3), do not interpret "pervasiveness" as pertaining to all beings having buddha nature per se, but to the following necessarily being the case (both the Sanskrit *vyāpti* and the Tibetan *khyab pa* can also refer to logical entailment). In the system that asserts the presentation of the three yānas to bear an intention, all beings are said to have the feature of being endowed with ultimate unsurpassable enlightenment. Therefore, in order to attain buddhahood, all followers of the three yānas and also non-Buddhists necessarily have to cultivate the knowledge of the path. For more details and JNS's comments on the *Vivṛti*, see Appendix I2A and Appendix I1E2–3.

999 The main cause for bodhisattvas being reborn in saṃsāra is compassion for all sentient beings. Āryavimuktisena, Haribhadra, and JNS present this as the subtle—and merely nominal—"affliction" of desire. Unlike śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, who deliberately relinquish all causes for rebirth in saṃsāra altogether, bodhisattvas deliberately do not relinquish this specific cause for rebirth. Thus, this most subtle and "best" kind of desire—compassion—is not to be relinquished on the path of the mahāyana, but represents the very nature of a bodhisattva's ability to accomplish the welfare of all beings. For more details, see Appendices I2A and I2D2db as well as I4B and I5E in Volume Two.

1000 As mentioned in the Introduction, by quoting various texts JG (pp. 198ff.) glosses "the true end" in question here as the fruitional prajñāpāramitā—that which consists of the kāyas of the Tathāgata; the nonabiding nirvāṇa; or the dharmadhātu free from all stains. In general, according to the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the *Uttaratantra*, Vasubandhu's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, and the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, it can also refer to emptiness, suchness, signlessness, the ultimate, what is devoid of all conditioned aspects, and cessation.

1001 For more details on the above five causes, see Appendix I2A. For the triad of completion, maturation, and purification, see Appendix I2A4ff. and Chart 12.

1002 As was explained above, on each one of these nine stages simultaneists relinquish all the respectively corresponding degrees (such as the lesser of the lesser) of the factors to be relinquished with regard to all three realms together.

1003 This matching of the seven sets of the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment with the first four paths, which differs considerably from the usual way of relating them, reflects the unique position of the Vaibhāṣikas as presented in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.70. However, this text also presents the commonly known order, which is followed by all other masters, as being the justified one. See, for example, throughout the Pāli canon (except for the *Mahāvagga* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*) and Chapter XVIII of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. For a comparison of the two ways of matching, see Appendix I4C1 as well as Charts 13 and 14.

1004 For more details, see Appendix I2B.

1005 Whenever the sixteen aspects of the four realities in the śrāvakayāna and the thirty-three listed here differ, the former are the ones given in ( ); see also Charts 4–5. JNS (p. 436) says that the aspects of the four realities as given in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the abhidharma system must be matched. For, otherwise, some people may object that bodhisattvas are not able to take care of those with the disposition of śrāvakasm because the names and numbers of these aspects in the sūtras differ from those in the abhidharma. The *Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 79a.4–5) says that it

does not follow that the aspects of the four realities in the sūtras do not represent the path of the śrāvakas because, in the mahāyāna, some of these aspects are synonyms of the ones in the abhidharma, while some others teach their nature.

1006 The *Ālokā* (D3791, fols. 78b.2–79a.4) says that suffering is impermanent because its nature is to arise and cease. It is dissatisfactory since all contaminated things are disagreeable. The actual nature of suffering is peaceful since it, in itself, does not constitute any identity or self. JNS (p. 436) glosses that emptiness means nothing but identitylessness. To teach identitylessness as "peace" does not refer to the cessation of some previously existing identity, but to the primordial peace of there never having been any kind of identity in the first place.

1007 JNS (p. 437) explains that the cause of suffering is like a disease because it needs to be cured through many (remedial) conditions and represents the principal power that gives rise to all the sufferings related to body, speech, and mind [*Ālokā*: This is like a seed being the main cause of a fruit]. The aspect of the origin of suffering is called "abscess" because it refers to the contaminations of karma and afflictions and the gradual occurrence of birth, aging, and perishing, which are like the swelling, ripening, and bursting of an abscess. "Arising" is referred to as a thorn/spear because pain is produced through inner and outer harm [*Ālokā*: Things like thorns and so on are the conditions for the arising of suffering. Here, Skt. *śalya* can refer to any sharp weapon (such as spears, darts, arrows), anything tormenting or causing pain (such as thorns or stings), or any extraneous substance lodged in the body and causing pain (such as splinters, pins, or stones in the bladder). The Tibetan has "pain" (*zug rngu*) throughout]. "Condition" is called "evil" because it is to be blamed and one will be harmed by it.

1008 As the beginning of this sentence says, this and each one of the following six aspects pertain to both the realities of suffering and its origin. Therefore, each of these seven aspects is numbered twice in order to arrive at the overall number of thirty-three aspects of the four realities.

1009 JNS (pp. 437–38) glosses that the shortcomings of both the realities of suffering and its origin are the adversaries to be struggled with through the disillusionment on the path of seeing. Their property is destructiveness—though they appear in the form of continua, they are not able to remain for a single moment [*Ālokā*: All adversary entities bear the property of destructiveness]. In terms of the freedom from desire on the pure path of familiarization, one needs to become familiar with these two realities being unsteady and disintegrating, respectively, because they are unable to sustain their own nature due to not existing in the first place, and because they bear the nature of having already ceased very swiftly before there is a chance for any actual arising [*Ālokā*: They disintegrate naturally, without depending on extrinsic causes]. At the end of completing the path of learning, one enters cessation through meditating that the nature of suffering and its origin, which are to be ceased without remainder, lies in being frightened of them since they only bring harm in this and all other lives; that nonhuman forces and so on still have the chance to harm one's other-dependent body (the remainder), it thus being like a plague [that can be caused by spirits; the *Ālokā* explains the other meaning of Skt. *upasarga*—falling prey to being harmed or possessed by evil spirits]; and that there are numerous kinds of calamities that can befall this body, such as its elements becoming disturbed.

1010 JNS (pp. 438–39) explains that identitylessness is referred to as cessation by having in mind that the nature of identitylessness is specified by the two kinds of cessation [*Ālokā*: "Peace" is the complete subsiding of all suffering]. Likewise, freedom (or seclusion) intends to convey "excellence" since the freedom [from all suffering] means to blissfully abide amidst visible phenomena [*Ālokā*: Such freedom is the state of bliss and purity]. Emptiness is referred to as "final deliverance" with the intention that the ground of such deliverance is the wisdom of emptiness, which has the three aspects (27)–(29) [*Ālokā*: Since the state of freedom from suffering is permanent and beneficial, it is (26)–(29)].

1011 JNS (p. 439) glosses "path" as what provides the opportunity for liberation. It is appropriate because all phenomena are realized in a nonreferential way [*Ālokā*: The path represents the sum total of remedies]. It accomplishes mind moving away from a mistaken state to its unmistaken state. It is conducive to delivering mind from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa [*Ālokā*: Through it, one reaches the permanent state of nonclinging (Tib. "... through nonclinging")].

1012 JNS (pp. 434 and 439) adds that bodhisattvas need to know the four realities as they are realized in the mind streams of others because they must gather all kinds of relinquishment and realization in the manner of the lower being incorporated in the higher and because they must take care of those to be guided who have the disposition of śrāvakas. In the context of the knowledge of the path, by virtue of bodhisattvas being endowed with the knowledge of all aspects they know the paths and fruitions of śrāvakas through not observing any nature of the aspects of the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

1013 CZ, p. 204.

1014 The Tibetan has this line as line II.3a, with all the following lines shifting accordingly.

1015 CZ, pp. 207–8.

1016 JNS (p. 441) explains the intention behind the meaning of (1) "not being able to differentiate emptiness" as follows. Since there are no parts in emptiness (a nonimplicative negation), the aspect of a vase being empty—it being empty of a nature of its own—does not exist as something that is suitable to be observed distinctly as a specific object of direct realization, saying, "This is it." (2) Focusing on the four realities, bodhisattvas settle in meditative equipoise through not even observing the sheer aspects of phenomena, such as form, within the sphere of the senses. (4) The sūtras speak of not abiding in any paths, remedies, relinquishments, and so on through taking them to be real—being established by any nature of their own—and existing as such paths and so on. The supreme dharma consists of settling in meditative equipoise in the meaning of this and one's mind stream being endowed with the corresponding type of realization. The Buddha, upon distinctly realizing what exists and what does not in terms of phenomena and their nature, from the perspective of the seeing while being settled in meditative equipoise, did not see any abiding of any seeming phenomena. Therefore, on the level of the supreme mundane dharma, all abiding of seeming phenomena is nonabiding and not existent. This is the definitive meaning. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 442–44) says that (4) the supreme dharma is the realization of putting an end to the belief that seeming phenomena exist on the level of the seeming and abide as merely something whose own nature is established. This realization is the experience of verifying the nonexistence of seeming phenomena through self-aware and self-lucid consciousness, which is taught to temporarily be a valid cognition and undeceiving. For if seeming phenomena really existed, buddhas surely would have to see them, but they do not. By virtue of this reason of the buddhas as a source of ultimate valid cognition not observing seeming phenomena, also the special prajñā on this last level of the path of preparation, which realizes that there are no such phenomena, is taught to be undeceiving valid cognition. Haribhadra's final uncommon position consists of explicitly and clearly teaching the nonexistence of seeming phenomena here, and, as shown above, holding meditative equipoise to be without appearances. The claims by others that Haribhadra asserts that the seeming exists and that meditative equipoise entails appearances just show that they do not understand what his intention in terms of the ultimate definitive meaning is. In brief, all phenomena in terms of (ordinary) mental states, such as the presentations of paths and fruitions, are mistaken, deceiving, and seeming. Other than being merely imaginary phenomena, they do not exist, being definitely like a lotus in the sky. With this in mind, so many great siddhas, such as Gampopa (1079–1153), the First Karmapa (1110–1193), master Shang (1122–1193), Baromba Tarma Wangchug (Tib. 'ba' rom pa dar ma dbang phyug; 1127–1199), and others said in their vajra dohās:

There is no saṃsāra and no nirvāṇa,
No buddhas and no sentient beings,
Neither self nor others—
All are phenomena of mind
And such mental phenomena are like horns of a rabbit.
So how do you enter the basic way of being?
Just like the sky not being seen by a corpse!

Since not even the view itself is seen,
How could you see what is not the view?
Since not even meditation is seen,
How could nonmeditation be experienced?

If unmistakenness does not exist as "this,"
Who could say that mistakenness "exists"?

If even the ultimate is self-empty,
That any self-nature of bad seeming phenomena
Is not empty and exists is just what dialecticians say.

Thus, they exclaimed their confidence that there is no seeming reality once the realization of Mahāmudrā is born. But these days, when the great Tagpo Kagyü siddhas utter their dohās by boasting about realization having dawned in them, they just misconstrue the fox's bark of the existence of seeming reality as being the lion's roar of Mahāmudrā, thus constantly emitting their cacophonous howls when blacking out in their fits at the fringes of society. But who among those who are able to analyze would mistake such for a lion's roar?

1017 CZ, p. 206.

1018 This is the lowest of the four Indian castes, serving the other three (brahmans, warriors, and merchants).

1019 For more details, see Appendix I2C.

1020 CE and JNS interpret *bdag nyid* (Skt. svayam) in II.6b to mean "nature" instead of "by themselves."

1021 CZ, p. 209.

1022 The *Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 88a.6), JNS (pp. 452–53), and others explain that words cannot be uttered without preceding coarse examination and/or subtle analysis. Therefore the act of speaking—which includes teaching the dharma—will cause distraction from resting in samādhi. LN (vol. 2, p. 27) adds that this includes both actual speech and phrasing something in one's mind. The example that is given in the commentaries for it being possible to teach without words is bodhisattvas recognizing that the manner of teaching the dharma through words is not the supreme one, thus making aspiration prayers to become buddhas who manifest rūpakāyas that can promote the welfare of all beings like wish-fulfilling jewels, even without words. Pratyekabuddhas, by virtue of their aspiration prayers and their compassion, are able to teach the dharma similar to this example. JNS addresses the qualm by others that it is not reasonable to connect verse II.7 with pratyekabuddhas teaching the dharma to others because the wisdom of pratyekabuddhas must dawn through their teaching themselves on their own, without depending on anyone else. In reply, JNS matches verse II.7 with the sūtra passage "What should those who listen to the dharma from the Elder Subhūti wish to be like? . . ." (the first two paragraphs on p. 211 in CZ) and elaborates on this as follows. What appear in this context as certain teachers, certain listeners, and certain teachings are all realized to be like dreams and illusions by virtue of appearing in the wisdom of rhinolike pratyekabuddhas. In terms of the definitive meaning, though all of these are not different entities, through certain teachers, listeners, and so

on arising in an illusionlike manner in the wisdom that appears as these teachers and so on, the fruition of a pratyekabuddha is eventually manifested in the listener too. The next sūtra passage, "There is no hearing and realizing by anybody," means that there is no listening and no realization in the manner of anything being expressed through any terms of seeming reality. However, what do exist are the listening and the realization that are nonconceptual in nature and appear to ultimate wisdom, which is also unmistakenly explained through lines II.7cd. In terms of the above two features that distinguish pratyekabuddhas from śrāvakas, JNS (p. 445) says that the sūtra passage "Thereupon, some gods within the retinues thought . . . 'What has not been heard cannot be understood'" (beginning of p. 209 in CZ) teaches the ways of pratyekabuddhas (1) progressing on the path by way of realizing what has the character of being self-arisen and (2) teaching the dharma. The wisdom of pratyekabuddhas being more profound than the one of śrāvakas is taught through the passage "Then, the gods thought, 'May noble Subhūti elucidate prajñāpāramitā . . .'" (last paragraph of p. 209 in CZ). This again represents feature (2). Though feature (1) is not explicitly mentioned in the latter passage, it is implicitly taught in it through realization arising in the gods. In the AA, the reverse is found—feature (1) is taught explicitly while (2) is only demonstrated implicitly. Haribhadra's commentaries explain both features, while Āryavimuktisena identifies only the latter one.

1023 CZ, p. 211.

1024 CZ, p. 210. JNS (p. 454) says that the conceptions about the apprehended are relinquished through realizing that apprehended referents are without any nature. The meaning of this sūtra passage here involves the intention that there is no form whose nature it is to be a really established other-dependent phenomenon because form and so on are mere imputations by virtue of being habituated to beginningless latent tendencies.

1025 CZ, p. 210.

1026 JNS (pp. 454–55) explains that inner mind as such, which is identical with the nature of saṃsāra, appears as a continuum from the perspective of the mistaken adventitious consciousness that never existed right from the beginning. Since this continuum holds a great variety of latent tendencies, what appears as this great variety through the power of conditions is not realized to be nonexistent. Therefore, the conceptions about the apprehender are not relinquished. As for the quote from the *Triṃśikā*, it teaches that, without a given apprehended referent, there is no specific apprehender that apprehends this referent either. However, merely through that, it is not established that there is no sheer apprehender per se. Furthermore, though the quote teaches that, without something apprehended, there is nothing that apprehends it, this does not entail that, by virtue of realizing that there is nothing apprehended, one must necessarily realize that there is no apprehender. In the meditative equipoise of the mahāyāna, both aspects of the dualistic appearance of apprehender and apprehended disappear, but mentation and perception still exist until the eighth bhūmi is attained (JNS gives no source, but such is clearly stated in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI. 45–46 and elsewhere). Also, the realization that the apprehended aspect is without nature is attained from the level of heat of the mahāyāna path of preparation onward, but it is not realized on this level that the aspect of the apprehender lacks a nature too. Furthermore, it is not certain that the conceptions about the apprehender are relinquished immediately upon having relinquished the conceptions about the apprehended. The scriptural source for this is *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* VI.8ab:

> The mind is aware that nothing other than mind exists.
> Then, it is realized that mind does not exist either.

This explains that the conceptions about the apprehended are relinquished first, while the ones about the apprehender need to be relinquished later.

1027 CZ, pp. 211–12. According to JNS (p. 456), in this sūtra passage, "irreversible bodhisattvas" refers to those on the path of preparation; "those who see reality," to the three types of persons on the paths of seeing of the three yānas; "arhats," to śrāvaka arhats; and "those who have been of service to past buddhas or who have generated virtues in regard to many buddhas or who are well taken care of by their spiritual friends," to persons on the path of accumulation.

1028 Ibid., p. 214. JNS (p. 456) says that this refers to the disposition that is the nature of phenomena—the natural disposition that does not originate from the causes of the five skandhas.

1029 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 457) says that, on the path of pratyekabuddhas, through familiarizing with the four realities as explained above (under the knowledge of the path of śrāvakas) and all phenomena being dependent origination, the conceptions about the apprehended are relinquished, but those about the apprehender are not. The type of realization that is distinguished through these two features and the specific disposition of a pratyekabuddha are the path of pratyekabuddhas, which is something to be known by bodhisattvas. However, they need not know all the substantial aspects of the pratyekabuddha path for their own welfare.

1030 JNS (pp. 458–59) explains that (1) heat is the aspect of realizing that imputations (the seeming) are not contradictory to the ultimate nature of phenomena, which is not suitable to be contained in time or names even for a moment, no matter how it may be named or as what it may be conceived. In other words, the seeming that consists of mere imputations and the true nature of this seeming (its not being established as such) are not contradictory in that both are emptiness. Or the wisdom that is free from denying the existence of ultimate reality and free from superimposing anything onto the nonexistence of seeming reality is without any mistakenness about both of these sides. Therefore, heat refers to pointing out that this wisdom is not in contradiction with profound suchness. Some people who are destitute of the dharma claim that lines II.9ab teach the existence of seeming reality. If the kind of realization of seeing that seeming reality exists were the wisdom of heat of the path of preparation, what would be the point of cultivating the path at all? For then, cultivating the path would entail a deceiving fruition because it represents the kind of realization that sees seeming reality as existent (whereas it actually does not exist). The term "seeming" refers to what does not exist appearing as if it existed and what is unreal appearing as if it were real. This means that any appearance of seeing the seeming as existent is necessarily nonexistent. Just like floaters in the eye, despite appearing to exist, the seeming does not exist, and, since it does not exist, any form of its "existence" is necessarily deceiving. So what are these appearances of the seeming? From the perspective of a mistaken mind, despite their nonexistence, they are suitable to appear by virtue of being habituated to them through the power of clinging, just as coarse phenomena appear as substantially established from the perspective of such a mind. Therefore, even the Vaibhāṣikas assert that the seeming is deceiving and not existent. As *Abhidharmakośa* VI.4ac says:

> If something is [physically] destroyed or mentally
> Broken down, its cognition does not operate [anymore],
> Just as in the case of a vase or water. It exists seemingly . . .

So if even they say this, what harm could there be for those who claim to be followers of the mahāyāna to accept it too? (2) The level of peak is the kind of realization that is distinguished by there being no decrease of flaws and no increase of qualities because these never existed in phenomena (such as form) right from the start. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 460) says that, in terms of the threefold lack of nature, (1) on the level of heat, imputed phenomena, such as form, are pointed out to be nothing other than the true nature of the imaginary. This means that all three degrees of heat focus on wisdom and imaginary forms in this way. (2) While focusing on them, peak means to train in the poised readiness for engaging the basic nature of these phenomena of wisdom and the imaginary—they appear as if they involve increase and decrease,

but form and so on of the perfect nature are ultimately without increase and decrease. (4) The wisdom of the supreme dharma has the aspect of the realization that, with there being no bases for attributes (phenomena such as form), their attributes (such as arising, ceasing, or any other characteristics) do not exist either. In general, as was said before, the realization of the path of seeing of the mahāyāna includes all three kinds of realizations of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. JNS (p. 457) points out that, in terms of the respective causes of these three realizations, in this context of the knowledge of the path only the paths of preparation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are taught since the mahāyāna path of preparation has already been taught as the third point of the knowledge of all aspects.

1031 CZ, pp. 215–16.

1032 Lines 11cd.

1033 D4038, fol. 118b.3.

1034 Ibid., fol. 118a.7–118b.2. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* adds that "one mind" refers to the time it respectively takes to fully complete the examination of the reality of suffering through each one of the above eight cognitions (the same goes for the other three realities).

1035 As explained before, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 93a.6–93b.4)—which is followed by Haribhadra and almost all other commentators on the AA—for each one of the four realities, dharma readiness represents the uninterrupted path of relinquishing the respective factors of all three realms to be relinquished through seeing. Dharma cognition is the path of liberation of having relinquished these factors. Subsequent readiness means to focus on both dharma readiness and dharma cognition and apprehend them as the causes for the qualities of the noble ones. Subsequent cognition does the same by focusing on subsequent readiness. Though, in general, all readinesses and cognitions are moments of wisdom, dharma readiness and dharma cognition focus on the twofold object (suchness and perfect wisdom), thus realizing the emptiness of the apprehended. Subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition (through the former focusing on both dharma readiness and dharma cognition and the latter focusing on subsequent readiness) focus on the very two wisdoms of realizing this twofold object, thus realizing the emptiness of the apprehender. In other words, dharma readiness and dharma cognition represent the wisdoms that are the cognizing subjects of those objects (suchness and wisdom), while subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition represent the wisdoms that are the cognizing subjects which perceive the former two cognizing subjects. In accordance with the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and what was explained above (see CE's general topic on AA I.27ff.), LN (vol. 2, p. 33) says here that, in the terms "dharma cognition" and so on, "dharma" refers to the sixteen or thirty-two aspects of the four realities (the latter number resulting from the sixteen aspects pertaining to the desire realm and the two higher realms, respectively). "Cognition" refers to the cognition of having analyzed these dharmas before on the path of preparation. "Readiness" means not being afraid, even though each one of the realities becomes revealed to one by virtue of one's preceding analysis. Thus, the first two among the four cognitions and readinesses refer back to the path of preparation, but the latter two (subsequent cognition and subsequent readiness) do not. For more details, see Appendices I1H (esp. section 3ad) and I2D2b and Chart 19.

1036 YT (p. 283) explains the benefit in this life as being irreversible from attaining buddhahood, while the benefit in other lifetimes lies in being able to recollect many past and future lifetimes. NSML (p. 288) explains the benefits by referring to AA I.10ab—"not dwelling in existence through prajñā" means the benefit in this life and "not dwelling in peace through compassion" refers to the qualities in all other lifetimes. For NSML (pp. 300–301) referring to many further qualities of the path of seeing, see below.

1037 CZ, p. 216.

1038 Ibid., p. 216.

1039 CE and JNS seem to suggest that "dwelling in this" refers to dwelling in the realization of dharmadhātu, whereas the *Ālokā* and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 98a.3) explicitly gloss "this" as "prajñāpāramitā" (*tasyām* being a female pronoun; see below). Of course, in terms of the meaning, both come down to the same.

1040 CZ, p. 217.

1041 Ibid., p. 222.

1042 JNS (pp. 484–87) says that the sixteen moments of the path of seeing are the aspects that consist of the moments of valid cognition which represent the modes of eliminating superimpositions onto the nature of phenomena while focusing on the four realities. The following are those among JNS's comments on these moments that differ—sometimes greatly—from CE (and any other commentaries). (1) The basic nature of phenomena is suchness and this very suchness that has never been tainted by any stains in any way is completely perfect buddhahood. Since these two cannot be differentiated in terms of their own nature, they are not any mutually nonidentical kinds of substances. Neither the former nor the latter are anything supported or a support for each other. For these two do not possess any differences in terms of earlier and later, nor are there any different attributes that they might possess. Let alone their being enumerations that are different in nature, they are not even accepted as synonyms that are not different in nature. The momentary aspect of realizing this is the dharma readiness of the reality of suffering. Or the following explanation is also fine in terms of the definitive meaning. Suchness—the ultimate profound other-empty—and the two rūpakāyas of a buddha at the time of fruition (in terms of the triad of ground, path, and fruition), which respectively appear from the tenth bhūmi onward and from the level of engagement through aspiration onward, are not one in their own nature because suchness and these rūpakāyas have no connection. The reason applies because they have no connection of identity—other-empty ultimate suchness and seeming buddhahood do not have the same nature. Nor do they have any connection of depending on each other because these two are not suitable to have any connection of dependence in terms of support and supported. The reason applies because profound other-empty suchness (which exists ultimately) and seeming buddhahood (which does not even exist on the mere level of the seeming) cannot have any connection of dependence such that the one is supported by the other or vice versa. For it is impossible for an existent and a nonexistent to come together as support and supported in a single basis. For this reason, I do not accept the assertion by others that other-empty suchness and the very excellent buddhas, who appear from the perspective of (seeming) mental states, are one in nature, but merely different synonyms, because the extremes of one and different are relinquished in them. Thus, to hold that the momentary realization of not abiding in the extremes of one and different is the dharma readiness of suffering represents the supreme system. (2) As the object of wisdom, greatness (Tib. chen po)—such as the form of the nature of phenomena—is beyond all dimensions (Tib. rgya; lit. "seals") or, all dimensions (seals) are not something other than this very greatness itself. This is the profound Mahāmudrā (Tib. phyag rgya chen po; "Great Seal") and the momentary aspect of realizing it is the dharma cognition of suffering. (4) Though the form and such of the profound other-empty are beyond the characteristics of the form and such that consist of minute particles, the great form of luminous Mahāmudrā is difficult to fathom or measure because it is not suitable to be observed in sentient beings. The aspect of realizing this is the subsequent cognition of suffering. (5) To realize that the dharmadhātu is empty of any extremes that are imputed by dysfunctional insight is the dharma readiness of the origin of suffering. (6) The dharma cognition of the origin of suffering is the realization of ascertaining the buddha heart as what exists on the other side of the obscuring stains (form and so on) that dwell in the persons on the path. (7) The subsequent readiness of the origin of suffering is the realization that there is nothing to be adopted through

attachment to seeming forms and so on and nothing to be discarded through aversion to them, which includes being free from the reference points of being close or distant. (9) To realize that all entities and nonentities are emptiness is the dharma readiness of cessation. (10) To realize that buddhahood is swiftly attained through this progression of realizations is the dharma cognition of cessation. (11) To realize that the qualities of all ultimate purified phenomena consist of being unconditioned is the subsequent readiness of cessation. (12) Once this is realized, there are no fears because one cannot be crushed by anything that is impossible in terms of how things actually are. Also, since the causes of diseases are not observable, all diseases (their results) are eliminated. To realize this is the subsequent cognition of cessation. (13) Since nirvāṇa primordially has the nature of nirvāṇa, the grasping at it as newly having the nature of nirvāṇa is at peace. To realize this is the dharma readiness of the path. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 487–92) says that these sixteen moments represent the realizations of the following. (1) In terms of the ultimate nature of phenomena, suchness—emptiness, the basic nature (the object)—and the wisdom of buddhahood (the subject) do not exist as entities that are support and supported because both are naturally empty. (2) Since the basic nature of form and so on—the nature of the dharmadhātu—has no parts, it is greatness. (3) Just like the greatness of the dharmadhātu, also the form and so on of the nature of phenomena are great and consummate. Therefore, there is no valid cognition of a consciousness on the level of the seeming that assesses this as its object. (4) Thus, just like the unassessable greatness of the form and so on of the dharmadhātu, by virtue of being similar to space without measure, also the form and so on of the ultimate nature of phenomena are boundless and have no measure. Or there is no measure for all the many seeming forms that are the bearers of this nature. (5) Form and so on are not suitable as permanent entities since they lack any nature of form and so on. Since this lack of nature is by nature and not by virtue of being fabricated, there is no extreme of form and so on becoming extinct later, nor are there any other stains of bad views. (6) For bodhisattvas who dwell in prajñāpāramitā, the forms and so on of the nature of the dharmadhātu are the vajra forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible objects that are entirely beyond the sphere of the sense faculties and represent the culmination of the clear manifestation of the qualities of wisdom, which are appearances as in mirror divinations and possess the infinite qualities of the nature of phenomena. These are the aspects that are ascertained by wisdom as being the svābhāvikakāya of the tathāgatas. (7) Through dwelling in prajñāpāramitā as before, bodhisattvas familiarize with all phenomena being neither to be adopted nor to be discarded and so on (that is, being liberated from all reference points of familiarizing with any reference points or characteristics). (8) They cultivate the four immeasurables by way of their preceding direct realization of all phenomena being without nature. (9) Seeming phenomena (such as form) are the emptiness of the very nature of Mahāmudrā—the actual nature that is the profound other-empty. This means that the ultimate nature of phenomena does not abide in seeming phenomena, which is the quintessence of all the definitive meanings in sūtras and tantras. (10) The final fruition of the generation of the roots of virtue that are equal to the unconditioned dharmadhātu is the attainment of the svābhāvikakāya of the tathāgatas. In brief, this refers to the meaning of the statement that the qualities of the dharmakāya as the fruition are attained from the causes that are the nonreferential virtues of gathering the accumulation of wisdom. As for these causes, according to the abhidharma they are established as causes of similar outcome and enabling causes. However, in terms of ultimate analysis, it is certain that one cannot present the accumulation of wisdom and the dharmakāya as cause and result because, in their own nature, they are inseparable. (11) Within prajñāpāramitā (the main factor of one's own practice), all remedies that overcome the antagonistic factors of the paths of the three yānas are included in the manner of the lower being incorporated in the higher. (12) Through the blessings of practicing prajñāpāramitā, all causes for inner and outer harm are at peace. (13) Since all phenomena are without nature, one's familiarity with having meditated on phenomena being without nature means that even the slightest stirring of clinging to any notion of really

established phenomena (from form up through the knowledge of all aspects)—even nirvāṇa—is at peace. (14) Bodhisattvas who engage in prajñā and skill in means are protected by the buddhas from all harm that is inflicted by gods, guarded against harm that comes from the elements, and sheltered from harm in terms of physical dysfunctions. (15) and (16) are as in CE. To summarize, the Eighth Karmapa says, I wrote down the ultimate understanding of the definitive meaning as it came to my mind and as it directly applies to glossing each one of these sixteen moments in accordance with how they are presented in the AA and the *Vivṛti*. Therefore, my glosses and what these texts say should not be considered as contradictory. There are very many Tibetans who do not understand some of my glosses in this context. They say many untenable things, for example, "The dharma readiness of cessation of the path of seeing of bodhisattvas means to realize 'the nature of form and so on as the emptiness of nothing but an actual nature' [the passage in ' ' is the literal reading of the *Vivṛti's* comment here] because form and so on are realized to ultimately be the dharmadhātu." To look further into just this statement, the reason used here ("because seeming form and so on are realized to ultimately be the dharmadhātu") accords with neither of the systems of those who propound *Rangtong* Madhyamaka and *Shentong* Madhyamaka. According to the followers of *Rangtong*, how could it be suitable that something like form and such is realized as the dharmadhātu (the cause of the noble ones), which is declared to be the sole reality of nirvāṇa by the victors? The reasons for this being impossible are that form and the dharmadhātu discord in their defining characteristics; that seeming form is empty of any nature of its own; and that its appearing as if it were able to perform a function is deceiving. According to the followers of *Shentong*, through the power of dependent origination, neither what is false (seeming form and such) nor what is correct (the ultimate dharmadhātu) shed their respective own natures. However, it is neither possible for what is false to be realized through valid cognition as what is correct nor is it possible for what is correct to be realized as what is false. If such were possible, endless flaws would accrue, such as it following that all presentations of valid cognition and nonvalid cognition become destroyed and that the true nature of dependent origination does not operate in terms of the power of entities. [For the issue of form and so on being dharmadhātu, see also the Third Karmapa's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Dharmadhātustava*, verses 38–45 (Brunnhölzl 2007b, pp. 245–51).] The *Vivṛti* and JNS's comments continue with the position of some other commentators that the above verses of the AA do not teach "aspects" (again understood as different stages of progressive realization) on the path of seeing, but only sixteen moments in terms of its nature or division, just as the AA's other verses on what is conducive to penetration and so on in the first and further chapters do not teach aspects, but just natures and divisions. However, then it would follow that the AA teaches neither the progression of familiarization in meditative equipoise nor the progression of what is to be mentally engaged during subsequent attainment nor the culmination of reaching the final fruition because it does not teach any aspects of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. If that is accepted, it follows that the AA does not teach even a little bit of the stages of clear realization. Moreover, such a position also contradicts what is said elsewhere in the AA, such as in line I.25a ("By virtue of focal objects, *aspects*"), which is hard to comment on based on the above position.

1043 CZ, p. 226.

1044 NSML (pp. 293–94 and 298–301) addresses the different ways in which the path of seeing is taught in the first five chapters of the AA and their compatibility. The fourfold practice of the equipment of the remedies for the factors to be relinquished through seeing taught in Chapter One and the fourfold culminating training of the path of seeing taught in Chapter Five are equivalent. They are presented as solely the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing because this path is one in nature, but merely divided into four in terms of the isolates of the remedies that relinquish the four types of conceptions which are the factors to be relinquished through seeing (the same applies to the fourfold practice of the equipment of the remedies for

the factors to be relinquished through familiarization and the fourfold culminating training of the path of familiarization, each of which are divided into four on the basis of the respective uninterrupted paths of the second through the tenth bhūmis). The path of seeing as taught by way of sixteen moments in Chapters Two through Four refers to distinct focal objects and aspects. However, in meditative equipoise there are no such distinctions in terms of focal objects and aspects because the dharmadhātu free from all reference points and the mind of realizing it do not appear as two. Thus, all of these sixteen moments are solely distinctions in terms of their inducing specific kinds of certainty during the phase of subsequent attainment. However, the power to induce these kinds of certainty is attained progressively during these sixteen moments. It is for this reason that the distinctions in terms of the readinesses and cognitions are presented with regard to meditative equipoise. To give just one example, the first moment of the meditative equipoise of the path of seeing of bodhisattvas is the dharma readiness of suffering explained in Chapter Two because it is the meditative equipoise that, through its own power, induces the certainty about suchness and buddhahood not being accepted as synonyms because of their not existing as mutual support and supported (see AA II.12ac). Likewise, this moment is also the dharma readiness of suffering explained in Chapter Three because it is the meditative equipoise that, through its own power, induces the certainty about the reality of suffering being free from the reference points of permanence and impermanence (see AA III.12a). It is also the dharma readiness of suffering explained in Chapter Four under the signs of irreversibility because it is the meditative equipoise that, through its own power, induces the certainty about the special physical and verbal conducts during the subsequent attainment of having turned away from discriminating notions of form and so on (see AA IV.47a). It is also the dharma readiness of suffering explained in Chapter Four under the defining characteristic of distinctiveness because it is the meditative equipoise that, through its own power, induces the certainty about the dharmadhātu being inconceivable (see AA IV.24a). In this way, through furthermore presenting the cultivation of the four immeasurables (see AA II.14a) in the eighth moment of the path of seeing as pertaining to its phase of subsequent attainment, this means that the power of inducing such cultivation is obtained during the eighth moment of the meditative equipoise of the path of seeing (the same applies to the special physical and verbal conducts during the subsequent attainment in the above context of irreversibility). Thus, all earlier and later presentations of the path of seeing are without contradictions. The same essential point also applies to all the infinite further qualities that are attained during the dharma readiness of suffering, such as the twelve times one hundred qualities explained in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (see Chart 12); the samādhis of the lion's sport and crossing in one leap taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras; and the qualities taught in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, such as the seven branches of enlightenment and the eightfold path of the noble ones. Since the meditative equipoise of the path of seeing means to rest one-pointedly in the actuality of the nature of phenomena free from reference points, bodhisattvas are not able to manifest these qualities within this meditative equipoise. However, they do so during the subsequent attainment of the first bhūmi. As for the seven branches of enlightenment, they are taught to be complete within the nature of the meditative equipoise of the path of seeing. However, though the power of the eightfold path of the noble ones is attained during this meditative equipoise, its actual manifestation occurs only during subsequent attainment. Therefore, this eightfold path appears to be presented from the path of familiarization onward, which is just as in the case of the meditative absorption of crossing in one leap.

1045 JNS (pp. 493–94) comments that (1)–(2) bodhisattvas bow to all beings in all respects in every situation and lack pride and conceit through two causes—the cognitive obscurations that are the conceptions about the three spheres being disciplined in every respect and the particular afflictive obscuration of pride being relinquished. (3) The victory over the afflictions in general, which includes their latencies, is the cause for (4) the temporary fruition of being invulnerable to attacks by adversaries with weapons, poison, and so on; (5) attaining the ultimate fruition of

unsurpassable enlightenment; and (6) the locations and so on at which bodhisattvas endowed with this function of the path of familiarization dwell becoming the support for increasing the merit of all sentient beings (the heart of enlightenment) and thus being worshipped by the latter with flowers and so on. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 594) says that (1) bodhisattvas have control over their minds in every respect through relinquishing false imagination. (2) They bow to spiritual friends who are worthy to bow to and all other persons who are worthy to bow to. Or they bow to all sentient beings, since they have an equal mind toward all beings. (3) They outshine all obscurations such as desire through rendering them naturally incompatible. (4) No matter what harm others may try to inflict upon them, bodhisattvas are invulnerable by virtue of the power of the nature of phenomena. According to Haribhadra, the above six represent the functions of both the contaminated and the uncontaminated paths of familiarization. Ratnākaraśānti and others say that they only pertain to the uncontaminated path of familiarization. Ngog Lotsāwa explains that the latter three pertain to both, while the first three, in due order, belong to the contaminated, accomplishing, and pure paths of familiarization (for these, see below). Earlier Tibetans say that, through the explanation of the path of seeing together with its benefit, its function is implicitly established, and that, through the explanation of the path of familiarization together with its function, its benefit is implicitly established.

1046 CZ, pp. 227–28.

1047 JNS (p. 501) adds that there is no disagreement in meaning between Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's terminology of "the contaminated and uncontaminated path of familiarization" and the terminologies of others, such as "the mundane and supramundane path of familiarization"; "the path of familiarization with appearance and without appearance"; and "the pure mundane path of familiarization during subsequent attainment and the nonconceptual wisdom during meditative equipoise." Therefore, some say that, on the path of familiarization, all phases of meditative equipoise are definitely presented as uncontaminated and all phases of subsequent attainment as contaminated. For the meditative equipoise is free from dualistic appearances that entail difference, while the subsequent attainment possesses the cognitive obscurations of apprehender and apprehended that entail difference. However, others say that the contaminated path of familiarization is presented as the impure bhūmis, while the uncontaminated path of familiarization is presented as the pure bhūmis. For more details, see Appendix I2E1.

1048 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 506) says that the prajñāpāramitā for which bodhisattvas aspire here is the fruitional mother. The *Ālokā* explains it as the triad of prajñāpāramitā being the scriptures, the path, and the fruition, while Ratnākaraśānti's *Śuddhamatī* identifies scriptural prajñāpāramitā alone. The commentaries that mention the causes for such aspiration identify them as pure scriptures and reasonings.

1049 CZ, p. 231.

1050 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 507) says that this can also be understood as the bodhisattvas themselves praising, eulogizing, and lauding the various levels of such aspiration in their own mind streams, which serves to further gather the accumulations and purify the obscurations. This makes the minds of these bodhisattvas more and more joyful and progressively increases their uncontaminated virtues. According to JNS, Āryavimuktisena, Haribhadra, and Ratnākaraśānti hold that these praises, eulogies, and laudations are primarily of the nature of speech because this is the context of putting others to be guided onto the path by extolling the benefits (said kinds of praises and so on) of the levels of aspiration in the mind streams of bodhisattva who are endowed with them. STT (p. 125) defines the triad of praise, eulogy, and laudation (all representing the benefit of the path of familiarization as aspiration) as "the proclamation of the merit of aspiration by genuine beings in order to create enthusiasm in the

meditator." For more details on the path of familiarization as aspiration, praise, and so on, see Appendix I2E2.

1051 CZ, p. 249. Note that, in the sūtras as translated in CZ, this quote marks the beginning of the third type of aspiration (in terms of the welfare of others) above, while the section on praise, eulogy, and laudation only starts on p. 256. Also, in presenting "praise, eulogy, and laudation" as a subpoint of "aspiration," like almost all other commentators CE follows the *Vivṛti's* treatment of the contaminated path of familiarization as threefold (aspiration, dedication, and rejoicing). However, in terms of the eleven points of the knowledge of the path, "aspiration" and "praise, eulogy, and laudation" are counted separately as points (6) and (7), respectively. As for the twenty-seven divisions of both of of these points, Obermiller 1933c (p. 248) observes, "The whole classification would seem quite absurd, if we should not take into consideration the concordance with the Sūtras. The fact is that we have there 27 passages in which the worship of the Buddha, of his relics etc. is spoken of. These passages are considered to refer to the different manifestations of Faith . . ."

1052 For more details, see Appendix I2E3.

1053 CZ, p. 269. The following quote is just a continuation of this passage.

1054 In JNS (p. 518), the comments on these twelve points and their order differ as follows. (1) The nature of the dedication by bodhisattvas on the path of familiarization is special in being greatly superior to those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, who dedicate merely for the sake of themselves alone passing into nirvāṇa and do so in a referential manner and for an inferior kind of enlightenment. By contrast, bodhisattvas make dedications in order for all sentient beings to pass into nirvāṇa and do so in a nonreferential manner and for unsurpassable enlightenment. Thus, the function of their dedication lies in making one attain the supreme state of perfect buddhahood. (2) The mental aspect of making dedications is the cognitive aspect that entails not referring to any object or time as anything whatsoever. (3) The defining characteristics of perfect dedication are unmistaken discrimination, frame of mind, and view. As for the manner of dedicating that relinquishes the poisons of dedication and serves as the supreme nectar, (4) bodhisattvas dedicate in the manner of knowing that the merit to be dedicated is free from all kinds of entities. (5) They dedicate the virtue of the great abundance of the unconditioned merit of perfect buddhahood by way of the sphere of the mindfulness that this unconditioned virtue is natural emptiness. (6) They dedicate in the manner of lacking any characteristics of reference points. (7) They dedicate in the manner of their nonreferential dedications being endowed with means. (8) They dedicate in the manner of dedicating the special virtues of the qualities of bodhisattvas, which represent the objects in which the perfect buddhas rejoice. As for the last three points, they are classified through their character in terms of the manner in which they produce great merit. (10) The virtues that are the causes for lesser dedication are mundane virtues; (11) the virtues for medium dedication are all the virtues of the inferior supramundane paths; and (12) the virtues for great dedication are the virtues that consist of the mahāyāna nirvāṇa. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 519–20) says that (1) the nature of the virtue of the mahāyāna aspirations as explained above is more special than those of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and that bodhisattvas dedicate them through mentally engaging in the special unsurpassable enlightenment. (2) The nature of such dedications is nonreferentiality in terms of not observing the five pure skandhas, such as ethics. (3) The object, time, intention, and application in the mind that makes such dedications are unmistaken. (4) It is free from the aspects of apprehender and apprehended and from all reference points when dedicating the entities that are the virtues of oneself and all other beings. (5) Bodhisattvas dedicate by being mindful that the nature of the abundance of the uncontaminated virtue of the buddhas is an inexhaustible fruition. This virtue consists of the two accumulations of all buddhas in the three times. (6) The dedications of bodhisattvas are endowed with being skilled in profound means,

such as generosity. (8) They apply themselves to dedicating the virtues of the paths of all three yānas in a highly dedicated manner because the buddhas encourage them to do so by praising these virtues. (9) All these virtues are not dedicated for any of the three realms of saṃsāra. All these twelve aspects of dedication are performed by way of focusing on nonreferentiality (or on being without focus). The phrase "focusing on nonreferentiality" is used by Haribhadra here because he wishes to praise nonreferential dedication as being supreme, but this in no way means that he teaches nonreferentiality itself as a reference point or focus. According to PBG (p. 522), unlike Haribhadra and other commentators, the *Vṛtti* explains only eleven aspects of dedication, with AA II.21a indicating dedication being special; II.21b, its function; and II.21cd–23, its nature.

1055 JNS (pp. 521–22) explains the nature of rejoicing as cultivating extraordinary joy by way of rejoicing in one's own and others' actions that are virtuous by nature. As for the reason that, through the merit of rejoicing in the roots of virtue of others, one accumulates the same roots of virtue and the same fruition as them, Paṇḍita Trilakṣa says that, among the actions of intention and what derives from intention, the former are more powerful. Commenting on the above verse, JNS says that "means" refers to the teaching that it is not contradictory that (a) there is no arising of results from actions since all phenomena do not exist through a nature of their own, while (b) results still arise from rejoicing and such. Prajñā refers to not observing either the arising or the nonarising of results from actions. Through this union of means and prajñā, bodhisattvas mentally engage in rejoicing in all virtues of themselves and others. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 522) says that rejoicing in natural roots of virtue means to give rise to the realization of rejoicing in the ultimate unconditioned virtue through the meditative equipoise of focusing on the roots of virtue on the level of the seeming (the aspect of means), while not observing them ultimately. To summarize the threefold contaminated path of familiarization, aspiration for prajñāpāramitā is the great treasure source from which infinite merit arises, just like nuggets coming forth from a gold mine. Dedication is indispensable for the infinite merit of aspiration (the cause) making one attain perfect enlightenment (the result), just as a goldsmith forges an ornament out of a gold nugget. Rejoicing means that the virtues performed by oneself and others lead to both attaining the same fruition together, just as, through a harvest grown in a single field, both the farmers and the king obtain the same fruits together. JNS adds that some commentators link the above triad of praise, eulogy, and laudation with regard to aspiration also to dedication and rejoicing.

1056 CZ, p. 281.

1057 JNS (p. 524) glosses the path of familiarization as accomplishment as entailing efforts, while the pure path of familiarization is free from such efforts. Thus, they cannot occur at the same time in the mind stream, but they are not contradictory in nature without any common basis because it is the very continuum of the path of familiarization that accomplishes the buddha qualities that takes on the nature of the pure path of familiarization at another time, while the latter again becomes the path of accomplishing the buddha qualities of relinquishment.

1058 JNS (p. 525) comments that (1) the path of familiarization, which has the nature of accomplishing the dharmakāya, is what eliminates flaws and darkness and produces qualities and light. (2) It is the supreme among the paths to enlightenment because its capacity to accomplish this enlightenment is superior to those of other paths. As for the manner of familiarizing, (3) bodhisattvas do so in the manner of not forming phenomena (such as form) as anything suitable to appear. (4) Familiarization in this way (the cause) temporarily procures and makes one attain in one's mind stream the fruition that concords with this cause—the realization that phenomena are unobservable. (5) is the ultimate fruition—the dharmakāya. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS says that (1) the nature of this path is to unmistakenly see, through the dharma vision, the light of suchness—ultimate forms and so on that are other than the ordinary ones.

For it is by virtue of the essential basic nature that this is what the dharma vision sees. (3) By virtue of the preparation of realizing that any distinctive features of all seeming phenomena are without arising, during the actual meditative equipoise no phenomena are mentally formed due to being free from all formations. (4) This path of familiarization, which is endowed with realizing the lack of (1)–(3) its nature, supremacy, and nonformation, progressively produces the realization of the phenomena of the two realities being unobservable as any reference points in the mind streams of yogins and eventually procures this realization in its fully perfect form. Like CE, BT (p. 451) says that the path of familiarization as accomplishment represents the uninterrupted path of the second bhūmi. YT (pp. 307–8) explains that only (1) pertains to this bhūmi and gives the following reason. On the mahāyāna path of seeing, the nature of form and so on is seen in a direct and unmistaken manner. During the uninterrupted path that is the meditative equipoise subsequent to having completed this path of seeing, one familiarizes in a continuous manner with what has already been seen in this way. (2)–(5) exist during the uninterrupted paths of the remaining bhūmis. NSML (p. 315) says that all of (1)–(5) pertain to the second bhūmi and the following ones. As for (2), LN (vol. 2, p. 58), YT, PBG (p. 525), and NSML (pp. 315–16) explain that the path of familiarization as accomplishment is superior to the contaminated path of familiarization (aspiration, dedication, and rejoicing) because buddhahood cannot be attained without the contaminated path (or the other five pāramitās) being embraced by the nonconceptual and prajñā of directly and unmistakenly seeing all phenomena as being free from reference points. BT adds that (1)–(5) can be summarized in three—nature, aspects, and distinctive functions. The aspects consist of (2) the benefit and (3) the mode of apprehension, while (4)–(5) represent the temporary and ultimate functions. PBG explains that (1)–(3) make up this path's nature that causes accomplishment, while (4)–(5) represent its power in terms of what is to be accomplished. See also Appendix I2E4.

1059 CZ, p. 283.

1060 There are different ways of calculating the length of an "incalculable eon," but the *Ālokā* (pp. 178 and 183) gives the classic explanation of "incalculable" (*asaṃkhyā*) referring to the highest number in ancient Indian counting (which is a 1 with fifty-nine zeros).

1061 CZ, p. 287.

1062 Line II.27a has Skt. *adiṣṭhāna* (power, sway, influence), but Tib. *thibs kyis non pa* (being obscured). Thus, CE glosses the latter with *byin rlabs*, but the translation retains the Sanskrit.

1063 Line II.27b has Skt. *dharmatā*, but Tib. *chos*, so CE comments accordingly.

1064 JNS (pp. 525–28) elaborates that this section has the purpose of identifying the conducive factors or causes for the arising of the pure path of familiarization and the antagonistic factors or causes that prevent its arising, which basically also needs to be presented for the path of familiarization as accomplishment. The reason for such a presentation being applied here to the pure path of familiarization alone is that the latter is the primary part of the uncontaminated path of familiarization. The proximate or substantial cause of the pure path of familiarization is the uninterrupted path of the path of familiarization as accomplishment. Its cooperative conditions consist of (a) the presence of the favorable conditions (1)–(3), which are conducive to both aspiring for this pure path of familiarization and to actually generating it in one's mind stream, and (b) the absence of the adverse conditions (1)–(4). Alternatively, it is also explained that the above three favorable conditions being complete represents the cooperative cause of the path of familiarization as accomplishment, while eliminating the four adverse conditions serves as the cooperative cause of the pure path of familiarization. As for the latter four, in general, to reject the dharma leads to more suffering and not attaining liberation. (1) refers to evil māras together with their consorts appearing as the gods who have mastery over others' emanations. To be under their obscuring influence means that they prevent any progress from the desire realm to higher levels and shoot the five arrows of arrogance, dullness, great dullness,

fainting, and being unconscious. (2) means to lack aspiration for the profound dharma—the other-empty. (3) refers to clinging to seeming phenomena (such as the skandhas) as being existent. In the context of these four, through one's clinging to what is not the dharma, praising oneself and putting down others happen as a matter of course and are called "the special verbal karma of rejecting the dharma." Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 528) says that, among the favorable conditions, (1) means to please the buddhas through one's pure view and conduct. As for (2)–(3), one perfects the pāramitās and is skilled in accomplishing their functions through the means of resting in the meditative equipoise of calm abiding without depending on efforts. Among the adverse conditions, (2) refers to reification and (4) means to associate with nonvirtuous friends.

1065 CZ, p. 291.

1066 D3802, fol. 237b.1.

1067 For more details, see Appendix I2E5.

1068 JNS (pp. 532–33) elaborates that the following two aspects are not different—(a) the aspect that consists of the own nature of the nature of phenomena (which is pure of what is to be separated from it—the adventitious stains—and is labeled with the name "fruition") having become pure and (b) the aspect that consists of form and such (the self-isolates of the adventitious stains, which are to be separated from (a)) being pure of any nature. The manner in which these two aspects of purity are not different is that they are not suitable as either different substances or isolates. This purity is not suitable as any substance because it is an empty entity and not really established. It is not suitable as an isolate either because it is not a phenomenon of mental states. In brief, these two aspects of purity are not one because the aspects of being empty, or the aspects of purity, of two given factors are not suitable to be one. But these two aspects of purity are not other either, because the single aspect of purity is only mentally presented as two distinct aspects of purity in dependence on the two aspects of subject and object. However, these two are one in being the single factor that is to be made pure—the stains. Thus, since these two aspects of purity are indivisible as being the same or other, they are proclaimed to be natural purity. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 533–34) says that the fruitions of the approach of virtuous effort—the four kinds of noble ones—are pure. The purity of being free from all antagonistic factors that obscure these fruitions means that these antagonistic factors (such as form) have been purified. Both the purity of these fruitions and the purity of form and such are characterized by being free from any reference points, such as clinging to any identity. Therefore, form and such are purity too. Thus, since the purity of these two aspects of purity is not different, they are indivisible. For these two aspects are neither different in terms of any characteristics that are established through their own specific characteristics nor in terms of any isolates that are general characteristics. JNS concludes with a verse:

> This very single factor to be purified—the stains—
> Being divided in terms of the way of becoming pure
> From the perspective of the two aspects of subject and object
> Is indeed labeled as two purities—
> Natural purity and purity of what is adventitious,
> But, ultimately, they cannot be split apart as being different.
> You should know that what are to be purified
> Are the phenomena from form and such up through the knowledge of all aspects;
> The means to purify is the path of familiarizing with prajñāpāramitā;
> And the results of purification are the fruitions of the approach of virtuous effort.

1069 CZ, pp. 291–92.

1070 JNS (pp. 534–35) says that one speaks of the results of purification of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas by virtue of the seeds of their respective factors to be purified (afflictions, conceptions about the apprehended, and conceptions about the apprehender) having been relinquished through the means of purification (the three paths of the three yānas). The utter purity of a buddha arises from, or is not different from, the dharmadhātu.

1071 CZ, p. 292.

1072 JNS (pp. 536–37) explicitly says that this manner of relinquishing refers to both the hīnayāna and the mahāyāna, with the fruition of utterly pure buddhahood being pure by virtue of having progressively relinquished the nine degrees of cognitive obscurations on (the uninterrupted paths of) the nine bhūmis of the path of familiarization, respectively. Abhayākaragupta's *Marmakaumudī* (D3805, fol. 108b) asserts that the nine degrees of the factors of the desire realm to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished from the second through the tenth bhūmis. From among the seventy-two factors of the two higher realms to be relinquished through familiarization, seventy-one are relinquished on the special path of the tenth bhūmi, while the last one is relinquished on the buddhabhūmi (the latter is refuted by LN vol. 2, p. 67). Both JNS and BT (p. 457) report the Third Karmapa to state that AA II.30 and II.31 explain the purity of the śrāvakas and a buddha, respectively. JNS adds that thus, according to the Third Karmapa, Haribhadra's following explanation on these verses is wrong, while BT says that the Karmapa is only giving an outline based on the verses of the AA without referring to Haribhadra's commentary (this is in fact all that is found in SC, pp. 34–35). Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 537) says that the remedial mental supports for relinquishing the nine degrees of cognitive obscurations with regard to the nine levels of saṃsāra (the foundation of the factors to be relinquished) consist of the four dhyānas, the four formless absorptions, and the meditative absorption of cessation. The ensuing relinquishment on the nine bhūmis of the path of familiarization results in the utter purity of a buddha, while the corresponding relinquishment of only the afflictive obscurations on the path of the śrāvakas represents the latter's type of purity.

1073 CZ, p. 293.

1074 As the ultimate answer to the above qualms, the *Ālokā* (D3791, fols. 163b.7–164a.2) cites the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, saying "there is nothing that benefits or harms." As the answer on the level of the seeming, the text uses the example of doing laundry as above in CE and continues that the last moment of the path of familiarization, through its being completely nonreferential with regard to the consciousnesses and the cognized objects that are the (dualistic) aspects of the three realms, realizes the equality of all phenomena and their being illusionlike. This is the nature of its being the remedy for everything. Thus, it is said that the actual utter purity is the one of the Buddha. The *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 101a.3–5) also has the latter answer, but just speaks about the utterly pure path of familiarization, not its last moment.

1075 JNS's (p. 538) example for small remedies being able to relinquish great factors to be relinquished is a little bit of light being able to eliminate an intense darkness. Commenting on the *Vivṛti's* refutation of the second qualm above, JNS (p. 540) says that cognition (that which verifies) and what is to be cognized (that which is to be verified) are realized to be unobservable and thus realized to be equality. For more details, see Appendix I2E5.

1076 CZ, p. 296.

1077 JNS (pp. 558–59) says that the knowledge of entities is an elaboration on the pure path of familiarization. In terms of those whose mahāyāna disposition is definite, this knowledge, which is required for properly rejecting and adopting what needs to be rejected and adopted, must be taught after the knowledge of the path. For bodhisattvas will not know the path well without being well-informed about the classificatory templates in terms of antagonistic factors and their remedies that are taught in the knowledge of entities. In terms of those whose disposition is

definitely of an inferior type, it is taught that the realization of the knowledge of the path will not arise without the preceding realization of the knowledge of entities. Thus, without a thorough knowledge of all entities (such as skandhas and dhātus), one will not know the path to perfect buddhahood well enough. Therefore, the knowledge of all these entities is taught after the knowledge of the path. As for matching the knowledge of entities with the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, according to CZ (pp. 298–311), it covers the last half of The Exposition of the Purity of All Dharmas (Chapter Thirty-six) and Unsupported Anywhere (Chapter Thirty-seven).

1078 The eight secondary colors are said to be bases for mistakenness, as there is no one single color of clouds or smoke and so on. To classify them as secondary colors in the abhidharma is simply an attempt to somehow account for them in the overall map of phenomena.

1079 For details on the totalities, see the comments on VIII.2d and Chart 12.

1080 Following JNS (p. 545), CE omits the fifth congruence (in terms of aspect) between primary minds and mental factors that is usually presented in texts on abhidharma and valid cognition. JNS says that if they both had the same aspect—which is the aspect in which consciousness itself manifests when cognizing a certain object—there would be no difference between them at all.

1081 See D4049, fols. 48aff.

1082 This refers to the meditative absorption without discrimination (Skt. asaṃjñisamāpatti, Tib 'du shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug), which is the highest type of meditative absorption within the fourth dhyāna (when performed for a long time, it leads to rebirth on the highest level of the gods of the form realm). During it, primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum (the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and their accompanying mental factors) temporarily cease. However, the latent tendencies for the arising of these consciousnesses are not eliminated. Thus, mistaken appearances will occur again, once one rises from this meditative absorption.

1083 This is another name of the absorption of cessation.

1084 (1) "Names" are mere designations, such as "book." (2) "Causal features" (Skt. *nimitta* can mean both "cause" and "characteristic" and is to be understood in this double sense here) refer to the bases for such designations, that is, dualistically appearing entities that, on the level of seeming reality, perform functions and have certain characteristics. (3) Here, "imagination" is a collective term for the eight kinds of consciousness. (4) "Perfect wisdom" bears this name because it is the perceiving subject of suchness. (5) "Suchness" is the ultimate object to be focused on through the path—the dharmadhātu. Among these, (1) corresponds to the imaginary nature, (2)–(3) represent the other-dependent nature, and (4)–(5) are the perfect nature in terms of subject and object (or the unmistaken and unchanging perfect nature), respectively.

1085 For more details, see Appendix I3A and Chart 21.

1086 The Tibetan has "extreme" (*mtha'*) for "shore."

1087 JNS (p. 559) says that what is taught here is that the prajñāpāramitā taught in the second chapter does not abide in the three spheres (agent, object, and action). Exactly this is taught as the nature of the knowledge of entities in this third chapter. If prajñāpāramitā were to abide at all, it would have to be in one of the three times, but since all three of them are understood as equality in that they are naturally empty, the prajñā of knowing this is asserted as prajñāpāramitā. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 563) says that, through realizing all phenomena in the three times, which arise from causes and conditions, as being equality in that they are actually unarisen, the means for being close to the buddhas and the bodhisattvas on the great bhūmis is the knowledge of the path as taught above. It has two functions. Through profound prajñā as its nature, it does not abide in saṃsāra (which has the characteristic of

being permanent in terms of an ongoing continuum). Through compassion as its distinctive feature of having a vast focus, it does not abide in nirvāṇa (which has the characteristic of said continuum being extinguished). Nor does it abide anywhere other than saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

1088 CZ, p. 298.

1089 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 563) says that, since śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not realize the equality of the three times, they are distant from the fruitional prajñāpāramitā of buddha wisdom. Thus, by virtue of their limited realizations, they lack the compassion and prajñā of the mahāyāna. Due to that, they abide in the extremes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa through focusing on them as being an entity and a nonentity (or being and nonbeing), respectively. For more details on the distinction between the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas versus that of bodhisattvas and the issue of whether the former two realize phenomenal identitylessness, see Appendix I3B.

1090 XVI.5d (D13, fol. 10a.2; Conze 1973, p. 44).

1091 JNS (pp. 565) says that the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is distant from fruitional prajñāpāramitā since it lacks the skill through great loving-kindness and compassion that is required to accomplish the fruitional mother. On the other hand, the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas is close by virtue of their skill in promoting the welfare of others (which is the means for accomplishing the fruitional mother). In brief, this difference between being close or distant refers to whether the prajñā of realizing the tathāgata heart is present or not. This prajñā of realizing the tathāgata heart must in turn depend on the arising of the prajñā of distinguishing the two realities. As for the latter, first, through the arising of the prajñā that realizes seeming reality, the aspect of conduct is primary by virtue of cultivating the trainings of bodhisattvas and gathering the accumulation of merit. Then, once the prajñā of realizing the ultimate has arisen, the aspect of the view is primary by virtue of this prajñā eliminating any clinging to characteristics and gathering the accumulation of wisdom. In this way, what is presented as close or distant here refers to the difference of whether this prajñā of practicing view and conduct in union is present or not. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, which quotes *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV.18ab ("What is dependent origination is explained by you to be emptiness"), JNS (pp. 564–67) says that the Buddha explained the dependent origination of all phenomena in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as being emptiness. Thus, knowing all phenomena in the three times to be equality in that they are empty is the actual knowledge of the basis that is the fundamental nature. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not have this knowledge since their presentation of dependent origination is a limited kind of emptiness. Thus, it is not that they, just through realizing this limited emptiness, realize all-encompassing emptiness. Without realizing this latter emptiness, the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas, which realizes the equality of the three times, does not arise. Therefore, the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas is close to the fruitional mother, whereas the one of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is distant from it. As for this being justified, by virtue of the above quote Haribhadra holds that Nāgārjuna and Maitreya agree. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are distant from the mother of the buddhas because they lack skill in means, such as lacking spiritual friends of the mahāyāna and, through not realizing the lack of nature of all phenomena, thinking of and clinging to the characteristics of really existent entities and nonentities (just as someone not realizing that the appearances in an illusionist's show are not real). Thus, since they do not realize that the nature of entities is being empty of any nature of entities, they lack the wisdom of equality. On the other hand, bodhisattvas are close to the mother of the buddhas because they possess skill in means in that they relied on mahāyāna spiritual friends for many eons and gave rise to the prajñā that arises from studying, reflecting, and meditating on the two realities, whose nature it is to be the unmistaken essential point of the pith instructions. Thus, they eliminated the mistaken clinging to

entities. In such bodhisattvas, through realizing that all phenomena are emptiness, the wisdom of knowing the equality of the three times arises.

1092 CZ, p. 298.

1093 JNS (pp. 567–68) says that the antagonistic factors of the path of bodhisattvas consist of the śrāvakas' and pratyekabuddhas' clinging to the emptiness of the five skandhas as the emptiness of the views about a real personality; clinging to the characteristics of the phenomena within the three times in the sense that these phenomena are substantially existent; and clinging to the factors of enlightenment as being real. The reasons for these kinds of clinging being antagonistic factors for bodhisattvas are as follows. During meditative equipoise, the mode of apprehension of the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is not contrary to the apprehension of characteristics. Also, during subsequent attainment, their knowledge of entities induces discriminating notions that apprehend characteristics, such as thinking, "A self does not exist." Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 568) says that the self and so on—which are imputed by non-Buddhists through their focusing on the contaminated phenomena of ordinary beings, the uncontaminated phenomena of noble ones, and merely ostensible entities as being real entities—are viewed as empty by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. These views and the discriminating notions that accomplish the inferior kinds of liberation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are indeed the remedies for the factors to be relinquished by them. However, on the path of bodhisattvas, any kind of apprehending characteristics is a factor to be relinquished because, through it, the actual way of being of objects is engaged in a mistaken way.

1094 JNS (pp. 568–69) comments that, though it is standard knowledge in Tibet that the familiarization in a manner that is the opposite of the one of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is the remedial knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas, this remedial knowledge is not explained as something other than the knowledge of the path in the second chapter of the AA. As for AA III.4ac, since one is not able to engage in prajñāpāramitā with conceptions about the three spheres, the above lack of clinging of bodhisattvas and their enjoining others to the same means that they stop all extremes of being attached to reference points. This is the remedy for the antagonistic factors that consist of the knowledge of entities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS says that the knowledge of entities of bodhisattvas is the remedy for the one of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—the clinging to characteristics—in every respect. For,through bodhisattvas being pure of the three spheres, they realize the phenomenal identitylessness of the pāramitās, thus dwelling in these pāramitās in such a way and also enjoining others to it. This means that they engage the actual way of being correctly, which is to be practiced as the bodhisattva path through stopping all clinging to characteristics in terms of any referents in which the agent, object, and action of attachment come together.

1095 CZ, p. 299. As also JNS indicates, the first phrase is usually considered to indicate the antagonistic factors, while the passage starting with "What is the detachment . . ." indicates the remedies.

1096 JNS (pp. 569–70) explains that, according to some Tibetan scholars, lines III.4ac refer to the relinquishment of clinging to characteristics in terms of the ground, while lines III.4d–5ab refer to the necessity of relinquishing such clinging in terms of the fruition too. This is basically how CE comments above. JNS explains III.4d as the actual clinging to characteristics in terms of the fruition, which is the subtle clinging to the Buddha or any other fruitions of the three yānas as being real, or being conceited about them. III.5ab represents the reason for this clinging being an antagonistic factor of the path of bodhisattvas—even the most subtle attachment to the path of manifesting the dharmakāya is such an antagonistic factor because attachment and so on are free (or void) by nature. Thus, the knowledge of the path is profound. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 570–71) says that all contaminated and uncontaminated virtues (such as paying homage to Buddha, dharma, and saṃgha through any forms of cognition on the level

of seeming reality) are causes for the accumulation of merit and thus represent the remedies for karmic obscurations. However, clinging to the Buddha, paying homage, and so on as actually being the Buddha, paying homage, and so on has the nature of subtle attachment. For bodhisattvas, such attachment can never be a remedy in any way and thus is an antagonistic factor to be relinquished. The reason for this is that phenomena like attachment are empty of any nature, essence, own characteristics, and substance. Thus, since the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas is profound in this way, even focusing on the Tathāgata with devotion is an antagonistic factor here. JNS adds that the phrase "being empty of any nature" in the *Vivṛti* here teaches nothing but being primordially empty. The imputations by others that *Svātantrika masters do not assert all phenomena as being primordially empty and that the above phrase must be interpreted as "being empty of real existence" are to be discarded.

1097 CZ, p. 300.

1098 JNS (p. 571) comments that the phenomena of seeming reality are of a single nature in that they are conditioned—they are empty of a nature. Ultimate phenomena are of a single nature in that they are unconditioned—they are also empty of a nature (note that, in either case, "empty of a nature" could equally be read as "naturally empty"). Knowing this relinquishes the attachment of apprehending any characteristics in terms of the fruition. For the basic nature of both realities is natural emptiness and, once this is revealed, its antagonistic factors—any superimpositions of apprehending it as nonempty phenomena—are relinquished. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 572) says that all phenomena are one in being empty of a nature (or being natural emptiness). As for what is called "the lack of nature," once cognition and what is to be cognized are realized to be one as the equality of emptiness, there is nothing that is attached, nor any basis to be attached to. Thus, any manner of being attached is relinquished.

1099 CZ, p. 301.

1100 At the beginning of the last sentence, CE has *kun rdzob pa'i gzugs la sogs par dmigs pa'i shes rab gyi yum gyi gnas tshul ma shes pa'i phyir*. Let alone the orthographical issue with the first *gyi*, it is hard to make sense of this phrase in this context without emending it to *kyis*, which seems to be supported by JNS's following comments (in addition, the phrase could also be read as "... the prajñā that [wrongly] focuses on or observes her as form ..."). Similar to CE, JNS (pp. 572–74) says that profound suchness—Mahāmudrā—is not realized through simply rejecting emptiness (the profound actuality free from reference points) being an object that is seen, heard, touched, or experienced by consciousness. This object of suchness is difficult to realize even through nonconceptual wisdom if its prowess is not perfected. All seeming phenomena (such as seeming form) are not observable as objects of this profound prajñāpāramitā. Therefore, wisdom does not cognize such objects, which are just nonexistent yet appearing. Or, in other words, since the special other objects—ultimate form and so on—are not objects of the consciousnesses of sentient beings, such objects are not cognized by them. For these reasons, prajñāpāramitā is not realized through consciousness and she is also difficult to be realized through ordinary wisdom. Since she is not any direct object or referent object whatsoever of both these cognitions, she is beyond the constraints of all conceiving and thus inconceivable. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 572–74) explains that, let alone profound prajñāpāramitā not being realized through any ordinary consciousness, the nature of ultimate prajñāpāramitā—profound Mahāmudrā—is difficult to realize even through simply eliminating all collections of consciousnesses together with their objects. The fundamental nature of the ultimate—the other-empty (which here bears the name of the knowledge of entities in the mind streams of bodhisattvas)—is taught to be more profound than the seeming, which is self-empty. Therefore, JNS concludes, just as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Haribhadra asserts that the seeing of the reality of the nature of phenomena on the first bhūmi represents the fully qualified seeing of this reality if the fundamental nature of the ultimate—the profound other-empty—is seen. However,

without seeing this fundamental nature, just by virtue of realizing the fundamental nature of the seeming—the nonprofound self-empty—as a nonimplicative negation, this is not the fully qualified seeing of reality. In brief, prajñāpāramitā being difficult to realize is presented in the AA as the reason for her being profound, while her being inconceivable is given as the reason for her being difficult to realize. Obviously, compared to other commentaries, the explanations by CE and JNS on lines III.6ab are quite unique. For example, the *Ālokā* (pp. 421–23; D3791, fols. 168a.8–169b.2) says that the way in which prajñāpāramitā is profound is as follows. By virtue of not observing (that is, removing or denying) the objects that are observed by all consciousnesses, the equality of cognition and what is cognized is pointed out. Therefore, the nature of prajñāpāramitā is said to be difficult to realize and thus as profound as space (due to being undifferentiated). As for the reason for this nature being so difficult to realize, the sūtras say, "There is no one who becomes completely and perfectly enlightened" (this and the following quotes are on pp. 300–302 in CZ) because the nature of the aspects from form up through the unique buddhadharmas is suchness. Therefore, it is asserted that becoming completely and perfectly enlightened is inconceivable and thus difficult to realize. As for the reason for its being inconceivable, the sūtras say, "It is neither something that can be known by mind nor something to be realized by mind." It is by virtue of its being unproduced (as the sūtras say, "Prajñāpāramitā is not produced") that it is not known by mind since the mental engagement in aspiring for it (on the path of preparation) is just an aspiration. And it is not to be realized by mind since it is not cognized through mentally engaging in true reality (from the path of seeing onward) either. The reason why it is unproduced is that, according to the sūtras, "a producer (or creator) is not observable," that is, any cause that could function as a producer cannot be found. Thus, this is expressed here as a proof by way of any causal or resultant entities with regard to prajñāpāramitā being unobservable through direct perception. In conclusion, the *Ālokā* says, it is not that prajñāpāramitā is realized by a cognition that is without aspect (*nirākāra*) because all conscious states per se are alike in being sheer awareness (*saṃvit*) without cognitional content. But it is equally not the case that prajñāpāramitā is realized by a cognition that entails an aspect (*sākāra*) because cognitions with aspects are not necessarily cognitions of real underlying entities (just as seeing two moons shows the aspect of two moons, while there is only one actual moon). In other words, this means that, unlike a dream consciousness and so on, what cognizes prajñāpāramitā is neither completely without any real basis (since it cognizes the ultimate reality—prajñāpāramitā) nor is its basis something that can be known in an ordinary or dualistic manner. In this way, prajñāpāramitā is beyond any ordinary form of knowledge and free from reference points and expression. PBG (p. 532) explains that ultimate reality is difficult to realize because it is the stopping of what is realized through conventional valid cognition (such as seeing or hearing).

1101 CZ, p. 301.

1102 JNS (pp. 574–75) glosses that this is the division of the antagonistic factors and remedies in terms of the prajñāpāramitā of realizing the equality of the three times as these factors were explained in the sūtras. In a concluding verse, JNS says that bodhisattvas who know that any apprehending of characteristics is a factor to be relinquished are victorious over all antagonistic factors through the profound prajñāpāramitā that is free from characteristics.

1103 CE lists only six examples, omitting "echoes." Instead of "optical illusion," the sūtras and most other commentaries have "a city of gandharvas" (which is basically a particular example of an optical illusion).

1104 JNS (pp. 576 and 581–82) comments that, among the ten trainings, (1)–(4) are the four trainings in profound prajñāpāramitā. To these, Āryavimuktisena applies the conventional term "trainings in stopping engagement in clinging." Some also say that these four are the natural trainings (see IV.8–9a) because they are the trainings that pervade all stages of the

path. Differing from CE, JNS says that only these four are trainings (or preparations) for yoga, while the remaining six are the actual stages of yoga. However, since "training" is the primary topic to be taught in this section, the remaining six are also designated with the conventional term "training." In particular, (3) means to stop clinging to what is incomplete as the support to be focused on on the path (imaginary and conceived forms) and what is complete as such a support (perfect form), which is the training in detachment. (4) means to even stop clinging to this very detachment. (5) The instruction that prajñāpāramitā (the object to familiarize with) is unchanging represents the training in stopping clinging to her never changing into anything else. (6) The instruction that there is no agent in this prajñāpāramitā that is the object to familiarize with represents the training in stopping clinging to profound prajñāpāramitā—the very agent. (7) The three kinds of what is hard to do for bodhisattvas refer to the trainings in stopping clinging in terms of it being difficult to (a) not become fainthearted when spacelike prajñāpāramitā is taught; (b) make efforts toward this spacelike prajñāpāramitā; and (c) not turn away from spacelike enlightenment. To connect this with the three knowledges, the importance of not becoming fainthearted is taught here because the knowledge of all aspects is an aim difficult to attain; effort is important because the knowledge of the path is accordingly difficult to train in; and a mindset of not turning away from great enlightenment is important because the activity of the knowledge of entities is accordingly difficult [*Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 170b.7): Through observing all phenomena like space, in true reality there is no difference in terms of prajñā or anything else. However, since bodhisattvas don the armor of vigor and so on for the sake of the knowledge of all aspects, it is very difficult]. (8) The instruction that the fruitions of a stream-enterer and so on are attained through training in prajñāpāramitā is as follows. Since such fruitions are attained according to the destinies of those who train in prajñāpāramitā with more or less excellence, there are the wishes for many fruitions through such trainings in their cause—prajñāpāramitā. The training here is to stop clinging to such wishes. (9) is the training in stopping engaging in clinging to the fact that those who make efforts in the profound yogas of prajñāpāramitā are independent of protection by other persons. (10) The reason for such independence is that bodhisattvas, or those who settle in meditative equipoise in prajñāpāramitā, understand all phenomena as illusions and so on. Therefore, they reveal the lack of nature of the triad of an object to be harmed, a subject that harms, and the harm itself. So what protection by others should they need? However, the training here is to stop clinging to being independent in this way. Some people also say, "The first four are the natural trainings, while the other six are situational trainings (see IV.8–11) because they need to be cultivated upon facing certain antagonistic factors" (this is found in RT). Among the latter, (5) is the training in terms of the nature of phenomena and the subject, while (6) is the one in terms of the bearers of this nature and the object. Respectively, (7)–(10) are the trainings in terms of activity or function, cause, fruition, and what makes one understand. In brief, though these ten are well-known as "the trainings in the knowledge of entities" and this designation is not contradictory if one thinks of them as something being taught in this third chapter on the knowledge of entities, they are not trainings that accord with the mode of apprehension of the knowledge of entities. Rather, they are trainings in engaging in the prajñāpāramitā as taught in the second chapter because they are yogas of stopping clinging to ten objects, such as form. These trainings include the three levels of training on the paths of seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning. Though it is just barely acceptable to match what is explicitly taught here with the path of preparation, in actual fact these trainings exist from the path of preparation up through the end of the continuum on the tenth bhūmi. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 582–83) says that, among the seven examples under (10), illusions represent the coming together of causes and conditions; mirages, the way of appearance and the actual way of being being contradictory; dreams, the transformation of latent tendencies; echoes, dependence on conditions; the reflection of the moon in water, appearing yet not shifting away from the actual way of being; a city of gandharvas, the lack of any support to support anything; and magical creations, there being no actual agents. Applying

this to all phenomena, the training is to stop clinging to mere appearances. These ten trainings of bodhisattvas are what the AA teaches explicitly, while śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas train in ways that are the opposites of these ten. LN (vol. 2, pp. 83 and 85) says that these ten trainings are trainings in nonreferentiality by way of eliminating clinging to any characteristics of one's practice. All ten entail both meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment, but the first six primarily pertain to meditative equipoise, while the tenth refers mainly to subsequent attainment. The boundary lines are that the actual ten trainings exist on the path of preparation since they are the causes for the subsequent path of seeing. However, in terms of the higher paths incorporating the qualities of the lower ones, it is not contradictory to say that these trainings also exist on the paths of seeing and familiarization. YT (pp. 335–36) defines the trainings in the knowledge of entities that stop clinging as "the yogas of nonreferential familiarization through mentally engaging in the knowledge of all aspects and thus relinquishing manifest engagement in clinging with regard to all inner and outer phenomena that there are." These ten trainings exist from the path of accumulation up through the end of the continuum. PSD (pp. 238–39) agrees with these boundary lines because the ten trainings in the knowledge of entities are the remedies for clinging to any characteristics with regard to view, meditation, conduct, fruition, subject, and object and thus must be cultivated for as long as any such characteristics arise. NSML (pp. 356–57 and 359) explains that these trainings in the knowledge of entities pertain to the progression of the factors to be relinquished and their remedies during the subsequent attainment of bodhisattvas since the same progression during their meditative equipoise was already taught in the second chapter. For though what is taught in both chapters is alike in including such a progression during meditative equipoise, the distinction of being close to or distant from the knowledge of all aspects is taught here by virtue of the specific feature of, respectively, knowing or not knowing said progression during subsequent attainment. All these trainings exist only on the path of preparation.

1105 CZ, p. 302.

1106 Skt. trilakṣaṇa, Tib. mtshan nyid gsum. This is another common name for the three natures.

1107 This common Indian simile is found in many Yogācāra texts, such as Vasubandhu's *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (verses 27–30; for a translation, see, for example, Brunnhölzl 2007a, pp. 47–53). There, the ālaya-consciousness is said to be like a mantra, suchness like the wood, imagination like the appearing aspect of the elephant, and duality like the notion of an elephant out there. In other words, the ālaya-consciousness is the "agent" that makes the illusory mere appearances of the other-dependent nature manifest, with their dualistic "content" (here a seemingly external "elephant") being the imaginary nature. The perfect nature, or suchness, is what is actually there, just perceived wrongly (a piece of wood, which was used by Indian magicians as the support that, through the power of mantra and so on, seemed to manifest as an illusory appearance). However, though the example of a piece of wood for suchness is often interpreted as reifying the perfect nature as some solid remainder, once duality has vanished it is not meant that way (at least by Vasubandhu and almost all Yogācāras). Though it is a seemingly static and material metaphor familiar in a traditional Indian context, the point is not to claim a static or reifying notion of suchness, but to illustrate that the dynamic mode of being of things as they actually are is the ground for all appearances. In other words, suchness, the perfect nature, or ultimate reality is not simply a blank nothingness.

1108 In other words, the former (Tib. mtshan nyid chad pa'i kun brtags) refers to sheer mental imputations of what, from a Yogācāra point of view, does not exist at all in any way, such as a truly existent self or external material substance. The latter (Tib. rnam grangs pa'i kun brtags) refers to mental images of conventionally existent phenomena (such as when thinking of a book

or a person); dualistic appearances for nonconceptual consciousnesses; and nonexistents that still seem to appear clearly (such as seeing purple mice when drunk).

1109 For more details on the three natures, see Appendix I3C and the Bibliography, especially Brunnhölzl 2004 (pp. 462–71 and 480–86), 2007b (pp. 60–62), and 2009 (pp. 35–53).

1110 The last sentence is unclear and has no identifiable reference in the sūtras (as also indicated in JNS, the corresponding portion is CZ, p. 305). JNS (pp. 583–84) comments that bodhisattvas need to cultivate each one of the above ten trainings by way practicing them through fourfold equality, which serves to eliminate obstacles. These four respectively refer to being free from apprehending (1) any entity with the defining characteristic of functioning; (2) any characteristics of form, which are just imputed designations; (3) anything that is positively delimited as "self" and anything that is negatively delimited as "other"; (4) any entity that is a support or something supported. Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 584–85) says that these four equalities refer to the cognitive aspects of the ten trainings in terms of stopping any conceit about any subject or object. Thus, they mean being free from any conceits (or such conceits being unobservable) in terms of clinging to (1) phenomena as having a nature; (2) their characteristics (such as color and shape); (3) the reference points of "me" and "mine," which come from not understanding the nature and aspects of phenomena [*Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 172a.4): reference points such as the twofold or twentyfold classifications of form]; and (4) realizing the ways in which phenomena appear and how they actually are. The reason why the direct seeing of the fundamental nature of all entities (skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas) on the path of seeing (as discussed in III.11ff.) must be preceded by having familiarized with this fourfold equality is that such seeing will not manifest without having put an end to the above four types of conceit about these entities.

1111 The Sanskrit of lines III.11ab (*dharmajñānānvayajñānakṣāntijñānakṣaṇātmakaḥ*; corresponding to lines bc in the translation) is a single and—given the usual order of the four readinesses and cognitions—somewhat peculiar compound, which may be broken down in more than one way. For example, the Tibetan has an "and" between "dharma cognition, subsequent cognition" and "readiness . . ." However, most commentaries simply read this as "readiness for *dharma cognition*, dharma cognition, *readiness for subsequent cognition*, and subsequent *cognition*." From a Sanskrit perspective (as represented in the translation), it seems more likely that *kṣāntijñānakṣanātmakaḥ* represents a compound on its own, with its general sense being instantiated by *dharmajñāna* and *anvayajñāna*. This is how PBG (p. 535) and BT (p. 476) read it (also JNS uses the phrase "moments of readinesses and cognitions" two times here). Alternatively, the overall compound could also be read as "has the character of momentary cognitions—dharma cognition, subsequent cognition, and their readinesses" (NSML [p. 364] speaks of "having the character of sixteen momentary wisdoms").

1112 JNS (p. 586) elaborates that the nature of the path of seeing taught here is the clear realization of the four realities free from the thirty-two superimpositions in terms of the sixteen aspects of the four realities. As for classifying these, the *Vṛtti* explains the sixteen readinesses and cognitions as the sixteen wisdoms free from the two times sixteen superimpositions in accordance with what the sūtras and the AA explicitly teach here. Haribhadra explains these sixteen by matching them with the four wisdoms and the four dharma readinesses of being free from four sets of eight superimpositions. The purpose of teaching that the path of seeing of bodhisattvas must be free from these thirty-two superimpositions is that it needs to go beyond the paths of both tīrthikas and śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, who respectively entertain one set of sixteen superimpositions as indicated above.

1113 Note that the following commentary relates each one of the sixteen aspects here with the corresponding one among the sixteen aspects of the four realities according to the śrāvaka system.

1114 The Tibetan of line III.12d has "being without attachment" (*chags pa spangs pa*) and CE comments accordingly.

1115 JNS (pp. 588–89) comments on the above sixteen moments of wisdom as follows. (1) Because the objects (form and so on of the nature of phenomena) are neither permanent nor impermanent, the subject that knows this (the dharma readiness of suffering) is also free from permanence and impermanence. (2) Because those objects (ultimate form and so on) are beyond extremes, the subject that knows this (the dharma cognition of suffering) is also free from all being beyond or not being beyond extremes. (3) Because these objects are pure, the subject that knows this (the subsequent readiness of suffering) is also free from being pure or impure. (4) Because these objects neither arise nor cease and so on (that is, lack any afflicted or purified phenomena), the subject that knows this (the subsequent cognition of suffering) is also free from nonarising, nonceasing, and so on. (5) Because these objects are pure like space, the subject that knows this (the dharma readiness of the origin of suffering) is also free from stains, just like space. (6) Because these objects are without attachment, the subject that knows this (the dharma cognition of origin) is also free from all attachment and free from any being free from attachment. (7) Because these objects cannot be grasped, the subject that knows this (the subsequent readiness of origin) is also free from all grasping and nongrasping. (8) Because these objects are inexpressible as a nature of their own, the subject that knows this (the subsequent cognition of origin) is also free from any nature of expressibility or inexpressibility. (9) The object (the subtle reality of cessation) and its subject (the dharma readiness of cessation) are both beyond the pure path. Also, the profound reality of cessation (the object that is impossible to convey to the mind streams of others through expressing the meaning of this subject and object) is not observable. For these reasons, the same goes for its subject (the dharma readiness of cessation). (10) Because this object (cessation) is free from all serving as a focal object, the same goes for its subject (the dharma cognition of cessation). (11) Because this object is utterly pure, the same goes for its subject (the subsequent readiness of cessation). (12) Because in this object (the ultimate abode of cessation) there is no arising of diseases and so on, the same goes for its subject (the subsequent cognition of cessation). (13) The dharma readiness of the path extinguishes the unpleasant realms and bestows all excellence. (14) The dharma cognition of the path is the nonconceptuality with respect to directly manifesting the fruitions of liberation and omniscience through prajñāpāramitā. (15) The subsequent readiness of the path means to have no connection with any characteristics. (16) The subsequent cognition of the path is the wisdom that there is no arising of any consciousness that is based on either entities or names (the objects or means of expression, respectively). The previous learned ones declared, "According to the path of seeing of śrāvakas, the four times four realizations, such as dharma readiness (the subjects), induce certainty about the objects that are the respective seeming natures of the four realities. However, on the mahāyāna path of seeing, these sixteen moments of subjects, while focusing on the four realities, induce certainty about the objects that are the respective ultimate natures of these realities. Thus, there is a difference between the followers of the hīnayāna and the mahāyāna in terms of the way of the perceiving subjects (the wisdoms) inducing certainty about differing objects—the seeming and the ultimate modes of being of the four realities, respectively." Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (pp. 589–93) says that the dharma readiness and so on of suffering are the realizations that all phenomena are (1) free from being permanent or impermanent because of lacking any nature of their own; (2) free from the extremes of permanence and extinction because of being free from being or not being suffering; (3) primordially pure because of being free from either being empty or nonempty; and (4) neither arising nor ceasing because of not being of the nature of an identity or identitylessness. Thus, the aspects of the mahāyāna reality of suffering put an end to the extremes of both sides—neither being suffering, afflicted, bound, and so on, nor being without suffering, purified, liberated, and so on (the same applies for the remaining three realities). The dharma readiness and so on of the origin of suffering are the realizations of being (5) the spacelike freedom from

being or not being a cause because of everything that is presented as causes and noncauses being delusive and null; (6) the relinquishment of all attachments of primary and secondary afflictions because of not entailing any origin or lack of origin; (7) free from any basis of imputation for grasping at anything as "this" or "that" because of not being connected with arising, nonarising, same, and different; and (8) inexpressible through a nature of its own because of being free from being or not being a condition. The dharma readiness and so on of the cessation that actually fulfills this function are the realizations of (9) it being impossible to convey the meaning of cessation to the mind streams of others through verbal expressions because of its not being connected with cessation or noncessation; (10) its not serving as a focal object because of not being either peace or nonpeace; (11) its being free from the two extremes and pure because of being free from being or not being excellence; and (12) no diseases of mistakenness arising in it because of neither being nor not being final deliverance. The dharma readiness and so on of the path are the realizations of (13) the locations of the unpleasant realms being completely extinct because of its being free from being or not being the path; (14) its nonconceptuality about the means for manifesting the supreme fruition because of not being mixed with being or not being appropriate; (15) its not being connected with the characteristics of all phenomena because of being free from being or not being accomplishment; and (16) no arising of any consciousness with regard to both knowable objects (the specifically characterized referents that are the objects of expression) and terms (the generally characterized means of expression) because of being neither conducive nor nonconducive to deliverance. As for the meaning of "neither permanent nor impermanent" under (1), the nature of the subject (the readinesses and cognitions) is an implicative negation. However, since the object is neither permanent nor impermanent, it is nothing but a nonimplicative negation. Some say that "not permanent" implies "impermanent" and "not impermanent" implies "permanent" and that therefore the aspect here is their inseparability, but this is highly obscured. As for the types of realization of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas (such as their paths of seeing), they are to be known by bodhisattvas for the sake of others, but these realizations are not something to be manifested by these bodhisattvas and even less something to be familiarized with. Therefore, a path of bodhisattvas familiarizing with these types of realization is not taught here. Some may say, "If bodhisattvas do not manifest the path of seeing of śrāvakas, then bodhisattvas who have not gone through inferior paths would not be able to relinquish the afflictive obscurations because the relinquishment of the afflictive obscurations depends on cultivating the path of the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence." There is no such flaw because bodhisattvas do not strive for a liberation that consists of merely relinquishing the afflictions. In this chapter of the AA, a path of familiarization of bodhisattvas on which they would familiarize with the personal identitylessness that they have seen already on the path of seeing is not taught because they do not deliberately familiarize with personal identitylessness as the remedy for afflictive obscurations, which is implied by them not striving for a nirvāṇa that consists merely of the relinquishment of afflictive obscurations. "What would be wrong with bodhisattvas familiarizing with personal identitylessness in this way?" If they were to do so, they would relinquish the causes for their taking rebirth in saṃsāra that bear the name "latencies of craving for the desire realm" because the personal identitylessness that entails the sixteen aspects of impermanence and so on is the remedy that eradicates the seeds of this craving for the desire realm. If bodhisattvas were to eradicate them, they would give up the nature of the knowledge of the path. For on the seven impure bhūmis of bodhisattvas who have not previously gone through inferior paths, they would not be able to accumulate uncontaminated karma by virtue of the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance and there would not be any other causes for their accomplishing a saṃsāric existence either. Some may object, "But then bodhisattvas on the first nine bhūmis who have not previously gone through inferior paths would not be able to take birth in the form realm because they have not relinquished the latencies for the desire realm, and one is not able to take birth in the form realm without having relinquished these." There is no such flaw either because it is the distinctive

feature of bodhisattvas on the path of preparation and up to manifest the actual states of higher levels without having relinquished the causes for taking birth in the lower ones and to equally take birth in the lower ones while not regressing from the actual states of higher ones. In brief, it is not the case that bodhisattvas are not able to relinquish the afflictive obscurations if they do not manifest the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas because bodhisattvas have relinquished the afflictions on the first bhūmi. The reason applies because they are able to relinquish the entirety of the afflictive obscurations that bind in saṃsāra through the dharma readiness of suffering of the mahāyāna path of seeing alone (being able to do so also means that they have relinquished the coarsest cognitive obscurations). Bodhisattvas just do not relinquish the afflictive obscurations that are said latencies of craving for the desire realm by way of deliberately familiarizing with personal identitylessness as their remedy, but that does not mean that they are not able to relinquish them. Some people refer to the following passage in the *Vṛtti* (D3787, fol. 118b.5–6) as being internally contradictory since it explains both that bodhisattvas do and do not manifest the paths of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas: "'The knowledge and seeing of bodhisattvas looks at the excellencies of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and then transcends them.' This is said with the intention of [bodhisattvas doing so] because they prioritize [the welfare of] others. Furthermore, this refers to [the sutra passage] 'The knowledges and seeings of stream-enterers up through pratyekabuddhas represent [the poised readiness of bodhisattvas who attained] the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising.'" As for the meaning of the first part of this passage (bodhisattvas not manifesting these inferior realizations), unlike the śrāvakas they neither manifest them by way of the sixteen aspects such as impermanence nor by way of relinquishing the craving for the desire realm. As for the meaning of the second part of this passage (bodhisattvas manifesting these realizations), it entails the intention that it is through the path of directly seeing emptiness that they relinquish personal identity and the apprehended aspect of phenomenal identity and realize both kinds of identitylessness in full. Therefore, these two statements are not contradictory because the basis of the intention with which they were made is not the same.

1116 CZ, p. 306.

1117 JNS (p. 594) says that the *Ālokā*, the *Vivṛti*, Abhayākaragupta's *Marmakaumudī*, and Ratnākaraśānti's *Sārottamā* comment that the order of the three knowledges in this concluding verse is the one in which they were explained in detail so far. The two Vimuktisenas, the revised version of the sūtra in twenty-five thousand lines, and Ratnākaraśānti's *Śuddhamatī* explain that the verse refers to the reverse order of the three knowledges.

1118 CZ, p. 309.

1119 Unless when indicated by (transl.), the general topics throughout Appendix I are usually not literal translations. It is the nature of traditional Indo-Tibetan treatises in general and JNS in particular to be very technical and terse in style. Thus, in order to clarify certain elements, be more in tune with the English language, and avoid redundancy, the materials here are partly paraphrased, supplemented, and/or slightly abbreviated. In particular, when quotations in JNS are explained in the text, they are often not translated, but only referred to by their page or verse numbers in the respective sources.

1120 Pp. 270–314. Note that most of the headings and much of the contents of JG's explanation on bodhicitta correspond closely to the discussion of this topic in LSSP (fols. 92b.1–112a.5). However, occasionally, JG refutes LSSP's positions (see below). As explained in the Introduction, LSSP uses numerous older commentarial templates, which makes a common source of LSSP and JG quite likely.

1121 Most probably this refers to XXXI.4, being the only verse in the *Prajñāpāramitā-saṃcayagāthā* that speaks about this:

When bodhisattvas taste the five sense pleasures
And yet have gone for refuge to the Buddha, the dharma, and the genuine saṃgha,
Turning their attention toward omniscience, [thinking,] "I shall become a buddha,"
They should be known as being established in the pāramitā of ethics.

1122 This must refer to Jetāri's *Bodhicittotpādasamādānavidhi* (D3968, fol. 242b.4–7), which presents the mahāyāna refuge by calling upon all buddhas and bodhisattvas in the ten directions and then taking refuge in the three jewels (the Buddha, the mahāyāna dharma, and the bodhisattva saṃgha) until one attains buddhahood for the sake of liberating all other sentient beings from saṃsāra (the śrāvaka way of taking refuge would be to take refuge in the Buddha, śrāvaka dharma, and śrāvaka saṃgha until one dies in order to liberate oneself alone from saṃsāra). Jetāri's text is also referred to by name in JG below, but—unlike in the *Tengyur*—attributed to Nāgārjuna.

1123 The Tibetan tradition distinguishes between two main approaches of generating bodhicitta through (1) regarding others as equal to oneself and exchanging oneself with others and (2) the sevenfold pith instruction on cause and result. (1) clearly corresponds to Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* VIII.89ff., but is usually further traced back to Nāgārjuna and Mañjuśrī. As for (2), while it may be regarded as being partly anticipated in certain passages of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (thus being usually associated with Maitreya and Asaṅga), Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama*, and Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa*, it is not set forth explicitly and in toto anywhere prior to the fully developed texts of the Tibetan *lamrim* and *lojong* genres. The seven steps in terms of the progressive causes that result in the respectively subsequent step and, finally, in the generation of uncontrived true bodhicitta are (1) regarding all sentient beings as equal; (2) acknowledging all sentient beings as having been our mothers in the past; (3) remembering their kindness as our mothers; (4) wishing to repay their kindness; (5) developing loving-kindness for them (wishing them to possess happiness and its causes); (6) developing compassion (wishing them to be free from suffering and its causes); and (7) developing the superior intention (the superior altruistic attitude of bodhisattvas having solely the welfare of others in mind, which is present in them in the same spontaneous intensity in which ordinary beings usually strive for their own well-being).

1124 Skt. cetanā, Tib. sems pa.

1125 I could not locate this exact statement (which is also adduced by LSSP and PSD) in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The closest that is found in this text is: "The perfect aspiration for the sake of what is supramundane is the supreme unsurpassable perfect aspiration among all those virtues" (P5538, p. 135.5.5). In addition, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (1.2, §§1.1.2. and 1.1.3.) explains bodhicitta as having the same two focal objects—enlightenment and the welfare of others—as Vasubandhu and others do below.

1126 Limaye ed., p. 42. According to Vasubandhu, the three qualities are (1) the great enthusiasm for attaining the profound and performing difficult tasks for a long time by virtue of armorlike vigor, as well as great endeavor by virtue of the ensuing vigor of application; (2) the great purpose of being concerned about the welfare of both oneself and others; and (3) the great outcome of attaining great enlightenment. Thus, the three qualities are the qualities produced by a person, the quality of working for the benefit of others, and the quality of maturing the fruition. The two focal objects are (1) great enlightenment and (2) promoting the welfare of others.

1127 P. 31.

1128 Just like LSSP (fol. 93a.5–6), JG says below that Āryavimuktisena identifies a mental consciousness that is focused on virtue as representing bodhicitta because the five sense consciousnesses are solely oriented outwardly, while the ālaya-consciousness and the afflicted mind are neutral (that is, neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous).

1129 Thus, against a more straightforward reading of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IV.1 and Vasubandhu's above commentary, Haribhadra takes "mind" (citta) in IV.1d as the main element of bodhicitta in the sense of a primary mind, while the mental factor "intention" is just its associated mental aid.

1130 P. 24; D3791, fol. 19b.1–5. For the very similar passage on which the *Ālokā* is based here, see p. 15 of the *Vṛtti* and below under 2ba3.

1131 D3793, fol. 82a.7–82b.3.

1132 Later, JG (pp. 291–92) elaborates further on the purpose of labeling the generation of bodhicitta with the name of "desire" or "striving" as its cause. In the mind streams of bodhisattvas who strive for the welfare of others and enlightenment, all virtuous dharmas of the mahāyāna will increase in accordance with this striving. Thus, this label of "desire" or "striving" is used in order to make one understand (1) that such striving resolve is the first specific cause of its result (bodhicitta) and (2) that this result arises from and accords with this cause. The purpose of the name of the mental aid being given to what is associated with it lies in making one understand that the generation of bodhicitta that arises in bodhisattvas is endowed with aspiration—the mental aid of striving for enlightenment. In general, "resolve" and "aspiration" are both similar in striving for a desired entity. However, the former appears as the aspect that is the desire to act or do something, while the latter appears as the aspect that is the desire to attain something. Therefore, here, the desire to act for the welfare of others is explained as "resolve," while the desire to attain enlightenment refers to "aspiration." In this way, the former is explained as the cause of bodhicitta, while the latter refers to its mental aid. The causal resolve represents the compassion that has the aspect of being focused on the welfare of others as its direct focal object and desiring these others to be free from suffering. Since the generation of bodhicitta arises from this cause that precedes it, this cause is explained as its result. The aspiration that serves as the mental aid of generating bodhicitta has the aspect of being focused on enlightenment as its direct focal object and desiring to attain it. It is explained as the mental aid of generating bodhicitta because it operates simultaneously with it.

1133 In sum, Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu explain bodhicitta as being a particular case of the mental factor "intention," while Āryavimuktisena, Bhadanta Vimuktisena, and Haribhadra do not identify bodhicitta as a mental factor, but as a primary mind—a particular case of the mental consciousness.

1134 The *Munimatālaṃkāra* (D3903, fol. 173a.7f) briefly presents the gist of what the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā* say, but does not go into said qualm and its answer.

1135 D3805, fol. 10a.7–10b.1.

1136 I could not locate this line in Atiśa's text, which says (D3804, fol. 232b.4):

> The desire for buddhahood for the sake of others
> Is explained as its definition by Maitreya.

1137 D3800, fol. 8b.6–7.

1138 D3801, fol. 79a.7–79b.1. LSSP (fol. 93b.2–4) adds here that Dharmamitra's explanation in his *Prasphuṭapadā* follows Haribhadra, but is a bit muddled, saying, "According to some, 'generating bodhicitta' is taught as the primary entity in [the process of] the generation of bodhicitta, that is, aspiring and such. According to others, it is designated as the aids that make the generation of bodhicitta increase, that is, generosity and so on. According to yet others, it is its results that are labeled as [bodhicitta], that is, the path of single progress [(the eighth bhūmi)] and so on."

1139 This and the following quotes from the *Vṛtti* are found on p. 15.

1140 Gendün Drub's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* (Varanasi 1973, p. 98) says that this quote is from a sūtra.

1141 As mentioned in the context of the translators' homage at the beginning of the AA, it is in the sense of the definition of generating bodhicitta that the *Ālokā* (p. 31) explains the meaning of *bodhisattva*. *Bodhi* is taken to refer to the power of prajñā taking enlightenment as one's object and sattva to refer to the force of compassion taking sentient beings as one's objects. Thus, literally, bodhisattvas are "those for whom enlightenment and sentient beings [serve as their objects]" (a rather peculiar Sanskrit *bahuvrīhi* compound). PK (fol. 30a.3–30b.2), following Haribhadra's *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā* (D3792, fol. 5a.2), explains the generation of bodhicitta as the generation of mind as emptiness with a heart of compassion. Through compassion, bodhisattvas focus on the aim that is the welfare of others, while emptiness refers to prajñā, through which they desire perfect enlightenment. Thus, compassion is what accomplishes and prajñā is what purifies. Also, compassion is counted as the accumulation of merit because it is for the sake of performing all activities for the welfare of others. Prajñā represents the accumulation of wisdom since it means to act for the sake of enlightenment. In this way, through dwelling in the compassion that seizes the seeming and the prajñā that seizes the ultimate, these two serve as aids for each other. By virtue of this, in the form of a mere illusion, they operate and accomplish in a simultaneous manner. For this reason, the *Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā* (fol. 7a.1–2) says, "Hence, the nature of the illusionlike generation of bodhicitta encompasses the knowledge of all aspects and the eight clear realizations."

1142 D3940, fol. 7a.5–6.

1143 D3874, fol. 6b.6.

1144 D3872, fols. 51bf.

1145 D3915, fol. 25a.2–4.

1146 LSSP (fol. 94b.2–6) adds the position of the later Buddhaśrījñāna ("The bodhicitta of aspiration is the one of all mundane [paths], while the bodhicitta of application starts with [the first bhūmi] 'Supreme Joy'") and says that Ngog Lotsāwa agrees with it. LSSP dismisses all positions such as Buddhaśrījñāna's and Dharmamitra's that draw the line between the bodhicittas of aspiration and application in terms of being or not being adopted through a ceremony; having or not having attained irreversibility; or making a commitment with regard to the cause and the fruition, respectively. For they all stray from the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* and Śāntideva's system that comments on this sūtra's intention.

1147 D3875, fol. 94a.6–7.

1148 As mentioned above, the *Tengyur* attributes this work to Jetāri.

1149 The phrase "The characteristic of aspiration is to be manifested" is found in the *Bodhicittotpādasamādānavidhi* (D3968, fol. 243a.2) right after the recitation of *Bodhicaryāvatāra* III.11 and 21–22. The text is about describing the ceremony for generating bodhicitta, but indeed only speaks of a single ceremony and not about a separate one for the bodhicitta of aspiration. This is even made explicit in the section that follows the above phrase, in which Jetāri says that one should adopt the bodhicitta of both aspiration and application by three times reciting *Bodhicaryāvatāra* III.23–24.

1150 As noted before, in Buddhism, "substance" includes not only matter, but also mind.

1151 The *Tengyur* does not contain such a text.

1152 This position is found in Tsongkhapa's LSSP (fol. 96a.1–4). Later Gelugpa commentators, such as the first 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721), disagree with Tsongkhapa, saying that the bodhicitta of both aspiration and application are developed simultaneously on the lesser path

of accumulation. However, the former type of bodhicitta needs to be sustained only up through the seventh bhūmi, while the latter must be retained until buddhahood (*mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi mtha' dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don kun gsal ba'i rin chen sgron me*, N. Gelek Demo ed., *Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyumphel Series*, New Delhi 1973, vol. 46, pp. 287.2 and 289.4). Note in this context that, according to Jñānakīrti's *Prajñāpāramitāyānabhāvanākramopadeśa* (as quoted in LSSP, fol. 95b.4), the first three generations of bodhicitta in AA I.19–20 are the divisions of the bodhicitta of aspiration, while the remaining nineteen represent the bodhicitta of application. The Nyingma master 'Jigs med gling pa (1729–1798) agrees with this (*Collected Works of Kum-mkhyen 'Jigs-med-gling-pa* in *Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab Series*, ed. Sonam T. Kazi, Gangtok 1970, vol. 29, p. 483).

1153 D3915, fol 25a.4.

1154 Literally, line IV.8d has "supreme" (Skt. paramatā, Tib. dam pa), which is taken to mean "ultimate" (Skt. paramārtha, Tib. don dam) by the *Bhāṣya* and all subsequent commentaries.

1155 Other equivalents of ultimate bodhicitta include prajñāpāramitā, dharmadhātu, ultimate reality, nonconceptual wisdom, emptiness that has a heart of compassion, buddha nature, and the nature of the mind.

1156 D3916, fol. 44a.2–5.

1157 Tib. rim gyis 'jug pa'i sgom don (D3938). In terms of both layout and content, this text can be considered as an abbreviated version of Kamalaśīla's three-volume *Bhāvanākrama*. As a counterpart, Vimalamitra also wrote a **Sakṛtpraveśikanirvikalpabhāvanāpada* (Tib. cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i sgom don). In sum, the bodhicitta that arises through taking the vow is equivalent to the seeming bodhicitta, which exists on the paths of accumulation and preparation. The bodhicitta that arises through the power of familiarization is equivalent to the ultimate bodhicitta, which exists from the path of seeing onward.

1158 This is echoed in verse 107 of the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*.

1159 The *Bhāṣya* comments that bodhisattvas, through increasing both their virtue and compassion, come to be always virtuous and compassionate. Thus, they always take delight in happiness because they are virtuous. They also delight in their own suffering, as it may happen while they accomplish the welfare of others, because they are compassionate.

1160 This is one of the eighteen subsects of the śrāvakas, being a division of Mahākātyāyana's disciples.

1161 Such explanations are, for example, found in Nyaön Kunga Bal's commentary.

1162 For more details on bodhicitta, in particular the ceremonies of taking the bodhisattva vow according to the traditions of Mañjuśrī/Nāgārjuna/Śāntideva and Maitreya/Asaṅga/Dharmakīrtiśrī as well as the benefits and major breaches of bodhicitta, see Chapter Nine of Gampopa's *Jewel Ornament of Liberation* (trans. Guenther, pp. 118–37); Ngari Panchen Pema Wangyi Gyalpo 1996, pp. 63–100; and Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé 1995, pp. 161–213.

1163 The *Ālokā* (p. 27) also mentions and rejects the position of "others" that the last eight generations of bodhicitta refer to the special paths of the bodhisattvabhūmis. LSSP (fol. 112a.1–2) says that this position as well as Buddhaśrījñāna's explanation (the first four among these eight pertaining to the eighth bhūmi; the next two, to the ninth; and the last two, to the tenth) represent Āryavimuktisena's intention.

1164 As can be seen from these two lines, "the path of single progress" is usually said to refer to the eighth bhūmi.

1165 D3801, fol. 80b.3–4.

1166 D3805, fol. 13a.2–4.

1167 LSSP (fol. 111b.3) adds the position of some that the generations of bodhicitta (15)–(19) represent the special paths of all ten bodhisattvabhūmis, which is identified by Sparham 2008b (p. 201) as being found in Dharmakīrtiśrī's *Durbodhālokā*. The latter (D3794, fols. 157b.6–158b.2) identifies (15)–(19) as the special path, but does not explicitly relate this to all ten bhūmis, though it may be read that way in the overall context.

1168 P. 26.

1169 Also spelled Sitaketu. This was the name of Buddha Śākyamuni while dwelling in the heaven of Tuṣita before his birth on earth.

1170 P. 27.

1171 CZ, pp. 53–54. In accordance with the following comments in the *Vṛtti* and *Ālokā*, JG obviously takes this as referring to these bodhisattvas dwelling in Tuṣita and then deciding to be born on earth and display the remaining of the twelve deeds of a nairmāṇikakāya. As mentioned before, "the heart of enlightenment" is the term for the place under the bodhi tree in Bodhgayā, where all buddhas on this earth are said to attain enlightenment.

1172 Pp. 22 and 26, respectively.

1173 Pp. 74–84.

1174 *Manas* has a wide semantic range, primarily being one of the many Sanskrit words for "mind" in general, also meaning "conceptual mind," "thought," and "imagination" (it can also refer to "intellect," "intelligence," "perception," "spirit," "opinion," "intention," "inclination," and more). There is a definite lack of proper equivalents for most of the rich Sanskrit and Tibetan terminologies used for mind and its many facets, but there is also a need for distinctive terms when going into the subtleties of mapping out "mind" in Buddhist texts, especially in the context of the eight consciousnesses. This is why *manas* is rendered throughout by the English technical term "mentation" (coming from the Latin *mens* ["mind," "thinking"] and *mentare* [to "think"], which are cognate with Skt. *manas*). *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines "mentation" as "mental action or a mental state," with the former suggesting mind being in some kind of operational mode, which is also one of the primary meanings of the Sanskrit and Tibetan terms. In its more specific uses, depending on the context, it can refer to either the afflicted mind (as in the above triad of mind, mentation, and consciousness), the sixth consciousness, or the mental faculty. For more details, see below and the discussions of this term in Brunnhölzl 2007b (pp. 58–59) and 2009 (pp. 29-33).

1175 Pp. 314–20. Similar to JG's discussion of bodhicitta, several of the headings and parts of the contents of JG's and JNS's explanations on the instructions correspond to LSSP (fols. 112a.5–117b.3). However, at times, JG also refutes LSSP (see below).

1176 These two terms render Skt. *avavāda* (Tib. gdams pa or gdams ngag) and *anuśāsana* (Tib. rjes su bstan pa), which both mean "instruction," "teaching," "order," or "precept," but are distinguished here by JG in accordance with the *Vṛtti* (see below).

1177 JG, despite speaking of a twofold purpose, only gives the following purpose of "directions." Thus, this sentence here is inserted in analogy to the description of the different functions of "instructions" and "directions," as presented in the *Vṛtti* and JG's explanation below (point 6b).

1178 As the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and others show, there are also śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who are, at least partially, able to give teachings on the mahāyāna.

1179 It is said that the inhabitants of this northern one in a four-continent world system of ancient Indian cosmology have weak spiritual faculties and also certain physical obscurations

(as the maturation of previous karma) that generally prevent them from being proper vessels for the dharma.

1180 LSSP (fol. 113b.3–4) adds: "Prajñākaramati's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttipiṇḍārtha* (D3795, fol. 256b.5–6) says, 'Starting with the level of a beginner up through the buddhabhūmi, the practice of bodhisattvas is pure by virtue of the instructions.' However, the *Prasphuṭapadā* states, 'On the uninterrupted path [of the tenth bhūmi, bodhisattvas] do not strive for the [instructions] because they are able to give rise to self-arisen wisdom.' Thus, he explains that [bodhisattvas] in their last existence do not depend on instructions because they are able to attain enlightenment without relying on others. This refinement is good if the boundary lines [of the instructions] are presented in terms of [bodhisattvas] definitely having to listen to instructions, but if they are set [in terms] of the teacher, as explained before, they go up to the buddhabhūmi."

1181 This position is found in LSSP (fol. 112b.1–3).

1182 CZ, pp. 203–4.

1183 On p. 31 of the *Ālokā*, after quoting *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.17–18, there is a brief phrase similar to the above ("By way of abiding through the power of mind being workable"), which is followed by *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.3. However, there is no mention of the path of accumulation.

1184 It is said that there are (1) the teachings spoken by the Buddha himself; (2) those that are given by others under the influence of blessings through the Buddha's body (such as the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*), speech (such as the *Ajātasātrukaukṛtyavinodanāsūtra*), or mind (such as Avalokiteśvara teaching the *Heart Sūtra*); and (3) those that are authorized by the Buddha but spoken by others (the passages in each sūtra that describe the setting; its connection to the actual sūtra; the favorable conditions; and the rejoicing at the end).

1185 D3796, fol. 43a.2.

1186 I could not locate this phrase in this text.

1187 D3804, fol. 232b.6.

1188 P. 31; D3788, fol. 11a.6–7.

1189 D3793, fol. 83b.6–7.

1190 D3801 (fol. 124b.3) literally says, "The instructions are [given] in order to first comprehend the ten [topics] that are to be comprehended."

1191 See AA II.1ab.

1192 This is the first of the four main sections of the vinaya scriptures in the Tibetan canon.

1193 Skt. ṛṣi, Tib. drang srong. Originally, this was the term for the wise who directly saw the Vedas, later it was the general expression for holy practitioners in Hinduism. Also the Buddha is sometimes called "the great seer."

1194 I could not find this passage in the *Ālokā* or any other commentaries in the *sher phyin* section of the *Tengyur*. The *Ālokā* only states the above-mentioned distinction between "instructions" and "directions" as protecting and not losing the qualities that have already been attained and attaining those that have not yet been attained, respectively (p. 32).

1195 Pp. 96–100.

1196 CZ, pp. 56–57.

1197 LSSP (fol. 115a.4–5) adds the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* (on XI.77) and Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitārthasaṃgraha* as saying the same. As mentioned before, the ten conceptual distractions are in terms of nonentities or entities, superimposition or denial, being one or different, a phenomenon's nature or its features, and taking a referent to be just as its name or vice versa (for these and their remedies as linked to the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, see *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.20–22; P5549, fols. 19b.6–20b.5).

1198 P. 58.

1199 Pp. 32–33.

1200 These are the four factors conducive to penetration, the path of seeing, and the path of familiarization (see also AA I.37a).

1201 JNS lists all the beginnings of each passage, starting with the four realities, which correspond to the respective section headings in CZ, pp. 60–66 and 74–94.

1202 The above "incalculable eon" refers to the first among three such eons that it takes for bodhisattvas of sharpest faculties to attain buddhahood—one eon each on (a) the level of engagement through aspiration (the paths of accumulation and preparation); (b) the seven impure bhūmis; and (c) the three pure bhūmis. According to the *Bhāṣya* on the above two verses, bodhisattvas "increasing their aspiration" means that it reaches a state beyond measure. These bodhisattvas are "primordially pure" because their bodhisattva vows are pure and their mahāyāna view is precise by virtue of their unerring grasp of its purport. They have "excellent insight" and "virtuous minds" due to having studied a lot and being free from impediments, respectively.

1203 D3791, fol. 326b.2–3.

1204 Note that, from here on, there are no more presentations from JG in Appendix I, since JG ends after AA I.22. Thus, unless indicated otherwise, all following sections in Appendix I are from JNS. As for the general presentation of the two realities here, its first two paragraphs are an elaboration on the nature of practice (AA I.21a; JNS, pp. 102–3), while the following three paragraphs elaborate on AA I.31c (pp. 181–83).

1205 Commenting on the *Vivṛti*, JNS (p. 187) says that, logically speaking, what has arising has final deliverance, and what has final deliverance also entails nirvāṇa. For further details on how this statement is mistaken in terms of mixing seeming and ultimate reality, see the next section on the two realities below.

1206 In the standard Tibetan doxographies, from among the last three sentences, the first two represent the position of the Vaibhāṣikas on the two realities, while the third one is said to be the position of the Sautrāntikas. As for the former, seeming reality means that if coarse phenomena (such as a cup or a mental continuum) are either destroyed physically or broken down mentally, due to the resultant lack of these phenomena the mental states that perceived them operate no longer either. By contrast, ultimately real phenomena (minutest material particles and moments of mind) cannot be destroyed physically or broken down mentally, so the perceiving mind keeps engaging them.

1207 Sections 2)–6) (vol. 2, pp. 391–400) elaborate on the sixteen qualms about the relationship between the two realities (under the last point of the fifth chapter on the culminating training of the uninterrupted path). In general, JNS says, the nature of wrong ideas that are to be eliminated consists of either wrong understanding (a mind influenced by the flawed scriptures and reasonings of bad masters) or doubt (thinking without reason that there are contradictions). What is taught here are the wrong ideas in terms of regarding the two realities as incompatible through taking either of them as the exclusive domain of valid cognition and then wrongly extending

the reasonings of this context into the other reality, thinking, "If this reality does not have the features of the other one, it is nonvalid cognition and thus contradictory."

1208 JNS mistakenly has *saṃskṛta*.

1209 XIX.54 (JNS quotes only lines ab). According to Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya*, "what does not exist" refers to characteristics and "what exists" refers to suchness. This is "the change of state" because, through it, this suchness (which did not appear) appears. It "is liberation" since one became independent (*svatantra*) and gained mastery over one's own mind.

1210 D107, fol. 261b.4–5.

1211 D3829, fols. 88b.5–89a.3.

1212 Both JNS and its blockprint have "it is asserted" (*'dod do*; being written in a different hand in the latter). In light of the above definition of the ultimate and in contrast to the seeming being said to be nonexistent at the beginning of this paragraph, I took this to mean "existent" (*yod do*).

1213 D231, fol. 99a.6–7.

1214 This phrase is found in many sūtras and Yogācāra and Madhyamaka texts (such as Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*; D3860, fol. 184a). It is also found in a famous verse of praise to Prajñāpāramitā (which the Tibetan tradition either attributes to Rāhulabhadra or Rāhula, the Buddha's son):

> Prajñāpāramitā, beyond speech, thought, and expression,
> Unborn and unceasing, the very nature of space,
> The sphere of personally experienced wisdom,
> Mother of the victors of the three times, I pay homage to You.

1215 *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.15b (glossing "ultimate reality" in I.14b). Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* on this says that one speaks of ultimate reality because it is the perceptual sphere of the wisdom of the noble ones.

1216 *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 54a.3–4).

1217 *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, line 35a.

1218 *Bhāvanākrama* (D3908), verse 40. As Lindtner (1997, p. 164) reports, all the verses of the *Bhāvanākrama* are found in Chapter X of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (the one in question is X.191; D107, fol. 163b.2).

1219 I could not locate these lines in Nāgārjuna's works.

1220 For more details, see Brunnhölzl 2004 (pp. 88ff.).

1221 JNS has *saṃskṛtasatya*.

1222 Lines 15ab.

1223 Ibid., verse 25.

1224 Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā* (D3856, fol. 59a.7–59b.2) lists three different ways in which the compound of these two words can be read in Sanskrit. *Artha* ("object," "purpose," or "actuality") refers to what is to be understood, realized, or examined. *Parama* means "supreme." Thus, (1) since *paramārtha* is an object and ultimate (or supreme), it is the ultimate object (technically, a *karmadhāraya* compound. (2) Or it may be read as "the object of the ultimate." Since it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom, it is the object of the ultimate (a *tatpuruṣa* compound). (3) Or it can be understood as "that which is in accordance with the ultimate object" (*bahuvrīhi* compound). Since the ultimate object exists in the prajñā that is in approximate accordance with the realization of this ultimate object, it is what is in accordance with the

ultimate object. In other words, in (1), both *parama* and *artha* refer only to the object as opposed to the subject that realizes it. (2) means that *parama* refers to the subject (wisdom) and *artha* to the object (emptiness). (3) indicates a reasoning consciousness that cognizes ultimate reality not directly but inferentially. Following Bhāvaviveka, the majority of Indian *Svātantrikas seem to favor the second way of reading *paramārtha*, while not denying the first. Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (D3860, fol. 163b.5–6) explicitly sides with (1). Yogācāras typically explain the ultimate along the lines of (1) and (2) as being twofold in terms of subject and object. For example, Sthiramati's commentary on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* VI.1 (D4034, fols. 74a.3–75b.1) says that the ultimate consists of suchness (the pure dharmadhātu) and nondual nonconceptual wisdom. Suchness is called the ultimate since it is the fruition of having cultivated the path of the noble ones and represents all phenomena. Or, in terms of its being an object, it is the ultimate because it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom. In the above, JNS obviously also refers to (1) and (2).

1225 This is a technical term in Tibetan debate that refers to the double negation of a phenomenon (the reverse of what that phenomena is not) and its resulting conceptual mental object arrived at through such exclusion. For example, the self-isolate of "book" is "non-non-book" (in effect, "book"—the only thing that is the reverse of "non-book"). Basically, this term is an equivalent for "definiendum." In general, an "isolate" refers to conceptual objects by indicating the process through which they appear for the thinking mind. For example, in terms of their meaning, "impermanent phenomena" and "phenomena that arise from causes and conditions" are not different in nature since all impermanent phenomena arise from causes and conditions and all phenomena that arise from causes and conditions are impermanent. However, when we think "impermanent phenomena," a different mental image or notion comes to mind than when we think "phenomena that arise from causes and conditions." It is said that conceptual mind selects the specific notion of "impermanent phenomena" through excluding everything that is not an impermanent phenomenon. In this way, a certain notion is "isolated" from all other notions, which is why it is called an "isolate."

1226 Examples of such faulty reasonings would be "There is no virtuous or nonvirtuous karma because everything is empty" or "All phenomena cannot be empty because there is cause and effect." The point here is that one cannot refute how things are ultimately through the way they appear from the perspective of seeming reality and vice versa, just as a person with blurred vision cannot refute what someone with clear vision sees (and vice versa). In fact, most wrong views in general and misunderstandings of the Buddhist view of the two realities in particular are based on either of these two approaches.

1227 Pp. 158–63.

1228 In Western scholarship, this argument is often referred to as "the *saṃvedana* inference." Both reasonings are found, for example, in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I.9–10 and its autocommentary as well as in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I.55bff. The first one also appears in the latter's *Pramāṇavārttika* (III.388–391) and the second in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (lines 2001, 2003, and 2029–33). For more details on these reasonings, see Appendix I5D and Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 307–8.

1229 Note that this sequence of the four levels of the path of preparation corresponds to the classical "four yogic practices" (*prayoga*), which are found in many mahāyāna sūtras and Yogācāra texts. These four are (1) outer objects are observed to be nothing but mind (*upalambhaprayoga/dmigs pa'i sbyor ba*); (2) thus, outer objects are not observed (*anupalambhaprayoga/mi dmigs pa'i sbyor ba*); (3) with outer objects being unobservable, a mind cognizing them is not observed either (*upalambhānupalambhaprayoga/dmigs pa mi dmigs pa'i sbyor ba*); (4) not observing both, nonduality is observed (*nopalambhopalambhaprayoga/mi dmigs dmigs pa'i sbyor ba*). As *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XIV.28 and its *Bhāṣya* say, the full and direct realization of the

nonduality of apprehender and apprehended (4) marks the beginning of the path of seeing. Besides Maitreya's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (as above and also in VI.8), these four steps are also found in *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* X.256–257; the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (lines 182–85, 264–70) and *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.6–7ab; and Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikākārikā* 28–30 and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* 36–37ab. Ratnākaraśānti's explanations in his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (D4079, fols. 156a.5-162a.6), *Prajñāpāramitābhāvanopadeśa* (D4078, fols. 131b.5-133b.6), *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (D4072, fols. 118a.7-119a.6), *Kusumāñjali* (D1851, vol. thi, fols. 41b.7-42a.7), and *Bhramahāra* (D1245, fols. 189b.7-190a.3) resemble these four steps more or less closely (like JNS here, he sometimes refers to them as the four *yogabhūmis*). In addition to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, he also relates them to the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī* (P810; Meinert 2003 confirms this as referring to fols. 5a.3–6b.2) and a verse from the *Guhyasāmajatantra*. Also some other Yogācāra-Madhyamaka texts quote the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and refer to these four stages, commenting on the last one from a Mādhyamika perspective, such as Śāntarakṣita's autocommentary on his *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (D3885, fol. 79a–b) as well as Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (P5286, fols. 137a–138a) and first *Bhāvanākrama* (D3915, fol. 33a–b).

1230 This parallels *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara* XI.31ab, which is also quoted in both CE and JNS below.

1231 Note that this differs considerably from the commonly held position that the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation are still dualistic conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend only object generalities through conflating terms and their referents (as, for example, in LSSP and NSML; see below). JNS returns several times to the theme of the nature of the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation (in particular the one of the supreme mundane dharma) being self-awareness, which is not the same as, but approximately concordant with, yogic valid perception (which, as the direct realization of the nature of phenomena, only occurs from the path of seeing onward). This kind of self-awareness on the path of preparation represents a bridge between (a) the conceptual thinking that entails an object generality of the nature of phenomena (or emptiness) as a mental image distinct from the thinking consciousness (which is cultivated on the path of accumulation) and (b) the yogic perception on the path of seeing that directly realizes the nature of phenomena in a completely nonconceptual and nondual way. To give a somewhat simplified example, when one looks at the picture of a very attractive person and then tries to bring that picture to mind with closed eyes, it is at first just a conceptual object, not clear at all, and one has to make great efforts to remember all the details. Through repeated visualization, this mental image becomes more and more clear and "alive" until one feels like directly encountering that person with all one's senses, being a vividly experienced and effortless presence in one's own mind without separating it from the experiencer. Finally, when actually meeting this person face-to-face, despite this experience not being the same as the vivid mental image before, the person is recognized immediately and fully in an equally effortless way. Likewise, the concept of "emptiness" is at first very far removed from one's mind, objectified by the thinking mind as a more or less vague notion. Through increased reflection on and familiarization with this concept and its application to all phenomena on the paths of accumulation and preparation, its mental image becomes clearer and clearer, until "the emptiness of all phenomena" becomes an experience that is no longer objectified, but a vivid presence in one's mind that is not separate from the experiencer. This is not yet a direct experience of natural emptiness just as it is since it is still somewhat "mind-made" or conjured up in a very subtle sense, but it is very similar to, and eventually merges into, the direct realization of emptiness on the path of seeing. See also the definitions of the paths of accumulation and preparation according to *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* in Chart 3.

1232 The above claim seems to be based on taking literally a single passage in the *Vṛtti* (D3787, fol. 51b.3–4; p. 65), while this text otherwise always speaks of "being associated."

1233 This explanation is based on the Tibetan *nges par 'byed pa'i cha dang mthun pa.* It somewhat mirrors the Sanskrit hermeneutical etymology of *nirvedhabhāgīya* as found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.20ab. There, "definite distinction" is said to refer to the path of the noble ones because it relinquishes doubts and clearly distinguishes or penetrates the four realities as what is suffering up through what is the path. The path of seeing is a "part" of this path of the noble ones, and the four factors that are "concordant with" this part that consist of definite distinction are so called because they serve as its aids through inducing it. These four factors arise from meditation alone, not from study and reflection. TOK (vol. 3, p. 476) explains, "Since the firelike nonconceptual wisdom of the path of seeing overcomes and penetrates all mistaken conceptions of ordinary beings at their root, the actual penetration refers to the path of seeing. Since [the path of preparation] is conducive to that, it is called 'what is conducive to penetration.' Since one engages in the poised readiness for the nature of phenomena through the power of aspiring for it, [this path is called] 'the level of engagement through aspiration.' Through cutting through the conceptions of apprehender and apprehended in one's own mind stream, the prajñā that arises from mundane meditation prepares for the first supramundane bhūmi (the path of seeing), which is the direct realization of the ultimate dharmadhātu. Since this is the path on which [such happens], it is [called] 'the path of preparation.'"

1234 This accords with NSML (pp. 179–84), which elaborates on the ways in which the four conceptions exist in terms of affirmation and negation during subsequent attainment and meditative equipoise, respectively, as follows. During the subsequent attainment of heat, afflicted phenomena or the paths and fruitions of the hīnayāna are clung to as the apprehended objects that are to be rejected. During the subsequent attainment of peak, purified phenomena or the paths and fruitions of bodhisattvas are clung to as the apprehended objects that are to be adopted. During the subsequent attainment of poised readiness, while not being embraced by the view of meditative equipoise, the compassion that focuses on sentient beings clings to them as being experiencers through focusing on them as being substantially existent persons. During the subsequent attainment of the supreme dharma, the compassion that focuses on the dharma clings to individuals as being experiencers through focusing on them as being imputedly existent. As for the four conceptions existing in a negating manner, during the meditative equipoise of heat, when one realizes the apprehended that consists of afflicted phenomena as being without nature, one does not go beyond clinging to its being without nature because this is a conception that apprehends by conflating terms and their referents. This very clinging represents also the conceptions that are to be relinquished on the subsequent paths. For, in general, in the Madhyamaka view, one needs to be without any clinging to any extremes whatsoever through putting an end to all clinging to existence, nonexistence, reality, and the lack of reality. The ways of such conceptions existing in terms of negation during the meditative equipoises of heat, poised readiness, and supreme dharma are to be understood in the same way. However, when it is said in AA I.25cd that the path of preparation "is associated with the four conceptions," it is not that the path of preparation is these conceptions because the conceptions taught here must be presented from the point of view of clinging, whereas the path of preparation must be presented from the the point of view of putting an end to clinging. There is no contradiction in terms of these two being of a single nature either. During the meditative equipoise of heat, when the clinging to the impermanence of the reality of suffering is put to an end, one does not go beyond the clinging of thinking that the reality of suffering is not impermanent. Therefore, both having put an end to the clinging to its impermanence and the clinging to its not being impermanent exist as a mental state with a single nature. At that point, though the part of having put an end to the clinging to impermanence is the path of preparation, it does not represent the type of conception taught here, which rather consists of the part of clinging to not being impermanent. However, the latter is not presented as the path of preparation. Likewise, through subsequent mental states putting an end to the objects to which preceding mental states cling, all forms of clinging to being empty, not being empty, and so on must be put to an end.

Thus, this principle needs to be applied to all focal objects and aspects. If one understands this essential point, one will understand the manner of presenting conceptions in terms of negation and the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation as being of a single nature; the manner of conceptions needing to put an end to all reference points in an alternating way; and the manner of yogic direct perception putting an end to all reference points simultaneously as being included in this single essential point. "So are the four conceptions that are taught here conceptions in terms of affirmation or negation?" What the sūtras teach implicitly and what the AA teaches explicitly are solely conceptions in terms of affirmation. For, while focusing on their four times nine objects, these conceptions have the aspects of apprehender and apprehended and therefore cannot be anything but conceptions in terms of affirmation. What the sūtras teach explicitly and what the AA teaches implicitly are conceptions in terms of negation. For, while focusing on their four times nine objects, these conceptions have the aspects of apprehender and apprehended being without nature and therefore their modes of apprehension have the aspect of negating. "So what are the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization?" The four conceptions that the AA teaches explicitly are solely factors to be relinquished through seeing, which is due to the essential point of the modes of apprehension of the paths of preparation and seeing being directly contrary. The four conceptions that have the aspect of negating and are taught implicitly in the AA cannot be relinquished through the path of seeing. Therefore, at that time, when there is no clinging to real existence, but just the clinging to phenomena being mere imputations, it is still possible for these conceptions to be manifest even in the mind streams of noble bodhisattvas. Thus, they must be presented as the conceptions that are the factors to be relinquished through familiarization as explained in the fifth chapter of the AA. "So what are the two obscurations?" In terms of persons, the factors to be relinquished through seeing—the four conceptions about apprehender and apprehended—that are explicitly taught here are solely factors to be relinquished on the path of bodhisattvas, but all types of factors to be relinquished in all three yānas are complete in them for the following reasons. The two kinds of conceptions about the apprehended are explicitly taught to be based on "entities" and their "remedies." When taking these entities as merely afflicted phenomena and their remedies as merely purified phenomena and then clinging to them as what are to be rejected and adopted, respectively, they represent the conceptions about the apprehended that are the cognitive obscurations of the type to be relinquished by pratyekabuddhas. When taking said entities as the paths and fruitions of the hīnayāna and their remedies as the paths and fruitions of bodhisattvas and then clinging to them as what are to be rejected and adopted, respectively, they represent the conceptions about the apprehended that are the cognitive obscurations of the type to be relinquished by bodhisattvas. As for the clinging to substantiality, since the clinging to persons being substantially existent is the clinging to personal identity, it represents the afflictive obscurations of the type to be relinquished by śrāvakas. Since the conceptions of clinging to phenomena as being substantially existent and imputedly existent are the clinging to phenomenal identity, they represent the cognitive obscurations of the type to be relinquished by bodhisattvas. In brief, within the conceptions that are factors to be relinquished through seeing, the types of factors to be relinquished of all yānas are included. In their remedies—the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation of bodhisattvas—the types of realization of all three yānas are included. In the fruition of these meditative equipoises—the uninterrupted path of the mahāyāna path of seeing—the types of realization of all three yānas are complete. In the fruition of this—the pure path of familiarization (as explained in AA II.28ff.)—the purity of having relinquished the factors to be relinquished of all three yānas is complete. This is taught as epitomizing the intention of the AA from beginning to end.

1235 On the topic of the nature of the mental states of the path of preparation, compare LSSP (fols. 173b.2–175a.5), which starts by using LN's refutation of the positions of (1) Ngog Lotsāwa and others and (2) Dré Sherab Bar (pp. 331–32). Against (1), the meditative equipoises on the path of preparation are not nonconceptual yogic valid perceptions. Otherwise, these meditative

equipoises would directly realize the nature of phenomena; already eliminate certain seeds that are factors to be relinquished through seeing; not be conceptual; and not be cognitions of ordinary beings. Against (2), said meditative equipoises are not recollections, that is, repetitive cognitions, either, because then it would follow that they lack the clear cognitive illumination of wisdom. The reason entails the predicate because recollection—repetitive cognition—is a conception based on terms, which contradicts its being a clear cognitive illumination. LSSP continues by saying that the explanation of said meditative equipoises possessing the clear illumination of wisdom is fine if it is asserted in the sense that, compared to the path of accumulation, distractions are less prominent on the path of preparation by virtue of being more habituated to the prajñā that arises from meditation. However, if this explanation is taken to mean that the above meditative equipoises possess the clear illumination of wisdom with regard to the nature of phenomena, it cannot but follow that they would represent yogic valid perception. In general, the assertion that those meditative equipoises have the nature of conceptions in terms of negation contradicts the position that they lack conceptions based on terms. As for our own position, we do not assert that the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation are direct perceptions of the actuality of identitylessness. For then it would follow that there could be occasions of the afflicted mind not operating in a manifest manner in the mind streams of ordinary beings because the manifestation of a mental state of directly realizing identitylessness contradicts the presence of any manifest views about identity. Hence, the path of preparation's being focused on identitylessness represents a mental state of evaluating an object generality through aspiring for and apprehending the object generality of identitylessness (the appearing object of this mental state) as actually being identitylessness. Therefore, it is a conception for which a term and its referent appear (mixed together). On the path of preparation, the mental formations of having gained certainty about the meanings of the four realities through reasoning on the path of accumulation have not deteriorated, so there will be both recollections—that is, repetitive cognitions—of these meanings and inferential cognitions of particular features of identitylessness. In this way, though the path of preparation represents mistaken cognition, unlike the mental states of ordinary persons it is not mistaken in all aspects. For it is produced through the flourishing of the latent tendencies for listening that are the natural outflow of the pure dharmadhātu (note that this reason is literally the same as what is found in Sthiramati's *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* on IV.12a; Pandeya ed., p. 139.26). Seeing this point, Maitreya says in *Madhyāntavibhāga* IV.12:

> Familiarization is approximately concordant yet mistaken,
> Connected yet opposite,
> As well as unmistaken and never
> Connected with mistakenness.

Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* (D4027, fol. 18a.3–4) explains that (1) the path of familiarization of ordinary beings is the mistaken cognition that is approximately concordant with unmistakenness. (2) The path of familiarization of learning noble ones is still connected with the mistaken factors to be relinquished through familiarization, but its own nature is unmistaken. (3) The path of familiarization of nonlearning noble ones is neither mistaken in itself nor connected with any mistakenness. Sthiramati's *Ṭīkā* (Pandeya ed., p. 139.27–28) explains that (1) refers to cultivating the foundations of mindfulness up through the five powers (the paths of accumulation and preparation), while (2) represents the seven branches of enlightenment and the eightfold path of the noble ones (the paths of seeing and familiarization). In brief, the learned follow Śāntarakṣita's statement:

> Since the minds of all who just see this life
> Are wrong about this,
> Not even the slightest real entity
> Is established through direct perception.

The learned also assert what Maitreya's *Uttaratantra* II.32–33ab says:

> Since it is subtle, it is not an object of study.
> Since it is the ultimate, it is none of reflection.
> Since it is the profound nature of phenomena,
> It is none of worldly meditation and so forth,
> Because childish beings have never seen it before,
> Just like a person born blind [has never seen] form.

Note, however, that LN's own position (pp. 332–33) on the nature of the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation differs from LSSP as follows: "The nature of the mental states [in those meditative equipoises] is personally experienced samādhi and wisdom. This represents a mistaken cognition that is partially similar to nonmistakenness because, through the power of having familiarized with all phenomena being identityless, there is a clear illumination with regard to the actuality with which to familiarize, but [this actuality] is not [yet] realized just as it is" [as scriptural support for this, LN also uses *Madhyāntavibhāga* IV.12 and its *Bhāṣya*]. Therefore, said meditative equipoises represent mistaken cognitions that lack the conceptions for which terms and referents appear. However, during their subsequent attainments, [bodhisattvas on this path, through engaging in said type of conceptions,] rely on spiritual friends, listen to the instructions, and promote the welfare of others through supernatural knowledge, compassion, and so on . . . It may be said, "It follows that the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation as the subject do not realize that apprehender and apprehended, which are established as lacking reality, [actually do] lack reality because they are mistaken." I accept this—ultimately, apprehender and apprehended are not established as lacking reality because [the ultimate] is free from any reference points of apprehender and apprehended being real or not real. "[But] the assertion that there are conceptions in said meditative equipoises contradicts the explanation in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* that conceptions are relinquished." There is no flaw because this [explanation] refers to the relinquishment of manifest conceptions about apprehender and apprehended being real, whereas here it is asserted that there are conceptions about [apprehender and apprehended] lacking reality." NSML (pp. 171–72) says the following: "If it is analyzed which type of mental state the [mahāyāna] path of preparation is, in certain [bodhisattvas] who previously have gone through the realizations of the hīnayāna (such as stream-enterers), it can also be yogic direct perception. For when they familiarize with personal identitylessness due to the need to relinquish the remainders of the afflictive obscurations, it is a direct realization. Also, in those who have gone through the realization of an arhat, it is possible that, at times, [this realization] manifests [again on their mahāyāna path of preparation. However,] for those who previously have not gone through the hīnayāna, the [mahāyāna] path of preparation that consists of the types of realization of the three yānas which are the causes for attaining all three yānas represents solely conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and their referents because it is a mental state of realizing the three [types of] identitylessness in the manner of object generalities. [However,] even for those who previously have not gone through the hīnayāna, it is not definite that the entire path of preparation consists of such [conceptions] because the supernatural knowledge of knowing the minds of others [that exists] in the mind streams of bodhisattvas on the path of preparation must be accepted as the path of preparation of bodhisattvas."

1236 Pp. 166–70.

1237 This is defined as a mind that realizes what has already been realized. In the Gelugpa tradition, it is regarded as one of five categories of nonvalid cognition because it is not a new realization. Examples include the second and all following moments of (a) directly perceiving a vase or (b) the inferential valid cognition of sound being impermanent. The other Tibetan epistemological traditions say that this category is superfluous. For something like (a) is not a nonvalid cognition in the first place, but a valid perception because not only the perceiving

subjects, but also their corresponding objects change and thus are new in each moment. As for (b), it is nothing other than memory, which belongs to wrong cognition (that is, being neither valid perception nor inferential cognition).

1238 Tib. yid dpyod. In the Gelugpa tradition, this is another one of the five categories of nonvalid cognition, but the other traditions consider it also as superfluous and include it under the category of "doubt" (a nonvalid cognition). Nyaön's commentary on the AA (Nya dbon kun dga' dpal 1978, fols. 407.4.4–408.4.3) presents a variety of opinions of early Kadampa masters on the nature of the meditative equipoises of the path of preparation, such as it being nonconceptual yogic perception (Ngog Lotsāwa and some of his followers), a repetitive cognition of inferential valid cognition (Bré shes rab 'bar and 'Dul dkar), both the inferential valid cognition that is based on the reasoning of being free from unity and multiplicity and its repetitive cognition, which refer to the object that is the compound meaning of appearance and emptiness ('Jam gsar), the nonvalid cognition that consists of the recollection of an already apprehended and unforgotten identitylessness (Rig pa'i ral gri), conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and referents—either inferential valid cognition, repetitive cognition, or correct assumption (Chu mig pa), a nonconceptual mistaken consciousness of its appearing object, a repetitive cognition in terms of its type (which is the nature of phenomena), and a correct assumption in terms of its meaning (also the nature of phenomena) ('Od zer mgon po). Nyaön's own position (ibid., fol. 410.5.5) is that these meditative equipoises represent yogic direct perception because they represent the supramundane wisdom of the illumination of ultimate reality that arises from being familiar with virtue.

1239 In the Tibetan tradition, those who assert three categories of nonvalid cognition (noncognition, wrong cognition, and doubt) are Sakya Paṇḍita and his followers. The Seventh Karmapa only asserts two (the above except for noncognition).

1240 D3793, fol. 88a.2–3 (note, however, that this is the beginning of the *Vivṛti's* comments on I.32d).

1241 Pp. 194–99.

1242 I.94.

1243 D4211, fol. 154b.1–2.

1244 RT (fol. 40b.3–8) explains the nature of conceptions as follows: "All the many kinds of conceptions that are mentioned in the scriptures are included in false imagination because they have the aspects of the three realms appearing as the duality of apprehender and apprehended under the sway of latent tendencies. False imagination is threefold—the conceptions that are the mere appearance as the duality of apprehender and apprehended; those that have the aspect of coarse states of mind; and those that have the aspect of the appearance of terms and their referents. The first consist of the mere appearance, under the sway of latent tendencies, of apprehender and apprehended being different. The second are what the abhidharma explains as the confused mental discourse that is included in the portions of [the mental factors of] intention and prajñā. The third is the clinging to referents through following names. You may wonder, 'Which ones are taken to be the main factors to be relinquished through the bodhisattva path here?' Though at the time of the fruition all conceptions are to be relinquished, the first [type of] conceptions is not the main one to be relinquished for the following reasons. Through the mere appearance as duality that is not clung to, no flaws are produced and therefore it need not be relinquished deliberately. One is also not able to relinquish it because it naturally occurs for as long as the latent tendencies of dualistic appearance have not been relinquished. Once these latent tendencies have been relinquished, [dualistic appearance] naturally stops and therefore need not be relinquished separately, just as [the appearance of] strands of hair naturally stops once blurred vision is removed. The second [type of] conceptions is not the

main one to be relinquished either because Vasubandhu explained even correct conceptions as being conceptions that have the aspect of coarse states of mind. Therefore, the last [type of conceptions] is the main one to be relinquished. For the clinging to the two [kinds of] identity is the root of all flaws and therefore the objects that consist of these two identities are negated through scriptures and reasoning, while their subjects—the two [kinds of] clinging to identity—are deliberately relinquished through the paths of seeing and familiarization. As Śāntideva says [in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.25cd]:

> Rather, the object of refutation
> Is the cause for suffering, which is the conception of reality."

1245 XI.45ac.

1246 In accordance with the beginning of this paragraph, during heat one relinquishes the conceptions about the substantiality that is taken as the object of one's innate conceptions as well as the conceptions about the apprehended in terms of substantial and imputed afflicted phenomena. During peak one relinquishes the conceptions about the apprehended in terms of substantial and imputed purified phenomena. Note that CE is more explicit about poised readiness and the supreme dharma as being the realizations of the lack of nature of an apprehender that is a substantially existent person and of an apprehender that is an imputed phenomenon, respectively (see also there for the *Ālokā*'s explanation).

1247 The *Vṛtti* (pp. 65 and 70; D3787, fols. 51b.2–4 and 55b.4–6) says that (similar to the conceptions to be relinquished on the paths of seeing and familiarization) the two conceptions about the apprehended are respectively based on mere entities (with "mere" excluding specification) and remedial factors. The difference between these two is that the first refer to all phenomena (afflicted and purified), while the second pertain only to purified phenomena. Thus, the first include the second. The two conceptions about the apprehender are based on substantially existent persons and imputed individuals, respectively. In due order, these four are associated with the four levels of the path of preparation. Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (pp. 63.23–64.6) explains that heat, peak, and poised readiness all refer to the increasing realization of there being nothing external that is apprehended, while the lack of an apprehender is only realized on the level of the supreme dharma. In general, all four levels are progressive stages of meditating on the identitylessness of all phenomena. In due order, these four levels of samādhi are called "attaining illumination," "expanded illumination," "one-sided engagement in true reality" (only realizing the lack of the apprehended through resting in the realization of mere mind [*cittamātra*], but not the lack of the apprehender itself), and "uninterrupted" (due to unimpededly progressing to the path of seeing within the same session of meditative equipoise).

1248 For more details on the four conceptions as related to the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, see Appendix I5A and Charts 17–18.

1249 Pp. 208–29 (transl.).

1250 As mentioned before, in terms of the meaning (if not the words), the same distinction is also made in Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, upon which the presentation by the Eighth Karmapa here greatly relies. Asaṅga distinguishes between the "ālaya-consciousness" and "the supramundane mind" (Skt. lokottaracitta, Tib. 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems), which is said to come from the latent tendencies for listening that are the natural outflow of the very pure dharmadhātu (which is said to be equivalent to the dharmakāya). The supramundane mind is equivalent to nonconceptual wisdom (see the quote from the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* below).

1251 The three characteristics are the same as the three natures.

1252 Lines 294–303.

1253 D4028, fol. 37b.4–5.

1254 That means being actual effective causes and results, and not just nominal ones.

1255 See also Appendix I8A.

1256 At first sight, this seems to contradict the Third Karmapa's repeated statements in his *Zab mo nang gi don gsal bar byed pa'i 'grel pa* and *Snying po bstan pa'i bstan bcos* that buddha nature or pure mind is the basis of everything in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. However, in the former text (Rang byung rdo rje n.d., p. 25), he qualifies this by referring to *Uttaratantra* I.55–57, in which the nature of mind, in its being the foundation of skandhas and so on, is said to be equal to space's being the foundation of the four elements, but never depending on or being supported by them (which is very much in harmony with what Mikyö Dorje explains). For more details, see Brunnhölzl 2009.

1257 The verse gives suchness, the true end, signlessness, the ultimate, and dharmadhātu as the synonyms of emptiness.

1258 The classic reference for this is the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Wogihara ed., p. 3.1–8; D4037, fol. 2b.3–5): "'What is the disposition?' In brief, the disposition is twofold—the naturally abiding one and the accomplished one (*samudānīta*). The naturally abiding disposition is the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas of bodhisattvas, which has been obtained through the nature of phenomena since beginningless time and is continuing as such [up through the present]. The accomplished disposition is what is obtained through having cultivated roots of virtue in the past. In terms of what [disposition] means here, both are asserted. This disposition is also called 'seed,' 'dhātu,' and 'primordial nature (*prakṛti*).'"

1259 Skt. vipākavijñāna, Tib. rnam smin gyi rnam shes (another name for the ālaya-consciousness).

1260 Asvābhava's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana* (P5552, fol. 262a; Taishō 1598) gives the further example of the ālaya-consciousness being like an attic in which all kinds of things are jumbled up, such as a panacea amidst all kinds of poison. Although these might abide next to each other for a long time, the medicine is not identical with the poison, nor are any of the poisons its seed. The same applies for the latent tendencies for listening.

1261 As here, in the Yogācāra system in general the distinction between vimuktikāya and dharmakāya is that the former designates the removal of only the afflictive obscurations as attained by śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats, while the latter refers to the removal of both afflictive and cognitive obscurations. The *Uttaratantra* describes these two kāyas as the two aspects of the complete relinquishment of the two obscurations in perfect buddhahood, without relating these kāyas to the distinction between bodhisattvas and arhats. Thus, when talking about the dharmakāya as the actual state of buddhahood in general, it is understood that both types of obscurations have been relinquished in it. In this sense, it then includes the vimuktikāya. In the context of the uncontaminated path of familiarization as presented in the AA below, JNS describes the vimuktikāya as mere complete relinquishment and the dharmakāya as the complete realization after this relinquishment (see Appendix I2E5).

1262 Often this term is translated as "swan," but the Sanskrit *haṃsa* clearly refers to a special type of white wild goose that is common in India.

1263 I.45–49 (P5549, fols. 11b.1–12a.6).

1264 Verses 62–63. As for the Sanskrit term *śrutavāsanā*, in itself, it can be understood as either "latent tendencies *of/through* listening" or "latent tendencies *for* listening" (the Tibetan *thos pa'i bag chags* seems to rather suggest the former). Accordingly, one finds a range of explanations of this term. In the context of explaining why bodhisattvas engage in mere cognizance (*vijñaptimātra*), *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* III.12 (P5549, fol. 29a.3–7) and its commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva (phrases in [ ]) say, "The cognitions of [nonconceptual and

unmistaken] supramundane calm abiding and superior insight focus on [all] the miscellaneous dharmas [of the mahāyāna, whose general characteristic is suchness], and the subsequently attained [nonconceptual] cognition in terms of various kinds of cognizance [realizes all phenomena to be nothing but imaginations of apprehender and apprehended]. Through these [cognitions], they relinquish all seeds in the ālaya-consciousness together with their causes, and thus increase the seeds of making contact with the dharmakāya [—cultivating the mahāyāna latent tendencies for listening. Finally,] through undergoing the fundamental change of state, they perfectly accomplish all the buddhadharmas and thus attain omniscient wisdom. This is why they engage [in mere cognizance]." In JNS's above quote of *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* I.45–49, the latent tendencies for listening are described in both of the above senses. On the one hand, they are said to be a "remedy," "mundane," and increasing "by virtue of being associated with listening, reflection, and meditation that are performed many times." On the other hand, the term refers to "the seeds of supramundane mind," "the natural outflow of the pure dharmadhātu," "the seeds of the dharmakāya," and is "included in the dharmakāya." JNS's above comments on all these expressions account for the latent tendencies for listening being thus said to be both mundane and supramundane, but clearly treat them primarily from an ultimate perspective. JNS says that they are "not something that must be input newly under the influence of conditions"; "what allows one to listen to all the twelve branches of a buddha's speech"; "the capacity of uncontaminated cognition that is active through the power of the nature of phenomena"; and "allowing the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya to engage the mind streams of sentient beings." Also, they do not really increase, but "it is only the power of the decline of the factors to be relinquished that appears as if the latent tendencies for listening, which are the natural outflow of the completely pure dharmadhātu, increase from small to medium and so on." The meaning of their being "mundane" is explained as referring only to their being the remedy for what is mundane, but, in being the natural outflow of the supramundane dharmadhātu, they are not contained in mundane mind streams. The gist of their being a "natural outflow of the dharmadhātu" is said to lie in this term addressing the need for some factor that is other than the completely pure dharmadhātu itself and at the same time outside of all impure phenomena. Thus, from the perspective of this factor of the natural outflow being associated with a mind stream on the path, it is presented as a bodhisattva and yet also as being included in the dharmakāya. In this way, "in the single body of a yogin that appears as the other-dependent nature there are two modes of engagement—the mode of engagement of the continuum of consciousness and the mode of engagement of the power of wisdom." Thus, depending on whether the latent tendencies for listening are regarded from the perspective of seeming reality, the path, and ordinary consciousness or from the perspective of ultimate reality, the ground/fuition, and nonconceptual supramundane wisdom (both perspectives are found in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and JNS), these tendencies can be described as either mundane, conditioned, and acquired (being a remedy, increasing, associated with listening, reflection, and meditation) or as supramundane, unconditioned, and innate (being the capacity of uncontaminated cognition that is active through the power of the nature of phenomena, being an outflow of the dharmadhātu, and belonging to the dharmakāya). According to JNS, such tendencies are the spontaneous impulses and habits of listening to and engaging in the dharma that are the natural expression of one's own buddha nature as the causal condition. Thus, the facts of the dharma, teachers, and texts appearing for oneself as well as being attracted to and engaging them come about through the main cause that consists of the revival of these internal tendencies appearing as if external, with the compassion and the enlightened activities of buddhas and bodhisattvas aiding as the dominant or contributing conditions. Fundamentally speaking, all of this happens nowhere else and as nothing else than appearances in the disciples' own minds, which in these cases are not stained by obscurations. After quoting the above passage of *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* I.45–49, the Third Karmapa's commentary on the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (Rang byung rdo rje 2006b, p. 504) says, "Therefore, . . . the dharmakāya originates from uncontaminated dharmas, but since the basic element of the stainless dharmakāya exists right now, the dharmas that are its

natural outflow arise. Look at this in detail in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*. [I summarize] what is taught here . . . :

> In the sky of the great dharmadhātu,
> The characteristics of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are like illusions.
> The perfect [nature as] the dependent origination of the nature of phenomena
> [Consists of] the dharmakāya and the dharmas that are its natural outflow.
> The dependent origination of what does not exist yet appears
> Consists of the causes and results of nonrealization, conception, imagination,
> And the ālaya-consciousness that is based on them.
> When you understand these two in an unmistaken way,
> This is the prajñā that distinguishes saṃsāra and nirvāṇa,
> Which is praised by the victors."

See also Schmithausen 1987 (pp. 80–81).

1265 I.56–57. These verses say that the skandhas and so on rest on karma and afflictions, these on improper mental engagement, and the latter on the purity of mind, which does not rest on any of them.

1266 Both Dölpopa's *Mountain Dharma* and *The Fourth Council* speak about buddha nature or the naturally abiding disposition as being unconditioned and a support for buddha qualities.

1267 According to Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, "these" refers to the nature of phenomena (in general) and the dharmadhātu (the disposition in specific) two sentences above.

1268 In the above, the Karmapa has presented the three criteria to identify a teaching as being of expedient meaning—the basis of the intention behind this teaching, its purpose, and the explicit statement being refutable through reasoning.

1269 In the introduction to his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, pp. 15ff.), the Eighth Karmapa says that there is no difference between the mantrayāna and Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka from the point of view of freedom from reference points. This means that once the objects of negation—clinging to extremes and clinging to reference points—have been relinquished, there is nothing whatsoever to be affirmed. However, the luminous wisdom mind that is explained in the sūtras and the luminous wisdom mind explained in the tantras are not the same. If they were just the same, either the tantric path would be indispensable as the means to realize the luminous mind as explained in the sūtras or the tantric path would be superfluous for realizing the luminous mind as explained in the tantras since the same could be accomplished through the sūtra path alone. Moreover, the luminous mind in the sūtras and the luminous mind in the tantras are explained to be mutually exclusive in the sense of not coexisting. As for the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Eight Thousand Lines* (D12, fol. 3a.3) saying, "As for the mind, it is no-mind. The nature of the mind is luminosity," the basis that is intended here is the luminous mind as it is explained in the tantras. The purpose of saying that the actual nature of the mind (that is, the six or eight consciousnesses) is luminosity is to understand that the buddhahood of the sūtra approach is attained through the path of the sūtras. Thus, this quote refers to the nondual wisdom mind that "is without the mind that consists of apprehender and apprehended." The luminous mind of the tantras resides in all sentient beings in an unmanifest way. However, when it is about to become manifest, gradually all eight consciousnesses plus their nature completely vanish, until finally the luminous mind as described in the tantras dawns. Thus, in the Kagyü lineage, in talking about buddhahood in the sūtras and tantras, the same names are used for the ground based on which buddhahood is accomplished, the path that accomplishes it, and the fruition that is accomplished. These names are "sugata heart," "mind," and "luminosity," each one being used in terms of ground, path, and fruition. However, what is labeled by these terms is not the same in the sūtras and tantras. Therefore, it is explained that

the accomplishment of sūtric buddhahood does not cover the attainment of tantric buddhahood, whereas the accomplishment of tantric buddhahood does incorporate the sūtric one. One may wonder, "Is the sugata heart not also taught in the sūtras?" It is taught indeed, but only as a mere name. Since its full scope does not fit into the minds of the disciples of the sūtra system, it is taught in a way that is not to be taken literally. On the other hand, in the tantras it is taught both in this way and in a manner that is to be taken literally. In the sūtras the tantric meaning is taught implicitly in a hidden manner, but the sūtric path does not operate with buddha nature as it is taught in the tantras. Rather, on the basis of the six or eight consciousnesses, the sūtric path causes the relinquishment of the two obscurations and the gathering of the two accumulations, which leads to attaining sūtric buddhahood. Therefore, in the sūtras buddha nature is explained as being unconditioned. Taking its being unconditioned as the basis, it is then sometimes further interpreted as an entity and sometimes as an empty nonentity. With the first way of interpretation in mind, Dölpopa and others interpreted buddha nature as an unconditioned entity that is permanent, lasting, and unchanging. Thinking of the second way of interpretation, the great translator Ngog Lotsāwa interpreted buddha nature as emptiness in the sense of a nonimplicative negation, while Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra explained the dharmadhātu—the disposition that is the foundation for accomplishing the pāramitās—as emptiness (for further details, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 61ff.).

1270 See the explanations in RT and LSSP/PSD below.

1271 NSML (p. 196) says that, according to the Mere Mentalists, there are several reasons for giving the bodhisattva disposition the name "the distinctive feature of the six āyatanas." From among the six āyatanas, it refers distinctively to the āyatana of mind. From among the latter's eight kinds of consciousness, it refers to the ālaya-consciousness. From among the latter's two portions—maturational and seminal—it refers to the seeds. From among virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral seeds, it refers to the first. Virtuous seeds can again be contaminated or uncontaminated, but here the latter are referred to.

1272 These and their relation to the disposition are taught in AA I.37–39.

1273 Both Dölpopa and Tāranātha assert that the qualities of the dharmakāya as well as the four wisdoms have both conditioned and unconditioned parts.

1274 For further details on the ālaya being conditioned or unconditioned, its relation to buddha nature, and the "distinctive feature of the six āyatanas," see the introduction of Sparham 1993 (esp. p. 33). Karma Trinlépa's commentary on *The Profound Inner Reality* (Ka rma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal 2006b, pp. 46–50) explains the following on the relationship between the naturally abiding and the unfolding disposition. Others say, "If this Heart had the sixty-four qualities from the very beginning, the qualities of perfect buddhahood would exist in the mind streams of sentient beings, and in that case, does the buddha wisdom in the mind stream of a hell being experience the sufferings of hell?" Such is said indeed, but it is precisely for this reason that we speak about [wisdom or luminous mind] by making the distinction that it is stained during the phase of sentient beings and stainless in the state of a buddha. In other words, perfect buddhahood and its powers and so on do not exist in the mind streams of sentient beings. This is definitely how it is, but it will be understood through saying again and again, "*Stained* buddhahood and its powers and so on exist [in their mind streams]." Again, some say, "The naturally abiding disposition being a continuous stream since beginningless [time] is the intention of all the words [of the Buddha]. Therefore, it is justified, but this statement that the unfolding disposition is not newly arisen is not something one should listen to. If you wonder why, it is because this [disposition] is explained as the new accomplishment of roots of virtue, as in [*Uttaratantra* I.149c]: 'the supreme of what is accomplished.' Furthermore, if the fact that the unfolding disposition abides as a continuum since beginningless [time] applies to all sentient beings, how could *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* [III.11] . . . be adduced?" Therefore,

this shall be explained a bit. In a treasure below the earth, the qualities of all one may desire or need exist right from the start. Likewise, the naturally abiding disposition is the naturally luminous dharmadhātu (mind as such), in which all buddha qualities dwell primordially in an inseparable way. Its having become pure of stains is called "having attained one's own welfare, the dharmakāya." From the very time of the fruit of a palm tree or a mango fruit dwelling inside their respective skins, they have the disposition that is the cause for the unfolding of the leaves of a palm tree and the core of a mango, which will then [actually] unfold through [additional conditions,] such as water, manure, warmth, and moisture. Likewise, the unfolding disposition is the essence of the eight collections [of consciousness], which abides as the nature of the four wisdoms and is inseparable from naturally luminous mind as such, the empty dharmadhātu. Through accomplishing the roots of virtue, it seems as if it increases and then enlightened activity unfolds. This is called "having attained the welfare of others, the two rūpakāyas," since *Mahāyānottaratantra* [I.149–50] says:

> Like a treasure and a fruit tree,
> The disposition is to be known as twofold—
> Naturally abiding without beginning
> And the supreme of what is accomplished.
> It is held that the three buddhakāyas
> Are attained by virtue of these two dispositions—
> The first kāya through the first one,
> And the latter two through the second one.

Therefore, though the naturally abiding disposition exists right from the beginning, without its essence ever changing, the dharmakāya will be attained through purifying the stains. Likewise, also the unfolding disposition exists indeed right from the beginning, but through accomplishing the roots of virtue, the supreme of enlightened activities—the twofold rūpakāya—will unfold. This is why [the *Uttaratantra*] speaks of "the supreme of what is accomplished."

In brief, from the perspective of its looking as if enlightened activity unfolds through accomplishing the roots of virtue, [the Buddha] spoke of "the unfolding disposition." However, the accomplishing of the roots of virtue itself is not the unfolding disposition. The equivalent [Sanskrit] term for "disposition" is "dhātu" [of course, the exact Sanskrit equivalent for "disposition" is *gotra*, but in this context here, all these terms are taken to be equivalent anyway], which refers to disposition, basic element, cause, nature, expanse, and so on. Therefore, since the accomplishing of the roots of virtue itself is not this expanse (dhātu), it is not the unfolding expanse. But if [some people] assert that the accomplishing of the roots of virtue is the unfolding disposition, then, by the same token, it would follow that the gathering of the accumulation of wisdom is the naturally abiding disposition. If they accept this, they thereby also claim a common locus between the naturally abiding disposition and the unfolding disposition. Consequently, they cannot steer clear of the three circles [an expresion for being left with no possible answer in a debate, thus being defeated]. Also, in the context of the nine examples and their nine meanings [in the *Uttaratantra*], what is taught in the example of a fruit is the unfolding disposition:

> Just as seeds and sprouts that exist in fruits, such as mangos and palm fruits,
> And have this indestructible property [of growing into a tree],
> Through coming together with ploughed earth, water and so on,
> Gradually become the entity of a majestic tree . . .

Here, one needs to examine [and thus understand] that the seed of a palm tree and the unfolding disposition are correlated as being the example and its meaning. In terms of being correlated as example and meaning, the same goes for [the seed's] unfolding through ploughed earth, water, and so on, and the unfolding of enlightened activity through accomplishing the roots of

virtue. With this meaning in mind, the *Dharmadhātustava* says that confidence and so forth are what unfold the basic element, but it does not say that these are the actual basic element. [The dharmas that unfold the basic element are listed in *Dharmadhātustava* verses 66–68. Confidence is not explicitly mentioned there, but appears several times in the Third Karmapa's commentary on it as the starting point in terms of such dharmas.] The intention of this must be understood. Also the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* does not speak about a cut-off unfolding disposition since it is not a text of the Vijñapti[vādins]. Therefore, having in mind that [some beings] may temporarily lack the conditions that awaken the unfolding disposition, [this text] says [above], "Some lack the virtue conducive to liberation." Having in mind that [some] may lack the conditions that awaken the naturally abiding disposition, it says, "Some have inferior immaculate [dharmas]." Thus, the claim of a common locus between the disposition and what is conditioned at the time of the ground, as well as the claim of a common locus between buddhahood and what is conditioned at the time of the fruition should be known to arise from the eyes that look at the definitive meaning by being blinded through the blurred vision of clinging to dialectics.

1275 These are the only two types of connection that Buddhist epistemology and logic allow. Below, the Karmapa discusses their applications in "nature reasons" and "result reasons," respectively.

1276 This refers to *Uttaratantra* I.105–107 and I.136 and Asaṅga's commentary (J 61; neither, however, has the explicit word "imputed").

1277 This is how the dharmakāya is often explained—as the kāya of the nature of phenomena (*dharmatākāya*). See also Appendix I8A.

1278 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fols. 13bff.

1279 Karma Trinlépa's commentary on *The Profound Inner Reality* (Ka rma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal 2006b, p. 329) says, "Here, my guru, the mighty victor [Chötra Gyatso] holds the following. Since the emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects and the Sugata heart are equivalent, being endowed with the supreme of all aspects refers to the Sugata heart being actually endowed with the sixty-four qualities of freedom and maturation, and the meaning of emptiness is that this is not established as anything identifiable or as any characteristics. Therefore he asserts that making it a living experience—cultivating this lucid yet nonconceptual [state]—is Mahāmudrā meditation."

1280 In Buddhism, an entity is defined as "something that is able to perform a function," which includes not only material things, but also all types of mind as well as processes that are neither matter nor mind (such as persons and continua).

1281 Just to note that the Karmapa for the second time here refutes both this position—which is no doubt still maintained by many Kagyüpas today and regarded as the epitome of the *Shentong* view—and the claim further above that the ālaya-consciousness is refined into mirrorlike wisdom is quite remarkable (to say the least) for a text that is supposed to be written to uphold the *Shentong* view.

1282 What Dölpopa is reported here to say is a paraphrase of a passage in his *Mountain Dharma* (Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, p. 121), which concludes, "If [existence] were to establish being [something], since excrement exists in humans, are humans then excrement or what?" Note that Hopkins's translation of *Mountain Dharma* (2006, p. 188; probably due to his Tibetan original reading *bshad pa* instead of *bshang ba*) has "explanations" instead of "excrement," which, of course, makes the argument much less poignant.

1283 Now, the Karmapa shifts into debate mode, which becomes a bit technical, but very interesting, since it leads up to the analysis of *Uttaratantra* I.28 on all sentient beings having buddha nature. A simple example for a "nature reason" would be "A squirrel is an animal, because it is

a mammal." Mammals (the reason) and animals (the predicate) share the same nature, in this case fulfilling the definition of an animal. An example of the second reason—a "result reason"—would be "Behind this house, there exists a fire, since there exists smoke." Here, one infers the existence of the cause, fire (the predicate), from the existence of smoke as its result (the reason).

1284 In nature reasons, both verbs must be *is* (or *are*) and may never be *exist* (obviously, one cannot say something like "A squirrel *is* an animal, because mammals *exist*"). In the above case, the full reasoning that the Karmapa refers to would run, "Sentient beings are buddhas, since buddahood exists in them."

1285 This is the first criterion for a correct reason—the set expressed by the reason must include the set expressed by the subject (for example, squirrels are included in mammals). In the above case, if being a sentient being and being a buddha are held to be mutually exclusive, any reason that uses buddha or buddhahood contradicts the above criterion and can never establish that the one is the other either.

1286 Skt. anvaya/vyatireka, Tib. rjes su 'gro ldog. These are equivalent terms for the second and third criteria of a correct reason (otherwise referred to as positive and negative entailment).

1287 I.28 (Skt. *saṃbuddhakāyaspharaṇāt tathatāvyatibhedataḥ/ gotrataś ca sadā sarve buddhagarbhāḥ śarīraṇaḥ;* Tib. *rdzogs sangs sku ni 'phro phyir dang/ de bzhin nyid dbyer med phyir dang/ rigs yod phyir na lus can kun/ rtag tu sangs rgyas snying po can*).

1288 This refers to the paths of accumulation and preparation.

1289 As mentioned before, this triad represents the criteria that qualify a statement as being of expedient meaning.

1290 There are many volumes in Tibet as well as by Japanese and Western scholars on how *Uttaratantra* I.28 and the compound *buddhagarbhāḥ* in it can be interpreted, so I will highlight just a few things here. As for the somewhat differing Sanskrit and Tibetan versions (see the above verse), *spharaṇa* literally means "quivering," "throbbing," "vibration," or "penetration." *Vyatibheda*, rendered as "undifferentiable" above (which corresponds more to the Tibetan *dbyer med*), literally means "pervading." The third line in the Tibetan says "because the disposition *exists*." The fourth line ends in *can*, which literally means "to possess," but is also a common way to indicate a *bahuvrīhi* compound in translations from Sanskrit, as in this case here. The two most basic renderings of the Sanskrit of this line with its compound *buddhagarbhāḥ* are "all beings are always such that they contain a buddha/have a buddha as their core" (thus, my above translation factually renders *garbha* twice in order to cover both facets). Interestingly, in the early Tibetan translations the verse ended in *yin* ("are"), which was only replaced by *can* at a rather late point. The most obvious reason for this is trying to avoid the reading "all beings *are* the buddha heart," which is immediately suggested to readers of Tibetan unfamiliar with the underlying Sanskrit. Nevertheless, especially some later Tibetan (and Western) commentators make a big point out of beings actually possessing the buddha heart or even full-fledged buddhahood. This is a point evidently denied by the Eighth Karmapa here, and is even contradicted by the preceding verse I.27 in the *Uttaratantra* (the order of the two verses being reversed in the Tibetan):

> Since buddha wisdom enters into the hosts of beings,
> Since its stainlessness is nondual by nature,
> And since the buddha disposition is metaphorically referred to [by the name of] its fruition,
> All sentient beings are said to contain the buddha [heart].

This explicitly says that the disposition is *not* actual buddhahood or dharmakāya—the fruition—but a case of labeling the cause with the name of its result. So, one way to look at these two verses is in terms of cause, fruition, and their fundamental equality. In this way, the disposition is the cause for the fruition of the buddhakāya, with suchness indicating that this "cause" is not

different from the result (the nature of the mind being always the same in sentient beings and buddhas, or, throughout ground, path, and fruition). This is underlined by *Uttaratantra* I.142ab:

> Its nature is buddhakāya,
> Suchness, and the disposition.

As the Eighth Karmapa demonstrates, it is impossible to establish verses I.27–28 as strict logical proofs for buddha nature actually existing in all beings (they may only serve as indications or metaphors). This is also highlighted by the fact that, in the Tibetan tradition, buddha nature is typically considered as a "very hidden phenomenon," which by definition does not lie within the reach of inferential valid cognition, but can only be approached through valid Buddhist scriptures. As for other explanations on *Uttaratantra* I.27–28, there is hardly anything in the three known Indian commentaries. Vairocanarakṣita's (eleventh century) very brief *Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī* (eight folios) does not comment at all on these verses. Sajjana's *Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa* just says that "because the perfect buddhakāya radiates" is to be understood as the twofold dharmakāya—(a) the completely unstained dharmadhātu and (b) its natural outflow, the instructions on the principles of the profound and the manifold (*dharmakāyo dvidhā jñeyaḥ dharmadhātuḥ sunirmalaḥ/ tann iṣyandaś ca gambhīravicitranayadeśaneti/ saṃbuddhakāyaspharaṇāt iti jñeyam/*; this distinction is found in *Uttaratantra* I.145). Asaṅga's *Ratngotravibhavyākhyā* does not comment directly on I.27–28, but provides an explanation in the context of its matching the nine examples for buddha nature with its threefold nature (J 69–72; P5526, fols. 113b.5–116a.6 on *Uttaratantra* I.143–152). The tathāgata heart (the cause for purifying the mind) has the nature of (1) the dharmakāya, (2) suchness, and (3) the disposition as found in I.28. (1) The dharmakāya of buddhas is twofold: the perfectly pure dharmadhātu that is the object of the personally experienced nonconceptual wisdom of tathāgatas (the dharma of realization) and the cause for attaining this—the natural outflow of the perfectly pure dharmadhātu, which arises as cognizance in other sentient beings in accordance with how they are to be guided (the dharma that is the teaching) [see the Introduction for the corresponding definitions of a dharma wheel, scriptural prajñāpāramitā, and a treatise (in Sthiramati's *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*)]. The teaching is twofold in terms of presenting the subtle and the vast dharmas, respectively. The former consists of the profound bodhisattvapiṭaka and is in terms of ultimate reality, while the latter consists of the twelve branches of a buddha's speech and is in terms of seeming reality. The three examples of a buddha statue, honey, and a grain teach that sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart in the sense of the tathāgata-dharmakāya pervading the entire realm of sentient beings. No sentient being is ever outside of the tathāgata-dharmakāya, just as forms always exist within space, which is supported by *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.15:

> Just as space is asserted to be always omnipresent,
> This [change of state] is held to be always omnipresent.
> Just as space is omnipresent in the host of forms,
> It is omnipresent in the hosts of sentient beings.

(2) Though the mind may be associated with infinite afflictions and sufferings, by virtue of its natural luminosity it is changeless like excellent gold and thus called "suchness." Upon this mind having arrived at being pure of all adventitious stains, it receives the appellation "tathāgata" ("having arrived at suchness"). It is in the sense of suchness being undifferentiable in this way (which is illustrated through the example of gold) that the suchness of a tathāgata is the heart of sentient beings. This natural purity of the mind is the nondual nature of phenomena, which is supported by *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.37:

> Though it is without difference in everything,
> Suchness having become pure
> Is the Tathāgata. Therefore,

All beings possess its heart.

(3) The remaining five examples of a treasure, a tree, a precious statue, a cakravartin, and a gold statue teach that, in the sense of the nature of the disposition for giving rise to the three buddhakāyas, the tathāgata-dhātu is the heart of all sentient beings. This tathāgata-dhātu is the cause for attaining the three buddhakāyas, with "dhātu" having the meaning of "cause." It exists in all sentient beings in the form of their heart, but they do not know it. The *Abhidharmasūtra* says:

The dhātu of beginningless time
Is the matrix of all phenomena.
Since it exists, all beings
And also nirvāṇa are obtained.

The following presents a selection of Tibetan commentaries on *Uttaratantra* I.27–28 that shows the wide range of explaining and justifying the "proofs" in these verses. (A) Ngog Lotsāwa (Rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab 1993b, fols. 28b.4–29b.2) first elaborates on the example of a huge silk cloth the size of an entire trichiliocosm that is encapsulated in a single minute particle (Chapter 30.11 of the *Avataṃsakasūtra/Tathāgatotpattisaṃbhavanirdeśasūtra* in the Chinese Buddhist canon; also quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* on *Uttaratantra* I.25 [J 22–24; P5526, fols. 88b.4–89b.8]). Here, the buddha wisdom that exists in the mind streams of sentient beings is the dharmadhātu. This dharmadhātu is wisdom in the sense that the prajñā of buddhas knows, in a single moment, all phenomena to lack characteristics. Therefore, this prajñā is inseparable from what it knows. Thus, the ultimate, this very dharmadhātu, is the wisdom that is aware of this dharmadhātu. Since said dharmadhātu abides in all sentient beings in a complete manner, the example and its meaning are very much justified. When the obscurations have subsided, no characteristics whatsoever are seen and this very nonseeing is the seeing of true reality. The wisdom of nothing to be seen is nothing but suchness itself. Therefore, it is in this sense justified (that dharmadhātu and wisdom are one). As for the intention of lines I.28ac, Ngog says that sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart because they (a) possess the resultant, (b) the natural, and (c) the causal tathāgata heart. (a) The perfect buddhakāya is pure suchness, and its radiating refers to sentient beings being pervaded by it. It is pervading because it is suitable to be attained by all sentient beings. From this perspective, the "tathāgata" (in "tathāgata heart") refers to the actual one, while it is only in a nominal sense that sentient beings possess the heart of this tathāgata. For those who have the fortune to attain this tathāgatahood are labeled as being pervaded by it. (b) In terms of suchness, both "tathāgata" and sentient beings who possess his Heart are taken to be the actual suchness. For even when suchness, which is naturally devoid of stains, is associated with adventitious obscurations, it is the nature of a buddha and it definitely abides in the mind streams of sentient beings. (c) In terms of the disposition, "tathāgata" is understood in a nominal sense because the causes for attaining the state of pure suchness—the latent tendencies of virtue that consist of the seeds of prajñā and compassion—are the causes of a tathāgata, whereas it is precisely the disposition that is "the heart of sentient beings." (B) Gyaltsab Darma Rinchen (Tibetan as quoted in Ruegg 1969, pp. 291–92) says that the tathāgata heart is explained by way of the result that is a tathāgata, the nature of a tathāgata, and the cause of a tathāgata. However, it is not that mere suchness and the dharmakāya of perfect buddhas are taken as instances of the tathāgata heart because the *Uttaratantra* and Asaṅga's commentary explain the latter as pertaining solely to the phase of sentient beings and the phase of the cause. As for identifying the three instances of the tathāgata heart in I.28, the result of having cultivated the path that purifies the basic element—the enlightened activity of the dharmakāya of perfect buddhas—radiates toward and pervades all sentient beings. Beings are explained to possess the tathāgata heart because they have this very factor of being suitable for enlightened activity to engage them, which is associated with them as the special phenomenon that exists solely in the mind streams of sentient beings. This is similar to AA VIII.11ab saying:

By virtue of the vastness of activity like that,
Buddhahood is described as "all-pervading."

Though suchness naturally devoid of stains is the nature of both sentient beings and buddhas, by taking its being the nature of buddhas as a reason, it refers to the tathāgata heart at the time when it is associated with the stains of the mind streams of sentient beings. It is said that all sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart with the intention that suchness with stains—the very suchness that is naturally devoid of the stains of the mind streams of sentient beings—exists in all beings. The same is also said with the intention that all beings possess the buddha disposition during the phase of the cause which makes them attain the three kāyas. Though there is also the naturally abiding disposition, when it is explained that beings possess the tathāgata heart through taking the existence of the disposition as a reason, this must be explained from the perspective of the cause of a tathāgata. When the same is explained through taking the existence of suchness as a reason, it must be explained from the perspective of the nature of a tathāgata. Therefore, one should understand that the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*, the *Uttaratantra*, and Asaṅga's commentary excellently determine the tathāgata heart as being all of the following three—the capacity in sentient beings' mind streams of their being suitable for enlightened activity to engage them, the suchness with stains in the mind streams of sentient beings, and the buddha disposition in the mind streams of beings that is suitable to change state into the three kāyas. Without realizing these meanings, to assert even the ultimate dharmakāya as the tathāgata heart through dividing the latter into the triad of the resultant, the natural, and the causal tathāgata heart is a presentation that may amaze the ignorant, but it is not the meaning of the *Uttaratantra* and Asaṅga's commentary. (C) According to Rongtön Shéja Künrig (Rong ston shes bya kun rig 1997, pp. 80–83), all sentient beings are said to possess the tathāgata heart because the dharmakāya of perfect buddhas radiates, because they possess the suchness that is undifferentiable from the aspect of the natural purity of the suchness of the dharmakāya, and because they have the disposition for the dharmakāya—the capacity of the basic element. After briefly reporting Ngog Lotsāwa's above explanation of I.28 and quoting I.27, Rongtön presents the manner in which the *Uttaratantra* (I.144ff.) and the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* match the dharmakāya, suchness, and the disposition with the nine examples for buddha nature. He says that the meaning of the tathāgata-dharmakāya radiating in all sentient beings is that the dharmakāya of realization pervades all sentient beings and quotes the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J 70; P5526, fol. 114a.6–8): "Through the three examples of a buddha statue, honey, and a grain, it is taught that sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart in the sense of the tathāgata-dharmakāya pervading the entire realm of sentient beings." The above citation of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.15 in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J 71; P5526, fol. 114a.8–114b.1) is taken as being the reason for this. According to Rongtön, this means that the factor of natural purity—the cause for attaining the change of state of both the dharmakāya of realization and the dharmakāya of the teachings—pervades all sentient beings. As for the meaning of suchness being undifferentiable, it is explained as "undifferentiable" because its being empty of any real nature pervades everything in terms of the ground and the fruition and everything internal and external. As for being pervaded by the disposition, this refers to the capacity of the mind that is to be awakened by conditions—the substantial cause of buddha wisdom. As *Uttaratantra* I.104c says, "The uncontaminated cognition in beings resembles honey." This explains the basic element to be purified, whose function is the function of the disposition—seeing the qualities of happiness and the flaws of suffering. Here, the assertion that the meaning of "the dharmakāya radiating" as being pervaded by enlightened activity is not justified because this contradicts the meaning of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.15, which is adduced above as the reason. Therefore, there is no flaw of repetition either since natural purity is used in terms of its being contained within the mind stream, while suchness pervades everything internal and external. Suchness and natural purity exist in the manner of a quality and the bearer of this quality, respectively. As *Uttaratantra* I.164d says, "The qualities are pure by nature." The meaning of the suchness of a tathāgata

being undifferentiable from all sentient beings is that the suchness of buddhas exists in all sentient beings in an undifferentiable manner. For the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J 71; P5526, fol. 114b.4–5) says, "In the sense of suchness being undifferentiable, [which is illustrated] through the one example of gold, the suchness of a tathāgata is the heart of sentient beings." The above citation of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.37 (J 71; P5526, fol. 115b.7–8) is taken as being the reason for this. Thus, the nature of phenomena—being empty of a nature—is without difference. The meaning of the tathāgata disposition existing in all beings is that the disposition for giving rise to the three buddhakāyas exists in sentient beings. For the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J 72; P5526, fol. 116a.2–4) says, "Through the remaining five examples of a treasure, a tree, a precious statue, a cakravartin, and a gold statue, it is taught that, in the sense of the nature of the disposition for giving rise to the three buddhakāyas, the tathāgata-dhātu is the heart of all sentient beings." The above citation of the *Abhidharmasūtra* (J 72; P5526, fol. 116a.6) is taken as being the reason for this. (D) Gö Lotsāwa ('Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal 2003b, pp. 262–63 and 268) says that the buddha wisdom which enters all sentient beings is expressed as "tathāgata heart." Though this buddha wisdom is the actual tathāgata, it is only the nominal heart of sentient beings because it is not contained in the mind streams of sentient beings. Also, the nature of the mind (suchness without adventitious stains) that exists in both buddhas and sentient beings without any difference is called "tathāgata heart." The suchness that exists in buddhas is the actual suchness and the suchness of sentient beings is buddhahood in a nominal sense. As for the buddha disposition, it is the factor in all sentient beings that represents the manner in which their skandhas and so on are similar to buddhahood. This disposition is also called "tathāgata heart" by metaphorically referring to it as its fruition, tathāgatahood. Thus, sentient beings possess the tathāgata heart because they are pervaded by the perfect buddhakāya, because their suchness exists as being undifferentiable from buddhas, and because they have the buddha disposition. This can be proven by either one of these three reasons—that there are three is only for the sake of guiding different sentient beings. However, all they prove is only a convention (and not a fact), that is, they just explain the meaning of the statement "All beings possess the tathāgata heart" in different words, but they do not prove the fact that all sentient beings possess it. Gö Lotsāwa describes Ngog's above division into resultant, natural, and causal tathāgata heart as "very excellent" and further divides each one of these into their seeming and ultimate aspects. The dharmakāya is twofold in terms of its qualities of freedom and maturation. The disposition is twofold as the naturally abiding and the accomplished dispositions. Suchness is not said to be divided in the *Uttaratantra*, but the teachings of the Buddha in general speak of the suchness of the ultimate and the suchness of the seeming. The division into three (dharmakāya, suchness, and disposition) is nothing but a division of the nature of the single suchness that is unchanging throughout all three phases. Thus, the three consist of nothing but suchness. (E) The Third Karmapa's autocommentary on his *Profound Inner Reality* (Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fols. 43b–44a) refers to I.28 in the context of explaining that the stained minds of ordinary beings, which appear as the five skandhas, are tainted forms of the buddhakāyas. Thus, upon the stains disappearing, the dharmakāya as well as, physically, the supreme nirmāṇakāya of a buddha radiate. (F) Dülmo Dashi Öser's (b. 1474) commentary on the *Uttaratantra* (Dul mo bkra shis 'od zer 2006, p. 152) which is largely based on Rangjung Dorje's lost commentary, says that the dharmakāya of a perfect buddha radiates within all sentient beings because the dharmakāya will become manifest through having familiarized with uncontrived mind as such. The suchness of sentient beings and the suchness of buddhas is undifferentiable. All sentient beings have the disposition—the seed of uncontaminated mind. (G) The Eighth Karmapa's *Lamp That Excellently Elucidates the System of the Proponents of Shentong Madhyamaka* (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1990, pp. 14–31)—differing from his presentation in JNS and without going through all the technicalities of reasoning—justifies the three reasons in I.28 at length. To summarize, as for "the buddhakāya radiating," the text says that the stained minds of sentient beings change state into stainless wisdom due to the power of both the blessings of the already stainless wisdom of

all buddhas and the factor of wisdom within the stainless aspect of their own minds. This change of state is the dharmakāya, whose buddha qualities then perform the enlightened activity that consists of both one's own and others' welfare. As for "suchness being undifferentiable": "the tathāgata heart," "dharmakāya," and so on are just different names with the same meaning. It is just the unobscured manifestation of the tathāgata heart that is called "dharmakāya." This is found in the three phases of sentient beings (impure), bodhisattvas (pure and impure), and buddhas (completely pure), but in itself is never tainted by any stains and is pure by nature. Thus, it is taught that, in the tathāgata heart, there is neither any being tainted by stains in the beginning nor any relinquishment of them later. In this way, the tathāgata heart is what appears as the three jewels (Buddha, dharma, saṃgha) since it is capable of bringing forth the accumulations of merit and wisdom on a temporary level as well as the excellence of self-arisen wisdom ultimately. Thus, throughout all these phases, in the tathāgata heart there is never any difference in terms of it being a cause that can be separated from its result. As for "the disposition," the support of the path is the tathāgata heart with stains, the supports of practicing this path are the persons in the three yānas (with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas being very distant from this disposition), and the nature of the path is the disposition. If it did not exist, even if buddhas have arrived in the world, there would be no basis for the growth of the roots of virtue and thus no attainment of perfect buddhahood. Thus, what is to be adopted is the tathāgata disposition and what is to be rejected are the adventitious stains—the imaginary and other-dependent natures. (H) Jamgön Kongtrul's commentary on the *Uttaratantra* (Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 2005b, pp. 49–50) explains that all beings primordially and uninterruptedly possess the ultimate tathāgata heart because the dharmakāya of perfect buddhas pervades all phenomena, because the true nature of all of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is undifferentiable form suchness, and because the naturally pure dharmadhātu exists in all sentient beings as being suitable to be purified from obscurations (the text also quotes Rongtön's brief description of Ngog Lotsāwa's above explanation on I.28). (I) Mipham Rinpoche's *Synopsis of the Tathāgata Heart* ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1975, fols. 282–94) says rightly that the usual brief glosses on the three parts of this "proof" do not penetrate the essential point of the *Uttaratantra*'s explanation of buddha nature. A common interpretation is that the dharmakāya—whether it is regarded as emptiness or wisdom—pervades all phenomena, that the suchness of buddhas and sentient beings is of the same type in being nothing but emptiness, and that the existence of the disposition refers to nothing but being suitable to become a buddha. However, with regard to both the first and the second lines, since both omniscient wisdom or emptiness equally pervade all phenomena without a mind too, it is hard to see that point as a specific reason for the mind of sentient beings having the potential to become buddhas, while other phenomena don't. As for the third line, the disposition cannot just be a mere potential that may evolve into the result of buddhahood since then that result would actually be produced by impermanent causes and conditions and thus—by definition—be impermanent too. (As the Karmapa explained above, this is impossible for something like buddhahood since buddhas would then inevitably fall back into saṃsāra at some point, and there would be huge differences between ground, path, and fruition, contradicting a primordially pure nature of the mind that does not change from sentient beings to buddhas.) In explaining the first three lines of verse I.28, Mipham Rinpoche joins them with the Buddhist standard set of the four reasonings of (1) dharmatā, (2) dependence, (3) performing a function, and (4) justification. As for the first line, he says that, though there is actually no earlier cause or later result as far as buddha nature is concerned, from the perspective of how things (mistakenly) appear, the result of the manifestation of the dharmakāya proves the cause of the disposition, thus applying reasoning (2). On the second line, the text says that the basic nature of all phenomena in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa—emptiness—is primordially inseparable from great luminosity, due to which buddhas and sentient beings too are equal ultimately. Therefore, reasoning (1) establishes that what is projected by adventitious delusion and looks like a sentient being never moves an inch from this ultimate nature of phenomena, thus having buddhahood

as its Heart. Also the sūtras (such as the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*) say that all phenomena have the nature of primordial luminosity. Of course, this seems to invite the above-mentioned consequence that stones and such would also have the disposition. Thus, Mipham Rinpoche says, what is called "disposition" must be presented as the infallible cause for buddhahood, that is, the unfolding of the mind that is unmistaken about the nature of all knowable objects, once the two obscurations that have arisen by virtue of mind's power are relinquished. But since what is not mind (such as stones) is without any process of accomplishing this through the path, despite it being inseparable in terms of suchness conventionally, there is no need to present it as having the disposition. Also, stones and such equally appear by virtue of the power of the mind—it is not that they are mental appearances by virtue of the power of external stones and the like. This is to be understood through the example of the relationship between what appears in a dream and the consciousness that dreams. As for the third line, sentient beings have the disposition of being suitable to become buddhas since the adventitious stains are established to be relinquishable, while the dharmakāya with its primordial qualities is established to exist without any difference throughout all phases from an ordinary being up through becoming a buddha. That sentient beings have such a disposition of being suitable to become buddhas means that they definitely have the buddha heart, since it is only for them that there is a phase of actually becoming buddhas, while the unconditioned nature of the dharmakāya is without any differences in terms of before and after or better and worse. Through this third reasoning, one understands that a result is produced from a cause, thus applying reasoning (3). This is not just inferring that a result comes forth through the mere existence of the cause, which is due to the following essential points: the disposition that is suchness (the nature of phenomena) is changeless; at the time of fruition, its nature is still without being better or worse; since the adventitious stains are always separable from it, no matter how long they have been around, it is impossible that the disposition ever loses its capacity for becoming a buddha. (J) Dongag Tenpé Nyima's notes on Mipham Rinpoche's above text (Mdo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma n.d., pp. 17.5–18.1) follows the latter's matching of the three lines with reasonings (2), (1), and (3), referring to result, nature, and cause, respectively. He adds that the first one is a result reason (*'bras bu'i rtags*), while the latter two are nature reasons (*rang bzhin gyi rtags*). Also, when it is said that "sentient beings are buddhas," this only refers to buddhahood in the sense of natural purity (but not in the sense of being endowed with twofold purity). Therefore, it speaks about the true nature of the mind but not its result. Hence, there is no flaw of the result already abiding in the cause (as in the Sāṃkhya system). (K) The Kagyü scholar Surmang Padma Namgyal (Zur mang padma rnam rgyal n.d., pp. 32–33) explains verse I.28 through linking it with the same four reasonings and even adding the nine examples for buddha nature in the *Uttaratantra*. He says that the first line proves the cause by way of the result, applying reasoning (3) and examples 1–3. As for the second line, the true nature of buddhas and sentient beings is the same and without any distinction of purity and impurity, referring to reasoning (1) and example 4. The third line shows that the result of the three kāyas depends on both the naturally abiding and the unfolding disposition, thus applying reasoning (2) and examples 5–9 (reasoning (4) is said to be contained implicitly in all three lines). (L) Ngawang Kunga Wangchug (Ngag dbang kun dga' dbang phyug 1987, pp. 197–98) says that the first three lines of I.28, in due order, refer to that which is suitable for (a) the condition of a buddha's enlightened activity engaging it, (b) relinquishing the adverse conditions of the obscurations, and (c) the arising of all buddha qualities as the fruition. Thus, the sugata heart at the time of it being a cause for buddhahood is defined as the dharmadhātu that has these three features.

Without going into further details (which are indeed infinite on this issue), I would like to present another more path-oriented example that adds to the perspective on the three "proofs," especially "the buddhakāya radiating." As we saw, the respective first lines in the above three verses I.27, I.28, and I.142 of the *Uttaratantra* equate buddhakāya, buddha wisdom, and dharmakāya, clearly indicating that the dharmakāya is not just mere emptiness but—as buddha

wisdom—actively engages and communicates with sentient beings (this is also clearly suggested by the above gloss on the first line of I.28 in Sajjana's *Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa* as well as Asaṅga's explaining in more detail that the dharmakāya of buddhas consists not only of the pure dharmadhātu, but also of its natural outflow, which manifests as teaching sentient beings). In addition, as mentioned above, the Sanskrit term for "radiates" literally means "vibrates." So, as far as the "awakening" of buddha nature in sentient beings is concerned, one may think of both buddhas and sentient beings as violins, with the "buddha violins" being in perfect tune and playing (teaching the dharma in various ways), while the strings of the "sentient being violins" are covered by various kinds of cloth and are somewhat out of tune. Still, as we know, all strings with the same tuning start to vibrate if just one of them resounds. Even if some strings are a little bit out of tune and/or are covered by a very light cloth, they still vibrate slightly. Of course, the better they are tuned and the less they are covered, the louder and clearer they resound. So one may say that proceeding on the path is a matter of progressively uncovering and tuning the strings, but they already have the perfect capacity to resound properly and thus make themselves noticeable by vibrating right at the very beginning of the playing of the "buddha violins" (which is a 24/7 display anyway), even if ever so inconspicuously. Thus, the path is basically a matter of sentient beings tuning in to the concert of all buddhas. In brief, the first line of *Uttaratantra* I.28 refers to the "buddha violins" vibrating and the third line to the "sentient being violins." The fact that the former can actually make the latter vibrate too is shown by the second line, which states that their strings are of the same nature. For further discussions of *Uttaratantra* I.27–28, see Kano 2006 and Mipham Rinpoche's *Lamp of Certainty* (Pettit 1999, pp. 384–87).

1291 D4049, fol. 54a.4.

1292 Tib. dus gsum mkhyen pa (the First Karmapa, 1110–1193).

1293 Tib. 'od gsal chub pa'i byang bya yin. JNS plays here on the two syllables of the Tibetan word *byang chub* (enlightenment, buddhahood), with *byang* meaning "to purify" and *chub*, "to fully realize."

1294 Sections 2) and 3) render JNS's (pp. 414–23) elaboration on the third cause—the disposition—for the arising of the knowledge of the path in AA II.1.

1295 Several passages of what follows are greatly related to the general topic on the result of valid cognition in terms of thorough analysis in the Seventh Karmapa's *Ocean of Texts on Reasoning* (Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 2, pp. 510–22).

1296 Chapter II, verses 204–205 (D107, fols. 173b.7–174a.1; JNS quotes only lines 204cd and 205bc). One may well add verses 131–132 from the same chapter (ibid., fol. 127b.2–3) here:

> On account of the differences between childish beings,
> Those of weak insight, and the noble ones,
> I speak of three yānas,
> One yāna, and no yāna.
> This is the door to the ultimate—
> Freedom from the duality of cognizance.
> Within the state of nonappearance, how could there be
> A presentation of three yānas?

1297 IX.37. Note that line b is a gloss of "tathāgata" as *tathatā-āgata*, literally meaning "suchness having arrived at purity" (*śuddhim āgata*).

1298 Chapter VII (D106, fol. 30b). It should be noted that this passage continues as follows: "Why is that? Because, by virtue of having very little compassion and being very much afraid of suffering, they are just naturally of inferior disposition." Thus, the sūtra does not say that śrāvakas have no disposition for attaining buddhahood at all.

1299 D113, fol. 20a.6.

1300 The two parts of this reason here respectively use the two syllables of *sangs rgyas*, the Tibetan rendering of "buddha(hood)," with the former meaning "awoken," "dispelled," or "purified" and the latter meaning "unfolded" or "expanded." The same applies in the following statements about sentient beings/adventitious stains becoming purified and buddha wisdom unfolding.

1301 This sentence is an abbreviated version of a passage in Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (J 32–33; P5526, fols. 94b.7–95a.4). In Tibet, there have been long-standing and complex debates about questions such as whether the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* belong to what Tibetans call "Mere Mentalism" (thus being inferior to Madhyamaka); whether these texts and the Yogācāra School teach that some beings have no disposition to attain enlightenment at all (and what exactly "disposition" means in this context); and whether they assert three yānas ultimately. The Gelugpa School in particular answers these questions in the affirmative and many modern scholars do so too. There is no room here to address these issues in detail (such as the complex treatment of *gotra* in different Yogācāra texts), but as can be seen from CE and JNS above, there are Tibetan teachers (as well as some modern scholars) who disagree with the Gelugpa answers. In particular, as for the term "disposition" (*gotra*), it should first be noted that, differing from the term's primary meaning in the *Uttaratantra*, in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* it is not an equivalent of buddha nature. Like the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the text speaks about five categories of *gotra* (those of bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, those with uncertain *gotra*, and those without *gotra*). The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* identifies the last category with those who just follow their great desire (*icchantika*) and reject the dharma, thus having eliminated all their roots of virtue and not attaining parinirvāṇa. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* follows the very common definition of *gotra* in general, which is "roots of virtue" (see also Sthiramati's *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, Yamaguchi ed., p. 188). The *Bhāṣya* on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.4 explains that *gotra* is that from which qualities arise and increase. Also the distinction between the naturally abiding (*prakṛtistha*) and the accomplished (*samudānīta*) or unfolding dispositions in this verse differs from how these terms are understood in the *Uttaratantra*, with the former being defined as what has the nature of being a support for further virtue (*prakṛti* can also mean "cause") and the latter as what is thus supported. On *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.9 and III.11, the *Bhāṣya* comments that accumulating roots of virtue is indispensable for acquiring a disposition, but once the bodhisattva disposition is acquired, it serves as the source of infinite further roots of virtue. Thus, *gotra* in this sense refers to conditioned and multiple phenomena, whereas *gotra* in the sense of buddha nature is clearly unconditioned and single. The former is also evident from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 41b.6–43a.2), which says that beings have infinite *gotras*, all of which refer to some (conventional) nature of theirs, such as being an angry or passionate person, or liking sweet versus other tastes. Just as the possession of the *gotra* of desire functions as the cause for giving rise to desire, but not for hatred, the three different *gotras* of the three yānas are indispensable for there being three yānas. As for *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11, the *Bhāṣya* explains that to be without disposition means to possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa—either for a certain time (the first four kinds of beings in the verse) or forever (the last one). According to Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 48a.4–49b.1), this refers to those with the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood) for a certain time and those who have the property of not attaining *any* kind of nirvāṇa for a certain time. He says that the first four pertain to those who *do* possess the bodhisattva disposition, but, by virtue of certain conditions, will temporarily (for many eons) not attain parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood). Among these, "those who are solely devoted to wrongdoing" are engaged in the five negative actions without interval. "Those who have completely destroyed the immaculate dharmas" are those who, under the influence of wrong spiritual teachers, have fallen into the wrong view of nihilism, thus denying karma, the three jewels, and so on. "Those who lack the virtue conducive to

liberation" have not gathered the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, but only the virtues for higher rebirths as gods and humans within saṃsāra. "Those who have inferior immaculate dharmas" have only gathered a fraction of the merit and wisdom necessary to attain parinirvāṇa. Thus, as long as these four do not fully remove their negative actions and wrong views, and accumulate the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, they will not attain this state. As for those who will not attain any nirvāṇa, "lacking the cause" refers to lacking the virtuous roots and the disposition for any of the nirvāṇas of the three yānas because without such a disposition, they do not attain any of these three nirvāṇas. They do lack the property of attaining nirvāṇa, just as the natures of stones and trees do not turn into something that has the nature of consciousness, such as minds and mental factors. Thus, in the first four cases, Sthiramati says, "lack of disposition" only has a pejorative sense, while "lacking the cause" means utter nonexistence because they do absolutely not attain nirvāṇa. However, considering the text's (and the commentators') understanding of "disposition" (virtuous roots), its explicit stance of all beings possessing *tathāgatagarbha* (IX.37), and its statement that mind is natural luminosity, which is merely obscured by adventitious stains (XIII.18–19), being without *gotra* (*agotraka*; the text does not use *icchantika*) forever is not equivalent to saying that some beings have no buddha nature or can absolutely never attain enlightenment(see also Appendix I2E3da). Rather, there are some beings who simply never acquire a "disposition" for any of the yānas in the sense of never acquiring any—or at least a significant—amount of virtue that qualifies as such a disposition. In other words, all beings have the potential for buddhahood, but some just never actualize this potential even remotely, which is exactly why saṃsāra in general is said to be endless. This is basically also what Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* on I.40–41 (J 36–37; P5526, fols. 96b.8–97b.6) explains, using the term *gotra* in both the above way and also for buddha nature. Without *tathāgatagarbha*, the text says, beings would neither be weary of suffering nor wish and strive for being free of it (nirvāṇa). These are the two functions that the pure buddha disposition exhibits, which dwells even in beings who are fixated on their wrong ways. However, to be aware of the shortcomings of saṃsāric suffering and the advantages of nirvāṇic happiness is not without any cause or condition, but due to the existence of the *gotra* of persons with virtuous dharmas. If this kind of *gotra* were without any cause or condition and not brought about through terminating wrongdoing, it would also have to exist in those who just follow their great desire, having the *gotra* of not passing into parinirvāṇa (*icchantikānām apy aparinirvāṇagotrānām*; clearly, here, *gotra* does not refer to buddha nature, but to virtuous roots as above). The *gotra* being pure of adventitious stains does not happen as long as one does not aspire for the dharma of one of the three yānas through connecting with the four conditions of relying on a genuine spiritual friend and so on (that is, dwelling in a conducive place, accumulating merit, and making aspiration prayers). The *Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra* says that the light rays of sunlike buddha wisdom touch even those who are fixated on wrongdoing, thus benefiting them and enhancing the arising of future causes for happiness through virtuous dharmas. As for the statement that those who just follow their great desire possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa forever, it refers to having aversion toward the mahāyāna dharma as being the cause for not attaining parinirvāṇa. Therefore, this statement was made for the sake of turning such people away from their aversion, with the intention of referring to another time (that is, that they actually can attain nirvāṇa at some point in the future). By virtue of the existence of the naturally pure *gotra*, it is impossible for anybody to never become pure, which is said with the intention that, by virtue of essentially not being different from the Bhagavān, in all sentient beings there is the possibility to become pure. Sthiramati's *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* (Yamaguchi ed., pp. 55.19–56.6) on I.19a ("the emptiness of the primordial nature" among the sixteen emptinesses) juxtaposes the positions on three versus a single *gotra*, but takes all of them to be primordial: "As for [I.19a] 'In order to purify the *gotra*,' its emptiness is the emptiness of the primordial nature. The reason for this is that, [according to the *Bhāṣya*,] '*gotra* is the primordial

nature.' How so? 'Because of having a nature of its own,' which means to have a nature of its own from beginningless time that is not adventitious. Just as some [phenomena] in beginningless saṃsāra are sentient and some are insentient, here too, some [sets of] the six āyatanas represent the *buddhagotra*, some the *śrāvakagotra*, and so on. The *gotra* is not accidental because it has been continuing since beginningless time [up through the present], just like the distinction between what is sentient and insentient. Others say that, since all sentient beings are endowed with the *tathāgatagotra*, *gotra* should be understood here in this way" (depending on how the Sanskrit here is reconstructed, "in this way" could also be read as "as suchness," which would conform to the comments by Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.37). As for the issue of there being only a single yāna, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.53–54 gives seven reasons for why the Buddha spoke about there being only one yāna. The commentaries by Vasubandhu (Limaye ed., pp. 199–200), Sthiramati (D4034, fols. 196a.5–199b.2), and Asvabhāva (D4029, fols. 93b.6–95a.2) elaborate on these reasons as (1) the dharmadhātu not being different in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas; (2) all those who progress through the yānas up through a buddha equally lacking a self; (3) the state of being liberated from the afflictions being the same in all of them; (4) śrāvakas with uncertain disposition being lead into and liberated through the mahāyāna; (5) a buddha's mind of equality toward all beings and the attainment by certain śrāvakas who remember that they have been bodhisattvas before being partially similar; (6) the Buddha having emanated as śrāvakas and attained parinirvāṇa through the śrāvakayāna; and (7) there being nothing more supreme to go to than the buddhahood to be reached through the mahāyāna. With buddhahood having only a single yāna, the respective statements in various sūtras that there is a single yāna should be understood through these seven intentions (*abhiprāya*). However, it is not the case that the three yānas do not exist. The reason why the buddhas teach a single yāna is to attract śrāvakas with uncertain disposition to the mahāyāna and to prevent bodhisattvas with uncertain disposition from falling away from this yāna. Sthiramati says explicitly that those sūtras that speak of a single yāna and three yānas are of expedient and definitive meaning, respectively. *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.32 quotes the very same two verses from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* as the answer to the question, "If this dharmakāya of the buddhas, which is endowed with such excellent qualities, is not in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, with what intention was a single yāna taught?" The commentaries by Vasubandhu (D4050, fol. 187a.1–187b.6) and Asvabhāva (D4051, fols. 292b.6–293b.3) repeat that the teachings on the single yāna entail the above seven intentions (however, Asvabhāva also says that there is a single yāna because, ultimately, the yānas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are the mahāyāna). Many Tibetan and most Western scholars follow this, holding that the Yogācāras in general, as in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, assert the ultimate existence of three yānas. In large part this is due to the common hermeneutical approach of taking the Sanskrit *abhiprāya* (Tib. dgongs pa) by default to mean "intention," and this by default meaning that anything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning. However, it is very hard to defend the position that the Yogācāras in general assert three yānas, let alone ultimately, and said hermeneutical approach entails a number of problems too. First of all, there is no text by Maitreya or Asaṅga that says that there are three vehicles ultimately, or that the teachings that there is a single yāna are of expedient meaning or entail some intention. On the contrary, at least as far as the presentations in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and the *Uttaratantra* go, they are both clearly from the perspective of a single yāna. Among the works of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva, the stance that the single yāna was taught with certain intentions is only found in their above-mentioned commentaries on the same two verses in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. Among these commentaries, it is only the one by Sthiramati which says that these teachings are of expedient meaning. However, in several other places in the same commentaries and other texts by these masters, there are passages that suggest only a single yāna, which eventually is entered by all śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats as well. I am not going to provide a new commentary here on verses IX.53–54 of

the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, but on their own they could very well be read as giving the reasons for why there in fact is only a single yāna (see also Yamabe 1997, pp. 200–203). In particular, the first reason in XI.53 is literally the same as in *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* I.40ab and verse 21 of Nāgārjuna's *Niraupamyastava*, which, however, is taken by these texts as the reason for why there in fact is, respectively, only a single *gotra* or yāna ultimately. In addition, these latter two verses are usually quoted by the very same scholars above as two of *the* classical scriptural supports for there being only a single *gotra* and yāna. Also, one cannot but wonder how this reason (1) of the dharmadhātu being the same in śrāvakas and all others is supposed to establish the *ultimate* existence of three yānas, or how it could serve as a proof for the expediency of the single yāna (if anything, it only proves the opposite). In fact, it would then absurdly follow that these ultimately existing three yānas have three ultimately different fruitions, which could consequently only come from three ultimately different kinds of dharmadhātu. In the same vein, reasons (2)–(3) also speak about a single yāna by virtue of certain features from an ultimate point of view (lack of a self and irreversible liberation from afflictions) being the same for the three yānas, and (7) speaks about a single yāna by virtue of there being no higher destination than the one arrived at through the mahāyāna, so how can there be three different yānas ultimately? In fact, looking at Vasubandhu's above concluding remarks in his commentary on IX.53, one could easily read it as there being only a single yāna from the perspective of buddhahood, but, relatively speaking, from the perspective of those in the śrāvakayāna and the pratyekabuddhayāna, it is not that their yānas do not exist at all. PK (fol. 107a.4–107b.3) says that Asaṅga and his followers, for the sake of guiding different beings, taught for those whose dispositions are individually certain that the yānas are real as different ones, and for those whose dispositions are not certain, they taught that there is a single yāna. Statements as in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.54 and teachings about the single yāna taught in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the *Ratnameghasūtra*, and so on being of expedient meaning are only given in order to dispel the fear of certain people, while Asaṅga's *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* establishes a single yāna. As for the sometimes chameleonlike notion of "intention" (Skt. abhiprāya/saṃdhi, Tib. dgongs pa), in general, as Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XII.16–18 (Dngul chu thogs med bzang po dpal 1979, fol. 133b.5–6) points out, "expedient meaning" on the one hand and the two categories of "intention" and "indirect intention" (Tib. ldem dgongs) on the other hand are not coextensive since *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.31 states that all teachings of the Buddha (and not just the portions of expedient meaning) have to be understood in terms of the four intentions and also says that the indirect intention of a remedy teaches all the remedies that consist of the eighty-four thousand teachings of the Buddha. Also, as is often pointed out, if everything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning, then all Buddhist teachings would be of expedient meaning because they were all given with certain intentions, including the ones with regard to emptiness. To conclude, as the above-quoted verses II.131–32 and 204–5 from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (D107, fols. 127b.2–3 and 173b.7–174a.1) say, even the teachings on a single yāna are just for those of weak insight, but are not the definitive meaning. Rather, in ultimate reality, any presentations of any yānas are obsolete. For further details, see the Bibliography, especially Ruegg 1969 (pp. 73–86, 97–100, and 185–88), Kunst 1977, Hakamaya 1980, Prasad 1991 (pp. 1–45), Lopez 1992 (pp. 16–70), Yamabe 1997, and D'Amato 2003.

1302 On the positive side, one may also add lines II.210cd–211ab from the same text:

> The nature without adversity
> That is actual reality is not harmed
> Through what is contrary, even with effort,
> Since mind [naturally] settles in its [own] sphere.

Some people argue that there is no state of permanent liberation or buddhahood without regressing into delusion again, giving the examples of heating up gold or water. Through this,

gold will become liquid, but eventually always solidify again. Likewise, water may become hot and even boiling, but will inevitably cool down. The Buddhist reply is that these examples miss the point because the nature of gold is to be solid and cool—and not liquid and hot—to begin with, thus reverting to precisely this solidity and coolness (the same goes for water). In the same way, realizing buddhahood means to recognize the true nature of the mind, while mistakenness is not its nature. Thus, once mistakenness is seen through, mind will not revert to it. In other words, once the nature of all phenomena is known for what it is, one cannot unknow it.

1303 This obviously refers to what these opponents understand as the *Shentong* tradition.

1304 As mentioned before, the state of being free from something (in particular, being free from obscurations by virtue of the prajñā of realizing identitylessness) is not considered a conditioned and impermanent result that is actually produced by a cause (such as a sprout by a seed), but is classified as an absence of entities that is permanent and unconditioned (see also Chart 24 in Volume Two).

1305 This is the Second Karmapa (1204–1283).

1306 Pp. 378–87.

1307 Note that the *Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarīkasūtra* (D111, fol. 85a.6–7) also speaks about the tathāgata heart being virtue:

> The ālaya with various seeds
> Is the sugata heart and also virtue.
> This heart was proclaimed as the ālaya,
> But the feeble-minded do not understand it.

This accords with JNS's description of the dharmadhātu (the tathāgata heart) as being unconditioned virtue (see Appendix I2E3).

1308 Note that LN, NSML, RT, and LSSP/PSD (see below) all consider the explanations on the disposition in the *Uttaratantra* as representing the Madhyamaka position.

1309 That is, in the Sanskrit word *gotra*, the syllable *go* is explained as *guṇa* ("qualities") and the syllable *tra* as *uttāraṇa* ("delivering," "setting free"). As mentioned above, both the *Vṛtti* (p. 77) and the *Ālokā* (p. 77) also refer to this hermeneutical etymology.

1310 D3903, fol. 169b.6–7.

1311 According to *Abhidharmakośa* VI.23cd, below the level of poised readiness of their own path of preparation, śrāvakas can still turn to the bodhisattva path and become buddhas. Below the level of supreme dharma, they can still turn to the pratyekabuddha path and attain its fruition.

1312 P5526, fol. 97b.3–4.

1313 P. 121/p. 374.

1314 This is obviously based on Rangjung Dorje's autocommentary on his *Profound Inner Reality* and its two supplementary treatises, called *Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom* and *Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart*.

1315 Fols. 43a.3–45a.5.

1316 I.48 (P5549, fol. 11b.6–7).

1317 Yamaguchi ed., p. 56.1–4 (D4032, fol. 216b.1–2).

1318 CZ, p. 118.

1319 The translation "basic element of awareness" mirrors the Tibetan (*rig khams*). The Sanskrit has *madhūpamaṃ dhātuṃ imaṃ vilokya*, which translates as "Seeing this dhātu known to be honeylike . . ."

1320 The Sanskrit *jñāna* can mean "consciousness," "cognition," or "wisdom," but is rendered in the Tibetan of this line as *shes pa*, which suggests cognition or consciousness.

1321 RT does not quote lines 1bd, but presents line 1a as directly following line 7d, as if they belonged to the same verse.

1322 Fols. 204b.5–210b.2. For PSD's (pp. 108–14) abbreviated version of this, see Volume Three of this trilogy.

1323 VI.7c.

1324 VI.8a.

1325 VI.8cd.

1326 D4090, fol. 8b.5.

1327 VI.57cd.

1328 D4052, fol. 298a.4–7. This text is sometimes attributed to Vasubandhu and comments on the first chapter of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.

1329 I.48 (P5549, fol. 11b.6–7).

1330 III.2.

1331 D4038, fols. 27b.6–28a.2.

1332 Note, however, that the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (ibid., fol. 28a.2–3) continues by saying that the operation of the supramundane dharmas that have arisen should be understood by virtue of what is produced through the power of the change of state. Thus, the disposition is not the ālaya-consciousness, but its remedy, and is called "the uncontaminated dhātu" and "freedom from reference points."

1333 Wogihara ed., p. 3.1–8; D4037, fol. 2b.3–5.

1334 D4036, fol. 2a.2–3.

1335 Ibid., fol. 2b.2–4 (in the last line, LSSP omits "contained within").

1336 Tib. gcig pu dpa' ba (probably Skt. ekasattva).

1337 III.4ac.

1338 D4036, fol. 2a.7–2b.1.

1339 P. 76; D3787, fol. 59b.4–5.

1340 D4049, fol. 54a.4.

1341 Here, LSSP reverses the order of these two conditions, but the preceding explanations make it clear that this is the correct order.

1342 Let alone that one can certainly argue with Tsongkhapa's frequent use of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* as representing a Yogācāra position on the disposition, his presentation of different Yogācāra assertions on the disposition reflects his ambiguous position toward this tradition. In his early works LSSP and *Ocean of Eloquence* (see Sparham 1993), he considers the existence of the ālaya-consciousness at least a possibility. In the fourth chapter of LSSP (vol. 2, fol. 33a.5–6), basing himself on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, Tsongkhapa explicitly speaks of the existence of the ālaya-consciousness during the meditative absorption of cessation (*gnas skabs de yang kun gzhi yod*

pas sems ldan yin). As is evident from the above presentation of the disposition, Tsongkhapa distinguishes between those Yogācāras who assert the ālaya-consciousness and those who do not assert it. However, the only two quotes that he gives as supports for the latter position are passages from Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Śrāvakabhūmi*, while he also cites Asaṅga as asserting the ālaya-consciousness in others of his texts. In addition, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as yet another text by the same author is cited as support for some Mere Mentalists presenting the disposition as the unconditioned nature of phenomena. These obvious inconsistencies are not addressed by either LSSP or PSD. In Tsongkhapa's later works, such as the famous *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* and his commentaries on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (*Dgongs pa rab gsal*) and the *Guhyasamājatantra*, he strictly denies the existence of the ālaya-consciousness. While at least accepting parts of the Yogācāra system in said earlier works, Tsongkhapa sometimes treats Maitreya and Asaṅga as Mādhyamikas (such as below in his presenting the explanation of the disposition in the *Uttaratantra* as Madhyamaka). In his later works, he consistently argues for the absolute superiority of Madhyamaka (in particular its *Prāsaṅgika branch) over Yogācāra (that is, "Mere Mentalism"), while maintaining that, in their ultimate view, both Maitreya and Asaṅga are *Prāsaṅgikas.

1343 VI.4–5a.

1344 Literally "into the family."

1345 P. 76–77; D3787, fol. 59b.5–6.

1346 I.24ac.

1347 I.49.

1348 I.113.

1349 Note that this contradicts LSSP's above presentation of the explanation of the disposition in the *Uttaratantra* as being Madhyamaka.

1350 III.4cd.

1351 D4037, fol. 2b.2–3.

1352 D4037, fol. 2b.2–3. Besides its comments on AA I.37–39, which agree with the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā*, YT does not provide any general explanations on the disposition. Nyaön's commentary (Nya dbon kun dga' dpal 1978, pp. 474–75) says that the disposition that is described as coming down from beginningless time in the third chapter of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is unconditioned. Neither of these texts, Nyaön says, assert a "cut-off disposition" and the naturally abiding disposition that Asaṅga refers to is the true nature (dharmatā) of the six āyatanas, whose nature is luminosity since beginningless time and definitely not conditioned.

1353 Fols. 74a.1–79b.2 and 16b.1–17a.3, respectively. The first half of this section in PK explains the tathāgata heart in detail by following the *Uttaratantra's* well-known presentation through three reasons, ten points, and nine examples, but the translation here excerpts only the immediately relevant points (for the details, see *Uttaratantra* I.28ff. and its commentaries).

1354 P5526, fol. 116b.4–5.

1355 This seems to allude to the last line of the two opening stanzas of paying homage in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

1356 The following translates only the points "nature" and "definition" since the others correspond (often literally) to their respective discussions in LN above.

1357 Pp. 194–200.

1358 Wogihara ed., p. 3.1–8; D4037, fol. 2b.3–5.

1359 Gnyal zhig 'jam dpal rdo rje n.d., pp. 420–31.

1360 III.1.

1361 I.40–41.

1362 III.2.

1363 III.3.

1364 III.13.

1365 I could not locate a sūtra with this name in the *Kangyur*.

1366 CZ, pp. 117–18.

1367 Compared to the English, the order of the two parts of this definition is reversed in the Tibetan. Thus, "[all] types of buddha qualities, which did not exist before" excludes that this definition applies to the buddhabhūmi, while "the virtues that newly produce" excludes its applying to the naturally abiding disposition.

1368 XXVIII.2.

1369 Here, a note in the text glosses "two" as the naturally abiding and the unfolding dispositions. The AA too is said to identify the practices up through the tenth bhūmi and their true nature as the unfolding and naturally abiding dispositions, respectively.

1370 III.4.

1371 III.5.

1372 IX.37.

1373 IV.10a.

1374 Here, notes in the text gloss "roots," "means," "doors," "approaches," and "wisdom" as the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, familiarization, and nonlearning, respectively.

1375 XXVIII.6.

1376 I.149–52.

1377 III.6.

1378 III.7.

1379 III.8.

1380 III.9.

1381 III.10.

1382 I.112–13.

1383 I.115–16.

1384 Pp. 244–48.

1385 CZ, pp. 120–21.

1386 Skt. vikāra or vikṛta, Tib. rnam 'gyur. These Sanskrit terms refer to some kind of change, distortion, perturbation of, or deviation from, some natural state, usually for the worse.

1387 D3787, fol. 61b.4–5; p. 80. The *Vṛtti* continues, "Therefore, [the sūtras] say, 'Subhūti, bodhisattvas should train in detachment from all phenomena and in their nonexistence.' The meaning of this is that the focal object represents the alterations as they pertain to this nature,

but not just mere alterations. Thus, [the sūtras] say, 'By virtue of lacking thoughts and conceptions, all phenomena should be understood as the basic way of nonduality.' Here, 'nonduality' refers to the two of apprehender and apprehended." The above passage and more are quoted in Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (p. 79), who also inserts some comments of his own, such as the following right before the above passage: "Purification is the progression of realizing that what has the nature of the seeming (which covers suchness) is illusionlike."

1388 This means that this meditative equipoise would be a conceptual mental state that merely identifies a general conceptual object (the lack of object or appearance) through excluding everything that it is not.

1389 IX.23.

1390 Pp. 311–14 (transl.). This section is an elaboration on "wisdom" in AA I.47a.

1391 X.191cd (D107, fol. 163b.2).

1392 Ed. Vaidya, p. 3.18 (D12, fol. 3a.3).

1393 Similar to what was said about buddha nature as the disposition and what actually fulfills this function above, emptiness as it is explained here is not just a mere fact that applies to all phenomena in a general sense, but "the emptiness that actually fulfills this function" clearly has the soteriological function of realizing the true nature of one's mind and being liberated from everything that obscures it. In other words, the sheer fact that everything is empty of itself or lacks a real nature of its own is both overextensive (since it applies even to nonexistents) and, in terms of realizing this emptiness to be mind's true nature, basically misses the point. To understand that the horns of a rabbit are empty of themselves has no liberating effect whatsoever since nobody believes in their real existence in the first place. Consequently, nobody engages in any actions motivated by attachment to or aversion for them. But for everything that we take to be really existent, the exact opposite is the case—the belief in really existing phenomena triggers attachment and aversion, followed by corresponding actions, all of which lead to suffering. In order to be liberated from this basic problem of saṃsāra, emptiness needs to be realized in a double fashion. (1) To realize everything (including mind's nature) that seems to be real as actually being unreal liberates from the clinging to illusory yet afflictive phenomena. (2) To realize the true nature of the mind that realizes (1), which is empty of everything under (1) including any tendency to reify the true nature of this realizing mind itself, reveals mind's natural qualities. Obviously, the sheer lack of real existence of this mind per se does not qualify as buddhahood with all its inconceivable qualities (otherwise, there would be no difference between realizing the emptiness of the horns of a rabbit and of one's mind). Rather, from an experiential perspective (as explained in Appendix I1E3), the point is to let mind's natural luminosity (the actual basis of emptiness)—which cannot be pinpointed or reified in any way—unfold itself just as it is, which is only possible once it is not obscured by the illusory phenomena of which it is empty (see also below).

1394 Note that this corresponds to the explanation in Appendix I3C1 of the other-dependent nature being just the compound of the perfect nature (the actual basis of emptiness) and the imaginary nature (the illusory features within it), as illustrated by the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*'s example of gold ore.

1395 The Tibetan *snying po'i chos nyid* can also be read as "the essential nature of phenomena."

1396 Sections 2)–5) represent JNS, pp. 320–35.

1397 D3793, fol. 89b.5.

1398 This alludes to a certain type of reasons of nonobservation—through the reason of a given person not observing something that does not appear commonly (such as a ghost, which

may appear to some people's minds, but not to everybody), one arrives at the conclusion that, conventionally speaking, one cannot categorically say that it exists or does not exist.

1399 This is just another way of saying that every phenomenon is empty of itself or "self-empty."

1400 JNS has *shes pa*, as does the Tibetan of the following quote from the *Ālokā*. The Sanskrit of this quote consistently has *jñāna* (which can mean knowledge, consciousness, or wisdom).

1401 This refers to the emptiness of emptiness.

1402 *Ālokā*, p. 95 (JNS has a greatly abbreviated/truncated version of this). Later, the *Ālokā* (p. 97) explicitly equates nonconceptual wisdom and emptiness, saying, "The nonconceptual mind discussed in this section of the sūtras through the discussion of emptiness is one in nature with the emptiness that it has as its focal object and realizes because emptiness—the nature of all phenomena—is its focal object."

1403 *Vṛtti*, pp. 96–97; D3787, fol. 72b.6.

1404 These two arguments and some of the following discussions are elaborations on an opponent's qualm and possible answers in the *Vṛtti* (pp. 96–97; D3787, fols. 72b.6–73a.4) and *Ālokā* (p. 97).

1405 P. 96; D3787, fols. 72b.7–73a.1.

1406 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.1.

1407 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.3.

1408 Also, in the *Vṛtti*'s above answer, which is ascribed here to the False Aspectarians, emptiness was said to not be an existent, so it cannot serve as an object.

1409 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.3.

1410 P. 96; D3787, fol. 72b.6.

1411 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.3–4. Note that JNS's entire paragraph that precedes this quote is an extended paraphrase of a passage in the *Ālokā* (p. 97), which also uses this quote and elaborates on it as follows. Devadatta stands for the lack of any being or entity (*abhāva*), the extreme of denial. A real nature or own-being (*svabhāva*), the extreme of superimposition, is symbolized by Yajñadatta. When Yajñadatta—the killer of Devadatta—has been killed by his own emptiness, Devadatta will not reappear.

1412 P. 97; D3787, fol. 73a.4.

1413 I.17–20.

1414 This presentation of the twenty emptinesses in JNS is combined with the text's comments on the *Vivṛti's* list of the twenty wisdoms (as representing the equipment of wisdom) that respectively take these emptinesses as their objects.

1415 In other words, emptiness itself is no exception to being empty of a nature of its own. The purpose of explaining this emptiness is to put an end to the clinging that emptiness itself is established as anything in any way. The Buddha (for example, in the *Kāśyapaparivartasūtra*), Nāgārjuna, Saraha, and many others repeatedly warned against reifying or clinging to emptiness in any way. As quoted above, Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (p. 95) says here that even the emptiness that consists of the nature of the cognition which has the other emptinesses as its focal objects is emptiness. The *Vivṛti* (D3794, fol. 91b.3) refers to this wisdom as "the empty entity." The mere cognition that all phenomena are emptiness is the emptiness of all phenomena. By virtue of this, emptiness is empty too since this cognition (which occurs on the path of preparation)

relinquishes conceptions of clinging to this emptiness. The same interpretation is also found in *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.17 and its commentaries.

1416 *Madhyāntavibhāga* III.11ab speaks of a threefold classification of the ultimate in terms of object, attainment, and practice. The first is suchness since it is the object of ultimate wisdom. The second is nirvāṇa because it is the supreme among everything that one can strive for. The ultimate in terms of practice is the path since it accomplishes this supreme fruition of nirvāṇa.

1417 Skt. prakṛtiśūnyatā, Tib. rang bzhin stong pa nyid. The very nature of phenomena is that they have no nature. As mentioned above, it is nothing but their lack of any nature that is labeled as their "nature." Thus, phenomena are not made empty through emptiness or anything else—they are just naturally empty. However, this empty nature of phenomena is not established as any nature whatsoever either, but equally lacks any nature of its own, which is called "the emptiness of the primordial nature." In terms of their meaning and their basis of emptiness, there is no difference between this "emptiness of the primordial nature" and "the emptiness of emptiness." However, they are explained separately in order to put an end to two aspects of clinging—clinging to emptiness as being emptiness and clinging to emptiness as being the actual nature of phenomena. The essential point for both these emptinesses is that they were taught as remedies for viewing all phenomena as nonempty or solidly existing things. However, if these remedial emptinesses were not empty of a nature of their own as well, they would defeat their very purpose. This is precisely the situation that is referred to as the antidote turning into poison. The Eighth Karmapa illustrates this in his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, p. 621) by saying that if water is all that one has to extinguish a fire and then this water itself turns into a blazing fire, there is no means left to extinguish the fire.

1418 Skt. svabhāvaśūnyatā, Tib. rang gi ngo bo stong pa nyid. Here, I translated *svabhāva* as "self-entity" (instead of just "nature" as elsewhere) in order to highlight the contrast between this emptiness and the following one.

1419 The name of this emptiness is "the emptiness of other-entity" (Skt. parabhāvaśūnyatā, Tib. gzhan gyi ngo bo/gzhan gyi dngos po stong pa nyid). The *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines* says here, "What is the emptiness of other-entity? No matter whether tathāgatas have appeared or whether tathāgatas have not appeared, the matrix of phenomena, the nature of phenomena, the dharmadhātu, the flawless dharma, suchness, unerring suchness, suchness that is never other, and the true end remain just as they are. These dharmas being empty of what is other is called "the emptiness of other-entity" (D9, vol. ka, fol. 313a.6–313b.1). The *Vṛtti* (D3787, fol. 72b.3–4; p. 96) first quotes this passage in abbreviated form ("No matter whether tathāgatas appear or not, the nature of phenomena . . . remains") and then continues, "This is the emptiness of other-entity,because it means being empty of any other agent. For it is said that any activity of a person that is related to emptiness amounts to nothing but tiring oneself out." The *Ālokā* (p. 96) simply repeats all of this verbatim. Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (D3860, fol. 90a.1–2) says, "In the world, any self-entity is called an 'other-entity' in dependence on some other self-entity. Heat (the self-entity of fire) is called 'other-entity' in dependence on water (which has the self-entity of being moistening). However, when analyzed, nothing has any self-entity, so how could any other[-entity] exist? Since there is no other[-entity], it is established that there is no self-entity either." His *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (D3862, fol. 324b.2–5) gives three reasons for why emptiness can be called "other-entity." First, though emptiness is not established as any nature whatsoever, it abides all the time as the supreme true reality of all phenomena, no matter whether buddhas appear or not. In this respect, it is other than the phenomena of the seeming that bear this nature of emptiness since they do not exist all the time. Second, since emptiness is what is to be realized by ultimate supreme wisdom, it is other than the entities of the seeming, which are not what is realized by this wisdom. Third, emptiness is beyond saṃsāra. Thus, it exists "on the other side" of it, whereas the seeming is

not beyond saṃsāra. Thus, the highest reality or the suchness that is completely unchanging and has the defining characteristic of emptiness is "the emptiness of other-entity." According to the Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, pp. 633–34), in the context of these last two emptinesses, the single emptiness that is the basic nature of all phenomena is expressed in two different ways by using the conventional terms *self-entity* and *other-entity*. However, again, both of these emptinesses are not established as any entities of their own. In order to determine this single emptiness, first it is taught that the self-entity of this emptiness lies in its being a natural emptiness that is not produced by the noble ones. Consequently, the emptiness of such a self-entity is that it is empty of being this natural unproduced emptiness. Second, this very same emptiness may also be called "other-entity" or "supreme entity." However, while using such a formulation in order to comply with some systems that are the common consensus of others, it is clearly determined that the very nature of such an other-entity is also nothing but emptiness. For further details on the sets of twenty, eighteen, sixteen, or fourteen emptinesses mentioned, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 117–25.

1420 This is a technical term for the conceptual object that instantiates a definition or general category, such as "cookbook" being an instance of "book."

1421 D9, vol. ka, fol. 313a.1–2

1422 This is the principle of *rangtong* ("self-emptiness") being explained in rather technical terms—the bearers of the nature of emptiness (the phenomena of seeming reality) are empty of these very bearers. In other words, the basis of emptiness is empty of that very basis of emptiness. By contrast, in *shentong* ("other-emptiness"), the actual ultimate basis of emptiness does not consist of these bearers of the nature of emptiness, but of the unchanging perfect nature or the sugata heart, which is empty of said bearers.

1423 P. 96; D3787, fol. 72b.3–4.

1424 This is another name of the first bhūmi or what is realized on it.

1425 As mentioned in the Introduction, this is one of JNS's instances that clearly show the most crucial distinction in the entire discussion (and controversy) of *rangtong* and *shentong*—that these notions apply to two different realms of experience and discourse. As JNS explicitly states here, in the above context of its discussions of the other-empty this notion is treated from the perspective of being a conceptual object and not as what is directly realized by the nonconceptual wisdom during the meditative equipoises of the first bhūmi and above (though the latter is alluded to in other passages, such as in what follows below and Appendix I1E).

1426 As mentioned in the Introduction, the last line exhibits an intriguing ambiguity, matching the above remarks about the other-empty as a conceptual object versus what is directly realized. It means either that the Karmapa explained Āryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's position as it corresponds to the Yogācāra system or it could also be read as "While (I was) dwelling in the practice of yoga," thus suggesting that the Karmapa wrote this based on his direct experience and realization within meditative equipoise.

1427 The following is an elaboration on AA V.21 (vol. 2, pp. 304–10).

1428 As it stands, I could not locate this phrase in either the sūtras or the commentaries by Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra. Both the *Ālokā* (D3791, fol. 303a.7–303b.2) and the *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 125b.1–3) say on AA V.21, "Since it is not tenable to be liberated from the clinging to entities in this way [referring back to V.20] without removing or adding any phenomena whose nature consists of superimposition or denial, this very nature of what is dependently originating (such as form) and exists correctly on the level of the seeming should be examined as being of the nature of lacking a nature and so on. Thus, just like an illusory elephant defeating

another illusory elephant [*Ālokā*: "king"], if true reality is seen through putting an end to what is mistaken, one will be liberated."

1429 For more details on wisdom, the nature of phenomena, and buddhahood being a permanent entity that performs a function, see Appendix I4F.

1430 J 76 (P5526, fol. 118b.3–4). This passage is found in the context of commenting on *Uttaratantra* I.154–155 (ibid., fol. 118a.8–118b.6) and reads in full as follows: "What is elucidated by this? There is no characteristic of affliction to be removed from it. For by virtue of the complete purity of the tathāgatadhātu, its nature is the emptiness of adventitious stains. Nor is the slightest characteristic of pure phenomena to be added to it since its nature consists of inseparable pure dharmas. Therefore, [the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*] says that the tathāgata heart is empty of all cocoons of afflictions, which are separable from it and from which it is realized to be free. It is not empty of the inconceivable buddhadharmas greater in number than the sands of the River Gaṅgā, which are inseparable from it and from which it is realized to not be free. Thus, one clearly sees that when something does not exist somewhere, the latter is empty of the former. In accordance with true reality, one understands that what remains there exists as a real existent. These two verses elucidate the unmistaken defining characteristic of emptiness since it [thus] is free from the extremes of superimposition and denial. Here, those whose minds stray away and are distracted from this principle of the actuality of emptiness, do not rest [in it] in samādhi, and are not one-pointed [with regard to it] are therefore called 'those whose minds stray from emptiness.' Without the gate of the wisdom of ultimate emptiness, one is not able to realize and directly perceive the nonconceptual dhātu." Originally, the above passage (with minor variations) comes from the *Cūlasuññatasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* 121), one of the few sūtras from the Pāli canon that were also included in the Tibetan *Kangyur*. There it is called *Śūnyatānāmamahāsūtra* (P956, fol. 275a.2–3; not to be confused with the *Mahāsuññatasutta*; *Majjhimanikāya* 122, P957). The passage is also found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Dutt ed., p. 32), Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 76b.3), and Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* on I.1. For the original context and the vast range of interpretations of this passage in the above and other texts, see Dargyay 1990 and Nagao 1991 (pp. 51–60). The comments on it by JNS certainly add to the range of possible interpretations.

1431 J 22 (P5526, fol. 88a.2–3).

1432 As already explained above in Appendix I1E, what are called "sentient beings" are nothing but the sum of the adventitious stains.

1433 D3864, fol. 7b.3–6 (JNS quotes only the first two sentences).

1434 On nondual wisdom, see also Appendix I5D (esp. section 3d).

1435 Pp. 335–68 (transl.).

1436 I omitted the part of JNS that states the same brief sūtra passages on the first nine bhūmis as CE.

1437 P. 98.

1438 P. 99.

1439 P. 99.

1440 Among the seventeen equipments (point nine of the knowledge of all aspects), these are the twelfth and the seventeenth, respectively.

1441 Thus, this twofold division of the equipment of the bhūmis is made in terms of twofold wisdom—the wisdom of suchness during meditative equipoise and the wisdom of variety during subsequent attainment.

1442 The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fols. 99b.7–100a.3) lists twenty-four kinds of impregnations of negative tendencies in terms of (1) expressions (which are omnipresent); (2) feelings; (3) afflictions; (4) karma; (5) maturation; (6) afflictive obscurations; (7) karmic obscurations; (8) maturational obscurations; (9) obscurations; (10) examination; (11) food; (12) sexual union; (13) dreams; (14) illnesses; (15) aging; (16) death; (17) fatigue; (18) being solid; (19) being great; (20) being medium; (21) being small; (22) afflictive obscurations; (23) obscurations of meditative absorption; and (24) cognitive obscurations. Sthiramati's *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054, fol. 230a.4–230b.7) explains that all of these refer to certain latent tendencies in the ālaya-consciousness. (1) refers to the latent tendencies of the omnipresent clinging to the names of all phenomena, which have followed one since beginningless time. They are also called "the latent tendencies of proliferating reference points" because the aspects of such clinging to names arise again and again. (2)–(4) refer to the latent tendencies of contaminated feelings, afflictions, and karma, respectively. (5) are the latencies of dysfunctional karmic maturations; (6) the nonexhaustion and the long continuum of the afflictions; (7) obstacles to the path, such as the five actions without interval; (8) the antagonistic factors of the clear realization of reality—obtaining the bodies of hell beings and so on; (9) the obstacles to engaging in virtue—being overpowered by striving for sense pleasures and so on; (10) the obstacles to being ordained—being overwhelmed by examining sense pleasures and so on; (11) not eating moderately (either very little or too much); (12) the physical and mental harm due to intercourse; (13) the seemingly physical body that is experienced by virtue of being asleep; (14) the experiences of unease due to the elements in the body being unbalanced; (15) being powerless in terms of the change of these elements; (16) all faculties being disturbed when dying; (17) physical exhaustion due to long walks and so on; (18) being joined to all the preceding latent tendencies in their respectively concordant ways and thus not passing into nirvāṇa; (19)–(21) being engaged in the realms of desire, form, and formlessness, respectively; (22) the antagonistic factors of the enlightenments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; (23) the antagonistic factors of accomplishing the nine meditative absorptions of progressive abiding; and (24) the antagonistic factors of omniscience. All of these are fully relinquished on the path of nonlearning, when the liberations of mind and prajñā are accomplished. Sthiramati's *Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya* (D4034, fols. 120b.6–121a.1) explains that those two liberations refer to the freedom from the afflictions (nirvāṇa) and the freedom from ignorance (omniscient wisdom), respectively. The first one means to be liberated from the afflictions to be relinquished through the paths of seeing and familiarization, which arises from the lack of attachment. The liberation of prajñā means realizing, just as it is, that the liberation of mind actually *is* liberation, which arises from the lack of ignorance.

1443 For more details on these nominal afflictions (a.k.a. compassion) that bodhisattvas deliberately retain in order to take rebirths in saṃsāra, see Appendices I2A4 and I2D2d as well as I4B1b–c in Volume Two.

1444 This refers to arhathood as the nirvāṇa in which the suffering of saṃsāra is extinguished, but no benefit for other sentient beings is accomplished.

1445 According to Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, these are not two different types of purifications, but the same purification seen from two different angles. For example, on the first bhūmi, "the purification during the process of attaining" takes place during the subsequent attainment of the first bhūmi, which means that the first bhūmi is not fully attained until this purification is completed. Thus, it is still an integral part of the first bhūmi. At the same time, since this very purification on the first bhūmi also purifies the obscurations that prevent one from progressing to the second bhūmi, it enables one to set foot on the second bhūmi. In this sense, it represents "the purification in terms of what has been attained." In other words, what has been attained (the complete first bhūmi) is the cause for a subsequent result (the attainment of the second bhūmi). The same is to be applied to the remaining bhūmis except for the tenth one, which entails only the first type of purification, but not the second one (see below).

1446 P. 99.

1447 XX.40.

1448 XX.32–38 (JNS provides only XX.32a). TOK (vol. 3, pp. 498–99), following the *Bhāṣya*, explains these verses further: "(1) Since one sees the actuality of the nature of phenomena that was not seen before, supreme joy arises upon seeing that one is close to one's own welfare (supreme enlightenment) and that the welfare of others (the vast welfare of sentient beings) will be accomplished. Therefore, the first bhūmi is designated as 'Supreme Joy.' (2) Since it is free from the stains of corrupted ethics and mental engagement in the hīnayāna, the second one is [called] 'The Stainless One.' (3) Through the power of samādhi, one searches for limitless dharmas and shines the great light of dharma on others. Therefore, the third one is 'The Illuminating One.' (4) Since the fire of the prajñā of the [thirty-seven] factors concordant with enlightenment burns the two obscurations, the fourth one is 'The Radiating One.' (5) When one matures sentient beings, by virtue of the afflictions due to the wrong practices of others the realms of sentient beings and one's own mind are difficult to master. Since the mastery over both is accomplished, the fifth one is [called] 'Difficult to Master.' (6) Based on the pāramitā of prajñā, one faces the equality of [saṃsāric] existence and nirvāṇa. Thus, the sixth one is 'The Facing One.' (7) Since one is close to attaining the path of single progress (the eighth bhūmi), one is connected with it and has reached the end of the training that entails effort. Therefore, the seventh one is [called] 'Gone Afar.' (8) The eighth one is not moved by the two discriminations of making efforts toward what has characteristics and what lacks characteristics. Therefore, it is 'The Immovable One.' (9) Since the fine insight of the four discriminating awarenesses has been attained, the ninth one is [called] 'The Excellent One.' (10) The cloudlike gates of samādhis and dhāraṇīs pervade the immeasurable spacelike dharmas that have been attained on the ninth bhūmi and below from the buddhas. Therefore, the tenth one is [called] 'Dharma Cloud.'"

1449 II.16.

1450 II.12–13. The first four fruitions are obvious. "Engaging" means to engage in the samādhis to be mastered and then to introduce disciples to the dharma through the miraculous powers gained thereby. "Liberating" refers to liberating the mind streams of others by virtue of teaching the dharma through prajñā. "Inexhaustibility" refers to virtue not becoming exhausted through skill in means. "Unbroken flow of virtue" means that the practice of virtue of bodhisattvas is continuous by virtue of their aspiration prayers. "Securing" refers to the pāramitā of power making sure that a bodhisattva's virtues serve as the causes for enlightenment and do not get lost through adverse conditions. "Enjoyment of the dharma and maturing" refer to wisdom and its fruition, that is, one's own consummate experience of the dharma and maturing others through demonstrating the dharma in many flawless ways.

1451 II.14–15. For an explanation of these two verses, see below.

1452 XI.45–46.

1453 I.77d.

1454 As explained in CE before, this refers to the five main afflictions and the five views (see also section 3a below as well as Charts 15 and 17).

1455 This indicates a universe that includes three sets of world systems. The first set (a chiliocosm) consists of one thousand worlds as presented in ancient Indian cosmology, with each one containing Mount Meru, the four continents, and so on. The second set (a dichiliocosm) consists of the first set plus one thousand worlds that each have the size of the first set, and the third set consists of the first two sets plus one thousand worlds that each have the size of the second set.

1456 This explanation refers to the "latent tendencies for listening," which are the natural outflow of the dharmadhātu as their cause. On this bhūmi, the realization of the dharmadhātu triggers an insatiable further search for dharma.

1457 This refers to the training in superior samādhi.

1458 JG (p. 244) explains that "without effort" on the eighth bhūmi only refers to not making any efforts that entail conceptions in terms of the three spheres of agent, object, and action. This does not mean that bodhisattvas on this bhūmi and above make no efforts whatsoever because there are statements to the contrary in texts such as the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and the *Svapnanirdeśasūtra* which explicitly speak of bodhisattvas making efforts in achieving/refining supernatural knowledge, wisdom, buddha qualities, conduct, the four immeasurables, and so on.

1459 IX.41 (JNS omits line 2).

1460 Both in terms of content and faculties of ten, these qualities vary in different sources (the main one being the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*). As for (5) "wisdom operates," this means that bodhisattvas, for the sake of helping sentient beings to become free from their negative actions, demonstrate the way in which ordinary beings wander in saṃsāra through their karma. Through (8) shaking a hundred realms, bodhisattvas cause beings to aspire for being guided. Through seeing (9) the illumination of realms, sentient beings are matured. (10) Opening a hundred gates of dharma means that bodhisattvas, for the sake of ripening their own insight, reflect about the meaning of the various specifications of dharma (PSD, p. 162). Furthermore, it is said that bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi make ten great aspirations—(1) to provide for the worship of all buddhas without exception; (2) to maintain the religious discipline that has been taught by all the buddhas and to preserve the teaching of the buddhas; (3) to see all the incidents in the earthly career of a buddha; (4) to realize bodhicitta, to practice all the duties of bodhisattvas, to acquire all the pāramitās, and to purify all the stages of their career; (5) to mature all beings and establish them in the knowledge of a buddha; (6) to perceive the whole universe; (7) to purify and cleanse all the buddha realms; (8) to enter the mahāyāna and to produce a common intention and purpose in all bodhisattvas; (9) to make all actions of body, speech, and mind fruitful and successful; and (10) to attain supreme and perfect enlightenment and to teach the dharma.

1461 For more details on this empowerment according to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, see Brunnhölzl 2007b, p. 421.

1462 P760.4.

1463 Lines VI.70–73. The commentary by Jamgön Kongtrul (Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 2005a, p. 189) identifies the sūtra as the *Sūtra for the Bodhisattva Vajrasamudghāta* (Tib. byang sems rdo rje rab 'joms kyi mdo), which probably refers to the *Mahāsāhasrapramardanasūtra* (P177).

1464 This means really existing by way of their own specific characteristics.

1465 Indra rules over the desire god realm called "The Thirty-three."

1466 This is a god ruling over "Freedom from Strife."

1467 In this heaven of the desire gods, they enjoy the sense pleasures that they themselves have emanated at will.

1468 In this heaven, the gods have control to even enjoy what their fellow gods emanated.

1469 In this third heaven of the first dhyāna level, the god Brahmā resides and rules over one thousand chiliocosms.

1470 This refers to the god Śiva, who abides in the highest heavens of the form gods and rules over a trichiliocosm.

1471 XX.8.

1472 P. 52.

1473 P. 98; D3791, fols. 58b.7–58a.1. Note that the *Ālokā* (p. 33) also says, "The path of seeing and the path of familiarization are not different either because [the latter] is based on nothing other than what the above-mentioned path of seeing manifests."

1474 Though the above phrase, on its own and when taken out of its context in the *Vṛtti*, may be interpreted as it is by JNS here, one has to note that this phrase is found in the context of the *Vṛtti*'s explanation of the path of familiarization as the last one of the tenfold instructions (the second point of the knowledge of all aspects). There, the *Vṛtti* says that the path of familiarization refers to the sūtra passage "The unconditioned dhātu cannot be indicated without the conditioned dhātu, nor can the conditioned dhātu be indicated without the unconditioned dhātu" (CZ, p. 94) and comments, "Here, the conditioned is the path and the unconditioned is the relinquishment. This teaches that, by virtue of being unable to indicate these two as being mutually different, the presentation of the path of familiarization is that it is nominal and not fully qualified *because the entity that is seen, just as it is, is not different from the entity that faces it.*" Thus, at least in the *Vṛtti*, the context of said phrase seems to be the undifferentiability of the remedial path and its outcome (or subject and object) on the path of familiarization alone and not the undifferentiability of the objects on the paths of seeing and familiarization, respectively.

1475 JNS deals here with the objection that the described type of realization is just a so-called "repetitive cognition," one of the five types of nonvalid cognition in the Gelugpa tradition.

1476 This clearly refers back to the above quotation from the *Ālokā*. However, differing from the above phrase *chos dbyings bdag nyid thams cad kyis* (which conforms to D3791, fol. 58b.7), here, JNS has *chos dbyings sa'i bdag nyid thams cad kyis* (which would mean "realize the dharmadhātu through the nature of all bhūmis").

1477 Verses 74–76.

1478 Of course, JNS describes this example in terms of how the cause for the moon phases is seen in the ancient Indo-Tibetan tradition (according to Western science, the moon appears to wax and wane by virtue of the earth's shadow and not it's own). However, in terms of what the example here is illustrating, it does not matter what casts the shadow that causes the moon's seeming parts.

1479 What is to be eliminated (Tib. bsal ba) refers to a false thesis that cannot withstand analysis, such as "The meditative equipoise of noble ones is a mental state with reference points" in the above consequence. The three short statements following this consequence indicate the fact that the opponent is left with none of the three possible answers to a consequence in Tibetan debate (Tib. 'khor gsum)—the subject property cannot be attacked since it is claimed by the opponent; the positive entailment cannot be attacked since it is established through valid cognition; and the thesis cannot be accepted either since it is invalidated through valid cognition.

1480 D3787, fol. 73a.2–3; p. 97. This passage is from the *Vṛtti's* explanation of the equipment of wisdom. For the context, see Appendix I1G2.

1481 I.73.

1482 On this, see also Mipham Rinpoche's commentary on the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (lines 191–94 and 201–4) below.

1483 To see two moons when suffering from blurred vision or cataracts is one of the classic Indo-Tibetan examples for nonexistents that still distinctly appear.

1484 Compare the *Rigs lam gsal byed* (Rnam rgyal grags pa n.d., pp. 52–53) by the tutor of the Ninth Karmapa on this, who defines yogic valid perception as "the nonconceptual nonmistaken

awareness of directly seeing identitylessness based on having familiarized with the sixteen aspects of the four realities (such as impermanence)." This is classified as twofold—(1) yogic perception with appearances and (2) yogic perception without appearances. (1) is defined as "the yogic perception that appears as the variety of the dependent origination of the seeming." It is classified as the three yogic perceptions with appearances of noble śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. This does not mean that all perceptions for which the variety of dependent origination appears represent yogic perceptions with appearances. What appears that way through being based on the dominant conditions of the physical sense faculties and the mental sense faculty is asserted as sense and mental perception, but what appears that way through being based on the dominant condition of samādhi is held to be yogic perception with appearances. To be precise, yogic perception with appearances refers to the wisdoms of realizing that everything which appears as the variety of dependent origination during the subsequent attainment of the above three kinds of noble ones consists of personal and phenomenal identitylessness. (2) is defined as "the yogic perception that is free from any appearances of seeming reality." It is classified as the three yogic perceptions without appearances of realizing personal identitylessness, phenomenal identitylessness in terms of the apprehended, and phenomenal identitylessness in terms of the apprehender. PSD (p. 166) says in this context that both Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra first refute the systems that say that the mere nature of phenomena is the object of meditative equipoise, that meditative equipoise has the aspects of apprehender and apprehended, or that it is free of any object. Then, they explain that the focal object of meditative equipoise is the implicative negation that is illusionlike dependent origination without any real entities. In this, it is not the case that subject and object are different, but the appearances that are experienced in meditative equipoise through the perceptual mode of self-awareness are empty of any nature. Also, these masters do not assert that these appearances are established in dependence on the nature of phenomena.

1485 Tib. rdo rje sor spang. This refers to the first of the six-branch yoga (Skt. ṣaḍaṅgayoga, Tib. sbyor ba yan lag drug pa) of the *Kālacakratantra*, usually called "withdrawal" (Skt. pratyāhāra, Tib. so sor sdud pa *or* so sor gcod pa). When this branch is accomplished, there is an appearance of certain signs, called "empty forms" (Skt. śūnyabimba, Tib. stong gzugs), which are regarded as actual manifestations of mind's true nature. It is to be noted that, from a Gelugpa standpoint, it is inadmissible to use the vajrayāna context within the sūtrayāna context. However, as in this case, masters from the Kagyü, Nyingma, Sakya (partially), and other schools obviously have no problem with this (the most striking example being Dölpopa).

1486 This is a slight variation of the classical format of a probative argument with concordant attributes (that is, with a concordant example). The first sentence presents the positive entailment, followed by the concordant example. The second sentence usually states the subject property, but here the thesis is given. When reformulated as a proof with subject, predicate, reason, and example, the above reads, "The meditative equipoise of the noble ones who have attained mastery over inner yoga is something that takes the appearances of what exists by nature as its object because it is a meditative equipoise of the noble ones; for example, the meditative equipoise of vajra relinquishment."

1487 This represents a slight variation of the classical format of a probative argument with discordant attributes (that is, with a discordant example). The first sentence presents the negative entailment, followed by the discordant example. The second sentence usually states the subject property, but here its opposite (with the subject being implied) is given since the whole statement is an absurd consequence. When reformulated as an absurd consequence with subject, predicate, reason, and example, this reads, "It follows that the meditative equipoise of the noble ones who have attained mastery over inner yoga is not of the nature of the meditative equipoise of the noble ones because the opponents claim that it is a cognition that takes appearances of what is nonexistent by nature as its object; for example, a cognition for which an illusion appears."

1488 Tib. dbu ma rnam brdzun pa. There is no attested Sanskrit equivalent of this term—the closest references are two eleventh-century Indian Buddhist texts. Sahajavajra's commentary on Maitrīpa's *Tattvadaśaka* (P3099, fol. 180a–b) speaks of "Aspectarian Mādhyamikas" and "Nonaspectarian Mādhyamikas" (referring to Śāntarakṣita and Kambala, respectively). Ratnākaraśānti's *Triyānavyavasthāna* (P4535, fol. 114a) similarly classifies Mādhyamikas into "those who regard the seeming as an aspect of consciousness" and "those who regard it as mere latent tendencies." In Tibet, the term "False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas" is sometimes used as another name for what some Tibetans call "Great Madhyamaka," "Yogācāra-Madhyamaka," "*Shentong* Madhyamaka," "the meditative tradition of the texts of Maitreya," and "the Madhyamaka of profound luminosity." However, as presented in detail elsewhere (Brunnhölzl 2007b, pp. 173ff.), the tradition of *Shentong* is far from holding just one single position. The Sakya master Śākya Chogden (in his *Byams chos lnga'i nges don rab tu gsal ba zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*) says that the view of "False Aspectarian Madhyamaka" is presented in the later texts of Maitreya (such as the *Uttaratantra* and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*). He states that it is established through scriptures and reasoning to call it this way and that its derogatory classification as "False Aspectarian Mere Mentalism" by some Tibetan scholars is not correct. Interestingly enough, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, pp. 20ff.; see also Ruegg 1988, pp. 1268–69), the Eighth Karmapa refutes at length Śākya Chogden's position, demonstrating that the term "False Aspectarian Madhyamaka" is internally contradictory and that there are no schools or persons to whom that term may apply. In brief, he says, after all extremes and reference points, such as the notion of real existence as understood by Real and False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, have been refuted through Madhyamaka reasonings, to reestablish with great struggle the extreme view that is held in one of the subdivisions of Mere Mentalism as being the meaning of Madhyamaka is the most unreasonable Madhyamaka approach possible. In particular, designations such as "the Madhyamaka of Maitreya's system" are not at all tenable because the Buddha prophesied Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga as the founders of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra and thus any Madhyamaka has to accord with what Nāgārjuna and his followers taught. Otherwise, apart from a so-called "Maitreya Madhyamaka," it would be justified that there are seven more different types of Madhyamaka taught by the remaining seven great bodhisattvas, or even one thousand different Madhyamaka systems of the one thousand buddhas of this eon. Obviously referring to the *Ālokā* and the *Vivṛti* on the four stages of yoga (see Appendix I5D below), the Karmapa continues that if the False Aspectarians were Mādhyamikas, the question is whether they are (a) superior, (b) inferior, or (c) equal to the Niḥsvabhāvavādins. Possibility (a) is ruled out by Haribhadra. For he presents the system of the False Aspectarians as the third stage of yoga and, by refuting it due to certain reference points remaining in it, presents the Niḥsvabhāva-Madhyamaka as the supreme fourth stage of yoga. Moreover, if some teachings on real existence were the supreme Madhyamaka, it would follow that Nāgārjuna and Maitreya are wrong in praising the teachings on putting an end to all views as the supreme Madhyamaka. (b) If the False Aspectarians are inferior to the Mādhyamikas that propound the lack of nature, they are simply very much qualified as proponents of the existence of a nature. But if one speaks of Mādhyamikas who propound the existence of a nature, then all Buddhist and non-Buddhist assertions about the existence of a nature would qualify as this kind of Madhyamaka. (c) If they were equal to the Niḥsvabhāvavādins, the Madhyamaka of the lack of a nature would become the Madhyamaka of the existence of a nature, or what is really established ultimately would become not really established ultimately. In addition, the Karmapa says, verse 2 of Maitrīpa's *Tattvadaśaka* refutes implicitly that "False Aspectarian Mādhyamikas" qualify as Mādhyamikas, which is elaborated in Sahajavajra's *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā* (for a translation of the latter on verse 2, see Brunnhölzl 2007a, pp. 150–65). TOK (vol. 2, p. 545) states that the conventional terms "real aspect" and "false aspect," which are based on the system of the Mere Mentalists, were just applied by Tibetans as they please. All that is found in the original texts are the two types of passages that establish the consciousness that appears as an outer referent as

being a real or a false aspect of consciousness (Elizabeth Callahan informed me that a similar statement is found in Śākya Chogden's *Nges don gcig tu grub pa*, p. 538.2–4). The Gelugpa master Janggya Rölpé Dorje (1717–1786) says in his *Presentation of Philosophical Systems* (*grub mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa*; as translated in Lopez 1987, p. 380) that Haribhadra is said to be a *Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika who conventionally asserts false aspects, whereas Āryavimuktisena is a Mādhyamika who resembles a Real Aspectarian conventionally. For more details on the issue of Real and False Aspectarians, see below (Appendix I5D, section 2db).

1489 These consist of the five works by Maitreya; Asaṅga's "five works on the bhūmis" (*Bahubhūmivastu*, *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, *Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī*, *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*, and *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*; together, these five make up the *Yogācārabhūmi*) and his two compendia (*Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*); and Vasubandhu's "eight discourses" (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya*, *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti*, *Vyākhyāyukti*, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa*, *Viṃśatikākārikā*, and *Triṃśikākārikā*).

1490 Mathes 1996, lines 191–94 (lines 199–200 of the text say that these are the characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom). These lines describe the second of three characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom in the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*—(1) how it actually abides; (2) being without appearance; and (3) entailing appearance. Commenting on (2), Vasubandhu's *Vṛtti* (D4028, fol. 34a.4–5) states that nonconceptual wisdom is what lacks the appearances listed in lines 192–94. Mipham Rinpoche's commentary ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho, c. 1990b, pp. 34–35) explains, "The self-luminous spacelike wisdom without appearance, which is beyond the nature of these appearances [in lines 192–94], is called 'nonconceptual wisdom without appearance.' Its own nature is the wisdom that is beyond consciousness, which is not contained in any of the [eighteen] dhātus, be they conditioned or unconditioned. Therefore, its nature is not fragmented through said appearances—it is self-luminous, without it and the nature of phenomena being two. If this is taught from the point of view of the isolate of the wisdom of realizing variety, while never moving away from the natural state of this [wisdom without appearance], the wisdom of realizing variety sees all appearances as equal and yet unmixed. That such occurs means that it is suitable for [these two wisdoms to operate] as a single union without contradiction. Why is that? While all phenomena do not move away from being of equal taste within the natural state of the nature of phenomena (suchness), all bearers of this nature simply appear, but these two [facts] are not contradictory. Likewise, within the self-appearances of the wisdom that sees the nature of phenomena, appearances dawn in an unimpeded manner. Nevertheless, inasmuch as [this wisdom] does not observe [these appearances] as such and such, the above meaning of its being taught as being without appearance is fully complete because it is beyond the nature of ordinary dualistic appearances and so on." As for wisdom entailing appearance, the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (lines 201–4) says, "[Wisdom operates] by virtue of appearance because all phenomena appear equal to the center of the sky and because all conditioned [phenomena] appear like illusions and so on." Vasubandhu's *Vṛtti* (D4028, fol. 34a.7–34b.1) explains that all phenomena appear equal to the center of the sky because their perceiving subject here (nonconceptual wisdom) has relinquished all characteristics. All conditioned phenomena appear like illusions and so on because this wisdom realizes that they appear as what is not actually real. Mipham Rinpoche's commentary (ibid., p. 35) says, "How is it that [wisdom operates] by virtue of appearance? In meditative equipoise, all phenomena are of equal taste and, by virtue of the nature of suchness, cannot be observed [as distinct phenomena] because they appear as equality, just as in the example of the center of the sky. [That wisdom operates by virtue of appearance is furthermore the case] because, through the wisdom during the subsequent attainment of such meditative equipoise, all conditioned phenomena without exception (no matter how and as what they appear) appear but are not established as any nature of their own, thus appearing like illusions, mirages, dreams, and so on. The ultimate union of

meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment occurs on the buddhabhūmi. On the bhūmis of the noble ones, [it occurs] in an approximately concordant manner, and when the symbolic wisdom of the path of mantra arises in the mind stream, it also happens in a partially similar way because [the latter] is a profound means. In this way, one must understand the manner in which, ultimately, buddhas see by way of the two kinds of wisdom of suchness and variety and how, on the path of learning, it is not contradictory for meditative equipoise to entail appearance and to be without appearance. Therefore, since this is of utmost importance, I explained it in a slightly elaborate manner." The Third Karmapa's commentary (Rang byung rdo rje 2006b, fols. 570.2ff.) on these three characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom says that (1) the characteristic of how nonconceptual wisdom actually abides means that it abides as the nature of phenomena that is nondual and inexpressible. (2) The characteristic of being without appearance refers to what does not appear in nonconceptual wisdom, that is, all forms of the imaginary and other-dependent natures because these are the obscurations of nonconceptual wisdom and it never appears as them. The nonappearance of names, characteristics, and imagination is what it means to be without obscurations. (3) The characteristic of appearance is as follows. Since meditative equipoise is free from all clinging to any characteristics of any phenomena, these phenomena appear like the center of space because the unchanging perfect nature is seen. During subsequent attainment, all conditioned phenomena appear as mere appearances (just as illusions, mirages, echoes, and dreams) because the nature of saṃsāra is seen. In brief, because the imaginary and the other-dependent natures do not appear, suchness and the unmistaken perfect nature that engages it appear. This is called "nonconceptual wisdom," which—despite no dualistic phenomena appearing for it—obviously does not mean not cognizing anything at all. See also Appendix I5D2d.

1491 Lines 83–85.

1492 Lines 259–60. The word "this" in these lines is identified as "false imagination" by Vasubandhu's *Vṛtti* (D4028, fol. 36a.7–36b.1), while Mipham Rinpoche's commentary ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho, c. 1990b, p. 42) glosses it as "the duality of apprehender and apprehended."

1493 D3856, fol. 162b.4.

1494 D4032, fol. 221b.5–6.

1495 I.40c.

1496 D4038, fol. 108a.5.

1497 JNS has *yod do* (the blockprint has *yod lo*, expressing disapproval). Usually, as does the sentence that immediately precedes the above quote from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (see below section 3bb), it is said that only the innate factors to be relinquished exist in all sentient beings. PSD (p. 175) explains that the meaning of imputational and innate in terms of the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization refers to one's mind respectively being altered or not being altered through non-Buddhist philosophical systems, but not to being manifest versus latent. Thus, the factors to be relinquished through seeing are the wrong engagements in the four realities (see below), while the factors to be relinquished through familiarization are the wrong engagements in objects.

1498 Ibid., fol. 110b.4.

1499 V.19.

1500 The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on V.19 explains that the notion of "I" in itself does not prevent one from virtuous actions and that the extreme of this "I" being or becoming nonexistent is the best view among the tīrthikas. Since both are just views about a nonexistent person and others are not harmed through either of them, they are considered as neutral.

1501 V.1–2ab.

1502 Mi bskyod rdo rje 2004 (pp. 515–16) lists the following definitions and functions of these ten afflictions. Desire is to delight in false qualities. Its function is to, under the sway of craving, establish the skandhas and produce suffering. Anger is a mind that is malicious toward undesired objects. It functions as the support for suffering and flawed conduct. Ignorance is to be ignorant about the actuality of the true nature. It functions as the suppport for the arising of all afflictions. Pride is a haughty mind based on the views about a self. It functions as the support for the arising of disrespect and suffering. Doubt is to be of two minds with regard to reality as well as karma and its results. It functions as the support for not engaging in virtue. The views about a real personality consist of regarding the appropriating skandhas as a permanent and single self and what is mine. They function as the support for all views. The views of clinging to extremes consist of regarding the skandhas as either exclusively permanent or extinct. They function as the support for obstructing final deliverance. Wrong views consist of denying causes and results as well as karma. They function as the support for severing roots of virtue and engaging in nonvirtue. Holding a view as paramount is to regard a view and its basis—the skandhas—as paramount, chief, and supreme. This functions as the support for clinging to bad views. The views of holding ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount consist of regarding inferior ethics and spiritual disciplines as well as their basis—the skandhas—as the causes for purity and liberation and as what is conducive to deliverance. Among these ten, those that are acquired temporarily through studying mistaken treatises and so on are the imputational afflictions and therefore factors to be relinquished through seeing. Those that are not dependent in such a way, but exist from the very start, are the innate afflictions and thus factors to be relinquished through familiarization.

1503 These are views held by non-Buddhists that are based on the views about a real personality and contained in the views about extremes and wrong views. They consist of mistaken conceptions about the beginning and the end of the self and the world, such as whether these are permanent or become annihilated, have a cause or not, have an end or not, whether this end is something with discrimination, without discrimination, or neither. All sixty-two are listed in the *Brahmajālasūtra*. For more details, see CE on AA IV.16b.

1504 Note that "excellent" and "conducive to deliverance" correspond to the third aspect of the reality of cessation and the fourth aspect of the reality of the path, respectively.

1505 Mi bskyod rdo rje 2004 (pp. 516–17) glosses engaging in the reality of suffering through wrong views as denying that this reality is the result of the reality of the origin of suffering or denying that it exists as its four defining aspects, such as being impermanent. Anger means to become irritated at those who say anything that does not accord with one's own views about a real personality, views about extremes, and wrong views. Among the ten afflictions, the kinds of desire, pride, and anger that focus on views are factors to be relinquished through seeing, but those that focus on objects are factors to be relinquished through familiarization. The manner in which one wrongly engages in the reality of the origin of suffering is similar to the one of wrongly engaging in the reality of suffering, but the difference lies in not understanding the reality of suffering as the result of ignorance versus not understanding the reality of the origin of suffering as consisting of its four defining aspects, such as origin. Since the realities of cessation and the path are not included in the three realms, the expression "the cessation and the path of the desire realm" refers to the freedom from the factors of the desire realm to be relinquished and the path that makes one attain that freedom, respectively. One cannot actually focus on these two realities through any afflictions because they are not object conditions of afflictions. However, one can focus on them in the manner of just focusing on their names, through which fear about them may arise. In this way, even anger may engage in these two realities in a direct manner (and not just based on previous wrong engagement).

1506 Note that the way in which the ten wrong engagements relate to the four realities is drawn from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, but that the numbers of wrong engagements in each of the four realities with respect to the three realms that are given here stem from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. The difference in the enumeration in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is that the first two views are not listed for the last three realities of all three realms, which makes a total of ninety-four factors to be relinquished through seeing—thirty-four wrong engagements in the desire realm and thirty in each one of the two higher realms (see section 3ac2a below as well as Charts 15 and 17).

1507 Since JNS's presentation of the factors to be relinquished through seeing here primarily follows the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, it does not list the 108 cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing as they are described in detail in AA V.5–16 (see CE and JNS on these verses). In brief, these cognitive obscurations consist of the four sets of nine conceptions about the apprehended in terms of (a) engaging in the purified phenomena of bodhisattvas and (b) withdrawing from the ones in the lower yānas and about the apprehender as (a) a substantial person and (b) an imputed individual, with each set being multiplied by the three realms.

1508 V.46.

1509 V.4ab.

1510 D4038, fol. 114b.6–7.

1511 As above, anger is excluded throughout the higher realms and the two views mentioned in the above quote from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* are excluded in the same ways as in the desire realm (see also Charts 15 and 17).

1512 PSD (p. 175) says here that the difference between the enumerations of the factors to be relinquished through seeing in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is one in terms of being more or less refined. PSD asserts that, in the context of the mahāyāna, the presentation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* should be considered as the authoritative one for both the factors to be relinquished through seeing and the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. TOK (vol. 3, p. 479) agrees with this and says that it is therefore better to explain the presentations in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* as representing the intentions of different sūtras. Thus, TOK rejects the classification that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* represents just the system of the Mere Mentalists, while the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* explains the system of the Sautrāntikas.

1513 As explained just above, the views about a real personality belong to those that are explicitly excluded from the last three realities in all realms in both the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*.

1514 XXV.4c (D13, fol. 15a.2; Conze 1973, p. 55). The same statement is found in the sūtra in eight-thousand lines (D12, fol. 233a.5–6; Conze 1973, p. 252).

1515 This section 3ad is best read in conjunction with Appendix I2D2b since there are a lot of cross-references and they supplement each other.

1516 Both presentations are from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and JNS (p. 469) says that the first one refers to the scope of explanation, while the second one presents the scope of how the path of seeing actually arises in the mind stream.

1517 The presentation in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (D4038, fol. 118a.7–118b.2) speaks about nine mental states on the path of seeing—the four dharma cognitions, the four subsequent cognitions, and the mental state of mere calm abiding after all of these. One arrives at the sixteen moments by dividing the former eight into an uninterrupted path and a path of liberation each. The ninth mental state of calm abiding is just the nominal path of seeing. In the presentation

below, it is the readiness for dharma cognition that represents the uninterrupted path, while dharma cognition, subsequent readiness, and subsequent cognition together represent the path of liberation. JNS (p. 471) also gives an alternative way of connecting the sixteen moments of readinesses and cognitions through matching them with the sixteen aspects of the four realities (such as impermanence) according to their order.

1518 *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054, fol. 215b.2–3). The *Tengyur* has Jinaputra as the author of this commentary, while Western scholars attribute it to Sthiramati.

1519 Tib. skye 'gyur gyi lam. This means that relinquishment takes place in a way that the process of the arising of a particular remedy and the process of the ceasing of its factor to be relinquished are simultaneous. If relinquishment occurs due to a "path concurrent with ceasing" (Tib. 'gag 'gyur gyi lam), the ceasing of the remedy and the ceasing of its factor to be relinquished are simultaneous. In general, JNS (pp. 538–39) says that the remedy does not directly cancel out its manifest factor to be relinquished because these two cannot occur simultaneously in one single mind stream. Rather, the remedy directly meets and cancels out the seeds or tendencies for the manifest factor to be relinquished, that is, its causes that dwell in the ālaya-consciousness. In that way, the arising of the remedy is the obstacle for the arising of the result—the future manifest factor to be relinquished—and thus causes it to not arise anymore. This is the actual meaning of the arising of the remedy and the ceasing of the factor to be relinquished being simultaneous (see Appendix I2E6).

1520 AA V.21d/*Uttaratantra* I.154d.

1521 The presentation of this in Haribhadra's *Ālokā* on II.11 (pp. 170–71; D3791, fols. 94a.3–95b.4) starts by defining the path of seeing of bodhisattvas as "the nonreferential samādhi associated with prajñā immediately after the supreme mundane dharma." Based on the dominant condition of the prior analysis of the reality of suffering on the path of preparation, the path of seeing is the uncontaminated wisdom that is the personal experience of the reality of suffering, through which the afflictions that are the factors to be relinquished through seeing with regard to the reality of suffering are relinquished (the same applies for the other three realities). This is followed by an almost literal copy of the presentation of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing and the way in which its factors to be relinquished are relinquished as it is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 93a.5–93b.4; see also Chart 19 and Appendix I2D2ba2a): "(1) What is readiness? It is the uncontaminated prajñā in which the reality of suffering becomes revealed as one's own personal experience by virtue of prior analysis [on the path of preparation]. Through this [prajñā] of seeing suffering, the [respective] afflictions to be relinquished are relinquished. This is called 'the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering.' (2) What is the dharma cognition of suffering? It is the cognition that manifests liberation [from the respective afflictions] right after the end of the readiness [for the dharma cognition of suffering]. (3) What is the readiness for the subsequently realizing cognition of suffering? It is the uncontaminated prajñā right after the end of the dharma cognition of suffering in which it becomes revealed as one's own personal experience that the two [cognitions that consist] of the readiness for the dharma cognition of suffering and the dharma cognition of suffering are the causes for the qualities of the noble ones. (4) What is the subsequently realizing cognition of suffering? It is the cognition that definitely seizes the readiness for the subsequently realizing cognition. The readinesses and cognitions that correspond to the remaining three realities should be understood in the same way. Here, through the readinesses for dharma cognition and the [dharma] cognitions, the apprehended is realized [to be empty]. Through the subsequently realizing readinesses and the [subsequent] cognitions, the apprehender is realized [to be empty]. It should be understood that all readinesses and cognitions entail the yoga of dwelling in signlessness. These sixteen moments of mind constitute the path of seeing. A moment of mind should be understood as the complete arising of a cognition with regard to what is to be

cognized [by it]." After rejecting the position of the śrāvakas that the path of seeing only has fifteen moments, the *Ālokā* continues that dharma readiness and dharma cognition represent the realizations in terms of the apprehended, while subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition are the realizations in terms of the apprehender. It should be understood that all these readinesses and cognitions constitute the yoga of abiding in signlessness (or the freedom from any characteristics). Also, with regard to it being a fruitional clear realization, the clear realization of the mahāyāna path of seeing is a single moment. However, since it eliminates mistakenness about each one of the four realities, these are realized solely through the sixteen moments of the path of individually discriminating clear realization. As long as there are certain causes of mistakenness, further superimposed aspects arise from them. Therefore, in order to eradicate the afflictions that arise through such mistakenness, beyond its first moment, the path of seeing entails further kinds of familiarization with the different aspects that remedy said mistakenness and superimpositions. It is thus that the phases of approaching stream-enterers and so on are well established. In this sense, when understood through the power of reasoning, the path of seeing consists of one single moment of clear realization, but it is explained to have sixteen moments of clear realization in terms of eliminating these various kinds of mistakenness. Therefore, though a given cognition is what apprehends the own nature of something in all its aspects, it is only through its being clearly familiar with a certain part that it is able to definitely eliminate the aspect that is mentally imputed onto that part. Thus, this cognition is a valid one by virtue of its eliminating the obscurations that block this ability with respect to this one part, but not with respect to others, just as the reason "sound is produced" only makes one understand that it is impermanent (and not permanent), but not any other features of sound. Therefore, noble ones are superior to ordinary beings to the progressive extents to which they are free from the causes of mistakenness through having eliminated certain superimposed aspects (for more details on the path of seeing being a single versus sixteen moments, see Appendix I2D2ba). TOK (vol. 3, p. 482) says, "Here, the four dharma readinesses are the uninterrupted paths that relinquish the factors to be relinquished through seeing, that is, the sufferings contained in the levels of [all] three realms. The four dharma cognitions are the paths of liberation on which these [factors] have been relinquished. The four subsequent readinesses are the uninterrupted paths that cut through the superimpositions of apprehending these [dharma readinesses and dharma cognitions] as some [factors] that are not the causes for the future qualities of noble ones. The four subsequent cognitions are the paths of liberation on which these [superimpositions] have been relinquished." As for the four remedies, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 96a.2–3) says, "What is the invalidating remedy? It means to regard contaminated formations as shortcomings. What is the relinquishing remedy? It refers to the paths of preparation and the uninterrupted paths. What is the sustaining remedy? It is the paths of liberation. What is the distancing remedy? It refers to the higher paths of these." For more details on these four remedies and four paths, see endnote 1674 and Chart 20 as well as CE's introduction to the training in all aspects and CE/JNS on V.22 in Volume Two.

1522 I.137.

1523 The order in which the sixteen moments are presented here in the first chapter of the AA is given with the intention that this is the order in which definitive certainty about these points is induced in bodhisattvas during the phase of subsequent attainment. However, it should be noted that JNS (pp. 474–76)—in its general discussion of the knowledge of the path of bodhisattvas in Chapter Two (see Appendix I2D)—clearly differentiates the ways in which the path of seeing is presented in the different chapters of the AA. In the first and fourth chapters, it is taught from the perspective of subsequent attainment. In the second, third, and fifth chapters, it is presented from the perspective of meditative equipoise. Thus, in terms of meditative equipoise, the actual intention of the AA and Haribhadra is that the one single session of meditative equipoise of the path of seeing is divided into sixteen aspects. This is by virtue of making a distinction between

one single moment of seeing and sixteen moments of realization. "Seeing" is used in terms of the appearing object, that is, the aspect that appears for the wisdom of the nature of phenomena. "Realization" refers to the objects of engagement with respect to which superimpositions are eliminated through inducing certainty about these respective objects, that is, the emptiness as the object that is connected with particular phenomena that bear this nature of emptiness. Furthermore, the readiness for dharma cognition is presented as the uninterrupted path; the dharma cognition, as the path of liberation; and both subsequent readiness and subsequent cognition, as the special path. TOK (vol. 3, pp. 479–82) states, "The uncommon mahāyāna says that, ultimately, factors to be relinquished and remedies are not established. Therefore, both [their] arising and ceasing are not tenable. This accords with *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* [V.21ab] saying:

> There is nothing to be removed in this
> And not the slightest to be added.

Bodhicaryāvatāra [IX.151ab] says:

> When phenomena are empty in this way,
> What is there to gain and what to lose?

Even if this is examined on the level of the seeming, it is not asserted that the remedy relinquishes the factors to be relinquished for the following reason. When the factors to be relinquished exist, the remedies do not exist, and once the remedies have arisen, the factors to be relinquished have ceased. Therefore, there is no meeting of nonsimultaneous phenomena. From the perspective of a mental state that does not examine [this], the arising of wisdom is labeled with the conventional expression 'the factors to be relinquished have been relinquished,' just as in the case of the [two] beams of a scale rising up and sinking down [simultaneously] . . . within seeing the nature of phenomena in its omnipresence, there are no divisions in terms of any [subsequent] new seeing that is of a different type [than the earlier seeing]. From this perspective, the path of seeing is presented as being [a single] moment. However, in terms of the manner in which it cuts through superimpositions and its manner of enhancement, it has sixteen moments."

1524 By quoting Haribhadra's *Ālokā* (pp. 98–99), JNS (p. 474; Appendix I2D2ba2a2) explains that, in terms of meditative equipoise, this means that only the first moment of the first bhūmi is the actual path of seeing, while everything from its second moment up through the vajralike samādhi represents the path of familiarization.

1525 D4038, fols. 127b.7–128a.1.

1526 For more details on the two presentations of the path of seeing in terms of a single versus sixteen moments, see Appendix I2D2ba2.

1527 As mentioned before, the śrāvakas say that the sixteenth moment of the path of seeing is already the result of having relinquished all the factors to be relinquished through seeing and thus represents the beginning of the path of familiarization.

1528 According to the *Bhāṣya*, the eight readinesses are the uninterrupted paths since they cut through one's acquired factors to be relinquished through seeing. The eight cognitions are the paths of liberation since they experience the attainment of freedom from these factors to be relinquished.

1529 V.4.

1530 It is not exactly clear how the fourfold manner of relinquishment in terms of the simultaneists is understood here (with the simultaneists, it cannot refer to a sequence in time, so it may simply refer to the clear realization of the four realities as they are realized in one moment). In general, the *Abhidharmakośa* (as per the Sarvāstivādins) clearly asserts a gradual realization of all sixteen aspects of the four realities on the path of seeing. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VI.27bc defends this against the "single clear realization" (*ekābhisamaya*) of other schools,

such as the Mahāsaṃghikas and Dharmaguptakas. The main argument of the latter is that one sees all four realities under the same aspect of the lack of a self (*anātmākāreṇa*). The *Bhāṣya* discusses three ways in which the clear realization on the path of seeing can be understood—in terms of (a) prajñā alone (*darśanābhisamaya*); (b) prajñā with its associated mental factors (*ālambanābhisamaya*); and (c) prajñā, mental factors, and nonassociated formations (such as ethics) together (*kāryābhisamaya*). From the perspective of the distinctness of the aspects of the four realities (one does not see the reality of the origin of suffering and so on under the aspects of the reality of suffering), it is said to be inadmissible to consider (a) as a single realization. However, in terms of (c), the clear realization on the path of seeing may be taken to be single in terms of those who see one of the realities obtaining mastery over the others too (that is, through seeing the reality of suffering, one obtains the capacity to see the other realities without any new preparatory stages). See also Chart 19.

1531 These are the innate aspects of the ten wrong engagements minus the last three views and doubt. As explained above and under 3bc2aa below, the latter four are purely imputational afflictions and thus factors to be relinquished through seeing alone.

1532 *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054, fol. 197b.2). JNS omits "views about a real personality," thus taking this phrase as applying to all innate obscurations.

1533 D4038, fol. 108a.5.

1534 Ibid., fol. 117b.1–2.

1535 Ibid., fol. 110b.3.

1536 Ibid., fol. 110b.5.

1537 I.40ab.

1538 D4059, fol. 14a.3–4.

1539 D4049, fol. 84b.6. Following the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, as before with the factors to be relinquished through seeing, the presentation here refers primarily to the afflictive obscurations to be relinquished through familiarization. The 108 cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through familiarization (as presented in detail in AA V.26–34) are again included in ignorance. In brief, they consist of the four sets of nine conceptions about the apprehended in terms of (a) engaging in certain mere entities and (b) withdrawing from certain mere purified phenomena and about the apprehender in terms of (a) mere imputed persons and (b) the causes for imputing such persons, with each of these sets being multiplied by the three realms.

1540 This means that greater, medium, and lesser desire are each again divided into greater, medium, and lesser degrees.

1541 V.5a.

1542 This means four in the desire realm and twenty-four in the two higher realms (desire, pride, and ignorance in each one of the four states of the form realm and the formless realm).

1543 One arrives at this number by multiplying the above twenty-eight factors in terms of the levels of saṃsāra by the nine degrees of each one of these factors (see also Charts 15–16).

1544 V.5ac.

1545 This refers to the above classification of the factors to be relinquished through familiarization in terms of the nine degrees of each one of the six innate afflictions on the nine levels of saṃsāra (with each one of the six thus having eighty-one degrees). Bodhisattvas relinquish all corresponding degrees of these afflictive factors to be relinquished through familiarization (such as the greater of the great degrees of ignorance, desire, anger, pride, and the two views) simultaneously. Therefore, on the first level of the path of familiarization (the second bhūmi),

from among these eighty-one degrees of all realms, they simultaneously relinquish the first, tenth, nineteenth, twenty-eighth, thirty-seventh, forty-sixth, fifty-fifth, sixty-fourth, and seventy-third degrees of these factors to be relinquished through familiarization. The same pattern continues throughout the remaining eight bhūmis of the path of familiarization. Thus, all the greatest degrees of the factors of all three realms to be relinquished through familiarization are relinquished through the weakest remedial path of familiarization, while all the smallest degrees are eliminated through the strongest remedial path of familiarization on the tenth bhūmi. The traditional example for this is the process of washing clothes—it does not take much effort or strong detergents to wash away the coarsest stains, but the finer they become the more effort and stronger detergents are needed to remove them. In terms of the presentation of the AA, the same eighty-onefold classification applies to the 108 conceptions about apprehender and apprehended to be relinquished through familiarization. They are relinquished through the remedies that consist of the nine levels of the path of familiarization (the second through tenth bhūmis), each one of which is again divided into nine (the lesser of the lesser and so on). On this, see CE and JNS on AA II.30–31.

1546 VI.77.

1547 CZ, p. 164.

1548 The process of relinquishment being strictly progressive for these persons means that, first, all factors of the desire realm to be relinquished are eliminated step-by-step, while the gradual relinquishment of the factors of the two higher realms follows only thereafter. As explained before, this process is usually presented through the framework of the eight levels of approachers to and abiders in the four fruitions of stream-enterer and so on (see also Chart 16).

1549 PSD (pp. 174–75) summarizes the differing ways of relinquishing the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization as follows: "Since the factors to be relinquished through seeing are the coarse factors that are produced through the mind being affected by bad philosophical systems, they are relinquished merely through directly seeing the [four] realities. Therefore, they are explained by way of the wrong engagements in the aspects of the [four] realities. As for the factors to be relinquished through familiarization, though they do not arise from imputations through bad philosophical systems, they are the subtle innate [obscuring] factors that operate since beginningless [time]. Therefore, they need to be relinquished [progressively] through becoming [increasingly] familiar with seeing the [four] realities, [starting] from the greater [over] the medium [down to the lesser degrees of these factors to be relinquished], but one is not able to relinquish them right upon merely seeing [the realities]. Therefore, they are presented as greater, medium, [and lesser] by way of the levels [of the path of familiarization]." Lopez 1992 (p. 185) concludes his discussion of the various kinds of afflictive and cognitive obscurations by saying, "The ability to compute all this prior to the invention of the electronic calculator is itself testimony to the Mahāyāna claim that bodhisattvas have sharper intellects than the adherents of the Hīnayāna." On the afflictive and cognitive obscurations, see also Appendix I4B.

1550 Pp. 411–14 and 423–27 (these sections represent JNS's comments and elaborations on the *Vivṛti* on these five causes).

1551 Interestingly, neither Ratnākaraśānti's *Sārottamā* nor *Śuddhamatī* says that the subduing of the pride of the gods is what makes them into suitable vessels for the knowledge of the path. Rather, they suggest that the Buddha's natural light eclipsing the light of the gods produces desire for and confidence in the mind (bodhicitta) that is able to outshine them (D3803, fol. 54b.6).

1552 CZ, p. 204.

1553 The *Vivṛti* (D3793, fol. 95b.2–3) literally says, "All beings are endowed with ultimate completely perfect and unsurpassable enlightenment."

1554 The further elaborations on this point (pp. 414–23) are found in Appendix I1E2–3.

1555 Interestingly, verses 76–77 of Nāgārjuna's *Bodhisaṃbhāra* say:

> One should fear the afflictions,
> But not terminate the afflictions.
> One must accumulate virtuous karma
> In order to suppress the suppressing afflictions.
> Bodhisattvas have the nature of the afflictions—
> They do not yet have the nature of nirvāṇa.
> [It is only] with the afflictions not [yet] burned away
> [That bodhisattvas can] give rise to the seed of enlightenment [(bodhicitta)].

1556 Here, JNS again uses the triad of the intention behind a statement, its purpose, and the invalidation of the explicit statement, which represent the criteria that qualify a statement as being of expedient meaning.

1557 In the "Elaborations on causes (4) and (5)" below, these latent tendencies are spelled out as "the latencies of desire for the desire realm and existence (that is, the two higher realms)."

1558 See also below on certain afflictions being deliberately retained in bodhisattvas and when they and their latent tendencies are relinquished (see also JG below and Appendices I2D as well as I4B and I5E in Volume Two).

1559 Pp. 42–49.

1560 D3793, fol. 80a.4–5.

1561 This refers to personal identitylessness; personal identitylessness plus the phenomenal identitylessness of the apprehended; and both personal and phenomenal identitylessness in full, as realized by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas, respectively.

1562 In this context, "dharma eye" (Tib. chos kyi mig) seems to stand for "dharma vision" (Tib. chos kyi spyan), which is defined as "seeing the scopes of the minds of those who are inferior and equal to oneself in terms of relinquishment and realization."

1563 As for the manner of the realizations and relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas being complete in bodhisattvas on their path of seeing, JG (pp. 194–96) says that the types of realization of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are complete at the point of the dharma readiness of suffering of the mahāyāna path of seeing because all kinds of identitylessness are directly realized at that point. The manner in which the relinquishments of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are complete is that, at the point of the dharma readiness of suffering of bodhisattvas who have not gone through any inferior paths before, the sheer types of the factors to be relinquished that constitute the anagonistic factors of the remedies that consist of the threefold completeness of the types of realization of the three kinds of identitylessness are relinquished as a matter of course. However, though these sheer types of factors to be relinquished have been relinquished during said dharma readiness of suffering, their corresponding paths of liberation are not attained and it is not the case that, at the point of the mahāyāna path of seeing, all relinquishments and realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are fully complete without exception. For certain subtle latent factors to be relinquished, such as the afflicted mind, have not been relinquished in an exhaustive manner, nor do bodhisattvas make any efforts to deliberately relinquish certain afflictions that function as the causes for further rebirths. "But do noble bodhisattvas then have fully qualified afflictions that function as causes for future rebirths?" Though they do not have fully qualified afflictions, they have

not relinquished those afflictions that function as causes for rebirth. For the causes for these bodhisattvas displaying inconceivable births, deaths, and transitions consist of the flaws of the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance; great compassion and so on (which, according to the *Sāgaramatisūtra*, are given the names "afflictions" and "latencies for the desire realm and existence"); and uncontaminated karmas. However, from the first bhūmi onward, bodhisattvas have relinquished all fully qualified afflictions together with their potent seeds that engage in the three realms. On the eighth bhūmi, the subtle continuum of those types of these seeds that lack potency as well as the afflicted mind that is conjoined with the subtle latencies of pride about oneself and so on are relinquished in the manner of their absolutely not arising again. It is with this intention that *Madhyamakāvatāra* VIII.3b says, "These stains together with their roots will utterly subside on the eighth bhūmi." Here, "together with" means that the impotent seeds of the afflictions, which remained after the manifest afflictions and their potent seeds had already been relinquished previously, are relinquished on this bhūmi without exception too. For the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (D3862, fol. 326b.5–6) on the above speaks about "previously arisen afflictions," saying, "Through the sun of nonconceptual wisdom shining, all the darknesslike previously arisen afflictions together with their roots that serve as the causes for being born in saṃsāra and engage in its three realms will definitely subside on the eighth bhūmi." Therefore, it is not the intention of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* that all afflictions together with their seeds are not absolutely relinquished from the eighth bhūmi onward for the following reason. The *Daśabhūmikasūtra* says, "O children of the victor, bodhisattvas who dwell on this seventh bodhisattvabhūmi are very much beyond everything that has the name and the meaning of affliction, such as desire. Bodhisattvas who engage in this bodhisattvabhūmi Gone Afar are neither referred to as 'possessing afflictions' nor called 'being without afflictions.' Why is that? They are not referred to as 'possessing afflictions' because afflictions do not arise in them in any respect. They are not called 'being without afflictions' either because the wishes and the intentions of tathāgata wisdom are not yet fully complete." Here, "afflictions do not arise" refers to the afflictions together with their seeds that engage in the three realms, while what is labeled by the name "afflictions" is "the wishes and the intentions of tathāgata wisdom not yet being fully complete." Thus, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* explains that there are no afflictions such as desire from the seventh bhūmi onward and the explanations in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* on the ten bhūmis are based on what this sūtra says. In sum, what are designated by the name "afflictions" above are the latent tendencies of the afflictions together with their seeds that are planted as their remainders and linger even after they have been relinquished. These latent tendencies are not relinquished until the end of the continuum on the tenth bhūmi (on the subtle latent tendencies of the afflictions remaining throughout the ten bhūmis, see also JNS in Appendix I4B1c). Thus, interestingly, in terms of increasing subtlety, JG distinguishes here between fully qualified afflictions (leading to rebirth in saṃsāra), their potent seeds, their impotent seeds, and the latent tendencies of the afflictions and their seeds. Note however, that this distinction does not match JNS's distinction of both the factors to be relinquished through seeing and the factors to be relinquished through familiarization in terms of "manifest ones" and "those that retain a certain potency" (see, for example, Appendices I5A3 and I5F7 in Volume Two and Chart 18). For more details on bodhisattvas deliberately retaining the latencies of the afflictions (particularly desire) that enable them to willingly take rebirth in saṃsāra, but relinquishing all latencies that bind in saṃsāra and agitate the mind stream, see Appendices I2D as well as I4B and I5E in Volume Two.

1564 Strictly speaking, this example does not refer to a big fire in its entirety, but to the process of each moment of a fire consuming one tiny part of a piece of wood after the other—in the parts where the wood has already been consumed by the fire, there is no more fire. In other words, in a given place with fuel, a fire can only burn as long as there is fuel, but burning means nothing but the fuel being consumed. Thus, as long as a certain portion of the fuel still exists,

there is no fire based on this portion and it cannot be said to be consumed. But once this portion of fuel is consumed, the fire that was based on it goes out too.

1565 On the triad of completion, maturation, and purification, see also Chart 12.

1566 Pp. 428–35 (transl.).

1567 VI.5ab.

1568 VI.19ac.

1569 VI.17–18.

1570 JNS only gives *gdags pa* as the name of the text. The only three texts in the *Tengyur* whose titles contain this term in Sanskrit and/or Tibetan are the anonymous abhidharma works *Lokaprajñapti* (Tib. 'jig rten gzhag pa; D4086), *Kāraṇaprajñapti* (Tib. rgyu gdags pa; D4087), and *Karmaprajñapti* (Tib. las gdags pa; D4088), but none of them contains this phrase.

1571 VI.28cd.

1572 VI.33.

1573 VI.67ab.

1574 "And so on" refers to the remaining three of the four realities, with the origin of suffering being what is to be relinquished; cessation being what is to be attained; and the path being what is to be relied on.

1575 VII.7ab.

1576 VII.7cd.

1577 CZ, p. 74 (though somewhat mistranslated).

1578 The above sūtra quote is found in almost identical form in the *Vṛtti*'s final section on the knowledge of entities (D3787, fols. 118b.6–119a.1), which explains it to mean that the first moment of the path of seeing of bodhisattvas (the dharma readiness of suffering) includes all relinquishments and realizations of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, but is not limited to them.

1579 These are also known as "the three fetters" that are the factors to be relinquished through the path of seeing—the views about a real personality; the views that hold ethics and spiritual disciplines as paramount; and doubt.

1580 An example for this are the above-mentioned nominal afflictions that are deliberately retained by bodhisattvas in order to be reborn in saṃsāra, but relinquished by arhats (see Appendix I2A).

1581 Pp. 445–49 (transl.).

1582 More precisely, this refers to the *Pratyekabuddhabhūmi* within the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

1583 JNS says "śrāvakas," which seems to be out of context here.

1584 Subjectively, whether it is a visual consciousness, a thought, an emotion, or any other mental factor, ordinary beings always experience these as the continuum of "my mind." In this, mind resembles a movie—many discrete yet similar momentary pictures being mistaken for a seamless continuum due to the swiftness of one following the other. Thus, when not closely scrutinized, mind's continuum seems to differ from outer things, which not only seem to appear in many strikingly different and changing forms, but are also clearly recognized as different and changing, such as a seed turning into a sprout, a plant, a flower, and the flower withering away and becoming earth.

1585 The verses are actually from Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā* (his autocommentary on the *Madhyamakahṛdaya*; D3856, fol. 146a.7–146b.1 and 146b.3–4).

1586 Śākya Chogden's *Nges don rgya mtsho sprin gyi 'brug sgra zab mo'i rgyas 'grel bdud rtsi'i char 'bebs* (Śākya mchog ldan 1988a, vol. kha, p. 325) agrees on the authentic view of the pratyekabuddhas being Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalism. For to familiarize with this view during the uninterrupted paths of meditative equipoise serves to relinquish the cognitive obscurations that consist of the conceptions about the apprehended.

1587 Pp. 461–82 (transl.).

1588 VI.27cd.

1589 VII.2ab.

1590 I.27d.

1591 XVI. 27ab.

1592 II.11ab.

1593 XIV. 26cd–27ab.

1594 VI.57c.

1595 See Appendix I4D.

1596 This section 2b is best read in conjunction with Appendix I1H3ad since there are a lot of cross-references and they supplement each other.

1597 XIV.31d.

1598 D3787, fol. 99a.7–99b.1.

1599 D4038, fols. 127b.7–128a.1.

1600 Ibid., fol. 118a.7.

1601 On these two presentations, see also Appendix I1H3ad1.

1602 P. 171; D3791, fol. 95b.1–2. The larger context (pp. 170–71, fols. 94b.7–95b.4) of this passage in the *Ālokā* is as follows: "It should be understood that all the readinesses and cognitions of the path of seeing constitute the yoga of abiding in signlessness . . . With regard to it being a fruitional clear realization, the clear realization of the mahāyāna path of seeing is a single moment. However, since it eliminates mistakenness about each one of the four realities, it comes to realize them solely through the sixteen moments of the path of individually discriminating clear realization . . . As long as there are certain causes of mistakenness, other superimposed aspects [arise] from them. Therefore, in order to eradicate the afflictions that arise through such mistakenness, there are still other familiarizations in other aspects [in order to remedy said mistakenness and superimpositions]. Thus, the phases of the Eighth One [(the approaching stream-enterer)] and so on are well established. With this intention, through the power of reasoning, the path of seeing is one single moment of clear realization, but it is explained as sixteen moments of clear realization [in terms of eliminating various kinds of mistakenness]. Therefore, though a given cognition is what apprehends the own nature of something in all its aspects, it is only through its being clearly familiar with a certain part that it is able to definitely eliminate the aspect that is mentally imputed onto that part. Thus, this cognition is a valid one by virtue of its eliminating the obscurations that block this ability with respect to this one part, but not with respect to others, just as [the reason "sound is produced" only makes one understand that it is] momentary [(and not permanent), but not any other features of sound]. Therefore, noble ones are superior to ordinary beings by way of the

[progressive] extents to which they are free from the causes of mistakenness through having eliminated certain superimposed aspects."

1603 D4049, fol. 93b.4.

1604 This quote appears in both the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (D4053, fol. 56a.1) and the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054, fols. 215b.7–216a.1; JNS has "wisdom" instead of "path"). Note that suchness and perfect wisdom correspond to the two kinds of the perfect nature—the unchanging one and the unmistaken one, respectively. As CE (fols. 65b–66a) explains, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* the four dharma readinesses and the four dharma cognitions represent the path of seeing in terms of objects (suchness and wisdom, respectively). The four subsequent readinesses and the four subsequent cognitions represent the path of seeing in terms of subjects, with the former one being the wisdom of focusing on both dharma readiness and dharma cognition and the latter one being the wisdom of focusing on subsequent readiness.

1605 Ibid., fol. 93a.5–93b.3. JNS only has "... right after the end of the readiness ... right after the dharma cognition ..." (see also Appendix I1H3ad).

1606 D4038, fol. 118a.7–118b.2.

1607 D4049, fol. 93a.2. This means to directly see the nature of all phenomena as they truly are, without any overlay of conventional designations, notions, symbols, or imaginations.

1608 D4038, fol. 69b.2–3.

1609 I.137.

1610 D3787, fol. 99a.7–99b.1.

1611 See the quote from the *Ālokā* (pp. 98–99) under 2b) below.

1612 VI.28ab.

1613 D4038, fol. 118b.3.

1614 Lines 11cd–12 (JNS omits lines 12bc).

1615 XXIV.40.

1616 This refers to the different ways in which the dharmadhātu is realized on each of the second through tenth bhūmis, as listed in *Madhyāntavibhāga* II.14–15 (see Appendix I1H1db).

1617 Pp. 98–99.

1618 JNS speaks here against classical Gelugpa positions as well as the misconceiving of the Kagyü hallmark "Thoughts are the dharmakāya" (for details on the latter, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 91–94). NSML (pp. 294–98) says that, in terms of its own nature, the meditative equipoise of the path of seeing is a single clear realization—for the mind during this entire meditative equipoise there are no distinct earlier and later moments. For this mind sees in a direct manner primarily through the apprehensional mode of perceiving the actuality of dependent origination without arising and ceasing. But if it saw distinct earlier and later moments, it would have to see the later ones arising after the earlier ones have ceased. Therefore, it is with this in mind—the manner of mind seeing the fundamental nature—that Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (see above) speaks about the lack of divisions of the path of seeing, starting with the cognition of this dharma of dependent origination without arising and ceasing. On the other hand, the bodhisattva's own certainty during subsequent attainment or superior beings seeing the minds of others entails many distinct earlier and later moments. In terms of the meditative equipoise of the path of seeing inducing a certain number of certainties during subsequent attainment, it is presented as sixteen moments. It is with this in mind that most sūtras and treatises speak

of it in the latter manner. In particular, it is taught as sixteen moments in the chapters of the knowledge of the path, the knowledge of entities, and the culminating training in both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the AA. However, since all of these refer to the mahāyāna path of seeing in all of its sixteen moments, there is no difference in terms of the manner in which the dharmadhātu is seen. For in the partless dharmadhātu, there are no parts that are seen while others are not seen. Also, during the entire meditative equipoise of the path of seeing, there are no distinctions in terms of focal objects and aspects because the dharmadhātu free from all reference points and the mind of realizing it do not appear as two. Therefore, the dharma readiness of suffering alone represents the direct seeing of the dharmadhātu of all four realities—there is no difference such as seeing the dharmadhātu of the four realities in their progressive order. Still, this does not mean that the following fifteen moments are not the path of seeing—they are presented as the path of seeing because they are included in the type of this continuum of the meditative equipoise of seeing the nature of phenomena (just as it is not the case that the lesser and medium levels of the supreme dharma do not belong to the supreme mundane dharma). Thus, though the path of seeing is explained as sixteen moments in these earlier chapters of the AA, in actual fact its first moment—the dharma readiness of suffering—alone is the uninterrupted path that relinquishes all factors to be relinquished through seeing simultaneously. This is stated in AA V.22cd and both Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra comment on this that, once the dharma readiness of suffering has arisen, all afflictive and cognitive obscurations to be relinquished through seeing are relinquished. This is also established through reasoning because this dharma readiness sees the true nature of all four realities in a simultaneous manner and thus also relinquishes everything to be relinquished through seeing in this same manner. For this reason, all following fifteen moments of the mahāyāna path of seeing are established as its path of liberation because they consist of being liberated from the corresponding stains to be relinquished through the preceding uninterrupted path and represent the continuum of the meditative equipoise that is not different from this uninterrupted path in terms of focal object and aspect.

1619 One could roughly compare this to the difference between just looking at a crowd of people as a whole without identifying any person in particular and deliberately looking at individual people in this crowd, thus identifying them as one's neighbor, one's friend, and so on. As for the difference between "seeing" and increasingly or fully "realizing" the nature of phenomena, it resembles the situation when someone who sees Central Park for the very first time and someone who lives in New York and has seen it many times look at Central Park and unmistakenly see the same, but unlike the first person, the latter knows all the details of Central Park, such as how big it is, all the paths in it, where the ponds are, where the exits are, or how to best walk around in it. Similarly, bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi perceive the nature of phenomena as fully as bodhisattvas on the remaining bhūmis or even a buddha, but the latter ones become increasingly familiar with and gain irreversible certainty about all its features.

1620 This refers to a typical Gelugpa distinction in terms of direct valid perceptions. One of the main general Gelugpa criteria for a consciousness being a valid cognition is that certainty is gained, which in terms of perceptions can be achieved either by virtue of the perception in question itself or through another valid cognition. Here, the former is addressed.

1621 As mentioned before, the text refers to "repetitive cognition" as a consciousness that again sees something that has already been seen before. However, as JNS explained before (pp. 111–12), within the cognition of the noble ones in meditative equipoise, even all the minds that ordinary beings may present as *valid* cognitions are not established through valid cognition. Therefore, it is even more untenable to equally apply any notions that correspond to the *nonvalid* cognitions of ordinary beings to such a meditative equipoise. In brief, all meditative equipoises of the ten bhūmis on the paths of seeing and meditation are manifestations of specific new and unmistaken realizations of the nature of phenomena in which manifest

conceptions have been relinquished because these meditative equipoises are respectively based on newly relinquishing specific aspects of obscuring mistakenness (for details, see JNS elaborating on CE on the path of seeing under 2.3.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.3. Instructions on the causes of consummate practice).

1622 "Something that is undeceiving . . ." is the definition of an object of engagement. By definition, as accepted in all traditions of *pramāṇa*, a consciousness that perceives such an object is necessarily a direct valid perception, but definitely not a nonvalid one (such as repetitive cognition).

1623 II.4d.

1624 See also Chart 19.

1625 Note that this is identical to one of JNS's own consequences, which was flung at an opponent above (under 2ba1a2).

1626 D3787, fol. 99a.7.

1627 VII.3bd.

1628 VI.28ab. To compare the presentations of the path of seeing in the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, see also Chart 19.

1629 VI.28cd (JNS quotes only line d).

1630 D4038, fol. 238b.3–4.

1631 D4026, fol. 132a.3. This sentence is also found in Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā* on VIII.1a (D4029, fol. 63a.7–63b.1), which says, "The afflictions of bodhisattvas are conceptions. Therefore, the relinquishment of the afflictions that are conceptions about entities, nonentities, and so on is called 'utter peace.'"

1632 As explained before, "those who are previously free from attachment" are those practitioners who have already relinquished some or all of the afflictions of the desire realm (but not those of the two higher realms) before the path of seeing. In the case of the path of seeing of bodhisattvas, this could have happened either through a preceding mundane path of familiarization or a path of seeing of lower yānas.

1633 This is an interesting play on the words "empty of reality" (Tib. bden pas stong pa) since they can be read as both these discourses by others lacking any truth or reality and the contents of such discourses being the hallmark of the Gelugpa understanding of emptiness (all phenomena being empty of real existence, but not of themselves).

1634 Pp. 494–501 (transl.).

1635 VI.1c.

1636 D4049, fol. 94a.1–2.

1637 Ibid., fols. 94a.2ff.

1638 D4038, fol. 119a.7–119b.1.

1639 D4049, fol. 91a.3.

1640 V.6ac.

1641 Here, this refers to the desire realm, the four dhyānas, and the remaining three formless absorptions.

1642 D3787, fols. 86a.5ff.

1643 XI.57cd.

1644 VI.73ab.

1645 For details on this, see Appendix I5F.

1646 I could not locate this passage as it stands. However, it could be a rather free and abbreviated paraphrase of the following passage in the *Ālokā* (p. 171; D3791, fol. 95a.4–5) in the context of the path of seeing being a single moment of clear realization (which is the only passage in both the *Vṛtti* and the *Ālokā* that contains the phrase "When the power of familiarization is perfected"): "When the power of the familiarization of those who familiarize with all phenomena lacking a nature or being empty is completely perfected, an uncontaminated cognition that has all phenomena as its objects and realizes their own nature in all aspects arises. This happens in the manner of [*Pramāṇavārttika* I.43] saying:

> Within what is identical in nature
> With a referent and directly perceived,
> What other unseen parts to be examined
> Through valid cognition could there be?"

1647 Pp. 502–5 (transl.).

1648 D3801, fol. 132b.1.

1649 D3796, fol. 58b.5–6.

1650 The latter is in fact what nearly all Indian and Tibetan commentaries (including JNS's own word commentary, CE, and STT) say.

1651 He was an eleventh/twelfth-century Yogācāra master, who authored the *Tarkabhāṣā* (D4264) and a commentary on Saraha's *Dohākośa* (D2258).

1652 This refers to the three criteria of what is called "inferential valid cognition of trust" or "inferential valid cognition by virtue of scripture." A valid scriptural passage may neither contradict direct valid cognition, nor inferential valid cognition, nor other scriptural passages that have already been established as valid in this way. The obvious issue of this approach entailing some circularity and/or having to start from one axiomatic passage is rather complex (for example, the *Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* deals with this at length).

1653 Vasubandhu's text says that "the change of mentation, perception, and conception has the meaning of no change" (*manasaś codgrahasya ca vikalpasya cāvṛtteḥ parāvṛtterarthaḥ*).

1654 Pp. 209–27; 227–63; 263–82 (JNS presents the ends of these passages in abbreviated form). The boundary lines as presented by JNS agree with PSD (p. 218). YT (pp. 297–98) explains that the first type of aspiration (in terms of one's own welfare) exists on the second through fourth bhūmis; the second one, on the fifth through seventh; and the third one, on the eighth through tenth bhūmis. NSML (pp. 305–6) seems to agree with this.

1655 Pp. 508–17 (transl.).

1656 I.18a.

1657 D4027, fol. 5a.

1658 For details, see the explanations on the reality of the origin of suffering in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in Chart 4 and on karmic formations in Appendix I5E2.

1659 The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fols. 93b.7–94a.5) speaks about the eight unconditioned phenomena, with the first three being the suchness of virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral phenomena. The suchness of virtuous phenomena is twofold identitylessness, emptiness, signlessness, the true end, ultimate reality, and the dharmadhātu. After providing a brief explanation

of each of these, the text says that the suchness of nonvirtuous and neutral phenomena should be understood in the same way as the suchness of virtuous phenomena.

1660 This accords exactly with the above discussion of the relationship between the statements—as found in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and other texts—that some beings are "without *gotra*" (*agotraka*), but that all beings have buddha nature (see Appendix I1E).

1661 As the following shows, in this case "entailment" is not only used for the second of the three criteria of a correct reason (the reason needing to entail the predicate), but in a more general sense as applying to the first criterion (the subject property) as well (that is, in the sense of the subject needing to entail the reason).

1662 Verse 60 (JNS quotes only line a).

1663 Respectively, these are the first lines of verses 31 and 55 of the *King of Aspiration Prayers for Noble Excellent Conduct* (Skt. Āryabhadracaryapraṇidhānarāja, Tib. 'phags pa bzang po spyod pa'i smon lam gyi rgyal po).

1664 P. 523 (transl.).

1665 Pp. 528–32 (transl.).

1666 CZ, pp. 291–92.

1667 Part 1, IX.1ab.

1668 D3808, fols. 196b.6–197a.5.

1669 I.16cd.

1670 D3802, fol. 237b.1–2 (JNS omits several words).

1671 Not that it makes a difference in terms of the basic meaning, but this sentence could also be read as, "The purity of ultimate reality is the fact of the ultimate [sugata] heart primordially never moving away from the fruition that is the dharmakāya, whose nature it is to be endowed with twofold purity."

1672 Again, without significant difference in meaning, this sentence could also be read as, "... within the emptiness of the different purities of the two realities, one is not able to distinguish them as being different."

1673 Pp. 538–40.

1674 This and JNS's answer refer to the following passage in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fol. 85a.3–5): "What is relinquished from where? [What is relinquished] is not what is in the past because it has ceased. It is not what is in the future because it has not happened yet. Nor is it what is happening at present because [the factors to be relinquished] do not operate simultaneously with the path. However, it is the impregnations of the negative tendencies of the afflictions that are relinquished from where they exist. In terms of the arising of a certain remedy for a certain aspect of these impregnations of negative tendencies, there is simultaneity. For the arising of the aspect of this remedy and the ceasing of the [corresponding] aspect of the impregnations of negative tendencies are simultaneous, just like the arising of light and the ceasing of darkness. Relinquishment means that, by virtue of being free from [certain] aspects of the impregnations of negative tendencies, [their corresponding] afflictions have the property of not arising in the future."

1675 This agrees with what the Seventh Karmapa says in his *Ocean of Texts on Reasoning* (Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 1, pp. 257-58): "Others say, 'It is not tenable for the remedies to relinquish the factors to be relinquished. Past and present afflictions and clinging to real existence cannot be relinquished because they have already arisen. Future ones do not need to

be relinquished because they have not arisen [yet]. Therefore, there is no liberation that consists of the factors to be relinquished having been relinquished through the remedies.' This is not the case. [There are] four paths for each aspect of the factors to be relinquished—[the path of] preparation, the uninterrupted [path], [the path of] liberation, and the special path. The first path suppresses the factors to be relinquished and directly induces the uninterrupted path. The second [path] makes it so that its own arising and the ceasing of the factors to be relinquished are simultaneous. The third [path] is the path that arises at the end of the [second path, lasting only] a single instant. The fourth [path] consists of all paths that arise thereafter. The first [path] undermines the factors to be relinquished, the second one eradicates them, the third one manifests liberation, and the fourth one distances the factors to be relinquished. The factors to be relinquished are twofold—manifest ones and seeds. The first ones are not relinquished. There is no need for relinquishing them because the past ones have ceased; because the present ones do not operate simultaneously with the path; and because the future ones cannot produce flaws since they have not yet arisen. Therefore, it is the seeds that are relinquished. Among these seeds, it is the future ones that are relinquished, but not the past and present ones. For [the latter two] have already arisen and therefore cannot be relinquished . . . The future ones can be relinquished through their remedies preventing any opportunities for the arising of the seeds to be relinquished that would [otherwise] arise [in the future] . . . Therefore, if the arising of said future seeds is not prevented, the afflictions will arise from them and, since all kinds of flaws arise from the afflictions, these [seeds] must be relinquished. Through relinquishing them, the future manifest factors to be relinquished will also be relinquished because results are put to an end if [their] causes are put to an end. Consequently, there is no need to cultivate any additional remedies for relinquishing the manifest [factors to be relinquished] apart from the remedies for relinquishing their seeds. The statements in the sūtras about meditating on repulsiveness as the remedy for desire, love as the remedy for hatred, and dependent origination as the remedy for ignorance [only] represent remedies for the arising of manifest [afflictions] in the sense of having the future in mind, but [these remedies] are not able to relinquish the seeds of those [afflictions] because *Pramāṇavārttika* [II.212cd] says:

> Because love and so on do not oppose ignorance,
> They do not fully annihilate flaws."

See also Appendix I1H3bd.

1676 Pp. 543–58.

1677 I.9ab.

1678 Other sources describe the nose sense faculty as resembling fine aligned copper needles and the body sense faculty as the skin (or the down) of the "bird that is soft to the touch."

1679 I.10.

1680 In ancient Indian cosmology, among the four sides of Mount Meru in the center of a four-continent world, the one that faces our southern continent, Jambudvīpa, is blue.

1681 I.14cd and I.16a.

1682 II.24.

1683 II.25 (the two roots of virtue are the lack of greed and hatred).

1684 II.26ac.

1685 II.26cd.

1686 II.27.

1687 This verse is not found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, but summarizes the last part of its *Bhāṣya* on I.27.

1688 This refers to the meditative absorption of cessation and the meditative absorption without discrimination.

1689 III.502cd–503ab.

1690 The *Kangyur* does not contain a sūtra of this name.

1691 Skt. mano āyatana, Tib. yid kyi skye mched.

1692 I.8cd.

1693 D4027, fol. 3a.

1694 XII.34.

1695 D4049, fols. 48b.1 and 79b.5.

1696 D4211, fols. 221a.1 and 160b.7–161a.1.

1697 III.470bc.

1698 D4038, fol. 77b.7.

1699 On this, see also Appendix I5D (section 2bb3bb2).

1700 I.21.

1701 I.20ab.

1702 I.14ab.

1703 I.16.

1704 Skt. manas, Tib. yid.

1705 Skt. manovijñāna, Tib. yid kyi rnam shes.

1706 In other words, "mentation" here refers to the mental faculty (the sixth "sense" faculty) and "mental consciousness" to the sixth consciousness. Similar to the physical sense faculties being the supports for the sense consciousnesses, the mental faculty is said to be the support for the mental consciousness. However, since it is also just mind, the mental faculty is nothing but the preceding moment of consciousness. There are varying descriptions of what exactly the mental faculty is, but it basically refers to the fact that the impetus of a given moment of mind having ceased triggers the next moment (in this respect, it is not limited to only giving rise to the sixth consciousness since all six consciousnesses in general are alike in being triggered by a preceding moment of consciousness).

1707 I.17.

1708 I.15bd.

1709 The above quote lists sixteen items in the āyatana or dhātu of phenomena (three skandhas, five imperceptible forms, and eight unconditioned phenomena). However, for the same reason as above, JNS does not consider the five imperceptible forms. According to this, the āyatana or dhātu of phenomena only includes eleven items (see Chart 21).

1710 I.19.

1711 I.22ab.

1712 I.18ab.

1713 For details on the latter two, see the comments on VIII.2d–3b.

1714 I.27.

1715 There are three reasons for presenting the triad of skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus. They are presented as (a) the remedies for three kinds of ignorance, (b) in dependence on three kinds of faculties, and (c) in dependence on three kinds of interest. (a) The division into the five skandhas is made as a remedy for the notion that mind is a single entity; the division into twelve āyatanas, as a remedy for the notion that form (or matter) is a single entity; and the division into eighteen dhātus, as a remedy for the notion that form and mind are both a self. (b) The skandhas were explained for those with highest faculties, who understand through a brief presentation; the āyatanas, for those with medium faculties, who understand through one of medium length; and the dhātus, for those of dull faculties, who only understand through a detailed one. (c) The five skandhas were taught for those who are interested in brief classifications; the āyatanas, for those interested in medium ones; and the dhātus, for those interested in detailed ones.

1716 These are arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence.

1717 The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049, fols. 52a.4ff.) lists twenty-three such factors—the thirteen except nonattainment from the list above plus 14. the state of an ordinary being, 15. operation, 16. distinctness, 17. relatedness, 18. speed, 19. sequence, 20. time, 21. location, 22. number, and 23. collection.

1718 III.13.

1719 I.4–5ac.

1720 As can be seen from the Bibliography, the famous commentary by Nyalshig is called *Entrance into the Mahāyāna* (and not *Supreme Essence*), but—as here in JNS—is commonly referred to as *gnyal ṭīk*. So the latter seems to be another name of the same text since only a single commentary on the AA by this author is known in the Tibetan sources (though it cannot be ruled out altogether that he wrote more than one).

1721 Pp. 559–63.

1722 D4049, fol. 54a.4.

1723 Compare this to the discussion of this issue by other Indian masters and in Mikyö Dorje's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 421–38).

1724 Pp. 576–81 (transl.). This section is an elaboration on the terms "incomplete" (referring to imaginary and conceived form and so on) and "complete" (referring to perfect form and so on, or the form of the nature of phenomena) in AA III.8c.

1725 As mentioned before in CE, these refer to a number of terms that are used in various non-Buddhist Indian traditions to indicate a really existing personal self, intrinsic soul, or spirit. The twelve are the four of self, sentient being, soul, and vital power; the four of individual, person, Manu-bearer, and Manu-born; and the four of agent, feeler, knower, and seer.

1726 I.3ab.

1727 XI.38. Here, the causal features of appearances and their latent tendencies are presented as the imaginary nature because they are the bases for imputing names and the causes for these features to appear, respectively. The actual essence of the imaginary nature is only what is stated in the third line above—mere appearances being made into names and reference points.

1728 As was made clear in Appendix I1E1 on the disposition by way of the example of milk and water being mixed and so forth, this does not of course mean that nondual wisdom is a part of the ālaya-consciousness.

1729 JNS has "is not empty," but given the context and JNS's above statements of "nondual wisdom being beyond dependent origination" (Appendix I1G6), the negative has been omitted here.

1730 This correlates well with *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.29 (P5549, fol. 22a.7–22b.6): "You may wonder, 'In the *Abhidharmasūtra*, the Bhagavān spoke of three dharmas—those that are included in the set of what is afflicted, what is purified, and both. What did the Buddha have in mind when he said that?' The existence of the imaginary nature in the other-dependent nature is that which is included in the set of what is afflicted. The existence of the perfect nature in the other-dependent nature is that which is included in the set of what is purified. The other-dependent nature is that which is included in both. This is what the Buddha had in mind when he taught [the above]. 'What example is there for that meaning?' The example is a gold-bearing lump of soil. In the case of a gold-bearing lump of soil, three [aspects] can be observed—the earth element, the lump of soil, and gold. [First, only] the lump of soil, which [actually] does not exist [as such] in the earth element, is seen, while the gold, which does exist, is not seen. Once [the lump of soil] is touched by fire, it does not appear like that, but the gold appears. The earth element appearing as a lump of soil is a false appearance. When appearing as gold, it appears just as it is. Therefore, the earth element is included in both parts. Likewise, through cognizance being untouched by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, this cognizance appears as what is false (the imaginary nature), but not as true reality (the perfect nature). Once cognizance has been touched by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, this cognizance appears as true reality (the perfect nature), but does not appear as what is false (the imaginary nature). Thus, the cognizance that is false imagination—the other-dependent nature—is included in both aspects, just as the earth element is in a gold-bearing lump of soil." Here, Asvabhāva's commentary (P5552, fol. 284a.2–4) explains that the earth element refers to the elemental principle of earth (which is not earth in a literal sense, but defined as what accounts for the general qualities of being hard and solid). The actual lump of soil with its color and shape is what derives from this elemental principle, while the gold is the seed or the refined essence of it. In other words, gold also partakes of the elemental principle of being hard and solid. Thus, the earth element is connected with both the lump of soil and the gold. A similar explanation is found in certain vajrayāna presentations of the pure essence (Tib. dvangs ma) and the dross (Tib. snyigs ma). Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on the Third Karmapa's *Profound Inner Reality* (Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 2005a, p. 34) reports the following explanation by Tagpo Rabjampa (1449–1524; Tib. dvags po rab 'byams pa): "In each one of all phenomena (skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus), there is the pure essence (the aspect of wisdom) and the dross (the aspect of [mistaken] consciousness). By taking the collection of both the pure essence and the dross as the basis for purification, with the dross as that which is to be purified, through the two means for purification (maturation and liberation) according with the progressive [purification] of the basis of purification, the result of purification (the three kāyas) is revealed." The Second Pawo Rinpoche's commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba n.d., pp. 887–88) declares that, when misinterpreting this, one may falsely cling to the nonexistence of ordinary mistaken consciousness and the real existence of wisdom.

1731 For more details, see below and Bhuti 2000 (pp. 48–68).

1732 D4049, fols. 92b.2–100b.2.

1733 Sthiramati's *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054, fol. 231a.6–231b.2) explains that (1) refers to the naturally luminous mind that is the nature of phenomena having become free from all adventitious afflictions without exception. This is also called "the change of state of suchness." (2) means that, once clear realization occurs on the mundane path, it has become the supramundane path. The latter is also called "the path of learning" because there still remain tasks to be accomplished. Once all antagonistic factors are eliminated through being free from attachment to the three realms, this is presented as the perfectly complete change of the state that is the nature of this path. (3) means the ālaya-consciousness being free from even the most subtle latent tendencies of all afflictions.

1734 Krang dbyi sun et al. 1993, pp. 598, 1222, 2030, 2084, and 2293.

1735 These are still present in bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation—the fear of lacking livelihood; the fear of not being praised; fears related to a retinue; the fear of dying; and the fear of the unpleasant realms.

1736 Vol. 3, pp. 466ff.

1737 The following summarizes four alternative presentations of the four realities in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on VII.13a (D4090, vol. khu, fols. 48b–50a) and the explanations in TOK, vol. 2, pp. 461–64.

1738 D4049, fols. 73b.2–100b.4.

1739 In due order, the sixteen up to this point correspond to the above sixteen aspects of the abhidharma.

1740 This is described in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

1741 The use of italics for certain names in Charts 7 and 8 indicates that these names are explicitly mentioned in the sūtras or the commentaries.

1742 JNS, pp. 137–38.

1743 D3787, fols. 33a.5–38b.3 (Sparham 2006, pp. 36–45).

1744 *Ālokā*, pp. 35–36; D3793, fols. 85b.3–86a.1.

1745 Pp. 138 and 147–53.

1746 The sets in this chart are listed in numerical order.

1747 See also Appendix I2A.

1748 For details, see Lamotte 1998.

1749 The prajñāpāramitā sūtras speak of several "stainless" samādhis, including "stainless lamp," "stainless light," "stainless moon," and "stainless light of sun and moon." However, they are all described in terms similar to the above.

1750 For details on the lion's sport, see CE on AA V.23–25 and Appendix I5F.

1751 Source: *Uttaratantra* I.14–18.

1752 This list is based on *Uttaratantra* II.53–56 (there are slightly varying lists).

1753 For more details and varying descriptions of these twelve, see Appendix I1H1e.

1754 Note that, here, "afflictions" refers to the various degrees of each affliction to be relinquished. The numbers of the afflictions to be relinquished through seeing are according to the *Abhidharmakośa*. The first numbers for the afflictions to be relinquished through familiarization refer to the general classification as eighty-one such afflictions. The numbers in ( ) refer to the classification of the afflictions to be relinquished through familiarization in Chart 15. This means that, in the śrāvakayāna, up through the level of an abiding nonreturner, only the innate afflictions of the desire realm have been relinquished. The innate afflictions of the two higher realms are all relinquished on the level of an approaching arhat (in the mahāyāna, the respectively corresponding degrees of obscurations of all three realms are relinquished simultaneously).

1755 Note that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* only lists what are called "afflictive obscurations" below, while the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* only lists the cognitive obscurations. As JNS (p. 359) says, in the former's presentation the cognitive obscurations are included in ignorance, or all six wrong engagements contain both types of obscurations. In terms of the mahāyāna presentation in the AA, JNS (vol. 2, p. 17) divides the afflictive obscurations into two portions according to

their capacities. (1) The afflictions' capacity of binding in saṃsāra is relinquished on the first bhūmi since mastery over eradicating the seeds of this capacity is gained during the dharma readiness of suffering of the mahāyāna path of seeing. (2) The afflictions that are latencies are also twofold in that they belong to the factors to be relinquished through seeing and the factors to be relinquished through familiarization. Thus, the first are relinquished as a matter of course and simultaneously with the 108 cognitive obscurations that are to be relinquished through seeing, while the second are relinquished simultaneously with the 108 cognitive obscurations that are to be relinquished through familiarization.

1756 Unlike most other commentaries, which speak only about innate obscurations on the path of familiarization, JNS repeatedly states that imputational factors to be relinquished are not only factors to be relinquished through seeing. For example, conceptions about the lack of real existence or about emptiness still arise during the subsequent attainments of the seven impure bhūmis, but they are not innate since they only occur in those whose minds have been altered by Buddhist philosophical systems. JNS (vol. 2, p. 363; see Appendix I5F7) says that the conceptions to be relinquished through seeing refer to the clinging to real existence, while those to be relinquished through familiarization are the clinging to characteristics on the impure bhūmis. Both the factors to be relinquished through seeing and familiarization are conceptions of clinging to imputations, which are not so divided in terms of being imputational and innate, but in terms of manifest ones and those that retain a certain potency. Among these, the manifest conceptions of clinging to imputations obstruct the direct seeing of the nature of phenomena, while those that retain a certain potency do not obstruct this seeing. The manifest conceptions obstruct the direct seeing of the nature of phenomena because if the nature of phenomena is seen directly, it must be seen by way of having put an end even to the manifest entertaining of the reference points that consist of the clinging to the lack of real existence. As for those conceptions that retain a certain potency not obstructing the direct seeing of the reality of the nature of phenomena, their case is similar to the latencies of the innate clinging to real existence not obstructing the direct seeing of the lack of real existence. Therefore, the conceptions to be relinquished through familiarization that are explained here do not refer to the innnate clinging to real existence, but are explained as the manifest conceptions of clinging to characteristics during the subsequent attainments of the impure bhūmis.

1757 Unlike almost all other commentaries, JNS (vol. 2, p. 253) says that the conventional terms of the fourfold division of the conceptions about apprehended and apprehender on the path of seeing do not apply to the fourfold division of the conceptions about apprehended and apprehender on the path of familiarization. In the latter context, with regard to the two kinds of conceptions about the apprehended, the words "engagement" and "withdrawal" in terms of dividing the objects of these two conceptions into those of the mahāyāna and those of the hīnayāna are not clearly found in the sūtras. Instead, Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra use the terms "mere entities" and "purified phenomena." The two kinds of conceptions about the apprehender are held by these masters to be based on the noble ones imputing persons and the causes for such imputations, respectively, but not through the conventional term "substantial existence." Thus, for the objects of the conceptions about the apprehender, they use the terms "merely imputed persons" and "imputed causes for imputing persons" (see also Appendix I5A2).

1758 To simplify, in this chart, the impregnations of negative tendencies are included under the cognitive obscurations. More precisely, JNS (Appendix I4B) explains that they are nothing but the last remainder of the ālaya-consciousness (to be relinquished during the last moment of the tenth bhūmi), which is not part of either the afflictive or the cognitive obscurations.

1759 See Appendices I5A2 and I5F7 in Volume Two.

1760 This model is presented by some Sakyapas.

1761 This model is, for example, presented by Mipham Rinpoche in his commentary on the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 340–43). Gelugpa scholars usually assert that, up through the seventh bhūmi, solely the afflictive obscurations are relinquished, while the relinquishment of the cognitive obscurations starts only on the eighth bhūmi. See also Hopkins 1996 (pp. 99 and 104–9). As mentioned above, most others disagree with the Gelugpa position (see Appendix I4B1c and, in particular, JG's comments there). Note also that Tsongkhapa's LSSP (fols. 272a.5–282a.6) relies on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and follows model (3).

1762 This model is followed by LSSP, PSD, JNS, and CE. However, note that, according to JNS and CE, there are some innate parts of the afflictive obscurations that are already relinquished on the path of seeing, while the cognitive obscurations to be relinquished on the path of familiarization include both imputational and innate parts. For details, see CE (fols. 21b, 56b, and 80b) and Appendices I1D3 and I1H3 as well as I4B and I5A in Volume Two.


1763 VI.25–28.

1764 D4049, fol. 93a.5–93b.3.

1765 The *Ālokā* and most other commentaries on the AA follow the presentation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

1766 See Appendix I2D2ba2b.

1767 For the Third Karmapa's extensive presentation of the sixteen aspects that differs from all the above, see Appendix III in Volume Two (STT, pp. 96–100).



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